criminal appeal, evidence law, Gujarat
0  17 Sep, 1991
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Yusufbhai Noormohmed Nendoliya Vs. State of Gujarat and Anr.

  Supreme Court Of India Civil Appeal /3659/1991
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Case Background

As per case facts, a notification under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, for lands occupied by the appellant was challenged in the High Court, which granted a ...

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PETITIONER:

YUSUFBHAI NOORMOHMED NENDOLIYA

Vs.

RESPONDENT:

STATE OF GUJARAT AND ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT17/09/1991

BENCH:

KANIA, M.H.

BENCH:

KANIA, M.H.

KASLIWAL, N.M. (J)

FATHIMA BEEVI, M. (J)

CITATION:

1991 AIR 2153 1991 SCR Supl. (1) 158

1991 SCC (4) 531 1991 SCALE (2)608

ACT:

Land Acquisition Act, 1894:

Section 11-A---Explanation--Interpretation of--Acquisi-

tion of landproceedings--When lapse---Two-Year period for

making of award--Computation of--Whether entire period

during which any action or proceedings pursuant to declara-

tion under Section 6 remained staved to be excluded.

HEADNOTE:

A notification under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition

Act, 1894 was published in respect of lands under the appel-

lant's occupation. The appellant challenged the notifica-

tion before the High Court and prayed for an interim stay of

operation and implementation of the notification. Pending

admission of the appellant's Special Civil Application, the

High Court granted limited interim relief by restraining the

respondent from taking possession of the lands. Meanwhile

Respondent No. 2, the Land Acquisition Officer, issued a

notice under Section 9(1) of the Act and proceeded to deter-

mine the compensation. In the enquiry, he rejected the

appellant's objection that as two years had elapsed after

the publication of the notification and no award had been

made within the said period, all the acquisition proceedings

lapsed and were exhausted. The High Court also rejected the

appellant's appeal, relying on the decision of a Division

Bench of the High Court, that Section 11-A of the aforesaid

Act enjoined exclusion of the entire period during which any

action or proceeding to be taken pursuant to a declaration

under Section 6 was stayed by an order of a competent court,

and that the Explanation to the Section was not confined to

the staying of the making of the award, pursuant to Section

6 of the notification, but it was widely worded and covered

in its sweep the entire period during which any action or

proceeding was stayed by a competent Court.

In the appeal before this Court, on behalf of the appel-

lant it was contended that by Explanation to Section 11-A

the only period excluded in computing the period of two

years was the period during which any action

159

or proceeding taken in pursuance of the declaration under

Section 6 upto the making of the award under Section 11 was

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stayed and that the question of taking possession could

arise after making the award and merely because the land-

holder obtained an injunction restraining land acquisition

authorities from taking possession that could not serve to

exclude any time from the period of two years within which

the award must be made.

Dismissing the appeal, this Court,

HELD: The Explanation to Section 11-A of the Land Acqui-

sition Act, 1894, which prescribes the period to be excluded

while computing the period of two years within which the

award has to be made, is in the widest possible terms and

there is no warrant for limiting the action or proceedings

referred to in the Explanation to actions or proceedings

preceding the making of the award under Section 11 of the

Act. In the first place, where the case is covered by Sec-

tion 17, the possession can be taken before an award is made

and there is no reason why the expression "the period during

which any action or proceedings to be taken in pursuance of

the said declaration is stayed by an order by a Court", in

the Explanation should be given a different meaning, depend-

ing upon whether the case is covered by Section 17 or other-

wise. On the other hand, the Explanation is intended to

limit the benefit conferred by Section 11-A on a land-holder

whose land is acquired after the declaration under Section

6. The benefit is that the award must be made within a

period of two years of the declaration, failing which the

acquisition proceedings would lapse and the land would

revert to the land-holder. In order to get the benefit of

the said provision what is required, is that the land-holder

who seeks the benefit must not have obtained any order from

a court restraining any action or proceeding in pursuance of

the declaration under Section 6 of the said Act so that the

operation of the beneficial provisions of Section 11-A is

confined to cases of those land-holders who do not obtain

any order from a court which would delay or prevent the

making of the award or taking possession of the land ac-

quired. [163 E-H, 164 A]

The High Court was, therefore, right in rejecting the

appellant's challenge to the continuance of the proceedings.

[164-B]

Special Civil Application No. 4314 of 1990 decided by

Gujarat High Court approved.

160

S. BavajanSahib v. State of Kerala and Others, AIR 1988

Kerala 280, disapproved.

JUDGMENT:

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION. Civil Appeal No. 3659 of

1991.

From the Judgment and Order dated 5.11.1990 of the

Gujarat High Court in Spl. Civil Application No. 7685 of

1990.

Dushyant Dave, Ms. Indu Malhotra and Ms. Shirin Jain for

the Appellant.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

KANIYA, J. Leave granted. Counsel heard

This appeal raises an interesting question

regarding the interpretation of Section 11-A

of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter

referred to as "the said Act"). Section 11-A

was inserted into the said Act by Section 9 of

Act 68 of 1984.

The relevant facts lie within a very narrow compass. The

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appellant is the occupant of lands comprising Survey Nos.

864 and 687 respectively of village Samal Pati in Patan

Taluka of Mehsana District in Gujarat. The said lands were

sought to be acquired by the State of Gujarat, Respondent

No. 2 herein, for the purpose of 'the North Gujarat Univer-

sity. The notification under Section 6 of the said Act in

respect of the said lands was issued on May 12, 1988. The

parties proceeded on the assumption that it was published in

the locality around about that time. The learned Counsel for

the appellant stated in the High Court that such publication

took place sometime in June 1988, and the parties as well as

the Court proceeded on the footing that the said statement

is correct. The appellant challenged the said notification

by filing Special Civil Application No. 4342 of 1988 in the

High Court of Gujarat. On the prayer for interim relief made

by the appellant for the stay of the operation and implemen-

tation of the said notification, the Gujarat High Court

granted only a limited interim relief by restraining re-

spondent No. 1 from taking possession of the said lands of

the appellant pending admission of the said special civil

application. The said interim relief, which was granted on

August 8, 1988, still continues to be operative. In the

meantime, respondent No. 2, being the Land Acquisition

Officer concerned, issued a notice under Section 9(1) of the

said Act and proceeded to determine the compensation after

hearing the objections. In the inquiry held by respondent

No. 2 in respect of the objections the appel-

161

lant took up the contention that, as two years had elapsed

after the publication of the notification making the decla-

ration under Section 6 of the said Act, and no award had

been made within the said period, all the acquisition pro-

ceedings in respect of the said lands lapsed and the acqui-

sition proceedings were exhausted. The said contention of

the appellant was rejected by the land acquisition authori-

ties. The appellant challenged this decision of the land

acquisition authorities by filing the Special Civil Applica-

tion No. 7685 of 1990 in the High Court of Gujarat. The

challenge made by the appellant to the continuance of the

acquisition proceedings was repelled by the Gujarat High

Court relying on the decision of an earlier Division Bench

of that Court comprising of R.C. Mankad and K.J. Vaidya, JJ.

in Special Civil Application No. 4314 of 1990. It was held

by the Division Bench that Section 11-A of the said Act

enjoins exclusion of the entire period during which any

action or proceeding to be taken pursuant to a declaration

under Section 6 is stayed by an order of a competent court.

The Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court took the view

that the Explanation to Section 11-A is not confined to the

staying of the making of the award pursuant to Section 6 of

the notification, but it is widely worded and covers in its

sweep the entire period during which any action or proceed-

ing to be taken in pursuance of the declaration under Sec-

tion 6, is stayed by a competent court. I1 is the correct-

ness of this decision, which is assailed before us.

In order to appreciate the submissions made before us,

it will be useful to refer to the relevant provisions of'

the said Act. Section 4 of the said Act deals with the

publication in the Official Gazette of the preliminary

notification that it appears to the appropriate government

that land in any locality is needed or is likely to be

needed for any public purpose or for a company, where it so

appears to the appropriate Government. Section 5A provides

for the hearing of the objections to the proposed acquisi-

tion. Section 6 provides for the issuance of a declaration

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of intended acquisition, namely, that land is required for a

public purpose after considering the report, if any, made

under Section 5-A. Section 11 of the said Act deals with the

enquiry into the matters set out therein and the making the

award of compensation by the Collector. The said section

prescribes that the said award, inter alia, shall determine

the compensation which in the opinion of the Collector

should be allowed for the land and for apportionment of such

compensation among all the persons interested in the said

land as provided in Section 11 (i) (iii) of the said Act.

Section 11-A which was inserted in 1984 into the said Act as

stated earlier runs as follows:

"11-A. Period within which an award shall be

made---The Col-

162

lector shall make an award under Section 11

within a period of two years from the date of

the publication of the declaration and if no

award is made within that period, the entire

proceedings for the acquisition of the land

shall lapse:

Provided that in a case where the said decla-

ration has been published before the commence-

ment of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act,

1984, the award shall be made within a period

of two years from such commencement."

Explanation: In computing the period of two

years referred to in this section, the period

during which any action or proceeding to be

taken in pursuance of the said declaration is

stayed by an order of a Court shall be exclud-

ed.

Section 12 deals with the question as to when the award

of the Collector becomes final. Section 15 deals with the

matters to be considered and matters to be neglected in the

determination of the compensation. Section 16 deals with the

power to take possession and provides that when the Collec-

tor has made an award under Section 11, he may take posses-

sion of the land which shall thereupon vest absolutely in

the Government free from encumbrances. Section 17 confers

powers on the appropriate government to take possession of

any land needed for a public purpose and intended to be

acquired, although no award has been made, in cases of

special urgency.

The submission of learned Counsel for the appellant is

that in the present case the notification under Section 6 of

the said Act was published in June 1988 and, as the award

under Section 11 not made by the Collector within a period

of two years from the date of the publication, the entire

proceedings for the acquisition of the land lapsed. In

connection with the Explanation to Section 1 I-A it was

submitted by learned Counsel that by the said Explanation

the only period excluded in computing the aforesaid period

of two years is the period during which any action or pro-

ceeding taken in pursuance of the said declaration under

Section 6 upto the stage of Section 11, namely, upto the

making of the award under Section 11 was stayed by the order

of a competent court. It was submitted by him that the

question of taking possession would arise after making the

award under Section 11 and merely because a landholder

obtained an injunction restraining land acquisition authori-

ties from taking possession that would not serve to exclude

any time from the aforesaid period of two years within which

the award must be made.

163

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In support of his contention learned Counsel for the

appellant relied upon the judgment of a learned Single Judge

of the Kerala High Court in S. Bavajan Sahib v. State of

Kerala and others, AIR 1988 Kerala 280. In his judgment the

learned Single Judge has taken the view that the action or

proceeding contemplated by the Explanation to Section 11-A

of the said Act is any action or proceeding to be taken

after the making of the declaration under section 6 and

before the passing of the award under section 11. Such

actions are those contemplated by sections 7 to 10. The

question of taking possession of the land arises only when

the award is passed under Section 16 of the said Act except

in cases of emergency covered under Section 17. It was

pointed out by the learned Judge that the case before him

was not a case in respect of which Section 17 was applicable

and hence, unless there was a stay of the proceedings con-

templated by Sections 7 to 10 or of further proceedings

pursuant to the declaration under Section 6 the Explanation

will not operate so as to extend the period of two years

prescribed by Section 11-A. We find ourselves unable to

agree with the view of the learned Single Judge of the

Kerala High Court in the aforesaid judgment. In the Expla-

nation to Section 11-A of the said Act which prescribes the

period which is to be excluded, the expression used is

"the period during which any action or pro-

ceedings to be taken in pursuance of the said

declaration is stayed by an order by a Court."

(Emphasis supplied)

The said Explanation is in the widest possible terms

and, in our opinion, there is no warrant for limiting the

action or proceeding referred to in the Explanation to

actions or proceedings preceding the making of the award

under section 11 of the said Act. In the first place, as

held by the learned Single Judge himself where the case is

covered by Section 17, the possession can be taken before an

award is made and we see no reason why the aforesaid expres-

sion in the Explanation should be given a different meaning

depending upon whether the case is covered by Section 17 or

otherwise. On the other hand, it appears to us that Section

11-A is intended to limit the benefit conferred on a land

holder whose land is acquired after the declaration under

Section 6 is made to in cases covered by the Explanation.

The benefit is that the award must be made within a period

of two years of the declaration, failing which the acquisi-

tion proceedings would lapse and the land would revert to

the land-holder. In order to get the benefit of the said

provision what is required, is that the land-holder who

seeks the benefit must not have obtained any order from a

164

court restraining any action or proceeding in pursuance of

the declaration under Section 6 of the said Act so that the

Explanation covers only the cases of those land-holders who

do not obtain any order from a court which would delay or

prevent the making of the award or taking possession of the

land acquired. In our opinion, the Gujarat High Court was

right in taking a similar view in the impugned judgment.

In the result, there is no merit in the appeal and it is

dismissed.

N.P.V. Appeal dismissed.

165

Reference cases

Description

Decoding the 'Stay' Period: Supreme Court's Landmark Ruling on Land Acquisition Timelines

In the pivotal case of Yusufbhai Noormohmed Nendoliya vs. State of Gujarat & Anr., the Supreme Court of India delivered a definitive judgment on the Interpretation of Section 11-A Land Acquisition Act, clarifying the impact of Stay Orders in Land Acquisition proceedings. This 1991 ruling, a cornerstone for property law jurisprudence and available for review on CaseOn, addresses whether a court-ordered stay on taking possession of land extends the two-year deadline for the government to declare an award, even if the award-making process itself was not explicitly halted.

Background of the Case

The dispute originated when the State of Gujarat initiated acquisition proceedings for lands owned by the appellant, Mr. Yusufbhai Noormohmed Nendoliya, for the purpose of the North Gujarat University. A declaration under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, was published in June 1988, officially starting the clock for the acquisition process.

The Landowner's Legal Challenge

The appellant challenged the acquisition notification in the Gujarat High Court. While the case was pending, the High Court granted a limited interim relief on August 8, 1988, restraining the government from taking physical possession of the lands. Importantly, this order did not explicitly stop the Land Acquisition Officer from proceeding with other formalities, such as determining compensation.

The Two-Year Deadline Controversy

As the legal battle continued, the Land Acquisition Officer proceeded with the compensation inquiry. The appellant raised a critical objection: more than two years had passed since the Section 6 declaration, and no compensation award had been made. He argued that under Section 11-A of the Act, the failure to make an award within two years causes the entire acquisition proceeding to lapse. The authorities, however, rejected this claim, leading the appellant to file another petition in the High Court, which was also dismissed. This brought the matter before the Supreme Court of India.

Legal Analysis: The IRAC Method

Issue

The central legal question before the Supreme Court was: For the purpose of calculating the two-year period under Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, should the entire duration of a court's stay order be excluded, even if the stay only restrains the act of taking possession and not the making of the award itself?

Rule

The case hinged on the interpretation of Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The section mandates that the Collector must make an award within two years from the date of the publication of the declaration. If no award is made, the proceedings lapse. The crucial part is the Explanation to this section, which states:

"In computing the period of two years referred to in this section, the period during which any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the said declaration is stayed by an order of a Court shall be excluded."

Analysis

The appellant's counsel argued for a narrow interpretation of the Explanation. They contended that the stay was only on "taking possession," an action that typically occurs *after* an award is made under Section 11. Therefore, the stay did not legally prevent the Collector from making the award, and the time taken should not be excluded. They argued that the only excludable period would be if the court had stayed proceedings leading up to the award, such as the inquiry itself.

The Supreme Court, however, rejected this line of reasoning and sided with the High Court's broader interpretation. The Court's analysis focused on the legislative intent and the plain language of the statute.

  • Widest Possible Terms: The Court emphasized that the phrase "any action or proceeding" used in the Explanation is framed in the "widest possible terms." It found no justification to limit its meaning to only those actions that precede the making of an award. Taking possession of the land is undeniably an "action or proceeding" taken in pursuance of the acquisition declaration.
  • Legislative Intent: The Court reasoned that Section 11-A is a beneficial provision for landowners, protecting them from indefinitely prolonged acquisition proceedings. However, the Explanation is intended to prevent landowners from taking undue advantage of this provision by initiating litigation and obtaining stay orders that delay the process. The Court held that a landowner who seeks and obtains a stay order cannot then turn around and claim the benefit of the proceedings lapsing due to the very delay they caused.
  • Holistic View: The Court pointed out that in certain urgent cases under Section 17 of the Act, possession can be taken even before an award is made. This shows that possession is an integral part of the acquisition process. Giving the Explanation a different meaning depending on whether Section 17 applies would lead to inconsistency.

For legal professionals grappling with the nuances of statutory interpretation in property law, quick and accessible resources are invaluable. Platforms like CaseOn.in, with their 2-minute audio briefs, assist legal professionals in rapidly analyzing these specific rulings and understanding their practical implications without sifting through pages of text.

The Supreme Court explicitly disapproved of the contrary view taken by a Single Judge of the Kerala High Court in S. Bavajan Sahib v. State of Kerala and Others, thereby settling the legal position on this issue.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court concluded that the Explanation to Section 11-A is all-encompassing. The entire period during which any action or proceeding related to the acquisition is stayed by a court order—including a stay on taking possession—must be excluded when calculating the two-year deadline for the award. Consequently, the Court held that the acquisition proceedings against the appellant had not lapsed and dismissed the appeal.

Final Summary of the Judgment

In Yusufbhai Noormohmed Nendoliya vs. State Of Gujarat, the Supreme Court held that the period of an interim stay granted by a court restraining authorities from taking possession of land must be excluded from the two-year limitation period prescribed for making an award under Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The Court favored a broad interpretation of the term "any action or proceeding" in the Explanation to Section 11-A, clarifying that a landowner cannot benefit from a procedural lapse that was a direct consequence of their own legal challenge.

Why This Judgment is an Important Read for Lawyers and Students

This judgment serves as a critical lesson in statutory interpretation, particularly concerning provisions that balance public interest with private rights. For lawyers practicing in land acquisition and property law, it provides a clear precedent on the consequences of seeking interim relief. It underscores the principle that one cannot take advantage of one's own actions to claim a legal benefit. For law students, this case is an excellent example of how courts discern legislative intent behind a statute and apply a purposive construction to prevent misuse of beneficial provisions.


Disclaimer: This article is for informational and educational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. The information provided is a simplified analysis of a legal judgment. For specific legal issues, it is imperative to consult with a qualified legal professional.

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