1

A.F.R.

Court No. - 21

Case :- WRIT - C No. - 25502 of 2019

Petitioner :- Ahmad Ullah

Respondent :- Union Of India And 5 Others

Counsel for Petitioner :- Azizur Rahman Khan

Counsel for Respondent :- A.S.G.I.,Vikas Budhwar,Yogendra Kumar

Hon'ble Pradeep Kumar Singh Baghel,J.

Hon'ble Piyush Agrawal,J.

(Per: Justice Piyush Agrawal)

We have heard Shri Azizur Rahman Khan, learned counsel for the

petitioner and Shri Vikas Budhwar, learned counsel for the respondent

nos. 2 & 3.

By means of the present writ petition, the petitioner is challenging

the order dated 13.07.2019 passed by the respondent no. 3; whereby, the

petitioner's candidature for Retail Outlet Dealership in Group - 1

category has been rejected and the same has been changed to Group - 3

category.

The facts of the case, in brief, are that on 25.11.2018, an

advertisement was issued for selection of retail outlet dealership by the

respondent - Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited (HPCL) for

different locations. The petitioner, vide online application dated

21.12.2018, applied for the location on Dumariyaganj - Bansi road,

Village - Sekhui, Tappa - Hallour, Block - Dumariyaganj, District -

Siddharth Nagar. Thereafter, vide letter/e-mail dated 20.06.2019, the

petitioner was declared successful in draw of lots for the retail outlet

dealership in Group - 1 category and the petitioner was asked to submit

certain documents and security amount. Pursuant to the aforesaid letter,

the petitioner deposited the security amount of Rs. 40,000/- on

26.06.2019, along with the documents.

Thereafter, by the impugned letter/order dated 13.07.2019, the

petitioner's candidature for Retail Outlet Dealership was changed from

2

Group - 1 to Group - 3. The petitioner has been further informed that his

candidature for retail outlet dealership may be considered for selection

along with Group - 3 category as per the guidelines.

Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the order dated

13.07.2019 has been passed in gross violation of the principles of

natural justice and without affording an opportunity of hearing to the

petitioner. He further submits that no reason has been assigned in the

impugned order for rejecting the claim of the petitioner.

Learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, submits

that the impugned order does not suffer from any illegality and tries to

justify the passing of the impugned order.

On perusal of the impugned order, we find that the respondent -

Corporation has not recorded any conclusion in the impugned order and

without assigning any reason, the category of the petitioner for retail

outlet dealership has been changed from Group - 1 to Group – 3.

It is settled law that reason is the heartbeat of every conclusion.

An order without valid reasons cannot be sustained. To give reasons is

the rule of natural justice. One of the most important aspect for

necessitating to record reason is that it substitutes subjectivity with

objectivity. It is well settled that not only the judicial order, but also the

administrative order must be supported by reasons recording in it.

Highlighting this rule, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the case of

Assistant Commissioner, Commercial Tax Department, Works

Contract & Leasing, Kota Vs. Shukla & Brothers, (2010) 4 SCC 785,

has observed that the administrative authority and the tribunal are

obliged to give reasons, absence whereof would render the order liable

to judicial chastisement. The relevant paragraphs of the aforesaid

judgement are quoted as under:-

"10. The increasing institution of cases in all Courts in India and its

resultant burden upon the Courts has invited attention of all concerned in

3

the justice administration system. Despite heavy quantum of cases in Courts,

in our view, it would neither be permissible nor possible to state as a

principle of law, that while exercising power of judicial review on

administrative action and more particularly judgment of courts in appeal

before the higher Court, providing of reasons can never be dispensed with.

The doctrine of audi alteram partem has three basic essentials. Firstly, a

person against whom an order is required to be passed or whose rights are

likely to be affected adversely must be granted an opportunity of being

heard. Secondly, the concerned authority should provide a fair and

transparent procedure and lastly, the authority concerned must apply its

mind and dispose of the matter by a reasoned or speaking order. This has

been uniformly applied by courts in India and abroad.

11. The Supreme Court in the case of S.N. Mukherjee v. Union of India

[(1990) 4 SCC 594], while referring to the practice adopted and insistence

placed by the Courts in United States, emphasized the importance of

recording of reasons for decisions by the administrative authorities and

tribunals. It said "administrative process will best be vindicated by clarity in

its exercise". To enable the Courts to exercise the power of review in

consonance with settled principles, the authorities are advised of the

considerations underlining the action under review. This Court with

approval stated:-

"11. ...the orderly functioning of the process of review requires that the

grounds upon which the administrative agency acted be clearly

disclosed and adequately sustained."

12. In exercise of the power of judicial review, the concept of reasoned

orders/actions has been enforced equally by the foreign courts as by the

courts in India. The administrative authority and tribunals are obliged to

give reasons, absence whereof could render the order liable to judicial

chastisement. Thus, it will not be far from absolute principle of law that the

Courts should record reasons for its conclusions to enable the appellate or

higher Courts to exercise their jurisdiction appropriately and in accordance

with law. It is the reasoning alone, that can enable a higher or an appellate

court to appreciate the controversy in issue in its correct perspective and to

hold whether the reasoning recorded by the Court whose order is impugned,

is sustainable in law and whether it has adopted the correct legal approach.

To sub-serve the purpose of justice delivery system, therefore, it is essential

that the Courts should record reasons for its conclusions, whether disposing

of the case at admission stage or after regular hearing.

13. At the cost of repetition, we may notice, that this Court has consistently

taken the view that recording of reasons is an essential feature of

dispensation of justice. A litigant who approaches the Court with any

grievance in accordance with law is entitled to know the reasons for grant

or rejection of his prayer. Reasons are the soul of orders. Non-recording of

reasons could lead to dual infirmities; firstly, it may cause prejudice to the

affected party and secondly, more particularly, hamper the proper

administration of justice. These principles are not only applicable to

administrative or executive actions, but they apply with equal force and, in

fact, with a greater degree of precision to judicial pronouncements. A

judgment without reasons causes prejudice to the person against whom it is

pronounced, as that litigant is unable to know the ground which weighed

with the Court in rejecting his claim and also causes impediments in his

taking adequate and appropriate grounds before the higher Court in the

event of challenge to that judgment. Now, we may refer to certain judgments

4

of this Court as well as of the High Courts which have taken this view.

14. The principle of natural justice has twin ingredients; firstly, the person

who is likely to be adversely affected by the action of the authorities should

be given notice to show cause thereof and granted an opportunity of hearing

and secondly, the orders so passed by the authorities should give reason for

arriving at any conclusion showing proper application of mind. Violation of

either of them could in the given facts and circumstances of the case, vitiate

the order itself. Such rule being applicable to the administrative authorities

certainly requires that the judgment of the Court should meet with this

requirement with higher degree of satisfaction. The order of an

administrative authority may not provide reasons like a judgment but the

order must be supported by the reasons of rationality. The distinction

between passing of an order by an administrative or quasi-judicial authority

has practically extinguished and both are required to pass reasoned orders.

15. In the case of Siemens Engineering and Manufacturing Co. of India Ltd.

v. Union of India and Anr. [AIR 1976 SC 1785], the Supreme Court held as

under:-

"6. ......If courts of law are to be replaced by administrative authorities

and tribunals, as indeed, in some kinds of cases, with the proliferation

of Administrative Law, they may have to be so replaced, it is essential

that administrative authorities and tribunals should accord fair and

proper hearing to the persons sought to be affected by their orders and

give sufficiently clear and explicit reasons in support of the orders made

by them. Then alone administrative authorities and tribunals exercising

quasi-judicial function will be able to justify their existence and carry

credibility with the people by inspiring confidence in the adjudicatory

process. The rule requiring reasons to be given in support of an order is,

like the principle of audi alteram partem, a basic principle of natural

justice which must inform every quasi-judicial process and this rule

must be observed in its proper spirit and mere pretence of compliance

with it would not satisfy the requirement of law. …"

16. In the case of Mc Dermott International Inc. v. Burn Standard Co. Ltd.

and Ors. (2006) SLT 345, the Supreme Court clarified the rationality behind

providing of reasons and stated the principle as follows:-

"56. . . Reason is a ground or motive for a belief or a course of action, a

statement in justification or explanation of belief or action. It is in this

sense that the award must state reasons for the amount awarded.

The rationale of the requirement of reasons is that reasons assure that

the arbitrator has not acted capriciously. Reasons reveal the grounds on

which the Arbitrator reached the conclusion which adversely affects the

interests of a party. The contractual stipulation of reasons means, as

held in Poyser and Mills' Arbitration in Re, `proper adequate reasons'.

Such reasons shall not only be intelligible but shall be a reason

connected with the case which the Court can see is proper.

Contradictory reasons are equal to lack of reasons. . . ."

17. In Gurdial Singh Fijji v. State of Punjab [(1979) 2 SCC 368], while

dealing with the matter of selection of candidates who could be under

review, if not found suitable otherwise, the Court explained the reasons

being a link between the materials on which certain conclusions are based

and the actual conclusions and held, that where providing reasons for

5

proposed supersession were essential, then it could not be held to be a valid

reason that the concerned officer's record was not such as to justify his

selection was not contemplated and thus was not legal. In this context, the

Court held:-

"... "Reasons" are the links between the materials on which certain

conclusions are based and the actual conclusions. The Court

accordingly held that the mandatory provisions of Regulation 5(5) were

not complied with by the Selection Committee. That an officer was "not

found suitable" is the conclusion and not a reason in support of the

decision to supersede him. True, that it is not expected that the Selection

Committee should give anything approaching the judgment of a Court,

but it must at least state, as briefly as it may, why it came to the

conclusion that the officer concerned was found to be not suitable for

inclusion in the Select List."

This principle has been extended to administrative actions on the premise

that it applies with greater rigor to the judgments of the Courts.

18. In State of Maharashtra v. Vithal Rao Pritirao Chawan [(1981) 4 SCC

129], while remanding the matter to the High Court for examination of

certain issues raised, this Court observed:

". . . It would be for the benefit of this Court that a speaking judgment is

given."

19. In the cases where the Courts have not recorded reasons in the

judgment, legality, propriety and correctness of the orders by the Court of

competent jurisdiction are challenged in absence of proper discussion. The

requirement of recording reasons is applicable with greater rigor to the

judicial proceedings. The orders of the Court must reflect what weighed with

the Court in granting or declining the relief claimed by the applicant. In this

regard we may refer to certain judgments of this Court.

20. A Bench of Bombay High Court in the case of M/s. Pipe Arts India Pvt.

Ltd. V. Gangadhar Nathuji Golamare [2008 (6) Maharashtra Law Journal

280], wherein the Bench was concerned with an appeal against an order,

where prayer for an interim relief was rejected without stating any reasons

in a writ petition challenging the order of the Labour Court noticed, that

legality, propriety and correctness of the order was challenged on the

ground that no reason was recorded by the learned Single Judge while

rejecting the prayer and this has seriously prejudiced the interest of justice.

After a detailed discussion on the subject, the Court held:-

"8. The Supreme Court and different High Courts have taken the view

that it is always desirable to record reasons in support of the

Government actions whether administrative or quasi judicial. Even if

the statutory rules do not impose an obligation upon the authorities still

it is expected of the authorities concerned to act fairly and in

consonance with basic rule of law. These concepts would require that

any order, particularly, the order which can be subject matter of judicial

review, is reasoned one. Even in the case of Chabungbambohal Singh v.

Union of India and Ors. 1995 (Suppl) 2 SCC 83, the Court held as

under:

"8. ...His assessment was, however, recorded as "very good"

whereas qua the appellant it had been stated unfit. As the appellant

6

was being superseded by one of his juniors, we do not think if it was

enough on the part of the Selection Committee to have merely stated

unfit, and then to recommend the name of one of his juniors. No

reason for unfitness, is reflected in the proceedings, as against what

earlier Selection Committees had done to which reference has

already been made."

10. In the case of Jawahar Lal Singh v. Naresh Singh and Ors. (1987) 2

SCC 222, accepting the plea that absence of examination of reasons by

the High Court on the basis of which the trial Court discarded

prosecution evidence and recorded the finding of an acquittal in favour

of all the accused was not appropriate, the Supreme Court held that the

order should record reasons. Recording of proper reasons would be

essential, so that the Appellate Court would have advantage of

considering the considered opinion of the High Court on the reasons

which had weighed with the trial Court.

12. In the case of State of Punjab and Ors. v. Surinder Kumar and Ors.

[(1992) 1 SCC 489], while noticing the jurisdictional distinction

between Article 142 and Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the

Supreme Court stated that powers of the Supreme Court under Article

142 are much wider and the Supreme Court would pass orders to do

complete justice. The Supreme Court further reiterated the principle

with approval that the High Court has the jurisdiction to dismiss

petitions or criminal revisions in limini or grant leave asked for by the

petitioner but for adequate reasons which should be recorded in the

order. The High Court may not pass cryptic order in relation to

regularisation of service of the respondents in view of certain directions

passed by the Supreme Court under Article 142 of the Constitution of

India. Absence of reasoning did not find favour with the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court also stated the principle that powers of the High

Court were circumscribed by limitations discussed and declared by

judicial decision and it cannot transgress the limits on the basis of

whims or subjective opinion varying from Judge to Judge.

13. In the case of Hindustan Times Ltd. v. Union of India and Ors.

[(1998) 2 SCC 242], the Supreme Court while dealing with the cases

under the Labour Laws and Employees' Provident Funds and

Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 observed that even when the

petition under Article 226 is dismissed in limini, it is expected of the

High Court to pass a speaking order, may be briefly.

14. Consistent with the view expressed by the Supreme Court in the

afore-referred cases, in the case of State of U.P. v. Battan and Ors.

[(2001) 10 SCC 607], the Supreme Court held as under:

"4. ...The High Court has not given any reasons for refusing to

grant leave to file appeal against acquittal. The manner in which

appeal against acquittal has been dealt with by the High Court

leaves much to be desired. Reasons introduce clarity in an order. On

plainest consideration of justice, the High Court ought to have set

forth its reasons, howsoever brief, in its order. The absence of

reasons has rendered the High Court order not sustainable."

15. Similar view was also taken by the Supreme Court in the case of Raj

Kishore Jha v. State of Bihar and Ors. JT 2003 (Supp.2) SC 354.

7

16. In a very recent judgment, the Supreme Court in the case of State of

Orissa v. Dhaniram Luhar (2004) 5 SCC 568 while dealing with the

criminal appeal, insisted that the reasons in support of the decision was

a cardinal principle and the High Court should record its reasons while

disposing of the matter. The Court held as under:

"8. Even in respect of administrative orders Lord Denning, M.R. In

Breen v. Amalgamated Engg. Union observed: "The giving of

reasons is one of the fundamentals of good administration." In

Alexander Machinery (Dudley) Ltd. v. Crabtree it was observed:

"Failure to give reasons amounts to denial of justice." "Reasons are

live links between the mind of the decision-taker to the controversy

in question and the decision or conclusion arrived at." Reasons

substitute subjectivity by objectivity. The emphasis on recording

reasons is that if the decision reveals the "inscrutable face of the

sphinx", it can, by its silence, render it virtually impossible for the

Courts to perform their appellate function or exercise the power of

judicial review in adjudging the validity of the decision. Right to

reason is an indispensable part of a sound judicial system; reasons

at least sufficient to indicate an application of mind to the matter

before Court. Another rationale is that the affected party can know

why the decision has gone against him. One of the salutary

requirements of natural justice is spelling out reasons for the order

made; in other words, a speaking-out. The "inscrutable face of the

sphinx" is ordinarily incongruous with a judicial or quasi-judicial

performance."

17. Following this very view, the Supreme Court in another very recent

judgment delivered on 22nd February, 2008, in the case of State of

Rajasthan v. Rajendra Prasad Jain Criminal Appeal No. 360/2008

(Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 904/2007) stated that "reason is the

heartbeat of every conclusion, and without the same it becomes lifeless."

18. Providing of reasons in orders is of essence in judicial proceedings.

Every litigant who approaches the Court with a prayer is entitled to

know the reasons for acceptance or rejection of such request. Either of

the parties to the lis has a right of appeal and, therefore, it is essential

for them to know the considered opinion of the Court to make the

remedy of appeal meaningful. It is the reasoning which ultimately

culminates into final decision which may be subject to examination of

the appellate or other higher Courts. It is not only desirable but, in view

of the consistent position of law,mandatory for the Court to pass orders

while recording reasons in support thereof, however, brief they may be.

Brevity in reasoning cannot be understood in legal parlance as absence

of reasons. While no reasoning in support of judicial orders is

impermissible, the brief reasoning would suffice to meet the ends of

justice at least at the interlocutory stages and would render the remedy

of appeal purposeful and meaningful. It is a settled canon of legal

jurisprudence that the Courts are vested with discretionary powers but

such powers are to be exercised judiciously, equitably and in

consonance with the settled principles of law. Whether or not, such

judicial discretion has been exercised in accordance with the accepted

norms, can only be reflected by the reasons recorded in the order

impugned before the higher Court. Often it is said that absence of

reasoning may ipso facto indicate whimsical exercise of judicial

discretion. Patricia Wald, Chief Justice of the D.C. Circuit Court of

Appeals in the Article, Blackrobed Bureaucracy Or Collegiality Under

8

Challenge, (42 MD.L. REV. 766, 782 (1983), observed as under:-

"My own guiding principle is that virtually every appellate decision

requires some statement of reasons. The discipline of writing even a

few sentences or paragraphs explaining the basis for the judgment

insures a level of thought and scrutiny by the Court that a bare

signal of affirmance, dismissal, or reversal does not."

19. The Court cannot lose sight of the fact that a losing litigant has a

cause to plead and a right to challenge the order if it is adverse to him.

Opinion of the Court alone can explain the cause which led to passing

of the final order. Whether an argument was rejected validly or

otherwise, reasoning of the order alone can show. To evaluate the

submissions is obligation of the Court and to know the reasons for

rejection of its contention is a legitimate expectation on the part of the

litigant.Another facet of providing reasoning is to give it a value of

precedent which can help in reduction of frivolous litigation. Paul D.

Carrington, Daniel J Meador and Maurice Rosenburg, Justice on

Appeal 10 (West 1976), observed as under:-

"When reasons are announced and can be weighed, the public can

have assurance that the correcting process is working. Announcing

reasons can also provide public understanding of how the numerous

decisions of the system are integrated. In a busy Court, the reasons

are an essential demonstration that the Court did in fact fix its mind

on the case at hand. An unreasoned decision has very little claim to

acceptance by the defeated party, and is difficult or impossible to

accept as an act reflecting systematic application of legal

principles. Moreover, the necessity of stating reasons not

infrequently changes the results by forcing the judges to come to

grips with nettlesome facts or issues which their normal instincts

would otherwise cause them to avoid."

20. The reasoning in the opinion of the Court, thus, can effectively be

analysed or scrutinized by the Appellate Court. The reasons indicated by the

Court could be accepted by the Appellate Court without presuming what

weighed with the Court while coming to the impugned decision. The cause

of expeditious and effective disposal would be furthered by such an

approach. A right of appeal could be created by a special statute or under

the provisions of the Code governing the procedure. In either of them,

absence of reasoning may have the effect of negating the purpose or right of

appeal and, thus, may not achieve the ends of justice.

21. It will be useful to refer words of Justice Roslyn Atkinson, Supreme

Court of Queensland, at AIJA Conference at Brisbane on September 13,

2002 in relation to Judgment Writing. Describing that some judgment could

be complex, in distinction to routine judgments, where one requires deeper

thoughts, and the other could be disposed of easily but in either cases,

reasons they must have. While speaking about purpose of the judgment, he

said,

"The first matter to consider is the purpose of the judgment. To my mind

there are four purposes for any judgment that is written: -

(1) to clarify your own thoughts;

(2) to explain your decision to the parties;

9

(3) to communicate the reasons for the decision to the public; and

(4) to provide reasons for an appeal Court to consider."

22. Clarity of thought leads to proper reasoning and proper reasoning is the

foundation of a just and fair decision. In Alexander Machinery (Dudley) Ltd.

v. Crabtree 1974 ICR 120, the Court went to the extent of observing that

"Failure to give reasons amounts to denial of justice". Reasons are really

linchpin to administration of justice. They are link between the mind of the

decision taker and the controversy in question. To justify our conclusion,

reasons are essential. Absence of reasoning would render the judicial order

liable to interference by the higher Court. Reasons are the soul of the

decision and its absence would render the order open to judicial chastism.

The consistent judicial opinion is that every order determining rights of the

parties in a Court of law ought not to be recorded without supportive

reasons. Issuing reasoned order is not only beneficial to the higher Courts

but is even of great utility for providing public understanding of law and

imposing self- discipline in the Judge as their discretion is controlled by

well established norms. The contention raised before us that absence of

reasoning in the impugned order would render the order liable to be set

aside, particularly, in face of the fact that the learned Judge found merit in

the writ petition and issued rule, therefore, needs to be accepted. We have

already noticed that orders even at interlocutory stages may not be as

detailed as judgments but should be supported by reason howsoever briefly

stated. Absence of reasoning is impermissible in judicial pronouncement. It

cannot be disputed that the order in question substantially affect the rights

of the parties. There is an award in favour of the workmen and the

management had prayed for stay of the operation of the award. The Court

has to consider such a plea keeping in view the provisions of Section 17-B of

the Industrial Disputes Act, where such a prayer is neither impermissible

nor improper. The contentions raised by the parties in support of their

respective claims are expected to be dealt with by reasoned orders. We are

not intentionally expressing any opinion on the merits of the contentions

alleged to have been raised by respective parties before the learned single

Judge. Suffice it to note that the impugned order is silent in this regard.

According to the learned Counsel appearing for the appellant, various

contentions were raised in support of the reliefs claimed but all apparently,

have found no favour with the learned Judge and that too for no reasons, as

is demonstrated from the order impugned in the present appeals."

21. The principles stated by this Court, as noticed supra, have been

reiterated with approval by a Bench of this Court in a very recent judgment,

in State of Uttaranchal v. Sunil Kumar Singh Negi [(2008) 11 SCC 205],

where the Court noticed the order of the High Court which is reproduced

hereunder:-

"I have perused the order dated 27.5.2005 passed by Respondent 2 and

I do not find any illegality in the order so as to interfere under Article

226/227 of the Constitution of India. The writ petition lacks merit and

is liable to be dismissed."

and the Court concluded as under:-

"In view of the specific stand taken by the Department in the affidavit

which we have referred to above, the cryptic order passed by the High

Court cannot be sustained. The absence of reasons has rendered the

High Court order not sustainable. Similar view was expressed in State

10

of U.P. v. Battan1. About two decades back in State of Maharashtra v.

Vithal Rao Pritirao Chawan the desirability of a speaking order was

highlighted. The requirement of indicating reasons has been judicially

recognised as imperative. The view was reiterated in Jawahar Lal

Singh v. Naresh Singh.

10. In Raj Kishore Jha v. State of Bihar this Court has held that reason

is the heartbeat of every conclusion and without the same, it becomes

lifeless.

"11. 8. ... Right to reason is an indispensable part of a sound

judicial system; reasons at least sufficient to indicate an application

of mind to the matter before court. Another rationale is that the

affected party can know why the decision has gone against him.

One of the salutary requirements of natural justice is spelling out

reasons for the order made;..

12. In the light of the factual details particularly with reference to

the stand taken by the Horticulture Department at length in the writ

petition and in the light of the principles enunciated by this Court,

namely, right to reason is an indispensable part of sound judicial

system and reflect the application of mind on the part of the court,

we are satisfied that the impugned order of the High Court cannot

be sustained."

22. Besides referring to the above well-established principles, it will also be

useful to refer to some text on the subject. H.W.R. Wade in the book

"Administrative Law, 7th Edition, stated that the flavour of said reasons is

violative of a statutory duty to waive reasons which are normally

mandatory. Supporting a view that reasons for decision are essential, it was

stated:-

".....A right to reasons is, therefore, an indispensable part of a sound

system of judicial review. Natural justice may provide the best rubric

for it, since the giving of reasons is required by the ordinary man's

sense of justice...

.....Reasoned decisions are not only vital for the purposes of showing

the citizen that he is receiving justice: they are also a valuable

discipline for the tribunal itself....."

23. We are not venturing to comment upon the correctness or otherwise of

the contentions of law raised before the High Court in the present petition,

but it was certainly expected of the High Court to record some kind of

reasons for rejecting the revision petition filed by the Department at the very

threshold. A litigant has a legitimate expectation of knowing reasons for

rejection of his claim/prayer. It is then alone, that a party would be in a

position to challenge the order on appropriate grounds. Besides, this would

be for the benefit of the higher or the appellate court. As arguments bring

things hidden and obscure to the light of reasons, reasoned judgment where

the law and factual matrix of the case is discussed, provides lucidity and

foundation for conclusions or exercise of judicial discretion by the courts.

Reason is the very life of law. When the reason of a law once ceases, the law

itself generally ceases (Wharton's Law Lexicon). Such is the significance of

reasoning in any rule of law. Giving reasons furthers the cause of justice as

well as avoids uncertainty. As a matter of fact it helps in the observance of

law of precedent. Absence of reasons on the contrary essentially introduces

11

an element of uncertainty, dis- satisfaction and give entirely different

dimensions to the questions of law raised before the higher/appellate courts.

In our view, the court should provide its own grounds and reasons for

rejecting claim/prayer of a party whether at the very threshold i.e. at

admission stage or after regular hearing, howsoever precise they may be.

24. Reason is the very life of law. When the reason of a law once ceases, the

law itself generally ceases (Wharton's Law Lexicon). Such is the

significance of reasoning in any rule of law. Giving reasons furthers the

cause of justice as well as avoids uncertainty. As a matter of fact it helps in

the observance of law of precedent. Absence of reasons on the contrary

essentially introduces an element of uncertainty, dis- satisfaction and give

entirely different dimensions to the questions of law raised before the

higher/appellate courts. In our view, the court should provide its own

grounds and reasons for rejecting claim/prayer of a party whether at the

very threshold i.e. at admission stage or after regular hearing, howsoever

precise they may be.

25. We would reiterate the principle that when reasons are announced and

can be weighed, the public can have assurance that process of correction is

in place and working. It is the requirement of law that correction process of

judgments should not only appear to be implemented but also seem to have

been properly implemented. Reasons for an order would ensure and enhance

public confidence and would provide due satisfaction to the consumer of

justice under our justice dispensation system. It may not be very correct in

law to say, that there is a qualified duty imposed upon the Courts to record

reasons.

26. Our procedural law and the established practice, in fact, imposes

unqualified obligation upon the Courts to record reasons. There is hardly

any statutory provision under the Income Tax Act or under the Constitution

itself requiring recording of reasons in the judgments but it is no more res

integra and stands unequivocally settled by different judgments of this Court

holding that, the courts and tribunals are required to pass reasoned

judgments/orders. In fact, Order XIV Rule 2 read with Order XX Rule 1 of

the Code of Civil Procedure requires that, the Court should record findings

on each issue and such findings which obviously should be reasoned would

form part of the judgment, which in turn would be the basis for writing a

decree of the Court.

27. By practice adopted in all Courts and by virtue of judge made law, the

concept of reasoned judgment has become an indispensable part of basic

rule of law and, in fact, is a mandatory requirement of the procedural law.

Clarity of thoughts leads to clarity of vision and proper reasoning is the

foundation of a just and fair decision. In the case of Alexander Machinery

(Dudley) Ltd. (supra), there are apt observations in this regard to say

"failure to give reasons amounts to denial of justice". Reasons are the real

live links to the administration of justice. With respect we will contribute to

this view. There is a rationale, logic and purpose behind a reasoned

judgment. A reasoned judgment is primarily written to clarify own thoughts;

communicate the reasons for the decision to the concerned and to provide

and ensure that such reasons can be appropriately considered by the

appellate/higher Court. Absence of reasons thus would lead to frustrate the

very object stated hereinabove. The order in the present case is as cryptic as

it was in the case of Sunil Kumar Singh Negi (supra). Being a cryptic order

and for the reasons recorded in that case by this Court which we also adopt,

the impugned order in the present appeal should meet the same fate.

12

28. The order in the present case is as cryptic as it was in the case of Sunil

Kumar Singh Negi (supra). Being a cryptic order and for the reasons

recorded in that case by this Court which we also adopt, the impugned order

in the present appeal should meet the same fate."

We find that the authority concerned has only recoded its

conclusion without assigning any reason. It is a well settled law that the

administrative order also must be supported by the reasons recorded in

it. The reason is heartbeat of every conclusion. The absence of reason

makes an order unsustainable. One of the most important aspects for

insisting to record reason is that it substitutes the subjectivity with

objectivity. It is also treated as a part of natural justice and fair play.

In the case of M/s Travancore Rayon Ltd. v. Union of India,

1969 (3) SCC 868 the Supreme Court has held as under:

"11. ...The communication does not disclose the "points" which were

considered, and the reasons for rejecting them. This is a totally

unsatisfactory method of disposal of a case in exercise of the judicial power

vested in the Central Government. Necessity to give sufficient reasons which

disclose proper appreciation of the problem to be solved, and the mental

process by which the conclusion is reached, in cases where a non-judicial

authority exercises judicial functions, is obvious. When judicial power is

exercised by an authority normally performing executive or administrative

functions, this Court would require to be satisfied that the decision has been

reached after due consideration of the merits of the dispute, uninfluenced by

extraneous considerations of policy or expediency. The Court insists upon

disclosure of reasons in support of the order on two grounds : one, that the

party aggrieved in a proceeding before the High Court or this Court has the

opportunity to demonstrate that the reasons which persuaded the authority

to reject his case were erroneous; the other, that the obligation to record

reasons operates as a deterrent against possible arbitrary action by the

executive authority invested with the judicial power."

The aforesaid said judgment has been quoted with approval by

the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of S.N.

Mukherjee Vs. Union of India, (1990) 4 SCC 594.

The Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case

of S.N. Mukherjee (supra) has emphasized the importance of recording

of reasons for decisions by the administrative authorities and tribunals.

It said "administrative process will best be vindicated by clarity in its

exercise".

13

The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the said judgement, has

emphasised the importance of recording a reason for decision by the

administrative authority and the Tribunal to enable the Courts to

exercise the power of review in consonance with the settled principle

and the authorities are advised of the consideration underlining the

action under review.

The Hon'ble Supreme Court has consistently taken the view that

recording of reason is an essential feature of dispensation of justice. A

litigant, who approaches the Court with a grievance in accordance with

law, is entitled to know the reason for grant or rejection of his prayer.

An administrative order without reasons causes prejudice to the person

against whom it is pronounced, as that litigant is unable to know the

ground which weighed with the Authority in rejecting his claim and also

causes impediments in his taking adequate and appropriate grounds

before the higher Court in the event of challenge to that administrative

order.

The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Dharampal Satyapal

Limited Vs. Depyty Commissioner of Central Excise, Gauhati &

Others, (2015) 8 SCC 519 has held as under:-

"19. What is the genesis behind this requirement? Why it is necessary that

before an adverse action is taken against a person he is to be given notice

about the proposed action and be heard in the matter? Why is it treated as

inseparable and inextricable part of the doctrine of principles of natural

justice?

20. Natural justice is an expression of English Common Law. Natural justice

is not a single theory – it is a family of views. In one sense administering

justice itself is treated as natural virtue and, therefore, a part of natural

justice. It is also called 'naturalist' approach to the phrase 'natural justice'

and is related to 'moral naturalism'. Moral naturalism captures the essence

of commonsense morality – that good and evil, right and wrong, are the real

features of the natural world that human reason can comprehend. In this

sense, it may comprehend virtue ethics and virtue jurisprudence in relation

to justice as all these are attributes of natural justice. We are not addressing

ourselves with this connotation of natural justice here.

21. In Common Law, the concept and doctrine of natural justice,

particularly which is made applicable in the decision making by judicial and

quasi- judicial bodies, has assumed different connotation. It is developed

with this fundamental in mind that those whose duty is to decide, must act

14

judicially. They must deal with the question referred both without bias and

they must given to each of the parties to adequately present the case made. It

is perceived that the practice of aforesaid attributes in mind only would lead

to doing justice. Since these attributes are treated as natural or fundamental,

it is known as 'natural justice'. The principles of natural justice developed

over a period of time and which is still in vogue and valid even today were:

(i) rule against bias, i.e. nemo iudex in causa sua; and (ii) opportunity of

being heard to the concerned party, i.e. audi alteram partem. These are

known as principles of natural justice. To these principles a third principle is

added, which is of recent origin. It is duty to give reasons in support of

decision, namely, passing of a 'reasoned order'."

The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of J. Ashoka Vs.

University of Agricultural Sciences & Others, (2017) 2 SCC 609 has

held as under:-

"22. In G. Durga Nageshwari, it was held as under:-

"9. The above case no doubt interpreted the Indian Administrative

Service Regulations. Regulation 5(5) of the said Regulations required

recording of reasons for supersession. But as can be seen from the

above paragraph of the Judgment, the Supreme Court based its

conclusion on the right to equality guaranteed under Articles 14 and

16(1) of the Constitution and observed that recording or reasons for

overlooking the claim of a person who is above and select a person

below was necessary. The said principle was applied by this Court in

the case of T.K. Devaraju v. State of Karnataka, ILR 1988 KAR 2084.

This Court pointed out that the Regulation 5(5) of the Indian

Administrative Service Regulation was only for the purpose of giving

effect to Article 14 and 16(1) of the Constitution and the position would

be the same even in the absence of such a regulation because of

recording of reasons is the only way to ensure obedience to the

fundamental right guaranteed under Articles 14 and 16(1). Therefore,

in our opinion, Clause (4) of Statute 30 must be read along with

Articles 14 and 16(1) of the Constitution, for the reasons, the University

of Agricultural Sciences is state as defined in Article 12 of the

Constitution and hence bound by the Articles included in the

Fundamental Rights Chapter. Therefore, when under Clause (2) of

Statute 30, a Selection Committee constituted for making selection on

the basis of the performance of the candidate at the interview

recommends the names in the order of merit, the power of the Board of

Regents to choose best among them means normally it should proceed

in the order of merit as arranged by the Selection Committee, and if it is

of the view that any person placed lower is the best, it can do so, but it

has to record reasons. If reasons are recorded then it can be said that

the provisions of Articles 14 and 16(1) are complied with. But if a

person placed below is appointed without assigning any reason, there is

no other alternative than to hold that such a selection and appointment

is arbitrary and violative of Articles 14 and 16(1) of the Constitution.

10. In the present case, it is not disputed that no reasons had been

recorded by the Board of Regents as to why the 2nd respondent was

selected for appointment in preference to the petitioner though the

petitioner was placed at Sl. No. 1 and the 2nd respondent was placed at

Sl. No. 3. The learned Counsel for the University submitted that reasons

15

were not recorded in view of the earlier decision of this Court in

Keshayya's case in which it was held that the Board of Regents had the

power to select any one of the persons whom it considers best and make

the appointment. But the precise question raised in this case and which

was not raised in Keshayya's case is as to whether the Board of Regents

could do so without assigning any reason. As shown earlier, the

recording of reasons is a must having regard to the right guaranteed to

the citizens under Articles 14 and 16(1) of the Constitution. Therefore,

we are of the view that whenever the Board of Regents considers that a

person placed lower in merit in the list of selected candidates

recommended by the Selection Committee, it can do so only by

recording reasons as to why the case of the person placed above is

being overlooked and the person below is considered the best for being

appointed. In the present case, no reasons have been recorded, may be

for the reason the Board considered that it was unnecessary as stated

by the learned Counsel. He however submitted that the Board of

Regents has stated that respondent-2 is more suitable than the

petitioner. That is the conclusion and not the reason. That conclusion

must be preceded by the reason which is wanting in this case"

24. Reasons are the links between materials on which certain conclusions

are based and the actual conclusions. They disclose how the mind is applied

to the subject - matter for a decision whether it is purely administrative or

quasi - judicial. They should reveal a rational nexus between the facts

considered and the conclusions reached. Only in this way can opinions or

decisions recorded be shown to be manifestly just and reasonable. We,

therefore, are of the considered opinion that the relevant provisions of the

Statute were fully complied with."

Further, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Kranti

Associates Private Limited & Another Vs. Masood Ahmed Khan &

Others, (2010) 9 SCC 496 has held as under:-

"12. The necessity of giving reason by a body or authority in support of its

decision came up for consideration before this Court in several cases.

Initially this Court recognized a sort of demarcation between administrative

orders and quasi- judicial orders but with the passage of time the distinction

between the two got blurred and thinned out and virtually reached a

vanishing point in the judgment of this Court in A.K. Kraipak and others vs.

Union of India and others reported in AIR 1970 SC 150.

13. In Kesava Mills Co. Ltd. and another vs. Union of India and others

reported in AIR 1973 SC 389, this Court approvingly referred to the opinion

of Lord Denning in Rigina vs. Gaming Board Ex parte Benaim [(1970) 2

WLR 1009] and quoted him as saying "that heresy was scotched in Ridge

and Boldwin, 1964 AC 40".

14. The expression `speaking order' was first coined by Lord Chancellor

Earl Cairns in a rather strange context. The Lord Chancellor, while

explaining the ambit of Writ of Certiorari, referred to orders with errors on

the face of the record and pointed out that an order with errors on its face, is

a speaking order. (See 1878-97 Vol. 4 Appeal Cases 30 at 40 of the report)

15. This Court always opined that the face of an order passed by a quasi-

judicial authority or even an administrative authority affecting the rights of

16

parties, must speak. It must not be like the `inscrutable face of a Sphinx'.

16. In the case of Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd. vs. Shyam Sunder

Jhunjhunwala and others, AIR 1961 SC 1669, the question of recording

reasons came up for consideration in the context of a refusal by Harinagar

to transfer, without giving reasons, shares held by Shyam Sunder.

Challenging such refusal, the transferee moved the High Court contending,

inter alia, that the refusal is mala fide, arbitrary and capricious. The High

Court rejected such pleas and the transferee was asked to file a suit. The

transferee filed an appeal to the Central Government under Section 111

Clause (3) of Indian Companies Act, 1956 which was dismissed. Thereafter,

the son of the original transferee filed another application for transfer of his

shares which was similarly refused by the Company. On appeal, the Central

Government quashed the resolution passed by the Company and directed the

Company to register the transfer. However, in passing the said order,

Government did not give any reason. The company challenged the said

decision before this Court.

17. The other question which arose in Harinagar (supra) was whether the

Central Government, in passing the appellate order acted as a tribunal and

is amenable to Article 136 jurisdiction of this Court.

18. Even though in Harinagar (supra) the decision was administrative, this

Court insisted on the requirement of recording reason and further held that

in exercising appellate powers, the Central Government acted as a tribunal

in exercising judicial powers of the State and such exercise is subject to

Article 136 jurisdiction of this Court. Such powers, this Court held, cannot

be effectively exercised if reasons are not given by the Central Government

in support of the order (Para 23, page 1678-79).

19. Again in the case of Bhagat Raja vs. Union of India and others, AIR

1967 SC 1606, the Constitution Bench of this Court examined the question

whether the Central Government was bound to pass a speaking order while

dismissing a revision and confirming the order of the State Government in

the context of Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957,

and having regard to the provision of Rule 55 of Mineral and Concessions

Rules. The Constitution Bench held that in exercising its power of revision

under the aforesaid Rule the Central Government acts in a quasi-judicial

capacity (See para 8 page 1610). Where the State Government gives a

number of reasons some of which are good and some are not, and the

Central Government merely endorses the order of the State Government

without specifying any reason, this Court, exercising its jurisdiction under

Article 136, may find it difficult to ascertain which are the grounds on which

Central Government upheld the order of the State Government (See para 9

page 1610). Therefore, this Court insisted on reasons being given for the

order.

20. In M/s. Mahabir Prasad Santosh Kumar vs. State of U.P and others, AIR

1970 SC 1302, while dealing with U.P. Sugar Dealers License Order under

which the license was cancelled, this Court held that such an order of

cancellation is quasi-judicial and must be a speaking one. This Court

further held that merely giving an opportunity of hearing is not enough and

further pointed out where the order is subject to appeal, the necessity to

record reason is even greater. The learned Judges held that the recording of

reasons in support of a decision on a disputed claim ensures that the

decision is not a result of caprice, whim or fancy but was arrived at after

considering the relevant law and that the decision was just. (See para 7

17

page 1304).

21. In the case of M/s. Travancore Rayons Ltd. vs. The Union of India and

others, AIR 1971 SC 862, the Court, dealing with the revisional jurisdiction

of the Central Government under the then Section 36 of the Central Excise

and Salt Act, 1944, held that the Central Government was actually

exercising judicial power of the State and in exercising judicial power

reasons in support of the order must be disclosed on two grounds. The first

is that the person aggrieved gets an opportunity to demonstrate that the

reasons are erroneous and secondly, the obligation to record reasons

operates as a deterrent against possible arbitrary action by the executive

authority invested with the judicial power (See para 11 page 865-866).

22. In M/s. Woolcombers of India Ltd. vs. Woolcombers Workers Union and

another, AIR 1973 SC 2758, this Court while considering an award under

Section 11 of Industrial Disputes Act insisted on the need of giving reasons

in support of conclusions in the Award. The Court held that the very

requirement of giving reason is to prevent unfairness or arbitrariness in

reaching conclusions. The second principle is based on the jurisprudential

doctrine that justice should not only be done, it should also appear to be

done as well. The learned Judges said that a just but unreasoned conclusion

does not appear to be just to those who read the same. Reasoned and just

conclusion on the other hand will also have the appearance of justice. The

third ground is that such awards are subject to Article 136 jurisdiction of

this Court and in the absence of reasons, it is difficult for this Court to

ascertain whether the decision is right or wrong (See para 5 page 2761).

23. In Union of India vs. Mohan Lal Capoor and others, AIR 1974 SC 87,

this Court while dealing with the question of selection under Indian

Administrative Service/Indian Police Service (Appointment by Promotion

Regulation) held that the expression "reasons for the proposed

supersession" should not be mere rubber stamp reasons. Such reasons must

disclose how mind was applied to the subject matter for a decision

regardless of the fact whether such a decision is purely administrative or

quasi-judicial. This Court held that the reasons in such context would mean

the link between materials which are considered and the conclusions which

are reached. Reasons must reveal a rational nexus between the two (See

para 28 page 98).

24. In Siemens Engineering and Manufacturing Co. of India Ltd. vs. The

Union of India and another, AIR 1976 SC 1785, this Court held that it is far

too well settled that an authority in making an order in exercise of its quasi-

judicial function, must record reasons in support of the order it makes. The

learned Judges emphatically said that every quasi- judicial order must be

supported by reasons. The rule requiring reasons in support of a quasi-

judicial order is, this Court held, as basic as following the principles of

natural justice. And the rule must be observed in its proper spirit. A mere

pretence of compliance would not satisfy the requirement of law (See para 6

page 1789).

25. In Smt. Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India and Anr., AIR 1978 SC 597,

which is a decision of great jurisprudence significance in our Constitutional

law, Chief Justice Beg, in a concurring but different opinion held that an

order impounding a passport is a quasi-judicial decision (Para 34, page

612). The learned Chief Justice also held when an administrative action

involving any deprivation of or restriction on fundamental rights is taken,

the authorities must see that justice is not only done but manifestly appears

18

to be done as well. This principle would obviously demand disclosure of

reasons for the decision.

26. Justice Y.V. Chandrachud (as His Lordship then was) in a concurring

but a separate opinion also held that refusal to disclose reasons for

impounding a passport is an exercise of an exceptional nature and is to be

done very sparingly and only when it is fully justified by the exigencies of an

uncommon situation. The learned Judge further held that law cannot permit

any exercise of power by an executive to keep the reasons undisclosed if the

only motive for doing so is to keep the reasons away from judicial scrutiny.

(See para 39 page 613).

27. In Rama Varma Bharathan Thampuran vs. State of Kerala and Ors., AIR

1979 SC 1918, Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer speaking for a three-Judge Bench

held that the functioning of the Board was quasi-judicial in character. One

of the attributes of quasi- judicial functioning is the recording of reasons in

support of decisions taken and the other requirement is following the

principles of natural justice. Learned Judge held that natural justice

requires reasons to be written for the conclusions made (See para 14 page

1922).

28. In Gurdial Singh Fijji vs. State of Punjab and Ors., (1979) 2 SCC 368,

this Court, dealing with a service matter, relying on the ratio in Capoor

(supra), held that "rubber-stamp reason" is not enough and virtually quoted

the observation in Capoor (supra) to the extent that reasons "are the links

between the materials on which certain conclusions are based and the

actual conclusions." (See para 18 page 377).

29. In a Constitution Bench decision of this Court in Shri Swamiji of Shri

Admar Mutt etc. etc. vs. The Commissioner, Hindu Religious and Charitable

Endowments Dept. and Ors., AIR 1980 SC 1, while giving the majority

judgment Chief Justice Y.V. Chandrachud referred to Broom's Legal Maxims

(1939 Edition, page 97) where the principle in Latin runs as follows:

"Ces-sante Ratione Legis Cessat Ipsa Lex"

30. The English version of the said principle given by the Chief Justice is

that:

"29. ....Reason is the soul of the law, and when the reason of any

particular law ceases, so does the law itself." (See para 29 page 11).

31. In M/s. Bombay Oil Industries Pvt. Ltd. vs. Union of India and Others,

AIR 1984 SC 160, this Court held that while disposing of applications under

Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act the duty of the Government

is to give reasons for its order. This court made it very clear that the faith of

the people in administrative tribunals can be sustained only if the tribunals

act fairly and dispose of the matters before them by well considered orders.

In saying so, this Court relied on its previous decisions in Capoor (supra)

and Siemens Engineering (supra), discussed above.

32. In Ram Chander vs. Union of India and others, AIR 1986 SC 1173, this

Court was dealing with the appellate provisions under the Railway Servants

(Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1968 condemned the mechanical way of

dismissal of appeal in the context of requirement of Rule 22(2) of the

aforesaid Rule. This Court held that the word "consider" occurring to the

Rule 22(2) must mean the Railway Board shall duly apply its mind and give

19

reasons for its decision. The learned Judges held that the duty to give reason

is an incident of the judicial process and emphasized that in discharging

quasi-judicial functions the appellate authority must act in accordance with

natural justice and give reasons for its decision (Para 4, page 1176).

33. In M/s. Star Enterprises and others vs. City and Industrial Development

Corporation of Maharashtra Ltd. and others, (1990) 3 SCC 280, a three-

Judge Bench of this Court held that in the present day set up judicial review

of administrative action has become expansive and is becoming wider day

by day and the State has to justify its action in various field of public law.

All these necessitate recording of reason for executive actions including the

rejection of the highest offer. This Court held that disclosure of reasons in

matters of such rejection provides an opportunity for an objective review

both by superior administrative heads and for judicial process and opined

that such reasons should be communicated unless there are specific

justification for not doing so (see Para 10, page 284-285).

34. In Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary

Education vs. K.S. Gandhi and others, (1991) 2 SCC 716, this Court held

that even in domestic enquiry if the facts are not in dispute non-recording of

reason may not be violative of the principles of natural justice but where

facts are disputed necessarily the authority or the enquiry officer, on

consideration of the materials on record, should record reasons in support

of the conclusion reached (see para 22, pages 738-739).

35. In the case of M.L. Jaggi vs. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Limited and

others, (1996) 3 SCC 119, this Court dealt with an award under Section 7 of

the Telegraph Act and held that since the said award affects public interest,

reasons must be recorded in the award. It was also held that such reasons

are to be recorded so that it enables the High Court to exercise its power of

judicial review on the validity of the award. (see para 8, page 123).

36. In Charan Singh vs. Healing Touch Hospital and others, AIR 2000 SC

3138, a three-Judge Bench of this Court, dealing with a grievance under CP

Act, held that the authorities under the Act exercise quasi-judicial powers

for redressal of consumer disputes and it is, therefore, imperative that such a

body should arrive at conclusions based on reasons. This Court held that

the said Act, being one of the benevolent pieces of legislation, is intended to

protect a large body of consumers from exploitation as the said Act provides

for an alternative mode for consumer justice by the process of a summary

trial.

The powers which are exercised are definitely quasi-judicial in nature and

in such a situation the conclusions must be based on reasons and held that

requirement of recording reasons is "too obvious to be reiterated and needs

no emphasizing". (See Para 11, page 3141 of the report)

37. Only in cases of Court Martial, this Court struck a different note in two

of its Constitution Bench decisions, the first of which was rendered in the

case of Som Datt Datta vs. Union of India and others, AIR 1969 SC 414, Mr.

Justice Ramaswami delivering the judgment for the unanimous Constitution

Bench held that provisions of Sections 164 and 165 of the Army Act do not

require an order confirming proceedings of Court Martial to be supported

by reasons. The Court held that an order confirming such proceedings does

not become illegal if it does not record reasons. (Para 10, page 421- 422 of

the report).

20

38. About two decades thereafter, a similar question cropped up before this

Court in the case of S.N. Mukherjee vs. Union of India, AIR 1990 SC 1984.

A unanimous Constitution Bench speaking through Justice S.C. Agrawal

confirmed its earlier decision in Som Datt (supra) in para 47 at page 2000

of the report and held reasons are not required to be recorded for an order

confirming the finding and sentence recorded by the Court Martial.

39. It must be remembered in this connection that the Court Martial as a

proceeding is sui generis in nature and the Court of Court Martial is

different, being called a Court of Honour and the proceeding therein are

slightly different from other proceedings. About the nature of Court Martial

and its proceedings the observations of Winthrop in Military Law and

Precedents are very pertinent and are extracted herein below:

"Not belonging to the judicial branch of the Government, it follows that

courts-martial must pertain to the executive department; and they are in

fact simply instrumentalities of the executive power, provided by

Congress for the President as Commander-in-Chief, to aid him in

properly commanding the Army and Navy and enforcing discipline

therein, and utilized under his orders or those of his authorized military

representatives."

40. Our Constitution also deals with Court Martial proceedings differently

as is clear from Articles 33, 136(2) and 227(4) of the Constitution.

41. In England there was no common law duty of recording of reasons. In

Marta Stefan vs. General Medical Council, (1999) 1 WLR 1293, it has been

held, "the established position of the common law is that there is no general

duty imposed on our decision makers to record reasons". It has been

acknowledged in the Justice Report, Administration Under Law (1971) at

page 23 that "No single factor has inhibited the development of English

administrative law as seriously as the absence of any general obligation

upon public authorities to give reasons for their decisions".

42. Even then in the case of R vs. Civil Service Appeal Board, ex parte

Cunningham reported in (1991) 4 All ER 310, Lord Donaldson, Master of

Rolls, opined very strongly in favour of disclosing of reasons in a case

where the Court is acting in its discretion. The learned Master of Rolls said:

"..It is a corollary of the discretion conferred upon the board that it is

their duty to set out their reasoning in sufficient form to show the

principles on which they have proceeded. Adopting Lord Lane CJ's

observations (in R vs. Immigration Appeal Tribunal, ex p Khan

(Mahmud) [1983] 2 All ER 420 at 423, (1983) QB 790 at 794-795), the

reasons for the lower amount is not obvious. Mr. Cunningham is

entitled to know, either expressly or inferentially stated, what it was to

which the board were addressing their mind in arriving at their

conclusion. It must be obvious to the board that Mr. Cunningham is left

with a burning sense of grievance. They should be sensitive to the fact

that he is left with a real feeling of injustice, that having been found to

have been unfairly dismissed, he has been deprived of his just desserts

(as he sees them)".

43. The learned Master of Rolls further clarified by saying:

"..thus, in the particular circumstances of this case, and without

wishing to establish any precedent whatsoever, I am prepared to spell

21

out an obligation on this board to give succinct reasons, if only to put

the mind of Mr. Cunningham at rest. I would therefore allow this

application."

44. But, however, the present trend of the law has been towards an

increasing recognition of the duty of Court to give reasons (See North Range

Shipping Limited vs. Seatrans Shipping Corporation, (2002) 1 WLR 2397).

It has been acknowledged that this trend is consistent with the development

towards openness in Government and judicial administration.

45. In English vs. Emery Reimbold and Strick Limited, (2002) 1 WLR 2409,

it has been held that justice will not be done if it is not apparent to the

parties why one has won and the other has lost. The House of Lords in

Cullen vs. Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, (2003) 1 WLR

1763, Lord Bingham of Cornhill and Lord Steyn, on the requirement of

reason held,

"7. ...First, they impose a discipline ... which may contribute to such

decisions being considered with care. Secondly, reasons encourage

transparency ... Thirdly, they assist the Courts in performing their

supervisory function if judicial review proceedings are launched."

(Para 7, page 1769 of the report).

46. The position in the United States has been indicated by this Court in

S.N. Mukherjee (supra) in paragraph 11 at page 1988 of the judgment. This

Court held that in the United States the Courts have always insisted on the

recording of reasons by administrative authorities in exercise of their

powers. It was further held that such recording of reasons is required as "the

Court cannot exercise their duty of review unless they are advised of the

considerations underlying the action under review". In S.N. Mukherjee

(supra) this court relied on the decisions of the U.S. Court in Securities and

Exchange Commission vs. Chenery Corporation, (1942) 87 Law Ed 626 and

John T. Dunlop vs. Walter Bachowski, (1975) 44 Law Ed 377 in support of

its opinion discussed above.

47. Summarizing the above discussion, this Court holds:

a. In India the judicial trend has always been to record reasons, even in

administrative decisions, if such decisions affect anyone prejudicially.

b. A quasi-judicial authority must record reasons in support of its

conclusions.

c. Insistence on recording of reasons is meant to serve the wider

principle of justice that justice must not only be done it must also appear

to be done as well.

d. Recording of reasons also operates as a valid restraint on any

possible arbitrary exercise of judicial and quasi-judicial or even

administrative power.

e. Reasons reassure that discretion has been exercised by the decision

maker on relevant grounds and by disregarding extraneous

considerations.

f. Reasons have virtually become as indispensable a component of a

decision making process as observing principles of natural justice by

judicial, quasi-judicial and even by administrative bodies.

g. Reasons facilitate the process of judicial review by superior Courts.

22

h. The ongoing judicial trend in all countries committed to rule of law

and constitutional governance is in favour of reasoned decisions based

on relevant facts. This is virtually the life blood of judicial decision

making justifying the principle that reason is the soul of justice.

i. Judicial or even quasi-judicial opinions these days can be as different

as the judges and authorities who deliver them. All these decisions serve

one common purpose which is to demonstrate by reason that the

relevant factors have been objectively considered. This is important for

sustaining the litigants' faith in the justice delivery system.

j. Insistence on reason is a requirement for both judicial accountability

and transparency.

k. If a Judge or a quasi-judicial authority is not candid enough about

his/her decision making process then it is impossible to know whether

the person deciding is faithful to the doctrine of precedent or to

principles of incrementalism.

l. Reasons in support of decisions must be cogent, clear and succinct. A

pretence of reasons or `rubber-stamp reasons' is not to be equated with

a valid decision making process.

m. It cannot be doubted that transparency is the sine qua non of

restraint on abuse of judicial powers. Transparency in decision making

not only makes the judges and decision makers less prone to errors but

also makes them subject to broader scrutiny. (See David Shapiro in

Defence of Judicial Candor (1987) 100 Harward Law Review 731-737).

n. Since the requirement to record reasons emanates from the broad

doctrine of fairness in decision making, the said requirement is now

virtually a component of human rights and was considered part of

Strasbourg Jurisprudence. See (1994) 19 EHRR 553, at 562 para 29

and Anya vs. University of Oxford, 2001 EWCA Civ 405, wherein the

Court referred to Article 6 of European Convention of Human Rights

which requires,

"adequate and intelligent reasons must be given for judicial

decisions".

o. In all common law jurisdictions judgments play a vital role in setting

up precedents for the future. Therefore, for development of law,

requirement of giving reasons for the decision is of the essence and is

virtually a part of "Due Process".

48. For the reasons aforesaid, we set aside the order of the National

Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission and remand the matter to the

said forum for deciding the matter by passing a reasoned order in the light

of the observations made above. Since some time has elapsed, this Court

requests the forum to decide the matter as early as possible, preferably

within a period of six weeks from the date of service of this order upon it.

49. In so far as the appeal filed by the Bank is concerned, this Court finds

that the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission in its order

dated 4th April 2008 has given some reasons in its finding. The reasons,

inter alia, are as under:

"We have gone through the orders of the District Forum and the State

Commission, perused the record placed before us and heard the parties

at length. The State Commission has rightly confirmed the order of the

District Forum after coming to the conclusion that the Petitioner and

the Builder - Respondents No.3 and 4 have colluded with each other

23

and hence, directed them to compensate the complainant for the

harassment caused to them."

A Division Bench of this Court in Writ C No. 18164 of 2018

(Nanak Chand Sharma Vs. State of U.P. & 3 Others, decided on

03.12.2018) has held as under:-

"We find that the authority concerned has only recoded his conclusion

without assigning any reason. It is a well settled law that not only

administrative but judicial order also must be supported by the reasons

recorded in it. The reason is heartbeat of every conclusion. The absence of

reason makes an order unsustainable. One of the most important aspects for

insisting to record reason is that it substitutes the subjectivity with

objectivity. It is also treated as a part of natural justice and fair play.

In the case of M/s Travancore Rayon Ltd. v. Union of India, 1969 (3) SCC

868 the Supreme Court has held as under:

"11. ...The communication does not disclose the "points" which were

considered, and the reasons for rejecting them. This is a totally

unsatisfactory method of disposal of a case in exercise of the judicial

power vested in the Central Government. Necessity to give sufficient

reasons which disclose proper appreciation of the problem to be solved,

and the mental process by which the conclusion is reached, in cases

where a non-judicial authority exercises judicial functions, is obvious.

When judicial power is exercised by an authority normally performing

executive or administrative functions, this Court would require to be

satisfied that the decision has been reached after due consideration of

the merits of the dispute, uninfluenced by extraneous considerations of

policy or expediency. The Court insists upon disclosure of reasons in

support of the order on two grounds : one, that the party aggrieved in a

proceeding before the High Court or this Court has the opportunity to

demonstrate that the reasons which persuaded the authority to reject his

case were erroneous; the other, that the obligation to record reasons

operates as a deterrent against possible arbitrary action by the

executive authority invested with the judicial power."

The aforesaid said judgment has been quoted with approval by the

Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of S.N. Mukherjee Vs.

Union of India, AIR 1990 SC 1984. Similar view has been taken by the

Supreme Court in the cases of Union of India Vs. Mohan Lal Capoor, AIR

1974 SC 87; Raj Kishore Jha Vs. State of Bihar, (2003) 11 SCC 519; Kranti

Associates Private Limited Vs. Masood Ahmed Khan, (2010) 9 SCC 496;

Sant Lal Gupta and others v. Modern Cooperative Group Housing Society

Limited and others, (2010) 13 SCC 336 and J. Ashoka v. University of

Agricultural Science and others, (2017) 2 SCC 609."

In view of the aforesaid cases of the Hon'ble Supreme Court as

well as this Court, it is clear that the reason is the heartbeat of the order

and without reason, the order becomes dead.

The administrative order, without any reason, causes prejudice to

24

the person against whom it is passed. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, time

and again, has emphasized the importance of recording reason for the

decision by the administrative authorities.

In the case in hand, after perusal of the material available on

record, we find that while passing the impugned order dated 13.07.2019,

the respondent no. 3 has not assigned any reason for changing the

category of the petitioner from Group – 1 to Group – 3 for the retail

outlet dealership.

For the reasons mentioned above, we find that the impugned

order dated 13.07.2019 cannot be sustained in the eyes of law and it is,

accordingly, quashed.

The matter is remanded back to the respondent for passing afresh

reasoned and speaking order after furnishing opportunity of hearing to

all the stake holders.

The writ petition is, accordingly, allowed.

No order as to costs.

Order Date :- 13.9.2019

Amit Mishra