As per case facts, a Judicial Officer was discharged from service and later reinstated by the Supreme Court with all consequential benefits, seniority, and continuity of service, along with partial ...
2026 INSC 762 REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
MISCELLANEOUS APPLICATION NO. 2228 OF 2026
[Arising out of Diary No. 17219 of 2024]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN … APPLICANT
VERSUS
ABHAY JAIN …OPPONENT
/NON-APPLICANT
IN
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2029 OF 2022
[Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 6107 of 2020]
ABHAY JAIN …APPELLANT
VERSUS
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE
FOR RAJASTHAN & ANR.
…RESPONDENT S
JUDGMENT
Miscellaneous Application No. 2228 of 2026 Page 1 of 36
J. B. PARDIWALA, J.
For the convenience of exposition, this judgment is divided into the following
parts:
INDEX
A. FACTUAL MATRIX: .............................................................................. 2
B. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PARTIES ..................................... 8
(i) Submissions on behalf of the Judicial Officer: ............................................... 8
(ii) Submissions on behalf of the Rajasthan High Court, on its administrative
side: ................................................................................................................. 14
C. ISSUE FOR DETERMINATION ............................................................. 15
D. ANALYSIS: ......................................................................................... 16
E. CONCLUSION: .................................................................................... 35
Miscellaneous Application No. 2228 of 2026 Page 2 of 36
A. FACTUAL MATRIX:
1. Delay condoned.
2. This Miscellaneous Application has been filed by the High Court of
Judicature of Rajasthan on its administrative side (hereinafter referred
to as the ‘Rajasthan HC’), original respondent no. 1, seeking
clarification of the judgment & order dated 15.03.2022 rendered by this
Court in the main matter i.e. Civil Appeal No. 2029 of 2022. The short
question that falls for our consideration is whether the directions
contained in the said judgment, whereby the opponent/non-applicant
Judicial Officer, original appellant, was ordered to be reinstated with
continuity of service, seniority and all consequential benefits,
necessarily entitle him to the grant of Selection Scale or Super Time
Scale, despite the absence of the requisite number of Annual
Confidential Reports (“ACRs”) for six of the seven years immediately
preceding the date on which his case came to be considered by the
Higher Judiciary Committee.
3. The factual background giving rise to the present miscellaneous
application is as follows:
a. The opponent was appointed as a Judicial Officer in the District
Judge Cadre of the Rajasthan Judicial Service in the year 2013.
Upon being discharged from service in the year 2016, he had filed
a writ petition in the Rajasthan High Court challenging the
Miscellaneous Application No. 2228 of 2026 Page 3 of 36
discharge order. Since the writ petition was dismissed by the High
Court vide its judgment dated 21.10.2019, the opponent had come
before this Court by way of Civil Appeal No. 2029 of 2022, in which
the present miscellaneous application has now been filed for our
consideration.
b. This Court, vide Judgment & Order dated 15.03.2022 (hereinafter
referred to as the “subject judgment”), allowed the appeal, by
quashing the discharge order and awarding the opponent
reinstatement with all consequential benefits including continuity
of service and seniority, along with 50% back wages. The operative
paragraph of the subject judgment reads thus:
“72. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed and the impugned
order of the High Court dated 21.10.2019 is set aside and the
discharge order dated 27.01.2016 is quashed. Keeping in
view that the appellant has not worked as judicial officer after
he was discharged, we direct that while the appellant be
reinstated with all consequential benefits including
continuity of service and seniority, but will be entitled to
be paid only 50% back wages, which may be paid within a
period of four months from today.”
(Emphasis supplied)
c. Following this Court’s order, referred to above, the opponent
Judicial Officer was reinstated on 13.04.2022, and his name was
inserted at S.No. 255A in the Revised Seniority List dated
Miscellaneous Application No. 2228 of 2026 Page 4 of 36
22.06.2020, on the basis of his original seniority as per
Government Cyclic Order dated 15.07.2013.
d. Thereafter, a representation was filed by the opponent before the
Higher Judicial Committee for the grant of Super Time Scale
claiming that he had come within the zone of consideration for the
same. However, when the name of the opponent Judicial Officer
was considered for grant of super time scale by the Higher
Judiciary Committee, it was decided vide resolution dated
19.05.2023, that an application seeking clarification be filed before
the Supreme Court. The Higher Judiciary Committee, concluded
its meeting dated 19.05.2023, with the following observations:
“[...] As Shri Abhay Jain remained out of service, out of last
seven years (i.e. from the year 2015 to 2021), except ACR for
the year 2015, as he did not actually perform judicial work,
the ACRs' for the remaining six years are not available.
Upon detailed deliberation, the Committee is of the view that
it would be appropriate to seek clarification of the order of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Shri Abhay Jain as to
whether consequential benefits would include grant of
Selection Scale/Super Time Scale automatically, even without
availability of ACRs of six years out of last seven years.
However, in order to protect the interest of Shri Abhay Jain,
till appropriate application for clarification is filed and decided
by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, one post in the Selection Scale
is kept reserved, so that after decision in the matter by the
Miscellaneous Application No. 2228 of 2026 Page 5 of 36
Hon'ble Supreme Court, the case of Shri Abhay Jain may be
considered accordingly.”
(Emphasis supplied)
e. Accordingly, the High Court decided to file the present
miscellaneous application, praying for the following:
“Clarify as to whether the consequential benefits awarded by
this Hon'ble Court vide order dated 15.03.2022 in Civil Appeal
No. 2029/2022 titled as ‘Abhay Jain vs. The High Court of
Judicature at Rajasthan & Anr.’ would include grant of
Selection Scale/Super Time Scale without the availability of
the ACRs of six years out of last seven years;”
4. When the present miscellaneous application came up for hearing on
12.07.2024, this Court was of the considered view that the High Court
on its own should have looked into the directions issued by this Court
and ought to have taken an appropriate decision for the purpose of
giving effect to such directions. It was added that if the opponent
Judicial Officer would find himself aggrieved in any manner with the
decision that the High Court on its administrative side may take, then
in such circumstances, this Court shall hear both the sides on merits
and resolve the matter.
5. Accordingly, the Higher Judiciary Committee held a meeting on
03.08.2024 to discuss the matter. However, the Higher Judiciary
Committee was of the opinion that since the parameters of grant of
Miscellaneous Application No. 2228 of 2026 Page 6 of 36
Selection Scale and Super-Time Scale have been demarcated by the Full
Court of the Rajasthan High Court by way of its Resolution dated
15.01.2011, therefore, any application of Selection Scale and Super-
Time Scale, which has mandatory ACR criteria laid down by the Full
Court, has to be considered by the Full Court itself.
6. Hence, on 21.08.2024, a Full Court Meeting of the Rajasthan High Court
was convened for deliberation upon the above-mentioned agenda.
However, as the minutes of the meeting dated 21.08.2024 reflects, the
opponent Judicial Officer was not found suitable for grant of selection
scale or Super Time scale, but no reasons were stated for arriving at
such a decision. The relevant portion of the minutes of the meeting dated
21.08.2024 reads thus:
“The case of Shri Abhay Jain was considered for grant of selection
scale. Taking into consideration the ACRs, it is found that till date
Shri Abhay Jain has been assessed for the years 2013, 2014, 2015
and 2022. The ACRs for the year 2013, 2014 and 2015 were under
consideration of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and the same has been
considered. The officer was graded ‘Very Good’ in the year 2022.
The ACRs for the period ending 31st December, 2023 are not made
available as they are pending consideration and not finalised. The
grant of selection scale as well as super-time scale is governed by
provisions contained in Rules 49 and 50 of the RJS Rules, 2010
respectively. The Full Court, vide its resolution dated 15th January,
2011, also laid down criteria for grant of Selection scale and Super
Miscellaneous Application No. 2228 of 2026 Page 7 of 36
Time scale. Rules 49 and 50 of the RJS Rules and relevant part of
Full Court resolution dated 15th January, 2011 read as under:
“(Rajasthan Judicial Service Rules, 2010: Rules 49 and
50):
49. Grant of selection scale to District Judges. - The
Officers of the District Judge cadre, who have put in not less
than 5 years service shall be granted selection scale by the
Court on the basis of merit to the extent of 35 percent of the
effective strength of District Judges.
50. Grant of super-time scale to District Judges. - The
Officers of the District Judge cadre, who have put in not less
than three years service in the selection scale shall be granted
super-time scale by the court on the basis of merit after taking
into consideration the entire service record to the extent of 15
percent of effective strength of District Judges."
(Relevant portion of Resolution dated 15th January,
2011):
“The incumbents who are having at least five good, very good
or outstanding entries with no adverse remarks in the
preceding seven years are entitled for grant of selection scale.
However, in case the continuous service of the officer in order
of seniority is five years or more but less than seven years
than the assessment be made on the basis of available
record.
Miscellaneous Application No. 2228 of 2026 Page 8 of 36
The incumbents who are having at least two outstanding or
very good and three good entries with no below average entry
in the preceding seven years and on consideration of entire
service record, are entitled for grant of Super Time Scale.”
Upon consideration of the records and ACRs, Shri Abhay Jain
is not found suitable for grant of selection scale or super time
scale.
The meeting ended with the Vote of Thanks to the Chair.”
(Emphasis supplied)
7. Since the opponent Judicial Officer was aggrieved by the above-
mentioned decision rendered at the Full Court Meeting dated
21.08.2024, both the parties appeared before this Court on 06.09.2024
and 25.10.2024 respectively and placed their respective submissions
before us.
B. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PARTIES
(i) Submissions on behalf of the Judicial Officer:
8. Mr. P.S. Patwalia, the learned senior counsel appearing for the Judicial
Officer, fairly submitted that in part compliance with the subject
judgment, the Judicial Officer was granted the benefit of seniority with
effect from the date of his initial appointment in the year 2013. However,
despite the grant of seniority, the selection scale or super time scale
have been denied to the Judicial Officer arbitrarily since the
Miscellaneous Application No. 2228 of 2026 Page 9 of 36
recommendations of the Higher Judiciary Committee dated 03.08.2024
had simply stated that the Judicial Officer was not found suitable for
grant of Selection Scale/ Super Time Scale, without assigning any
reasons for the same.
9. He submitted that this Court in the subject judgment clearly directed
that the Judicial Officer be reinstated with all consequential benefits
including continuity of service and seniority, and therefore he cannot be
denied the benefit of Selection Scale or Super Time Scale. He submits
that denying such scale to the opponent amounts to rendering this
Court’s direction of granting ‘all consequential benefits’ to the Judicial
Officer otiose.
10. The learned senior counsel vehemently argued that the Judicial Officer
cannot be held responsible or be blamed for the non-availability of ACRs
for the period 2016 to 2021 since he was unlawfully kept away from
service for the period 27.01.2016 to 13.04.2022. He submitted that the
Judicial Officer had been wrongfully discharged and therefore, the
applicant cannot now seek to derive any advantage of its own
wrongdoing to deny him the benefit of the pay scale to which he would
have been entitled, had he been allowed to perform his duties.
11. He further submitted that the direction of this Court in the subject
judgment leaves no manner of doubt that while considering the grant of
Selection Scale or Super Time Scale, the period of discharge, i.e.
Miscellaneous Application No. 2228 of 2026 Page 10 of 36
27.01.2016 to 13.04.2022 shall be considered as period rendered in
service by the Judicial Officer. He argued that any other interpretation
would be in derogation of the express direction of the subject judgment.
Furthermore, he submitted that Rule 54 of the Rajasthan Service Rules,
1951, provides that where an officer has been fully exonerated, the
period of absence from duty shall be treated as period spent on duty for
all purposes.
12. The learned senior counsel placed strong reliance on this Court’s
judgment in Central Bank of India & Ors. v. Dragendra Singh
Jadon [(2022) 8 SCC 378] to submit that the employer cannot take
advantage of its own wrong of wrongfully dismissing the employee from
service and denying him the benefit of seniority, promotion and other
benefits to which he would have been entitled, if he had attended to his
duties. Thus, he argued that, in the present matter as well, the judicial
officer cannot be denied the benefit of Selection Scale or Super Time
Scale for non-availability of ACRs as he cannot be blamed for the same.
13. The learned senior counsel drew our attention to the fact that officers
junior to the opponent have been granted the benefits of Selection Scale
and Super Time Scale in the years 2019 and 2023 respectively, while
the opponent remains deprived of such consequential benefit. In this
regard, the learned senior counsel relied on this Court’s judgment in
Gurpal Singh v. High Court of Judicature of Rajasthan [(2012) 13
Miscellaneous Application No. 2228 of 2026 Page 11 of 36
SCC 94] wherein it was held that the petitioner therein was entitled to
be considered for the promotion notionally when an officer junior to him
was promoted and also directed that the officer would be entitled to all
consequential benefits.
14. Furthermore, the learned senior counsel also placed reliance upon this
Court’s judgment in Union of India v. K.V. Jankiraman [(1991) 4 SCC
109] wherein, it was held that when an employee is completely
exonerated, he has to be given all consequential benefits from the date
on which he would have normally been promoted but for the disciplinary
proceedings.
15. The learned senior counsel submitted that in cases where ACRs of an
officer are not available for any reason (such as non-communication of
ACRs, non-preparation, etc.), the decision regarding promotion /grant
of scale ought to be taken on the basis of available ACRs of the officer.
However, he added that uncommunicated and uninitiated ACRs of an
officer cannot be used to his prejudice and have to be excluded while
considering the grant of consequential benefits. In this regard, he
further submitted that this Court’s decisions in Prabhu Dayal
Khandelwal v. Chairman, UPSC & Ors. [(2015) 14 SCC 427] and in
R.K. Jibanlata Devi v. High Court of Manipur & Ors., [2023 SCC
OnLine SC 178] respectively are of significant relevance. In Prabhu
Dayal (supra), the applicable rules therein had provided that the last
Miscellaneous Application No. 2228 of 2026 Page 12 of 36
five ACRs were to be taken into consideration for promotion. However,
since the ACRs for some of the years in the subject time period were
uncommunicated, it was held that the case for promotion had to be
considered on the basis of the two ACRs which had been communicated
and valid. Similarly, in the case of R.K. Jibanlata Devi (supra), wherein
the ACRs for two out of the required four years were not communicated,
this Court had directed that the promotion of the petitioner therein be
considered on the basis of the available ACRs of the remaining years.
16. Thus, the learned senior counsel submitted that in the present case as
well, since the Judicial officer cannot be blamed for the non-availability
of ACRs for the period 2016 to 2021, he ought to be given the benefit of
Selection Scale/Super Time Scale on the basis of the available ACRs. He
drew this Court’s attention to the fact that the available ACRs of the
Judicial Officer are as under:
S.No. Period Remarks in ACR
1 2013 Very good
2 2014 (Part I) Very good
3 2014 (Part II) Good
4 2022 Very good
17. The learned senior counsel in his detailed submissions further added
that in the ACR for the year 2014 (Part II) the remark ‘Good’ was
Miscellaneous Application No. 2228 of 2026 Page 13 of 36
qualified with another comment regarding the requirement to improve
judicial work. However, the learned senior counsel submitted that such
remarks made in the ACR for 2014(PartII) were based upon the enquiry
initiated against the Judicial Officer vide chargesheet issued on
07.08.2015, and not for the period of 2014 for which it was meant to be.
He submitted that as far as the ACR for the year 2015 is concerned, the
said ACR was prepared after the Judicial Officer was discharged. As the
said ACR was never communicated to the Judicial Officer, the subject
judgment had held that the non-communication of the ACR for the year
2015 was arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of
India, and that the said ACR could not have been the basis of the
discharge order passed against the Judicial Officer.
18. Furthermore, the learned senior counsel also highlighted the following
findings recorded by this Court in paragraph no. 71 of the judgment, as
being relevant to the determination of the present MA:
a. That the Judicial Officer was competent to pass the bail order
dated 27.04.2015 and the Hon’ble Rajasthan High Court has not
been able to prove any extraneous consideration or ulterior motive
on the part of the officer.
b. That there was no material to showcase unsatisfactory
performance of the Judicial Officer in terms of the requirement
under Rule 45 and 46 of Rajasthan Judicial Service Rules, 2010.
Miscellaneous Application No. 2228 of 2026 Page 14 of 36
19. Having put forth the submissions as mentioned hereinabove, the
learned senior counsel prayed that the applicant/Rajasthan HC on its
administrative side, be directed to grant the benefit of Selection Scale
and Super Time Scale to the Judicial Officer, in terms of the subject
judgment.
(ii) Submissions on behalf of the Rajasthan H igh Court, on its
administrative side:
20. Mr. Gopal Jha, the learned Advocate-on-Record, appearing for the
applicant, Rajasthan High Court on its administrative side, submitted
that the Full Court in its meeting convened on 21.08.2024, found that
the opponent was not suitable for grant of Selection Scale or Super Time
Scale for want of requisite number of ‘Outstanding/Very Good/Good’
entries in his available ACRs of the preceding years.
21. The learned counsel submitted that the opponent has only four ACRs,
i.e. 2013, 2014, 2015 & 2022 respectively, as he remained out of service
from January, 2016 to May, 2022.
22. With regard to the communication of the ACR for the year 2015, the
learned counsel submitted that the ACR had not been conveyed since it
was still in the process of being filled up and could not be completed by
the time the opponent was discharged from service in August 2016.
Miscellaneous Application No. 2228 of 2026 Page 15 of 36
Since the prevalent practice is to not convey ACRs to officers who have
retired or not in service, the ACR for the year 2015 could not be conveyed
to the opponent when he remained out of service.
23. In such circumstances referred to above, the learned counsel prayed
that taking into consideration the recommendation dated 03.08.2024 of
the Higher Judiciary Committee, and the resolution of the Full Court of
the Rajasthan HC dated 21.0.2024, this Court may clarify the order
dated 15.03.2022 as regards the granting of Selection Scale or Super
Time Scale to the Judicial Officer.
C. ISSUE FOR DETERMINATION
24. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties, and having
gone through the materials on record, the following question falls for our
consideration:
Whether the ‘consequential benefits’ awarded to the Judicial
Officer in the present matter, vide Judgment and Order dated
15.03.2022, would include the grant of Selection Scale or Super
Time Scale without the requisite number of Annual Confidential
Report(s)?
Miscellaneous Application No. 2228 of 2026 Page 16 of 36
D. ANALYSIS:
25. Our adjudication essentially revolves around the core issue whether the
opponent Judicial Officer is entitled to the grant of Selection Scale or
Super Time Scale, despite the non-availability of the requisite number
of ACRs. The principal submission advanced on behalf of the applicant
Rajasthan HC is that, although the opponent has been reinstated with
the consequential benefits of seniority and continuity of service, yet the
absence of the requisite number of ACRs for the intervening period
nevertheless disentitles him from being considered for the grant of
Selection Scale or Super Time Scale.
26. The question whether the Judicial Officer could have been denied the
benefit of Selection Scale or Super Time Scale for want of the requisite
ACRs has to be considered in the backdrop of the circumstances which
led to the non-availability of those ACRs. In other words, before
examining the legal effect of the absence of the requisite ACRs, it
becomes necessary to ascertain whether such absence is attributable to
the Judicial Officer or not. It is in this context that the decisions of this
Court in K.V. Jankiraman (supra) and Dragendra Singh Jadon
(supra) respectively, relied upon by the learned senior counsel appearing
for the Judicial Officer, assume considerable significance. Both the
decisions embody the principle that the consequential benefits of
seniority, pay, promotion and the like, cannot be refused merely because
Miscellaneous Application No. 2228 of 2026 Page 17 of 36
fulfilment of the eligibility conditions had been rendered impossible by
the employer’s own wrongful act of causing impediment in the service
tenure of the employee.
27. In K.V. Jankiraman (supra), a three-Judge Bench of this Court
recognised that where an employee is completely exonerated and is not
blameworthy in the least, he ought not to be deprived of the benefits
which would have ordinarily accrued to him in the normal course of
service. It was held that such an employee is entitled not only to the
notional promotion, but also to the salary and all consequential benefits
of the promotional post from the date on which he would have ordinarily
been promoted but for the disciplinary intervention. The underlying
rationale is that an employee cannot be prejudiced by the circumstances
for which he bears no responsibility and which have subsequently been
found to be unjustified. The relevant observation of this Court in K.V.
Jankiraman (supra), reads thus:
“23.There is no doubt that when an employee is completely
exonerated and is not visited with the penalty even of censure
indicating thereby that he was not blameworthy in the least,
he should not be deprived of any benefits including the salary
of the promotional post. It was urged on behalf of the appellant-
authorities in all these cases that a person is not entitled to the
salary of the post unless he assumes charge of the same. […]
xxx xxx xxx
Miscellaneous Application No. 2228 of 2026 Page 18 of 36
25. We are not much impressed by the contentions advanced on
behalf of the authorities. The normal rule of “no work no pay”
is not applicable to cases such as the present one where the
employee although he is willing to work is kept away from
work by the authorities for no fault of his. This is not a case
where the employee remains away from work for his own
reasons, although the work is offered to him. It is for this
reason that F.R. 17(1) will also be inapplicable to such cases.
26. We are, therefore, broadly in agreement with the finding of the
Tribunal that when an employee is completely exonerated
meaning thereby that he is not found blameworthy in the
least and is not visited with the penalty even of censure, he
has to be given the benefit of the salary of the higher post
along with the other benefits from the date on which he
would have normally been promoted but for the
disciplinary/criminal proceedings. However, there may be
cases where the proceedings, whether disciplinary or criminal, are,
for example, delayed at the instance of the employee or the
clearance in the disciplinary proceedings or acquittal in the criminal
proceedings is with benefit of doubt or on account of non-availability
of evidence due to the acts attributable to the employee etc. In such
circumstances, the concerned authorities must be vested with the
power to decide whether the employee at all deserves any salary
for the intervening period and if he does, the extent to which he
deserves it. Life being complex, it is not possible to anticipate and
enumerate exhaustively all the circumstances under which such
consideration may become necessary. To ignore, however, such
circumstances when they exist and lay down an inflexible rule that
in every case when an e mployee is exonerated in
disciplinary/criminal proceedings he should be entitled to all salary
Miscellaneous Application No. 2228 of 2026 Page 19 of 36
for the intervening period is to undermine discipline in the
administration and jeopardise public interests. […]”
(Emphasis supplied)
28. This Court in Dragedra Singh Jadon (supra), similarly endorsed the
view that the employer cannot deny the consequential benefits arising
out of employment, when the dismissal itself was wrongful. The relevant
observation of this Court in Dragedra Singh Jadon (supra) reads thus:
“21. The appellant Bank cannot take advantage of its own
wrong of wrongfully dismissing the respondent from service,
to deny him the benefit of seniority, promotion and other
benefits to which he would have been entitled, if he had
attended to his duties.”
(Emphasis supplied)
29. Therefore, it is necessary to first ascertain whether the opponent
Judicial Officer can be held liable for the non-availability of the requisite
ACRs, and for that it is imperative to refer to the subject judgment. In
the present matter, this Court had quashed the discharge order, with
the observation that though the opponent might have been negligent in
the sense that he did not carefully go through the case file and had failed
to take notice of the order of the High Court, which was on his file, yet
such negligence cannot be treated to be a misconduct. It was observed
Miscellaneous Application No. 2228 of 2026 Page 20 of 36
that merely because a wrong order has been passed by the opponent or
the action taken by him could have been different, the same by itself
without anything more did not warrant initiation of disciplinary
proceedings against the Judicial Officer. It was also noted that the
present case did not involve a string of continuous illegal orders that
might have been alleged to be passed for extraneous considerations.
Rather, the present case revolved around only a single bail order, and
that too was passed with competent jurisdiction. It was categorically
noted that in the present case, there was no material to showcase
unsatisfactory performance of the opponent in terms of requirement
under Rules 45 and 46 of the Rajasthan Judicial Service Rules, 2010
(“RJS Rules, 2010”) respectively. It was emphatically stated by this
Court that this is not the case where there are strong grounds to suspect
the opponent’s bona fide and even if the opponent’s act is considered to
be negligent, it cannot be treated as “misconduct”. The relevant
observation of this Court made in the judgment & order dated
15.03.2022, reads thus:
“69. In light of the above judicial pronouncements, we hold that the
appellant may have been guilty of negligence in the sense
that he did not carefully go through the case file and did not
take notice of the order of the High Court which was on his
file. This negligence cannot be treated to be misconduct.
Moreover, the enquiry officer virtually sat as a court of appeal
picking holes in the order granting bail, even when he could not find
Miscellaneous Application No. 2228 of 2026 Page 21 of 36
any extraneous reason for the grant of the bail order. Notably, in
the present case, there was not a string of continuous illegal
orders that have been alleged to be passed for extraneous
considerations. The present case revolves only around a
single bail order, and that too was passed with competent
jurisdiction. As has been rightly held by this Court in Sadhna
Chaudhary (supra), mere suspicion cannot constitute
“misconduct”. Any ‘probability’ of misconduct needs to be supported
with oral or documentary material, and this requirement has not
been fulfilled in the present case. These observations assume
importance in light of the specific fact that there was no allegation
of illegal gratification against the present appellant. As has been
rightly held by this Court, such relief-oriented judicial approaches
cannot by themselves be grounds to cast aspersions on the honesty
and integrity of an officer.
xxx xxx xxx
71. To conclude, we are of the firm view that in the present
case there was no material to showcase unsatisfactory
performance of the appellant in terms of requirement under
Rule 45 and 46 of the RJS Rules, 2010. Moreover, the
appellant’s discharge was not simpliciter, as claimed by the
respondent. The non-communication of the ACRs to the
appellant has been proved to be arbitrary and since the
respondent choose to hold an enquiry into appellant’s alleged
misconduct, the termination of his service is by way of punishment
because it puts a stigma on his competence and thus affects his
future career. In such a case, the appellant would be entitled to the
protection of Article 311(2) of the Constitution. Moreover, the adverse
comments in the ACR for the year 2015 could not have been the
Miscellaneous Application No. 2228 of 2026 Page 22 of 36
basis on which the appellant was discharged from service. The
appellant was never granted an opportunity to improve and
there was no intimation to him about his performance being
unsatisfactory. Importantly, no verifiable complaint was
filed against the appellant that could form the basis of the
disciplinary proceeding against him. After perusing all the
relevant record, we hold that the appellant was competent to
pass the bail order dated 27.04.2015 and that the
Respondent has not been able to prove the pr esence of any
extraneous consideration or ulterior motive on the part of the
appellant. It should also be highlighted here that neither the bail
order dated 27.04.2015 was ever challenged by the State before
any Court of law, nor was any complaint received against the
appellant regarding the said bail order. This is not the case where
there are strong grounds to suspect the appellant’s bona
fides. Even if appellant’s act is considered to be negligent, it
cannot be treated as “misconduct”.
72. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed and the impugned order of
the High Court dated 21.10.2019 is set aside and the discharge
order dated 27.01.2016 is quashed. Keeping in view that the
appellant has not worked as judicial officer after he was discharged,
we direct that while the appellant be reinstated with all
consequential benefits including continuity of service and
seniority but will be entitled to be paid only 50% back wages, which
may be paid within a period of four months from today.”
(Emphasis supplied)
Miscellaneous Application No. 2228 of 2026 Page 23 of 36
30. Thus, it has already been held by this Court in the present case that the
opponent was wrongfully discharged from service. It is but a natural and
inevitable corollary of such such wrongful discharge that the opponent
could not have earned the requisite number of ACRs for the relevant
period of time, since he was kept out of service by the applicant itself.
The absence of the requisite ACRs, therefore, is not attributable to any
omission, default or deficiency on the part of the opponent, but is solely
the direct consequence of the applicant’s wrongful action. In such
circumstances, it would be manifestly unjust to permit the applicant to
rely upon a shortcoming which it itself created in order to deny the
opponent of the consequential service benefits that would otherwise
have accrued to him. The law does not permit a party to derive an
advantage from its own wrongful act. Consequently, the opponent
cannot be made to bear the adverse consequences of the wrongful
discharge, by being denied consideration for the grant of the Selection
Scale or the Super Time Scale on the ground of non-availability of the
requisite number of ACRs, for the period during which he was
unlawfully kept out of service.
31. This Court in a plethora of its decisions has held that even when the
requisite number of valid ACRs are not available, that in itself should
not make the employee ineligible for the pay scale or promotion involved.
Rather, in circumstances where the employee is found to be not
responsible for the default, the evaluations for the respective pay scale
Miscellaneous Application No. 2228 of 2026 Page 24 of 36
or promotion are to be undertaken based on the remaining ACRs which
are valid. We may refer to this Court’s judgment in Prabhu Dayal
(supra) and R.K. Jibanlata Devi (supra) respectively to expound the
position of law on this issue. In both Prabhu Dayal (supra), and R.K.
Jibanlata Devi (supra) respectively, this Court held that when, due to
the employer’s fault, the ACRs are short of the number required to meet
the eligibility criteria, the employee would nevertheless have to be
considered for the promotion or pay scale based on the other remaining
valid ACRs.
32. The relevant observation of this Court in Prabhu Dayal (supra) is as
follows:
“7. In the above view of the matter, we are satisfied that the
impugned order passed by the High Court, deserves to be set aside,
inasmuch as, the claim of the appellant could not be ignored by
taking into consideration, uncommunicated annual confidential
reports for the years 1995-1996, 1996-1997 and 1998-1999,
wherein the appellant was assessed as "good". In the absence of
the aforesaid entries, it is apparent, that the remaining
entries of the appellant being "very good", he would be
entitled to be considered fit for the promotion, to the post of
Chief Commissioner of Income Tax, on the basis of the then
prevailing DoPT guidelines, and the remaining valid annual
confidential reports.
xxx xxx xxx
Miscellaneous Application No. 2228 of 2026 Page 25 of 36
9. In the above view of the matter, we are satisfied, that the
respondents ought to be directed to reconsider the claim of
promotion of the appellant, to the post of Chief Commissioner of
Income Tax, for the vacancies which arose during the years 2000-
2001 and 2001-2002 on the basis of the communicated reports
for the years 1997-1998 and 1999 -2000, within a period of
three months from today. Ordered accordingly.
10. In case the appellant is found to be entitled for promotion to the
post of Chief Commissioner of Income Tax, he shall be promoted to
the said post, with effect from the date of his entitlement. In such an
eventuality, he shall also be entitled to all arrears of salary, as
would have been payable to him, if he had been promoted as Chief
Commissioner of Income Tax at the right time. Simultaneously, he
would be entitled to revision of his retiral benefits.
11. In case the appellant is found suitable for the promotion, this
order should not be taken as permitting the authorities to interfere
with the promotions already made. Suffice it to state that, to
accommodate”
(Emphasis supplied)
33. Similarly, this Court in R.K. Jibanlata Devi (supra) had held that when
certain ACRs were found to be invalid due to non-communication by the
employer, the employee deserved to be considered for promotion in issue
therein, based on the ACRs for the remaining years. The relevant
observation of this Court in R.K. Jibanlata Devi (supra) reads thus:
Miscellaneous Application No. 2228 of 2026 Page 26 of 36
“22. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, the case
of the petitioner for promotion to the post of Assistant Registrar
as on 9-4-2021 is required to be considered afresh ignoring the
uncommunicated ACRs for the years 2016 -2017 and 2019-20
and her case is required to be considered afresh taking into
consideration the ACRs for the years 2017 -2018 and 2018-
2019 for which the petitioner was having "Very Good"
gradings.
23. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, present
petition is allowed. The DPC proceedings dated 9-4-2021 denying
the promotion to the petitioner for the post of Assistant Registrar are
hereby quashed and set aside. The case of the petitioner for
promotion to the post of Assistant Registrar as on 9-4-2021 i.e. the
date on which the juniors came to be promoted is directed to be
considered afresh ignoring the uncommunicated ACRs for the years
2016-2017 and 2019- 20 and thereafter the DPC/competent
authority to take a fresh decision in accordance with law and
taking into consideration the ACRS of remaining years i.e.
2017-2018 and 2018-2019. Such an exercise be completed within
a period of six weeks from today.
24. In case after fresh exercise as above the petitioner is promoted
to the post of Assistant Registrar, it goes without saying that she
shall be entitled to all the consequential benefits including the
arrears, seniority, etc. w.e.f. 9-4-2021 the day on which the juniors
came to be promoted.”
(Emphasis supplied)
Miscellaneous Application No. 2228 of 2026 Page 27 of 36
34. Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the present case, we are
of the considered view that the opponent could not have been denied the
benefit of Selection Scale or Super Time Scale merely because the
requisite number of ACRs were unavailable for the period during which
he was kept out of service pursuant to his wrongful discharge. As noted
hereinabove, this Court in the present matter has categorically held that
the opponent’s discharge was wholly unsustainable. In such
circumstances, consistent with the principle enunciated by this Court
in Prabhu Dayal (supra) and R.K. Jibanlata Devi (supra) respectively,
the opponent’s entitlement is required to be assessed on the basis of the
valid ACRs and cannot be allowed to be defeated on account of the
absence of requisite number of ACRs occasioned solely by the
applicant’s own wrongful action.
35. We may turn to the relevant paragraphs of the subject judgment wherein
this Court had referred to the opponent’s ACRs for the years 2013, 2014
and 2015 respectively, in order to arrive at its decision. The same reads
thus:
“43. The material placed before the Higher Judicial Committee,
which recommended the discharge of the appellant, clearly shows
that no adverse remarks were made against the appellant
except in relation to the grant of bail on 27.04.2015. The said
material consisted of Bi-Annual Reports/Special Reports and
the ACRs of the appellant. The Bi-annual/Special Reports for
the period of July 2013-January 2014, January 2014 -July
Miscellaneous Application No. 2228 of 2026 Page 28 of 36
2014 and July 2014-January 2015, which were placed before
the committee makes it clear that the work and conduct of the
appellant was “good” and his integrity was never doubted.
Furthermore, the ACR of the appellant for the year 2013
contains the comment “very good” and mentions that the
integrity of the appellant was never in doubt . Similarly, the
ACR for the year 2014(Part -I) records the comment “very
good” for the appellant and also provides him with an
integrity certificate.
44. The ACR for the year 2014(Part -II) contains the remark
“good” for the appellant. During this period, the appellant was
working as the Presiding Officer, Labour cum Industrial Tribunal. In
this context, it is pertinent to note that the comment by the Inspecting
Judge regarding the requirement to “improve judicial work” is based
upon the enquiry initiated against the appellant vide chargesheet
issued on 07.08.2015, which related to his functioning as Special
Judge, ACD cases Court, Bharatpur and not for the period of 2014.
Additionally, the aforesaid comment by the Inspecting Judge is
contrary to the comments made by him in the Special Report for the
contemporaneous period which clearly records his conduct,
performance and work throughout the period to be “good”. Lastly,
no adverse remark is made even by the Administrative Judge,
who only added an advisory remark for the officer to
concentrate on judicial work and improve the quality.
Notably, no remark was made against the integrity of the
appellant.
xxx xxx xxx
Miscellaneous Application No. 2228 of 2026 Page 29 of 36
46. In our opinion, to argue that the comments and observations in
this 2015 ACR were the basis on which the appellant was
discharged, is misplaced and erroneous. Firstly, a bare perusal of
the ACR reveals that the top of this ACR itself carried a comment
that read “Discharged from Service”. Secondly, the Higher Judicial
Committee had, even prior to the submission of the 2015 ACR,
already recommended the discharge of the appellant. Notably, the
ACR for the year 2015 was filled and submitted by the appellant on
20.01.2016, while the Higher Judicial Committee had already
recommended the discharge of the appellant on 24.11.2015 itself
and the impugned order of discharge was passed on 27.01.2016,
admittedly, in pursuance of a Full Court meeting on 20.01.2016.
Additionally, although the learned counsel for the respondent had
submitted before us that the Integrity Certificate of the Appellant
was withheld by the Inspecting Judge, he failed to highlight that the
reason for the certificate being withheld was that the appellant had
been served with a chargesheet and not because of the appellant’s
service record.
47. Moreover, it is not disputed that the ACRs were not
communicated to him within reasonable time. In this context,
a 3-Judge Bench of this Court in Sukhdev Singh vs Union of India
[(2013) 9 SCC 566] has held that:
“In our opinion, the view taken in Dev Dutt [Dev Dutt vs Union
of India] that every entry in ACR of a public servant must be
communicated to him/her within a reasonable period is
legally sound and helps in achieving threefold objectives.
First, the communication of every entry in the ACR to a public
servant helps him/her to work harder and achieve more that
helps him in improving his work and give better results.
Second and equally important, on being made aware of the
Miscellaneous Application No. 2228 of 2026 Page 30 of 36
entry in the ACR, the public servant may feel dissatisfied with
the same. Communication of the entry enables him/her to
make representation for upgradation of the remarks entered
in the ACR. Third, communication of every entry in the ACR
brings transparency in recording the remarks relating to a
public servant and the system becomes more conforming to
the principles of natural justice. We, accordingly, hold that
every entry in ACR-poor, fair, average, good or very good-must
be communicated to him/her within a reasonable period.”
(emphasis supplied)
Hence, in light of the above, the non-communication of the
ACRs to the appellant in the present case is arbitrary and as
has been held by this court in Maneka Gandhi vs Union of India
[(1978) 1 SCC 248], such arbitrariness violated Article 14 of the
Constitution of India.
xxx xxx xxx
51. We also find merit in the submission of the appellant that the
adverse comments in the ACR for the year 2015 could not have been
the basis on which the appellant was discharged from service.
Additionally, it is pertinent to note that the learned counsel for the
Respondent has himself submitted that the ACR for the year 2015
was recorded after the discharge order was passed and that the
comments of the Administrative Judge were made on 08.06.2016
and are based upon the enquiry and the subsequent discharge of
the appellant. Moreover, upon the perusal of the ACR for the year
2015, it is revealed that despite the comments recorded, the overall
performance of the Appellant was rated as “good” by the Inspecting
Judge himself. Part-II of the said ARC also contains the comment
“good” on the appellant’s capacity of handling files systematically
Miscellaneous Application No. 2228 of 2026 Page 31 of 36
and the comment “Yes” on whether the appellant is fair and
impartial in dealing with the public and the bar. Therefore, we are
of the opinion that the submissions of the learned counsel of the
appellant holds merit that there was no material on record to
showcase unsatisfactory performance of the appellant in
terms of requirement under Rule 45 and 46 of the RJS Rules,
2010.
52. There appears to be no infirmity in the appellant’s record
and the entire recommendation of discharge by the Higher Judicial
Committee is based upon the passing of the bail order dated
27.04.2015. Moreover, it is also pertinent to note that the Enquiry
Judge of the Disciplinary Proceeding against the appellant was also
a part of the Higher Judicial Committee which had to provide
recommendations regarding discharge/confirmation of judicial
officers.
xxx xxx xxx
54. We are in agreement with the ratio laid down in the case of
Ishwar Chand Jain (supra) that every judicial officer is likely to
commit mistake of some kind or the other in passing orders in the
initial stage of his service, which a mature judicial officer would not
do. However, if the orders are passed without there being any
corrupt motive, the same should be over-looked by the High Court
and proper guidance should be provided to him. In the present case,
admittedly there was no intimation to appellant about his
performance being unsatisfactory and hence he was deprived of his
opportunity to improve as a judicial officer.
xxx xxx xxx
Miscellaneous Application No. 2228 of 2026 Page 32 of 36
69. In light of the above judicial pronouncements, we hold that the
appellant may have been guilty of negligence in the sense that he
did not carefully go through the case file and did not take notice of
the order of the High Court which was on his file. This negligence
cannot be treated to be misconduct.[…]”
(Emphasis supplied)
36. Thus, we find that this Court has held that the adverse remarks
contained in the opponent’s ACR for the year 2015 could not have formed
the basis of his discharge and further held that the non-communication
of the said ACR was arbitrary. In view of the law laid down by this Court
in Sukhdev Singh vs Union of India [(2013) 9 SCC 566], an
uncommunicated ACR cannot be relied upon to the detriment of the
employee while determining his entitlement to promotion, pay scale or
any career advancement. Consequently, the ACR for the year 2015
cannot be taken into consideration for determining t he opponent’s
entitlement to Selection Scale or Super Time Scale. Therefore, as already
explained hereinabove, it is in line with the principle enunciated by this
Court in Prabhu Dayal (supra) and R.K. Jibanlata Devi (supra),
respectively, we hold that the opponent is liable to be assessed on the
basis of the remaining valid ACRs i.e. those for the years 2013 and 2014
(both Part I & Part II), which contain the following remarks:
Miscellaneous Application No. 2228 of 2026 Page 33 of 36
S.No. Period Remarks in ACR
1 2013 Very good
2 2014 (Part I) Very good
3 2014 (Part II) Good
37. As the above-quoted findings of this Court clearly indicate, the service
record of the opponent, as it stood prior to his wrongful discharge, has
been found to be free from any material warranting denial of career
progression, but rather contain the remarks “Very good” and “Good”
along with integrity certificates.
38. Therefore, upon perusal of the ACRs for the year 2013 and 2014 (Part I
& Part II), we hold that in order to give full effect to the relief of
reinstatement as granted by this Court, the opponent shall be entitled to
the grant of the Selection Scale and Super Time Scale with effect from
the dates on which he first became due for such consideration in the
normal course of service as per Rule 49 and Rule 50 of the RJS Rules,
2010, respectively, read with the Full Court Resolution of the Rajasthan
HC dated 15th January, 2011.
39. The materials on record indicate that the opponent was appointed as an
Additional District Judge vide order dated 15.07.2013 [Order no.
F.19(8)Nyaya/2011], issued by the Law & Legal Affairs Department,
Government of Rajasthan. Since he was reinstated in service with the
Miscellaneous Application No. 2228 of 2026 Page 34 of 36
consequential benefits of continuity of service and seniority, he can be
said to have completed five years of service on 15.07.2018. Therefore,
as per Rule 49 of the RJS Rules, 2010, the earliest point in time when
the opponent can be said to have become due for consideration for the
grant of Selection Scale, is 16.07.2018. It is not in dispute that vide
order dated 16.07.2019 [Order No. Estt. (RJS) 55/2019], the Registrar
General, Rajasthan High Court, granted the benefit of Selection Scale to
the officers recruited alongside (and even those junior to) the opponent
in accordance with their respective dates of eligibility starting July, 2018
onwards. Accordingly, we hold that the opponent is entitled to the grant
of Selection Scale with effect from 16.07.2018.
40. Once the opponent is held entitled to Selection Scale with effect from
16.07.2018, the period notionally spent in Selection Scale must
necessarily be reckoned for the purpose of granting Super Time Scale.
Consequently, upon completion of the period of three years in Selection
Scale, as prescribed in Rule 50 of the RJS Rules, 2010, the earliest point
in time when the opponent can be said to have become due for
consideration for the grant of Super Time Scale is 16.07.2021. It is also
not in dispute that vide order dated 12.09.2023 [Order No. Estt. (RJS)
62/2023], the Registrar General, Rajasthan High Court, granted the
benefit of Super Time Scale to the officers appointed alongside (and even
those junior to) the opponent in accordance with their respective dates
of eligibility, starting July, 2021 onwards. The opponent is, therefore,
Miscellaneous Application No. 2228 of 2026 Page 35 of 36
equally entitled to the said benefit. Accordingly, we hold that the
opponent is entitled to the grant of Super Time Scale with effect from
16.07.2021.
E. CONCLUSION:
41. Thus, for the reasons stated hereinabove, we hold that since the
applicant was itself responsible for the opponent’s wrongful discharge
and the resultant non-availability of the requisite number of ACRs, the
said circumstance could not have been relied upon by it to deny the
opponent the grant of Selection Scale or Super Time Scale. In
consonance with the principles laid down by this Court in Prabhu
Dayal (supra) and R.K. Jibanlata Devi (supra) respectively, we hold
that where the non-availability of the requisite ACRs is attributable to
the employer, the employee’s entitlement to the promotion/pay in
question is required to be assessed on the basis of the remaining valid
ACRs. Accordingly, we hold that the opponent’s entitlement to the
Selection Scale and Super Time Scale is liable to be determined on the
basis of his valid ACRs for the years 2013 and 2014 (Part I & Part II),
respectively.
42. Having regard to the opponent’s valid ACRs for the years 2013 and 2014
(Part I & Part II), read with the findings recorded by this Court whereby
the opponent was granted reinstatement with continuity of service,
seniority and all consequential benefits, we hold that the opponent is
Miscellaneous Application No. 2228 of 2026 Page 36 of 36
entitled to the grant of Selection Scale with effect from 16.07.2018 and
Super Time Scale with effect from 16.07.2021.
43. We further clarify that the arrears arising from the grant of Selection
Scale and Super Time Scale respectively, shall be computed by giving
effect to the direction contained in the judgment and order dated
15.03.2022 of this Court, with regard to payment of 50% back wages.
The applicant shall accordingly re-fix the opponent’s pay, revise all
consequential benefits and disburse the arrears payable to the opponent
within a period of three months from the date of this judgment.
44. With the aforesaid, the miscellaneous application stands disposed of.
45. Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of.
46. Registry shall forward one copy each of this judgment to all the High
Courts.
…………………………………. J.
(J.B. PARDIWALA)
………………………………….J .
(MANOJ MISRA)
New Delhi
29
th
July, 2026
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