IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA

CONSTITUTIONAL WRIT JURISDICTION

APPELLATE SIDE

Present:

The Hon’ble Justice Rai Chattopadhyay

WPA 27338 of 2017

Amarendra Kumar Nath & Ors.

Vs.

Union of India & Ors.

For the Petitioners : Mr. Malay Dhar

: Mr. Amarnath Sen

: Mr. Pranab Kr. Ghosh

: Ms. Subhangi Panigrahi

: Mr. Biswajit Sarkar

For the UOI : Ms. Sabita Roy

: Ms. Tapati Samanta

: Mr. Arindam Ghosh

For the respondent

Nos. 2 to 4 : Mr. Bikash Ranjan Bhattacharyya, ld. Sr. Adv.

: Mr. Arup Nath Bhattacharyya

: Ms. Sayani Das

: Ms. Sreetama Biswas

: Mr. Snehasish Dey

: Mr. Arya Bhattarcharyya

Judgment on : 10.06.2026

Uploaded on : 10.06.2026

Rai Chattopadhyay, J. :-

1) The writ petitioners have filed the instant case seeking relief

inter alia that, (i) order dated August 17, 2017, passed by the

3

rd

respondent/Board of Directors of the Security Printing and

Minting Corporation of India Limited [in short SPMCIL] may be

set aside and quashed; (ii) the respondents be directed to grant

pay scale and other benefits to the petitioners as „electricians‟

similarly and equally as paid to the electricians of other

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departments of the Government of India; (iii) revise the pay

scales of the petitioner in appropriate rate as mentioned in the

prayer of the writ petition, with effect from January 1, 1986 for

the petitioners No.1 to 5 and from the date of their respective

appointments for the petitioners No.6 to 8, commensurate to

the recommendation of the 5

th

Central Pay Commission; (iv)

revision of pay giving effect to all the successive Pay

Commissions‟ recommendations including consequential

benefits, retirement benefits and pension.

2) In the impugned order dated August 17, 2017, the 3

rd

respondent/Board has held in the following manner; The

petitioners argued that electricians working in other Central

Government organizations were receiving higher pay scales

and that the petitioners were performing comparable duties.

On that basis, parity in pay was sought under the doctrine of

“equal pay for equal work.” Reliance was placed by the

petitioners on the judgment of the Supreme Court of India in

State of Punjab v. Jagjit Singh reported at (2017) 1 SCC

148. The Board held that the judgment in Jagjit Singh

(supra) was not applicable because that case concerned

temporary, daily-wage, ad hoc, casual, or contractual

employees claiming minimum pay parity with regular

employees, whereas the present petitioners were already

regular employees enjoying regular pay scales fixed by Pay

Commissions.

3) The petitioners also relied upon the Office Memorandum dated

February 10, 2006, issued by the Department of Economic

Affairs, Ministry of Finance concerning transfer of assets and

liabilities of Mints, Presses and Paper Mill to SPMCIL. The

Board observed that the cited Office Memorandum regarding

transfer of assets was not directly relevant. Instead, another

Office Memorandum dated same that is, February 10, 2006,

relating to transfer of staff was applicable, for determining

claim of the petitioners as above. Under that memorandum:

o Employees were initially to remain on deemed deputation

for two years.

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o Employees could thereafter opt either for absorption in

the company or redeployment through the Department of

Personnel and Training.

o Existing service conditions, including pay, allowances,

medical facilities and leave, were to continue until

company rules were framed.

o Employees were assured that no benefits would become

inferior after absorption.

4) The Board recorded that all concerned employees, including

the petitioners, exercised their option for permanent

absorption in SPMCIL on November 1, 2008, pursuant to a

Memorandum of Settlement [MoS] under Section 12(3) of the

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, before the Chief Labour

Commissioner. Clause-5 of the Memorandum of Settlement

provided that the pay structure and allowances would

continue according to existing Central Government rules. The

company also implemented the recommendations of both the

6

th

and 7

th

Central Pay Commissions for the employees,

including the petitioners. Therefore, the Board concluded that

no benefit due under the Memorandum of Settlement had been

denied to the petitioners as permanent employees of the 2

nd

respondent/company.

5) The Board then examined the claim for parity with electricians

in other organizations and made observations:

o Pay scales of electricians differ across Central

Government departments and PSUs.

o Even the petitioners‟ own examples showed differing pay

scales among organizations including those cited by the

petitioners, like CPWD, Ministry of Water Resources and

Ministry of Defence.

6) The Recruitment Rules of the organizations cited by the

petitioners were found materially different because:

• They permitted direct recruitment from the open market.

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• They required 3–5 years‟ field experience.

• The petitioners, in contrast, had been recruited as fresh

matriculates.

7) The Board further held that the nature of duties was not

identical. Electricians in organizations such as CPWD and

Railways handled complex high -tension and low-tension

systems, including maintenance of electrical traction systems

and overhead equipment. By contrast, electricians in SPMCIL

were mainly engaged in:

• Repair and maintenance of electrical installations,

• Battery checking and repairs,

• Forklift electrical connections,

• Electrical panel checking,

• Limited programmable logic controller (PLC) related

work, with specialized PLC work often outsourced to

private agencies.

8) The Board noted that electricians within SPMCIL itself

belonged to different grades carrying different grade pay

scales, ranging from Grade Pay ₹1800 to ₹4200. Hence, all

electricians could not claim parity with one specific grade in

another organization. The Board also discussed the historical

cadre structure. The petitioners had originally been recruited

as Probationary Tradesmen and later promoted through

Tradesman Grade III, Grade II and Grade I. The “Tradesman”

category historically included many different trades such as

machinist, fitter, plumber, carpenter, mason, electrician,

welder, painter, millwright and others, all having identical pay

scales. According to the Board, granting electricians alone a

higher scale would disturb the long-maintained parity among

various tradesmen categories.

9) After considering all circumstances, the Board concluded:

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• The petitioners did not perform equal work comparable

to electricians in the cited organizations.

• No discrimination or unequal treatment was established.

• Therefore, the claim for higher pay on the principle of

equal pay for equal work had no merit.

10) Before dealing with the respective arguments of the parties,

the factual background of the case may be stated here in a nut

shell. The petitioners have joined in service with the

Government of India Mint, on various dates between December

5, 1977 and December 1, 1986. At the time of filing of the writ

petition the petitioners No.6 to 8 were still working and the

petitioners No. 1 to 5 had retired from service. Though at the

time of their induction in service, the Mint was under

supervision and control of the Government of India, the

situation has changed subsequently. As per decision of the

Union Cabinet, the 2

nd

respondent/company was incorporated

on January 31, 2006. After incorporation of the company, the

existing employees were given option either to continue with

the service under the Union of India or to join the newly

formed company. In exercise thereof the writ petitioners opted

to be engaged with the newly established company, that is the

respondent No.2. the company becomes a separate legal entity

being controlled and managed by the Board of Directors and

the Union of India had no manner of control over there any

further. Assets and liabilities were also transferred by the

Union of India, in favour of the newly formed corporate entity.

11) A tripartite Memorandum of Settlement dated November 15,

2008, was entered into between the employees, the company

and the Union of India to decide that the employees of the

newly formed company shall be entitled to the pay structure as

per recommendation of up to the 6

th

Pay Commission. It was

decided further that subsequent there after pay structure of

the employees was to be decided by the company/Board itself.

By this way the employees of the company have been allowed

benefits under the recommendation of the 7

th

Pay Commission

too.

Page 6 of 21

12) The petitioners say that they were recruited through

Employment Exchange as qualified “Probationary Tradesman

Electricians”, with the India Government Mint at Alipore,

Kolkata. That they possess I.T.I. certificates, NCTVT

certification, apprenticeship training, and electrical licences.

They state that after completion of probation , they were

confirmed as electricians but were placed in lower pay scales

compared to electricians employed in other departments of the

Central Government. Also, that they are technically qualified

and skilled workmen, not unskilled or semi-skilled employees.

According to them, they discharge highly technical duties

involving installation, maintenance, repair of electrical

systems, transformers, substations, computerized PLC -

controlled machinery, coin stamping and packaging machines,

telephone lines, pumps, motors, a nd allied electrical

equipment. They contend that the nature of their duties is

identical or even more onerous than those performed by

electricians employed in departments such as the Central

Public Works Department (CPWD), Ministry of Water

Resources, Ministry of Defense and Army establishments.

13) A major grievance raised is discrimination in pay scales

despite equal qualifications and equal work. The petitioners

compare their own scales with those granted to electricians in

other Central Government departm ents. They cite examples

showing that electricians elsewhere, possessing similar

qualifications such as matriculation and I.T.I. certification,

were granted substantially higher scales under successive

Central Pay Commissions, whereas the petitioners continued

in lower scales. They allege that this disparity violates Articles

14 and 16 of the Constitution and offends the doctrine of

“equal pay for equal work.” To substantiate their claims, the

petitioners rely upon various documents, advertisements, and

information obtained under the Right to Information Act from

different Government departments. These documents allegedly

demonstrate that the prescribed qualifications and duties for

electricians in other departments are substantially identical to

theirs, while those employees receive higher scales of pay. The

RTI replies from the Ministry of Water Resources, CPWD, and

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Ministry of Defense are specifically cited to show

corresponding pay structures under the 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th

Central Pay Commissions. The petitioners have therefore,

prayed for revision and upgradation of their pay scales

retrospectively in parity with electricians of other Central

Government departments, including grant of scales under the

4th, 5th, and 6th Central Pay Commissions, correspon ding

grade pay, arrears, consequential service benefits, and revised

retiral benefits for those who had already retired.

14) The writ petitioners have been represented by Mr. Malay Dhar.

The points made in argument may be summarized in the

following manner. That study of the comparative pay

structures of electricians working in organizations such as the

Central Ground Water Board, CPWD and Ministry of Defen se

would show that electricians in those departments received

substantially higher scales under successive Central Pay

Commission revisions. That, the petitioners possessed

comparable or superior qualifications, including

Madhyamik/Higher Secondary qualification, ITI certification,

NCTVT certification, electrical licences and prior experience in

the trade. That, the petitioners were recruited through

employment exchange after prescribed trade tests and were

appointed substantively as “Probationary Tradesman –

Electrician” and they have discharged specialised electrical

functions. The petitioners allege that in the impugned order,

the respondent authority has deliberately suppressed and not

considered the extent and technical nature of duties

discharged by the writ petitioners.

15) The petitioners‟ further argument is that they have been

erroneously catagorised by the respondent authority in a

broad industrial tradesman category comparable to

machinists, fitters, plumbers and carpenters. According to the

petitioners, electricians constitute a distinct technical category

requiring specialised qualifications and statutory permits, and

therefore cannot reasonably be equated with unrelated trades.

It is argued that the comparison adopted by the respondents

and even the observations of the Fifth Central Pay Commission

lacked rational basis and resulted in arbitrary classification

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and downgrading of the petitioners‟ scale of pay, which is not

only irrational but is in violation of the Constitutionally

protected rights of them.

16) The petitioners‟ further argument is that contention of the

respondent authority that under Clause 8 of the Memorandum

of Settlement dated September 15, 2008, disputes relating to

pay scales ought to be raised only through the registered trade

union as an industrial dispute before the Industrial Tribunal,

is an afterthought and belated contention. That such plea has

never been raised earlier before the Central Administrative

Tribunal, the Division Bench in W.P.C.T. No. 254 of 2009, the

contempt proceedings, or even in the affidavits filed in the

present writ petition. Therefore, according to the petitioners,

the respondents had waived such objection regarding

alternative remedy and maintainability.

17) The petitioners submit about the procedural history of the

litigation from 2005 onwards, including proceedings before the

Tribunal, the High Court and th e contempt proceedings

culminating in the impugned order dated August 17, 2017.

They say Clause-25 of the settlement dated 15.09.2008, has

contemplated review of anomalies arising out of

implementation of the 5

th

Pay Commission recommendations

through consultation with employee representatives. On that

basis, it has been argued that the respondents themselves had

admitted the existence of pay anomalies. It has been

contended that neither Clause 8 nor the overall settlement

could curtail the writ petitioners‟ constitutional right to

approach the High Court under Article 226 on the specific

allegation of violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution

through discriminatory pay fixation.

18) It has been submitted by relying on the ratio decided by the

Supreme Court in M.R.Gupta versus Union of India and

others at AIR 1996 SC 669, that though the petitioners have

been espousing their cause since the year 2005, the alleged

inaction of the respondent authority is a continuing wrong

which gives rise to recurring cause of action justifying

maintainability of the instant writ petition. The petitioners

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have also relied on the Supreme Court‟s Constitution Bench

decision in D.S. Nakara versus Union of India at (1983) 1

SCC 305, as they say that where all relevant considerations

are same, persons holding identical posts may not be treated

differently in the matter of their pay, merely because they

belong to different departments. In D.S.Nakara (supra), the

Supreme Court has quoted an earlier decision of it, in

Randhir Sing versus Union of India at (1982) 1 SCC 618 .

19) The principle of “equal pay for equal work” has been discussed

by the Supreme Court and applied to uphold the right of the

respondents before it, in the case of Union of India versus

Dineshan K.K. at (2008) 1 SCC 586 , which the petitioners

have relied upon, while trying to establish that the said

principle of law squarely applies in their case too. They

specifically rely on the Court‟s finding that when there is no

dispute with regard to the qualifications, duties and

responsibilities of the persons holding identical posts or ranks

but they are treated differently merely because they belong to

different departments or that the basis of classification of

posts is ex-facie irrational, arbitrary or unjust, it is open to the

Court to intervene in exercise of writ jurisdiction. They also

rely on the Court‟s finding not to accept the decision of the

expert body like Pay Commission only as sacrosanct and that

the Court should never interfere into the same. On the similar

proposition of “equal pay for equal work”, another judgment in

Arindam Chattopadhyay a nd Others versus State of West

Bengal and Others at (2013) 4 SCC 152 , has been relied on.

Similarly, a judgment of this Court in Anirban Ghosh versus

State of West Bengal and Others at (2019) 3 CAL L.T. 617

(HC), has also been referred to.

20) The next judgment of Supreme Court in Bhagwan Das and

Others versus State of Haryana and Others at (1987) 4

SCC 634, has been relied on for the proposition that inequal

treatment amongst the equals is not justified on the ground

that processes of selection of the two classes of employees have

been different. The petitioners have also relied on the Court‟s

finding that it is fallacious to determine artificial parameters to

deny fruits of labour as held by the Supreme Court in State of

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Punjab and Others versus Jagjit Sin gh and Others at

(2017) 1 SCC 148. The Court has further held that any act of

paying less wages as compared to others similarly situated,

constitutes an act of exploitative enslavement emerging out of

domineering position of the State and finally that the

temporary employees possessing requisite qualifications and

appointed against posts which were also available in regular

cadre, performing similar duties and responsibilities as being

discharged by regular employees holding the

same/corresponding posts, were entitled to claim wages on a

par with minimum pay scale of regular employees holding the

same posts. According to the petitioners, determination by the

respondent authority in the impugned order regarding

existence of different category of pay scale, in the

establishment where the petitioners are engaged, justifying no

similar pay scale for all of them, is baseless insofar as,

according to them the law settled has envisaged for grant of at

least the minimum corresponding similar pay scale

comparable to similarly placed personnel in the other

departments. Similarly, it has been argued that this kind of

equal treatment is bound to be extended to the pensioners,

who have retired upon reaching the age of superannuation,

having duly discharged their duties during their service period.

In regard to the retired employees the judgment of Supreme

Court in Maharashtra State Financial Corporation Ex -

employees Association and Others versus State of

Maharashtra and Others at AIR 2023 SC 792 , has been

referred to.

21) The respondent company/ SPMCIL is the principal objector

here and has been represented by Mr. Bikash Ranjan

Bhattacharyya, Learned Senior Advocate. the said respondent

has contended inter alia that after the petitioners have

consciously and undisputedly opted to join in the company

and also accepted the terms of the Memorandum of

Settlement, they should be considered to bourn in the

industrial workmen cadre and not on a same platform with an

employee of any department of the Union of India, as they

claim to be. Whereas, they have erroneously claimed parity

with classified cadre in Group-C in Central Government. That,

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the documents relied on by the petitioners, like vacancy

notification of Army Services, appointment order issued by

Water Resources Department, office order issued by Central

Public Works Department, appointment order issued by the

Central Ministry of Textiles, office note envisaging duties and

responsibilities of „electricians‟ at Central Ground Water

Board, categorically relate to the Group-C cadre employees in

Central Government. It has been submitted that there is no

parity between two different cadres under the two different

establishments. That as an independent corporate entity the

respondent company is at liberty to decide pay structure for its

work force, which may or may not be in comparison to any

other entity or any Government organisation, but for disparity

if any, the decision cannot ipso facto be held as invalid or

against the Constitutional mandate. That, the petitioners

having belonged to industrial workmen cadre under the

respondent company, have been holding commensurate posts

and pay scales accordingly. That, there can be found no

discrimination or illegality in the same as alleged. According to

the said respondent, the petitioners have sought to equate

their service with the service under the Central Government,

which is untenable. The respondent has stated that the cadre

of staff with whom the petitioners have tried to equate

themselves, belong to different entity, cadre and classification

and the petitioners who belong to the industrial cadre, cannot

be treated as equal with them.

22) The respondent says that the Recruitment Rules of the

organizations cited by the petitioners are materially different

because the others permitted direct recruitment from the open

market of the persons with 3–5 years‟ field experience; whereas

the petitioners, in contrast, had been recruited as fresh

matriculates. That therefore the petitioners being industrial

cadre employees, in contrast with the clas sified cadre

employees under the Central Government, are governed under

independent and different set of recruitment procedure. That

the petitioners‟ entry into the service was as „Probationary

Tradesman cum Electricians”, whereas the comparable posts

are for „Direct Recruitment‟ as skilled employees in the posts of

„Electricians‟. Hence the respondent says that if the petitioners

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are treated to have been differentiated in any manner in

respect of pay, the same is based only in reasonable

classification and does in no manner violates the

Constitutional mandate of equal treatment amongst the equals

only.

23) It has been submitted that exercise of option by the petitioners

pursuant to the Memorandum of Understanding dated

February 10, 2006, has amounted to cessation of their

employment with the Central Government and coming under

the administrative control of the newly incorporated company.

This has also brought them protection of grade and pay with

three additional increments not absorbable in future

increments of pay. The effective date of the petitioners‟

absorption with the 2

nd

respondent company was November 1,

2008. That the petitioners have received all the benefits of

their past services including those as were settled in the said

Memorandum of Unders tanding. That similar is the position

with regard to the pensionary benefits. It is submitted that the

petitioners may not have any further sustainable claim as

regards pay and allowances.

24) It has been further submitted that the Central Pay

Commission of India, which is an expert body to determine the

applicable pay scale for all categories and cadres of post, has

provided for a specific grade of pay and other service

conditions for the posts of the writ petitioners‟. That the law

settled in such event is that the Court may not interfere into

the same, in exercise of power of judicial review. More so,

when the Commission in its recommendation has duly dealt

with the issue of alleged disparity of pay of the Mint workers

due to their initial placement on probation for one year. That

recommendations of the 7

th

Pay Commission has been adopted

and implemented for the writ petitioners but that is as per the

independent decision of their employer, the respondent

company. It is submitted that the writ petitioners have failed

to discharge their duly to justify their claim beyond

requirements of any factual enquiry. Decision of the

Commission with regard to the admissible pay has never been

challenged by the writ petitioners. On the proposition that a

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complex matter like equation of posts and salary should be left

to the expert body and Court cannot interfere lightly, a

judgment of Supreme Court in Rajesh Pravinchandra

Rajyaguru versus Gujtar Water Supply and Sewerage

Board at (2021) 19 SCC 128, has been referred to.

25) In reply the petitioners have sought to rebut the respondents‟

contention that pay fixation falls exclusively within the domain

of Pay Commissions as expert bodies. Referring again to the

judgment Union of India versus Dineshan K.K. reported in

(2008) 1 SCC 586, the petitioners argued that the Supreme

Court had already rejected such an argument where

discriminatory treatment violating Article 14 was established.

They have challenged the respondents‟ reliance on the Fifth

Pay Commission report. According to the petitioners, the Pay

Commission had only considered anomalies between

apprentice tradesmen pay scales of Rs.800–1150 and Rs.950–

1500, whereas the petitioners were never apprentice

tradesmen. It was further argued that the Fifth Pay

Commission never specifically examined the disparity between

electricians working in the Mint and electricians working in

other Government departments. Therefore, the respondents‟

reliance on the Pay Commission report was said to be

misconceived.

26) The challenge raised by the writ petitioners, upon careful

consideration of the factual matrix and the settled principles

governing judicial review in matters of pay fixation, does not

merit interference under Article 226 of the Constitution. The

reasons therefor are discussed as follows. The foundational

premise of the writ petition proceeds on an assumption that

the petitioners are similarly situated and identically

circumstanced with „electricians‟ employed in various

departments of the Central Government such as CPWD,

Ministry of Defence, Central Ground Water Board and other

establishments. Such assumption itself is fundamentally

misconceived. Equality under Articles 14 and 16 of the

Constitution of India operates amongst equals and not

amongst unequals. The doctrine of “equal pay for equal work”

is not a doctrine of abstract or mechanical application. Before

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invoking the same, the claimants must establish complete and

wholesome identity in the matter of employer, source of

recruitment, nature of cadre, hierarchy, service conditions,

duties, responsibilities, promotional avenues and governing

statutory framework. Mere similarity in nomenclature of post

or possession of comparable technical qualifications cannot by

itself confer enforceable parity in pay.

27) In the present case, the petitioners are employees of the 2

nd

respondent/company, namely the Security Printing and

Minting Corporation of India Limited, which is an independent

corporate entity incorporated pursuant to a conscious policy

decision of the Union Cabinet. Upon such incorporation, the

assets, liabilities and administrative control of the concerned

establishments stood transferred to the company. The

company thereafter became a distinct juristic entity governed

through its own Board of Directors and not as a department of

the Central Government. The petitioners consciously exercised

option to be permanently absorbed in the said company. Such

absorption was neither involuntary nor automatic. It is evident

from the records that the petitioners were afforded the

opportunity either to continue under the Governmental

framework through redeployment or to join the newly

incorporated company. Having voluntarily opted for absorption

under the respondent company and having accepted all

consequential benefits flowing therefrom, including continuity

of service, protection of pay, additional increments,

implementation of recommendations of successive Pay

Commissions and benefits under the Memorandum of

Settlement, the petitioners cannot now be permitted to

approbate and reprobate simultaneously by contending that

their inclusion within the industrial workmen framework or

under the Memorandum of Settlement is itself untenable.

28) The principle that a party cannot accept benefits under a

transaction or settlement and simultaneously challenge the

very basis thereof is too firmly entrenched in law to require

any elaborate reiteration. The doctrine of election, coupled with

the equitable principle against approbation and reprobation,

bars a litigant from blowing hot and cold at the same time. The

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petitioners have admittedly continued under the corporate

structure for years together, derived benefits thereunder,

accepted implementation of the 6th and 7th Pay Commission

recommendations through the company structure and

continued to be governed by the Memorandum of Settlement

entered into under Section 12(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act,

1947. Having accepted the advantages flowing from the

settlement and the altered legal relationship, they cannot

selectively repudiate only those parts thereof which do not suit

their present claim.

29) The Court also finds considerable substance in the contention

of the respondent that the petitioners belong to an industrial

workmen cadre altogether distinct from the classified Group-C

cadre employees, serving directly under the Central

Government departments, with whom parity is sought. The

materials placed before this Court demonstrate that the

petitioners entered service as “Probationary Tradesman –

Electricians” within an industrial trades structure comprising

various categories such as machinists, fitters, p lumbers,

welders, carpenters and others. The cadre historically

maintained parity amongst all such industrial tradesmen. The

petitioners were not recruited as direct-entry “Electricians” in

the classified Central Government service. On the contrary, the

records disclose that the comparable posts in departments like

CPWD, Railways and Defence establishments were governed by

entirely different recruitment rules permitting direct

recruitment from open market candidates possessing

substantial field experience of three to five years. The

petitioners, admittedly, entered service as fresh matriculates

under a different industrial framework. Thus, the very source

and methodology of recruitment, the nature of cadre and the

governing service structure stand materially differentiated.

30) It is now well settled that reasonable classification founded on

intelligible differentia and bearing rational nexus with the

object sought to be achieved does not offend Articles 14 and 16

of the Constitution. Distinction based upon cadre structure,

recruitment process, nature of employer and service conditions

has repeatedly been recognised as constitutionally permissible.

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The petitioners therefore cannot claim constitutional parity

merely because they possess ITI qualifications or discharge

certain electrical functions. The doctrine of equal pay does not

envisage comparison across dissimilar establishments or

unrelated cadres merely on broad functional overlap.

31) Even otherwise, the factual foundation necessary for

application of the doctrine of “equal pay for equal work” has

not been established. The impugned decision has elaborately

considered the nature of duties discharged by electricians in

other departments and found substantial distinction in

operational responsibilities. Electricians employed in

organisations such as CPWD or Railways were found to be

handling complex high-tension and low-tension systems,

traction systems, overhead electrical infrastructure and

extensive field operations. The duties of the petitioners within

the respondent company were found substantially confined to

maintenance and repair work relating to installations,

electrical panels, battery systems, forklifts and allied internal

operations, with specialised PLC work frequently outsourced.

Such findings involve technical assessment of functional

equivalence and cannot lightly be displaced in judicial review

in absence of manifest perversity, which is wholly absent here.

32) It is also relevant to note that the employees with whom the

petitioners seek parity belong to the classified service cadre

under the Central Government and are governed by statutory

service rules framed under the constitutional and

administrative framework applicable to Government servants.

Their appointments, promotions, disciplinary control, service

conditions and retiral benefits are regulated through codified

service jurisprudence applicable to civil posts under the Union.

The petitioners, on the other hand, upon absorption in the

respondent company, became part of the industrial workmen

cadre governed substantially by industrial law mechanisms,

including the Industrial Disputes Act, collective bargaining

arrangements and the Memorandum of Settlement entered

into under Section 12(3) thereof. Their rights and obligations

are therefore rooted in an altogether different legal regime

distinct from classical service law. Such distinction is neither

Page 17 of 21

artificial nor inconsequential. Service-rule governed classified

employees and industrial workmen operating under industrial

jurisprudence constitute two separate and distinct classes in

law. Consequently, the petitioners cannot legitimately claim

automatic equivalence or parity with classified Government

employees merely on the basis of similarity in designation or

certain overlapping technical functions.

33) In this regard a judgment of the Supreme Court may be

mentioned in State of Rajasthan versus Kunji Raman at

AIR 1997 SC 693, in which considering difference in mode of

recruitment and applicable service rules the Court has upheld

difference in pay scales for regular establishment employees

[similar to classified cadre] and work -charged industrial

employees noting that they operate under different service

frameworks.

34) The Court must also remain conscious of the settled limitation

upon judicial review in matters of pay fixation and equation of

posts. Determination of pay structures, equation of cadres and

assessment of comparative responsibilities fall primarily within

the domain of expert bodies such as the Pay Commission and

the employer concerned. Courts exercising writ jurisdiction do

not ordinarily undertake the complex exercise of evaluating

relative responsibilities, functional requirements and financial

implications involved in pay determination. Unless the

decision is demonstrated to be patently arbitrary, mala fide or

based on manifestly irrational classification, interference is

unwarranted. The Supreme Court in several decisions,

including Rajesh Pravinchandra Rajyaguru (supra), has

reiterated that equation of posts and salary structures are

matters best left to expert bodies and that Courts ought not

substitute their own assessment for that of specialised

authorities.

35) In the present case, the recommendations of the Pay

Commission itself have never been specifically challenged. The

petitioners seek selective enhancement of their scales while

simultaneously accepting the broader framework under which

such scales were determined and implemented. Once the

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expert body has considered the cadre structure and the

employer has implemented the same within the framework of

the Memorandum of Settlement and company policy, this

Court would be slow to reopen the entire exercise merely on

the basis of perceived disparity with unrelated departments.

36) The issue shall be best explained with the words of Supreme

Court in State of Haryana v. Haryana Civil Secretariat

Personal Staff Assn at (2002) 6 SCC 72, which is as follows:

“10. It is to be kept in mind that the claim of equal pay for

equal work is not a fundamental right vested in any

employee though it is a constitutional goal to be achieved by

the Government. Fixation of pay and determination of parity

in duties and responsibilities is a complex matter which is

for the executive to discharge. While taking a decision in the

matter, several relevant factors, some of which have been

noted by this Court in the decided case, are to be considered

keeping in view the prevailing financ ial position and

capacity of the State Government to bear the additional

liability of a revised scale of pay. It is also to be kept in mind

that the priority given to different types of posts under the

prevailing policies of the State Government is also a relevant

factor for consideration by the State Government. In the

context of the complex nature of issues involved, the far-

reaching consequences of a decision in the matter and its

impact on the administration of the State Government, courts

have taken the view that ordinarily courts should not try to

delve deep into administrative decisions pertaining to pay

fixation and pay parity. That is not to say that the matter is

not justiciable or that the courts cannot entertain any

proceeding against such administrative decision taken by

the Government. The courts should approach such matters

with restraint and interfere only when they are satisfied

that the decision of the Government is patently irrational,

unjust and prejudicial to a section of employees and the

Government while taking the decision has ignored factors

which are material and relevant for a decision in the matter.

Even in a case where the court holds the order passed by

the Government to be unsustainable then ordinarily a

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direction should be given to the State Government or the

authority taking the decision to reconsider the matter and

pass a proper order. The court should avoid giving a

declaration granting a particular scale of pay and compelling

the Government to implement the same. As noted earlier, in

the present case the High Court has not even made any

attempt to compare the nature of duties and responsibilities

of the two sections of employees, one in the State Secretariat

and the other in the Central Secretariat. It has also ignored

the basic principle that there are certain rules, regulations

and executive instructions issued by the employers which

govern the administration of the cadre.”

37) The Supreme Court has stated in S.C.Chandra versus State

of Jharkhand at (2007) 8 SCC 279:

“35. In our opinion fixing pay scales by courts by applying

the principle of equal pay for equal work upsets the high

constitutional principle of separation of powers between the

three organs of the State. Realising this, this Court has in

recent years avoided applying the principle of equal pay for

equal work, unless there is complete and wholesale identity

between the two groups (and there too the matter should be

sent for examination by an expert committee appointed by

the Government instead of the court itself granting higher

pay).”

38) The reliance placed by the petitioners on D.S. Nakara (supra)

is misplaced. The said judgment dealt with liberalisation of

pensionary benefits amongst pensioners forming one

homogeneous class under the same employer and statutory

scheme. The ratio therein cannot be extended to compel parity

between employees belonging to different establishments,

different cadres and different service structures. Similarly, the

decision in Randhir Singh (supra) does not assist the

petitioners because even therein the Court emphasised

substantial identity in all relevant aspects before parity could

be claimed.

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39) The judgment in Dineshan K.K. (supra) also stands

distinguishable on facts. In that case, the Court found

complete parity in qualifications, duties, responsibilities and

rank between personnel within comparable organisational

structures and found the classification ex facie irrational. In

the present case, however, the respondents have demonstrated

substantial differences in recruitment methodology, governing

rules, cadre structure, employer identity, operational

responsibilities and service conditions. Therefore, the factual

substratum necessary for invoking the ratio in Dineshan K.K.

(supra) is conspicuously absent in the present case.

40) Likewise, any reliance on Bhagwan Das (supra) is of little

assistance to the petitioners because the present case does not

involve mere difference in mode of selection amongst otherwise

homogeneous employees. Here, the distinction is foundational

and structural. The petitioners belong to an industrial

workmen cadre under a corporate entity whereas the

comparators belong to classified Government service under

distinct departments governed by altogether separate

recruitment rules and administrative control.

41) Jagjit Singh’s judgment (supra) is concerning temporary, ad

hoc, daily-wage and casual employees claiming minimum pay

parity with regular employees discharging identical work under

the same employer. The petitioners before this Court are

themselves regular employees governed by structured pay

scales. Their claim is not for minimum pay protection against

exploitative engagement but for equation with entirely different

cadres under different establishments. The factual and legal

context of Jagjit Singh (supra) therefore bears no application

to the present controversy.

42) The Court also cannot overlook the larger administrative

ramifications of the relief sought. Acceptance of the petitioners‟

claim would disturb the long -standing parity maintained

amongst various industrial trades within the respondent

establishment itself and would amount to judicial

restructuring of cadre hierarchy and pay architecture. Such

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exercise falls beyond the permissible contours of judicial

review under Article 226.

43) For all the aforesaid reasons, this Court is not inclined to hold

that the impugned decision suffers from arbitrariness,

perversity, hostile discrimination or violation of constitutional

mandate as alleged, warranting interference. The petitioners

have failed to establish that they constitute the same class as

electricians employed in the various Central Government

departments relied upon by them. On the contrary, the

materials on record clearly establish that they belong to a

separate industrial cadre under a distinct corporate employer

governed by an independent settlement and service structure.

The writ petitioners therefore cannot claim parity as a matter

of constitutional right.

44) For the reasons as discussed above, the instant writ petition

No. WPA 27338 of 2017 stands dismissed.

45) Urgent certified copy of this judgment, if applied for, be

supplied to the parties upon compliance with all requisite

formalities.

(Rai Chattopadhyay, J.)