REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 3758 – 3796 /2023

[ARISING OUT OF SLP(C) NOS.28258-28296/2018]

Jini Dhanrajgir & Anr. … Appellants

Versus

Shibu Mathew & Anr. Etc. …Respondents

WITH

CONTEMPT PETITION(C) NO.2091/2018

IN

SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) NO.24344/2014

Jini Dhanraj Curi & Anr. …Petitioners

Versus

Thomas Mathew (Dead) @ Thampykunju & Anr. ..Respondents

J U D G M E N T

DIPANKAR DATTA, J.

Leave granted.

2. More than a century and a half back, the Privy Council (speaking

through the Right Hon. Sir James Colville) in The General Manager

of The Raj Durbhunga, Under the Court of Wards vs.

1

Maharajah Coomar Ramaput Singh

1

lamented that the

difficulties of litigants in India indeed begin when they have

obtained a decree. A reference to the above observation is also

found in the decision of the Oudh Judicial Commissioner's Court in

Kuer Jang Bahadur vs. Bank of Upper India Ltd. Lucknow

2

. It

was ruled there that the Courts had to be careful to ensure that the

process of the Court and the laws of procedure were not abused by

judgment-debtors in such a way as to make the courts of law

instrumental in defrauding creditors, who had obtained decrees in

accordance with their rights.

3. Notwithstanding the enormous lapse of time, we are left awestruck

at the observation of the Privy Council which seems to have proved

prophetic. The observation still holds true in present times and this

case is no different from cases of decree-holders’ woes commencing

while they are in pursuit of enforcing valid and binding decrees

passed by civil courts of competent jurisdiction. The situation is

indeed disquieting, viewed from the perspective of the decree-

holders, but the law, as it stands, has to be given effect whether the

court likes the result or not. In Martin Burn Ltd. vs. Corporation

of Calcutta

3

, this Court held that a court has no power to ignore

that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from

its operation.

1 (1871-72) 14 Moo IA 605

2 AIR 1925 Oudh 448

3 AIR 1966 SC 529

2

4. The challenge in these civil appeals by the Appellants herein,

daughter and son of Mrs. Tara Cherian (“Mrs. Cherian”, hereafter), is

to the common interim order of the Principal Sub-Judge, Kottayam,

(“the Executing Court”, hereafter) dated 29

th

June, 2018. The

Executing Court was seized of an execution application under

Section 47 read with Order XXI Rule 97 of the Civil Procedure Code,

1908 (“CPC”, hereafter) filed by the Appellants, seeking

enforcement of the decree dated 21

st

October, 2000 (“Decree”,

hereafter) and removal of resistance put forth by the contesting

respondents herein (“Respondents”, hereafter). By the impugned

order, the Executing Court held several objections filed by the

Respondents to be maintainable and deemed it necessary to

adjudicate the same on their own merits, after due recording of

evidence.

5. Having regard to the nature and extent of controversy raised, a

decision on these appeals should not have necessitated noting the

facts triggering the appeals and the rival contentions advanced

across the bar in any great depth; however, since the parties have

addressed us at length, we propose to briefly narrate the essential

facts and refer to the rival claims as advanced by learned senior

counsel for the parties before recording our conclusions on such

claims.

3

6. The basic facts arising from the two sets of proceedings, which we

would presently advert to, are intertwined; hence, it is considered

appropriate to dissect the same for facility of appreciation.

7. The first part of the factual matrix is that:

a.Mrs. Cherian, as the original plaintiff, instituted OS No.

28/1987 (“the Suit”, hereafter) inter alia against Mr. V.T.

Mathew [defendant no.1], his sons [defendant no. 2, Mr.

Thomas Mathew (“Mr. Thomas”, hereafter) and defendant no.

3, Mr. Abraham Mathew (“Mr. Abraham”, hereafter), and Mr.

Mathew’s assistant defendant no. 4, Mr. K.T. Joseph (“the

Defendants”, wherever referred to collectively, hereafter) for

declaration of title of Mrs. Cherian in respect of land

measuring in excess of 2.81 acres in Village Nattakom,

Kottayam, Taluk, Kottayam District, Kerala (“Suit Property”,

hereafter), and recovery of possession with mesne profits from

the Defendants.

b.Mrs. Cherian contended that Mr. Mathew, the caretaker of the

Suit Property, had intended to purchase the same from her

deceased husband, that the sale had not been completed as

balance consideration was still to be paid, and that in the

interim the Defendants had made constructions on the Suit

Property. The Defendants contended that they were tenants in

respect of the Suit Property through an oral lease agreement

with Mrs. Cherian’s deceased husband and his brothers and

were entitled to fixity of tenure under the provisions of the

4

Kerala Land Reform Act, 1963 (for brevity “KLR Act”,

hereafter).

c.In course of trial of the Suit, the question of tenancy was

referred by the trial court to the Land Tribunal under Section

125(3) of the KLR Act. In R.C. No. 84/1988, the Land Tribunal

found that Mr. Mathew was a cultivating tenant entitled to

protection under the KLR Act. Based on the observation of the

Land Tribunal, the Suit was dismissed by the trial court on 16

th

November 1989. Challenging the dismissal of the Suit, Mrs.

Cherian filed A.S. No. 27/1991 before the High Court.

d.Mr. Mathew passed away on 18

th

January 1998, and the

proceedings before the High Court continued with his sons Mr.

Thomas and Mr. Abraham contesting the appeal.

e.The High Court, allowed A.S. No. 27/1991 on 18

th

December

1998, and opined that the Defendants were not entitled to

fixity of tenure. The Suit was remanded to the trial court for

adjudication on other issues.

f.A Division Bench of the High Court while hearing CMA No.

34/1999, being an appeal against the aforementioned order of

the Single Judge, dismissed the same on 13

th

December 1999,

and confirmed that Mr. Mathew had only been the caretaker of

the Suit Property.

g.Upon remand, the Suit was decreed on 21

st

October 2000, in

favour of Mrs. Cherian and the Defendants were directed to

put Mrs. Cherian in possession of the Suit Property.

5

h.Mr. Thomas and Mr. Abraham filed A.S. No. 219/2001 before

the High Court. It was partly allowed on 11

th

February 2014,

inter alia, to the extent that the Decree was modified whereby

Mrs. Cherian was required to deposit Rs. 25,99,250 as

compensation in lieu of part-payment of the purchase

consideration paid by Mr. Mathew, after which the Defendants

would surrender vacant possession of the decretal property to

her.

i.The order dated 11

th

February 2014 was carried before this

Court by Mr. Thomas and Mr. Abraham in S.L.P. (C) No.

24344/2014. On 13

th

October 2014, this Court while disposing

of the said petition marginally enhanced the compensation to

Rs. 30,00,000.00. The Appellants were directed to deposit the

balance compensation, whereafter the Defendants were

required to handover possession of the decretal property to

the Appellants; the Decree was otherwise kept undisturbed.

8. This being one part of the factual matrix, we proceed to notice the

other part. It begins with proceedings under the KLR Act, being S.M.

Nos. 107/1992 and 55-56/1989 before the Land Tribunal. On 23

rd

January 1993, the Land Tribunal issued a Purchase Certificate to Mr.

Mathew in S.M. No. 107/1992, whereby Mr. Mathew was conferred

the status of a cultivating tenant. Pertinently, Mrs. Cherian was put

on notice but did not ultimately contest the proceedings. After

obtaining the Purchase Certificate, parcels of the decretal property

6

were sold by Mr. Mathew to some of the Respondents. Certain other

Respondents were also issued Purchase Certificates in S.M. No.

55/1989 and S.M. No. 56/1989 qua parcels of the decretal property

during the period intervening between institution of the Suit and

much before the same was decreed on 21

st

October 2000.

9. The following subsequent events are of further importance to the

instant case:

a.The Executing Court on 27

th

May 2017, in E.P. No. 379/2012,

accepted the Appellants’ prayers for delivery of the decretal

property, appointed an Advocate Commissioner, and issued

directions to deliver possession of the decretal property within

10 days of the order, with the help of the relevant Sub-

Inspector of Police.

b.The Commissioner, on 23

rd

June 2017, submitted a report to

the effect that the Respondents objected to the delivery of

possession to the Appellants.

c.Subsequently, certain Respondents as objectors filed multiple

objections in the main execution proceedings objecting to the

execution of the Decree and refusing to give possession to the

Appellants. They inter alia contended that they were not

aware of the proceedings in the Suit and became aware of the

same only when the Commissioner attempted to take delivery

of possession as per the order of the Executing Court on 27

th

May 2017.

d.The Appellants then filed a petition before the High Court

under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. On 5

th

April

7

2018, a Single Judge of the High Court directed the Executing

Court to consider the Appellants’ contentions on the

objections filed by the Respondents and decide the same on

or before 30

th

June 2018.

e.Upon a contested hearing, the Principal Sub-Judge, Kottayam,

being the Executing Court, passed the present impugned

interim order on 29

th

June 2018.

10.Mr. Diwan, learned senior counsel for the Appellants contended that:

a.The pleadings in S.L.P. (C) No. 24344/2014, filed by Mr.

Thomas and Mr. Abraham, made no disclosure of anyone else

being in possession of the decretal property. Further, the

conduct of the Respondents was in wilful disobedience of the

Decree passed by the trial court and its affirmation up to and

by this Court. The Respondents had no rights in the decretal

property and hence no locus standi in the matter to resist the

Decree which was made two decades back.

b.The contentions of the Respondents are based on Purchase

Certificate being SM No. 197/1992, obtained by Mr. Mathew

from the Land Tribunal, Kottayam. However, the Respondents

held no title to the said properties as the person from whom

the title flowed, i.e., Mr. Mathew himself had no title to the

decretal property.

c.The persons alleging to have purchased different plots in the

decretal property from Mr. Mathew did not produce documents

of title along with their objection petitions in the Executing

Court.

8

d.The objections are frivolous and not maintainable and in the

light of the order of this Court dated 13

th

October 2014, in SLP

(C) No. 24344/2014, which had given finality to these

proceedings, the conduct of the Respondents has the effect of

nullifying such order.

e.The Appellants had already deposited Rs. 30,00,000 with the

trial court in compliance with this Court’s directions on 13

th

October 2014, and that the Respondents were enjoying the

decretal property without delivering possession to the

Appellants.

f.As per Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, the

aforesaid transfers are hit by lis pendens, and were

impermissible; also, in view of Rule 102 of Order XXI of the

CPC, Rules 98 and 100 thereof would not be attracted and the

Executing Court misdirected itself in holding the objections of

the Respondents to be maintainable.

11.Mr. Diwan cited the following decisions of this Court in support of his

contentions:

a.Usha Sinha vs. Dina Ram

4

, where this Court, inter alia, held

that a pendente lite purchaser had no right to offer resistance

or cause obstruction as the purchaser’s rights had not been

crystallised in a decree.

b.Board of Trustees vs. Nikhil Gupta

5

, where this Court

issued directions to the obstructionists to handover possession

4 (2008) 7 SCC 144

5 (2015) 10 SCC 1339

9

to the petitioner therein in a case where a decree of eviction

was obtained after three decades of litigation.

c.Sriram Housing Finance and Investments India Ltd. vs.

Omesh Mishra Memorial Charitable Trust

6

, where this

Court expounded that Order XXI Rule 97 empowers a decree-

holder to make an application complaining about any

resistance or obstruction in possession of immovable property

and that Rule 102 also clarified that Rules 98 and 100 would

not apply in cases where resistance or obstruction in

execution was offered by a transferee pendente lite, where

the property was transferred by a judgment debtor to such a

person after the institution of a suit in which the decree

sought to be executed was passed.

d.Firm Ganpat Ram Rajkumar vs. Kalu Ram and Ors

7

,

where this Court held that non-compliance of the orders of the

Supreme Court, with an objective to mislead the Court, should

not lead to frustration of the order.

12.Mr. Diwan, accordingly, appealed that justice of the case demands

setting aside of the impugned order and a direction on the

Executing Court to put the Appellants in possession of the decretal

property after removing the obstructions raised by the Respondents.

13.Per contra, Mr. Chitambaresh, learned senior counsel appearing for

the Respondents contended that:

a.Mr. Mathew was a tenant of the entire decretal property and

on a part thereof he along with Mr. Thomas and Mr. Abraham

6 (2022) SCC OnLine SC 794

7 (1989) Supp 2 SCC 418

10

Mathew had constructed buildings. In S.M. No. 107/1992

before the Land Tribunal, Mrs. Cherian was a party, yet, she

did not challenge the Purchase Certificate after it was issued

in favour of Mr. Mathew. Further, two other Purchase

Certificates had been issued by the Land Tribunal to certain

Respondents in the proceedings being SM Nos. 55 and

56/1989.

b.In terms of the decision of this Court in Cheeranthoodika

Ahmmedkutty & Anr. vs. Parambur Mariakutty Umma &

Ors

8

, where it was held that in the absence of any material to

doubt the veracity of the Purchase Certificates due weight

should have been given to them as per law, it was submitted

that the Purchase Certificate issued in suo motu proceedings

under Section 72K of the KLR Act in favour of inter alia Mr.

Mathew was conclusive proof of his title, and since the same

has remained unchallenged, would operate as res judicata.

c.The Respondents as objectors had set up title, independent of

the judgment-debtors, and that their objection deserved to be

adjudicated by the Executing Court.

d.That apart, the Executing Court had only held the objectors’

applications to be maintainable; in such circumstances, this

Court ought not to interfere when adjudication on merits was

yet to be made.

e.Brahmdeo Chaudhary vs. Rishikesh Prasad Jaiswal

9

, is

an authority for the proposition that a claim filed pursuant to

Section 47 read with Order XXI Rule 97 CPC is maintainable

8 (2000) 2 SCC 417

9 (1997) 3 SCC 694

11

despite the right being independent of that of the judgment-

debtor.

f.The decision in T Vijendradas & Anr. vs. M. Subramanian

& Ors

10

has held that if any judgment or order was obtained

by fraud, then the same is a nullity; and since the judgment in

A.S. No. 27/1991 was obtained without impleading all the legal

representatives of Mr. Mathew, for this reason, the

proceedings are vitiated by fraud and a nullity due to

suppressio veri.

g.In ITI Ltd. v. Siemens Public Communications Network

Ltd

11

, this Court had noted that despite the vast powers it had

to directly entertain an appeal, litigants should not be

encouraged to bypass other available remedies in the

potential hope of a more efficacious remedy.

h.The Appellants’ conduct in directly approaching this Court

under Article 136 of the Constitution of India without invoking

the revisional or appellate jurisdiction of the appropriate forum

is open to criticism based on the decision in Columbia

Sportswear Company v. Director of Income Tax,

Bangalore

12

, where this Court opined that the scope of

discretion under Article 136 of the Constitution of India while

granting special leave was such that only a substantial

question of general importance or one already pending before

this Court should be entertained, especially when remedies

10 (2007) 8 SCC 751

11 (2002) 5 SCC 510

12 (2012) 11 SCC 224

12

under Article 226 and/or 227 were available on the same

grounds before the High Court.

i.The question of application of lis pendens doctrine does not

arise on facts and in the circumstances of the present case

since the sale transactions were effected when no lis was

pending.

14.Resting on the aforesaid contentions, Mr. Chitambaresh urged that

no case for interference has been set up by the Appellants and that

the Executing Court ought to be left free to decide the objections on

merits.

15.The only issue that we are tasked to decide at this stage is, whether

interference with the common order under appeal is called for or

not.

16.In our considered view, for more reason than one, relief claimed by

the Appellants ought to be declined.

17.Section 47 of the CPC, being one of the most important provisions

relating to execution of decrees, mandates that the court executing

the decree shall determine all questions arising between the parties

to the suit or their representatives in relation to the execution,

discharge, or satisfaction of the decree and that such questions may

not be adjudicated in a separate suit. What is intended by conferring

exclusive jurisdiction on the executing court is to prevent needless

and unnecessary litigation and to achieve speedy disposal of the

questions arising for discussion in relation to the execution,

13

discharge or satisfaction of the decree. Should there be any

resistance offered or obstruction raised impeding due execution of a

decree made by a court of competent jurisdiction, the provisions of

Rules 97, 101 and 98 of Order XXI enable the executing court to

adjudicate the inter se claims of the decree-holder and the third

parties in the execution proceedings themselves to avoid

prolongation of litigation by driving the parties to institute

independent suits. No wonder, the provisions contained in Rules 97

to 106 of Order XXI of the CPC under the sub-heading “Resistance to

delivery of possession to decree-holder or purchaser” have been

held by this Court to be a complete code in itself in Brahmdeo

Chaudhary (supra) as well as in a decision of recent origin in Asgar

vs. Mohan Verma

13

. In the latter decision, it has been noted that

Rules 97 to 103 of Order XXI provide the sole remedy both to parties

to a suit as well as to a stranger to the decree put to execution.

18.In Bhanwar Lal vs. Satyanarain

14

, this Court held that when any

person, whether claiming derivative title from the judgment-debtor

or sets up his own right, title or interest de hors the judgment

debtor, the executing court whilst executing the decree, in addition

to the power under Rule 35(3), is empowered to conduct an enquiry

whether the obstruction by that person is legal or not.

13 (2020) 16 SCC 230

14 (1995) 1 SCC 6

14

19.This Court in Noorduddin v. Dr. K.L. Anand

15

reiterated that the

executing court was bound to adjudicate the claim of an

obstructionist and to record a finding allowing or rejecting the claim

which was laid before the executing court, the person being neither

a party to the earlier proceedings nor the decree being passed

against him.

20.Yet again, in Babulal v. Raj Kumar & Ors.

16

, this Court after

setting aside the order impugned held that a determination is

required to be conducted under Order XXI Rule 98 before removal of

the obstruction caused by the objector and a finding is required to

be recorded in that regard. It was also held that the executing court

was required to determine the question relating to when the

appellants had objected to the execution of the decree as against

those appellants who were not parties to the decree for specific

performance.

21.The decision in Brahmdeo Chaudhary (supra) cited by Mr.

Chitambaresh, is also to the same effect.

22.Considering the scheme of Order XXI Rules 97 to 106, this Court in

Silverline Forum Pvt. Ltd. v. Rajiv Trust & Anr.

17

found it

difficult to agree with the High Court that resistance or obstruction

made by a third party to the decree put to execution cannot be gone

into under Order XXI Rule 97. Referring to Rules 97 to 106, this

15 (1995) 1 SCC 242

16 (1996) 3 SCC 154

17 (1998) 3 SCC 723

15

Court further held that they were intended to deal with every sort of

resistance or obstruction raised by any person and that Rule 97(2)

made it incumbent on the court to adjudicate upon such complaint

in accordance with the procedure laid down. This Court also

proceeded to observe:

"It is clear that executing court can decide whether

the resistor or obstructer is a person bound by the

decree and he refuses to vacate the property. That

question also squarely falls within the adjudicatory

process contemplated in Order 21, Rule 97(2) of

the Code. The adjudication. mentioned therein

need not necessarily involve a detailed enquiry or

collection of evidence. Court can make the

adjudication on admitted facts or even on the

averments made by the resistor. Of course, the

Court can direct the parties to adduce evidence for

such determination if the Court deems it

necessary".

23.The long line of precedents notwithstanding, it is indeed true that in

terms of the ordainment of Rule 102 of Order XXI, Rules 98 and 100

thereof would not apply to resistance or obstruction in execution of

a decree for the possession of immovable property by a person to

whom the judgment-debtor has transferred the property after the

institution of the suit in which the decree was passed.

24.The thrust of Mr. Divan’s argument has been that the Respondents

are pendente lite transferees, the doctrine of lis pendens applies,

and in view of the clear terms of Rule 102, the objections were not

maintainable; therefore, the Respondents are not entitled to the

protection of having an adjudication of their claims in terms of

Rule 98.

16

25.The argument, though attractive at first blush, pales into

insignificance in view of the peculiar facts obtaining here. From the

factual narrative, it appears that the Suit instituted by Mrs. Cherian

in 1987 was initially dismissed on 16

th

November 1989 and upon an

appeal being preferred in 1991, the Suit was restored to the file of

the trial court by the order of the High Court dated 18

th

December

1998. If, indeed, there have been transfers post dismissal of the Suit

during the time when there was no pending lis, it would be most

appropriate for the Executing Court to determine the question as to

whether any of the transfers made by Mr. Mathew to the

Respondents would attract Rule 102. This would indeed involve an

exercise of leading of evidence by the parties and merely because

the Suit was ultimately decreed on 21

st

October 2000 and ultimately

was upheld by this Court with a minor modification of the amount of

compensation, that would not be sufficient justification to throw out

the objections raised by the Respondents as being devoid of merit.

26.That apart, the effect of the Purchase Certificate obtained by

Mr. Mathew in proceedings before the Land Tribunal where Mrs.

Cherian was noticed on the transfers made in favour of the

Respondents, would also have to be examined by the Executing

Court. Notably, it is the contention of the Respondents that the said

Purchase Certificate was issued in terms of the KLR Act and not only

the same went unchallenged at the instance of Mrs. Cherian, she did

not make any disclosure thereof at any stage of the civil

proceedings.

17

27.The impugned order of the Executing Court bearing in mind the

unchallenged order dated 5

th

April 2018 passed by the High Court

has found the objections to be maintainable, at least warranting an

enquiry. On facts, this Court finds no legal infirmity in such order

deserving interference.

28.Now, it is time to consider the effect of the order of this Court dated

13

th

October 2014, whereby the special leave petition of Mr. Thomas

and Mr. Abraham was disposed of enhancing the compensation by a

marginal amount. Simply because this Court did not interfere with

the first appellate decree dated 11

th

February 2014 is no ground to

hold that such order would bar an enquiry of the nature

contemplated by Rule 101. This Court would not allow its vision to

be colored by treating the order dated 13

th

October 2014 as bringing

an end to the controversies between the decree-holders and the

strangers/third parties, who were not before it. While it cannot be

gainsaid that the dignity, prestige and majesty of this Court has to

be maintained, yet, merely because the issue between the

Appellants on the one hand and Mr. Thomas and Mr. Abraham on the

other has attained finality, the same would not afford any

justification for this Court, much less sufficient justification, to

uphold the contention of the Appellants which has the effect of

subverting, rather than effectuating, the substantive right that Rules

97 to 103 of Order XXI confer on strangers/third parties not bound

18

by the decree for recovery of possession. The claim regarding right,

title and interest in respect of their respective shares in the decretal

property, as raised by the Respondents, cannot be thrown out at the

threshold since it is well within their rights to contest the application

under Order XXI Rule 97, CPC filed by the Appellants. Since evidence

is required to be led before it, the Executing Court was well-nigh

justified in holding the objections to be maintainable at this stage

not in the sense that the decree cannot be executed against them

but in the sense that a prima facie case had been set up for an

enquiry to be conducted, and posting the matter for evidence to be

led by the parties. We are sure that upon determination of the

questions referred to in Rule 101, the Executing Court would

proceed in the manner mandated by Rule 98.

29.Further, Mr. Chitambaresh is right when he submits that this Court

should not entertain the aforesaid appeals against the order of the

Executing Court without such order having been subjected to any

challenge by the Appellants before the High Court. In the decision

cited by Mr. Chitambaresh, viz., ITI Ltd. (supra), it was observed

that litigants should not be indulged to hop, skip and jump to reach

the Supreme Court for no better reason than the remedy is quick

and more efficacious. As a matter of practice, the Supreme Court in

its discretion does entertain special leave petitions directly from

orders of tribunals/courts without the High Court having been

approached only in matters where substantial questions of general

19

importance are involved or where a similar issue is pending for its

(the Supreme Court’s) consideration. The decision in Columbia

Sportswear Company (supra) is to that effect. However, these are

cases which are few and far between. The power to grant leave

under Article 136 itself being discretionary, this Court would not

allow a party invoking the ‘special leave’ jurisdiction to bypass the

remedy available at the level of the High Court without the two

situations, as aforesaid, being satisfied. Indeed, this is not one such

case.

30.For the foregoing reasons, we find no reason to interfere with the

order under challenge. It is upheld and the appeals stand dismissed,

without any order for costs.

31.It is made clear that the Executing Court shall proceed to deal with

the application of the Appellants under Rule 97 of Order XXI of the

CPC together with the objections raised by the Respondents on their

own merits and without being influenced by any observation made

in this order which has been necessitated only for disposal of the

present appeals.

32.Having regard to the fact that the Appellants have been deprived of

the fruits of the Decree dated 21

st

October 2000 for over two

decades, it would only be just and proper to request the Executing

Court to proceed to decide the contentious issues in accordance

with law as early as possible without granting unnecessary

20

adjournments to any of the parties. It would, thus, be eminently

desirable if the proceedings are completed within 18 months of

receipt of a copy of this judgment and order.

33.In view of the aforesaid order, Contempt Petition (C) No. 2091/2018

initiated by the Appellants to punish Mr. Thomas and Mr. Abraham

for willful disobedience of the order dated 13

th

October, 2014 passed

by this Court in Special Leave Petition (C) No. 24344/2014, at this

stage, does not survive; hence, the same stands dismissed.

…………………………J.

[A.S. BOPANNA]

..………………………J.

[DIPANKAR DATTA]

NEW DELHI;

16

th

MAY, 2023.

21