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IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK

CMP No.1424 of 2026

CNR No.- ODHC010635932026

(In the matter of an application under Article 227 of the

Constitution of India, 1950).

Amaresh Sarkar …. Petitioner (s)

-versus-

Cuttack Durgabari Samity, Cuttack

& Ors.

….

Opposite Party (s)

Advocates appeared in the case through Hybrid Mode:

For Petitioner (s) : Mr. Bibekananda Bhuyan, Sr. Adv.

Along with

Mr. Sourav Suman Bhuyan, Adv.

For Opposite Party (s) : Mr. Surya Prasad Mishra, Sr. Adv.

Along with

Mr. Amlan Mishra, Adv.

(for O.P. No.1)

Mr. P.P. Behera, ASC (for O.P. Nos.2 & 3)

CORAM:

DR. JUSTICE SANJEEB K PANIGRAHI

DATE OF HEARING:-28.08.2026

DATE OF JUDGMENT:- 29.08.2026

Dr. Sanjeeb K Panigrahi, J.

1. The Petitioner has instituted the present Civil Miscellaneous Petition

under Article 227 of the Constitution of India assailing the legality,

propriety and correctness of the order dated 03.08.2026 passed by the

learned 1

st

Addl. Senior Civil Judge, Cuttack, in C.S. No.9 of 2011/C.S.

No.424 of 2022. By the impugned order, the learned Trial Court has CMP/1424/2026

ODHC010635932026

2026:OHC:70

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rejected the petition dated 23.07.2026 filed by the defendant No.3 (the

present Petitioner) to mark the certified copy of the judgment and

decree passed in F.A. No.16 of 1968 as exhibit and admit the same in

evidence during the stage of argument. The impugned order, being

devoid of reasons and reflecting complete non-application of judicial

mind, has caused serious prejudice and grave hardship to the

Petitioner. It is, therefore, liable to be set aside in exercise of the

supervisory jurisdiction of this Court.

I. FACTUAL MATRIX OF THE CASE:

2. The brief facts of the case are as follows:

(i) The present dispute pertains to a parcel of land situated in

Cuttack town and principally concerns the nature and legal

character of the possession exercised by Cuttack Durgabari

Samity (Opposite Party No. 1) over the said property. Opposite

Party No.1, as plaintiff, instituted C.S. No.09 of 2011 before the

learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), 1

st

Court, Cuttack, against

the present Petitioner and other opposite parties, seeking

declaration of right, title and interest and exclusive possession

over the suit schedule property, along with other consequential

reliefs.

(ii) Subsequently, the present Petitioner as plaintiff instituted C.S.

No.424 of 2022 before the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division),

1

st

Court, Cuttack, seeking, inter alia, a decree for recovery of

possession and permanent injunction in respect of the same

property, together with other consequential reliefs.

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(iii) Since both the suits relate to the same suit property and

substantially involve the same parties and interconnected

questions of fact and law, the Petitioner approached the learned

District Judge, Cuttack, by filing Tr. P. (Civil) No.06 of 2022,

seeking transfer of C.S. No.09 of 2011 to the Court of the learned

Civil Judge (Senior Division), Cuttack, where C.S. No.424 of

2022 was pending.

(iv) The learned District Judge, Cuttack, allowed the said transfer

petition and directed transfer of C.S. No. 09 of 2011 to the Court

of the learned Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division), Cuttack,

for analogous trial along with C.S. No.424 of 2022, with a further

direction to dispose of both the suits by a common judgment.

(v) The suit land was originally recorded under the Khasmahal in

favour of Sri Rameswar Nath Suthoo (Defendant No.4) and Sri

Motilal Pandit, the father of Defendant Nos.5 and 6, as

pattadars. One Smt. Chandan Bilasini Dasi, wife of Late Kali

Krushna Sarkar of Alamchand Bazar, Cuttack, was the

darpatadar in respect of the suit property and was paying rent

to the pattadars in whose names the land stood recorded.

(vi) On 10.09.1967, Smt. Chandan Bilasini Dasi, being the

darpatadar, granted a licence in favour of Cuttack Durga Bari

Samiti, represented by the then President of the Samity, Sri

Paritosh Kumar Bose (since dead). A deed of licence was

executed by the parties on the same date in the presence of

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witnesses, incorporating specific terms and conditions binding

upon both parties.

(vii) Under the terms of the said licence, the licensee was permitted

to construct a compound wall, Mandap and thereafter Pandal,

together with such other permanent and temporary structures

as might be required for conducting Durga Puja, Laxmi Puja and

other religious functions, as well as social and cultural activities

as decided by the licensee. The deed further contained a specific

stipulation that the descendants of the licensor would have no

right to interfere with the possession of the licensee over the suit

land.

(viii) The licence also stipulated that it could be cancelled only in the

event that the prescribed pujas were not performed for three

consecutive years. Pursuant to the licence, the plaintiff-Samiti

entered into possession of the suit property and has since

remained in continuous, peaceful and undisturbed possession

thereof.

(ix) Over the years, the Samiti made substantial permanent

constructions and developments upon the suit land from its

own funds. These included a Puja Mandap constructed of brick

and mortar with RCC roof, walls with iron-grill gates, a store

room, stage and platform in front of the Puja Mandap, two shop

rooms, a borewell and other ancillary structures. The

constructions are of a permanent character and substantial

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amounts have been expended by the Samiti for their

construction and maintenance.

(x) The Opposite Party/ Plaintiff-Samiti/Society claims to have been

in exclusive, peaceful and uninterrupted possession of the suit

land since 1967 under a licence granted by the concerned

licensors/pattadars. According to the plaintiff, the licence has

become irrevocable and neither the landlords nor the plaintiff

has disputed the respective rights of the pattadars or the

Khasmahal Authority.

(xi) The Petitioner (Defendant No.3), claiming to be the adopted son

and successor of Chandan Bilasini Dasi, subsequently obtained

recognition of his claim as Darpattadar from the Hon’ble

Supreme Court. The plaintiff contended that, as successor to the

licensor, Defendant No.3 is also bound by the terms of the

license, which prohibit interference with the plaintiff’s

possession.

(xii) The plaintiff stated that it constructed a boundary wall around

the suit property for protection of the property and facilitating

the performance of puja ceremonies. A portion of the western

boundary wall subsequently became damaged. When the

plaintiff attempted to reconstruct the broken portion, Defendant

No.3 allegedly obstructed the work and allegedly used anti-

social elements to interfere with the plaintiff’s possession and

enjoyment of the property.

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(xiii) Consequently, the plaintiff instituted the aforesaid suit seeking

protection of its possession and right to enjoy the suit land,

including reconstruction of the damaged western boundary

wall.

(xiv) The Petitioner (defendant No.3 in the suit) has disputed the said

deed of license in the suit. The present dispute arose when after

closure of the evidence in the suit, the present Petitioner filed an

application before the learned trial Court to mark a judgment of

this Court to exhibit in the suit without even recalling their

witnesses. The present Opposite Party No.1 also filed its

objection.

(xv) The learned trial Court rejected the said application on the

ground that no explanation has been provided in the

application. The said order of rejection is impugned in the

present CMP by the Petitioner/ Defendant No.3.

II. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER:

3. The learned counsel for the Petitioner earnestly made the following

submissions in support of his contentions:

(i) The Petitioner submits that the C.S. No.09 of 2011 filed by

Cuttack Durgabari Samity (Opposite Party No.1, Plaintiff in the

suit) against Shri Amaresh Sarkar (Petitioner, Defendant No.3 in

the suit), Tahasildar, Cuttack Sadar (Defendant No. 2), among

others. The Samity sought declaration of right, title, interest and

exclusive possession over the suit land on the strength of an

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unregistered lease deed executed by the adopting mother of the

Petitioner (Defendant No. 3).

(ii) Similarly, C.S. No.424 of 2022 filed by Shri Amaresh Sarkar

(Petitioner in the present case, Plaintiff in the suit) against

Cuttack Durgabari Samity (Opp. Party No.1 in the present case

and Defendant No.1 in the suit). Shri Sarkar sought a decree for

recovery of possession and permanent injunction.

(iii) The suit land was originally held by Sri Ram Narayan Nath

Sahoo and Sri Monilal Pandit as pattadars (landholders) under

the Khasmahal (Government land administration). Smt.

Chandan Bilasini Dasi, wife of late Kali Krushna Sarkar, was the

darpatedar (sub-lessee) and paid rent. On September 10, 1967,

Chandan Bilasini Dasi allegedly granted a lease-cum-license to

Cuttack Durgabari Samity to construct a puja mandap (prayer

hall) and other structures for religious and cultural functions. A

deed of license was purportedly executed with certain

conditions, including that the licensor's descendants could not

interfere, and the license could only be cancelled if pujas were

not performed for three consecutive years. The Samity claims to

have constructed permanent structures (mandap, store room,

stage, shop rooms, borewell) and spent significant funds,

contending that the license has become irrevocable. They assert

exclusive, undisturbed and peaceful possession since 1967, with

a limited, non-evictable title. The Samity alleges that Shri

Amaresh Sarkar (Defendant No.3 in the suit) is creating

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disturbances and obstructing the reconstruction of a boundary

wall.

(iv) The petitioner (Defendant No.3 in the suit) claims to be the

adopted son and successor-in-interest of Chandan Bilasini Dasi

and his claim was later allowed by the Supreme Court in Civil

Appeal No.2462 of 1977.

(v) It is further contended that the alleged license deed (marked as

Ext.3) is a fabricated document created by Samity members to

unlawfully grab the property. The Samity only had permissive

possession over the suit property. The said Chandan Bilasini

Dasi, the adopting mother of the Petitioner was not legally

competent to transfer or encumber the property, as it was

bequeathed to her under a WILL by her husband- Kali Krishna

Sarkar and she had only held a life interest over the same.

Therefore, any license or lease granted by her is invalid. The

Petitioner also stated that he revoked the permission granted to

the Samity on November 5, 2016 & filed C.S. No.424/2022 for

ejectment.

(vi) Since both the suits pertain to the same property and parties, the

learned District Judge, Cuttack transferred C.S. No.09 of 2011 to

the court of the learned 1

st

Addl. Civil Judge (Sr. Divn.), Cuttack,

for analogous trial with C.S. No.424 of 2022, with a direction for

passing a common judgment.

(vii) It is further contended that at the time for filing of Petitioner's

impugned application that led to the impugned order, both civil

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suits were at the argument stage. The application sought to

mark the certified copy of the judgment and decree passed in

F.A. No. 16/1968 (First Appeal No.16 of 1968) which has

conclusively determined the adoption of the Petitioner and the

alienable interest of late Chandan Bilasini Dasi.

(viii) The learned 1

st

Addl. Senior Civil Judge, Cuttack rejected the

said application on the ground that the Petitioner failed to

provide a sufficient reason as to how the document was

necessary for proper adjudication of the suits.

(ix) It is further contended that the judgment and decree passed in

F.A. No.16 of 1968 is critically important and should have been

admitted. The Petitioner contended that this judgment is

essential to determine the “fact in issue”, specifically, whether

Opposite Party No.1 is in lawful possession of the suit property

or merely has permissive possession. Moreover, the Opp. Party

No.1 has disputed the adoption of the Petitioner and questioned

his locus to maintain the suit.

(x) It is further contended that the judgment, which was sought to

be marked as exhibit passed by this Court, directly addressed

the legal competence of Chandan Bilasini Dasi to transfer

property. It explicitly stated that she was not competent to

encumber or transfer properties bequeathed to her by her

deceased husband’s WILL, as she only possessed a life interest

in them. Consequently, a Sale Deed (document of sale) executed

by her was set aside by this Court.

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(xi) The Opposite Party No.1’s claim over the suit property is based

on an unregistered lease deed (which was initially a license

deed) allegedly executed by Chandan Bilasini Dasi. The

judgment passed in F.A. No.16 of 1968 directly impacts

Chandan Bilasini Dasi’s power to alienate (transfer ownership)

of the property, thereby affecting the genuineness and legal

validity of the lease deed relied upon by Opposite Party No.1.

The Petitioner highlights that Opposite Party No.1 in his written

objection did not deny the relevancy of the document but only

objected to its admission on the grounds of delay in the trial.

(xii) Learned Senior counsel has also placed reliance in the case of

Billa Jagan Mohan Reddy & Anr. v. Billa Sanjeeva Reddy &

Ors.

1

, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as follows:-

“4. Order 13, Rule 1 provides thus:

“1. Documentary evidence to be produced at or before the

settlement of issues.— (1) The parties or their pleaders

shall produce, at or before the settlement of issues, all the

documentary evidence of every description in their

possession or power, on which they intend to rely, and

which has not already been filed in Court, and all

documents which the Court has ordered to be produced.

(2) The Court shall receive the documents so produced:

Provided that they are accompanied by an accurate list

thereof prepared in such form as the High Court directs.”

It is clear from its bare reading that the parties or their

counsel shall be required to produce all the documentary

evidence in their possession or power which they intend

to rely on to establish their right along with pleadings or

before settlement of the issues. The court is enjoined

1

(1994) 4 Supreme Court Cases 659

Page 11

under sub-rule (2) to receive such documents provided

they are accompanied by an accurate list thereof prepared

in the prescribed form. If they are not in the party's

possession or custody, it shall be filed by the party along

with an application to condone the delay in filing them.

The explanation for delay is not as rigorous as one filed

under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. These documents

were not in the possession or custody of the appellants,

but they have obtained certified copies from the Revenue

Authorities and sought to be produced. It is undoubted

that there is a delay in production of the said documents.

But the trial court had stated that the application was

filed at the stage of arguments, seeking to produce those

documents and sought to rely upon the documents. It is

settled law that, if the documents are found to be relevant

to decide the real issue in the controversy, and when the

court felt that interest of justice requires that the

documents may be received, exercising the power under

Order 41, Rule 27 CPC the appellate court would receive

the documents and consider their effect thereof. When

such is the position, when the documents are sought to be

produced in the trial court, before the arguments are

completed, normally they may be received; an

opportunity given to prove them and rebuttal if any and

their relevance and effect they may have, be considered in

deciding the issues arising in the controversy. Under

these circumstances, the trial court was not justified in

refusing to condone the delay and to receive the

documents. The High Court also committed the same

error in not considering the effect in this behalf in the

right perspective. The orders are accordingly set aside

and the delay in filing the documents is condoned. The

trial court is directed to receive the documents, give an

opportunity to the parties to prove the documents and if

necessary, opportunity to the respondent to rebut the

same and then dispose of the reference according to law.”

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(xiii) In view of the above submission and taking into account the

ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, learned counsel

for the Petitioner seeks to allow the CMP and allow the

Petitioner to exhibit the aforesaid document in the suit.

III. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE OPPOSITE PARTY NO.1:

4. Per contra, the learned counsel for Opposite Party No.1 earnestly made

the submission that the present CMP deserves to be rejected in limine.

(i) The Opposite Party No.1 submitted that, the so-called document

vide Annexure-8 which the Petitioner had prayed before the

learned Trial Court to mark as an exhibit, is a Judgment of this

Court. The certified copy of the said Judgment was obtained in

the year 2004 which is absolutely clear from the last page of the

said document. The Petitioner in his Petition before the learned

Trial Court (Annexure-5) has not provided any explanation as to

why the said document was not filed at the time of filing of

Written Statement or settlement of issues or even at the time of

evidence. Only after closure of the evidence the Petitioner

(Defendant No.3) filed an application to mark the present

document as an exhibit.

(ii) It is clear that only to avoid cross-examination with respect to

the said document the Petitioner (Defendant No.3) very cleverly

wants to exhibit the document after closure of the evidence. It is

a right of this Opposite Party No.1 being the Plaintiff in the suit

to cross-examine the witnesses.

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(iii) The Petitioner has also not mentioned as to how the present

document is relevant to the facts of the present Case. Fact

remains that the said judgment/document does not involve the

present Opposite Party No.1 and nor does it involve the present

Suit land. Also, no explanation has been provided as to why the

document was not filed at the time of evidence. The learned

Trial Court has rightly rejected the petition of the Petitioner on

this ground alone.

(iv) It is submitted that the said document vide Annexure-8 is a

judgment of this Court. A judgment of this Court can be relied

upon at any stage of the case. The same cannot and need not be

marked as an exhibit.

(v) The Petitioner at the time of argument of the present CMP stated

that Opposite Party No.1 has disputed the adoption of the

Petitioner and that is why the present document is relevant. The

same is totally incorrect. The Opposite Party No.1 in fact, admits

that the Petitioner is the adopted son of Kali Krushna Sarkar

(father) and Chandan Bilasini Dasi (mother). The said admission

is evident from the cause title of the Plaint filed by this Opposite

Party No.1 wherein Defendant No.3 (Petitioner) has been

reflected as the son of Kali Krushna Sarkar. Therefore, the said

document is not at all relevant for the adjudication of the suit

and is being filed just to delay the entire Suit.

(vi) Even if the present CMP is dismissed and the said document is

not marked as an Exhibit in the Suit, still then the Petitioner can

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rely on the said document as the same is a Judgment of this

Court. Therefore, no prejudice will be caused to the Petitioner in

any manner. But, on the contrary, if the said document is

allowed to be marked as an Exhibit, then the Opposite Party

No.1 will be deprived of its valuable right to cross-examine the

witness of the Petitioner with respect to the present document

and this document will go to trial without being put to cross-

examination. It is a settled law that at no cost the right of cross-

examination of party can be taken away. Therefore, the learned

trial Court has rightly rejected the petition of the Petitioner.

(vii) Learned counsel also relied upon the decision of the Supreme

Court in the case of Bagai Construction (through its proprietor

Lalit Bagai) v. Gupta Building Material Store

2

, wherein it has

been held as follows:

“15. After change of various provisions by way of

amendment in CPC, it is desirable that the recording of

evidence should be continuous and followed by

arguments and decision thereon within a reasonable

time. This Court has repeatedly held that courts should

constantly endeavour to follow such a time schedule. If

the same is not followed, the purpose of amending several

provisions in the Code would get defeated. In fact,

applications for adjournments, reopening and recalling

are interim measures, could be as far as possible avoided

and only in compelling and acceptable reasons, those

applications are to be considered. We are satisfied that the

plaintiff has filed those two applications before the trial

court in order to overcome the lacunae in the plaint,

pleadings and evidence. It is not the case of the plaintiff

2

(2013) 14 Supreme Court Cases 1

Page 15

that it was not given adequate opportunity. In fact, the

materials placed show that the plaintiff has filed both the

applications after more than sufficient opportunity had

been granted to it to prove its case. During the entire

trial, those documents have remained in exclusive

possession of the plaintiff, still the plaintiff has not placed

those bills on record. It further shows that final

arguments were heard on a number of times and the

judgment was reserved and only thereafter, in order to

improve its case, the plaintiff came forward with such an

application to avoid the final judgment against it. Such

course is not permissible even with the aid of Section 151

CPC.”

(viii) He has also placed reliance in the case of Pitani Sai Ganesh

Kumar v. Pitani Nagamani & Ors.

3

, wherein this Court has held

as follows:

“9. After closure of evidence, the plaintiff filed an

application to mark the certified copy of RSD No.

10161201295 dated 26.12.2012 and the certified copy of

deed of re-conveyance dated 29.8.2000 as exhibits. The

plaintiff was in possession of the deed of re-conveyance

since 2000 and the sale deed since 2012. No plausible

explanation has been offered to the satisfaction of Court

for not filing the documents on or before the settlement of

issues. The object of Order 13 Rule 1 CPC is to lay down

the stage when a party shall file documentary evidence so

that each knows on what document the other party seeks

to rely and gets ready for trial. Merely using the words

"unavoidable circumstances" are not suffice. The

discretionary power of the Court has to be used

sparingly. The said power is not intended to be used to

fill up omissions in the evidence. In the wake of aforesaid,

the petition, sans merit, deserves dismissal. Accordingly,

3

In CMP No.1534 of 2014 decided on 10.02.2017

Page 16

the same is dismissed. There shall be no order as to

costs.”

(ix) In view of the above, learned Senior Counsel contended that the

impugned order dated 03.08.2026 passed by the learned trial

Court rejecting the petition of the Petitioner is totally correct and

legal.

IV. FINDING OF THE LEARNED TRIAL COURT :

5. On perusal of the petition, case records and other relevant documents,

learned trial court found that no reason has been assigned in the

petition explaining the manner in which the document is necessary for

proper adjuration of the suits. Merely stating in the petition that the

document would throw some light for adjudication of the issues

involved in the suits, is not sufficient to accept the document at the

stage when the suits have matured for argument and should cause

unnecessary hardship to the Opposite Party. Accordingly, the learned

trial Court dismissed the petition filed by the Petitioner vide order

dated 03.08.2026, which is impugned herein.

V. COURT’S REASONING AND ANALYSIS:

6. Heard learned Senior Counsel for the parties and perused the record

placed before the Court. The principal question falling for

consideration is a narrow one. It is whether a certified copy of the

judgment of this Court in First Appeal No.16 of 1968 may be received

in evidence and marked as an exhibit in two analogously tried suits

which have reached the stage of argument. The question wears a

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procedural dress though its consequence is not procedural at all. A

document shut out at this stage is a document which the trial court

shall never see. A finding on title rendered without it, is a finding

rendered upon a record which both sides know to be incomplete.

7. It is necessary at the threshold to state what this Court does not intend

to decide whether Chandan Bilasini Dasi was competent to execute

the deed dated 10.09.1967 nor does it decide whether that instrument

is a licence or a lease. It also does not decide whether the possession of

Opposite Party No.1 is lawful or permissive. These are the questions

which the learned trial court shall answer in the common judgment.

The solitary question for consideration in the present case is whether

the learned trial court was justified in refusing to permit a public

record of this Court to come in the file.

8. The Civil Procedure Code deals with the stage of production of

documents with some care especially in Order VII Rule 14(3) which

provides that a document which ought to have been produced by the

plaintiff along with the plaint and is not so produced shall not be

received in evidence on his behalf at the hearing of the suit without

the leave of the Court. Order VIII Rule 1-A(3) makes identical

provision for a defendant. Order XIII Rule 1 requires the parties to

produce their documentary evidence in original on or before the

settlement of issues. Order XVIII Rule 17-A which permitted reception

of evidence not previously within the knowledge of a party stood

deleted with effect from 01.07.2002.

Page 18

9. The petitioner occupies both positions in the two suits. He is

Defendant No.3 in C.S. No.09 of 2011 and plaintiff in C.S. No.424 of

2022. Order VIII Rule 1-A(3) governs him in the former and Order VII

Rule 14(3) in the latter. Both provisions employ the same three words

that is “without the leave of the Court”. So, the Code, therefore, erects

any sort of bar for accepting rather it erects a discipline and entrusts

the relaxation of that discipline to judicial discretion.

10. The effect of the deletion of Order XVIII Rule 17-A stands

authoritatively explained in K.K. Velusamy v. N. Palanisamy

4

wherein it was held that the deletion does not mean that no evidence

can be received after a party closes its evidence. It means that the

amended Code contemplated little or no interval between the close of

evidence and the conclusion of argument. Where such an interval

does arise and a party comes upon evidence which it could not lay

hands upon earlier, in that event the court may in exercise of its

inherent power under Section 151 permit its production, if the same is

relevant and necessary in the interest of justice and subject to such

terms as may be imposed. The same decision also cautions that Order

XVIII Rule 17 is no device for filling up gaps and that the power must

be used sparingly. Both limbs of that holding must be given effect.

Here, the one restrains and the other preserves. Similar views have

been echoed by Supreme Court in Shubhkaran Singh Vrs. Abhayraj

Singh & Ors.

5

and K. Bharathamma Vrs.- Bandaru Sakku Bai & Ors.

6

.

4

2011 (11) SCC 275

5

(2025) SCC Online SC 1028

Page 19

11. The power so conferred is out and out discretionary and its exercise is

not mechanical or casual. In Kanda v. Waghu

7

the Privy Council has

very succinctly held that where the question is one of admitting public

records at a later stage, the court has a discretion and that generally

speaking, it would be a wise exercise of that discretion to admit such

evidence. It was further held that the question must be decided in

each case depending on its own circumstances. That formulation has

lost none of its force even today. It furnishes the answer to much of

the argument advanced at the Bar.

12. In Kumar Gopika Raman Roy vs Atal Singh

8

wherein it has been held

that the Court has a discretion, and while generally speaking it will be

a wise exercise of the discretion to admit such evidence which has

been put thus:

“the rule of exclusion, however, only comes into operation

when the documents on which the parties rely should have

been, but were not, produced at the first hearing. Now,

according to the evidence at the date of the first hearing,

three documents were not in the possession or power of the

plaintiff, and the plaintiff and his advisers did not know of

their existence so as to enable them to inspect them and form

an opinion as to whether they would rely on them or not. In

these circumstances it cannot be said that they should have

been produced at the first hearing and therefore the rule does

not authorise the exclusion. Further, as has been held in

India, even where the rules of exclusion apply and the

documents cannot be filed without the leave of the Court,

that leave should not ordinarily be refused where the

6

(2026) SCC Online SC 1484

7

AIR 1950 PC 68

8

(1929)31BOMLR734

Page 20

documents are official records of undoubted authenticity

which may assist the Court to decide rightly the issues

before it”.

13. In a case where leave is sought to bring a document on record after

evidence has been closed, the court must satisfy itself upon two things

that is, the first is whether the document is relevant and necessary for

a proper adjudication of the controversy and the second is whether

the delay stands explained and if it does not whether as to the default

is such that the party must be shut out or whether it can be

compensated in terms. Both the enquiries are obligatory.

14. In the present case, the impugned order dated 03.08.2026 records that

no reason has been assigned in the petition explaining the manner in

which the document is necessary for proper adjudication of the suits.

It further records that a mere statement that the document will throw

some light is not sufficient at a stage when the suits have become

matured for argument and that exhibit of the documents at belated

stage would cause unnecessary hardship to the opposite party.

Relevance is not established by the adjectives employed in a petition

rather, it is established by the relation which the document bears to

the issues and that relation is to be found in the record. The learned

trial court had before it, the plaint and the written statements and the

issues and the evidence. It was not confined to the four corners of the

application where the bearing of the document was apparent from the

file itself. Delay and inconvenience may be an important consideration

to refuse but so long as the trial is alive and the court retains the

Page 21

power to impose terms by permitting recall or by allowing rebuttal by

an award of costs.

15. The authenticity of the documents which is sought to be produced is

not going to be tested in the cross examination and is also not open to

doubt. The objection by the respondent has been confined to the

timing of production and to relevance. It pleads further that the earlier

round of litigation concerning the estate of Kali Krushna Sarkar

travelled up to the Supreme Court. The document now tendered is the

documentary counterpart of a plea which has stood upon the record

since 2016. A party who seeks to prove what he has pleaded is not

filling up a lacuna. He is discharging a burden which he assumed

when he filed his written statement.

16. In Billa Jagan Mohan Reddy v. Billa Sanjeeva Reddy

9

wherein the

Supreme Court has held that where documents are found relevant to

decide the real issue in the controversy and are sought to be produced

in the trial court before the arguments are completed they may

normally be received with an opportunity to prove them and to rebut

them and with their relevance and effect being considered while

deciding the issues. It was held that the trial court in that case was not

justified in refusing to condone the delay. A delay which can be

compensated in costs does not become a ground of forfeiture merely

because it is long.

9

(1994) 4 SCC 659

Page 22

17. Further, a limited recall is not a trial de novo. The submission that

exhibiting of a single public document would compel the trial to begin

afresh does not bear scrutiny.

18. One of the objections raised in vehemence by the Respondent is that a

judgment of this Court may be relied upon at any stage and need not

be marked as an exhibit. The submission overlooks a distinction of

some importance. A judgment cited as an authority is a source of law.

It is addressed to the court and it binds by reason of what it lays down

and it needs no exhibit. A judgment tendered for what it adjudicated

between particular persons in respect of particular property is a fact.

Facts come upon the record only through evidence. The petitioner

tenders this judgment for the latter purpose. It must therefore be

exhibited if it is to be used at all.

VI. CONCLUSION:

19. In view of the foregoing analysis and upon careful consideration of

the material facts and circumstances of the case, this Court is of the

considered opinion that the order dated 03.08.2026 cannot be

sustained. It does not advert to the public character of the document

or to the consequence that it requires no proof.

20. In the result C.M.P. No.1424 of 2026 is allowed upon the following

terms.

(i) The order dated 03.08.2026 passed by the learned 1st Additional

Civil Judge (Senior Division) Cuttack in C.S. No.09 of 2011 and C.S.

No.424 of 2022 is quashed.

Page 23

(ii) The application of the petitioner for exhibition of the certified

copy of the judgment and decree in First Appeal No.16 of 1968 is

allowed. The learned trial court shall receive the document and

mark it as an exhibit from the side of Defendant No.3 in C.S. No.09

of 2011 and the plaintiff in C.S. No.424 of 2022.

(iii) The marking shall be subject to all objections of Opposite Party

No.1 as to the relevance and admissibility and evidentiary value of

the document including its relevance under Sections 40 to 43 of the

Evidence Act and the extent to which it operates against one who

was no party to that appeal. All such objections are kept open and

shall be decided by the learned trial court in the common

judgment.

(iv) Opposite Party No.1 shall be at liberty to recall D.W.2 for cross-

examination confined to the said document and to lead rebuttal

evidence limited to it if so advised. Any such application shall be

filed within two weeks of the appearance of the parties before the

learned trial court and shall be disposed of forthwith.

(v) The petitioner shall pay costs of Rs.20,000 to Opposite Party

No.1. Payment of such costs shall be a condition precedent to the

marking of the document and in default the impugned order shall

stand revived.

(vi) The parties shall appear before the learned trial court on the

date fixed without unnecessary adjournment. The learned trial

court shall hear and dispose of both the suits by a common

Page 24

judgment as expeditiously as possible and preferably within three

months of that date.

21. It is made clear that the observations herein are confined to the

question of the exhibition of the document in evidence. Nothing stated

shall be construed as an expression of opinion upon the competence of

any document or any evidence. All such issues shall be decided by the

learned trial court uninfluenced by this order.

22. The C.M.P. is disposed of, accordingly.

23. Interim order, if any, passed earlier stands vacated.

(Dr. Sanjeeb K Panigrahi)

Judge

Orissa High Court, Cuttack,

Dated the 29

th

August, 2026/