2026 INSC 52
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2026
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (CIVIL) NO. 27660 OF 2025)
ALKA SHRIRANG CHAVAN & ANR. APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
HEMCHANDRA RAJARAM
BHONSALE & ORS. RESPONDENT(S)
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2026
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (CIVIL) NO. 27868 OF 2025)
J U D G M E N T
UJJAL BHUYAN, J.
Leave granted.
2. These two civil appeals by special leave are directed
against the judgment and order dated 19.12.2024 passed by
the High Court of Judicature at Bombay (briefly ‘the High
Court’ hereinafter) in Second Appeal No. 396 of 2022 (Alka
2
Shrirang Chavan and Anr. Vs. Hemchandra Rajaram
Bhonsale & Ors.) and Second Appeal (ST) No. 22336 of 2022
(Jaymala Shriram Date Vs. Hemchandra Rajaram Bhonsale
and Ors.).
2.1. Be it stated that by the impugned judgment and
order dated 19.12.2024, the High Court has dismissed both
the second appeals preferred by the appellants holding that
there is no merit in any of the substantial questions of law
raised by the appellants. However, the High Court granted
stay for a period of three months.
3. Relevant facts may be briefly noted.
4. Respondent No. 1 is the plaintiff (decree holder).
He had entered into an agreement for sale with the
defendant Rajaram Bajirao Pokale on 26.04.1973.
5. Since the defendant failed to perform his part of
the contract, respondent No. 1 (plaintiff) instituted Regular
Civil Suit No. 910 of 1986 on 28.04.1986 in the Court of
learned Civil Judge, Junior Division, Pune against
respondent No. 2 i.e. the defendant (judgment debtor). In the
said suit, plaintiff sought for a decree ordering the defendant
3
to execute the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff. In the event
defendant failed to execute the sale deed, the court be
pleased to execute the sale deed through its officers and to
put the plaintiff in actual possession of the suit property.
6. On 02.05.1986, respondent No. 1 (plaintiff)
registered lis pendens.
7. During the period from 07.05.1987 to 31.08.1987,
respondent No. 2 (judgment debtor) by eight sale deeds
transferred the right, title and interest of various parts of the
suit property to different persons. Jaymala Shriram Date, the
appellant in Second Appeal (ST) No. 22336 of 2022, is claiming
right, title and interest on the basis of one such registered sale
deed dated 07.07.1987.
8. In the year 1989, one Shri Sarangdhar, one of
the transferee pendente lite, constructed a bungalow on an
area admeasuring 5R, which is part of the suit property.
9. Learned 3
rd Joint Civil Judge, Junior Division,
Pune vide the judgment and order dated 30.11.1990 decreed
Regular Civil Suit No. 910 of 1986. Operative portion of the
decree dated 30.11.1990 reads as under:
4
(1) The suit is decreed ex parte.
(2) The plaintiff is directed to pay Rs. l775.00 to
the defendant and defendant is directed to
execute the document of sale-deed in respect
of the suit land bearing Survey No. 155 Pot
Hissa 3 admeasuring 36 gunthas situated at
village Dhayari, Taluka Haveli, District Pune in
favour of the plaintiff, within two months from
this order.
(3) If the defendant fails to execute the sale-deed
in favour of the plaintiff, then the plaintiff is at
liberty to get the document of sale deed
executed through Court Commissioner and the
defendant is directed to bear its cost.
(4) The defendant is also directed to hand over
vacant possession of the suit land peacefully to
the plaintiff.
(5) Defendant shall pay costs of this suit to the
plaintiff and bear his own.
10. Regular Darkhast No. 205 of 1991 i.e. execution
petition was filed by respondent No. 1 (decree holder) against
respondent No. 2 on 03.07.1991 for execution of the decree.
11. On 25.03.1993, on orders of the Executing
Court, the Court Commissioner on behalf of respondent No.
5
2 (judgment debtor) executed the sale deed in favour of
respondent No. 1 (decree holder).
12. Respondent No. 2 (judgment debtor) filed an
application under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
1908 (‘CPC’ for short) below Ex. 28 in Regular Darkhast No.
205 of 1991 on 09.08.1994 stating that he had transferred
the right, title and interest over the suit property to various
purchasers in or about 1987. Therefore, he prayed that the
sale deed executed by the Court Commissioner in favour of
respondent No. 1 (decree holder) be cancelled.
13. By registered sale deed dated 27.11.1995 and by
two separate registered sale deeds, both dated 16.11.1996,
appellants in Second Appeal No. 396 of 2022 i.e. Alka
Shrirang Chavan and Pradip Shrirang Chavan became
owners of the land admeasuring 15 gunthas of the suit
property including the land admeasuring 5R owned by Shri
Sarangdhar who had constructed a bungalow thereon in the
year 1989.
14. On 11.04.1996, Civil Suit No. 1720 of 1996 was
filed by respondent No. 2 (judgment debtor) against respondent
No. 1 (decree holder) for cancellation of the sale deed dated
6
25.03.1993. However, this civil suit was dismissed for non-
prosecution on 03.03.2004.
15. In the meanwhile, respondent No. 2 (judgment
debtor) filed an appeal on 10.11.1997 against the judgment
and decree dated 30.11.1990 passed in Regular Civil Suit
No. 910 of 1986. Alongwith the appeal, Miscellaneous Civil
Application No. 850 of 1997 was also filed by respondent No.
2 (judgment debtor) for condonation of delay in filing the
appeal. However, the Appellate Court vide order dated
26.06.1998 dismissed Miscellaneous Civil Application No.
850 of 1997 with cost. Consequently, the appeal also stood
rejected.
16. Thereafter, respondent No. 2 (judgment debtor)
filed Civil Revision Application No. 38 of 1999 before the
High Court against the order dated 26.06.1998 whereby
Miscellaneous Civil Application No. 850 of 1997 was
dismissed. However, the said civil revision application was
dismissed by the High Court for non -prosecution on
27.01.1999.
17. In the meanwhile respondent No. 2 (judgment
debtor) had instituted Civil Suit No. 1720 of 1996 against
7
respondent No. 1 (decree holder) for cancellation of the sale
deed dated 25.03.1993. However, the same was dismissed
for non-prosecution on 03.03.2004.
18. Thus, the judgment and decree dated 30.11.1990 as
well as the sale deed executed by the Court Commissioner in
favour of respondent No. 1 (decree holder) on 25.03.1993
attained finality.
19. The Executing Court by order dated 18.07.2013
rejected the application below Ex. 28 filed by respondent No.
2 (judgment debtor) under Section 47 CPC in Regular
Darkhast No. 205 of 1991.
20. Assailing the aforesaid order dated 18.07.2013,
respondent No. 2 (judgment debtor) filed Civil Revision
Application No. 851 of 2013 before the High Court but the
same was dismissed vide the order dated 14.03.2016. While
dismissing the revision application, the High Court held as
follows:
9. Judgment debtor has also contended in
paragraph 4 of application Ex. 28 that he had laid
the plots in the suit property and sold the plots to
various persons in 1997. If that be so, judgment
debtor cannot be said to have any locus to maintain
8
proceedings under Section 47 of CPC. That apart, no
such plea was taken in the earlier round of litigation.
In my opinion, the entire attempt on the part of
judgment debtor is to delay handing over possession.
The decree of specific performance was passed on
30.11.1990 and till date decree holder is not put in
possession.
21. Respondent No. 1 (decree holder) filed an
application marked as Exhibit 190 on 02.04.2016 for
issuance of possession warrant. Writ was issued for
measurement of the suit property etc while directing the
application below Exhibit 190 to be kept in abeyance till
receipt of report.
22. Measurement having been done, report was
submitted. At that stage, respondent No. 1 (decree holder)
filed application under Exhibit 224 for possession warrant.
On 09.02.2018, the Executing Court by passing order below
Ex. 224 in Regular Darkhast No. 205 of 1991 issued
possession warrant under Order XXI Rule 35 CPC for
18.01.2019.
23. When respondent No. 1 (decree holder)
accompanied by bailiffs and policemen went to the suit
9
property armed with the possession warrant for taking
possession of the suit property, appellants resisted and
obstructed possession.
24. Simultaneously, appellants as obstructionists
raised objections below Ex. 236 on 18.01.2019 itself to the
execution of the decree relating to handing over of
possession on the ground that they are the owners of the
suit property and that they are residing in the house
constructed thereon.
25. Opposing the application below Ex. 236,
respondent No. 1 (decree holder) filed two applications on
11.02.2019 for removal of obstruction bearing Ex. 238 and
Ex. 238A under Order XXI Rule 97 CPC. By order dated
29.02.2020, the Executing Court i.e. the 26
th Joint Civil
Judge, Senior Division, Pune allowed the applications filed
by respondent No. 1 (decree holder) and rejected the
objection of the obstructionists (appellants). Thereafter, the
Executing Court issued possession warrant under Order
XXI Rule 97. More particularly, the Executing Court directed
removal of obstruction in execution of the decree, further
directing the obstructionists i.e. the appellants to vacate the
10
premises within one month from the date of the said order.
Relevant portion of the order dated 29.02.2020 is as follows:
21. It is well settled that the Executing Court cannot
go behind the decree. The decree in R.C.S. No.
910/1986 has already attained finality. Though the
obstructionists filed documents list Ex. 270 showing
that since 1985 till date there were several execution of
sale deeds, mutation entries, 7/12 extracts and other
entries in revenue record, completion certificates,
construction of buildings etc. will not be helpful to the
obstructionists as they have purchased the suit land
during the pendency of R.C.S. No. 910/1986. Moreover,
the plaintiff/D.H. had already registered in notice of lis-
pendens on 02.05.1986. The obstructionists have
purchased the part of the suit land during pendency of
the suit, therefore, the submission of learned counsel
for obstructionists that decree is not binding upon the
obstructionists cannot be taken into consideration. The
authorities relied by the obstructionists are not
applicable in this case as the decree is executable and
attained finality and the same is binding upon the
obstructionists also, thus, I answer point Nos. l and 2
in affirmative in result of point No. 3 I pass following
order: ……..
26. The aforesaid judgment and decree dated
29.02.2020 of the Executing Court was challenged by the
obstructionists (appellants) by filing Regular Civil Appeal No.
11
169 of 2020 (appellants – Alka Shrirang Chavan and Pradip
Shrirang Chavan) and Regular Civil Appeal No. 68 of 2022
(appellant – Jaymala Shriram Date).
27. Appellants had also filed a stay application in
Regular Civil Appeal No. 169 of 2020. However, the same
was rejected by the appellate court vide the order dated
16.07.2020.
28. Challenging the legality and validity of the
aforesaid order dated 06.07.2020, appellants in Regular
Civil Appeal No. 169 of 2020 filed Writ Petition No. 3637 of
2021 which was dismissed by the High Court vide the
judgment and order dated 03.08.2021, relevant portion of
which reads thus:
16. Petitioners are purchasers of the suit property after
initiation of R.C.S. No. 910/1986 as it is claimed by the
petitioners that their predecessor-in-title purchased the
suit property from judgment debtor-defendant to the
suit sometime in 1987 and in 1995/1996, title vested in
them by virtue of registered sale deed.
17. As such, claim by the petitioners that they have
purchased the property without notice cannot
be accepted. Apart from above, it is quite
apparent that all the efforts on the part of
judgment debtor including that of raising an
12
objection under Section 47 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 is already rejected by this
Court vide order dated 14.03.2016. That being
so, petitioners cannot claim better title than his
predecessor viz. judgment debtor as he has
stepped into the shoes of judgment debtor-
respondent No. 2.
18. Apart from above, petitioner though appears to
have knowledge about Revision being preferred by
the judgment debtor being Revision (ST) No.
7769/2021 which was dismissed on 01.03.2021,
same is not brought to the notice of this Court by
placing appropriate documents on record but for
only mention about the same in independent list
of dates and events submitted before this Court.
It appears that decree passed in 1990 is not
permitted to be executed for last 30 years even
though sale deed pursuant to the decree for
specific performance was executed in favour of
respondent No. 1 decree holder on 25.03.1993.
19. Assistant Superintendent, Court of Senior Division,
Pune in compliance with the decree in execution
proceedings on March 25, 1993 executed the sale
deed of the suit property in favour of decree bolder
whereas petitioners have purchased part of the
suit property on 27.11.1995 and 16.11.1996. As
such, it cannot be inferred that petitioners are
purchasers of the suit property without notice.
13
20. Considering the very conduct of the petitioners-
objectors referred above, this Court is prompted
to infer that they are equally responsible for
prolonging the execution proceedings.
21. As such, petition fails, stands dismissed.
Decree if not already executed as directed by the
Executing Court, to be executed expeditiously.
29. Respondent No. 2 (judgment debtor) then filed
an application bearing Ex. 355 for dismissal of Regular
Darkhast No. 205 of 1991. The said application was
dismissed by the Executing Court vide the order dated
01.03.2021.
30. This order dated 01.03.2021 was assailed by the
appellants by filing Civil Revision Application (ST) No. 7769
of 2021 which was dismissed by the High Court vide the
order dated 15.04.2021 by directing that Regular Civil
Appeal No. 169 of 2020 and the other connected civil appeal
should be decided expeditiously within three months.
31. The appellate court i.e. District Judge – 13, Pune
vide the common judgment and order dated 12.04.2022
dismissed both Regular Civil Appeal No. 169 of 2020 and
Regular Civil Appeal No. 68 of 2022.
14
32. Aggrieved thereby, appellants preferred Second
Appeal No. 396 of 2022 and Second Appeal (ST) No. 22336
of 2022 before the High Court.
33. By order dated 02.05.2022, High Court admitted
the two second appeals on the following substantial
questions of law, further directing that the Executing Court
shall not proceed further. The substantial questions of law
so framed are as under:
(i) Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the
case, the decree for specific performance passed in
Regular Civil Suit No. 910 of 1986 is executable when
the decree holder has not acquired title to the suit land
by sale deed dated 25.03.1993 executed by the Court
Commissioner?
(ii) Whether the learned courts below erred in law
in not deciding the vital issue as to whether the
decree holder is entitled to recover possession
of the suit land in execution of decree for
specific performance?
34. By the impugned judgment and order dated
19.12.2024, the High Court dismissed both the second
15
appeals by holding that there is no merit in the two
substantial questions of law so framed. However, in the
interest of justice, the interim relief granted by the High
Court directing the Executing Court not to proceed further
has been extended for a period of three months.
35. This Court vide the order dated 19.09.2025
issued notice in the related special leave petitions, further
directing the parties to maintain status quo. The order dated
19.09.2025 is as under:
1. Delay condoned.
2. Application of respondent seeking permission to
appear and argue in person is allowed.
3. The submission on behalf of the petitioner is that
pursuant to the decree for specific performance
in favour of the first respondent, the court
executed a sale deed on behalf of the judgment
debtor. However, on the date when the sale deed
was executed, the judgment debtor had already
lost title as he had transferred the suit property,
but the transferee was not joined to execute the
sale deed. It is argued that as the transferee lis
pendens was not privy to the sale deed executed
in favour of the decree holder, and the judgment
debtor had already lost title by the date when the
sale deed was executed, there was no valid title
16
transferred in favour of the decree holder so as to
enable him to maintain a claim for possession
from the transferee of the transferee lis pendens
(i.e., the petitioner).
4. The decree holder (i.e., respondent) has appeared
in person along with his son, who is an advocate.
He prays for opportunity to file brief written
submissions to elucidate that since lis pendens
was registered, transferee lis pendens was not
required to be joined as a party and, therefore, to
create a valid title, there was no necessity to
implead the subsequent transferees in the
execution proceeding.
5. Considering the question of law that emerges for
our consideration, we request both parties to
submit their brief written submissions along with
the citations of the authorities which they
propose to rely.
6. List these matters on 06.10.2025.
7. In the meantime, the parties shall maintain
status quo.
36. Mr. Vinay Navare, learned senior advocate for
the appellants, at the outset submits that the impugned
judgment and order of the High Court dated 19.12.2024 is
wholly untenable on facts as well as on law. He submits that
appellants are bona fide subsequent purchasers of the suit
17
property. By a registered sale deed dated 27.11.1995 and
thereafter again by two separate registered sale deeds, both
dated 16.11.1996, appellants had purchased 15R part of the
suit land from Laxmibai Maruti Shinde, Sushma Mohan
Kulkarni and Ramakant Gajanan Sarangdhar who had
purchased the said 15R part of the suit land from
respondent No. 2 in the year 1987. Thus, appellants had
acquired title over the said 15R part of the suit land
whereafter they are in actual physical possession over the
said land.
36.1. High Court had failed to appreciate that
respondent No. 1 had notice of the transfer of the suit
property by the judgment debtor (respondent No. 2) by way
of eight registered sale deeds in 1987 to the purchasers
including the vendors of the appellants; that the names of
the purchasers were mutated in 7/12 extract of the suit
land; and that a bungalow was constructed by the vendor of
the appellants in the year 1989. Hence, the subsequent
purchasers of the suit land including the appellants should
have been joined to the sale deed dated 25.03.1993 executed
by the Court Commissioner for passing on title which still
18
reside with them. In this regard, learned senior counsel has
placed reliance on a decision of this Court in Thomson Press
(India) Limited Vs. Nanak Builders and Investors Private
Limited
1 to contend that transfer pendente lite is neither
illegal nor void ab initio though it remains subservient to
rights effectually determined by the court in the pending
litigation. Therefore, the transferees pendente lite should
have been impleaded in the conveyance or in the execution
proceedings or atleast in the application for possession
which would have enabled such subsequent purchasers to
raise their defence.
36.2. Mr. Navare, learned senior counsel, submits
that the High Court erred by not considering the law laid
down by this Court in Lala Durga Prasad Vs. Lala Deep
Chand
2. In the said decision, it has been held that the proper
form of decree is to direct specific performance of the
contract between the vendor and the plaintiff and direct the
subsequent transferee to join in the conveyance so as to
pass on the title which resides in him to the plaintiff.
1
(2013) 5 SCC 397
2
(1953) 2 SCC 509
19
36.3. Learned senior counsel further submits that
transferee lis pendens is not void. High Court failed to
appreciate that the decree for specific performance merely
recognizes claim for specific performance of contract for sale;
it does not elevate the status of the decree holder to that of
owner of the property. In fact, it does not create any right,
title and interest in or charge over the immovable property
in favour of the decree holder. Hence, the decree holder i.e.
respondent No. 1 has not acquired title over the suit land by
virtue of the sale deed dated 25.03.1993 executed by the Court
Commissioner without joining the subsequent purchasers including
the appellants to the sale deed.
36.4. In this connection, Mr. Navare asserts that the
subsequent purchasers including the vendors of the
appellants had acquired valid title to the suit land by way of
registered sale deeds executed by the judgment debtor
(respondent No. 2) in the year 1987 during the pendency of
the suit as Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882
(‘Transfer of Property Act’ hereinafter) does not annul the lis
pendens transfer. Hence, the subsequent purchasers including the
appellants had acquired valid title to the suit land.
20
36.5. It is further submitted that High Court had
failed to appreciate that under Order XXI Rule 101 CPC, all
questions including those relating to right, title and interest
over the property arising between the parties to the
proceedings or their representatives on application under
Order XXI Rule 97 CPC are to be determined by the court
dealing with the application. Hence, the question raised by
the appellants that the decree holder had not acquired title
over the suit land because he had not joined the subsequent
purchasers including the appellants to the sale deed dated
25.03.1993 is fully justified calling for an affirmative
response from the High Court.
36.6. Merely because appellants are lis pendens
purchasers, their objection to the execution could not have
been rejected as has been done in the instant case.
36.7. That apart, learned senior counsel has highlighted that
respondent No. 1 (decree holder) had initiated proceedings for
delivery of possession only on 09.02.2018 i.e. 27 years after
the execution petition was filed under Order XXI Rule 11
CPC. In the meanwhile, much development had taken place
including change of ownership by way of registered sale
21
deeds. Adverting to the decision of this Court in Anwarbi Vs.
Pramod D.A. Joshi
3, Mr. Navare submits that in view of the
obstruction so caused, it was for the decree holder to have
taken appropriate steps under Order XXI Rule 97 CPC for
removal of the obstruction and to have the rights of the
parties including that of the obstructionists adjudicated
under provisions of Order XXI Rule 101 CPC.
36.8. He, therefore, submits that the belated application filed
by respondent No. 1 (decree holder) for possession of the suit
land was not maintainable. This aspect was not considered.
In this connection, he has referred to Articles 129 and 134
of the Limitation Act, 1963 and submits that the High Court
had overlooked the above aspect of the matter.
36.9. Finally Mr. Navare, learned senior counsel ,
submits that the impugned judgment and order requires a
re-look. Therefore, the same may be set aside and quashed.
37. Respondent No. 1 appearing in person submits
that there is no merit at all in the civil appeals. No such law
exists which permits joining of the transferee pendente lite
3
(2000) 10 SCC 405
22
to the sale deed which was executed by the Court
Commissioner when execution of the decree has attained
finality and rights of the obstructionists have been
adjudicated under Order XXI Rules 97 to 101 to the
complete satisfaction of the court. In this connection, he
submits that all the courts below upon hearing the
contentions advanced by the obstructionists have upheld
the decree in favour of the decree holder (respondent No. 1).
37.1. Further submission is that there is concurrence
in the findings of all the courts below. All the courts have
rejected the contention of the obstructionists that they have
independent title over the suit property. On the contrary, it
was admitted by the obstructionists that they are bound by
the decree which was passed in favour of respondent No. 1
(decree holder) on 30.11.1990. Notwithstanding the same,
when respondent No. 1 (decree holder) went for execution of
the decree at the suit property, obstructionists offered
resistance to execution of the decree by not letting the
possession warrant from getting executed on 18.01.2019.
Within 30 days thereafter respondent No. 1 (decree holder)
23
filed application before the Executing Court for removal of
obstruction.
37.2. Appellants i.e. obstructionists had purchased a
portion of the suit property during pendency of Regular Civil
Suit No. 910 of 1986 and after registration of the lis pendens
notice. Hence, their purchase is governed by Section 52 of the Transfer
of Property Act. That being so, such transactions are pendente lite with
the decree of specific performance binding on them. All the
transferee pendente lite have no right or locus standi to
obstruct execution of the decree for possession as they have
stepped into the shoes of the judgment debtor.
37.3. If the contention of the appellants is accepted,
then it will defeat the very object of Section 52 of the Transfer
of Property Act. This will amount to the Executing Court
going behind the decree which is not permissible.
37.4. Such a transferee, as the appellants in this case,
is subservient to the decree. In other words, he is bound by
the ultimate decree of the civil court. In this case, appellants
are bound by the directions given to the judgment debtor
(respondent No. 2) to execute the sale deed in favour of the
plaintiff (decree holder) and in the event of failure to do so,
24
the Court Commissioner to execute the sale deed in favour
of the plaintiff (decree holder) and upon such execution, the
title over the suit land to pass on to the plaintiff (decree
holder). A transferee pendente lite is bound by the decree
just as much as he was a party to the suit. In fact, title of
the obstructionists stood extinguished under Section 52 of
the Transfer of Property Act.
37.5. A combined reading of Section 52 of the Transfer
of Property Act read with Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief
Act and Section 47 CPC alongwith Order XXI Rules 97, 98
and 101 thereof would show that title of a transferee
pendente lite cannot supersede the decree. It is subject to
the said decree and such transferee is bound by the decree.
37.6. He further submits that once the objection/obstruction
is adjudicated by the court under the aforesaid provisions and
the court is satisfied that such obstruction is caused by the
transferees, then Order XXI Rule 98 CPC mandates removal
of the obstructionists and delivering possession of the suit
property to the decree holder. That being the legal
framework, appellants cannot claim any right, title and
interest over the suit property once the sale deed is executed
25
by the court which makes the title of the decree holder valid
as per decree of the court. In this connection, he pointed out
the scheme of Order XXI Rules 97 to 102 CPC read with the
Bombay Amendment.
37.7. According to respondent No. 1, appellants had
purchased portions of the suit property after institution of
the civil suit on 28.04.1986 and after registration of lis
pendens on 02.05.1986. Adverting to Section 52 of the
Transfer of Property Act, he submits that in a suit or
proceeding in which any right to immovable property is
directly and specifically in question, the property cannot be
transferred or otherwise dealt with by any party to the suit
or proceeding so as to affect the rights of any other party
thereto under any decree or order which may be made
therein. The Explanation to Section 52 makes it very clear
that pendency of a suit or proceeding shall be deemed to
commence from the date of presentation of the plaint and
continues till such time the suit is disposed of by a final
decree or order and complete satisfaction or discharge of
such decree or order has been obtained.
26
37.8. Contention of the appellants that in order to
convey title over the suit property to the decree holder the
obstructionists should have been joined in the conveyance
in order to pass on title to the decree holder which currently
vests with the obstructionists is completely wrong and
without any substance. This is because the doctrine of lis
pendens does not annul the conveyance of such transferee
pendente lite but makes it subservient to the rights of the
parties and dependent upon the final decision of the suit.
That being the position, no valid title vested with the
obstructionists or any of the transferee pendente lite. In this
connection, respondent No. 1 has referred to the decision of
this Court in Jayaram Mudaliar Vs. Ayyaswami
4 which has
been approved in the subsequent decision in Celir LLP Vs.
Somati Prasad Bafna
5. He also places reliance on a decision
of this Court in Sanjay Verma Vs. Manik Roy
6.
37.9. Respondent No. 1 asserts that the doctrine of lis
pendens is in accordance with the principles of equity, good
conscience and justice. It is a principle of public policy. Any
4
(1972) 2 SCC 200
5
(2024) SCC Online SC 3727
6
(2006) 13 SCC 608
27
dilution of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act would
defeat the rights of the parties and undermine the very
sanctity of the judicial process.
37.10. In so far reliance placed by learned senior
counsel for the appellants on the decision of this Court in
Lala Durga Prasad, respondent No. 1 submits that the
factual context in which the decision in Lala Durga Prasad
was rendered is totally different from the present case. The
distinction has been clearly brought out by the High Court.
In this connection, he has referred to paragraphs 27, 31, 32,
and 33 of the impugned judgment.
37.11. He finally submits that by one method or the
other appellants have been frustrating execution of the
decree in favour of respondent No. 1 for more than three
decades. There is no merit at all in the civil appeals.
Therefore, the civil appeals are liable to be dismissed.
38. Submissions made by learned counsel for the
parties have received the due consideration of the Court.
39. At the outset, let us advert to Section 52 of the
Transfer of Property Act on which the entire lis between the
28
parties are centered around. Section 52 of the Transfer of
Property Act reads thus:
52. Transfer of property pending suit relating
thereto. —
During the pendency in any court having authority
within the limits of India excluding the State of
Jammu and Kashmir or established beyond such
limits by the Central Government of any suit or
proceeding which is not collusive and in which any
right to immovable property is directly and specifically
in question, the property cannot be transferred or
otherwise dealt with by any party to the suit or
proceeding so as to affect the rights of any other party
thereto under any decree or order which may be made
therein, except under the authority of the court and
on such terms as it may impose.
Explanation.— For the purposes of this section, the
pendency of a suit or proceeding shall be deemed to
commence from the date of the presentation of the
plaint or the institution of the proceeding in a court of
competent jurisdiction, and to continue until the suit
or proceeding has been disposed of by a final decree
or order and complete satisfaction or discharge of
such decree or order has been obtained, or has
become unobtainable by reason of the expiration of
any period of limitation prescribed for the execution
thereof by any law for the time being in force.
29
40. This section has been subjected to judicial
dissection on numerous occasions. It is not necessary for us
to advert to the long line of precedents inasmuch as two
recent judgments of this Court have succinctly summed up
the essence and amplitude of this provision. Section 52 of
the Transfer of Property Act encapsulates the doctrine of lis
pendens.
41. In Celir LLP, this Court examined the expression
‘lis pendens’ in the following manner:
155. The term “lis pendens” as explained in the Law
Lexicon is as under:—
“Lis means a suit, action controversy, or
dispute, and lis pendens means a pending suit.
The doctrine denotes those principles and rules
of law which define and limit the operation of
the common-law maxim pendente lite nihil
innovetur, that is, pending the suit nothing
should be changed.
A pending suit.
As soon as proceedings are commenced to
recover or charge some specific property [Ex
parte Thornton [L.R.] 2 Ch. 178] there is “lis
pendens” - a pending suit, the consequence of
which is that until the litigation is at an end
30
neither litigant can deal with the property to the
prejudice of the other.
41.1. Explaining the aforesaid doctrine, this Court has
held that nothing new can be introduced during the pendency
of a petition and if anything new is introduced, the same
would be subject to the final outcome of the petition. This
Court explained that the doctrine of lis pendens is duly
recognized in Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act which
declares that during the pendency of any suit in which any
right to immovable property is directly and specifically in
question, the property cannot be transferred or otherwise
dealt with by any party to the suit or proceedings. Explanation
to Section 52 clarifies that pendency of a suit or proceeding
shall be deemed to commence from the date of presentation of
the plaint or institution of the proceeding in a court and shall
continue until the suit or proceeding is disposed of by a final
decree or order and complete satisfaction of the order is
obtained, unless it has become unobtainable by reason of
expiry of any period of limitation. This Court held thus:
156. As per the doctrine of lis pendens, nothing new
can be introduced during the pendency of a petition and
if at all anything new is introduced, the same would also
31
be subject to the final outcome of the petition, which
would decide the rights and obligations of the parties.
157. The doctrine of lis pendens is duly recognized in
Section 52 of the TPA which states that during the
pendency in any court of any suit in which any right to
immovable property is directly and specifically in
question, the property cannot be transferred or
otherwise dealt with by any party to the suit or
proceedings. The explanation to the provision states
that for the purposes of the Section, the pendency of a
suit or proceedings shall be deemed to commence from
the date of the presentation of the plaint or institution
of the proceeding in a court, and shall continue until
the suit or proceeding is disposed by a “final decree or
order” and complete satisfaction of the order is
obtained, unless it has become unobtainable by reason
of the expiry of any period of limitation.
41.2. Elaborating further, this Court culled out five
conditions which must be fulfilled for application of the
doctrine of lis pendens. It has been noted that the only
exception to the principle of lis pendens is when the property
is transferred under the authority of the court. But where one
of the parties to the suit transfers the suit property or a
portion thereof to a third party, the latter would be bound by
the result of the proceedings even if he did not have notice of
32
the suit or proceeding. Relevant portion of the decision of this
Court in Celir LLP is extracted hereunder:
158. The following conditions ought to be fulfilled for
the doctrine of lis pendens to apply:—
i. There must be a pending suit or proceeding;
ii. The suit or proceeding must be pending in a
competent court;
iii. The suit or proceeding must not be collusive;
iv. The right to immovable property must be
directly and specifically in question in the suit or
proceeding;
v. The property must be transferred by a party to
the litigation; and,
vi. The alienation must affect the rights of any
other party to the dispute.
159. In short, the doctrine of lis pendens, which
Section 52 of the TPA encapsulates, bars the transfer of
a suit property during the pendency of litigation. The
only exception to the principle is when it is transferred
under the authority of the court and on terms imposed
by it. Where one of the parties to the suit transfers the
suit property (or a part of it) to a third-party, the latter
is bound by the result of the proceedings even if he did
not have notice of the suit or proceeding.
41.3. It was canvassed on behalf of the subsequent
transferee that it was a bona fide third party purchaser of the
secured asset since it was neither arrayed as a party to the
33
proceedings in the main appeals nor was issued a notice of
the said proceedings either by the petitioner or by the bank.
Repelling such contention, this Court referred to its previous
decision in Sanjay Verma where it was held that the principle
of lis pendens enshrined in Section 52 of the Transfer of
Property Act is not only based on equity, good conscience and
justice but is also a principle of public policy. No party can
claim exemption from the application of this doctrine on the
ground of bona fide or good faith. Further, this Court referred
to another of its earlier decisions in Guruswamy Nadar Vs. P.
Lakshmi Ammal
7 where it was held that the principle of lis
pendens will apply irrespective of whether the subsequent
purchaser had bought the property, which is a subject-matter
of a pending proceeding, in good faith or not.
42. It may be mentioned that in a recent judgment of
this Court in M/s. Siddamsetty Infra Projects Pvt. Ltd. Vs.
Katta Sujatha Reddy
8 it has been held that the doctrine of lis
pendens kicks in the moment a proceeding is instituted
7
(2008) 5 SCC 796
8
2024 SCC OnLine SC 3214
34
irrespective of whether such institution or filing is defective or
notice is yet to be issued by the court.
43. One of the questions which fell for consideration
in Danesh Singh Vs. Har Pyari
9 is whether transfer of the suit
property in favour of respondent Nos.1 and 2 is hit by Section
52 of the Transfer of Property Act and the doctrine of lis
pendens? It was in that context this Court looked into Section
52 and held as follows:
49. Section 52 of the 1882 Act stipulates that during
the pendency of any suit in a court of competent
jurisdiction in which any right to the immovable
property is directly and specifically in question, such
property cannot be transferred or otherwise be dealt
with by any party to the suit or proceedings with a view
to affect or defeat the rights of any other party under
any decree or order. The only exception that the
provision carves out is with regard to a situation where
the transfer of the property is made permissible under
the authority of the court and in accordance with the
terms imposed by the court.
50. The explanation to the section further elaborates
that the pendency of a suit or proceeding shall be
deemed to commence from the date of the presentation
of the plaint and would continue until the suit is
disposed of by a final decree, and the “complete
9
2025 SCC OnLine SC 2805
35
satisfaction or discharge of such decree” has been
obtained, unless the same cannot be obtained due to
the expiry of the prescribed limitation period.
43.1. This Court also referred to its earlier decision in
Celir LLP and noted the essentials of Section 52. Thereafter,
this Court held thus:
52. This Court in Celir LLP (supra) had also emphasized
that such a pendente lite transferee would be bound by
the result of the proceedings irrespective of whether
they had notice of the pending suit or not. In other
words, the lack of knowledge of the proceedings would
not be a valid defence against the application of the
doctrine of lis pendens.
44. Section 52 has undergone an amendment in the
State of Maharashtra by virtue of the Bombay Amendment
Act, 1939 (Act XIV of 1939). Section 52, as amended in
Maharashtra, stands restructured in as much as there are
two sub-sections with an explanation, sub-section (2) being
the Maharashtra insertion. Section 52 as amended in
Maharashtra reads as under:
52. Transfer of property pending suit relating
thereto. —
(1) During the pendency in any court having
authority within the limits of India excluding the
36
State of Jammu and Kashmir established beyond
such limits by the Central Government, of any
suit or proceeding which is not collusive and in
which any right to immovable property is directly
and specifically in question, if a notice of the
pendency of such suit or proceeding is registered
under Section 18 of the Indian Registration Act,
1908, the property after the notice is so registered
cannot be transferred or otherwise dealt with by
any party to the suit or proceeding so as to affect
the rights of any other party thereto under any
decree or order which may be made therein,
except under the authority of the court and on
such terms as it may impose.
(2) Every notice of pendency of a suit or proceeding
referred to in sub-section (1) shall contain the
following particulars, namely:
(a) the name and address of the owner of immovable
property or other person whose right to the
immovable property is in question;
(b) the description of the immovable property the
right to which is in question;
(c) the court in which the suit or proceeding is pending;
(d) the nature and title of the suit or proceeding;
and
(e) the date on which the suit or proceeding was
instituted.
Explanation.—For the purposes of this section,
the pendency of a suit or proceeding shall be deemed
to commence from the date of the presentation of the
37
plaint or the institution of the proceedings in a court of
competent jurisdiction, and to continue until the suit
or proceeding has been disposed of by a final decree or
order and complete satisfaction or discharge of such
decree or order has been obtained, or has become
unobtainable by reason of the expiration of any period
of limitation prescribed for the execution thereof by any
law for the time being in force.
45. The aforesaid amendment has been examined in
Celir LLP. This Court has held that the requirement of
registration of notice of pendency of suit or proceeding is to
prevent any undue or unwarranted hardship to a third party
who even after a reasonable due diligence has bona-fidely
purchased the property believing it to be free from the
encumbrances of any pending proceeding only to later face
the adverse consequences of losing the rights by a
mechanical application of lis pendens. This additional
requirement is only for effective application of the doctrine
of lis pendens. The objective is to discourage any thwarting
or frustration of rights of the litigating parties by
unscrupulous and unanticipated transactions. This Court
cautioned against mechanical application of the aforesaid
rule because if it is held that absence of notice registration
38
would render the doctrine of lis pendens inapplicable, it
would encourage exploitation of procedural gaps and
thereby undermine the very sanctity of the judicial process.
Such an interpretation would lead to a very chilling effect
whereby third parties despite being expected to verify the
title and status of the property would simply abdicate their
duty to conduct thorough due diligence in transactions
involving immovable properties or mischievously execute
back dated agreements in collusion with a party to a lis prior
to registration of such notice of pendency to circumvent the
due court process. This Court held thus:
171. We have carefully gone through the aforesaid state
amendment made to Section 52 of the TPA. The
amended Section 52 sub-section (1) of the TPA casts
upon a party who is claiming any right to a property
which is a subject matter of any pending suit or
proceeding an additional duty to register a notice of
pendency in respect of such property so as to caution
and put to notice any third-party who might otherwise
be unaware of such proceeding or litigation despite the
best of due diligence either due to inadvertence or
deliberate misleading by one of the parties to the lis and
as result might be genuinely considering to purchase or
acquire any right in the subject-matter proceeding. The
requirement of registration of notice of pendency is to
prevent any undue or unwarranted hardship to such
39
third-parties who even after a reasonable due diligence
have bona-fidely purchased the property believing it to
be free from the encumbrances of any pending
proceeding only to later face the adverse consequence of
losing their rights by a mechanical application of lis
pendens.
172. This additional requirement of registration of
notice of pendency is for the benefit of the party claiming
any right in such subject-matter property and also for
the benefit of any third-party interested in such subject-
matter property by enabling the former to claim the
benefit of lis pendens as an absolute right after having
duly taken steps towards ensuring that the public is
well-aware of the impeding litigation in respect of such
property by registering a notice of pendency and to
enable the latter to ascertain the veracity of title of such
property by exercise of its due diligence. Although, the
said provision is for the benefit of the third-party, yet
such subsequent purchasers cannot as a matter of
absolute right claim any title to such property solely on
the ground of want of any notice of pendency being
registered. To hold otherwise would undermine the
object and purpose of the doctrine of lis pendens which
is based on the principle of equity, good conscience, and
public policy and discourage a ny thwarting or
frustration of rights of the parties so litigating by
unscrupulous and unanticipated transactions.
173. The vital essence of this additional duty imposed
upon the party claiming a right to a property which is a
subject matter of a pending proceeding, is only to aid a
40
third-party to exercise its due diligence and obviate the
possibility of any dishonesty, misrepresentation or fraud
by a party in order to gain an undue advantage or
benefit despite the pendency of proceedings. However, if
the absence of notice registration were to render the
doctrine entirely inapplicable, it would lead to
exploitation of procedural gaps by parties who
deliberately delay or avoid registering such notices to
defeat substantive rights of the parties and undermine
the very sanctity of judicial proceedings. Such an
interpretation would lead to a very chilling effect
whereby, third parties despite being expected to verify
the title and status of the property would simply
abdicate their duty to conduct thorough due diligence in
transactions involving immovable properties or that
despite being fully aware of the pendency of such
proceedings would be able to deviously claim absolute
rights to such property or worse, mischievously execute
back-dated agreements in collusion with a party to a lis
prior to registration of such notice of pendency to
circumventing the very proceedings and render them
infructuous.
46. At this stage, we may also advert to the provisions
of Section 19 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (‘the Specific Relief
Act’ hereinafter). Section 19 is included in Chapter II of the
Specific Relief Act which deals with specific performance of
contracts. Heading of Section 19 is ‘Relief against parties and
41
persons claiming under them by subsequent title’. Section 19
reads thus:
19. Relief against parties and persons claiming
under them by subsequent title.- Except as otherwise
provided by this Chapter, specific performance of a
contract may be enforced against—
(a) either party thereto;
(b) any other person claiming under him by a title
arising subsequently to the contract, except a
transferee for value who has paid his money in good
faith and without notice of the original contract;
(c) any person claiming under a title which, though
prior to the contract and known to the plaintiff, might
have been displaced by the defendant;
(ca) when a limited liability partnership has entered into
a contract and subsequently becomes amalgamated
with another limited liability partnership, the new
limited liability partnership which arises out of the
amalgamation;
(d) when a company has entered into a contract and
subsequently becomes amalgamated with another
company, the new company which arises out of the
amalgamation;
(e) when the promoters of a company have, before its
incorporation entered into a contract for the purpose
of the company and such contract is warranted by the
terms of the incorporation, the company:
42
Provided that the company has accepted the contract
and communicated such acceptance to the other party
to the contract.
46.1. The only clause which may be of some relevance
is clause (b) of Section 19. It says specific performance of a
contract may be enforced against any other person claiming
under him by a title arising subsequently to the contract
except a transferee for value who has paid his money in good
faith and without notice of the original contract.
46.2. Section 19 in general and clause (b) thereof in
particular acknowledges the claim of a person to a contract
qua a subsequent transferee. But clause (b) carves out an
exception when a subsequent transferee acts in good faith and
without notice of the original contract.
47. In K.S. Manjunath Vs. Moorasavirappa
10, the
subsequent purchasers were seeking to bring themselves
within the status of bona fide purchaser under Section 19(b)
of the Specific Relief Act. It was in that context, this Court
examined Section 19(b) as under:
10
2025 SCC Online SC 2378
43
68. ………Section 19 provides for the categories of
persons against whom specific performance of a
contract may be enforced. Amidst all, Clause (b) of
Section 19 states that specific performance may be
enforced against any other person claiming under him
by a title arising subsequently to the contract except a
transferee for value who has paid his money in good
faith and without notice of the original contract. Thus,
a transferee for value who has paid his money in good
faith and without notice of the original contract is
excluded from the purview of the said clause. In the case
of Ram Niwas Vs. Bano
11, this Court had set out three
factors that a subsequent transferee must show to fall
within the excluded class: (a) he has purchased for
value the property, which is the subject matter of the
suit for specific performance; (b) he has paid his money
to the vendor in good faith; and (c) he had no notice of
the earlier contract for sale specific performance of
which is sought to be enforced against him. The Court
observed that “notice” can be (i) actual notice or
(ii) constructive notice, or (iii) imputed notice. As per
Section 3 of Transfer of Property Act, 1882, a person is
said to have notice of a fact when he actually knows that
fact or when but for wilful abstention from inquiry or
search which he ought to have made, or gross
negligence, he would have known it……..
47.1. Thereafter, this Court referred to a decision of the
Madhya Pradesh High Court and held thus:
11
(2000) 6 SCC 685
44
69. Similarly, in Durg Singh Vs. Mahesh Singh
12, the
Madhya Pradesh High Court had observed that there
are two factors that are necessary for the adjudication
of suit for specific performance of the contract where the
subject matter property has been sold to a subsequent
purchaser: (i) that whether the plaintiff remained always
ready and willing to perform his part of the contract to
purchase the suit property and the readiness and
willingness should exist till the date of the passing of the
decree, and (ii) that whether subsequent transferee was
having prior knowledge of the earlier agreement executed
in favour of the plaintiff. Both these factors need to have
nexus with the facts of each case and conduct of
parties……….
47.2. This Court analysed the expressions ‘wilful
abstention from inquiry or search’, ‘notice’ and ‘good faith’ and
concluded that to claim protection under Section 19(b), the
purchaser must show three things: (a) purchase for value, (b)
payment in good faith, and (c) absence of notice of the earlier
contract. ‘Notice’, it has been emphasized, includes not merely
actual knowledge but also constructive and imputed
knowledge.
12
2004 SCC Online MP 9
45
48. However, it is evident that Section 19(b) of the
Specific Relief Act operates at a stage prior to institution of a
suit or proceeding.
49. We have already analysed Section 52 of the
Transfer of Property Act and the interpretation given thereto
by this Court. In our view, the interpretation and
understanding of clause (b) of Section 19 has to align with the
interpretation given to Section 52 of the Transfer of Property
Act as any other interpretation would lead to an incongruous
and anomalous situation which should be avoided.
50. As pointed out above, Section 19(b) of the Specific
Relief Act would be available to a party to a contract who
suffers a subsequent transfer of property. However, the
moment a suit or proceeding is instituted by a party to the
contract whereafter there is transfer of the suit property,
Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act would have to give way
to Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act in which event the
doctrine of lis pendens would come into force.
51. We may now refer to Section 47 CPC which deals
with questions to be determined by the court executing
decree. As per sub-section (1), all questions arising between
46
the parties to the suit in which the decree was passed or
their representatives and relating to the execution,
discharge or satisfaction of the decree shall be determined
by the court executing the decree and not by a separate suit.
Sub-section (3) clarifies that where a question arises as to
whether any person is a representative of a party to the suit
or not, such question shall be determined by the Executing
Court. While according to Explanation I, a plaintiff and a
defendant are parties to the suit, Explanation II(a) makes it
clear that for the purposes of Section 47, a purchaser of
property at a sale in execution of a decree shall be deemed
to be a party to the suit in which the decree is passed and
clause (b) of Explanation II says that all questions relating
to delivery of possession of such property to such purchaser
or his representative shall be deemed to be questions
relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the
decree within the meaning of Section 47.
51.1. Thus, Section 47 CPC provides that all questions
which arise between the parties to the original suit in which
the decree was passed or their representatives and which
relate to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the
47
decree shall be determined by the Executing Court. There is
a bar to filing of a separate suit in matters relating to the
questions covered by Section 47.
52. Order XXI CPC deals with execution of decrees
and orders.
53. Rule 97 of Order XXI CPC deals with resistance
or obstruction to possession of immovable property. Rule 97
reads thus:
97. Resistance or obstruction to possession of
immovable property.— (1) Where the holder of a decree
for the possession of immovable property or the
purchaser of any such property sold in execution of a
decree is resisted or obstructed by any person in
obtaining possession of the property, he may make an
application to the court complaining of such resistance
or obstruction.
(2) Where any application is made under sub-rule (1),
the court shall proceed to adjudicate upon the
application in accordance with the provisions herein
contained.
53.1. Thus, what Rule 97 contemplates is a situation
where the decree holder for possession of immovable
property is resisted or obstructed by any person in obtaining
possession of the suit property. In such a case, the decree
48
holder may make an application to the Executing Court
complaining of such resistance or obstruction. Sub-rule (2)
makes it very clear that when such an application is made,
the Executing Court shall proceed to adjudicate upon the
application in accordance with the provisions contained in
Rule 97 of Order XXI.
54. Then comes Rule 98 which deals with orders
after adjudication. Rule 98 is as under:
98. Orders after adjudication. —(1) Upon the
determination of the questions referred to in rule 101,
the court shall, in accordance with such determination
and subject to the provisions of sub-rule (2),—
(a) make an order allowing the application and
directing that the applicant be put into the
possession of the property or dismissing the
application; or
(b) pass such other order as, in the circumstances
of the case, it may deem fit.
(2) Where, upon such determination, the court is
satisfied that the resistance or obstruction was
occasioned without any just cause by the judgment -
debtor or by some other person at his instigation or on
his behalf, or by any transferee, where such transfer was
made during the pendency of the sui t or execution
proceeding, it shall direct that the applicant be put into
possession of the property, and where the applicant is
49
still resisted or obstructed in obtaining possession, the
court may also, at the instance of the applicant, order
the judgment-debtor, or any person acting at his
instigation or on his behalf, to be detained in the civil
prison for a term which may extend to thirty days.
54.1. Sub-rule (1) of Rule 98 says that upon hearing
such an application, the Executing Court may make an
order allowing the application or dismissing the application.
In the event the application is allowed, a consequential
direction should follow putting the applicant into possession
of the suit property. Sub-rule (2) specifically deals with the
resistance or obstruction put forth by any person to
obtaining possession of the suit property, including in a
situation where the transfer was made during the pendency
of the suit or execution proceeding. It says that where upon
adjudication, the Executing Court is satisfied that the
resistance or obstruction was occasioned without any just
cause by the judgment debtor or by some other person at
his instigation or on his behalf or by a transferee where the
transfer was made during pendency of the suit or execution
proceeding, the Executing Court shall direct that the
applicant be put into possession of the suit property. If the
50
resistance continues further, the Executing Court has the
mandate to order such person including the judgment
debtor to be detained in civil prison for a term which may
extend to thirty days.
54.2. There is a Bombay amendment to Rule 98(2) vide the
Maharashtra Government Gazette notification dated 15.09.1983
which has come into effect from 01.10.1983. As per this
amendment, in addition to civil imprisonment, the Executing
Court also has the mandate to order the persons whom it holds
responsible for putting such resistance or obstruction to pay
jointly or severally in addition to costs, reasonable
compensation to the decree holder or the purchaser, as the case
may be, for the delay and expenses caused to him in obtaining
possession.
55. This brings us to Rule 101 of Order XXI which
says that all questions including questions relating to right,
title or interest in the property arising between the parties
to a proceeding on an application under Rule 97 (or under
Rule 99) or their representatives, and relevant to the
adjudication to the application, shall be determined by the
51
Executing Court dealing with an application under Rule 97
(or under Rule 99) and not by a separate suit.
55.1. There is a Bombay amendment to Rule 101 vide
the Maharashtra Gazette dated 15.09.1983 w.e.f.
01.10.1983 whereby a proviso has been inserted. The
proviso deals with a situation where the Executing Court is
not competent to decide such a question due to want of
pecuniary jurisdiction. Since such an issue does not arise
for consideration in this case, we are of the view that it may
not be necessary to further dilate on the Bombay
amendment to Rule 101.
56. Though Rule 102 says that Rules 98 and 100 are
not applicable to a transferee pendente lite, the same has
been omitted by the aforesaid Bombay amendment vide the
Maharashtra Gazette dated 15.09.1983 w.e.f. 01.10.1983.
However, as per this amendment, in Rule 100, a proviso has
been added. Rule 100 as applicable to the State of
Maharashtra is extracted as under:
100. Order to be passed upon application
complaining of dispossession. –
52
Upon the determination of the questions referred to in
rule 101, the court shall, in accordance with such
determination,-
(a) make an order allowing the application and
directing that the applicant be put into the
possession of the property or dismissing the
application; or
(b) pass such other order as, in the circumstances
of the case, it may deem fit.
Where it is determined that the application is
made by person to whom the judgment -debtor has
transferred the property after the institution of the suit
in which the decree was passed, the court shall dismiss
the application under sub-rule (a) above.
57. Rule 103 makes it clear that where any
application has been adjudicated upon under Rule 98 or
under Rule 100, the order made thereon shall have the same
force and be subject to the same conditions as to an appeal
or otherwise as if it were a decree.
58. Thus Rules 97 to 103 of Order XXI CPC provides
the procedural framework when a decree holder seeks
possession of immovable property and is resisted or
obstructed by any person in obtaining such possession. It is
53
not necessary to repeat what we have already analysed
supra.
59. In Silverline Forum Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Rajiv Trust
13, a
sub-tenant, who was not a party to a decree for eviction,
resisted execution of the decree and the court ordered an
inquiry under Section 151 CPC. The High Court upheld that
order and that was challenged in appeal before this Court.
While disagreeing with the view taken by the High Court that
resistance or obstruction made by a third party to the decree
for execution cannot be gone into under Order XXI Rule 97
CPC, this Court observed as under:
9. ……..Rules 97 to 106 in Order 21 of the Code
are subsumed under the caption “Resistance to
delivery of possession to decree-holder or purchaser”.
Those rules are intended to deal with every sort of
resistance or obstructions offered by any person. Rule
97 specifically provides that when the holder of a
decree for possession of immovable property is
resisted or obstructed by “any person” in obtaining
possession of the property such decree-holder has to
make an application complaining of the resistance or
obstruction. Sub-rule (2) makes it incumbent on the
13
(1998) 3 SCC 723
54
court to proceed to adjudicate upon such complaint in
accordance with the procedure laid down.
10. It is true that Rule 99 of Order 21 is not
available to any person until he is dispossessed of
immovable property by the decree-holder. Rule 101
stipulates that all questions “arising between the
parties to a proceeding on an application under Rule
97 or Rule 99” shall be determined by the executing
court, if such questions are “relevant to the
adjudication of the application”. A third party to the
decree who offers resistance would thus fall within the
ambit of Rule 101 if an adjudication is warranted as a
consequence of the resistance or obstruction made by
him to the execution of the decree. No doubt if the
resistance was made by a transferee pendente lite of
the judgment-debtor, the scope of the adjudication
would be shrunk to the limited question whether he is
such a transferee and on a finding in the affirmative
regarding that point the execution court has to hold
that he has no right to resist in view of the clear
language contained in Rule 102. Exclusion of such a
transferee from raising further contentions is based on
the salutary principle adumbrated in Section 52 of the
Transfer of Property Act.
11. When a decree-holder complains of resistance
to the execution of a decree it is incumbent on the
execution court to adjudicate upon it. But while
making adjudication, the court is obliged to determine
only such question as may be arising between the
parties to a proceeding on such complaint and that
55
such questions must be relevant to the adjudication of
the complaint.
12. The words “all questions arising between the
parties to a proceeding on an application under Rule
97” would envelop only such questions as would
legally arise for determination between those parties.
In other words, the court is not obliged to determine a
question merely because the resister raised it. The
questions which the executing court is obliged to
determine under Rule 101, must possess two
adjuncts. First is that such questions should have
legally arisen between the parties, and the second is,
such questions must be relevant for consideration and
determination between the parties, e.g., if the
obstructor admits that he is a transferee pendente lite
it is not necessary to determine a question raised by
him that he was unaware of the litigation when he
purchased the property. Similarly, a third party, who
questions the validity of a transfer made by a decree-
holder to an assignee, cannot claim that the question
regarding its validity should be decided during
execution proceedings. Hence, it is necessary that the
questions raised by the resister or the obstructor must
legally arise between him and the decree-holder. In the
adjudication process envisaged in Order 21 Rule 97(2)
of the Code, the execution court can decide whether
the question raised by a resister or obstructor legally
arises between the parties. An answer to the said
question also would be the result of the adjudication
contemplated in the sub-section.
56
13. In the above context we may refer to Order 21
Rule 35(1) which reads thus:
“35. (1) Where a decree is for the delivery
of any immovable property, possession
thereof shall be delivered to the party to whom
it has been adjudged, or to such person as he
may appoint to receive delivery on his behalf,
and, if necessary, by removing any person
bound by the decree who refuses to vacate the
property.”
59.1. This Court held that it is clear that the executing
court can decide whether the resister or obstructor is a
person bound by the decree and whether he refuses to vacate
the property. It has been held thus:
14. It is clear that the executing court can decide
whether the resister or obstructor is a person bound
by the decree and he refuses to vacate the property.
That question also squarely falls within the
adjudicatory process contemplated in Order 21 Rule
97(2) of the Code. The adjudication mentioned therein
need not necessarily involve a detailed enquiry or
collection of evidence. The court can make the
adjudication on admitted facts or even on the
averments made by the resister. Of course the court
can direct the parties to adduce evidence for such
determination if the court deems it necessary.
57
60. NSS Narayana Sarma Vs. Goldstone Exports (P)
Ltd.
14, also makes an analysis of Order XXI Rules 97 to 101
CPC. In this case, the contest was between two sets of
transferees of the subject property, including the appellants.
The objections filed by the appellants under Order XXI Rule
99 read with Rule 101 CPC having been dismissed by the
High Court as non-maintainable, the appellants were before
this Court assailing the judgment of the High Court. In that
context, this Court examined the aforesaid provisions in the
following manner:
15. Provision is made in the Civil Procedure Code
for delivery of possession of immovable property in
execution of a decree and matters relating thereto. In
Order 21 Rule 35 provisions are made empowering the
executing court to deliver possession of the property
to the decree-holder if necessary, by removing any
person bound by the decree who refuses to vacate the
property. In Rule 36 provision is made for delivery of
formal or symbolical possession of the property in
occupancy of a tenant or other person entitled to
occupy the same and not bound by the decree to
relinquish such occupancy. Rules 97 to 101 of Order
21 contain the provisions enabling the executing court
to deal with a situation when a decree-holder entitled
14
(2002) 1 SCC 662
58
to possession of the property encounters obstruction
from “any person”. From the provisions in these Rules
which have been quoted earlier the scheme is clear
that the legislature has vested wide powers in the
executing court to deal with “all issues” relating to
such matters. It is a general impression prevailing
amongst the litigant public that difficulties of a litigant
are by no means over on his getting a decree for
immovable property in his favour. Indeed, his
difficulties in real and practical sense, arise after
getting the decree. Presumably, to tackle such a
situation and to allay the apprehension in the minds
of litigant public that it takes years and years for the
decree-holder to enjoy fruits of the decree, the
legislature made drastic amendments in provisions in
the aforementioned Rules, particularly, the provision
in Rule 101 in which it is categorically declared that
all questions including questions relating to right, title
or interest in the property arising between the parties
to a proceeding on an application under Rule 97 or
Rule 99 or their representatives, and relevant to the
adjudication of the application shall be determined by
the court dealing with the application and not by a
separate suit and for this purpose, the court shall,
notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in
any other law for the time being in force, be deemed to
have jurisdiction to decide such questions. On a fair
reading of the Rule it is manifest that the legislature
has enacted the provision with a view to remove, as far
as possible, technical objections to an application filed
59
by the aggrieved party whether he is the decree-holder
or any other person in possession of the immovable
property under execution and has vested the power in
the executing court to deal with all questions arising
in the matter irrespective of whether the court
otherwise has jurisdiction to entertain a dispute of the
nature. This clear statutory mandate and the object
and purpose of the provisions should not be lost sight
of by the courts seized of an execution proceeding. The
court cannot shirk its responsibility by skirting the
relevant issues arising in the case.
60.1. After adverting to Silverline and other decided
cases, this Court concluded as under:
19. From the principles laid down in the decisions
noted above, the position is manifest that when any
person claiming title to the property in his possession
obstructs the attempt by the decree -holder to
dispossess him from the said property the executing
court is competent to consider all questions raised by
the persons offering obstruction against execution of
the decree and pass appropriate order which under
the provisions of Order 21 Rule 103 is to be treated as
a decree……...
61. The next case on this issue is Usha Sinha Vs.
Dina Ram
15. After agreeing with the proposition of law laid
down in Silverline, this Court held as under:
15
(2008) 7 SCC 144
60
25. We are in respectful agreement with the
proposition of law laid down by this Court in Silverline
Forum. In our opinion, the doctrine is based on the
principle that the person purchasing property from the
judgment-debtor during the pendency of the suit
has no independent right to property to resist, obstruct
or object execution of a decree. Resistance at the instance
of transferee of a judgment-debtor during the pendency of the
proceedings cannot be said to be resistance or obstruction by a
person in his own right and, therefore, is not entitled to get his
claim adjudicated.
26. For invoking Rule 102, it is enough for the
decree-holder to show that the person resisting the
possession or offering obstruction is claiming his title
to the property after the institution of the suit in which
decree was passed and sought to be executed against
the judgment-debtor. If the said condition is fulfilled,
the case falls within the mischief of Rule 102 and such
applicant cannot place reliance either on Rule 98 or
Rule 100 of Order 21.
62. Having noticed the broad legal framework, we
may now revert back to the facts of this case which as we
have adverted supra are not disputed. Nonetheless, for
proper application of the legal principles we may briefly
summarize the admitted factual position.
61
63. Respondent No. 1 (plaintiff) had entered into an
agreement for sale of the subject property with the defendant
(judgment debtor) on 26.04.1973. Since the defendant failed
to perform his part of the contract, respondent No. 1 as the
plaintiff instituted Regular Civil Suit No. 910 of 1986 on
28.04.1986. Thereafter, on 02.05.1986, respondent No. 1
(plaintiff) registered lis pendens.
63.1. During the pendency of the suit, from 07.05.1987
to 31.08.1987, respondent No. 2 (judgment debtor) by eight
sale deeds transferred the right, title and interest of various
parcels of the suit property to different persons from whom
the present appellants further purchased portions of the suit
property. In the year 1989, one of the transferee pendente
lite constructed a bungalow over a part of the suit property.
63.2. The trial court vide the judgment and order
dated 30.11.1990 decreed the suit in favour of respondent
No. 1 (plaintiff).
64. Within a period of one year from the date of the
said judgment and decree, respondent No. 1 filed execution
petition being Regular Darkhast No. 205 of 1991 against
respondent No. 2 (judgment debtor) on 03.07.1991.
62
64.1. On 25.03.1993, on orders of the Executing Court,
the Court Commissioner executed the sale deed in favour of
respondent No. 1 (judgment debtor), thus transferring title over
the suit property to respondent No. 1 (decree holder).
64.2. Though respondent No. 2 (judgment debtor)
attempted to belatedly challenge the judgment and decree
dated 30.11.1990, the same was unsuccessful. Further, his
challenge to execution of sale deed by the Court Commissioner was
also rejected by all the courts. As a result, the said judgment and
decree dated 30.11.1990 and execution of the sale deed by the Court
Commissioner in favour of respondent No. 1 (decree holder) on
25.03.1993 attained finality.
64.3. Again, though respondent No. 2 (judgment
debtor) had resisted the execution petition of respondent No.
1 (plaintiff), the same was dismissed by the Executing Court
vide the order dated 18.07.2013. Though this order dated
18.07.2013 was challenged by respondent No. 2 in civil
revision, the High Court did not entertain such revision
application.
64.4. In the execution proceedings i.e. in Regular Darkhast No.
205 of 1991, on completion of various procedural steps, the
63
Executing Court passed order on 09.02.2018 issuing
possession warrant for 18.01.2019.
64.5. Appellants as obstructionists resisted execution
on 18.01.2019 and raised objections before the Executing
Court on 18.01.2019 itself. Opposing such objections,
respondent No. 1 (decree holder) filed applications on
11.02.2019 for removal of obstruction. By order dated
29.02.2020, the Executing Court allowed the application of
respondent No. 1 (decree holder) and rejected the objection of the
obstructionists. Executing Court directed the obstructionists i.e. the
appellants to vacate the premises within one month from the date of
the said order.
64.6. This order dated 29.02.2020 of the Executing
Court was assailed by the appellants in appeal. However, the
appellate court vide the judgment and order dated 12.04.2022
dismissed the appeals.
64.7. In the meanwhile, respondent No. 2 (judgment
debtor) filed an application before the Executing Court for
dismissal of Regular Darkhast No. 205 of 1991 which was
however dismissed vide the order dated 01.03.2021. Though
64
there was a further challenge before the High Court by way
of revision application, the same was also dismissed.
64.8. Against the appellate judgment and order dated
12.04.2022, the related second appeals were filed by the
appellants which came to be dismissed by the High Court
vide the impugned judgment and order dated 19.12.2024.
65. In the aforesaid factual background, it is clear
as day light that the rights of the appellants who are
subsequent purchasers are subservient to the rights of the
decree holder. After the judgment and decree of the trial court
and following execution of the sale deed by the Court
Commissioner, a valid title qua the suit property passed on to
respondent No. 1 (decree holder). Admittedly in the present case,
the transfer of the suit property is pendente lite. Therefore, the
doctrine of lis pendens as encapsulated in Section 52 of the
Transfer of Property Act is squarely applicable. All the courts
have recorded a clear finding of fact that the appellants were
fully aware of the pendency of the suit. However, even that
is not necessary. As has been held by this Court in Silverline,
the scope of adjudication is limited to the only question as
to whether the objector who has resisted execution is a
65
transferee pendente lite or not and if the finding is in the
affirmative, then such a transferee has no right to resist. In
so far the present case is concerned, the rights of the
appellants have been duly adjudicated under Order XXI
Rules 97 to 102 CPC to the complete satisfaction of the
Executing Court. That being the position, there is no merit
at all in the case projected by the appellants and the
Executing Court rightly passed the order dated 29.02.2020.
66. Reliance placed by Mr. Navare on Thomson Press
is totally misplaced. There is no dispute to the proposition
that transfer pendente lite is neither illegal nor void ab initio.
But it remains subservient to the decree that may be passed
by the court. Now that the decree and conveyance in favour
of respondent No. 1 have attained finality, the transferee
pendente lite i.e. the appellants have to give way and hand
over actual physical possession of the suit property to
respondent No. 1.
67. Mr. Navare, learned senior counsel for the appellants
also placed heavy reliance on the decision of this Court in Lala
Durga Prasad. According to us, given the facts of this case, Lala
Durga Prasad will have no application at all. High Court has
66
noted in paragraph 26 of the impugned judgment the factual
position in Lala Durga Prasad which is clearly
distinguishable from the facts of the present case.
Thereafter, High Court held as under:
27. Thus, it is clear that in the said case the issue
involved is not a transaction pendente lite but the
transaction is a subsequent transaction after the
execution of agreement dated 7th February 1942
executed with the Plaintiff. However; the subsequent
transaction executed on 4
th April 1942 in favour of the
Appellants in that case, has been executed prior to
filing of the Suit and therefore the original vendor as
well as the subsequent purchaser have been made
parties to the Suit. Thus, the issue involved in the case
of Lala Durga Prasad (supra) is totally different. In that
case, the vendor executed agreement with the Plaintiff
on 7th February 1942. Thereafter, with subsequent
purchaser a transaction was executed on 4th April
1942 and the property has been sold.
67.1. High Court referred to paragraphs 40 and 41 of
Lala Durga Prasad and held that in the factual context of
that case, Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act was not
attracted. Relevant portion of the finding of the High Court
is extracted as under:
28. Thus, it is clear that the factual position in said
Lala Durga Prasad (supra) and Paragraph 40 and 41
67
in said Lala Durga Prasad (supra), clearly shows that
in the said decision Section 52 of the TP Act and the
parameters concerning the same are not under
consideration and in fact in those cases Section 52 is
not even applicable. In the said decision, admittedly
the sale in favour of subsequent purchaser by the
Defendant/Vendor is before filing of the Suit by the
Plaintiff. Thus, the said decision of Lala Durga Prasad
(supra) has no application to the facts of the present
case.
67.2. Concluding the analysis, the High Court held
that if the subsequent transferee acquires right, title and
interest with respect to the subject property before filing of
the suit, the law laid down in Lala Durga Prasad would be
applicable. In paragraph 41 of the impugned judgment, the
High Court noted that since in the present case, the
transfers are pendente lite, such transactions are covered by
Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act and hence the law
laid down in Lala Durga Prasad would have no application.
68. We are in complete agreement with the views
expressed by the High Court. Lala Durga Prasad was a case
which arose out of a vendee’s suit for specific performance
of a contract of sale dated 07.02.1942. The only question
68
which this Court was called upon to decide except for certain
subsidiary matters was whether the agreement dated
07.02.1942 was a concluded one or not. Appellant’s case
was that the plaintiff’s so-called agreement of 07.02.1942
was not a concluded one as t he parties never reached
finality. In the facts of that case, this Court held that there
was a completed contract on 07.02.1942 which the plaintiff
was entitled to have specifically performed. It was in that
context, this Court considered the question viz., the proper
form of decree in such cases. At this stage, it may be
mentioned that the vendor in this case was the first
defendant who had migrated to Pakistan following partition
and his property was taken over by the Custodian, Uttar
Pradesh. After noticing that the practice of the courts in
India till that point of time was not uniform, this Court
opined that in such cases the proper form of decree would
be to direct specific performance of the contract between the
vendor and the plaintiff and direct the subsequent
transferee to join in the conveyance so as to pass on the title
which resides in him to the plaintiff. He does not join in any
special covenants made between the plaintiff and his vendor;
69
all he does is to pass on his title to the plaintiff. Therefore, it
is quite evident that the fact situation in Lala Durga Prasad
is distinguishable from the present case and in any view of
the matter, Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act was
not at all an issue therein. As such, this judgment can be of
no assistance to the appellants.
69. Towards the end of the hearing, Mr. Navare,
tried to introduce the question of limitation by contending
that respondent No. 1 (decree holder) had slept over his
rights. Despite being fully aware of transfer of the suit land
and construction of permanent structure thereon, he moved
for possession warrant only in the year 2018; rather, he filed
application in 2019 seeking removal of obstruction. In this
regard, learned senior counsel has placed reliance on
Articles 129 and 134 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (‘the
Limitation Act’ hereinafter).
70. I am afraid, such a submission has no merit at
all and has to be recorded only to be rejected. The point of
limitation was nowhere pleaded by the appellants including
before the High Court. In fact, no such substantial question
of law was framed by the High Court. All throughout the
70
proceedings, it was the case of the appellants that they being
subsequent purchasers, they ought to have been brought on
record while executing the sale deed and also during
execution proceeding. As already noted above, appellants
being transferee pendente lite, the doctrine of lis pendens
applies with full force to them. That apart, respondent No. 1
(decree holder) had sought for execution within a period of
one year from the date of the judgment and decree of the
trial court.
71. Article 129 of the Limitation Act prescribes a
period of limitation of 30 days for filing an application for
possession after removing resistance or obstruction to
delivery of possession of immovable property decreed or sold
in execution of a decree. This period of 30 days is to be
counted from the date of resistance or obstruction. Likewise,
under Article 134, the period of limitation for delivery of
possession by a purchaser of immovable property at a sale
in execution of a decree is one year which limitation period
would begin to run from the date when the sale becomes
absolute. Obviously, Article 134 is not attracted in the
present case. Respondent No. 1 got the title over the suit
71
land transferred to him by way of a sale deed executed by
the Court Commissioner since respondent No. 2 failed to
comply with the judgment and decree of the trial court. In
so far Article 129 is concerned, the present appellants raised
objections to the execution of the decree concerning handing
over of possession on 18.01.2019. Respondent No. 1 filed
the application for removal of obstruction on 11.02.2019,
which is well within the period of 30 days.
72. Thus on a thorough consideration of all aspects
of the matter, we do not find any error or infirmity in the
view taken by the High Court. There is no merit in the two
appeals which are liable to be dismissed.
73. Appellants are directed to hand over actual
physical possession of the suit property to respondent No. 1
(decree holder) on or before 15.02.2026.
74. We were seriously pondering whether to conclude the
judgment here or to proceed further for issuing certain directions,
considering the peculiar facts of this case, which in the very
nature of things would be under Article 142 of the
Constitution. The related suit was instituted by respondent
No. 1 in the year 1986 for specific performance of contract
72
dated 26.04.1973. The decree is dated 30.11.1990 .
Execution proceedings were initiated on 03.07.1991. Court
Commissioner executed sale deed on 25.03.1993 . Since
then it has been more than 3 decades but respondent No. 1
is yet to enjoy the fruits of his litigation success as actual
physical possession of the suit property has still not been
handed over to him, despite adjudication of the objection of
the appellants as obstructionists to the complete
satisfaction of the Executing Court. In the process, he has
suffered multiple rounds of litigation either at the hands of
the judgment debtor or at the instance of the appellants. In
order to ensure that respondent No. 1 (decree holder) does
not have to undergo the ordeal of further frivolous litigation
thus prolonging his hardship, we deem it appropriate to
issue certain direction(s). Accordingly, we direct that no
further application(s) or petition(s) either by the appellants
or by the judgment debtor i.e. respondent No. 2 or by any
other person claiming right qua the suit property through
them shall be entertained by any court. We consider such a
direction to be necessary to ensure that respondent No. 1 is
73
not subjected to any further harassment which will meet the
ends of justice.
75. Consequently, both the appeals are
dismissed in the aforesaid terms. No cost.
……………………………J.
[MANOJ MISRA]
……………………………J.
[UJJAL BHUYAN]
NEW DELHI;
JANUARY 12, 2026.
In a landmark ruling, the Supreme Court recently delivered a crucial judgment in the case of ALKA SHRIRANG CHAVAN & ANR. vs. HEMCHANDRA RAJARAM BHONSALE & ORS., shedding light on the intricate application of the [Main Keyword 1] and the procedural nuances of property execution. This decision, now available on CaseOn, serves as a vital precedent for understanding the rights of subsequent purchasers during ongoing litigation. The Court meticulously examined the doctrine of *lis pendens* and the finality of judicial decrees, particularly in cases involving protracted execution proceedings. Through this analysis, we delve into how the Court upheld the rights of a decree-holder against obstructionists claiming title through transfers made during the pendency of the suit, directly impacting the landscape of [Main Keyword 2].
The Supreme Court was tasked with resolving several critical questions arising from the appellants' challenge to the High Court's dismissal of their second appeals. Specifically, the Court considered:
The Supreme Court's decision primarily rested upon a careful interpretation and application of several key legal provisions:
Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (TPA) – The Doctrine of Lis Pendens: This section stipulates that during the pendency of any non-collusive suit or proceeding involving immovable property, the property cannot be transferred or dealt with by any party to affect the rights of other parties under any decree or order made therein. The Explanation clarifies that pendency commences from the plaint's presentation and continues until final decree or order, satisfaction, or expiration of limitation for execution. The Maharashtra Amendment to Section 52 further requires registration of the notice of pendency, aiming to prevent undue hardship to bona fide third-party purchasers, though its absence doesn't necessarily invalidate the doctrine.
Section 19 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963: This section outlines against whom specific performance of a contract can be enforced. Clause (b) allows enforcement against any person claiming title subsequently to the contract, with an exception for a transferee who paid value in good faith and without notice of the original contract.
Order XXI, Rules 35, 97, 98, 101, 102, 103 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC): These rules govern the execution of decrees, particularly concerning resistance or obstruction to possession of immovable property. Rule 97 allows a decree holder to complain of obstruction. Rule 98 details orders after adjudication, specifically mentioning transferees *pendente lite*. Rule 101 mandates that all questions related to right, title, or interest arising between parties in obstruction proceedings shall be determined by the Executing Court, not by a separate suit. The Bombay Amendments to Rules 98(2) and 101 introduce provisions for compensation and clarify jurisdiction in certain pecuniary situations.
Articles 129 and 134 of the Limitation Act, 1963: Article 129 prescribes a 30-day limitation for an application for possession after removing resistance or obstruction, counted from the date of resistance. Article 134 sets a one-year limitation for delivery of possession by a purchaser of immovable property at a sale in execution of a decree, starting when the sale becomes absolute.
The case originated from an agreement for sale of property in 1973. The plaintiff (Respondent No. 1) filed Regular Civil Suit No. 910 of 1986 on 28.04.1986, and crucially, registered *lis pendens* on 02.05.1986. During the suit's pendency (1987-1987), the defendant (judgment debtor) transferred parts of the suit property via eight sale deeds. The present appellants are subsequent purchasers from these transferees *pendente lite*. In 1990, the trial court decreed specific performance in favor of Respondent No. 1. An execution petition was filed in 1991. In 1993, a Court Commissioner executed the sale deed in favor of Respondent No. 1. The judgment debtor's attempts to challenge the decree and the Commissioner's sale deed were unsuccessful and attained finality.
Years later, in 2018, Respondent No. 1 sought a possession warrant. When bailiffs attempted to take possession in 2019, the appellants (obstructionists) resisted, claiming ownership and residence in a constructed house. They filed objections under Order XXI Rule 236. Respondent No. 1 responded with applications for removal of obstruction under Order XXI Rule 97 CPC. The Executing Court, in 2020, allowed the decree holder's applications and rejected the obstructionists' claims, directing them to vacate. This order was upheld by the appellate court in 2022 and subsequently by the High Court in 2024, leading to the current appeals before the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court meticulously reviewed the lower courts' findings, emphasizing that the appellants' rights as subsequent purchasers were subservient to those of the decree holder. The Court highlighted that the transfer of the suit property occurred *pendente lite*, making the doctrine of *lis pendens* under Section 52 of the TPA squarely applicable. It reiterated that transferees *pendente lite* are bound by the decree, irrespective of their knowledge of the pending suit, a principle established in cases like Celir LLP and Sanjay Verma. The Maharashtra Amendment, requiring registration of *lis pendens*, aims to prevent unwarranted hardship but does not negate the doctrine if registration is absent. In this case, *lis pendens* was registered, leaving no ambiguity.
The Court dismissed the appellants' argument that they should have been joined to the sale deed or execution proceedings. It affirmed that once the decree and conveyance in favor of the decree holder attained finality, the transferees *pendente lite* had no right to resist possession. The scope of adjudication in obstruction proceedings under Order XXI Rules 97-102 CPC is limited to determining if the objector is a transferee *pendente lite*, and if so, they have no right to resist.
Notably, the Court distinguished the appellants' reliance on Lala Durga Prasad Vs. Lala Deep Chand, clarifying that the factual context of that case involved a transaction *prior* to the suit's filing, making Section 52 TPA inapplicable there. In contrast, the present case unequivocally involved *pendente lite* transfers.
Regarding the limitation argument, the Court observed that this point was not pleaded before the High Court and no substantial question of law was framed on it. Furthermore, it found that the decree holder sought execution within one year of the trial court's judgment. The application for removal of obstruction, filed in 2019, was well within the 30-day period prescribed by Article 129 of the Limitation Act, counted from the date of obstruction in 2019. Article 134 was deemed inapplicable as it pertains to possession by a purchaser at a sale in execution, whereas the decree holder had already received title via the Court Commissioner's sale deed.
For legal professionals and students looking to quickly grasp the nuances of such complex property disputes and the Supreme Court's stance on *lis pendens*, CaseOn.in offers invaluable 2-minute audio briefs that summarize these specific rulings, making legal research more efficient and accessible.
The Supreme Court ultimately found no error or infirmity in the High Court's decision. It dismissed both civil appeals, directing the appellants to hand over actual physical possession of the suit property to Respondent No. 1 (decree holder) on or before February 15, 2026. The Court also invoked its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution, issuing a stern direction that no further applications or petitions by the appellants, the judgment debtor (Respondent No. 2), or any other person claiming rights through them over the suit property shall be entertained by any court. This was deemed necessary to prevent further harassment and ensure that the decree holder finally enjoys the fruits of litigation after more than three decades.
This Supreme Court judgment is an essential read for lawyers, law students, and anyone involved in property transactions, especially those concerning ongoing litigation. It provides crucial clarity on the:
This ruling strongly deters dilatory tactics and reinforces the principle that judicial decrees must be honored and executed effectively, providing much-needed certainty in property disputes.
Disclaimer: All information provided in this blog post is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. Readers are advised to consult with a qualified legal professional for any specific legal concerns or decisions. The content is based on the analysis of the Supreme Court judgment as published and should not be relied upon as a substitute for professional legal counsel.
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