Page 1 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 792 OF 2014

Additional District and Sessions Judge ‘X’ … Petitioner

versus

Registrar General,

High Court of Madhya Pradesh and others … Respondents

J U D G M E N T

Jagdish Singh Khehar, J.

1. The present writ petition has been filed by a former

Additional District and Sessions Judge of the Madhya Pradesh

Higher Judicial Service. The factual narration in the writ petition

incorporates allegations of sexual harassment aimed at the

petitioner, at the behest of a sitting Judge of the High Court of

Madhya Pradesh (herein after referred to as, ‘the High Court’),

who has been impleaded by name as respondent no.3. The

authenticity of the allegations levelled by the petitioner, which

have been expressly disputed by respondent no.3, would stand

Page 2 affirmed or repudiated only after culmination of due process.

Such being the sensitivity of the matter, it would be inappropriate

to disclose the identity either of the petitioner or of respondent

no.3. In the title of the present writ petition, as also in its

contents, the petitioner has been described as Additional District

and Sessions Judge ‘X’. We shall refer to her as Addl.D&SJ ‘X’.

This would help to preserve the dignity of the petitioner. Insofar

as respondent no.3 is concerned, since he is a sitting Judge of the

High Court, his reputation deserves a similar protection, we shall

refer to him as Justice ‘A’.

2. The averments made in the writ petition reveal that the

petitioner having practiced as an advocate for fifteen years at

Delhi, applied for appointment by way of direct recruitment to the

Madhya Pradesh Higher Judicial Service. On the culmination of

the process of selection, the merit list of the selected candidates

was released on 22.3.2011. The petitioner was placed at serial

no.2 in the merit list. She was accordingly appointed as District

Judge (entry level) by the Madhya Pradesh State Legal and

Legislative Works Department, vide order dated 8.7.2011. She

was deputed for training on 30.7.2011 and was posted as

Additional District and Sessions Judge, Gwalior.

2

Page 3 3. The contents of the writ petition are systematically

divided into various components. In the first part of the writ

petition, the petitioner endeavours to demonstrate her efficient

discharge of duties. For this, reliance has been placed on an

order passed by the Sessions Judge, Gwalior dated 9.10.2012

(while exercising powers under Sections 408 and 409 of the

Criminal Procedure Code), whereby all sessions cases, criminal

appeals, criminal revisions and miscellaneous criminal cases etc.

pending in the Court of the 2

nd

Additional Sessions Judge, were

transferred to the Court of the petitioner. Relying on the above

order, it is the petitioner’s contention, that her superiors

immediately recognized her professional caliber, and afforded her

an opportunity to deal with the important and sensitive cases. On

23.1.2013, the Sessions Judge, Gwalior, nominated the petitioner

for regular hearing and expeditious disposal of heinous and

sensational cases involving offences of rape, gang-rape, rape with

murder etc. under the Indian Penal Code. It is further brought

out, that on 9.4.2013, the petitioner was appointed as the

President of the Vishaka Committee (in compliance with the

directions issued by this Court in Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan,

(1997) 6 SCC 241), by the District and Sessions Judge, Gwalior. It

3

Page 4 is also pointed out, that the High Court (in exercise of the power

vested in it under Section 6(2) of the Madhya Pradesh Dekaiti Aur

Vyapaharan Prabhavit Kshotra Adhiniyam, 1981) appointed the

petitioner as “Special Judge” for dealing with matters falling in a

defined area within the territorial jurisdiction of Gwalior Sessions

Division. It is pointed out that again, through a notification dated

10.5.2013 (in exercise of the power under Section 9(3) of the

Code of Criminal Procedure), the High Court designated the

petitioner as “Presiding Officer” for speedy trial of offences of

rape, gang-rape, murder with rape and other related offences. It

is also the case of the petitioner, that the petitioner’s

performance came to be evaluated by the District and Sessions

Judge in a report dated 5.1.2013. It is submitted, that thereafter

in April 2013, the District Judge (Inspection and Vigilance)

inspected the civil and criminal records and assessed the

petitioner’s performance.

4. The factual position with respect to the selection and

appointment of the petitioner has not been disputed. The fact

that the petitioner was assigned different responsibilities from

time to time is also acknowledged. It is not necessary for us to

record the personal assessment made by the petitioner on the

4

Page 5 basis of the afore-stated reports, suffice it to state that in the

reply filed before this Court on behalf of the Registrar General of

the High Court (respondent no.1), it is acknowledged that even

though her disposal was assessed as – average, her overall

performance was graded as – very good ‘B’. It was further

pointed out, that even though the petitioner was advised to

improve inter-personal relationship and team work skills, her

overall assessment was evaluated as – ‘very good’.

5(i).The next component of the writ petition is devoted to the

allegations levelled against respondent no.3 – Justice ‘A’. It is

asserted, that on 8/9-12-2013, the wife of the Chief Judicial

Magistrate, Gwalior called, the petitioner on her land line. During

her conversation, she informed the petitioner, that respondent

no.3 – Justice ‘A’, was eager that the petitioner should perform a

dance on an “item-song”, on the occasion of ladies sangeet (on

10.12.2013) during the festivities of the 25

th

marriage anniversary

of respondent no.3. It is also the assertion of the petitioner, that

she politely refused the invitation for 10.12.2013 by giving out

that she had prior commitments, for that date. It is sought to be

asserted by the petitioner, that for reasons of official protocol, she

felt compelled to attend the main marriage anniversary

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Page 6 celebrations scheduled for 11.12.2013. It is pointed out, that she

ventured to do so in the company of her two daughters. It is

alleged by the petitioner that on 11.12.2013, respondent no.3 –

Justice ‘A’ came close to her and whispered in her ear, that he

missed the opportunity of viewing her sexy and beautiful figure

dancing on the floor. It is the petitioner’s assertion, that

respondent No.3 also told the petitioner, that he wished he could

see her dancing. The petitioner claims that she was appalled by

the above behaviour of respondent no.3, and therefore, she left

the party along with her two daughters, with tears in her eyes.

(ii).The factual position narrated above, pertaining to the

telephonic conversation with the wife of the Chief Judicial

Magistrate, Gwalior has been denied by respondent no.3. For

this, respondent no.3 has appended the affidavit of the wife of the

Chief Judicial Magistrate, Gwalior as Annexure R-16 with his

counter-affidavit. In her affidavit, it is inter alia asserted, that she

had neither called the petitioner on 8/9-12-2013, nor had she told

the petitioner that respondent no.3 – Justice ‘A’ was eager to

watch her perform a dance on an “item-song”. The other

assertions at the behest of the petitioner, narrated in the

foregoing paragraph have also been denied by respondent no.3.

6

Page 7 It is the pointed contention of respondent no.3, that there was no

occasion for him to personally interact with the petitioner on

11.12.2013. It is also the assertion of respondent no.3, that the

function of 11.12.2013 was video-graphed, which shows that the

petitioner enjoyed her dinner and was seen talking to other

invitees.

(iii).Addl.D&SJ ‘X’ has also asserted, that in January 2014,

respondent no.3 had sent messages to her through the District

Registrar, asking the petitioner to meet him, at his residence. It is

the contention of the petitioner, that knowing that respondent

no.3 – Justice ‘A’ usually lived alone, she avoided going to his

residence. As per the understanding of the petitioner, thereafter

respondent no.3 started showing abnormally high interest in her

work, and also started making sexually coloured remarks, at her.

Illustratively, referring to the occasion of a marriage party of a

judicial officer on 22.2.2014, it is asserted, that respondent no.3

in the presence of the petitioner’s 16 years old daughter, told her

that “although your work is very good, but you are far more

beautiful than your work”. It is contended, that he further went

on to say, that looking at the petitioner, one does not desire, even

to blink ones eyes. It is averred, that the above remarks were

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Page 8 made, while respondent no.3 – Justice ‘A’ sized up the petitioner

from head to toe. It is also the pointed assertion of the

petitioner, that while making the above remarks, respondent no.3

– Justice ‘A’, put his hand on her back. It is sought to be asserted,

that the above behaviour of respondent no.3, discomforted the

petitioner as well as her daughter. It is also pointed out, that the

petitioner indicated to respondent no.3, that his advances were

not welcome. Thereafter, the petitioner along with her daughter,

left the marriage party.

(iv).The factual position as recorded in the foregoing

paragraph has been denied by respondent no.3 in the counter-

affidavit filed by him. It is also asserted, that respondent no.3 did

not even meet the petitioner, at the aforesaid marriage party. It

is sought to be asserted in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of

respondent no.3, that he is in possession of the videography of

the marriage function in question, which can be produced by him.

(v).Another instance referred to by the petitioner in the writ

petition, relates to a farewell party organized by the District

Judiciary, on the occasion of the retirement of a Judge from the

Gwalior Sessions Division. It is asserted, that all sitting Judges of

the Gwalior Bench of the High Court, had been invited. On the

8

Page 9 said occasion, it is asserted, that respondent no.3 – Justice ‘A’,

continuously stared at the petitioner. The petitioner claims, that

sensing the attitude of respondent no.3 and given his past

conduct, the petitioner left the farewell party before respondent

no.3 could make any advances at her.

6. In the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of respondent no.3,

the facts narrated in the foregoing paragraph have been

expressly denied. It has been asserted, that respondent no.3 had

never inter-acted with the petitioner personally, except when the

petitioner had herself made three calls to him for her own

problems.

7(i).The next component of the narration in the writ petition

deals with the consequences which the petitioner had to suffer for

not responding to respondent no.3 – Justice A’s advances. First

and foremost, it is asserted, that respondent no.3 started

subjecting the petitioner to intense surveillance and harassment,

in his capacity as Administrative Judge of Sessions Division,

Gwalior from April 2014 onwards. It is submitted, that the

aforesaid surveillance/harassment was effectuated through the

District Judge, the District Judge (Inspection), and the District

Registrar. It is pointed out, that the District Judge and the District

9

Page 10 Judge (Inspection) visited the petitioner’s court room with unusual

frequency. Sometimes, on an hourly basis. At times, within a few

minutes of her commencing court work. Sometimes, minutes

after her rising for lunch. At other times, minutes after her

resuming court work after lunch. And also after the petitioner had

risen at the end of the day’s work. It is also asserted, that the

District Judge, Gwalior would depute his staff to check the

petitioner during court working hours. On certain occasions, this

happened even during in-camera trials. When deputed by the

District Judge, his staff, at times, would even snatch board-diaries

of cases pending in her court. It is the petitioner’s contention, that

no fault could ever be found insofar as the discharge of duties and

the responsibilities of the petitioner were concerned. It is the

contention of the petitioner, that all these inspections were not

carried, for the purpose contemplated under the Madhya Pradesh

Rules (Criminal) Inspection of Criminal Courts (for short, ‘the

Rules’). Relying on Rule 703 of the Rules, it is asserted, that

these actions were only for harassing the petitioner.

(ii).In the context of harassment, it is also averred in the writ

petition, that the petitioner availed casual leave in May 2014, to

attend a family event in New Delhi. During the above leave

1

Page 11 period, a stenographer attached to the petitioner’s court, was

posted elsewhere for a full day, on the instructions of the District

Judge. It is pointed out, that this was done despite the express

request made by the petitioner to the Court Manager, that the

concerned stenographer had to type several judgments, which

the petitioner had dictated, before proceeding on leave. Even

otherwise, it is pointed out, that according to the orders of the

District Judge (dated 25.4.2014), such posting is permissible only

for half a day. On account of the above interference in the

discharge of her official functioning, the petitioner addressed a

complaint dated 12.5.2014 to the District Judge against the Court

Manager. In her complaint, the petitioner also highlighted the

fact that the Court Manager usually refused to provide alternative

staff to the petitioner, when staff attached to the petitioner was

on leave. According to the petitioner, rather than taking action

against the Court Manager, the District Registrar issued a notice

to the concerned stenographer, asking him to show cause why he

had not disclosed the extent of pending dictation work, with

reference to the petitioner’s court. The concerned stenographer

was asked to file his reply, within three days. It is averred, that

the petitioner again approached the District Judge on the above

1

Page 12 issue. Rather than appreciating the predicament of the petitioner,

the District Judge informed the petitioner, that if she said

anything, he would spoil her confidential report. It is also averred,

that the District Judge advised her to make a complaint to the

Administrative Judge (respondent no.3) if she had any problem

with the system. According to the petitioner, given aforesaid

circumstances, she contacted respondent no.3 – Justice ‘A’ on his

mobile phone on 30.5.2014. Respondent no.3, it is averred,

informed her, that he could not speak to her as he was not in

station.

(iii).Another instance of harassment and victimization pointed

out by the petitioner emerges from the fact, that the peon

provided to the petitioner at her residence was diagnosed with a

likelihood of cancer on 12.5.2014. The concerned peon sought

leave for treatment, at Mumbai. Despite several oral requests, no

substitute was provided to the petitioner. Therefore, on

20.5.2014, the petitioner sent a letter to the District Judge,

Gwalior, requesting him to provide a peon at her residence, out of

the surplus staff. Even though the petitioner was entitled to a full

time peon at her residence, on 22.5.2014, the District Judge made

1

Page 13 provision for a temporary peon for two hours (from 9 a.m. to 11

a.m.).

(iv).In order to further demonstrate victimization, it is pointed

out, that the petitioner was suddenly and unceremoniously

transferred mid-session on 8.7.2014. It is further pointed out,

that general transfers are made every year, in March/April. It is

the case of the petitioner, that when annual general transfers

were made in 2014, the petitioner had not completed the

stipulated tenure of service, and accordingly, was not subjected

to transfer. Mid-session transfer, according to the petitioner, is

almost impermissible, and as such is extremely rare, and is

effected only for compelling reasons. In order to demonstrate the

assertion of victimization, it is pointed out, that the petitioner was

transferred to Sidhi, a remote place in Madhya Pradesh.

According to the petitioner for her posting, Sidhi was deliberately

chosen, to prevent her husband from visiting her on week ends,

because of its non-connectivity. It is also pointed out, that Sidhi

was chosen because the area is well known to be naxal affected

and it would be difficult for the petitioner to work, at that station.

It was also pointed out, that the said transfer was in violation of

the transfer guidelines/policy of the High Court. (guidelines/policy

1

Page 14 appended to the petition, as Annexure P-27). On the very next

day, after the receipt of the transfer order dated 8.7.2014, i.e.,

9.7.2014, the petitioner-Addl.D&SJ ‘X’, addressed a representation

to the Registrar General of the High Court, seeking eight months

extension. The aforesaid extension was sought because the

petitioner’s daughter was to take Board examinations of Class XII.

It was also pointed out, that under the transfer policy/guidelines,

in case daughter of a judicial officer is to take Board/University

examinations, the officer is not to be transferred till the end of the

academic session. Having submitted the aforesaid

representation, it is the case of the petitioner, that she contacted

respondent no.3 – Justice ‘A’, in his capacity as Administrative

Judge of her Sessions Division, and pleaded with him that her

transfer be deferred for the sake of her daughter, who was to take

the Class XII Board examination. In the pleadings the petitioner

asserted, that respondent no.3 mockingly reacted to the

petitioner’s request by telling her that she had not fulfilled his

desires, she had not visited his residence alone to meet him even

once, and therefore, this order of transfer was before her. He

further told the petitioner, that he would finish her career

1

Page 15 completely. It is submitted that the petitioner’s representation

dated 9.7.2014, was declined on 11.7.2014.

8. All the facts narrated in the foregoing paragraph have

been denied by respondent no.3 in his counter-affidavit. In

response to the above averments, it is denied that respondent

no.3 ever issued any instructions to the District Judge, District

Judge (Vigilance) or the District Registrar in regard to surveillance

of the professional work of the petitioner. It is denied, that the

actions of respondent no.3, were responsible for the petitioner’s

harassment. Justice ‘A’ has denied having ever spoken to the

officers referred to by the petitioner, with reference to the

petitioner, on any of the issues raised by her. On the allegation of

the petitioner’s intentional transfer to Sidhi in July, 2014, the

Registrar General of the High Court has filed an affidavit dated

17.11.2014 acknowledging, that the exercise of annual transfers

was carried out in March, 2014, but the petitioner was transferred

in July, 2014. It is sought to be explained, that at the relevant

time, the Transfer Committee of the High Court comprised of two

senior Judges, which recommended the transfer of two Additional

District & Sessions Judges, namely, Shri Manoj Kumar Tiwari and

Shri Rajeev Kumar Singh, to Sidhi in March 2014. The

1

Page 16 recommendation of the Committee was accepted by the Chief

Justice of the High Court, whereupon the said officers were

transferred to Sidhi. Reciprocally, no Additional District and

Sessions Judge was transferred out of Sidhi, at that juncture. The

above transfers had been made on the basis of a request made

by the District and Sessions Judge, Sidhi to handle the huge

pendency of cases at Sidhi. Despite the transfer of two Additional

District and Sessions Judges referred to above, the District and

Sessions Judge, Sidhi made another request through his

communication dated 9.6.2014 to post another two Additional

District and Sessions Judges, at Sidhi. This requirement

expressed by the District and Sessions Judge, Sidhi was

considered by the Transfer Committee, along with similar other

requests from other Sessions Divisions. On a fresh consideration,

the Transfer Committee recommended the transfer of 28 judicial

officers including 6 Additional District & Sessions Judges. The

Chief Justice of the High Court approved the recommendations

made by the Transfer Committee. The transfer of the petitioner-

Addl.D&SJ ‘X’ to Sidhi accordingly materialized. It is submitted

that all the transfers, including that of the petitioner, were made

in administrative exigencies, and not on extraneous

1

Page 17 consideration. Insofar as the representation made by the

petitioner, dated 9.7.2014 seeking cancellation/deferment of

order of her transfer is concerned, it is pointed out, that the same

was placed before the Transfer Committee. The Transfer

Committee, vide its resolution dated 11.7.2014, recommended

the rejection of the representation. The said recommendation

was approved by the Chief Justice of the High Court on 11.7.2014

itself. With reference to the petitioner’s representation dated

11.7.2014, it is pointed out, that the same was also placed before

the Transfer Committee. The Transfer Committee vide its

resolution dated 14.7.2014, recommended the rejection of the

second representation. The recommendation made by the

Transfer Committee, was again approved by the Chief Justice of

the High Court on 14.7.2014. It is pointed out, that on the very

next day, i.e., 15.7.2014, the petitioner tendered her resignation.

9(i).The next component of the narration in the writ petition,

relates to the measures adopted by the petitioner. In this behalf,

it is asserted, that the petitioner along with her husband traveled

to Jabalpur on 1.6.2014. The sole purpose was to discuss the

afore-stated issues with a senior Judge of the High Court. After

the petitioner narrated her version to the senior Judge, she was

1

Page 18 informed by the senior Judge, that he knew respondent no.3 –

Justice ‘A’, and promised to intervene in the matter. He assured

the petitioner, that he would arrange a meeting between the

petitioner and respondent no.3 at Gwalior (during a forthcoming

marriage in the 2

nd

week of June, 2014).

(ii).From 11.4.2014 to 14.7.2014, the petitioner claims that

she spoke to the Private Secretary to the Chief Justice of the High

Court, for seeking an audience with the Chief Justice of the High

Court. According to the pleadings in the writ petition, on

13.7.2014, the Private Secretary informed the petitioner that the

Chief Justice had refused to give her an appointment. The Private

Secretary however reassured her, that he would make yet

another effort to procure her an appointment for the following

day, and was hopeful to manage the same. He had also informed

the petitioner that he would convey the outcome “early next

morning”. On 14.7.2014, since the petitioner did not receive any

message from the Private Secretary, she sent a message to him

inquiring about the outcome of his efforts. Learned counsel,

during the course of hearing, submitted that the Private Secretary

did not contact the petitioner thereafter. In support of the

assertion, that the petitioner was seeking an appointment with

1

Page 19 the Chief Justice of the High Court, it is asserted, that as the

Private Secretary was hopeful of getting her an audience with the

Chief Justice, she purchased two railway tickets for 14.7.2014 to

travel from Gwalior to Jabalpur, in the company of her husband.

These tickets were in addition to the tickets purchased by her to

make a similar journey on 11.7.2014 to meet senior Judges of the

High Court. Copies of both sets of tickets have been appended to

the writ petition.

(iii).It is the pleaded case of the petitioner, that on the

following day, after the petitioner met respondent no.3 – Justice

‘A” i.e., on 11.7.2014, the petitioner visited a number of senior

Judges of the High Court. She was advised to make another

representation seeking deferment of her transfer, which she did

on 11.7.2014 itself. Some of them urged the petitioner to have

faith in the system, and to await the outcome of her second

representation. The petitioner’s second representation, was

declined through a communication dated 11.7.2014.

10. According to the petitioner, having been subjected to

victimization and harassment, the petitioner submitted her

resignation from the post of Additional District and Sessions

Judge, on 15.7.2014. The aforesaid resignation was addressed to

1

Page 20 the Registrar General of the High Court. In her resignation, the

petitioner expressly mentioned about her elder daughter studying

in Class XII. It was submitted, that no reference to the sexual

harassment suffered by her was made in the resignation letter, as

the same would have been embarrassing for the petitioner. It

was pointed out that the resignation submitted by the petitioner,

was accepted on 17.7.2014 by the Legal and Legislative Work

Department of the State Government. On the issue of the

petitioner’s resignation, the position explained in the reply filed

on behalf of respondent no.1 is, that the petitioner’s resignation

was received in the office of the Registrar General of the High

Court on 15.7.2014. The same was placed for consideration of

the Chief Justice of the High Court on 16.7.2014. The Chief Justice

recommended the acceptance of the resignation to the State

Government. The State Government accepted the petitioner’s

resignation on 17.7.2014.

11. Having suffered extreme vilification at the hands of her

superiors, for having not been afforded even an opportunity of

being able to express her difficulties, the petitioner sent a

representation to the President of India, the Chief Justice of India

and the Chief Justice of the High Court on 1.8.2014. In her

2

Page 21 representation, the petitioner inter alia sought the following

reliefs:

“1. Appropriate action be taken, after a fact-finding.

2. Re-consider the circumstances under which the

Petitioner was coerced and exerted a great duress upon,

until the only option she had was to resign.

3. Institute an appropriate mechanism for redressal of

grievances like the above, of sub-ordinate services judicial

officers.”

12. Another relevant fact, which has not been disclosed in the

writ petition, and which has emerged from the reply filed on

behalf of respondent no.1-the Registrar General of the High Court,

needs to be recorded here to complete the sequence of events. It

is pointed out on behalf of respondent no.1, that the petitioner

had never disclosed the factum of sexual harassment in any of

the numerous communications addressed by her to the High

Court. It is pointed out, that the factum of sexual harassment had

not even been incorporated in the petitioner’s resignation letter.

In the reply filed by respondent no.1, it is sought to be asserted,

that the allegations of sexual harassment were recorded by the

petitioner, for the first time, in her representation dated 1.8.2014,

which was addressed to the Chief Justice of India. It is also sought

to be asserted, in the reply filed on behalf of respondent no.1,

that the nature of allegations of sexual harassment levelled by

2

Page 22 the petitioner came to the knowledge of the Chief Justice of the

High Court through a newspaper item published on 4.8.2014 in

the Times of India. It is averred in the reply filed on behalf of

respondent no.1, that respondent no.3 – Justice ‘A’, addressed a

letter to the Chief Justice of the High Court with reference to the

news item dated 4.8.2014. The news item as well as the letter

received from respondent no.3 were sent by the Chief Justice of

the High Court, by a special messenger, to the Chief Justice of

India. Respondent no.1, i.e., the Registrar General of the High

Court, on being directed by the Chief Justice of the High Court,

issued the following press release on 4.8.2014:

“PRESS RELEASE

This is with regard to news item published in daily

newspaper ‘Times of India’ dated 04.08.2014 reporting

that a lady Judicial Officer posted as Additional District

Judge, Gwalior had to resign from judicial service due to

alleged harassment by a High Court Judge. It has been

reported that when the lady Judicial Officer sought

appointment with Hon’ble the Chief Justice to apprise him

of the factual position, the same was declined. This is a

distorted version.

As a matter of fact, she sought appointment

telephonically through Principal Private Secretary (PPS) to

Hon’ble the Chief Justice, after she had already tendered

her resignation which was forwarded to the State

Government for necessary action. In the given situation,

she was informed by the PPS to submit a formal

2

Page 23 representation, if advised, in the matter. However, no

representation has so far been made by her.

In the context of the news item, the concerned High

Court Judge faxed a confidential letter to Hon’ble the Chief

Justice which was received on 4

th

August, 2014 in the

morning. Hon’ble the Chief Justice has forwarded a copy

of the said letter to Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India with

comments.

The lady Ex-Judicial Officer, who was posted at

Gwalior since August, 2011 was transferred in July, 2014

to Sidhi on administrative grounds. Her two

representations seeking cancellation of the transfer on the

ground of education of her daughters were duly

considered and rejected by the concerned Administrative

Committee of the High Court. She has not represented

about the alleged misbehavior or harassment caused to

her by anyone.

Sd/-

(VED PRAKASH)

REGISTRAR GENERAL

HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH

JABALPUR

04.08.2014”

(emphasis is ours)

The aforesaid press release has been extracted hereinabove so as

to avoid any further narration on the aforesaid subject.

13. According to the averments made in the reply filed on

behalf of the Registrar General of the High Court, a sealed

envelope was received from the office of the Chief Justice of India

in the High Court on 7.8.2014. From the record made available, it

2

Page 24 is apparent that the Chief Justice of the High Court, keeping in

view the sensitivity and seriousness of the matter, invited the two

senior most judges of the High Court and the Registrar General of

the High Court. All decisions in the matter were made

collectively, in the best interest of all concerned. In furtherance

of the communication received from the Chief Justice of India, the

Chief Justice of the High Court constituted a two-member senior

judges Enquiry Committee (one of whom was a lady judge), to

make a confidential and discreet inquiry, and to submit a report.

A senior lady Additional District and Sessions Judge, was

nominated by the Chief Justice of the High Court, for secretarial

assistance of the “two-Judge Committee”.

14. Consequent upon the nomination of the “two-Judge

Committee”, the petitioner received (via e-mail) a notice from the

Secretary of the Committee constituted by the Chief Justice of the

High Court on 12.8.2014, requiring her to appear for a preliminary

inquiry before the “two-Judge Committee” on 19.8.2014 at 10.30

a.m. The petitioner responded to the aforesaid notice vide her

reply dated 14.8.2014 (via e-mail and speed post) requesting for

information, as to under what authority of law the “two-Judge

Committee” had been constituted. In order to ensure, that the

2

Page 25 deliberations assigned to the Committee constituted by the Chief

Justice of the High Court were fair, the petitioner, through her

above reply dated 14.8.2014, requested that administrative

functions be withdrawn from respondent no.3 – Justice ‘A’. She

also sought the transfer of the District Judge, the District Judge

(Inspection) and the District Registrar posted at Gwalior, so that

her witnesses could depose freely and fairly before the “two-

Judge Committee”. In a response dated 14.8.2014 (sent via e-

mail), the petitioner was informed, that the Chief Justice of the

High Court had set up the “two-member Committee” to conduct a

preliminary inquiry into the allegations levelled against

respondent no.3. On 19.8.2014, the petitioner submitted her

second reply (via e-mail as also via speed post) stating that her

request for withdrawal of administrative work from respondent

no.3 – Justice ‘A’ and her request for transfer of judicial officers

from Sessions Division, Gwalior had remained unaddressed. She

also pointed out, that the procedure envisaged by the Supreme

Court in the decision rendered in C. Ravichandran Iyer v. Justice

A.M. Bhattacharjee (1995) 5 SCC 457, was not being followed,

inasmuch as the Chief Justice of the High Court was to conduct a

discreet inquiry at his own and that she could not be required to

2

Page 26 appear before the “two-Judge Committee” for a preliminary

inquiry. In support of the original complaint submitted by the

petitioner, on this occasion she also enclosed a sworn affidavit,

affirming the factual position expressed in her complaint.

15. The determination of the present controversy, will emerge

from the factual position projected by the rival parties which has

been summarized above.

16. It would be pertinent to mention, that the main

submission advanced at the hands of the learned counsel for the

petitioner was, that the proceedings being conducted in the

matter, are not in consonance with the “in-house procedure”

adopted by this Court for taking suitable remedial action against

judges, who by their acts of omission or commission, do not follow

the accepted values of judicial life, including the ideals expressed

by the Supreme Court in the “Restatement of Values of Judicial

Life”. The projection of the aforesaid contention, we felt, would

not require an insight into the allegations made by Addl.D&SJ ‘X’,

or even the response of Mr. Justice ‘A’. However, the

submissions, as they have emerged during the course of hearing,

reveal that the same also require to be considered. We also felt,

after hearing submissions advanced on behalf of the rival parties,

2

Page 27 that the steps taken by the Chief Justice of the High Court, also

needed a closer examination, for an effective and fruitful

consideration of the controversy in view of the sensitivity and

seriousness of the matter. We have, accordingly, briefly traced

the allegations made by the petitioner, as also, the defence of

respondent no.3. We have also ventured to narrate the steps

taken by the Chief Justice of the High Court, consequent upon the

petitioner’s complaint being forwarded to him by the Chief Justice

of India. As a note of caution, we would like to record, that our

recording of the events, may not be taken as the last word on the

matter, we may have noticed certain facts in a manner which may

have overlooked the sensitivity with which the party concerned

had viewed or projected them. We may have also missed certain

finer points, which could, on an analysis of facts, result in quite a

different conclusion on their holistic examination. The issue of

sexual harassment has a variety of fine connotations. Its

evaluation may sometimes depend upon the sensitivity of the

person concerned. And also whether, the perception of the

harassed individual was known to the one against whom the

accusing finger is pointed.

2

Page 28 17. Every day is a matter of learning. Hearing of submissions

in this case, we may say, was a matter of further understanding

the sensitivities involved in a controversy of the present nature.

We may venture to demonstrate this, by noticing a verbal

exchange, during the course of hearing, between the counsel for

the petitioner and that for the High Court. While the learned

counsel representing the High Court was on “his” legs, learned

counsel for the petitioner interjected to express “her” point of

view. All through, during the process of hearing, submissions

were advanced in a lively and respectful manner, and pointedly

on the subject under consideration. Feeling that the thought

being projected by the learned counsel was being disturbed by

the intervention, the Bench accordingly exhorted learned counsel,

to go on unmindful of the interruption. Learned counsel for the

High Court, well-meaning and deferential as he always is,

responded by observing, “The interjections by the learned senior

counsel for the petitioner, are always delightful”. Learned senior

counsel for the petitioner, had serious objection to the term,

‘‘delightful’’ used, with reference to “her”. She questioned, the

use of the term, ‘‘delightful” by posing to the learned senior

counsel, whether similar interjections by men, were also

2

Page 29 considered by him as delightful. Why then, she questioned,

should “her” interjection be found ‘‘delightful’’. In expressing her

view, she went on to describe the response of the learned senior

counsel as “sexually coloured”. Having given our thoughtful

consideration to the response, of the learned counsel for the

petitioner, we may only say, that she may well be right. There is

a lot to be learnt, from what she innocuously conveyed. Her

sensitivity to the issue, one may confess, brought out to us, a

wholly different understanding on the subject. It is, therefore,

that we have remarked above, that the evaluation of a charge of

sexual harassment, would depend on the manner in which it is

perceived. Each case will have to be decided on its own merits.

Whether the perception of the harassed individual, was conveyed

to the person accused, would be very material, in a case falling in

the realm of over-sensitivity. In that, it would not be open to him

thereafter, to defend himself by projecting that he had not

sexually harassed the person concerned, because in his

understanding the alleged action was unoffending.

18. Therefore, as a matter of caution, we desire to expressly

record, that the facts taken into consideration by us, are for the

limited purpose of the submissions advanced at the hands of the

2

Page 30 learned counsel for the petitioner, to consider whether the

procedure being followed in the present controversy, is in

consonance with the “in-house procedure” adopted by this Court,

as also, whether the procedure adopted by the Chief Justice of the

High Court, would meet the ends of justice.

19. Before dwelling upon the pointed issues canvassed before

us, we would venture to briefly record the sequence of events

which led to the adoption by this Court, of the “in-house

procedure”. It is necessary for us to do so, because the

contentions advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner

were founded on the “in-house procedure”, whereas, it was the

contention in response, that the same was not justiciable, and as

such, the present writ petition is not maintainable in law.

20. Amongst the first encounters, to an investigation into the

conduct of a judge, can be traced from a statement made to the

Bar by the then Chief Justice of India, Mr. Justice Sabyasachi

Mukherjee on 20.7.1990, with reference to the allegations levelled

against Mr. Justice V. Ramaswami, who at that juncture, was a

sitting Judge of the Supreme Court of India. An extract of the

statement made to the Bar is being reproduced hereunder:

“Re: Ramaswami, J.

CJI’s Statement to the Bar

3

Page 31 In the beginning of May, 1990, some learned advocates of

this Court drew my attention to certain newspapers about

the audit report investigating the expenses incurred in

furnishing the residence of a former Chief Justice of the

Punjab & Haryana High Court, namely, Shri V.

Ramaswami, who is now a sitting Judge of this court. I was

requested by the learned lawyers to take action suo-motu.

The matter was mentioned more than one. On 1

st

May,

1990. I had received a communication from the editor of a

magazine enclosing therewith a copy of April 90 issue of

the magazine The Lawyers, stating that it contained the

full text of the audit report of the Chandigarh

Administration. Thereafter after, the learned Attorney

General, Sir. Soli Sorabjee, the former Attorney General,

Sri Parasaran, Mr. Venugopal, the president of the

Supreme Court Bar Association, and Dr. Y.S. Chitale,

former President of the Supreme Court Bar association,

also met me and drew my attention to these reports and

expressed concern on the contents of the publications.

The Union Minister of Law and Justice called on me and

expressed the concern of the members of parliament

about the alleged extravagance by Justice Ramaswami

and the contents of the report, while working as the Chief

Justice of the Punjab and Haryana High Court. Sharing

their concern, I had told the Law Minister and have since

assured the learned Attorney General and other members

of the Bar that I would look into the matter.

Legally and constitutionally the Chief Justice of India, as

such, has no right or authority to inquire into the conduct

of a sitting Judge of the Supreme Court. However, the

Chief justice of India, as the head of the Judicial Family

has, I believe, the duty and the responsibility to maintain

the judicial propriety and attempts to secure the

confidence of the public in the working of the judicial

process.

This was an unprecedented and an embarrassing

situation. It called for caution and establishment of a

salutary convention. If have obtained from the Chief

Justice of Punjab and Haryana High Court the necessary

papers.

3

Page 32 There are three kinds of reports (i) Reports submitted by

the Internal Audit Cell of the High Court (ii) Fact-finding

Reports submitted by District and Sessions Judges

(Vigilance) both of Punjab and Haryana; and(iii) Reports

and audit-paras submitted by the official of the

Accountant Generals office to the High Court for reply. The

reports and audit paras last mentioned seek clarifications

and justifications in respect of the transactions which

prime facie appeared to be irregular.

I have looked into it and then arrived at a certain tentative

impression it is not necessary to recapitulate in detail, the

alleged irregularities I understand from the authorities of

the High Court that the officials involved in the alleged

irregularities have been suspended and departmental

inquiries have been instituted against them. The final

result of these departmental inquiries is awaited. In the

meantime, I took Brother Ramaswami into confidence and

made known to him the contents of the audit reports with

a view to ascertaining his position in relation to the

disclosures made in the reports. He has given his version.

I have also requested Brother Ramaswami to

communicate his views to the Registrar, High Court of

Punjab and Haryana so that the High Court may reply to

the audit objections raised by the Government.

I understand that the High Court had directly sought

Brother Ramaswamis clarifications with regard to certain

audit objection and he has written to the officers of the

High Court in this behalf. The proceedings, as mentioned

before, against some of the officers of High Court on

alleged irregularities are still pending. In respect of some

of the irregularities which I have considered and the

tendency of the departmental inquiries against the

suspended officers, I am of the opinion that it would be

appropriate to wait for a closer examination of the replies

to the audit objections and the various queries submitted

by the High Court to Brother Ramaswami before one can

come to a final conclusion.

xxx xxx xxx

The Supreme Court must uphold the rule of law. It is,

therefore, necessary that those who uphold the rule of law

3

Page 33 must live by law and judges must, therefore, be obliged to

live according to law. The law, procedure and the norms

applicable in this case, enjoin that the expenses incurred

by the Court for the Judges must be according to the

rules, norms and the practice. No man is above law or the

rules. The Judges either of the Supreme Court or of the

High Courts and the Chief Justices are all subject to the

rule of law and procedure like any other citizen of this

country and must abide by the norms and regulation

prescribed inasmuch as these and to the extent are

applicable to them I always thought this was clear and

needed no reiteration. We must, therefore, ensure that

there is no conduct of the Judges, which affects the faith

of the people that Judges do not live according to law.

Judges cannot afford to be involved in disputes, which

have to determine the question whether the Judges while

functioning as Judges of Chief Justices have attempted to

subvert the law either designedly or in utter negligence or

recklessness.

In this matter, the questions involved are, namely, (i)

whether the Chief Justice was entitled to the expenses of

his telephone at Madras because Chandigarh was

declared a disturbed area;

(ii) Whether the Chief Justice was obliged to obtain leave

to avail the facility of LTC;

(iii) Whether the Chief Justice was entitled to direct the

cars to be taken to madras when he was on vacation from

Chandigarh for the reasons mentioned by him;

(iv) Whether the silver maces ordered by the High Court

have been done at the rate similar to the rate applied in

respect of those supplied tot he Madras high Court, and

(v) Whether even though the Judges of the Punjab and

Haryana High Court did not approve the idea of having

maces for each individual Judge, the Chief Justice was

entitled to direct the purchase of these maces. Theses are

the matters on which interpretation of the rules or on the

permission or relaxation of rules, certain consequences

will follow, and if the Chief justice was not so entitled or

these could not be sanctioned as has been done under the

3

Page 34 circumstances mentioned in the aforesaid objections and

communications, reimbursement or recovery would be

directed. These matters, therefore, will have to await

adjudication by the appropriate authorities, namely, the

Government and the sanctioning authorities dealing with

audit objections, in respect of the permissions sought.

Though one would like to think that there has been

extravagance and ostentiousness but these by the selves

do not involve determining questions of moral or legal

impropriety of a judge functioning as a Judge in the Court.

But there are some other aspects involved in this matter,

namely, the questions of not accounting for all the

furnitures or items that were in the residence and office of

the Chief Justice, the alleged replacement of superior

quality items by inferior quality items, the missing items

and the splitting up of the bills in order to have the

sanction of the authorities or to conform to the rules, are

the matters which are also pending determination and

adjudication.

Involvement in any investigation on the conduct of a

sitting Supreme Court Judge on such matters as aforesaid

is embarrassing in the circumstances and the background

in which these questions have arisen in the instant case.

For one who should attempt to uphold the rule of law, it is

embarrassing to be involved in such a dispute. But no final

decision on this aspect can be arrived at until the

investigations and inquiries are completed. I have, on

these aspects after looking into the matter and the points

involved, no doubt that those who aspire to uphold the

rule of law must strive to live according to law and they

necessarily expose the selves to the danger of perishing

by law. I am aware and deeply conscious that in certain

circumstances somebody may be a victim of certain

situation. I was constrained, in those circumstances, to

advise Brother Ramaswami to desist from discharging

judicial functions so long as the investigations continued

and his name was cleared on this aspect.

I wrote to Brother Ramaswami on 18

th

July 1990 rendering

my aforesaid advice. I have also conveyed to him my

anguish in tendering this advice and I have requested him

3

Page 35 to please be on leave until the investigations on the

aforesaid conduct are completed.

On 18

th

July, 1990 after receipt of my letter, Brother

Ramaswami has applied for leave for six weeks in the first

instance with effect from 23

rd

July, 1990. I have directed

the office to process his application for leave.

Since I had assured the learned Attorney General, the Law

Minister, the president of the Bar Association and other

that I will look into it, I thought I must covey to you result

of my looking into it.”

It would be relevant to mention, that no further action was taken

by the Chief Justice of India, in furtherance of the administrative

authority vested in him, in the matter relating to the allegations

levelled against Justice V. Ramaswami. Impeachment

proceedings were initiated against Justice V. Ramaswami under

Article 124 of the Constitution of India. The outcome of the same,

is inconsequential to the present controversy.

21. Contextually, reference needs to be made, to the

resolution passed by the Bombay Bar Association on 1.3.1995 by

a majority of 185 out of 207 permanent members, demanding the

resignation of Justice A.M. Bhattacharjee, the then Chief Justice of

Bombay High Court. A writ petition came to be filed in this Court,

seeking an appropriate writ, order or direction to restrain the Bar

Council of Maharashtra and Goa, the Bombay Bar Association, and

the Advocates’ Association of Western India, from coercing Justice

3

Page 36 A.M. Bhattacharjee from resigning the office held by him. The

petitioner in the above case, had also made a prayer, that the

allegations levelled against Justice A.M. Bhattacharjee be required

to be investigated by the Central Bureau of Investigation, and if

the same were found to be true, a direction be issued to the

Speaker of the Lok Sabha, to initiate action for the removal of

Justice A.M. Bhattacharjee, under Article 124 read with Article 218

of the Constitution of India, and the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968.

While deliberating upon the aforesaid issue, this Court inter alia

held as under:

“40. Bearing all the above in mind, we are of the

considered view that where the complaint relates to the

Judge of the High Court, the Chief Justice of that High

Court, after verification, and if necessary, after

confidential enquiry from his independent source, should

satisfy himself about the truth of the imputation made by

the Bar Association through its office bearers against the

Judge and consult the Chief Justice of India, where

deemed necessary, by placing all the information with

him. When the Chief Justice of India is seized of the

matter, to avoid embarrassment to him and to allow

fairness in the procedure to be adopted in furtherance

thereof, the Bar should suspend all further actions to

enable the Chief Justice of India to appropriately deal with

the matter. This is necessary because any action he may

take must not only be just but must also appear to be just

to all concerned, i.e., it must not even appear to have

been taken under pressure from any quarter. The Chief

Justice of India, on receipt of the information from the

Chief Justice of the High Court, after being satisfied about

the correctness and truth touching the conduct of the

Judge, may tender such advice either directly or may

3

Page 37 initiate such action, as is deemed necessary or warranted

under given facts and circumstances. If circumstances

permit, it may be salutary to take the Judge into

confidence before initiating action. On the decision being

taken by the Chief Justice of India, the matter should rest

at that. This procedure would not only facilitate nipping in

the bud the conduct of a Judge leading to loss of public

confidence in the courts and sustain public faith in the

efficacy of the rule of law and respect for the judiciary, but

would also avoid needless embarrassment of contempt

proceedings against the office bearers of the Bar

Association and group libel against all concerned. The

independence of judiciary and the stream of public justice

would remain pure and unsullied. The Bar Association

could remain a useful arm of the judiciary and in the case

of sagging reputation of the particular Judge, the Bar

Association could take up the matter with the Chief Justice

of the High Court and await his response for the action

taken thereunder for a reasonable period.

41.In case the allegations are against Chief Justice of a

High Court, the Bar should bring them directly to the

notice of the Chief Justice of India. On receipt of such

complaint, the Chief Justice of India would in the same

way act as stated above qua complaint against a Judge of

the High Court, and the Bar would await for a reasonable

period the response of the Chief Justice of India.

42.It would thus be seen that yawning gap between

proved misbehaviour and bad conduct in consistent with

the high office on the part of a non cooperating

Judge/Chief Justice of a High Court could be disciplined by

self-regulation through in-house procedure. This in-house

procedure would fill in the constitutional gap and would

yield salutary effect. Unfortunately, recourse to this

procedure was not taken in the case at hand, may be,

because of absence of legal sanction to such a

procedure.”

22. In furtherance of the directions issued in C.Ravichandran

Iyer’s case (supra), this Court constituted a committee comprising

3

Page 38 of three Judges of this Court, namely, Justices S.C. Agrawal, A.S.

Anand (as he then was), S.P. Bharucha (as he then was), and the

then two senior-most Chief Justices of High Courts, i.e., Justices

P.S. Misra and D.P. Mohapatra (of the Andhra Pradesh High Court

and the Allahabad High Court, respectively), to lay down the “in-

house procedure”, for taking suitable remedial action against

judges, who by their acts of omission or commission, do not follow

the accepted values of judicial life, including the ideals expressed

by the Supreme Court in the “Restatement of Values of Judicial

Life”. The committee submitted its report on 31.10.1997. The

same was adopted with amendments, in a Full Court Meeting of

the Supreme Court of India, on 15.12.1999. In the afore-stated

report, three sets of procedure for taking such suitable remedial

action against judges were laid down. The first, related to Judges

of the High Courts, the second, to Chief Justices of the High

Courts, and the third, to Judges of the Supreme Court. Insofar as

the present controversy is concerned, since the same relates to

the allegations made against a sitting Judge of the Madhya

Pradesh High Court, only the “in-house procedure” pertaining to

Judges of the High Courts is relevant. The main submission

advanced at the hands of the learned counsel for the petitioner is

3

Page 39 also based on the same. The “in-house procedure”, as

determined with reference to Judges of the High Court, is

accordingly being extracted hereunder:

“ HIGH COURT JUDGE:

A complaint against a Judge of a High court is received

either by the Chief justice of that High Court or by the

Chief Justice of India (CJI). Some times such a complaint is

made to the President of India. The complaints that are

received by the President of India are generally forwarded

to the CJI. The Committee suggests the following

procedure for dealing with such complaints:-

(1) Where the complaint is received against a Judge of a

High Court by the Chief Justice of that High Court, he shall

examine it. If it is found by him that it is frivolous or

directly related to the merits of a substantive decision in a

judicial matter or does not involve any serious complaint

of misconduct or impropriety, he shall file the complaint

and inform the CJI accordingly. If it is found by him that

the complaint is of a serious nature involving misconduct

or impropriety, he shall ask for the response thereto of the

Judge concerned. If on a consideration of the allegations in

the complaint in the light of the response of the Judge

concerned, the Chief Justice of the High Court is satisfied

that no further action is necessary he shall file complaint

and inform the CJI accordingly. If the Chief Justice of the

High Court is of the opinion that the allegations contained

in the complaint need a deeper probe, he shall forward to

the CJI the complaint and the response of the Judge

concerned along with his comments.

(2) When the complaint is received by the CJI directly or it

is forwarded to him by the President of India the CJI will

examine it. If it is found by him that it is either frivolous or

directly related to the merits of a substantive decision in a

judicial matter or does not involve any serious complaint

of misconduct or impropriety, he shall file it. In other

cases the complaint shall be sent by the CJI to the Chief

Justice of the concerned High court for his comments. On

3

Page 40 the receipt of the complaint from CJI the Chief Justice f the

concerned High court shall ask for the response of the

judge concerned. If on a consideration of the allegations in

the complaint in the light of the response of the Judge

concerned the Chief justice of the High Court is satisfied

that no further action is necessary or if he is of the opinion

that the allegations contained in the complaint need a

deeper probe, he shall return the complaint to the CJI

along with a statement of the response of the Judge

concerned and his comments.

(3) After considering the complaint in the light of the

response of the judge concerned and the comments of the

Chief justice of the high court, the CJI, if he is of the

opinion that a deeper probe is required into the

allegations contained in the complaint, shall constitute a

three member Committee consisting of two Chief justices

of High Courts other than the High Court to which the

Judge belongs and one High Court Judge. The said

Committee shall hold an inquiry into the allegations

contained in the complaint. The inquiry shall be in the

nature of a fact finding inquiry wherein the Judge

concerned would be entitled to appear and have his say.

But it would not be a formal judicial inquiry involving the

examination and cross-examination of witnesses and

representation by lawyers.

(4) For conducting the inquiry the Committee shall devise

its own procedure consistent with the principles of natural

justice.

(5)(i) After such inquiry the Committee may conclude and

report to the CJI that (a) there is no substance in the

allegations contained in the complaint, or (b) there is

sufficient substance in the allegations contained in the

complaint and the misconduct disclosed is so serious that

it calls for initiation of proceedings for removal of the

Judge, or (c) there is substance in the allegations

contained in the complaint but the misconduct disclosed is

not of such a serious nature as to call for initiation of

proceedings for removal of the Judge.

4

Page 41 (ii) A copy of the Report shall be furnished to the judge

concerned by the Committee.

(6) In a case where the Committee finds that there is no

substance in the allegations contained in the complaint,

the complaint shall be filed by the CJI.

(7) If the Committee finds that there is substance in the

allegations contained in the complaint and misconduct

disclosed in the allegations is such that it calls for

initiation of proceedings for removal of the Judge, the CJI

shall adopt the following course:-

(i) the Judge concerned should be advised to resign his

office or seek voluntary retirement;

(ii) In a case the judge expresses his unwillingness to

resign or seek voluntary retirement, the chief justice of

the concerned High Court should be advised by the CJI not

to allocate any judicial work to the judge concerned and

the President of India and the Prime Minister shall be

intimated that this has been done because allegations

against the Judge had been found by the Committee to be

so serious as to warrant the initiation of proceedings for

removal and the copy of the report of the Committee may

be enclosed.

(8) If the Committee finds that there is substance in the

allegations but the misconduct disclosed is not so serious

as to call for initiation of proceedings for removal of the

judge, the CJI shall call the Judge concerned and advise

him accordingly and may also direct that the report of the

Committee be placed on record.”

23. Next in sequence, we may advert to the letter dated

4.8.2008 written by the then Chief Justice of India, Mr. Justice K.G.

Balakrishnan, to the then Prime Minister Mr. Manmohan Singh,

recommending the removal of Mr. Justice Soumitra Sen, then a

4

Page 42 sitting Judge of the Calcutta High Court. A relevant extract of the

above letter is placed below:

“The text of the letter written by Chief Justice of India,

K.G. Balakrishnan to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh

recommending removal of Mr. Justice Soumitra Sen, Judge

of the Calcutta High Court.

Dated: 4

August, 2008

Dear Prime Minister,

I write this to recommend that the proceedings

contemplated by Article 217(1) read with Article 124(4) of

the Constitution be initiated for removal of Mr. Justice

Soumitra Sen, Judge, Calcutta High Court.

2-8. xxx xxx xxx

9. Reports appeared in newspapers concerning the

conduct of Justice Soumitra Sen in the above-noted

matter. The then Chief Justice of Calcutta High Court

withdrew judicial work from him and wrote a letter dated

25

th

November, 2006 to my learned predecessor bringing

the matter to his notice for appropriate action.

10. On 1

st

July, 2007 I sought a comprehensive report from

the Chief Justice of Calcutta High Court along with his

views about Justice Soumitra Sen. On 12

th

July, 2007

Justice Soumitra Sen called on me, on advice of his Chief

Justice and verbally explained his conduct. He sent his

report to me on 20

th

August, 2007.

11. xxx xxx xxx

12. On 10

th

September, 2007 I had asked Justice Soumitra

Sen to furnish his fresh and final response to the judicial

observations made against him. After seeking more time

for this purpose he furnished his response on 28

th

September, 2007 requesting that he may be allowed to

resume duties in view of the order of the Division Bench of

Calcutta High Court.

4

Page 43 13. Since I felt that a deeper probe was required to be

made into the allegations made against Justice Soumitra

Sen, to bring the matter to a logical conclusion, I

constituted a three Member Committee consisting of

Justice A.P. Shah (Chief Justice, Madras High Court), Justice

A.K. Patnaik (Chief Justice, High Court of Madhya Pradesh)

and Justice R.M. Lodha (Judge, Rajasthan High Court), as

envisaged in the ‘In-House Procedure’ adopted by

Supreme Court and various High Courts, to conduct a fact

finding enquiry, wherein the Judge concerned would be

entitled to appear and have his say in the proceedings.

14. The Committee submitted its report dated 1

st

February, 2008, after calling for relevant records and

considering the submission made by Justice Soumitra Sen,

who appeared in-person before the Committee. The

Committee inter alia concluded that:

(a) Shri Soumitra Sen did not have honest intention right

from the year 1993 since he mixed the money received as

a Receiver and his personal money and converted

Receiver’s money to his own use:

(b) There has been misappropriation (at least temporary)

of the sale proceeds since:

(i) he received Rs. 24,57,000/- between 25

th

February

1993 to 10

th

January, 1995 but the balance in the

Account No. 01SLPO632800 on 28

th

February, 1995

was only Rs. 8,83,963.05.

(i) a sum of Rs. 22,83,000/- was transferred by him

from that account to Account No. 01SLPO813400

and, thereafter, almost entire amount was withdrawn

in a couple of months reducing the balance to the

bare minimum of Rs. 811.56, thus, diverting the

entire sale proceeds for his own use and with

dishonest intention.

© he gave false explanation to the court that an amount

of Rs. 25,00,000/- was invested from the account where

the sale proceeds were kept, whereas, in fact, the amount

of Rs. 25,00,000/- was withdrawn from Special Officer’s

4

Page 44 Account No. 01SLPO813400 and not from 01SLPO632800,

in which the sale proceeds were deposited;

(d) mere monetary recompense under the compulsion of

judicial order does not obliterate breach of trust and

misappropriation of Receiver’s funds for his personal gain;

(e) the conduct of Shri Soumitra Sen had brought

disrepute to the high judicial office and dishonour to the

institution of judiciary, undermining the faith and

confidence reposed by the public in the administration of

justice.

In the opinion of the Committee misconduct disclosed is

so serious that it calls for initiation of proceedings for his

removal.

15. A copy of the Report dated 6

th

February, 2008 of the

Committee was forwarded by me to Justice Soumitra Sen

and in terms of the In-House procedure, he was advised to

resign or seek voluntary retirement. Thereupon, Justice

Soumitra Sen made a detailed representation dated 25

th

February, 2008 seeking reconsideration of the decision of

his removal and sought a personal hearing. On 16

th

March,

2008 a Collegium consisting of myself, Justice B.N.

Agrawal and Justice Ashok Bhan (Seniormost Judges of

Supreme Court) gave a hearing to Justice Soumitra Sen

and reiterated the advice given to him to submit his

resignation or seek voluntary retirement on or before 2

nd

April, 2008. However, vide his letter dated 26

th

March,

2008 Justice Soumitra Sen expressed his inability to

tender resignation or seek voluntary retirement.

In view of the foregoing, it is requested that proceedings

for removal of Justice Soumitra Sen be initiated in

accordance with the procedure prescribed in the

Constitution.

With warm regards,

Yours sincerely

Sd/-

(K.G. Balakrishnan)

4

Page 45 Hon'ble Dr. Manmohan Singh,

Prime Minister of India,

7, Race Course Road,

New Delhi-110011.”

Based on the communication addressed by the Chief Justice of

India, impeachment proceedings were actually initiated against

Mr. Justice Soumitra Sen, under Article 124 of the Constitution of

India. Consequent upon his resignation, during the course of

deliberation on the impeachment proceedings in Parliament, the

impeachment proceedings were dropped as having been abated.

24. It is, therefore, apparent that the seeds of the “in-house

procedure” came to be sown in the judgment rendered by this

Court in C. Ravinchandran Iyer’s case (supra). It is also apparent,

that actions have been initiated under the “in-house procedure”,

which has the approval of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of

India. And, based on the afore-stated “in-house procedure”,

impeachment proceedings were actually initiated by the

Parliament under Article 124 of the Constitution of India. There

can therefore be no doubt whatsoever, that in the above

situation, the “in-house procedure” is firmly in place, and its

adoption for dealing with matters expressed by this Court in C.

Ravichandran Iyer’s case (supra) is now a reality.

4

Page 46 25. Despite the above conclusion, it is imperative to take into

consideration the observations recorded by this Court in Indira

Jaising v. Registrar General, Supreme Court (2003) 5 SCC 494, as

under:

“In our constitutional scheme it is not possible to vest the

Chief Justice of India with any control over the puisne

Judges with regard to conduct either personal or judicial.

In case of breach of any rule of the Code of Conduct, the

Chief Justice can choose not to post cases before a

particular Judge against whom there are acceptable

allegations. It is possible to criticise that decision on the

ground that no enquiry was held and the Judge concerned

had no opportunity to offer his explanation particularly

when the Chief Justice is not vested with any power to

decide about the conduct of a Judge. There is no adequate

method or machinery to enforce the Code of Conduct.

Article 124 provides for appointment of Judges of this

Court and also their removal. Similarly, Article 217 deals

with the appointment and removal of the Judges of the

High Court. In the Judges' Enquiry Act of 1968 provisions

are made for investigation into misbehavior or incapacity

of a Judge. It may be noted that since Judges of the

superior Courts occupy very high positions, disciplinary

proceedings which exist in the case of all other employees

cannot be though of.

The Committee referred to by the petitioner is stated to

have been constituted as a part of In-House procedure. A

Judge cannot be removed from his Office except by

impeachment by a majority of the House and a majority of

not less than 2/3rd present and voting as provided by

Articles 124 and217 of the Constitution of India. The

Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 has been enacted providing for

the manner of conducting inquiry into the allegation of

judicial conduct upon a Motion of Impeachment sponsored

by at least 100 Lok Sabha members or 50 Rajya Sabha

members. The Presiding Officer of the concerned House

has the power to constitute a Committee consisting of

4

Page 47 three persons as enumerated therein. No other

disciplinary inquiry is envisaged or contemplated either

under the Constitution or under the Act. On account of this

lacuna In-House procedure has been adopted for inquiry

to be made by the peers of Judges for report to the

Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India in case of a complaint

against the Chief Justices or Judges of the High Court in

order to find out truth of the imputation made in the

complaint and that In-House inquiry is for the purpose of

his own information and satisfaction. A report made on

such inquiry if given publicity will only lead to more harm

than good to the institution as Judges would prefer to face

inquiry leading to impeachment. In such a case the only

course open to the parties concerned if they have material

is to invoke the provisions of Article 124 or Article 217 of

the Constitution, as the case may be. It is not appropriate

for the petitioner to approach this Court for the relief or

direction for release of the Report, for what the Chief

Justice of India has done is only to get information from

peer Judges of those who are accused and the report

made to the Chief Justice of India is wholly confidential.

The said report is only for the purpose of satisfaction of

the Chief Justice of India that such a report has been

made. It is purely preliminary in nature, ad hoc and not

final. If the Chief Justice of India is satisfied that no further

action is called for in the matter, the proceeding is closed.

If any further action is to be taken as indicated in the In-

House procedure itself, the Chief Justice of India may take

such further steps as he deems fit. Therefore, in the

hierarchy of the courts, the Supreme Court does not have

any disciplinary control over the High Court Judges, much

less the Chief Justice of India has any disciplinary control

over any of the Judges. That position in law is very clear.

Thus, the only source or authority by which the Chief

Justice of India can exercise this power of inquiry is moral

or ethical and not in exercise of powers under any law.

Exercise of such power of the Chief Justice of India based

on moral authority cannot be made subject matter of a

writ petition to disclose a report made to him.”

4

Page 48 A perusal of the observations made by this Court in the extract

reproduced above, reveals that the existence of the “in-house

procedure” is now an established means for inquiring into

allegations levelled against a judge of a superior court, through

his peers. It is a confidential inquiry for institutional credibility

under the charge of the Chief Justice of India. And therefore, its

affairs are to be kept out of public domain. The proceedings under

the above procedure being sensitive, are required to be

inaccessible to third parties. And therefore, the prayer seeking

the disclosure of the report submitted on the culmination of the

“in-house procedure” was declined. The object sought to be

addressed through the “in-house procedure”, is to address

concerns of institutional integrity. That would, in turn, sustain the

confidence of the litigating public, in the efficacy of the judicial

process.

26. It is impermissible to publicly discuss the conduct of a

sitting judge, or to deliberate upon the performance of his duties,

and even on/of court behaviour, in public domain. Whilst the “in-

house procedure” lays down means to determine the efficacy of

the allegations levelled, it is now apparent, that the procedure is

not toothless, in the sense, that it can lead to impeachment of the

4

Page 49 concerned judge under Article 124 of the Constitution of India.

Such being the cause, effect and repercussions of the findings

recorded during the course of the “in-house procedure”, this

Court in Indira Jaising’s case (supra) declined to entertain the writ

petition filed at the behest of a third party, seeking details of the

proceedings, and the consequential report prepared by the

committee of judges. But, that should not be understood to

mean, that an individual concerned, who is called upon to subject

himself/herself to the contemplated procedure, should be

precluded or prevented from seeking judicial redress. It is now

well understood, that an individual who subjects himself/herself to

the jurisdiction of an authority, cannot turn around to find fault

with it at a later juncture. If there is a fault, the same should be

corrected, before one accepts to submit to the jurisdiction of the

concerned authority. The submission of the petitioner in the

present case, to the “two-Judge Committee”, would certainly have

had the above effect. We are therefore satisfied to hold, that

those who are liable to be affected by the outcome of the “in-

house procedure”, have the right to seek judicial redressal, on

account of a perceived irregularity. The irregularity may be on

account of the violation of the contemplated procedure, or even

4

Page 50 because of contemplated bias or prejudice. It may be on account

of impropriety. The challenge can extend to all subjects on which

judicial review can be sought. The objections raised on behalf of

respondent no.3, in respect of the sustainability of the instant

petition at the hands of Addl.D&SJ ‘X’, are therefore wholly

untenable. The challenge to the maintainability of the instant writ

petition, is accordingly declined.

27. The petitioner’s pointed contention with reference to the

procedure adopted, while giving effect to the “in-house

procedure” approved by the Full Court of the Supreme Court, is

with reference to the clear and categoric jurisdictional authority,

exclusively vested with the Chief Justice of the concerned High

Court. According to learned counsel, the Chief Justice of the High

Court is, to examine the veracity of the allegations, at his own. It

was accordingly submitted, that the Chief Justice of the High

Court, had neither the jurisdiction nor authority, to constitute a

committee of judges to hold a fact finding inquiry, by recording

statements of witnesses. Pointing out to the procedure

contemplated in paragraph (1) of the “in-house procedure”

(extracted in paragraph 22 herein above), it was submitted, that

where the complaint made against a sitting judge of the High

5

Page 51 Court is received by the Chief Justice of the High Court, “he” is

required to examine the same. On “his” examination, if the

complaint is found to be frivolous or directly related to the merits

of a substantive decision in a judicial matter, or if it does not

involve serious allegations of misconduct or impropriety, “he”

shall file the complaint and inform the Chief Justice of India

accordingly. Alternatively, if it is found by “him”, that the

complaint is of a serious nature involving misconduct or

impropriety, “he” would seek the response of the concerned

judge. Based on the complaint and the response, “the Chief

Justice of the High Court” would take appropriate action, namely,

“he” would file the complaint if “he” is satisfied that no further

action is necessary. However, if “he” considers that the

allegations need to be further probed, “he” would forward the

complaint, and the response of the concerned judge, along with

“his” comments to the Chief Justice of India. It was pointed out

that the terms “he”, “his” or “him”, have a reference, exclusively

to the Chief Justice of the concerned High Court.

28. Referring to paragraph (2) of the “in-house procedure”

pertaining to a complaint against a sitting High Court Judge, i.e.,

in situations where the complaint is received by the Chief Justice

5

Page 52 of India directly (or it is forwarded to him by the President of

India), the Chief Justice of India may file the complaint at his own,

if it is found by “him”, i.e., the Chief Justice of India, that it is

either frivolous or directly related to the merits of a substantive

decision in a judicial matter or does not involve any serious

misconduct or impropriety. In other cases, the complaint shall be

forwarded by the Chief Justice of India to the Chief Justice of the

concerned High Court. On the receipt of such complaint, the

Chief Justice of the High Court would seek the response of the

concerned judge. The consideration at the hands of the Chief

Justice of the High Court, is limited to an examination of the

complaint in conjunction with the response of the concerned

judge. Thereupon, the Chief Justice of the High Court could either

be satisfied that no further action is called for, or “he” may

entertain the opinion that the allegations contained in the

complaint need a deeper probe. “he” shall return the complaint

to the Chief Justice of India, along with the response of the

concerned judge and “his” comments. It was pointed out, that

even in paragraph (2) of the “in-house procedure” the terms “he”

and “his”, have a reference exclusively to the Chief Justice of the

High Court.

5

Page 53 29. Based on paragraphs (1) and (2) of the “in-house

procedure” pertaining to complaint against a sitting High Court

Judge, it is the contention of the learned counsel for the

petitioner, that the procedure does not envisage/contemplate,

holding of a full fledged inquiry. The jurisdiction vested in the

Chief Justice of the High Court, under the “in-house procedure”,

according to learned counsel, is limited to seeking the response of

the concerned judge, and thereupon, in case the allegations

contained in the complaint require a deeper probe, the Chief

Justice of the High Court, is to forward the complaint along with

the response of the concerned High Court Judge, as well as his

own comments, to the Chief Justice of India. It is therefore, the

contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner, that

constitution of the “two-Judge Committee”, to be assisted for

secretarial purposes, by a senior lady Additional District Judge,

was clearly beyond the authority and jurisdiction of the Chief

Justice of the High Court, and that the same was in complete

violation and derogation of the “in-house procedure” approved by

the Full Court of the Supreme Court.

30. It was also the contention of the learned counsel for the

petitioner, that the action of the “two-Judge Committee”

5

Page 54 constituted by the Chief Justice of the High Court, requiring the

petitioner to appear before the Committee, along with relevant

documents in relation to the imputations levelled by her, was also

impermissible. It was pointed out, that the “two-Judge

Committee” had not only required the petitioner’s presence, but

also that of her daughter. It is further submitted, that a

communication was addressed by the “two-Judge Committee” to

the petitioner’s husband, also requiring him to remain present

before the Committee. All the afore-stated actions, according to

the learned counsel for the petitioner, were in clear violation of

the “in-house procedure”, approved by the Full Court of the

Supreme Court.

31. During the course of hearing, learned counsel for the

petitioner invited our attention, to the assertions made on behalf

of respondent no.3, namely, that it was imperative for the “two-

Judge Committee” constituted by the Chief Justice of the High

Court, to verify the factual position, from the wife of the Chief

Judicial Magistrate, Gwalior, the District Registrar, Gwalior, the

District Judge (Inspection), Gwalior, as also, the District and

Sessions Judge, Gwalior, since averments had been made with

reference to all of them, in the complaint filed by the petitioner.

5

Page 55 Responding to the aforesaid, it was submitted, that an inquiry

extending to the persons referred to hereinabove, as also the

staff attached to the petitioner, who could be witnesses, to the

acts of omission and commission alleged against respondent no.3,

were also clearly beyond the scope of “in-house procedure”.

32. It is also necessary for us to record, that the submissions

advanced at the hands of the learned counsel for the petitioner,

to demonstrate the responsibility of the Chief Justice of the High

Court, with reference to the “in-house procedure”, was not

contested by the learned counsel for the respondents. Whilst the

stance adopted by the Registrar General of the High Court was,

that the procedure adopted by the Chief Justice of the High Court,

was based on the sensitivity involved in the matter. In the

counter affidavit filed on behalf of the Registrar General of the

High Court, it is sought to be averred, that even though the “two-

Judge Committee” constituted by the Chief Justice of the High

Court had commenced to inquire into the matter, but the report

thereof was not submitted to the Chief Justice of the High Court,

because of the news flashed in the media on 29.08.2014, about

this Court having stayed further proceedings in the matter. The

issue under consideration is not whether the Chief Justice of the

5

Page 56 High Court was well meaning, in constituting the “two-Judge

Committee” for inquiring into the matter. The issue is, whether it

was open to the Chief Justice of the High Court, to constitute such

a committee, within the framework of the “in-house procedure”.

We are satisfied, that the Chief Justice of the High Court, had no

jurisdiction to do so, in terms of the “in-house procedure”. It is

therefore, that the learned counsel representing the High Court

repeatedly adopted the stance, that in the given facts and

circumstances of the case, the High Court would not be averse to

following any procedure, which this Court would consider

reasonable and proper. Learned Solicitor General representing the

Secretary General of the Supreme Court, fully endorsed the above

view.

33. No pointed submission was advanced by the counsel

representing respondent no.3 – Justice ‘A’, on the main

submission advanced at the hands of the learned counsel for the

petitioner. Learned counsel for respondent no.3, in order to

repudiate the submissions advanced at the hands of the learned

counsel for the petitioner, contended that the Chief Justice of a

High Court, does not function under the administrative control of

the Chief Justice of India. It was, therefore pointed out, that while

5

Page 57 adjudicating on the issue being canvassed, it needed to be kept in

mind, that the Chief Justice of a High Court, is not subservient to

the Chief Justice of India. It was accordingly asserted, that in

discharging his onerous responsibility, the Chief Justice of a High

Court, would (and should) be at liberty, to evolve a procedure, in

the best interest of all concerned. It was submitted, that the

Chief Justice of a High Court, should not be deprived of the said

liberty, for the simple reason, that he has to ensure fairness to

the rival parties, and at the same time, to safeguard the dignity of

the institution. It was therefore, that learned counsel advised us,

not to limit or place fetters on the discretion of the Chief Justice of

the High Court, insofar as the investigative procedure is

concerned. Learned counsel submitted, that the procedure

adopted by the Chief Justice of the High Court, represented the

ethical and moral authority of the High Court, and as such, it

would not be proper to interfere with the same. It was submitted,

that the petitioner had not alleged, that the procedure adopted by

the Chief Justice of the High Court, was unethical or morally

improper. It was repeatedly pointed out, that the proceedings

assailed by the petitioner, had neither any statutory status, nor

the force of law. It was submitted that the Chief Justice of the

5

Page 58 High Court had followed the procedure, he felt best for the

purpose. The submissions of the learned counsel representing

respondent no.3, we are sure, was well intentioned. The response

of the learned counsel avoids the issue being canvassed. The

response would be understandable if the Chief Justice of the High

Court had adopted the procedure in question, because the “in-

house procedure”, would not have been the proper course to

follow, or would have resulted in injustice to one or the either

party. But that is not the case here.

34. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the main

contention advanced at the hands of the learned counsel for the

petitioner. In the process of examining the “in-house procedure”,

we have had the occasion to appreciate the invaluable

contribution made by three Judges of this Court, two of whom

adorned this Court as Chief Justices, and two Chief Justices of High

Courts, one of whom was later elevated as a Judge of this Court.

The “in-house procedure”, did not overlook any relevant aspect.

The sensitivity of the matter was kept in mind. The individual

integrity of the parties was taken care of. The parties concerned

were assured, that all efforts would be made to unravel the truth.

The procedure devised ensured the preservation of institutional

5

Page 59 reputation, as well. In dealing with complaints made against

sitting judges of High Courts, the onus of recording a prima facie

view, was vested with the Chief Justice of the concerned High

Court. Participation in the investigative process, at the hands of

any other judge of the same High Court, was sought to be

excluded. The exclusion of judges of the same Court from the

investigative process, was also well thought out. In certain

situations it may be true, as pointed out by the learned counsel

for the petitioner, that judges of the same Court being colleagues

of the concerned judge, would endeavour to exculpate him from

his predicament. It is not as if, the position could not be

otherwise. Animosity amongst colleagues is not unknown.

Reasons of competitiveness, jealousy and the like are known

amongst colleague judges, specially from the same High Court.

By excluding judges of the concerned High Court (as the judge

complained against), is bound to be beneficial, in both the

situations, referred to above. The Chief Justice of the High Court,

being a Judge from another State, would be shorn of any such

prejudices. Moreover, being a man on the spot, he would be most

suited for the purpose.

5

Page 60 35. A perusal of the “in-house procedure” applicable to sitting

judges of High Courts reveals, that the same is

compartmentalized into two stages. Through the first stage, the

prima facie veracity of the allegations, contained in the complaint

is ascertained. If so, whether a deeper probe is called for. The

first stage does not contemplate an in-depth examination of the

allegations. It requires merely an assessment based on the

contents of the complaint, and the response of the concerned

judge. All that the Chief Justice of the High Court is required to

do, is to determine whether a deeper probe is required. This is to

be done, on the basis of a logical assessment made on a

consideration of the response of the concerned Judge (with

reference to the allegations levelled in the complaint).

36. It is the second stage of the “in-house procedure”, relating

to sitting judges of High Courts, which could lead to serious

consequences. The second stage is monitored by none other,

than the Chief Justice of India. Only if the Chief Justice of India

endorses the view expressed by the Chief Justice of the High

Court, that a deeper probe is called for, he would constitute a

“three-member Committee”, and thereby take the investigative

process, to the second stage. This Committee is to comprise of

6

Page 61 two Chief Justices of High Courts (other than the concerned High

Court), besides a Judge of a High Court. The second stage,

postulates a deeper probe. Even though the “three-member

Committee” is at liberty to devise its own procedure, the inherent

requirement provided for is, that the procedure evolved should be

in consonance with the rules of natural justice. Herein, for the

first time, the authenticity of the allegations, are to be probed, on

the basis of an inquiry. The incumbents of the “three-member

Committee”, would have no nexus, with the concerned judge.

Not only would the concerned judge have a fair opportunity to

repudiate the allegations levelled against him, even the

complainant would have the satisfaction, that the investigation

would not be unfair. The “in-house procedure” was devised to

ensure exclusion of favouritism, prejudice or bias.

37. By forwarding the complaint received by the Chief Justice

of India against respondent no.3 – Justice ‘A’, to the Chief Justice

of the High Court, the “in-house procedure” was sought to be put

in motion. The extract of the “in-house procedure” (applicable to

sitting Judges of High Court), reproduced in paragraph 22 above

reveals, that the same is expressed in the simplest possible

words. For recording our conclusions, we have endeavoured to

6

Page 62 explain the same through “seven steps” contemplated therein.

The description of the “in-house procedure”, relating to sitting

High Court Judges, is being narrated hereunder, stepwise:

Step one: (i) A complaint may be received, against a sitting

Judge of a High Court, by the Chief Justice of that High Court;

(ii) A complaint may also be received, against a sitting

Judge of a High Court, by the Chief Justice of India;

(iii)A complaint may even be received against a sitting Judge

of a High Court, by the President of India. Such a complaint is

then forwarded to the Chief Justice of India;

In case of (i) above, the Chief Justice of the High Court shall

examine the contents of the complaint, at his own, and if the

same are found to be frivolous, he shall file the same.

In case of (ii) and (iii) above, the Chief Justice of India shall

similarly examine the contents of the complaint, by himself, and if

the same are found to be frivolous, he shall file the same.

Step two: (i) The Chief Justice of the High Court, after having

examined a complaint, may entertain a feeling, that the

complaint contains serious allegations, involving misconduct or

impropriety, which require a further probe;

6

Page 63 (ii) The Chief Justice of India, on examining the contents

of a complaint, may likewise entertain a feeling, that the

complaint contains serious allegations, involving misconduct or

impropriety, which require a further probe;

In case of (i) above, the Chief Justice of the High Court, shall seek

a response from the concerned Judge, and nothing more.

In case of (ii) above, the Chief Justice of India, shall forward the

complaint to the Chief Justice of the High Court. The Chief Justice

of the High Court, shall then seek a response from the concerned

Judge, and nothing more.

Step three:The Chief Justice of the High Court, shall consider the

veracity of the allegations contained in the complaint, by taking

into consideration the response of the concerned Judge. The

above consideration will lead the Chief Justice of the High Court,

to either of the below mentioned inferences:

(i) The Chief Justice of the High Court, may arrive at the

inference, that the allegations are frivolous. In the instant

eventuality, the Chief Justice of the High Court shall

forward his opinion to the Chief Justice of India.

(ii) Or alternatively, the Chief Justice of the High Court, may

arrive at the opinion, that the complaint requires a deeper

6

Page 64 probe. In the instant eventuality, the Chief Justice of the

High Court, shall forward the complaint, along with the

response of the Judge concerned, as also his own

consideration, to the Chief Justice of India.

Step four:The Chief Justice of India shall then examine, the

allegations contained in the complaint, the response of the

concerned Judge, along with the consideration of the Chief Justice

of the High Court. If on such examination, the Chief Justice of

India, concurs with the opinion of the Chief Justice of the High

Court (that a deeper probe is required, into the allegations

contained in the complaint), the Chief Justice of India, shall

constitute a “three-member Committee”, comprising of two Chief

Justices of High Courts (other than the High Court, to which the

Judge belongs), and one High Court Judge, to hold an inquiry, into

the allegations contained in the complaint.

Step five:The “three-member Committee” constituted by the

Chief Justice of India, shall conduct an inquiry, by devising its own

procedure, consistent with the rules of natural justice. On the

culmination of the inquiry, conducted by the “three-member

Committee”, it shall record its conclusions. The report of the

“three-member Committee”, will be furnished, to the Chief Justice

6

Page 65 of India. The report could lead to one of the following

conclusions:

That, there is no substance in the allegations levelled against the

concerned Judge; or that there is sufficient substance in the

allegations levelled against the concerned Judge. In such

eventuality, the “three-member Committee”, must further opine,

whether the misconduct levelled against the concerned Judge is

so serious, that it requires initiation of proceedings for removal of

the concerned Judge; or that, the allegations contained in the

complaint are not serious enough to require initiation of

proceedings for the removal of the concerned Judge.

In case of (i) above, the Chief Justice of India, shall file the

complaint.

In case of (ii) above, the report of the “three-member

Committee”, shall also be furnished (by the Committee) to the

concerned Judge.

Step six:If the “three-member Committee” constituted by the

Chief Justice of India, arrives at the conclusion, that the

misconduct is not serious enough, for initiation of proceedings for

the removal of the concerned Judge, the Chief Justice of India

shall advise the concerned Judge, and may also direct, that the

6

Page 66 report of the “three-member Committee” be placed on record. If

the “three-member Committee” has concluded, that there is

substance in the allegations, for initiation of proceedings, for the

removal of the concerned Judge, the Chief Justice of India shall

proceed as under:-

(i) The concerned judge will be advised, by the Chief Justice

of India, to resign or to seek voluntary retirement.

(ii)In case the concerned Judge does not accept the advice of

the Chief Justice of India, the Chief Justice of India, would

require the Chief Justice of the concerned High Court, not

to allocate any judicial work, to the concerned Judge.

Step seven:In the eventuality of the concerned Judge, not

abiding by the advice of the Chief Justice of India, the Chief Justice

of India, as indicated in step six above, the Chief Justice of India,

shall intimate the President of India, and the Prime Minister of

India, of the findings of the “three-member Committee”,

warranting initiation of proceedings, for removal of the concerned

judge.

38. It is apparent from the “seven steps”, of the “in-house

procedure”, for sitting High Court Judges, that the role of the Chief

Justice of the High Court, is limited to the first three steps. We

6

Page 67 are satisfied, that the main contention advanced by the learned

counsel for the petitioner, relying on the “in-house procedure” is

fully justified. There can be no doubt, that it was not open to the

Chief Justice of the High Court, either to constitute the “two-Judge

Committee”, or to require the “two-Judge Committee”, to hold an

inquiry into the matter, by recording statements of witnesses.

The role of the Chief Justice of the High Court, being limited to the

first stage of the investigative process, during which the only

determination is, whether a prima facie case is made out

requiring a deeper probe; the Chief Justice of the High Court had

exceeded the authority vested in him under the “in-house

procedure”. It is only in the second stage of the investigative

process, that the Chief Justice of India, is to constitute a “three-

member Committee” for holding a deeper probe, into the

allegations levelled in the complaint. Learned counsel for the

petitioner, was fully justified, in submitting, that the “two-Judge

Committee” constituted by the Chief Justice of the High Court,

was beyond the purview of the “in-house procedure”.

39. Having examined the facts and circumstances of the case,

we are of the view, that by not strictly abiding by the procedure

contemplated under the “in-house procedure” evolved by this

6

Page 68 Court, the Chief Justice of the High Court, introduced serious

infirmities in the investigative process. These infirmities were of

the nature which were sought to be consciously avoided under

the “in-house procedure”. We may mention a few. It is apparent,

that the “in-house procedure” contemplated an independent

holistic two-stage process. We have described hereinabove, that

the first stage comprises of steps ‘one’ to ‘three’. The first stage

is limited to a prima facie consideration, at the hands of the Chief

Justice of the High Court, for determining whether a deeper probe

into the matter was required. The first stage of the “in-house

procedure” contemplates the implied exclusion of colleague

Judges, from the same High Court. In the process adopted by the

Chief Justice of the High Court, he has consciously involved

colleague Judges, of the same High Court. This was sought to be

avoided under the “in-house procedure”. Unfortunately, what

Chief Justice of the High Court has embarked upon, is not a prima

facie determination, but a holistic consideration of the allegations.

This is also wholly contrary to the “in-house procedure”. The

Chief Justice of the High Court, has actually embarked upon steps

‘four’ to ‘seven’, which are a part of the second stage of the “in-

house procedure”. The second stage of the “in-house procedure”

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Page 69 envisages a deeper probe, which is to be monitored by the Chief

Justice of India himself. If the proceedings move to the second

stage, the Chief Justice of India, would nominate a “three-member

Committee”. In the process adopted by the Chief Justice of the

High Court, he has usurped the investigative process, assigned to

the “three-member Committee”. The Chief Justice of the High

Court, has himself, commenced the deeper probe, through the

“two-Judge Committee”. Furthermore, under the second stage,

the inquiry is to be conducted by two sitting Chief Justices of High

Courts, and one Judge of a High Court. An inquiry conducted by

the “three-member Committee”, in terms of the “in-house

procedure”, would have a wholly different impact. Not only would

the concerned parties feel reassured, that justice would be done,

even the public at large would be confident, that the outcome

would be fair and without any prejudices. By doing so, the Chief

Justice of the High Court, ignored the wisdom of the Committee of

Judges, who devised the “in-house procedure”, as also, the

determination of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of India. In

the procedure adopted, by the Chief Justice of the High Court in

the instant case, it is possible for one or the other party to feel,

that he/she may not get justice at the hands of the “two-Judge

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Page 70 Committee”. In fact, that is exactly the position, in the present

case. For the reasons recorded hereinabove, the proceedings

adopted by the Chief Justice of the High Court are liable to be set

aside. The same are accordingly hereby set aside.

40. The next contention of the learned counsel for the

petitioner was, that the inquiry conducted by the “two-Judge

Committee”, constituted by the Chief Justice of the High Court,

cannot be expected to arrive at a fair conclusion. That by itself,

according to learned counsel, vitiates the entire proceedings. The

instant submission was sought to be supported on two counts.

Firstly, it was the submission of the learned counsel for the

petitioner, that all the persons and officers through whom the

petitioner is to substantiate her allegations, are subordinate to

respondent no.3 – Justice ‘A’. It was pointed out, that Justice ‘A’

exercises administrative superintendence and control over them.

It was also the submission of the learned counsel for the

petitioner, that even persons who would vouchsafe the veracity of

the assertions made by respondent no. 3 - Justice ‘A’, are under

the administrative supervision and control of respondent no. 3,

and as such, they too cannot be expected to make statements,

freely and without fear. Secondly, it was the contention of the

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Page 71 learned counsel for the petitioner, that the “two-Judge

Committee” constituted by the Chief Justice of the High Court,

comprised of colleagues of respondent no.3 – Justice ‘A’, and as

such, the said committee may not be open-minded enough, to

affirm the claim of the petitioner. In this behalf, it was the

submission of the learned counsel, that the endeavour of the

“two-Judge Committee”, would be to exculpate their colleague,

from the allegations levelled against him. Accordingly, it was the

assertion of the learned counsel, that the “two-Judge Committee”

required to inquire into the matter, by the Chief Justice of the

High Court, was wholly unsuited for inquiring into the allegations

levelled by the petitioner.

41. It is not necessary for us, to delve into the contention

advanced at the hands of the learned counsel for the petitioner,

as has been noticed in the foregoing paragraph, for the simple

reason, that while accepting the main contention advanced at the

hands of the learned counsel, we have already concluded, that

the procedure adopted by the Chief Justice of the High Court, is

liable to be set aside. Be that as it may, we consider it just and

appropriate to deal with the above contention, so that the issue

canvassed is crystallized, by an effective determination for future

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Page 72 reference. There can be no doubt, that an investigation, would

lead to consequences. The concerned judge may be found remiss,

or alternatively, he may be exculpated of the charges. Whilst in

the former eventuality, the concerned judge against whom the

findings are recorded, would be the obvious sufferer. In the latter

eventuality, the adverse consequences would be against the

complainant, for it would be assumed that she had levelled

unfounded allegations. It is therefore imperative, that the

procedure adopted for the investigative process, is absolutely fair

for all concerned. The procedure should be such as would ensure,

that it would be shorn of favouritism, prejudice or bias. Presence

of any one of the above, would vitiate the entire investigative

process. Recording of statements of individuals, who are

subservient to respondent no.3 – Justice ‘A’, irrespective of

whether the statements are recorded on behalf of the

complainant or the concerned judge, would most definitely render

the investigative process unsustainable in law. The influence of

the concerned judge, over the witnesses to be produced, either

by the complainant or by the concerned judge himself, will have

to be removed. It will be for the complainant, to raise a grievance

of the nature referred to above. In such an eventuality, the

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Page 73 grievance will be considered by the Chief Justice of India. And

whenever necessary, remedial steps will be taken.

42. The last contention of the learned counsel for the

petitioner was, that the Chief Justice of the High Court himself, is

clearly incapacitated, to be a party to any determinative process,

insofar as the allegations levelled by the petitioner are concerned.

It was the contention of the learned counsel, that for the present

case, the Chief Justice of the High Court, should not even be

required to determine, whether or not a deeper probe into the

matter was required. Insofar as the instant aspect of the matter

is concerned, learned counsel vehemently contended, that the

petitioner had made numerous efforts to meet the Chief Justice of

the High Court, to apprise him of the factual position. It was

pointed out, that in the petitioner’s efforts to meet the Chief

Justice of the High Court, she had also made repeated attempts to

do so, through the Private Secretary of the Chief Justice. The

Private Secretary has now assumed the stance, that the petitioner

had never contacted him, for the said purpose. This position,

according to the petitioner, is false not only to the knowledge of

the Private Secretary, but also, to the knowledge of all concerned.

It is sought to be emphasized, that a press note was also

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Page 74 released, to the aforesaid effect, at the behest of the Chief Justice

of the High Court. The position adopted by the Chief Justice of the

High Court, according to the learned counsel, clearly reveals a

position of denial of the factual assertions made by the petitioner.

In the above view of the matter, it was the contention of the

learned counsel for the petitioner, that even the Chief Justice of

the High Court, was in denial of the facts asserted by the

petitioner. And by doing so, the Chief Justice of the High Court

had rendered himself ineligible, for any role arising out of the

complaint made by the petitioner.

43. It is essential for us to record a finding even on the last

contention advanced at the hands of the learned counsel. We say

so, because according to the learned counsel for the petitioner, it

would not be proper, in the facts and circumstances of this case,

to reinitiate the process expressed in the “in-house procedure”,

through the Chief Justice of the High Court. It seems to us, that

there is merit in the instant contention. Undoubtedly, the Chief

Justice of the High Court has adopted a position, in respect of

some aspects of the matter, contrary to the position asserted by

the petitioner. Truthfully, even though these facts do not have

any direct bearing on the allegations levelled against respondent

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Page 75 no. 3, yet when examined dispassionately, the fact of the matter

is that the Chief Justice of the High Court, personally perceived

certain facts differently. These facts are personal to the Chief

Justice of the High Court, namely, whether attempts were made

by the petitioner to meet the Chief Justice of the High Court, and

whether he declined such attempts. In the above view of the

matter, we are of the considered view, that it may not be

appropriate, in the facts and circumstances of the present case,

to associate the Chief Justice of the High Court with the

investigative process. It is not as if, there is any lack of faith, in

the Chief Justice of the High Court. It is also not as if, there is any

doubt in our mind, about the righteousness of the Chief Justice of

the High Court. The issue is that of propriety. To the credit of the

Chief Justice of the High Court, we may also observe, that he may

have adopted the present procedure, just for the reasons

indicated above, namely, to keep himself out of the fact finding

process, so as to arrive at a fair and just decision. But that is

inconsequential. We are accordingly further satisfied in

concluding, that following the “in-house procedure” strictly by

associating the Chief Justice of the concerned High Court, would

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Page 76 not serve the contemplated purpose, insofar as the present

controversy is concerned.

44. We have concluded hereinabove, that it is no longer

viable, to strictly follow the “in-house procedure” contemplated

for sitting judges of the High Court de novo. That however, does

not mean, that it is no longer possible to determine the veracity

of the allegations levelled by the petitioner. What procedure

must be followed in the facts and circumstances of the present

case, will have to be determined by the Chief Justice of India. We

therefore, leave it to the Chief Justice of India, to take a fresh call

on the matter. All that needs to be done is, that the role assigned

to the Chief Justice of the concerned High Court, in the first stage

of the “in-house procedure”, will now have to be assigned to

some one other than the Chief Justice of the concerned High

Court. In taking a decision on the matter, the Chief Justice of

India may assign the above role to a Chief Justice, of some other

High Court. Or alternatively, he may himself assume the said

role. The assumption of the role by the Chief Justice of India

himself, would not be unrealistic, as the said role is vested with

the Chief Justice of India, under the “in-house procedure”, with

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Page 77 reference to complaints received against Chief Justices of High

Courts.

45. In view of the consideration and the findings recorded

hereinabove, we may record our general conclusions as under:

(i) The “in-house procedure” framed by this Court,

consequent upon the decision rendered in C. Ravichandran Iyer’s

case (supra) can be adopted, to examine allegations levelled

against Judges of High Courts, Chief Justices of High Courts and

Judges of the Supreme Court of India.

(ii) The investigative process under the “in-house

procedure” takes into consideration the rights of the complainant,

and that of the concerned judge, by adopting a fair procedure, to

determine the veracity of allegations levelled against a sitting

Judge. At the same time, it safeguards the integrity of the judicial

institution.

(iii)Even though the said procedure, should ordinarily be

followed in letter and spirit, the Chief Justice of India, would have

the authority to mould the same, in the facts and circumstances

of a given case, to ensure that the investigative process affords

safeguards, against favouritism, prejudice or bias.

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Page 78 (iv)In view of the importance of the “in-house procedure”, it is

essential to bring it into public domain. The Registry of the

Supreme Court of India, is accordingly directed, to place the same

on the official website of the Supreme Court of India.

46. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, our

conclusions are as under:

(i)With reference to the “in-house procedure” pertaining to a

judge of a High Court, the limited authority of the Chief Justice of

the concerned High Court, is to determine whether or not a

deeper probe is required. The said determination is a part of

stage-one (comprising of the first three steps) of the “in-house

procedure” (elucidated in paragraph 37, hereinabove). The Chief

Justice of the High Court, in the present case, traveled beyond the

determinative authority vested in him, under stage-one of the “in-

house procedure”.

(ii)The Chief Justice of the High Court, by constituting a “two-

Judge Committee”, commenced an in-depth probe, into the

allegations levelled by the petitioner. The procedure adopted by

the Chief Justice of the High Court, forms a part of the second

stage (contemplated under steps four to seven –elucidated in

paragraph 37, hereinabove). The second stage of the “in-house

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Page 79 procedure” is to be carried out, under the authority of the Chief

Justice of India. The Chief Justice of the High Court by constituting

a “two-Judge Committee” clearly traversed beyond his

jurisdictional authority, under the “in-house procedure”.

(iii)In order to ensure, that the investigative process is fair and

just, it is imperative to divest the concerned judge (against whom

allegations have been levelled), of his administrative and

supervisory authority and control over witnesses, to be produced

either on behalf of the complainant, or on behalf of the concerned

judge himself. The Chief Justice of the High Court is accordingly

directed to divest respondent no.3 – Justice ‘A’, of the

administrative and supervisory control vested in him, to the

extent expressed above.

(iv)The Chief Justice of the High Court, having assumed a firm

position, in respect of certain facts contained in the complaint

filed by the petitioner, ought not to be associated with the “in-

house procedure” in the present case. In the above view of the

matter, the Chief Justice of India may reinitiate the investigative

process, under the “in-house procedure”, by vesting the authority

required to be discharged by the Chief Justice of the concerned

High Court, to a Chief Justice of some other High Court, or

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Page 80 alternatively, the Chief Justice of India may himself assume the

said role.

47. Liberty was sought by the learned counsel for the

petitioner, to raise all remaining issues raised in the writ petition,

through a separate petition. Leave and liberty sought, is granted.

The instant petition is disposed of, in the above terms.

……………………………J.

(Jagdish Singh

Khehar)

……………………………J.

(Arun Mishra)

New Delhi;

December 18, 2014.

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