Page 1 of 15 WP(C) 924/2023

HIGH COURT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND LADAKH

AT SRINAGAR

WP(C) 924/2023

Reserved On: 1

st

June, 2023

Pronounced on: 9

th

October 2023

1. Ab. Hamid Bhat (Aged: 65 years)

S/o Ab. Aziz Bhat

R/o Batamaloo, Srinagar.

And 285 others.......

….. Petitioner(s)

Through: Mr. G.A. Lone, Advocate.

V/s

1. Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir

through Chief Secretary, Civil Secretariat

Srinagar/ Jammu.

2. Commissioner Secretary to Government

Housing and Urban Development Department,

Civil Secretariat Srinagar/ Jammu.

3. Divisional Commissioner, Kashmir, Srinagar.

4. Vice Chairman, Srinagar Development

Authority, Bemina Srinagar.

5. Director, Land Management, Srinagar

Development Authority, Bemina, Srinagar.

6. Deputy Commissioner, Srinagar.

7. Director, Rakhs and Farms Department, Lal

Mandi, Srinagar.

8. Collector Land Acquisition, District Srinagar.

9. Collector Land Acquisition, District Budgam.

10. Sub Divisional Magistrate (Central), Shalteng

Srinagar.

11. Chief Engineer, Irrigation and Flood Control

Department, Engineering Complex, Near, Silk

Factory Road, Rajbagh, Srinagar.

12. Executive Engineer, Irrigation and Mechanical

Division, Zaldagar, Srinagar.

…..Respondent(s)

Through: Mr. Mohsin S. Qadri, Sr. AAG with

Mr. Syed Musaib, Dy. AG.

Page 2 of 15 WP(C) 924/2023

CORAM:

HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE WASIM SADIQ NARGAL, JUDGE .

JUDGMENT

01. In these proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution, the

short question which is posed for the consideration of this court is, “whether,

the Petitioners are Camas or Tenants of the subject land or not?” Other

prayers are ancillary to it. However, before returning a finding on the said

question, this Court, in the facts and circumstances of this case, has to decide

whether the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India

would be maintainable?

02. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has confined his arguments

to following two issues viz, first, to declare that petitioners as tenants of the

subject land, not camas. Second, alternatively, if petitioners are not held to

be tenants, then as camas they are entitled to Rs 12.00 Lacs of compensation

per kanal of land as improvement charges, development charges and other

charges for taking away the possession of land from them. Also, the Learned

Counsel has made a statement at bar that he does not wish to press an

application for amendment being CM No. 3017/2023.

ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF PETITIONERS:

03. Learned Counsel for Petitioners, Mr. G.A. Lone has submitted

that vide J&K Arms Command Order No. 373 Dated 04.04.1949, the

Military Farms Department and the Lands (Farms and Rakhs) were

transferred to the Revenue Department, J&K. Further, vide cabinet order no.

409-C of 1950 dated 30.03.1950, the Land and Farms, supra were formally

taken over by the Revenue Department in the then State of J&K. Thereafter,

the Revenue Department handed over the management and control of lands

to the Rakhs and Farms Department in the erstwhile State of Jammu and

Kashmir. The area of land in possession of the Rakhs and Farms Department

spread across both the provinces i.e. Jammu and Kashmir.

04. Learned Counsel further submits, at that point of time, there was

shortage of food stuffs in the erstwhile State of Jammu and Kashmir, as such

a scheme known as Grow More Food was introduced by the Government

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and the said scheme was implemented by providing Rakhs and Farms Land

to marginal, small farmers, landless and needy persons in the locality for

cultivation as tenants.

05. Learned Counsel further submits that land measuring 4200

Kanals belonging to Rakhs and Farms was also available in estate Rakhe

Gund Aksha which partly fell under District Srinagar and small portion fell

in District Budgam. The land remained water lodged but was capable of

being cultivated.

06. Learned Counsel further submits that predecessors in interest of

the Petitioners being marginal and small farmers and some of them being

landless, were provided the land, supra for cultivation of food grains as a

measure of social security i.e. providing an opportunity of earning

livelihood. The predecessors in interest have through their toil and sweat,

brought the land into cultivation paddy, peas, vegetables and oil seeds.

07. Learned Counsel further submits that the facilities of irrigation

are available to the land and the land at present is a multi cropped land,

which is the only source of livelihood to the Petitioners. The predecessors in

interest of petitioners and thereafter the petitioners themselves have been

continuously in possession of the land and have been cultivating it for

around seven decades as tenants. The share of crops is divided between the

government through Rakhs and Farms Department and the Petitioners. The

share of crops is divided in the ratio of 1/4

th

produce being paid to the

Government through the Rakhs and Farms Department and 3/4

th

share along

with grass is the agreed share of the Petitioners. The position of sharing the

crops as tenants and landlords has been arranged from the time of delivery of

possession to the petitioners and their predecessors in interest under the

Grow More Scheme.

08. Learned Counsel for Petitioners further submits that vide

Government Order No. LB-6/C of 1958 dated 05.06.1958, the Petitioners

were entitled to be recorded as tenants at will and thereafter under

Government Order No. S-432 of 1966 dated 03.06.1966, they were entitled

to be recorded as owners of the land on payment of price then fixed by the

Government for conferment of such rights. Relevant revenue authorities at

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that point in time, failed to exercise the powers of attestation of mutation in

favour of the petitioners under the aforesaid government orders but the

failure on the part of the revenue authorities shall not be allowed to denude

the petitioners from the rights as created in their favour under the

aforementioned government order.

09. Learned Counsel for the petitioners further submits that vide

Government Order No. 191-HUD of 2000 dated 24-08-2000 sanction was

accorded by the Government to the transfer of land, supra measuring 4200

Kanals, 19 Marlas falling in Khasra No. 1 to 10, 12,71 to 75, 78, 79 and 80

in village Rakh Gund Akshan, Tehsil and District Srinagar to District

Development Authority on payment of improvement charges as fixed by the

Revenue Department. On perusal of the government order no. 191-HUD of

2000, it is crystal clear that the government has resumed the Rakh land in

Bemina for development of housing colony. After the transfer of land to

Srinagar Development Authority, the Petitioners have continued to remain in

possession of the land as tenants paying rent to the extent of 1/4

th

of the

produce of crops to the government through Rakhs and Farms Department.

10. The learned Counsel for petitioners has admitted that the

Petitioners have filed one suit, before the court of District Judge, Srinagar,

wherein, they challenged the Government order no. 191-HUD of 2000 dated

24.08.2000, whereby the subject land was transferred to Srinagar

Development Authority. It has been submitted that in another suit i.e. second

suit, the Petitioners sought protection of their possession by filing a suit for

permanent injunction against the government. Both the suits were not

subsequently prosecuted, as such these suits were dismissed in default. The

applications for restoration of suits are pending adjudication.

11. Learned Counsel for petitioners submits that now vide

Government order no. 298-HUD of 2018 dated 12-10-2018, sanction has

been accorded to the payment of improvement charges to the Camas i.e.

Petitioners of left over land of 3760 Kanals transferred to Srinagar

Development Authority for setting up of a Smart Satellite Township at

Rakh-i-Gund Akashah at Bemina, Srinagar. Further, this order says that the

improvement charges shall be paid to the Camas i.e Petitioners at the same

Page 5 of 15 WP(C) 924/2023

rates as have been paid to Camas for acquisition of similar kind of land for

the Central University, Ganderbal i.e. at the rate of Rs. 60000 Per Kanal for

non-irrigated non-paddy fields and Rs. 1.20 Lacs Per Kanal for Abi-Awal

Paddy Land, instead of Rs. 40000 Per kanal, uniformly fixed through

Government order 132-HUD of 2001 dated 28-05-2001. Subsequently, the

petitioners have filed an application for seeking amendment of prayer clause

to enable the Petitioners to seek quashment of Government Order No. 56-JK

(Rev) of 2022 dated 17.03.2022. However at the time arguments, the

Petitioners stated at bar that they are not pressing for adjudication of said

application for amendment and prayed that the matter may be adjudicated,

finally.

12. Learned Counsel for the petitioners submits that now through an

advertisement notice dated 15-02-2023, Srinagar Development Authority

has invited applications from the general public on the prescribed

application, available on E-Portal on the J&K Housing Mission initiated by

the Srinagar Development Authority (SDA) for advance registration of

residential plots intended for construction of residential houses on the part of

the land in possession of the petitioners as tenants measuring 49 Hectares of

land The advertisement notice shows that each plot of land which is slightly

less than 1 Kanal in area, is priced at Rs. 83 Lacs and a smaller size of plot

with 85x45 Ft. dimension, is priced at Rs. 64 Lacs and lesser size plot is

priced at Rs. 42 Lacs having an area of 75x36 Ft. Further, it has been

submitted that the impugned advertisement notice and the project report

shows that the Satellite Township is being constructed in Rakh-i-Gund

Aksha on the land which is in possession of the Petitioners.

13. Learned Counsel for the petitioners submits that the petitioners

are not Camas but tenants, as such it is incumbent on the Government to

initiate a process of acquisition under Right to Fair Compensation and

Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Re-Settlement Act,

2013 and pay compensation to the petitioners at the market value to be

assessed in terms of the said Act.

14. The learned Counsel for petitioners confines his prayer to the

limited issue only i.e. to declare the petitioners as tenants and has made a

Page 6 of 15 WP(C) 924/2023

statement at bar that they (petitioners) are not opposing the transfer of land

to the Srinagar Development Authority and development of Satellite

Township.

ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENTS:

15. Per-contra, the Counsel for the Respondents, Mr. Mohsin Qadri,

the learned Senior Additional Advocate General, submits that petitioners

have, on the same cause of action, already instituted two Civil Suits before

the trial court with respect to the subject land transferred to Srinagar

Development Authority and the said civil suits stand dismissed, and the

applications for restoration are pending adjudication, as such, present writ

petition is not maintainable.

16. Learned Counsel further submits that petitioners are Camas

(Labourers) and not Tenants as claimed by the petitioners in the Writ

Petition. Also, 80 Camas of the Rakhs and Farms Department have already

been paid improvement charges at the rate of Rs. 40,000/- per kanal in the

year 2003.

17. Learned Counsel for Respondents further submits that vide

Government order no. 132-HUD of 2001 dated 28-05-2001 the subject land

has been resumed from the Rakhs and Farms Department by the

Government and transferred to SDA for development of Satellite Township,

as such the Government is not supposed to acquire its own land.

18. Learned Counsel further submits that amongst the total land

transferred to Srinagar Development Authority in the year 2000, certain

parcels of land have been transferred in favour of Department of Law and

Parliamentary Affairs for construction of J&K High Court Complex and also

to Industries Department for setting up Medi-City and this has been done in

public interest.

19. Learned Counsel further submits that Petitioners cannot claim to

be tenants as the land in question is the state land which has been resumed

from the Rakhs and Farms Department. Only Camas can make a claim for

payment of improvement charges as fixed by the Government. That none of

the rights of the Petitioners are infringed by the launch of Satellite Township

Page 7 of 15 WP(C) 924/2023

project for allotment of plots. Further, it has been pleaded that the petitioners

cannot stall a development project initiated in public interest on the basis of

raising disputed question of facts in writ proceedings as the same cannot be

adjudicated in the writ petition. It has further been submitted that Right to

Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation

Re-Settlement Act, 2013 is not applicable to the petitioners case as the

petitioners are not owners of the land in question besides the land in question

is State Land. It is pertinent to mention herein that the Respondents in their

reply at Para 11 of their reply that the petitioners are Camas and are entitled

to improvement charges as fixed by the Government.

20. Learned Counsel for the Respondents further submits that

petitioners have tried to mislead this Hon’ble court by pleading that

Petitioners have recently come to know about the Government order no.

292-HUD of 2018 dated 12-10-2018 just to come out of the wriggle of

doctrine of latches.

21. Learned Counsel for Respondents further submits that the

Petitioners cannot claim the amount of Rs. 12 Lac per kanal as improvement

charges as the matter of right; government has already fixed rates for

payment for improvement charges in favour of Camas and at this belated

stage the petitioners cannot take the plea that they were not unaware of the

Government order no. 298-HUD of 2018 dated 12-10-2018.

22. It has been submitted that the Petitioners in order to stall the

development project are trying to mislead this Hon’ble court by submitting

wrong fact.

ISSUES TO BE ANSWERED BY THIS HON’BLE COURT

a. Whether the writ petition is maintainable in light of an

admitted fact on behalf of the Petitioners that they had

earlier filed two Civil Suits with regard to subject land and

those suits have been dismissed in default, however, the

applications for restoration of the said suits are pending

adjudication.

Page 8 of 15 WP(C) 924/2023

b. If the aforesaid issue is decided in affirmative, then the

second question will be whether the Petitioners are barred to

maintain writ petition on the ground of delay and laches.

c. If, both of the aforementioned issues are answered in

affirmative, whether the Petitioners are Camas or Tenants. It

may be noted if first question is answered against the

petitioners, then the rest of the questions need not be

answered.

PLACING ON RECORD THE COPIES OF SUITS

23. That Petitioners have vaguely mentioned in their pleadings that

they have filed two other suits related to subject land, accordingly this Court

directed the petitioners to place on record the copies of suits Accordingly,

the counsel of the petitioners has placed on record the copies of both the

suits. On perusal of the pleadings and prayer clause in the said suits, it is

plainly decipherable that sum and substance of the cause of action in both

the suits and present writ petition is identical i.e. to declare the petitioners as

protected tenants and not to dispossess the petitioners from the subject land

with a further relief to quash the government order whereby the subject land

has been transferred to Srinagar Development Authority in the year 2000.It

is pertinent to mention here that the copies of orders dismissing suits in

default for non prosecution were not placed on record with the

aforementioned suits. However, parties submitted the hard copies of said

orders after the case was reserved for judgment. Both these orders are made

part of the record. On perusal of the two orders dated 04.04.2012 passed in

two suits supra, it is apparent from the order of dismissal of the suits that

both suits were dismissed in default when the counsel for the defendants was

present and the plaintiffs (petitioners herein) and their counsel were absent.

For facility of reference, the principal prayer made in one of the suits

mentioned herein above is reproduced as under:

“a. To pass a decree for declaration to the effect since the

plaintiffs are the protected tenants and their status of being

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protected tenants is protected by the tenancy laws and

cannot be thrown out or evicted under such law.

b. To pass a decree for declaration to the effect that the

impugned government order No. 191 HUD of 2000 dated

24.08.2000 is against the spirit of law as applicable to the

land in possession and ownerships of the plaintiffs.

…………”

LEGAL ANALYSIS

24. The preliminary objection taken by the Respondents is that the

reliefs prayed for in by the petitioners in the present writ petition is barred

by the principle of res-subjudice. Upon examination of the averments of the

present writ petition, it is seen that the Petitioners have admitted in

Paragraph No. 7 (Seven) of writ petition that they have earlier filed two suits

with regard to subject land before the trial court and both those suits have

been dismissed in default and the application for restoration of the suit is

pending adjudication in both the suits.

25. The suits have been dismissed in default, such dismissal for

default, which stands till restoration is allowed, if at all, obviates the scope

of applying the principle of res-subjudice. However, applying the principle

of Order IX Rules 8 and 9 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, if the cause of

action in the suits and present writ petition is identical, then petitioners are

barred from seeking similar reliefs in the present writ petition. For facility of

Reference, Order IX Rule 8 and 9 are reproduced hereunder:

“8. Procedure where defendant only appears.- Where the

defendant appears and the plaintiff does not appear when

the suit is called on for hearing, the court shall make an

Order that the suit be dismissed, unless the defendant

admits the claim, or part thereof, in which case the court

shall pass a decree against the defendant upon such

admission, and, where part only of the claim has been

admitted, shall dismiss the suit so far as it relates to the

remainder.”

“9. Decree against plaintiff by default bars fresh suit.

Page 10 of 15 WP(C) 924/2023

(1) Where a suit is wholly or partly dismissed under rule 8,

the plaintiff shall be precluded from bringing a fresh suit

in respect of the same cause of action. But he may apply

for an order to set the dismissal aside, and if he satisfies

the Court that there was sufficient cause for his non-

appearance when the suit was called on for hearing, the

Court shall make an order setting aside the dismissal upon

such terms as to costs or otherwise as it thinks fit. and

shall appoint a day for proceeding with suit.

(2) No order shall be made under this rule unless notice of

the application has been served on the opposite party.”

26. Order IX Rule 9 bars fresh suit or proceedings in respect of the

same cause of action in case the earlier suit was dismissed as indicated in

Order IX Rule 8 of the CPC. The term “same cause of action” assumes

significance in as much as the bar under Order IX Rule 8 of the CPC applies

to a later suit only in respect of the very same cause of action. In case the

cause of action in the later suit was altogether different, which has nothing to

do with the cause of action in the earlier suit; the statutory bar has no

application to such later suits. It was only with a view to curb the tendency

of filing multiple suits, on the basis of the very same cause of action,

successively even after the dismissal of the earlier suit that such a provision

has been introduced. It was not the intention of the Legislature to bar the

subsequent suits between the parties and the same was evident by the

qualifying words, “same cause of action”. Therefore, everything depends

upon the cause of action and in case the subsequent cause of action arose

from a totally different bunch of facts, such suit cannot be axed by taking

shelter to the provision of Order IX Rule 9 of CPC. This being the legal

position, it becomes important to mention herein that the Hon’ble Supreme

Court of India in its various judicial pronouncements has laid down that

although the Civil Procedure Code may not be applicable in its entirety in

writ proceedings but the principles enshrined therein apply with full force.

Consequently, in view of the principles enshrined under Order IX Rule 9

prohibiting filing of a second suit for same cause of action, it would

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necessarily imply that on the same cause of action which was wholly or

partly subject matter of suit filed by petitioner earlier and which has been

dismissed in default for non appearance of the plaintiffs, a writ petition

under Article 226 is not maintainable.

27. This Court is fortified by the view taken by the Division Bench

of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Sheo Nath Dubey v. District

Inspector of Schools, 1985 SCC OnLine All 799 : 1986 AWC 648,

wherein, it was held as under: -

“12. In the rejoinder affidavit, the petitioner has come out

with an excuse for not disclosing the fact of dismissal of the

suit in the writ petition which appears to us to be a lame one

His explanation is that as he was not getting leave from the

College for pursuing the suit, he had no alternative but to

leave the same. It was his duty to have disclosed the said

fact in the writ petition. Be that as it may from the order it

appears that on the date when the suit was taken up, the

defendant was present in the court and the order indicates

that the petitioner had since failed to show cause for which

be had been granted time, it was dismissed for want of

prosecution. To the filing of the writ petition, the principle

of Order IX Rule 9 applied. In the view of the applicability

of the principle, the present writ petition was barred. It is

true that Order IX Rule 9 applies to a civil suit in terms but,

as stated above Order IX Rule 9, being behind the idea that

no body should be harassed unnecessarily by fresh

proceedings one after the other, would apply to the

maintainability of the writ petition also.”

28. Furthermore, in another case titledPrem Narain Nigam vs : The

State of U.P. and Ors., 2006(7)ADJ228 the Court held as under:

“19. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases of Regional

Food Controller, Meerut and Anr. v. Hazari Mal Radha

Kishan, Commission Agent, RDTD. Firm At Pakka Bagh,

Page 12 of 15 WP(C) 924/2023

Hapur, District Meerut through its Partner Om Prakash

1966 64 ALJ 528, Sarguja Transport Service v. State

Transport Appellate Tribunal, Gwalior and

Ors.MANU/SC/0114/1986 : [1987]1SCR200 , In re: Udai

Narain Rai1992 A.LJ. 274, Tata Press Limited v.

Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Limited and Ors.

MANU/SC/0745/1995 : AIR1995SC2438 Ashok Kumar

Srivastav v. National Insurance Company Ltd. and Ors.

MANU/SC/0314/1998 : [1998]2SCR1199 ,Commissioner of

Endowments and Ors. v. Vittal Rao and Ors.

MANU/SC/1003/2004 : AIR2005SC454 has specifically laid

down that although Civil Procedure Code may not be

applicable in its entirety in writ proceeding but principle

enshrined therein apply with full force. Consequently, in

view of the principle, prohibiting bringing of a second suit

for same cause of action would necessarily apply that a writ

petition for the same cause of action which was wholly or

partly subject matter of suit filed by plaintiff-petitioner

earlier and which has been dismissed in default would be

precluded.”

29. What is a cause of action is now settled beyond any doubt. The

classic definition of that expression is that of Lord Justice Brett in Jay

Cook v. Henry S. Gill reported in [L.R.] 8 C.P. 107 as under:

“Cause of action‟ has been held from the earliest time to

mean every fact which is material to be proved to entitle the

plaintiff to succeed, — every fact which the defendant

would have a right to traverse.”

30. Lord Justice Fry put it in the negative by saying, “Everything

which, if not proved, gives the defendant an immediate right to judgment,

must be part of the cause of action.” This definition is the basis of all

subsequent decisions containing an interpretation of the expression ‘cause

of action.’ It was accepted in by the Privy Council in Mohammad Khalil

Khan v. Mahbub Ali Mian reported in AIR 1949 PC 78.

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31. The principles for determining whether the causes of action in

two suits/proceedings are different or not were laid down by the Privy

Council in Mohammad Khalil Khan v. Mahbub Ali Khan AIR 1949 PC

78 and referred to with approval by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Suraj

Rattan Thirani v. Azamabad Tea Company AIR 1965 SC 295.The Hon’ble

Court has held as under:

“29. We consider that the test adopted by the Judicial

Committee for determining the identity of the causes of

action in two suits in Mohammed Khalil Khan v. Mahbub

Ali Mian [75 IA 121] is sound and expresses correctly the

proper interpretation of the provision. In that case Sir

Madhavan Nair, after an exhaustive discussion of the

meaning of the expression “same cause of action” which

occurs in a similar context in para (1) of Order 2 Rule 2 of

the Civil Procedure Code observed:

“In considering whether the cause of action in the

subsequent suit is the same or not, as the cause of action in

the previous suit, the test to be applied is/are the causes of

action in the two suits in substance — not technically —

identical?”

30. The learned Judge thereafter referred to an earlier

decision of the Privy Council in Soorijomonse

Dasee v. Suddanund [(1873) 12 Beng LR 304, 315] and

extracted the following passage as laying down the

approach to the question:

“Their Lordships are of opinion that the term „cause

of action‟ is to be construed with reference rather to

the substance than to the form of action….”

32. Correspondingly, on careful examination of the averments made

in the both suits, supra filed before trial court and the orders whereby, the

suit has been dismissed in default, it is crystal clear that cause of action in

substance in those civil suits and this writ petition is identical. The principle

substantial cause of action in both suits and present writ petition is same i.e.

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to decide declare petitioners as tenants, other prayers are ancillary to it; also,

the question is whether the further allegations about allocation of land for

construction of, Medi-City and Satellite township has really destroyed the

basic and substantial identity of the causes of action in the two proceedings

i.e. two suits and the present writ petition. This can be answered only in the

negative. As such, the essential bundle of facts on which the petitioners have

based their right to relief were identical in the two suits and the present writ

petition. Further, it is apparent from the order of dismissal of the suits that

both suits were dismissed under the provisions of Order IX Rule 8 of the

CPC as the counsel for the defendants was present and the plaintiffs

(petitioners herein) and their counsel were absent. Therefore, to this extent,

the writ petition is substantially barred by Order 9 Rule 9 of CPC.

33. However, the petitioners have made an alternative prayer,

wherein, they have sought a relief that if petitioners are held to be camas

then the petitioners be paid Rs 12.00 Lacs as improvement charges,

development charges and other charges for taking away the possession of

land from petitioners. It is pertinent to mention herein that the Respondents

in their reply at Para 11 have admitted that the petitioners are camas and are

entitled to improvement charges as fixed by the Government. The

government vide Order No. 298-HUD of 2018 dated 12.10.2018 has

provided for payment of improvement charges to the camas i.e. petitioners.

This issue was neither directly nor substantially raised in the suits mentioned

herein above. To this extent, the court takes note of a fact that Government

Order No. 298-HUD of 2018 dated 12.10.2018 has relied on the assessment

for payment of compensation to camas made in the year 2001. For facility of

reference, the said Government Order is reproduced as under: -

“Sanction is hereby accorded to the payment of

improvement charges to the Kamas of leftover land of 3760

canals transferred to the Srinagar Development Authority

for setting up of a Smart Satellite Township at Rakh-i-Gund

Akashah at Bemina Srinagar at the same rates as have been

paid to Kamas for acquisition of similar kind of land for the

Central University Ganderbal i.e. @Rs 60,000 per kanal for

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non-irrigated non-paddy fields & Rs 1.20 lac per kanal for

abi awwal paddy land, instead of Rs 40,000/- per kanal,

uniformly fixed through the Govt, Order No. 132-HUD of

2001 dated 28.05.2001”

34. Paying of compensation/improvement charges to camas on the

basis of assessment/valuation done years ago, i.e., in the year 2001, is

arbitrary. As such, I am of the considered opinion that the Respondents have

to reassess the amount of compensation/improvement charges to be paid to

camas (petitioners herein) based on the parameters/formula to be taken into

count as per rules. As a necessary corollary, Respondents are directed to

reassess the payment of improvement charges to be paid to the camas

including petitioners within a period of two months.

35. Having regard to what has been observed and discussed

hereinabove, the petition is accordingly disposed of along with connected

CM(s). Interim orders, if any, stand vacated.

(Wasim Sadiq Nargal)

Judge

SRINAGAR:

09.10.2023

“Hamid”

i. Whether the judgment is reportable? Yes

ii. Whether the judgment is speaking? Yes