2025 INSC 338 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2356 OF 2024

YUVRAJ LAXMILAL KANTHER & ANR. APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

STATE OF MAHARASHTRA RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

UJJAL BHUYAN, J.

This appeal by special leave is directed against the

judgment and order dated 02.11.2017 passed by the High

Court of Judicature at Bombay (briefly ‘the High Court’

hereinafter) in Criminal Revision Application No. 269 of 2017.

2. By the aforesaid judgment and order dated

02.11.2017, the revision application filed by the appellants

assailing the order dated 01.04.2017 passed by the learned

Additional Sessions Judge, Pune in Sessions Case No. 749 of

2014 came to be dismissed.

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2.1. Be it stated that by the aforesaid order dated

01.04.2017, learned Additional Sessions Judge, Pune

dismissed the discharge applications filed by the appellants

being Exhibit Nos. 6 and 10 in Sessions Case No.749 of 2014.

3. Appellants are Yuvraj Laxmilal Kanther and

Nimesh Pravinchandra Shah.

4. Appellant No. 1 was doing interior decoration of

the concerned shop in Pune on contract basis. Appellant No.

2 was the Store Operation Manager of M/s. lntergold Gems

Private Limited which had taken the concerned shop on lease.

4.1. On 27.09.2013, at about 09:00 PM, the work of

decoration of the front side of the shop was being undertaken

by two employees of appellant No.1, Salauddin Shaikh and

Arun Sharma. It is alleged that both the employees viz.

Salauddin Shaikh and Arun Sharma were provided with an

iron ladder and they were working on the sign board which

was approximately at a height of 12 feet from the ground

level. While they were working on the sign board, they were

struck by electricity as a result of which they got electrocuted

and fell down. Due to the fall, they suffered head injuries as

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well as injuries on their arms. They were taken to Pune

Hospital and Research Centre where they were declared dead

on arrival.

4.2. Accidental reports bearing Nos. 67/23 and 68/23

under Section 174 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973

(CrPC) were registered.

4.3. After more than two months, on 04.12.2013, FIR

was lodged at Vishrambag Police Station, Pune by the Police

Sub-Inspector Shri S.G. Patil against the appellants which

was registered as FIR No. 316/2013. It was stated that the

appellants did not provide any safety equipments like belt,

helmet, rubber shoes etc to the two deceased employees .

According to the investigating officer, the two accused

persons had not taken proper care and caution by providing

safety shoes, safety belt etc to the two employees though the

work assigned to them was quite risky. Informant opined that

both the appellants were responsible for the unnatural death

of the two employees since they had knowledge that there was

risk to the lives of the employees. Therefore, the first

informant summed up by saying that both the accused

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persons were responsible for the unnatural death of the two

deceased persons. Accordingly, it was alleged that appellants

had committed offences under Sections 304 and 304A IPC.

4.4. On 04.12.2013 itself both the appellants were

arrested in connection with the aforesaid FIR. They were

subsequently released on the same day. After completion of

investigation, police submitted chargesheet in which the two

appellants were arrayed as accused. Appellants were

chargesheeted for committing an offence under Sections

304A/182/201 read with Section 34 IPC.

4.5. Learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Pune,

before whom the chargesheet was filed, was of the view that

there were material to attract Section 304 Part II IPC. Since

it became a sessions triable case, the same was committed to

the Court of Additional Sessions Judge, Pune where it was

registered as Sessions Case No.749 of 2014.

5. Appellants filed Exhibit Nos. 6 and 10 applications

in the Court of Additional Sessions Judge, Pune seeking their

discharge under Section 227 of CrPC.

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5.1. Contention of the appellants in the discharge

applications was that there were no materials to show that

the appellants had committed the alleged offence. Ingredients

of the alleged offence charged were not even prima facie

established against the appellants. Charge levelled by the

prosecution against the appellants was groundless. FIR was

totally silent about any overt act of the appellants. Appellants

were not present at the place of occurrence when the incident

took place. There was no negligence on the part of the

appellants; not to speak of having any knowledge or intention

to cause the death of the two employees or such bodily injury

as would likely cause their death.

5.2. Even if all the statements of the witnesses were

considered and accepted as correct, the trial would not end

in conviction of the appellants. Going ahead with the trial

would be a futile exercise. There were no materials to show

that appellants had committed the offence as charged. In the

circumstances, appellants sought for discharge as

contemplated under Section 227 of the CrPC.

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6. Learned Additional Sessions Judge, Pune vide his

order dated 01.04.2017 dismissed both the discharge

applications. He held that the two appellants were certainly

not oblivious of the fact that they had not provided safety gear

to the employees which was certainly dangerous to them as

they got exposed to electrocution risk. Learned Additional

Sessions Judge was also of the view that there was much

force in the argument advanced on behalf of the prosecution

that there was sufficient material justifying framing of charge

against the accused for the offence punishable under Section

304 Part II read with Section 34 IPC. In that view of the

matter, the discharge applications were dismissed.

7. Aggrieved by the aforesaid decision, appellants

preferred Criminal Revision Application No. 269 of 2017

before the High Court. After going through the materials on

record and after hearing the parties, High Court was of the

view that there was strong suspicion against both the

appellants for committing the offence for which they were

charged. It could not be said that there were no grounds to

proceed against the appellants. No case for interference was

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made out. Hence, the revision petition was dismissed vide the

judgment and order dated 02.11.2017.

8. Assailing the aforesaid judgment and order dated

02.11.2017 of the High Court, appellants preferred the

related SLP(Crl.) No. 9928 of 2017. By order dated

09.01.2018, this Court had issued notice and granted stay of

further proceedings in Sessions Case No. 749 of 2014

pending on the file of the Additional Sessions Judge, Pune.

8.1. The matter was heard on 30.04.2024 when leave

was granted. Hence, the appeal.

9. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that

both the Trial Court and the High Court fell in error in

rejecting the discharge applications filed by the appellants.

Though the prosecution had submitted chargesheet alleging

commission of offence under Sections 304A/182/201 IPC

read with Section 34 IPC, learned Magistrate while

committing the case to the Court of Sessions concluded that

there was material to invoke Section 304 Part II IPC. Trial

Court took the view that there is sufficient material justifying

framing of charge against the appellants for the offence

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punishable under Section 304 Part II read with Section 34

IPC. Interestingly, High Court proceeded on the basis that

appellants were accused of committing offence s under

Sections 304 and 304A IPC while dismissing the revision

application of the appellants.

9.1. Learned counsel submits that no offence is made

out against the appellants under Section 304 Part II IPC or

even under Section 304A IPC. The two deceased employees of

appellant No. 1 were working on the sign board as part of

cleaning the front side of the shop. It was an accident that

they got electrocuted and fell down because of which they

suffered multiple injuries leading to their death.

9.2. The only reason for filing of chargesheet against

the appellants is that according to the prosecution,

appellants had not provided safety equipments to the two

deceased employees such as rubber shoes, safety belt etc. He

submits that non-furnishing of such equipments would not

make it a criminal offence.

9.3. Adverting to the order of the High Court, learned

counsel submits that the High Court proceeded on the basis

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that it was expected from a prudent person to have provided

the deceased employees wooden scaffolding instead of an iron

ladder. Therefore, by applying the test of a prudent person,

High Court found shortcomings on the conduct of the

appellants. Therefore, it observed that a strong suspicion

could be inferred against the appellants that they had

knowledge that by asking the two deceased employees to

work in the manner in which they did would cause their

death.

9.4. Learned counsel submits that such observations

by the High Court are way off the mark and cannot justify

initiation of criminal proceedings against the appellants.

Neither any negligent or rash act was committed by the

appellants nor any specific overt act can be attributed to the

appellants. It was a case of sudden accident.

9.5. Learned counsel also submits that appellants have

paid compensation to the legal heirs of the two deceased

employees to the extent of Rs. 5,91,180.00 (Arun Sharma)

and Rs. 5,20,584.00 (Salauddin Shaikh). Appellant No. 1 has

also provided employment to the brother of the deceased

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Salauddin Shaikh. That apart, educational expenses of the

children of Arun Sharma have been taken care of by appellant

No. 1.

9.6. In that view of the matter, learned counsel for the

appellants submits that there is no material to justify launch

of criminal trial against the appellants. Therefore, the

appellants should be discharged.

10. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent

submits that appellants knew fully well about the risk that

the two deceased employees had to undertake to do the work

assigned to them. Yet the appellants did not provide any

safety equipments to them. The two deceased employees

sustained electric shock and fell down because of which they

suffered multiple injuries causing their death. There is, thus,

a strong prima facie case made out against the appellants.

10.1. Learned counsel submits that there is sufficient

material to justify framing of charge against the appellants

for the offence punishable under Section 302 Part II IPC read

with Section 34 thereof. In any case, police had filed the

charge-sheet alleging commission of offence under Section

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304A IPC by the appellants. There are sufficient materials to

substantiate such a charge. In this connection, learned

counsel has placed reliance on the decision of this Court in

Keshub Mahindra Vs. State of M.P.

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10.2. Finally, learned counsel for the respondent

submits that there is no merit in the appeal and, therefore,

the same should be dismissed.

11. Submissions made by learned counsel for the

parties have received the due consideration of the court.

11.1. At the outset, it would apposite to deal with the

relevant legal provisions.

12. We have noted above that the appellants have been

charged for committing offence under Section 304 Part II IPC

read with Section 34 IPC. Since Section 34 IPC covers

common intention, the substantive charge against the

appellants is under Section 304 Part II IPC which reads as

under:

Punishment for culpable homicide not amounting to

murder –

1

(1996) 6 SCC 129

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Whoever commits culpable homicide not amounting

to murder shall be punished with imprisonment of

either description for a term which may extend to ten

years or with fine or with both, if the act is done with

the knowledge that it is likely to cause death; but

without any intention to cause death or to cause such

bodily injury as is likely to cause death.

12.1. The ingredients constituting an offence under

Section 304 Part II IPC are as follows:

(i) he must commit culpable homicide not

amounting to murder;

(ii) the act must be done with the knowledge that it

is likely to cause death;

(iii) but such act is done without any intention to

cause death or to cause such bodily injury as is

likely to cause death.

12.2. Therefore, the first important expression is

‘culpable homicide not amounting to murder ’. Culpable

homicide is defined in Section 299 IPC. It says that whoever

causes death by doing an act with the intention of causing

death or with the intention of causing such bodily injury as

is likely to cause death or with the knowledge that he is likely

by such act to cause death, commits the offence of culpable

homicide.

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12.3. All culpable homicides are murders except in the

cases excepted under Section 300 IPC. Thus, except the

cases specifically exempted under Section 300 IPC, all other

acts within the meaning of Section 299 IPC would amount

to committing the offence of culpable homicide. However,

what is important to note is that for committing the offence

of culpable homicide, a positive act must be done by the doer

with the intention that such act would cause death or cause

such bodily injury as is likely to cause death or he having

the knowledge that by such an act, death may be caused.

What, therefore, is significant is that the doer of the act must

have the intention of causing death or the intention of

causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death or has

the knowledge that by doing such an act he is likely to cause

death. Therefore, to commit the offence of culpable

homicide, intention or knowledge is of crucial importance.

12.4. Coming back to Section 304 Part II IPC, we find

that the said section would be attracted if anyone commits

culpable homicide not amounting to murder if the act is

done with the knowledge that it is likely to cause death but

without any intention to cause death or to cause such bodily

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injury as is likely to cause death. Therefore, the requirement

of Section 304 Part II IPC is that the doer must have the

knowledge that the act performed is likely to cause death or

to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death but

without any intention to cause death. Thus, the basic

ingredient of Section 304 Part II IPC is presence of

knowledge and absence of intention. The doer must have the

knowledge that the act performed by him would likely cause

death etc but there should not be any intention to cause

death.

13. This being the legal framework, let us now deal

with the charge against the appellants taking the same as

correct. According to the prosecution and accepted by the

Trial Court and the High Court, the two accused persons

had not taken proper care and caution by providing safety

shoes, safety belt etc to the two employees though they were

asked to perform the job of working on the sign board as

part of decorating the front side of the shop which was

approximately at a height of 12 feet from the ground level.

The accused persons had provided only an iron ladder to the

two employees but while working they were struck by

15

electricity as a result of which they suffered electrocution

and fell down. They suffered multiple injuries which led to

their death. Therefore, both the accused persons were

declared to be responsible for the unnatural death of the two

deceased employees.

14. Even if we take the allegation against the

appellants as correct, we are afraid no prima facie case can

be said to have been made out against the appellants for

committing an offence under Section 304 Part II IPC. From

the record of the case, it is evident that there was no

intention on the part of the two appellants to cause the death

or cause such bodily injury as was likely to cause the death

of the two deceased employees. It cannot also be said that

the appellants had knowledge that by asking the two

deceased employees to work on the sign board as part of the

work of decoration of the frontage of the shop, they had the

knowledge that such an act was likely to cause the death of

the two deceased employees. As such, no prima facie case of

culpable homicide can be said to have been made out

against the appellants. If that be so, the subsequent

requirement of having knowledge that the act was likely to

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cause the death but not having any intention to cause death

would become irrelevant though we may hasten to add that

nothing is discernible from the record of the case that the

appellants had the knowledge that by asking the two

employees to work on the sign board would likely cause their

death or cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause their

death.

15. Therefore, the basic ingredients for commission of

offence under Section 304 Part II IPC are absent in the

present case.

16. Section 227 CrPC deals with discharge. What

Section 227 CrPC contemplates is that if upon consideration

of the record of the case and the documents submitted

therewith and after hearing the submissions of the accused

and the prosecution in this behalf, the judge considers that

there is no sufficient grounds for proceeding against the

accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his

reasons for doing so. At the stage of consideration of

discharge, the court is not required to undertake a

threadbare analysis of the materials gathered by the

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prosecution. All that is required to be seen at this stage is

that there are sufficient grounds to proceed against the

accused. In other words, the materials should be sufficient

to enable the court to initiate a criminal trial against the

accused. It may be so that at the end of the trial, the accused

may still be acquitted. At the stage of discharge, court is only

required to consider as to whether there are sufficient

materials which can justify launch of a criminal trial against

the accused. By its very nature, a discharge is at a higher

pedestal than an acquittal. Acquittal is at the end of the trial

process, may be for a technicality or on benefit of doubt or

the prosecution could not prove the charge against the

accused; but when an accused is discharged, it means that

there are no materials to justify launch of a criminal trial

against the accused. Once he is discharged, he is no longer

an accused.

17. Learned counsel for the respondent has placed

reliance on a decision of this Court in Keshub Mahindra

(supra). However, on going through the aforesaid judgment,

we are of the view that facts in Keshub Mahindra and facts

in the present case are poles apart. Keshub Mahindra arose

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out of the in-famous Bhopal Gas tragedy. A highly

dangerous and toxic gas escaped from a tank in the Bhopal

factory belonging to Union Carbide India Limited. As a result

of such leakage, 3828 human beings lost their lives; 18922

suffered permanent injuries; 7172 suffered temporary

disablement; 1313 suffered temporary disablement caused

by permanent injuries; and permanent partial disablement

was suffered by 2680 persons. While 40 human beings

suffered from permanent total disablement, a total of 2544

animals died. Criminal proceedings were initiated against

the company and officials belonging to the company.

Charges were framed under Sections 304 Part

II/324/326/429 IPC read with Section 35 IPC. Some of the

accused persons challenged such framing of charge before

the High Court of M.P. at Jabalpur. However, the High Court

dismissed the criminal revision application whereafter the

matter came up before this Court. In Keshub Mahindra

(supra), this Court upon perusal of the material on record

held that charges under Section 304 Part II, 324, 326 and

429 of IPC were not attracted at all. Framing of such charges

against the concerned accused persons fell short of even

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prima-facie case. It was observed that mere act of running a

plant as per permission granted by the authorities would not

be a criminal act. This Court held that:

20. …….Consequently in our view taking the

entire material as aforesaid on its face value and

assuming it to represent the correct factual position

in connection with the operation of the plant at Bhopal

on that fateful night it could not be said that the said

material even prima facie called for framing of a

charge against the accused concerned under Section

304 Part II IPC on the specious plea that the said act

of the accused amounted to culpable homicide only

because the operation of the plant on that night

ultimately resulted in deaths of a number of human

beings and cattle.

17.1. However, considering the gravity of the incident,

this Court exercised power under Article 142 of the

Constitution of India and examined the question as to

whether the material led by the prosecution could prima

facie support a charge under Section 304A IPC against the

concerned accused persons. This Court thereafter opined as

under:

22. ……..It cannot be gainsaid that the voluminous

evidence led by the prosecution in this connection at

least prima facie shows that the accused concerned

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who operated the plant on that fateful night at Bhopal

could be alleged to be at least guilty of rash and

negligent act in the way this highly volatile substance

MIC was handled by them and which ultimately

escaped in vaporous form and extinguished the lives

of thousands of human beings and animals apart from

causing serious bodily injuries to thousands of others.

* * * * * *

However for framing charge under Section 304-A on

the aforesaid material it cannot be said that the said

material even prima facie did not point out the

culpability of the accused concerned in running a

defective plant having a number of operational defects

and in being prima facie guilty of illegal omissions to

take safety measures in running such a limping plant

on that fateful night which resulted into this colossal

tragedy. The aforesaid conclusion of ours, therefore,

would make out a prima facie case against accused 5,

6, 7, 8 and 9 who were in actual charge of running of

the Bhopal Plant and would require them to face the

trial for charge under Section 304-A of the IPC.

17.2. The aforesaid conclusion of this Court and the

consequential directions issued was in exercise of power

under Article 142 of the Constitution of India considering

the gravity and magnitude of the incident.

17.3. In so far facts of the present case is concerned, the

two deceased employees of appellant No. 1 were undertaking

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the work of decoration of the front side of the shop. As part

of the said work, they were working on the sign board which

was approximately at a height of 12 feet from the ground

level. For this purpose, they were provided with an iron

ladder. While working on the sign board, they were struck

by electricity as a result of which they got electrocuted and

fell down resulting in multiple injuries leading to their death.

It was purely accidental. On these basic facts, no prima facie

case can be said to be made out against the appellants for

committing an offence under Section 304A IPC, not to speak

of Section 304 Part II IPC. In any case, the Trial Court only

considered culpability of the appellants qua Section 304 Part

II IPC as the committing Magistrate had committed the case

to the Court of Sessions confining the allegations against the

appellant to Section 304 Part II IPC and not Section 304A

IPC.

17.4 Therefore, Keshub Mahindra (supra) can be of no

assistance to the respondent.

18. That being the position and having regard to the

discussions made above, we are of the view that both the

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Trial Court and the High Court fell in error in rejecting the

discharge applications of the appellants. For the reasons

stated above, the order of the Trial Court dated 01.04.2017

and that of the High Court dated 02.11.2017 are hereby set

aside and quashed. Consequently, the discharge

applications being Exhibit Nos. 6 and 10 in Sessions Case

No. 749 of 2014 are hereby allowed. Appellants are

discharged from Sessions Case No. 749 of 2014.

Consequently, Criminal Appeal No. 2356 of 2024 is allowed.

………………………………J .

[ABHAY S. OKA]

………………………………J .

[UJJAL BHUYAN]

NEW DELHI;

MARCH 07, 2025.