IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA

CONSTITUTIONAL WRIT JURISDICTION

APPELLATE SIDE

Present:

The Hon’ble Justice Rai Chattopadhyay

WPA 591 of 2019

Amalaksha Jana & Ors.

Vs.

State of West Bengal & Ors.

For the Petitioner : Mr. Samim Ahammed

: Mr. Arka Maiti

: Ms. Ambiya Khatun

For the respondent PSC : Ms. Shraboni Sarkar

For the UGC : Mr. Anil Kumar Gupta

Judgment on : 13.10.2026

Uploaded on : 13.10.2026

RaiChattopadhyay, J. :-

(1) In the present writ petition, the petitioner challenges the appointment

of the Principal in Government College of Art and Craft (hereinafter

referred to as “GCAC”). The petitioner has prayed for the writ of quo

warranto quashing the entire selection process, including the

recommendations by the Public Service Commission as well

appointment of Respondent no. 10/Principal. The petitioner has also

prayed for necessary direction for de novo selection to be to be made

with eligible candidates by constituting a separate interview board.

Page 2 of 38

(2) The Public Service Commission vide Advertisement No. 16/2015

sought application for the post of Principal of GCAC. The said

advertisement is said to be in consonance with the Recruitment Rules

vide Notification No. 1175-Edn(A)/10M-129/11 dated 10.10.2014,

framed by the State. The eligibility criteria as mentioned in the said

advertisement is shown hereinbelow:

“QUALIFICATIONS:

(a) Must have a Master’s Degree with at least 55% marks (or an equivalent

grade in a point scale wherever grading system is followed) by a

recognized University

Provided that a relaxation of 5% marks may be provided at the

Master’s level for the candidates belonging to the Scheduled

Castes/Scheduled Tribes/Differently abled (Physically and visually

differently abled) categories for the purpose of eligibility and for assessing

good academic record during recruitment.

Provided further that in respect of candidate who has obtained

Master’s degree prior to 19

th

September, 1991, the said relaxation of 5%

marks is admissible from 50% marks instead of 55% marks as stated

above.

(b) Must have a Ph.D. degree in concerned/allied/relevant discipline(s) in the

institution concerned with evidence of published work and research

guidance.

(c) Must be an Associate Professor/Professor with a total experience of

15(fifteen) years of teaching/research/administration in

Universities/Colleges and other institutions of Higher Education.

(d) Must have a minimum score as stipulated in the Academic Performance

Indicator (API) based Performance Based Appraisal System (PBAS) as set

out in the University Grants Commission (Minimum Qualifications for

Appointment of Teachers and other Academic Staff in Universities and

Colleges and other Measures for the Maintenance of Standards in Higher

Education) Regulations, 2010 and

(e) Must have good power of expression in Bengali or Nepali

Page 3 of 38

OR

A traditional/professional artist of great eminence with highly commendable

professional achievement in the concerned subject, who

(i) Must have 12 (twelve) years of outstanding performing achievements

in the field of specialization

(ii) Must have made significant contributions in the field of specializations

and has the ability to guide research in the subject;

(iii) Must have participated in National/International

Seminars/Conferences/Workshops and/or recipient of

National/International Awards/Fellowships;

(iv) Must have ability to explain the logical reasoning of the subject

concerned and adequate knowledge to teach theory with illustrations;

and

(v) Must have good power of expression in Bengali or Nepali”

(3) The University Grants Commission (Minimum Qualifications for

Appointment of Teachers and other Academic Staff in Universities

and Colleges and other Measures for the Maintenance of Standards in

Higher Education) Regulations, 2010 do not provide for appointment

to the post in question on the basis of being a traditional or

professional artist of eminence with commendable professional

achievement in the concerned subject. The advertisement, however,

introduced such eligibility criteria independently of the said

Regulations. Consequently, the selection process under the

advertisement was based on standards not specifically contemplated

under the UGC Regulations, 2010.

(4) Upon submission of applications, a list of 14 (fourteen) names had

been published who were called to interview for recruitment to the

post of Principal, GCAC, on August 17, 2016. The candidates whose

Page 4 of 38

names were against serial nos. 11 to 14 had an asterisk mark beside

their names. The name of Respondent no. 10 appeared against serial

no. 11 and contained an asterisk mark. The list is produced

hereinbelow:

Interview for recruitment to the post of Principal for the Government

College of Art and Craft in the West Bengal Senior Education Service

under the Higher Education Department, Govt. of West Bengal vide

Commission’s advt. no. 16(1)/2015

S.L.

No.

Name User ID Time Date

1 BENOD MUKHERJEE HOW0019126

11:00

A.M.

17.8.2016

2 SAROJ KUMAR

SARKAR

OTH0005917

3 PAULA SENGUPTA KOL0025706

4 PARTHA DASGUPTA KOL0025689

5 SUMITABHA PAL NTP0065327

6 PRAMATHES

CHANDRA

KOL0025700

7 AKHIL CHANDRA

DAS

KOL0025687

1:30

P.M.

8 SUMAN KUMAR

PAL

NTP0065328

9 ABHIBRATA

CHAKRABARTY

KOL0025745

10 SWAPAN KUMAR

JANA

HOW0019147

11 CHHATRAPATI

DUTTA*

KOL0025679

12 JAYANTA

CHAUDHURI*

KOL0025694

13 MOHAN SHYAM

BHASKAR*

MUR0024305

14 RAJESH BHOWMIK* OTH0005960

Page 5 of 38

*You have been called to interview provisionally subject to furnishing

of satisfactory documents in support of experience in the field of

specialisation as per the advertised criteria within 11

th

August, 2016

failing which your candidature for the said post are liable to be

cancelled

(5) Subsequently, a fresh list of twelve candidates was published for

interview for the post of Principal, GCAC, scheduled on November 13,

2016, whereas the earlier list had contained fourteen candidates. No

reasons were stated for cancellation of the earlier interview or for the

reduction in the number of candidates. It was also not disclosed

whether Respondent No. 10 had submitted the requisite statutory

documents establishing the prescribed experience in the relevant field

by August 11, 2016. Unlike the earlier list, the subsequent interview

list contained no asterisk against any candidate’s name.

(6) Thereafter, Chhatrapati Dutta, the Respondent no. 10 had been said

to be selected by the Selection Committee constituted by the Public

Service Commission, West Bengal. A notification dated April 24,

2017, declared that the Respondent no. 10 had been provisionally

appointed as the Principal of GCAC, against an unreserved

permanent post for two years.

(7) Petitioner submitted that the impugned appointment of the Principal

of GCAC has been done ignoring necessary criteria. PSC did not take

into account the guidelines and due process, thereby affecting the

entire selection process. According to the writ petitioner, the

appointing authority has, inter alia, failed and neglected to consider

the following:

Page 6 of 38

(a) The Selection Committee by the PSC was not

constituted as per regulations for selection of

candidates for West Bengal Senior Education Service;

(b) Verification was not properly done, since the same

was not referred to an expert in the relevant field;

(c) Respondent no. 10 does not possess any Ph.D.

degree in concerned/allied/relevant discipline(s) in

the institution concerned with evidence of published

work and Research Guidance, which is necessary for

being appointed to such post;

(d) Respondent no. 10 does not possess 15 (fifteen)

completed years of continuous service as an

Associate Professor or professor in teaching,

research, administration of universities, colleges and

other institutions of Higher Education;

(e) Respondent no. 10 has failed to satisfy the minimum

score as stipulated in the academic performance

indicator based Performance Appraisal System as

laid down by the University Grants Commission for

determining the minimum qualification for

appointment of teachers in universities and colleges;

(f) Alternatively, Respondent no. 10 does not possess

any illustrious achievement either in the field of Fine

Arts or in the field of guiding research in t he

concerned subject. He cannot claim himself as an

eminent professional artist who has made

Page 7 of 38

outstanding contributions in the relevant field of

specialisation;

(g) The antecedents and credentials of the Respondent

no. 10 should have been verified prior to

provisionally appointing him;

(h) The essential requirements as contained in the

University Grants Commission (Minimum

Qualifications for Appointment of Teachers and other

Academic Staff in Universities and Colleges and other

Measures for the Maintenance of Standards in Higher

Education) Regulations, 2010, have not been

complied with by the respondent authorities.

(8) The petitioners have learnt that Respondent no. 10/ Principal has

been accused of acts involving moral turpitude. He had joined the

Rabindra Bharati University on 30.03.1995 as lecturer under the

Faculty of Visual Arts and had been dismissed from service from

30.11.2006 as per the recommendation of the Executive Council of

the Rabindra Bharati University. The information being obtained from

the Public Information Officer of the Rabindra Bharati University

under the provisions of the Right to Information Act, 2005 has been

quoted hereinbelow:

“Sub: Information sought under the Right to Information Act, 2005

*** *** *** *** *** ***

i. Mr. Chhatrapati Dutta, who had joined Rabindra Bharati University

on 30.03.1995, as Lecturer under the Faculty of Visual Arts did not

Page 8 of 38

resign, but was terminated (dismissal of service) w.e.f 30.11.2006 as

per recommendation of the Executive Council.

*** *** *** *** *** ***

iii. Mr. Chhatrapati Dutta, without due permission of the competent

authority of Rabindra Bharati University compelled a student of 1

st

year under Visual Arts Faculty, to perform certain activities which was

indecent, obscene, unethical, immoral and illegal.

Such activities were not permissible as per the syllabus of Visual

Arts of Rabindra Bharati University. Thus a fact finding committee

against Mr. Dutta was held due to such “gross misconduct”.”

The petitioners maintain that the dismissal order and the adverse report

against the Respondent no. 10 have neither been set aside not has any

challenge been mounted upon the same by the Respondent no. 10.

In this respect, let the relevant provision of UGC Regulations on Minimum

Qualifications for Appointment of Teachers and other Academic Staff in

Universities and Colleges and Measures for the Maintenance of Standards in

Higher Education, 2010 be also quoted hereinbelow for benefit of

discussion: -

“5.1.6 College Principal

(a) The Selection Committee for the post of College Principal shall

have the following composition:

1. Chairperson of the Governing Body as Chairperson.

2. Two members of the Governing Body of the college to be

nominated by the Chairperson of whom one shall be an expert in

academic administration.

Page 9 of 38

3. One nominee of the Vice Chancellor who shall be a Higher

Education expert. In case of Colleges notified/declared as

minority educational institutions, one nominee of the

Chairperson of the College from out of a panel of five names,

preferably from minority communities, recommended by the

Vice-Chancellor of the affiliating university of whom one should

be a subject expert.

4. Three experts consisting of the Principal of a college, a

Professor and an accomplished educationalist not below the rank

of a Professor (to be nominated by the Governing Body of the

college) out of a panel of six experts approved by the relevant

statutory body of the university concerned.

5. An academician representing

SC/ST/OBC/Minority/Women/Differently-abled categories, if any

of candidates representing these categories is the applicant, to

be nominated by the Vice Chancellor, if any of the above

members of the selection committee do not belong to that

category.

(b) At least five members, including two experts, should

constitute the quorum.

(c) All the selection procedures of the selection committee shall

be completed on the day of the selection committee meeting

itself, wherein, minutes are recorded along with the scoring

proforma and recommendation made on the basis of merit with

the list of selected and waitlisted candidates/Panel of names in

order of merit, duly signed by all members of the selection

committee.

(d) The term of appointment of the college principal shall be FIVE

years with eligibility for reappointment for one more term only

after a similar selection committee process.”

(9) The respondent no. 6/PSC submitted that the matter under challenge

in a recruitment process in the civil post under the State and as such

Page 10 of 38

the remedy of the petitioner at the first instance lies before the West

Bengal Administrative Tribunal pursuant to section 15 and 16 of the

Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985.

(10) Furthermore, petitioners retain no locus standi to challenge the

recruitment process as they were not a candidate in the said selection

process and in no way affected the selection for the post of Principal

for GCAC. To that effect, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed.

(11) Respondent no. 10/Principal raised the preliminary point of the

petitioners having no locus standi to file the writ petition. Petitioner

no. 1 is an Advocate having interest in Art and petitioner nos. 2 and 3

claimed to be alumni of GCAC.

(12) Respondent no. 10 submitted that the Selection Committee’s first

choice for principal was one Smt. Paula Sengupta. When she did not

accept the proposal after several requests were made, Respondent no.

10 was appointed in the alternate category.

(13) It is further contended that the removal of Respondent no. 10 from

the position of Assistant Professor was actually a resignation owing to

his personal reasons.

(14) Following are the judgments relied on by the petitioners:-

(i) Gambhirdan K. Gadhvi v. State of Gujarat(2022) 5 SCC 179

The High Court’s power to issue a writ of quo warranto is limited.

Such a writ may be issued where a person occupying a public office

lacks the prescribed eligibility or qualifications, or where the

appointment has been made in violation of the applicable statutory

provisions or rules.

Page 11 of 38

It was laid down that in case of conflict between UGC Regulations

and the State made recruitment rules, the former would prevail and

be binding upon all.

(ii) Mohd. Abdullah Azam Khan v. Nawab Kazim A li Khan(2022)

20 SCC 233

The Evidence Act, 1872 is fundamentally concerned with the

ascertainment of truth by providing rules for proving or disproving

facts in issue. Since judicial decisions depend upon the truthfulness

of facts asserted by the parties, the Act seeks to balance their

competing interests through the proper establishment of relevant

facts and evidence.

A judgment may be vitiated where the burden of proof is wrongly

placed. Although rules governing burden of proof are founded on

considerations of convenience, reasonableness, and policy, where a

rebuttable presumption of law operates in favour of one party, the

burden lies on the opposing party to rebut that presumption.

Where a fact is especially or exclusively within the knowledge of a

party, the burden of proving that fact lies upon that party. This

principle operates as an exception to the general rule of burden of

proof and does not apply where the fact is equally capable of being

known by others. Accordingly, where a person claims an inte ntion

different from that ordinarily inferred from the nature and

circumstances of an act, the burden rests upon that person to

establish such intention. The Evidence Act, 1872 ultimately seeks to

facilitate justice by enabling the discovery of truth.

Page 12 of 38

(iii) Maria Margarida SequeiraFernandes v. Erasmo Jack de

Sequeira(2012) 5 SCC 370

Courts are required to discharge both discretionary and mandatory

statutory functions in accordance with law while administering

justice. Their duty extends beyond merely de ciding disputes to

ensuring that justice is both done and demonstrably achieved . A

fundamental purpose of the judicial system is therefore the discovery,

vindication, and establishment of truth, which remains central to the

functioning of courts of justice.

(iv) DuryodhanSahu v. Jitendra Kumar Mishra (1998) 7 SCC 273

Tribunals constituted under the Act were regarded as effective

substitutes for the High Courts in service matters, both in law and in

practical operation, and were empowered to exercise corresponding

jurisdiction. On that basis, the High Courts’ judicial review

jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 was treated as excluded in

such matters. However, an Administrative Tribunal cannot entertain

a public interest litigation filed by a complete stranger to the dispute.

(v) Central Electricity Supply Utility of Odisha v.

DhobeiSahoo(2014) 1 SCC 161

The High Court’s jurisdiction to issue a writ of quo warranto is

limited to examining whether the holder of a public office possesses

the prescribed eligibility and whether the appointment complies with

statutory rules. The strict requirement of locus standi applicable in

service matters does not govern quo warranto proceedings, since its

object is to enable constitutional courts to prevent a person from

Page 13 of 38

unlawfully usurping or occupying a public office without legal

authority.

(15) Following are the cases relied on by the respondents:-

(i) Surinder Kumar v. S. Raghavan2010 SCC OnLine Mad 6011

A writ of quo warranto is a discretionary and technical remedy and

cannot be issued as a matter of course. Before granting such relief,

the Court must consider the relevant facts and circumstances and

must have sufficient material to reach a definite conclusion that the

person concerned has no lawful authority to continue in the public

office.

(ii) B. Srinivasa Reddy v. Karnataka Urban Water Supply &

Drainage Board Employees' Assn. 2006 SCC OnLine SC 887

The Court cannot probe the mind of the appointing authority in a

motion for quo warranto.

I. Whether the writ petition is maintainable in this Court

notwithstanding the jurisdiction of the West Bengal

Administrative Tribunal;

(16) The preliminary objection raised on behalf of respondent nos. 6 and

10 is that the dispute relates to recruitment to a civil post under the

State and, consequently, the petitioner ought to have approached the

West Bengal Administrative Tribunal in terms of Sections 15 and 16

of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. The objection, though

requiring consideration, cannot be determined merely by looking at

Page 14 of 38

the identity of the post or the fact that the impugned appointment

has been made by a State authority. The true nature of the

proceeding, the character of the relief claimed and the source of the

alleged illegality must be examined.

(17) The present proceeding is not founded upon a claim by an

unsuccessful candidate seeking appointment, comparative

preference, seniority or any other individual service benefit. The

petitioner invokes the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court for a

writ of quo warranto, questioning the legal authority of respondent

No. 10 to occupy the office of Principal of Government College of Art

and Craft. The central controversy is whether the appointment was

made in accordance with the binding qualifications and legal

requirements governing the office. The challenge, therefore, concerns

the legality of the occupation of a public office and not the

enforcement of a private service right.

(18) A writ of quo warranto is distinct in character from the ordinary

remedies available in service jurisprudence. Its object is to call upon

a person occupying a substantive public office to demonstrate the

legal authority under which that office is held. Where the

appointment is alleged to contravene mandatory statutory

requirements, the question transcends the competing interests of

individual candidates and assumes a public -law dimension. The

Court is concerned with the lawful constitution of public authority

and the enforcement of the rule of law.

(19) In the case of DuryodhanSahu (supra) as referred to by the

petitioner, the Supreme Court considered whether an Administrative

Tribunal could entertain a public interest litigation. The decision

Page 15 of 38

recognises the significance of the distinction between the jurisdiction

of a tribunal over service disputes and the constitutional jurisdiction

of a High Court to issue a writ of quo warranto at the instance of a

person who need not himself be aggrieved. The reasoning in that

decision supports the conclusion that an ordinary stranger cannot be

required to convert a public-law challenge of this character into an

individual service claim before a tribunal which does not entertain

such public interest proceedings.

(20) It is equally necessary to bear in mind that the jurisdiction of this

Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution has not been

wholly excluded by the creation of administrative tribunals. In L.

Chandra Kumar versus Union of India, (1997) 3 SCC 261, the

Supreme Court affirmed that judicial review by the High Courts

under Articles 226 and 227, and by the Supreme Court under Article

32, forms part of the basic structure of the Constitution. Although

tribunals are competent to adjudicate matters falling within their

statutory jurisdiction, their decisions remain subject to the

constitutionally preserved power of judicial review.

(21) The objection as to the availability of the Administrative Tribunal

cannot, therefore, be accepted as an absolute bar to the present

proceeding. The Court is not called upon to adjudicate a conventional

claim for appointment by an individual candidate. It is called upon to

determine whether respondent No. 10 possesses the legal

qualification and authority required to hold a public office. The relief

sought is directed against an alleged unlawful occupation of that

office, and the constitutional remedy invoked is appropriate to that

controversy. This conclusion does not imply that every dispute

concerning recruitment to a State post may bypass the Tribunal; it is

Page 16 of 38

confined to the distinctive nature of the present challenge by way of

quo warranto.

II. Maintainability of the writ petition and locus standi of the

petitioner

(22) The next objection is that the petitioners were not participants in the

selection process and, therefore, has no locus standi to question the

appointment. Respondent No. 6 relies upon the absence of any direct

injury to the petitioners, while respondent No. 10 emphasises that

the 1

st

petitioner is an Advocate having an interest in art and that the

other petitioners claim to be alumni of the institution. These

objections proceed upon a conception of standing applicable

principally to ordinary adversarial litigation. The applicable principle

in a proceeding for quo warranto is materially different.

(23) The essential requirement for the issuance of quo warranto is not

that the petitioner should establish a personal legal injury or

demonstrate that he would himself have been entitled to the office.

Any person may bring to the notice of the Constitutional Court an

alleged unlawful occupation of a public office, provided the challenge

is bona fide, raises a legally cognisable issue and is supported by

sufficient material. The petitioners act, in substance, to secure

compliance with the law governing public appointments. The absence

of a personal claim to the post does not, by itself, render the

proceeding incompetent.

(24) In DhobeiSahoo (supra), the Supreme Court has explained that quo

warranto jurisdiction is directed towards examining whether a person

holds a public office in accordance with the law prescribing eligibility

for that office. The strict requirement of personal standing ordinarily

Page 17 of 38

associated with service disputes does not govern a genuine

proceeding of this nature. The object is to prevent an individual from

continuing in a public office without the legal authority required for

its occupation. The principle is also consistent with the decision in

University of Mysore versus C.D. GovindaRao, AIR 1965 SC 491 ,

wherein the Supreme Court explained the nature and limitations of

the writ of quo warranto. The Court does not undertake a general

assessment of the relative merits of candidates, but examines

whether the appointment is contrary to law or whether the appointee

lacks a qualification prescribed by law.

(25) The present petitioner does not merely express dissatisfaction with

the choice made by the Public S ervice Commission. The petition

raises specific questions concerning the absence of the prescribed

Ph.D. qualification, the requisite experience, the stipulated academic

performance indicators and the introduction, through the State's

recruitment notification and advertisement, of an alternative route

based on professional eminence which is alleged to be inconsistent

with the UGC Regulations, 2010. These are questions of legal

eligibility and the validity of the governing recruitment criteria, rather

than questions of comparative suitability.

(26) The objection founded upon the petitioner's non-participation in the

selection process must accordingly fail. The petitioner is not seeking

to secure for himself the appointment or to substitute his assessment

of merit for that of the Selection Committee. He seeks a determination

of whether respondent No. 10 was legally eligible to be appointed at

all. The proceeding is maintainable, subject always to the petitioner

establishing the alleged legal infirmity by reference to the applicable

provisions and the material on record.

Page 18 of 38

III. The governing principles of a writ of quo warranto

(27) The jurisdiction to issue quo warranto is limited, but its limited

character does not diminish its constitutional importance. It is not an

appellate jurisdiction over the process of selection. The Court does

not sit as a Selection Committee, nor does it determine which of

several eligible candidates would have been the better choice. The

inquiry is confined to the legality of the appointment, including

whether the office is public in character, whether the appointee holds

it, and whether the appointment satisfies the qualifications and

conditions prescribed by the governing law.

(28) The writ of quo warranto is an expression signifying an inquiry into

the authority by which a person claims to occupy an office. The writ

protects the public against an unlawful usurpation of public office.

Its foundation is the principle that public power must be exercised,

and public office occupied, only in accordance with law. The doctrine

is thus an aspect of the rule of law; no appointment, however formally

made or administratively approved, can acquire immunity from

judicial scrutiny if it is demonstrably contrary to a mandatory legal

requirement.

(29) In University of Mysore (supra), the Supreme Court cautioned that

the Court must not enter into a detailed assessment of the

comparative merits of candidates. At the same time, where the

appointment is challenged on the ground that the appointee lacks a

qualification prescribed by the applicable rules, the Court is

competent to determine whether the appointment conforms to those

rules. The distinction is between an impermissible substitution of

judicial opinion for expert judgment and a permissible determination

Page 19 of 38

of legal eligibility. The principles have been reiterated in

DhobeiSahoo (supra), and more recently in Gambhirdan K. Gadhvi

(supra). The latter decision makes it clear that quo warranto may be

issued where the holder of public office does not fulfil the eligibility

criteria prescribed by law or where the appointment is contrary to the

governing statutory provisions.

(30) The respondents have relied upon Surinder Kumar (supra) , to

contend that quo warranto is a discretionary and technical remedy

which cannot issue as a matter of course. That proposition, stated at

the appropriate level of generality, is correct. The Court must have

sufficient material to reach a definite conclusion that the person

concerned lacks lawful authority to hold the office. However, the

principle does not assist an appointee where the prescribed legal

qualification is demonstrably absent. The requirement of clear proof

regulates the exercise of jurisdiction; it does not immunise an

appointment from scrutiny.

(31) Reliance has also been placed upon B. Srinivasa Reddy (supra), for

the proposition that the Court cannot probe the mind of the

appointing authority. That proposition is likewise distinguishable.

The present Court need not investigate the subjective reasoning or

motives of the Selection Committee. The inquiry concerns objective

legal conditions: the applicable qualifications, the documents

establishing them, and the validity of the criteria under which

respondent No. 10 was considered eligible. The Court may not

substitute its opinion on comparative merit, but it cannot abdicate its

responsibility to determine compliance with law.

Page 20 of 38

IV. What constitutes lawful authority to continue in a public

office

(32) Lawful authority to occupy a public office does not arise merely from

the issuance of an appointment lette r, a recommendation by a

competent commission, or the subsequent assumption of charge.

These acts establish the formal fact of appointment. The substantive

legal authority to hold the office depends upon compliance with the

law governing the appointment, including the qualifications, eligibility

conditions, prescribed procedure and other mandatory requirements

applicable at the relevant time.

(33) The doctrine of de jure authority requires that a person occupying a

public office derive that authority from a lawful source and continue

to satisfy the legal conditions governing the office. Where the

appointment is made in breach of an essential statutory qualification,

administrative approval or the passage of time cannot, by itself, cure

the defect. Nor can the fact that the appointee was recommended by a

Selection Committee displace a binding statutory norm.

(34) In Gambhirdan K. Gadhvi (supra) the Supreme Court considered a

challenge to an appointment to the office of Vice-Chancellor and held,

in substance, that an appointment cannot be sustained contrary to

the applicable UGC Regulations governing eligibility. The decision is

particularly relevant because it recognises that the question whether

an appointee possesses the qualifications prescribed by binding

regulations is a question of legality amenable to quo warranto. The

State cannot rely upon a more permissive local provision to validate

an appointment where the applicable national regulations prescribe

mandatory standards which the State provision fails to satisfy.

Page 21 of 38

(35) It follows that the inquiry in the present case must proceed in the

following order: first, to identify the legal instrument governing the

post of Principal of Government College of Art and Craft; secondly, to

determine the qualifications prescribed by that instrument read with

the applicable UGC Regulations; thirdly, to ascertain whether the

State's Notification No. 1175-Edn(A)/10M-129/11 dated October 10,

2014 and Advertisement No. 16/2015 are consistent with those

binding requirements; and, finally, to determine whether respondent

No. 10 satisfies the legally applicable criteria. Only after these

questions have been answered can the Court properly decide whether

respondent No. 10 has lawful authority to continue in the office.

V. The constitutional sche me concerning education and the

interrelationship between Central and State law

(36) The controversy cannot be resolved without considering the

constitutional distribution of legislative power concerning education.

Under the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, Entry 25 of List III,

the Concurrent List, covers education, including technical education,

medical education and universities, subject to the provisions of

Entries 63, 64, 65 and 66 of List I. Entry 66 of List I confers upon

Parliament the power to legislate with respect to the coordination and

determination of standards in institutions for higher education or

research and scientific and technical institutions.

(37) The constitutional arrangement therefore recognises both State

competence over education withi n its allocated field and the

overriding importance of nationally coordinated standards of higher

education within the Union's legislative domain. The State may

regulate the administration of its colleges, the constitution of its

Page 22 of 38

services and the recruitment process for posts within its institutions,

subject to the Constitution and applicable Parliamentary legislation

and statutory regulations. Such power, however, cannot be exercised

so as to defeat binding national standards validly prescribed within

the legislative competence of Parliament.

(38) The University Grants Commission Act, 1956, was enacted to provide

for the coordination and determination of standards in universities

and for related purposes. Section 26 empowers the UGC to make

regulations within the scope of the Act. The UGC Regulations

prescribing minimum qualifications for appointment of teachers and

other academic staff in universities and colleges are intended to

maintain standards in higher education. Where a particular

appointment falls within their field of operation, the State's

recruitment framework must be read consistently with those binding

requirements.

(39) It is necessary to distinguish the existence of a State power to frame

recruitment rules from the question whether a particular rule can

prevail in the face of an inconsistent binding national standard. The

former is not in dispute. The latter must be resolved by examining the

source, scope and binding character of the relevant UGC Regulation

and the nature of the alleged inconsistency. The State cannot claim

an unrestricted power to dilute a mandatory qualification merely

because the institution is maintained by the State or the post forms

part of a State service.

(40) Article 254 of the Constitution addresses inconsistency between

Parliamentary law and State law in a field falling within the

Concurrent List. Its application must be considered with

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care,particularly where the Central norm arises from regulations

made under a Parliamentary enactment and the subject also engages

Entry 66 of List I. It would be inaccurate to treat every inconsistency

between a State notification and a UGC Regulation as automatically

resolved by Article 254 without examining the relevant legislative and

statutory framework. The question here is whether the applicable

UGC Regulations validly prescribe a binding minimum qualification

for the post and whether the State instrument purports to permit an

appointment inconsistent with that requirement.

(41) In Gambhirdan K. Gadhvi (supra) , the Supreme Court examined

the relationship between State legislation and UGC Regulations in the

context of appointment to a senior university office. The Court held

that the appointment could not be sustained contrary to the

applicable UGC Regulations and rejected the proposition that a State

provision prescribing a diluted standard could displace the binding

national requirements. The principle is directly material to the

present dispute, subject to the necessary verification that the post

and the particular qualifications in issue fall within the applicable

regulatory framework.

(42) The result is that the State retains its authority to regulate the

selection process, constitute the appropriate selection body and

prescribe additional conditions consistent with law. It cannot,

however, treat a qualification which is mandatory under an

applicable UGC Regulation as optional, or create an alternative route

of eligibility which has the effect of dispensing with a mandatory

national qualification. A recruitment rule must be interpreted and

applied subject to the superior legal norm governing the relevant

standard of higher education.

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VI. Whether the State Notification of 2014 and Advertisement

No. 16/2015 conflict with the UGC Regulations, 2010

(43) The material placed before the Court shows that Advertisement No.

16/2015, issued by the Public Service Commission for recruitment to

the post of Principal of Government College of Art and Craft, was

framed in accordance with the State's Notification No. 1175 -

Edn(A)/10M-129/11 dated October 10, 2014. The adverti sement

prescribed, under one route, a Master's degree with the stipulated

marks, a Ph.D. in the concerned, allied or relevant discipline, fifteen

years of teaching, research or administrative experience, the

prescribed Academic Performance Indicator score, and the requisite

language ability.

(44) The advertisement, however, also prescribed an alternative route for a

traditional or professional artist of great eminence with highly

commendable professional achievements. Under that route, the

applicant was required to demonstrate twelve years of outstanding

professional achievements, significant contributions and the ability to

guide research, participation in national or international seminars or

receipt of awards or fellowships, and the ability to explain the subject

and teach its theory. The advertisement thus permitted consideration

under an alternative set of criteria which did not, on its face,

reproduce all the qualifications prescribed under the first route.

(45) The petitioner's challenge is not merely that the alternative route is

less stringent or that respondent No. 10 should not have been

preferred. It is that the State notification and advertisement

introduced a mode of eligibility which is not contemplated by the

applicable UGC Regulations, 2010 and thereby permitted the

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appointment of a Principal without compliance with mandatory

national qualifications. The distinction is fundamental. If the UGC

Regulations permit an alternative qualification for the particular post,

the State may give effect to that alternative in accordance with law. If,

however, the UGC Regulations prescribe an exhaustive and

mandatory qualification and do not permit the State to substitute a

different route, the State cannot introduce such a route by

notification or advertisement.

(46) In Gambhirdan K. Gadhvi (supra), the Supreme Court held that an

appointment to a senior academic office must conform to the

applicable UGC Regulations and cannot be sustained on the strength

of a State provision which dilutes their mandatory requirements. The

principle is that the State's authority to prescribe recruitment

conditions does not extend to derogating from a binding national

standard governing the qualification for the post.

(47) The relevant question, therefore, is not whether professional

eminence in the visual arts is valuable or whether a distinguished

artist may be capable of contributing to an institution of higher

education. Professional accomplishment and academic qualification

are not necessarily identical, and a recruitment authority may

recognise both where the governing law permits it. The question is

whether the particular alternative prescribed by the State is legally

compatible with the UGC Regulations applicable to this post.

Administrative convenience, institutional preference or the special

character of an art institution cannot, by themselves, justify

departure from a mandatory qualification.

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(48) In the present writ petition the petitioner asserts that the alternative

route of professional eminence is not contemplated by the applicable

2010 Regulations. The propriety and justification of such submission

is evident. Relevant texts are quoted above. The petitioner’s assertion

appears to be borne out by the regulatory text and the relevant

provision governing appointment to this particular post. In that case,

the State's inconsistent provision cannot be used to validate an

appointment that would otherwise be ineligible.

(49) The Court is consequently unable to accept the proposition that the

mere existence of the 2014 notification and the 2015 advertisement

concludes the matter in favour of the respondents. A subordinate

instrument cannot acquire overriding force merely because the

appointing authority has acted in accordance with it. The legality of

the instrument itself remains open to examination wher e it is

challenged as inconsistent with a binding superior norm. If the

alternative eligibility route is indeed contrary to the applicable UGC

Regulations, the relevant provision of the notification and the

corresponding part of the advertisement must yield to the superior

law and cannot sustain the appointment of respondent No. 10.

VII. Whether respondent No. 10 satisfies the qualifications

prescribed by law

(50) Having considered the legal framework governing the appointment,

the Court must now examine whether respondent No. 10 satisfies the

qualifications required for appointment to the post of Principal of

Government College of Art and Craft. The question must be

determined by reference to the applicable legal criteria and the

contemporaneous material relating to his educational qualifications,

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professional experience and other prescribed requirements. Neither

the recommendation of the Public Service Commission nor the

subsequent notification of provisional appointment can dispense with

the necessity of establishing eligibility in accordance with law.

(51) The petitioner's case is that respondent No. 10 does not possess a

Ph.D. degree in the concerned, allied or relevant discipline with

evidence of published work and research guidance; does not possess

fifteen completed years of the prescribed teaching, research or

administrative experience as contemplated by the relevant eligibility

criteria; and has not demonstrated the requisite Academic

Performance Indicator score. These are not incidental procedural

objections. If the qualifications in question are mandatory under the

applicable regulatory framework, the absence of any essential

qualification strikes at the legal foundation of the appointment itself.

(52) The Court must, however, distinguish between an allegation of

ineligibility and a finding of ineligibility. The burden initially rests

upon the petitioner to place sufficient material before the Court to

raise a legally sustainable challenge. Once a specific deficiency in an

essential qualification has been demonstrated by relevant material,

the appointing authority and the appointee cannot answer the

challenge merely by relying upon the fact of selection.

(53) In Mohd. Abdullah Azam Khan versus NawabKazim Ali Khan,

(2022) 20 SCC 233 , the Supreme Court discussed the principles

governing the burden of proof and the relevance of facts especially

within the knowledge of a party. Section 106 of the Indian Evidence

Act, 1872, as it then stood, recognised that where a fact is especially

within the knowledge of a person, the burden of proving that fact

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rests upon that person, subject to the foundational requirements of

the general law of evidence. The corresponding principle under

Section 109 of the BharatiyaSakshyaAdhiniyam, 2023, must be

applied where that enactment governs the evidentiary question. The

principle does not relieve the petitioner of establishing the

foundational facts of the challenge; it does, however, militate against

permitting an appointee to rely upon a qualification which the

relevant records fail to establish.

(54) In the present case, the question of experience assumes particular

importance. The first interview list, containing fourteen candidates,

marked respondent No. 10 as a provisional candidate whose

candidature was subject to furnishing satisfactory document s

establishing experience in the field of specialisation by August 11,

2016. A subsequent interview list contained twelve candidates and

did not carry the earlier asterisks. The material summarised in the

petition does not disclose whether respondent No. 10 furnished the

required documents within the stipulated period or how the

discrepancy between the two lists was resolved.

(55) The mere publication of a subsequent interview list without an

asterisk cannot, by itself, be treated as conclusive proof that the

requisite documents were submitted and duly verified. The relevant

inquiry is whether the prescribed experience was established by the

material required under the applicable rules and whether the

selection authority verified that material before recommending the

candidate. To that effect the respondents have failed to produce

sufficient material in this case in order to draw a result of

examination by Court, in a manner otherwise than pleaded by the

writ petitioner. Where the record fails to demonstrate compliance with

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an essential eligibility requirement, the selection cannot be sustained

merely upon an unexplained alteration in the candidate list.

(56) The respondents cannot contend that the selection process is

immune from scrutiny simply because the Public Service Commission

conducted the interview. The Commission's expertise and

institutional independence deserve due respect in matters of

comparative assessment. Nevertheless, the verification of minimum

eligibility is a legal obligation. A selection authority cannot, by

accepting a candidate's credentials without adequate verification,

convert an unfulfilled statutory condition into a fulfilled one.

(57) The petitioner further contends that respondent No. 10 cannot qualify

under the alternative category of a traditional or professional artist of

great eminence. The advertisement required, inter alia, outstanding

achievements over twelve years, significant contributions to the

specialisation, an ability to guide research, and specified professional

or academic accompli shments. The question is not whether

respondent No. 10 is an artist of ability in a general sense, but

whether he satisfies the precise conditions lawfully applicable to the

alternative category, assuming that category itself is legally

permissible.

(58) Professional eminence cannot be presumed merely from participation

in the selection process or inferred solely from the fact of

appointment. If the alternative category is available under the

governing law, the authority must establish that the candidate

satisfies its stated conditions. Conversely, if that category is

inconsistent with the binding UGC Regulations, proof of professional

eminence cannot cure the absence of an essential qualification

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required under the superior norm. The two questions must be kept

analytically distinct; the legality of the alternative route and the

factual eligibility of respondent No. 10 under that route.

(59) The Court is conscious that it cannot sit in appeal over the artistic or

academic assessment undertaken by the Selection Committe e. It

would be impermissible to substitute the Court's own evaluation of

the quality of respondent No. 10's artistic work for the judgment of a

duly constituted expert body. But that limitation does not prevent the

Court from examining whether the expert body applied the correct

legal criteria, whether the prescribed documents were obtained, and

whether the candidate possessed the minimum qualifications

necessary to be considered at all.

(60) On the basis of the material placed before the Court, the petitioner's

challenge raises a substantial question concerning the satisfaction of

the mandatory eligibility requirements. A final finding against

respondent No. 10 must rest upon the relevant qualifications and

contemporaneous recruitment records, rather than upon an inference

drawn exclusively from the absence of particulars in the petitioner's

summary of events. If, upon examination of the complete record, it is

established that respondent No. 10 did not possess the mandatory

Ph.D. qualification, the requisite experience or the prescribed API

score, and that the alternative route cannot lawfully dispense with

those requirements, his appointment cannot be sustained.

VIII. The effect of the previous dismissal of respondent No. 10

from RabindraBharati University

(61) The petitioner has also relied upon information obtained under the

Right to Information Act, 2005, indicating that respondent No. 10

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joined RabindraBharati University as a Lecturer on 30 March 1995

and that his service was terminated with effect from 30 November

2006 pursuant to a recommendation of the Executive Council. The

information further refers to a fact-finding committee constituted in

relation to alleged misconduct. Respondent No. 10, on the other

hand, has contended that his departure from the University was in

substance a resignation on personal grounds.

(62) The conflict between these assertions must be resolved by reference

to the actual service record, the relevant resolution and the operative

order governing the termination of respondent No. 10's previou s

service. An information response recording dismissal cannot simply

be disregarded in favour of an assertion of resignation; equally, the

precise legal consequences of the earlier service event cannot be

determined without examining the underlying documen ts and any

subsequent adjudication.

(63) The Court must also distinguish between the question of eligibility for

the post presently in issue and the question of past misconduct.

Unless the governing recruitment rules prescribe a relevant

disqualification arising from the earlier service event, or the material

establishes a legally sustainable ground affecting the appointment,

the mere existence of an adverse allegation cannot independently

determine the question of lawful authority. The present proceeding is

one for quo warranto, not a disciplinary inquiry into respondent No.

10's previous employment.

(64) Nevertheless, the appointing authority was required to consider all

matters which the applicable law made relevant to eligibility and

appointment. If the recruitment rules required verification of specified

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antecedents or imposed a disqualification arising from a previous

dismissal, failure to undertake that exercise would require

examination as a possible legal infirmity. The Court does not base its

conclusion upon the unproved allegations of misconduct. The

decisive question remains whether respondent No. 10 possessed the

qualifications and legal eligibility required for the public office at the

relevant time.

IX. Whether the appointment can be sustained on the ground

that respondent No. 10 was selected as an alternative candidate

(65) Respondent No. 10 has stated that the Selection Committee initially

preferred Smt. Paula Sengupta and that, upon her unwillingness to

accept the appointment despite repeated requests, respondent No. 10

was appointed as an alternative candidate. Even if this factual

explanation is accepted, it does not resolve the legal controversy. The

refusal of a preferred candidate may justify consideration of another

candidate who is eligible under the applicable rules, but it cannot

confer eligibility upon a person who does not satisfy the mandatory

conditions governing the post.

(66) Recruitment to a public office is regulated by the principle that

eligibility precedes comparative selection. The appointing authority

may choose among candidates who satisfy the prescribed

requirements, subject to the applicable selection procedure. It cannot

relax an essential statutory qualification merely because the first-

choice candidate declines appointment or because the authority

considers the next candidate suitable for the institution.

(67) The doctrine of legality requires that the appointing authority act

within the boundaries of the power conferred upon it. A decision may

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be administratively convenient and may even reflect a bona fide

desire to fill a vacant post, yet remain legally unsustainable if the

person appointed does not possess the qualifications prescribed by

law. The Court's inquiry is not whether respondent No. 10 was the

next available candidate, but whether he was legally eligible to be

appointed.

(68) Nor can the fact that respondent No. 10's appointment was initially

provisional for two years, as recorded in the notification dated 24

April 2017, cure an absence of essential eligibility. A provisional

appointment remains subject to the governing law. Where the legal

qualification is a condition precedent to appointment, provisional

status does not confer an authority to occupy the office in derogation

of that condition.

X. The judgments relied on by the respondent do not defeat the

petitioner's case

(69) The authorities relied upon by the respondents establish that quo

warranto is not to be issued casually, that the Court cannot

investigate the subjective deliberations of a Selection Committee, and

that a definite conclusion concerning the absence of lawful authority

must be supported by sufficient material. Those propositions are not

disputed. They define the limits within which the Court must act.

(70) The present challenge, however, does not invite the Court to evaluate

the comparative merits of candidates or to speculate about the

reasons which motivated the Sele ction Committee. It raises a

question of legal competence to hold the office, founded upon the

alleged absence of prescribed qualifications and the inconsistency of

the State's recruitment framework with binding national regulations.

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The respondents' authorities do not prohibit judicial scrutiny of such

questions; indeed, the distinction between eligibility and comparative

merit is fundamental to the exercise of quo warranto jurisdiction.

(71) The decision in B. Srinivasa Reddy (supra) cannot be understood as

permitting an appointing authority to disregard a mandatory

qualification. The prohibition against probing the mind of the

authority is not a prohibition against examining the objective legality

of its decision. Likewise, judgment in Surinder Kumar’s case

(supra) does not establish that a public appointment becomes

immune from challenge whenever the appointee has been formally

selected. Both principles must be applied consistently with the

Supreme Court's decision in Gambhirdan K. Gadhvi (supra) , which

recognises the availability of quo warranto where the appointment

violates binding eligibility requirements.

(72) The Court therefore rejects the respondents' preliminary objections as

to jurisdiction and locus standi. On the substantive issue, the

applicable law must prevail over any inconsistent recruitment

condition, and the appointment must be tested against the

qualifications legally prescribed for the post. The conclusion cannot

be based upon an assessment of personal preference or institutional

convenience, but upon the objective legal requirements governing the

office.

XI. Conclusion

(73) The office of Principal of Government College of Art and Craft is a

public office. The appointment to that office must conform to the

applicable statutory and regulatory framework. Neither the State

Government nor the Public Service Commission possesses an

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unfettered discretion to appoint a person who does not satisfy the

mandatory legal qualifications. The authority to make an

appointment carries with it the obligation to ens ure that the

appointment is made in accordance with law.

(74) The State's Notification No. 1175-Edn(A)/10M-129/11 dated 10

October 2014 and Advertisement No. 16/2015 cannot be treated as

conclusive of the legality of the appointment merely because

respondent No. 10 was considered and selected under their terms. If

the alternative category for a traditional or professional artist of great

eminence is inconsistent with the applicable UGC Regulations, 2010,

that category cannot lawfully operate to dispense with a mandatory

qualification prescribed by the governing national norm. The relevant

provision must yield to the superior applicable law.

(75) Equally, where the complete selection record establishes that

respondent No. 10 did not possess the requisite Ph.D. qualification,

prescribed experience, API score or other mandatory requirement

applicable to the post, the appointment is vitiated by a substantive

defect of eligibility. Such a defect cannot be cured by the

recommendation of the Public Service Commission, by the

appointment notification, by the refusal of another candidate, or by

the passage of time.

(76) The Court is mindful that the jurisdiction of quo warranto is limited

and must be exercised on the basis of established facts. The

conclusion that respondent No. 10 l acks lawful authority must

therefore rest upon the actual regulatory text and the

contemporaneous documentary record establishing the absence of

the requisite qualification. Subject to that necessary evidentiary

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foundation, the appointment cannot be sustained in law. The rule of

law does not permit a person to continue in a public office when the

legal conditions essential to the occupation of that office remain

unfulfilled.

(77) For the reasons aforesaid, the writ petition deserves to be allowed as

it is found that the 2014 notification and the 2015 advertisement

permit a route inconsistent with the binding UGC Regulations 2010

and respondent No. 10 does not satisfy the qualifications lawfully

applicable to the post. In such circumstances, the appointment is not

merely irregular in a procedural sense; it is without the legal

foundation necessary to sustain the occupation of the public office. A

writ of quo warranto is consequently warranted.

(78) In view of the foregoing discussion, and upon the Court being

satisfied from the applicable UGC Regulations and the

contemporaneous recruitment record that respondent No. 10 does

not fulfil the mandatory eligibility criteria, the writ petition is allowed

in the following terms:

(i) The preliminary objections concerning the

maintainability of the writ petition, the petitioner's locus

standi and the availability of a remedy before the West

Bengal Administrative Tribunal are rejected for the reasons

recorded hereinabove;

(ii) The provisions of Notification No. 1175-Edn(A)/10M-

129/11 dated 10 October 2014, and the corresponding

conditions of Advertisement No. 16/2015, insofar as they

permit appointment to the post of Principal of Government

College of Art and Craft in derogation of mandatory

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qualifications prescribed by the applica ble UGC

Regulations, 2010, are declared inoperative to that extent

and incapable of sustaining an appointment contrary to the

governing law;

(iii) The recommendation of the Public Service Commission

in favour of respondent No. 10, and the consequential

appointment notification dated 24 April 2017, are set aside

insofar as they relate to respondent No. 10, upon the

finding that he does not satisfy the mandatory eligibility

requirements applicable to the post;

(iv) A writ in the nature of quo warranto is issued against

respondent No. 10, declaring that he has no lawful

authority to continue to occupy the post of Principal of

Government College of Art and Craft;

(v) The State Government and the competent appointing

authority shall take immediate consequential steps to give

effect to this order and shall ensure that respondent No. 10

ceases to discharge the functions of the said office pursuant

to the impugned appointment.

(vi) The competent authority shall make appropriate interim

administrative arrangements for the discharge of the

functions of the Principal in accordance with law until a

duly eligible person is appointed, till a person competent

and duly eligible is selected and appointed in the said post;

(79) The writ petition No. WPA 591 of 2019 is allowed and disposed of.

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(80) Urgent certified copy of this judgment, if applied for, be supplied to

the parties upon compliance with all requisite formalities.

(RaiChattopadhyay, J.)