BAIL APPLN. 3808/2026 Page 1 of 16

* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

Reserved on: September 16, 2026

% Pronounced on: September 24, 2026

# CNR No. DLHC010432042026

+ BAIL APPLN. 3808/2026

AJEET BHARTI ....Applicant

Through: Mr. Jai Anant Dehadrai, Mr.

Pratyush Prasanna, Ms. Yashvi

Aswani, Mr. Ram Pravesh Dubey

and Mr. Rishabh Chauhan, Advs.

Versus

STATE OF NCT OF DELHI AND ANR. ....Respondents

Through: Ms. Meenakshi Dahiya, APP with

Mr. Ashish Priya, Ms. Kirti Gupta,

Ms. Urmila Saluja, Mr. Mukesh

Kumar Pand, Ms. Upasna Bakshi,

Mr. Sourav Suman and Ms. Divya

Bakshi, Advocates

ACP Mahesh Kumar, ACP/DIU

and Insp. Ajay Singh, PS: North

Avenue

Mr. Mohan Shyam Arya, Mr.

Abhishek Suman, Mr. Pradeep

Kumar, Mr. Satish Kumar, Mr.

Mukesh Gautam, Mr. Umar Khan,

Mr. Surya Pratap Deva, Mr.

Chandra Gupta and Mr. Sourabh

Rai, Advs. for R-2

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SAURABH BANERJEE

J U D G M E N T

1. By virtue of the present application under Section 482 of the

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023

1

, the applicant seeks grant of

1

Hereinafter referred to as ‘BNSS’

BAIL APPLN. 3808/2026 Page 2 of 16

anticipatory bail in proceedings arising out of FIR No.30/2026 dated

28.03.2026 registered at PS: North Avenue under Sections

3(2)(va)/3(1)(r)/3(1)(s)/3(1)(u)/3(1)(v)/3(1)(w) of the Scheduled Castes

and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989

2

, Section 67

of the Information Technology Act, 2000

3

and Sections 196(1)(c)/351(3)

of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023

4

.

2. Since learned counsel for the applicant has addressed all his

arguments qua the present application, to which learned counsel for the

complainant, appearing on advance service, has also argued in rebuttal, as

well as learned APP made submissions on behalf of the State, after

handing over the Status Report, which was taken on record, with the

consent of learned counsels for the parties as also the learned APP, the

present application is being disposed of accordingly.

3. Succinctly put, the present FIR was registered at the instance of the

complainant, being the Delhi State President of the political party namely

Azad Samaj Party, who stated that on 22.08.2026, the applicant uploaded

and circulated one audio-visual media entitled ‘SB79: Reservation Hatao

Andolan Nautanki & More/ Saptahik Bakaiti’

5

through his social media

and digital presence, which allegedly had approximately 23,100 views at

the time of registration of the FIR, and which contained repeated caste-

based abuse, caste-names/ slurs and derogatory remarks particularly

directed at Mr. Chandrashekhar Azad

6

, Member of Parliament on behalf

of the constituency Nagina, Uttar Pradesh from the Azad Samaj Party, and

2

Hereinafter referred to as ‘SC/ ST Act’

3

Hereinafter referred to as ‘IT Act’

4

Hereinafter referred to as ‘BNS’

5

Hereinafter referred to as ‘concerned video’

6

Hereinafter referred to as ‘named individual’

BAIL APPLN. 3808/2026 Page 3 of 16

who also belongs to the SC community, with the intent to humiliate him,

as also against Dr. B.R. Ambedkar and other members of the Scheduled

Caste

7

and the Scheduled Tribe

8

communities at large and to promote

caste-based hatred and ill-will in society.

4. In this backdrop this Court has heard learned counsels for the

parties and carefully perused the pleadings and documents on record along

with the judgments cited at the Bar.

5. Before adverting to the factual matrix involved, since the present

FIR involves allegations under the SC/ ST Act, this Court is to proceed

keeping in mind the relevant provisions of Sections 18/ 18A(2) therein,

which, for ready reference reproduced as under:-

“18. Section 438 of the Code not to apply to persons

committing an offence under the Act-Nothing in section

438 of the Code shall apply in relation to any case involving

the arrest of any person on an accusation of having

committed an offence under this Act.’

‘18A. No enquiry or approval required-

*** *** ***

(2) The provisions of section 438 of the Code shall not

apply to a case under this Act, notwithstanding any

judgment or order or direction of any Court.’

6. Needless to say, “Section 438 of the Code” (the Code of Criminal

Procedure, 1973) therein, being the erstwhile provision pertaining to grant

of an anticipatory bail, is para materia to Section 482 BNSS. As such,

there is no gainsaying that above Sections 18/ 18A(2) SC/ ST Act are very

much applicable in the same manner to the facts involved in the present

application under Section 482 BNSS as well.

7

Hereinafter referred to as ‘SC’

8

Hereinafter referred to as ‘ST’

BAIL APPLN. 3808/2026 Page 4 of 16

7. The aforesaid Sections 18/ 18A(2) SC/ ST Act, i.e. the (non-)

applicability of the provisions qua grant of an anticipatory bail to cases

under the SC/ ST Act, have recently been interpreted by the Hon’ble

Supreme Court, after analysing a long line of judicial precedents in

Shajan Skaria vs. State of Kerala

9

, wherein it has been held as under:-

“24. It is manifest from a plain reading of Section 18

referred to above that it bars the applicability of Section 438

of the CrPC in respect of offences under the Act, 1989. The

legislature in its wisdom thought fit that the benefit of

anticipatory bail should not be made available to the

accused in respect of offences under the Act, 1989, having

regard to the prevailing social conditions which give rise to

such offences and the apprehension that the perpetrators

of such atrocities are likely to threaten and intimidate the

victims and prevent or obstruct them in the prosecution of

such offences, if they are allowed to avail the benefit of

anticipatory bail.

[*** *** ***]

46. The aforesaid discussion indicates that the term

‘arrest’ appearing in the text of Section 18 of the Act, 1989

should be construed and understood in the larger context of

the powers of police to effect an arrest and the restrictions

imposed by the statute and the courts on the exercise of such

power. Seen thus, it can be said that the bar under Section

18 of the Act, 1989 would apply only to those cases where

prima facie materials exist pointing towards the

commission of an offence under the Act, 1989. We say so

because it is only when a prima facie case is made out that

the pre-arrest requirements as stipulated under Section 41

of CrPC could be said to be satisfied.’

iii. When can it be said that a prima facie case is made

out in a given FIR/complaint?

9

2024 SCC OnLine SC 2249

BAIL APPLN. 3808/2026 Page 5 of 16

47. Prima facie is a Latin term that translates to “at first

sight” or “based on first impression”. The expression

“where no prima facie materials exist warranting arrest in

a complaint or FIR” should be understood as “when based

on first impression, no offence is made out as shown in the

FIR or the complaint”. This means that when the

necessary ingredients to constitute the offence under the

Act, 1989 are not made out upon the reading of the

complaint, no case can be said to exist prima facie.

48. As a sequitur, if the necessary ingredients to

constitute the offence under the Act, 1989 are not disclosed

on the prima facie reading of the allegations levelled in the

complaint or FIR, then in such circumstances, as per the

consistent exposition by various decisions of this Court, the

bar of Section 18 would not apply and the courts would not

be absolutely precluded from granting pre-arrest bail to the

accused persons.

49. In our opinion, the aforesaid is the only test that the

court should apply, when an accused prays for anticipatory

bail in connection with any offence alleged to have been

committed under the provisions of the Act, 1989 [… … …]

However, powers under Section 438 of the CrPC cannot be

exercised once the contents of the complaint/ FIR disclose

a prima facie case. In other words, if all the ingredients

necessary for constituting the offence are borne out from

the complaint, then the remedy of anticipatory bail

becomes unavailable to the accused.’

[Emphasis Supplied]

8. In fact, it is the learned counsel for the applicant who has placed

reliance on Shajan Skaria (supra) before this Court.

9. In fact, more recently in Kiran vs. Rajkumar Jivraj Jain & Anr.

10

the Hon’ble Supreme Court has once again analysed the nature of the bar

on grant of an anticipatory bail in cases under the SC/ ST Act, as also the

10

2025 SCC OnLine SC 1886

BAIL APPLN. 3808/2026 Page 6 of 16

objects, reasons and legislative intent therefor, and has also referred to

Shajan Skaria (supra) along with other relevant judgements on the

subject, and looked into the powers of the Court while doing so to hold as

under:-

“5.1.1. Section 18A in its sub section (1) of the Act

provides that for the registration of an FIR against any

person, preliminary enquiry shall not be required. It is

further stated that the investigating officer shall not be

required to take approval for the arrest, if necessary, of any

person against whom an accusation about the commission

of an offence under this SC/ST Act has been made. Sub

section (2) of Section 18A of the SC/ST Act mentions that the

provisions of Section 438 of the Cr. P.C. shall not apply to a

case under this Act notwithstanding any judgment or order

or direction of any Court.

5.2. It is evident from the above provision of Section 18

that it expressly excludes the applicability of Section 438 of

the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (“hereinafter referred

to as “the Cr. P.C.”). In another words, in relation to any

case involving arrest of a person who is facing the

accusation about committing offence under this Act,

protection of Section 438, Cr. P.C. would not be available.

The Legislature has taken away the benefit of anticipatory

bail in respect of the arrest for the offences alleged under

the SC/ST Act. The bar in Section 18 of the SC/ST Act

would operate.

5.3. While upholding the Constitutional validity of Section

18 of the Act, this Court in State of M.P. v. Ram Krishna

Balothia [(1995) 3 SCC 221] observed as under,

“… The offences enumerated under the said Act fall

into a separate and special class. Article 17 of the

Constitution expressly deals with abolition of

‘untouchability’ and forbids its practice in any form.

It also provides that enforcement of any disability

arising out of ‘untouchability’ shall be an offence

BAIL APPLN. 3808/2026 Page 7 of 16

punishable in accordance with law. The offences,

therefore, which are enumerated under Section 3(1)

arise out of the practice of ‘untouchability’.”

5.3.1. The court proceeded to observe,

“The exclusion of Section 438 CrPC in connection with

offences under the Act has to be viewed in the contest of

the prevailing social conditions which give rise to such

offences, and the apprehension that perpetrators of such

atrocities are likely to threaten and intimidate their victims

and prevent or obstruct them in the prosecution of these

offenders, if the offenders are allowed to avail of

anticipatory bail as pointed out in the Statement of Objects

and Reasons of the Act. In these circumstances, if

anticipatory bail is not made available to persons who

commit such offences, such a denial cannot be considered as

unreasonable or violative of Article 14, as these offences

form a distinct class by themselves and cannot be compared

with other offences”

[*** *** ***]

5.8. The decision of this Court in Shajan Skaria (supra)

sought to be pressed into service on behalf of respondent

No. 1 take no different view. In that case, the Bench of two

Judges of this Court elaborated the law in respect of grant

of anticipatory bail, then highlighted and recognised the

bar created under Section 18 of the SC/ST Act to observe

that only in the cases where the offence could not be said

to have been made out on a very prima facie consideration,

the court may exercise the discretion to grant pre-arrest

bail to the accused.

[*** *** ***]

6. In light of the parameters in relation to the

applicability of Section 18 of the Act emanating from

afore-discussed various decisions of this Court, the

proposition could be summarised that as the provision of

Section 18 of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes

BAIL APPLN. 3808/2026 Page 8 of 16

Act, 1989 with express language excludes the applicability

of Section 438, Cr. P.C., it creates a bar against grant of

anticipatory bail in absolute terms in relations to the arrest

of a person who faces specific accusations of having

committed the offence under the Scheduled Caste and

Scheduled Tribe Act. The benefit of anticipatory bail for

such an accused is taken off.

6.1. The absolute nature of bar, however, could be read

and has to be applied with a rider. In a given case where on

the face of it the offence under Section 3 of the Act is

found to have not been made out and that the accusations

relating to the commission of such offence are devoid of

prima facie merits, the Court has a room to exercise the

discretion to grant anticipatory bail to the accused under

Section 438 of the Code.

6.2. Non-making of prima facie case about the

commission of offence is perceived to be such a situation

where the Court can arrive at such a conclusion in the

first blush itself or by way of the first impression upon very

reading of the averments in the FIR. The contents and the

allegations in the FIR would be decisive in this regard.

Furthermore, in reaching a conclusion as to whether a

prima facie offence is made out or not, it would not be

permissible for the Court to travel into the evidentiary

realm or to consider other materials, nor the Court could

advert to conduct a mini trial.’

[Emphasis Supplied]

10. Thus, it entails therefrom that where there are allegations under the

SC/ ST Act against anyone like the applicant herein, if, on a bare perusal

of the contents of the FIR and the supporting materials on record, albeit,

without conducting a mini-trial, offences under the SC/ ST Act, are found

to be “…prima facie not made out…”, then, and only then, the application

by such individual seeking grant of an anticipatory bail may be

considered, otherwise, the bar created thereon by virtue of Section 18/

BAIL APPLN. 3808/2026 Page 9 of 16

18A(2) SC/ ST Act, would apply in full force and any such application for

grant of an anticipatory bail by anyone like the applicant herein is/ will not

be maintainable, and, thus, liable to be dismissed.

11. Therefore, under the facts and circumstances involved herein, it is

necessary for this Court to determine as to whether there is a prima facie

case made out under the SC/ ST Act against the applicant herein. The

specific provisions of the SC/ ST Act invoked against the applicant are

reproduced as under:-

“3. Punishments for offences atrocities-(1) Whoever, not

being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe,-

[*** *** ***]

(r) intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to

humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled

Tribe in any place within public view;

(s) abuses any member of a Scheduled Caste or a

Scheduled Tribe by caste name in any place within public

view;

[*** *** ***]

(u) by words either written or spoken or by signs or by

visible representation or otherwise promotes or attempts to

promote feelings of enmity, hatred or ill-will against

members of the Scheduled Castes or the Scheduled Tribes;

(v) by words either written or spoken or by any other

means disrespects any late person held in high esteem by

members of the Scheduled Castes or the Scheduled Tribes;

(w)(i) intentionally touches a woman belonging to a

Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe, knowing that she

belongs to a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe, when

such act of touching is of a sexual nature and is without the

recipient’s consent;

BAIL APPLN. 3808/2026 Page 10 of 16

(ii) uses words, acts or gestures of a sexual nature

towards a woman belonging to a Scheduled Caste or a

Scheduled Tribe, knowing that she belongs to a Scheduled

Caste or a Scheduled Tribe.

[*** *** ***]

(2) Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste

or a Scheduled Tribe,-

[*** *** ***]

(va) commits any offence specified in the Schedule, against

a person or property, knowing that such person is a member

of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe or such property

belongs to such member, shall be punishable with such

punishment as specified under the Indian Penal Code (45 of

1860) for such offences and shall also be liable to fine;’

[Emphasis Supplied]

12. Both Sections 3(1)(r)/ 3(1)(s) hereinabove are emphasised since

learned counsels for the applicant as well as that of the complainant have

strictly restricted their respective arguments only qua the same for the

purposes of the present application.

13. Moving ahead accordingly, since the concerned video viewed by as

many as 23,000 users logged on is the bedrock of the issue raised in the

FIR by the prosecution, this Court has gone through the relevant portions

thereof in Chambers via a pen drive handed over by the IO in Court, as

well as the exact transcript thereof forming a part of the record.

14. It is pertinent to mention that learned counsel for the applicant has

during the course of his arguments admitted that the applicant does not

belong to any of the SC/ ST communities. The learned counsel has also

candidly admitted that, having regard to the public nature of the social

media platform wherein the concerned video was aired on, as well as

BAIL APPLN. 3808/2026 Page 11 of 16

considering the wide audience who witnessed/ viewed the same, the airing

of the concerned video is an incident in a place ‘within public view’. Thus,

since this is an admitted position, this Court need not to traverse thereon.

15. Therefore, in today’s age when the Internet is the fastest mode of

dissemination of anything, the concerned video uploaded on the world

wide web, which is a public digital platform with open and easy access to

one and all across the Globe, plays a vital role as it is freely available/

accessible over the Internet at all times, and can be seen, heard, consumed,

engaged with and/ or reshared by anyone at any time of their choosing.

Under such a scenario, there is no requirement for physical presence of the

victim like the named individual herein, as the same is accessible without

any fetters.

16. Regarding the contents of the concerned video, particularly

pertaining to the named individual, this Court, after hearing and seeing the

same, is of the considered opinion that, prima facie, the same is such

wherein the applicant has made certain caste-based abuses, caste-names/

slurs and denigratory remarks aimed at causing embarrassment/

humiliation/ dishonour to as also affect the dignity of the named

individual, some of which are reproduced as under:-

“… …अजीत भारती अपनी बहन की शादी MP चंद्रशेखर से कर दो

reservation खत्म हो जाएगी। ससंह जी यदद आपने experiment ककया

हुआ है अपनी बहन की शादी ककसी डXXX [caste slur] से करवाई हो या

अपनी मां की शादी ककसी चXXX [caste slur] से करवा दी हो तो

11

…

मतलब यह आप मेरी बहन की शादी हो गई है उसके दो बच्चे हैं। she is

quite comfortable in her life. तो उसको मैं चंद्रशेखर जैसे [___] के

साथ तो नहीं वििाह करिाऊं गा। मतलब अगर िैसा होता… शक्ल देखें

11

Hereinafter referred to as ‘STATEMENT ONE’

BAIL APPLN. 3808/2026 Page 12 of 16

चंद्रशेखर की? थूकने योग्य नहीं है। उसकी मूछ देखकर के मैं उसके म ंह पर

थूक दूंगा। तो भाई वििाह में बह त सारी चीजें देखी जाती है। यह नहीं कक

चXXX [caste slur] है और MP है इससिए वववाह कर दो।

12

ऐसे नहीं

होता है। चंद्रशेखर को स्वयं को उस योग्य बनाना पडेगा कक वह जो है ककसी

भी सवर्ण का उसकी बेटी का हाथ मांगे।

13

…”

[Emphasis Supplied]

Translation:

“… …Ajeet Bharti get your sister married to MP

Chandrashekar and reservation will end. Singh Ji, if you

have conducted this experiment, gotten your sister married

to some DXXX [caste slur], or gotten your mother married

to some CHXXX [caste slur] then… (STATEMENT ONE)

I mean, my sister is already married, she has two children.

She is quite comfortable in her life. So, I wouldn’t get her

married to a [___] like Chandrashekhar. I mean… have you

seen his face? It’s not even worth spitting on. I will spit on

his face seeing his moustache. There are many

considerations in a marriage. It's not like he is a CHXXX

[caste slur] and an MP, so marriage is done.

(STATEMENT TWO ) It’s not like that. Chandrashekhar

will have to make himself worthy enough so he can ask for

the hand of a savarna, their daughter. (STATEMENT

THREE)”

[Emphasis Supplied]

17. As evident from the above, both STATEMENT ONE and

STATEMENT TWO make it amply clear that the applicant publicly

identified the named individual with caste-names/ slurs. STATEMENT

ONE, which was immediately preceded by a direct reference to the named

individual, contains two explicit caste-names/ slurs apparently in response

to a comment specifically about the named individual, which together

12

Hereinafter referred to as ‘STATEMENT TWO ’

13

Hereinafter referred to as ‘STATEMENT THREE ’

BAIL APPLN. 3808/2026 Page 13 of 16

have the clear impact of equating the named individual to the said caste-

names/ slurs. Then, after several derogatory remarks about the named

individual and the use of abusive words qua him in the statements in

between, STATEMENT TWO is where the applicant once again goes on to

identify both ‘MP (Member of Parliament)’ and the caste-name/ slur in the

very same breath, once again, leaving no manner of doubt that it was, in

fact, the named individual to whom he was publicly attaching the caste-

names/ slurs used by him.

18. Going further, and after having so identified the named person with

the caste-names/ slurs used, the applicant goes on in STATEMENT THREE

to, once again, directly refer to the named individual and state that he

would have to “… …make himself worthy enough to ask for the hand of a

savarna, their daughter… …” which term itself, as admitted in Court by

learned counsel for the applicant, has been used by the applicant to refer to

the so-called ‘upper-caste’ individuals, thereby otherising the named

individual and suggesting invocation of caste hierarchy and superiority

against him in a glaring manner.

19. Therefore, it is borne out therefrom that the applicant, being well-

aware of the named individual, his status, position, caste, gender, and the

like, chose to make all the remarks, he did within the context of what he

was talking about. Reading the aforesaid extracted portion as a whole,

including the actual words used by the applicant while referring to the

named individual directly as also while alluding to him indirectly while

simultaneously using explicit caste-names/ slurs, the nature, tone, tenor

and manner of expression employed therein and the overall context in

which they were made, this Court is of the prima facie view that the

BAIL APPLN. 3808/2026 Page 14 of 16

present FIR clearly discloses that the applicant used/ abused the named

individual using caste-names/ slurs, which were with a view to humiliate

the named individual within the purview of Sections 3(1)(r)/3(1)(s) SC/

ST Act.

20. Interestingly, this Court finds that the Hon’ble Supreme Court in

Shajan Skaria (supra), relied on by learned counsel for the applicant

himself, though the remarks made by the accused therein containing no

reference to the caste of the victim, were overall found to be in the nature

of only reckless allegations, however, on the overall intent and purport of

Section 3(1)(r) SC/ ST Act, held as under:-

“61. The words “with intent to humiliate” as they appear

in the text of Section 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989 are

inextricably linked to the caste identity of the person who

is subjected to intentional insult or intimidation. Not every

intentional insult or intimidation of a member of a SC/ ST

community will result into a feeling of caste-based

humiliation. It is only in those cases where the intentional

insult or intimidation takes place either due to the

prevailing practice of untouchability or to reinforce the

historically entrenched ideas like the superiority of the

“upper castes” over the “lower castes/untouchables”, the

notions of ‘purity’ and ‘pollution’, etc. that it could be said

to be an insult or intimidation of the type envisaged by the

Act, 1989.

62. We would like to refer to the observations of this

Court in Ram Krishna Balothia (supra) to further elaborate

upon the idea of “humiliation” as it has been used under the

Act, 1989. It was observed in the said case that the offences

enumerated under the Act, 1989 belong to a separate

category as they arise from the practice of ‘untouchability’

and thus the Parliament was competent to enact special

laws treating such offences and offenders as belonging to a

separate category. Referring to the Statements of Objects

BAIL APPLN. 3808/2026 Page 15 of 16

and Purposes of the Act, 1989 it was observed by this

Court that the object behind the introduction of the Act,

1989 was to afford statutory protection to the Scheduled

Castes and the Scheduled Tribes, who were terrorised and

subjected to humiliation and indignations upon assertion

of their civil rights and resistance to the practice of

untouchability. For this reason, mere fact that the person

subjected to insult or intimidation belongs to a Scheduled

Caste or Scheduled Tribe would not attract the offence

under Section 3(1)(r) unless it was the intention of the

accused to subject the concerned person to caste-based

humiliation.”

[Emphasis Supplied]

21. Therefore, considering the repeated references to caste-names/

slurs, directly and indirectly aimed at the named individual, who is a

member of SC community, and that too in the context of the concerned

video, makes it clear that the remarks made therein were not general or

reckless/ stray. They were clear references to caste, and explicit invocation

of ideas of caste superiority prevalent in society, that too, with reference to

the institution of marriage, which also represents age old notions of the

hierarchy of the castes within the contours of what is elucidated by the

Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shajan Skaria (supra) hereinabove.

22. As such, this Court is of the view that a case against the applicant

under Sections 3(1)(r)/3(1)(s) SC/ ST Act is prima facie made out,

especially for the purposes of consideration of the present application

seeking grant of anticipatory bail.

23. In view thereof, the submission of learned counsel for the applicant

that the remarks in the concerned video were made by the applicant only

after provocation by someone online, is devoid of any merit. In any event,

the same cannot act as a shield for the applicant to escape his doings, that

BAIL APPLN. 3808/2026 Page 16 of 16

too, whence he was well-aware of what he was saying/ doing. Be that as it

may, the said ‘provocation’, if any, was not by the named individual. It is

also nowhere the case of the applicant that he has subsequently issued any

clarification/ explanation/ retraction/ apologies.

24. Consequently, though Sections 3(2)(va)/3(1)(u)/3(1)(v)/3(1)(w) SC/

ST Act as well as the provisions of the IT Act and the BNS are also

invoked against the applicant, in view of the findings hereinabove qua

Sections 3(1)(r)/3(1)(s) SC/ ST Act, the same need not to be adverted to at

this stage.

25. In view of the afore-going, finding a case under Sections

3(1)(r)/3(1)(s) SC/ ST Act to be prima facie made out against the

applicant, considering the statutory bar of Sections 18/ 18A(2) SC/ ST Act

read with clear legal position as elucidated above, the present application

seeking grant of anticipatory bail, being not maintainable, is dismissed.

26. Needless to say, observations, if any, on the merits of the matter are

for the limited purpose of adjudication of the present application and shall

have no bearing on the overall proceedings involved.

SAURABH BANERJEE, J.

SEPTEMBER 24, 2026/Ab/RS