Page 1 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL Nos.4676-4677 OF 2013

AMIN MERCHANT …. APPELLANT

VERSUS

CHAIRMAN, CENTRAL BOARD OF

EXCISE & REVENUE & ORS. …. RESONDENTS

JUDGMENT

N.V. RAMANA, J.

1.These appeals, by special leave, have been filed against the

impugned judgment and order dated 02.09.2011 in Writ Petition

No.1761 of 2009 and order dated 24.11.2011 in Review Petition

No.24 of 2011 in Writ Petition No.1761 of 2009 respectively, of the

High Court of Judicature at Bombay, by which the High Court has

dismissed the Writ Petition filed by the appellant herein and also

dismissed the Review Petition by holding that no error apparent on

record has been made out.

Page 2 2.The facts leading to these appeals, in brief, are that the

appellant imported eight consignments of goods falling under Tariff

Sub-Heading 2208.10 of the Customs Tariff, namely, “Compound

alcoholic preparations of a kind used for the manufacture of

beverages” during the financial years 1993-94 and 1994-95. The

customs authorities assessed the goods imported provisionally and

subjected them to a prescribed rate of duty of Rs.300/- per liter or

400% whichever is higher specified in respect of Sub-Heading

2208.10 of the Customs Tariff for 1993-94 and 1994-95. The

appellant claims to have deposited the amount of duty provisionally

assessed on the assessable value declared in the eight bills of entry.

According to the appellant, he cleared the goods for home

consumption during financial years 1993-94 and 1994-95. Between

the years 1994 and 2001 the appellant addressed several

communications, inter alia, to the Central Board of Excise and

Customs and to the Tariff Research Unit (TRU) of the Union Ministry

of Finance. The grievance of the appellant is that the rate which has

been prescribed for goods falling under Tariff Sub-Heading 2208.10 is

higher than that was authorized in the Budget Proposals during

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Page 3 financial years 1993-94 and 1994-95. The appellant took recourse to

the provisions of the Right to Information Act in order to procure

relevant information from the concerned authorities. According to the

appellant, the authorities have not furnished the relevant information.

3.Not satisfied with the attitude of the authorities, the appellant

preferred a Writ Petition before the High Court seeking the following

reliefs: (a) a writ of Mandamus directing the first and second

respondents herein to issue a notification u/s.25(1) of the Customs

Act, 1962 (for short ‘the Act’) in order to exempt goods falling under

Tariff Sub-Heading 2208.10 so as to give effect to the Budget

proposal announced by the Finance Minister (FM) in Parliament for

financial years l993-94 and 1994-95; (b) a direction to the Chief

Commissioner of Customs to finalize assessment of the eight bills of

entry after a notification is issued by the first and second respondents

u/s.25(1) of the Act; (c) a writ of Mandamus directing the second

respondent to issue a notification u/s.25(2) of the Act for granting

exemption from customs duty for goods falling under Tariff

Sub-Heading 2208.10 for financial years 1993-94 and 1994-95; (d) an

order for refund after assessments are finalized and (e) an order for

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Page 4 the payment of interest at the rate of 12% p.a. on the refund that is

ordered.

4.The High Court has dismissed the Writ Petition by the

impugned judgment and order dated 2.9.2011. Being dissatisfied

with the dismissal of his writ petition, the appellant preferred a Review

Petition, which was also dismissed by the High Court by the

impugned judgment and order dated 24.11.2011.

5.Heard the appellant, appearing in person, and learned Senior

Counsel for the respondents.

6.The appellant, appearing in person, vehemently submits that

the budget proposals for 1993-94 stipulated, inter alia, a reduction in

effective rate of import duty on items which had then attracted a rate

of duty higher than 85%, to 85% advalorem, except on dried grapes,

almonds, alcoholic beverages, ball and roller bearings and passenger

baggage; the Budget proposals for 1994-95 similarly contemplated a

reduction in effective rates of customs duty on items which until then

attracted a duty higher than 65%, to 65% except, inter alia, on

alcoholic beverages. ‘CAP of a kind used in the manufacture of

beverages’ falling under sub-heading 2208.10 of the Act are not

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Page 5 covered by the said exceptions ‘dried grapes, almonds, alcoholic

beverages, ball and roller bearings and passenger baggage’ as

mentioned in the Budge proposal appearing at Sl.No.B 1. Hence the

import duty on ‘CAP of a kind used in the manufacture of beverages’

falling under sub-heading 2208.10 should have been read as “85%”

for the financial year 1993-1994 in keeping with the Budget Proposal

at Sl.No.B1 duly passed by the Parliament for the financial year

1993-94 so also for the financial year 1994-95, it should have been

“65%”.

7.The appellant would further submit that all the notifications

contained in the Explanatory Memorandum 1993-94 and 1994-95

were to give effect to the Budget Proposals duly passed and

legislated by the Parliament and rectify the erroneous tariff rates

prescribed by the TRU department in the Customs Tariff Act, Finance

Bill and Finance Act for 1993-94 and 1994-95; Budget proposals

announced by the FM in the Parliament are duly passed and/or

approved by the Parliament, no person, executive, bureaucrat or any

authority or Court of Law has the authority and/or power to alter or

amend the same. If the executives are allowed to prescribe any tariff

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Page 6 rates contrary to the Budget Proposals duly authorized by the

Parliament, then the Budget Proposals duly passed by the Parliament

will have no meaning and will be rendered nugatory and thus opening

the flood gates for ‘corrupt practice’.

8.He also submits that the goods falling under sub-heading

2208.10 of the Customs Tariff Act are not ‘alcoholic beverages’ but

‘Compound alcoholic preparations of a kind used for the manufacture

of beverages’ falling under sub-heading 2208.10 in the Customs Tariff

Act 1993-94 and 1994-95, not being ‘alcoholic beverages’ and not

being covered by the exceptions mentioned in the said proposal at

Sl.No. B1, the rate of duty duly passed and legislated by the

Parliament should have been prescribed as 85% for the year 1993-94

and as 65% for the year 1994-95. The statutory term ‘Compound

alcoholic preparations of a kind used for the manufacture of

beverages’ clearly explains that it covers compound alcoholic

preparations for the manufacture of beverages and that it is a product

that precedes the consumable ‘alcoholic beverage’ and hence it

cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be equated to and or termed as

‘alcoholic beverages’ in itself. If “Compound alcoholic preparations of

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Page 7 a kind used for the manufacture of beverages’ are sought to be

included in the term ‘spirits, liquors and other spirituous beverages’

and or sought to be treated as ‘Alcoholic Beverages’ then the

statutory term ‘Compound alcoholic preparations of a kind used for

the manufacture of beverages’ distinctly falling under sub-heading

2208.10 will be redundant and such a perverse interpretation is not

permissible as it will alter the statutory heading 22.08 and

sub-heading 2208.10 in the Customs Tariff Act, 1975. He would

further submit that Harmonized System of Nomenclature (HSN), an

International Regulation evolved in 1986 by the Customs

Co-operation Council, Brussels, which is adopted by the Govt. of

India, clearly recognizes that ‘CAP of a kind used in the manufacture

of beverages’ are distinct and different products from ‘alcoholic

beverage’ which are intended for immediate consumption and in the

said HSN Explanatory Notes dealing with sub-heading 2208 it is

expressly stated that “these preparations are not intended for

immediate consumption and thus can be distinguished from the

liquors and other spirituous beverages of this heading”.

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Page 8 9.In this connection, he places reliance on a Judgment of the

Bombay High Court in Bussa Overseas and Properties (Pvt.) Ltd.

Vs. Union of India, reported in 1991 (53) ELT 65 (Bom.), wherein

the Bombay High Court, while dealing with classification has held that

goods falling under sub-heading 2208.10, namely, ‘CAP of a kind

used in the manufacture of beverages’ are not consumable as such,

have to be sold to the distilleries where they undergo a process and

cannot be treated as Whisky, Gin or Brandy as known in the trade.

Against the said decision, Union of India has preferred S.L.P.(C)

Nos.13194-210/1991 in this Court wherein this Court has dismissed

the aforesaid SLPs upholding the decision of the Bombay High Court.

10.He also places reliance on a judgment of the High Court of

Delhi in Seagram Manufacturing Ltd. Vs. Commissioner of

Customs, New Delhi, reported in 2003 (154) ELT 610 (Tri.Del.),

which is affirmed by this Court reported in 2004 (163) ELT A 205 (SC)

wherein this Court, confirming the views of the Tribunal regarding

classification, held that ‘goods’ falling under sub-heading 2208.10 are

not intended for immediate consumption and are not ‘alcoholic

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Page 9 beverages and are classifiable under sub-heading 2208.10 of

Customs Tariff’.

11.He would further submit that the TRU department has issued

notifications for all other erroneous tariff rates prescribed by them in

the Customs Tariff Act, Finance Bill and Finance Act 1993-94 and

1994-95 to give effect to the Budget proposals duly passed and

legislated by the Parliament and the respondents cannot discriminate

in the case of the appellant and refuse to issue notifications.

12.He further submits that he is seeking a suitable notification

prescribing Customs Tariff of 85% and 65% on goods falling under

sub-heading 2208.10 to give effect to the budget proposals at Sl.No.B

1 duly passed and legislated by the Parliament for the years 1993-94

and 1994-95 since collection of tax without authority of law is in

violation of Article 265 of the Constitution and violation of the

appellant’s right to property under Article 300 A of the Constitution

and return of the excess amount of Rs.5,62,46,722/- (Rupees Five

core sixty two lakhs forty six thousand seven hundred and twenty two

only) collected from him at the time of provisional assessment for

imports made during the years 1993-94 and 1994-95 with simple

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Page 10 interest @ 12% p.a. On the point of interest, he would submit that

the respondents are liable to pay interest on the excess duty

unlawfully collected from him since 1993-94 and 1994-95 and having

retained the same since the last 20 years. In this connection, he

places reliance on Sandvik Asia Ltd. Vs. Commissioner of Income

Tax, Pune, reported in [(2006) 150 TAXMAN, 591 (SC)].

13.He would further submit that the Courts can, in exceptional

circumstances like the present one, compel officers of Respondent

No.2 to issue appropriate notification u/s.25(2) of the Customs Act,

1962, in order to give effect to the Budget Proposals so as to levy

duty on the appellant’s imports only at 85% for the F.Y. 199-94 and

65% for the F.Y. 1994-95. In this connection, he places reliance on a

judgment of this Court in Choksi Tube Co. Vs. Union of India

reported in 1998(97) ELT 404 SC.

14.He would further contend that the respondents/revenue have

illegally collected import tax/import duty without any authority of law

and deprived the appellant of profits of the said amount of

Rs.5,62,46,726/- since 1993-94 and 1994-95 and thereby put an

unreasonable restriction on the appellant’s fundamental right as

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Page 11 guaranteed by Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution, to carry on his

trade and business since 1993-94 and 1994-95. In support of this

contention, he places reliance on a Judgment of this Court in

Mohammed Yasin Vs. Town Area Committee, Jabalpur & Anr.

reported in AIR 1952 SC 115.

15.Per contra, learned Senior Counsel for respondents would

submit that the speech of the Finance Minister while presenting the

Budgetary Proposals only highlights the more important proposals of

the Budget; Budgetary changes are, in fact, enacted by the

Parliament as contained in the Finance Bill or ratified by Parliament

or implemented through notifications. The legal force for charging a

particular rate of customs duty on import of goods, is derived from the

First Schedule of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 read with notifications

issued u/s.25(1) of the Act. If any changes in the rates were intended

by Parliament it would have been reflected in the respective Finance

Bills.

16.He further submits that there was no error or discrepancy

between the budget proposals announced by the Finance Minister

and the Finance Bill. According to him, the High Court has rightly

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Page 12 held that the appellant did not dispute the fact that the goods

imported by him fell within Tariff Heading 2208.10 and the position

under the Finance Act of 1993 was that the rate of duty prescribed for

Tariff sub-heading 2208.10 was Rs.300/- per liter or 400% whichever

is higher and the High Court thus rightly held that budget proposals

and the speech of the Finance Minister in Parliament may or may not

accept the proposal as held in B.K. Industries V. Union of India

reported in (1993) 65 ELT 465 (SC) and once Parliament has duly

legislated, and a rate of duty is prescribed in relation to a particular

tariff heading that constitutes the authorities’ expression of the

legislative will of Parliament; the speech of the Finance Minister and

the financial/budget proposals duly passed by Parliament are two

separate and distinct documents; the law as enacted is what is

contained in the Finance Act after it is legislated upon by the

Parliament. Budgetary proposals constitute legislative material

antecedent to the enactment of law. The rates of tax are those which

are prescribed by legislation, once it is enacted by Parliament. It is

the law as enacted, which gives expression to legislative will and it is

the law as enacted which prescribes the rate of tax which Parliament

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Page 13 has duly imposed. Consequently, as a matter of first principle, it

would be impermissible for the Court to undertake the exercise of

entering upon a scrutiny of the correctness of the collective

expression of legislative will which finds expression in the legislation

as adopted by the Parliament.

17.In his submission, the Court cannot undertake a scrutiny of

whether there was an error on the part of the Parliament in legislating

to provide a particular rate of duty. The power to issue a notification

u/s. 25(1) of the Act has been conferred upon the Central

Government where it is satisfied that it is necessary in the public

interest so to do. Under sub-section (2) of Section 25, the Central

Government may, where it is satisfied that it is necessary in the public

interest so to do, by special order in each case, exempt from the

payment of duty, under circumstances of an exceptional nature to be

stated in such order, any goods on which duty is leviable and this

Court has observed in the case of Union of India Vs. Jalyan Udyog

reported in [1993(68) ELT 9 (SC)] that “the Parliament cannot

constantly monitor the needs of and the emerging trends in the

economy and is in no position to engage itself in day-to-day

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Page 14 regulation and adjustment of import-export trade. Accordingly, the

power is conferred upon the Central Government to provide for

exemption from duty of goods, either wholly or partly and with or

without conditions, as may be called for in public interest. We see no

warrant for reading any limitation into this power.”

18.According to him, the Government of India i.e. the TRU is fully

empowered to decide the quantum of levy of duty on a particular

commodity and to define it. Therefore, no wrong was committed by

the TRU when it held that the commodity imported by the appellant

did not enjoy the peak duty structure of 70% but fell under the

exceptions and replied to the appellant accordingly. The Court,

therefore, would not be justified in directing the Central Government

to issue a notification in this case.

19.He would further contend that the goods imported by the

appellant were cleared provisionally on payment of duty prescribed in

the Customs Tariff Act, 1975; the imported compound alcoholic

preparation was known as “concentrated extracts”. Compound

Alcoholic Preparations are used in the manufacture of various

beverages and are not for immediate consumption. The claim of the

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Page 15 appellant-importer that duty should have been imposed at the rate of

85% for 1993-94 and 65% in 1994-95 and the claim that he had paid

excess duty of Rs.5,62,46,726/- cannot be sustained since all these

consignments were assessed provisionally and the goods were

classified under Chapter Tariff Heading No.2208.10 of the First

Schedule to the then Custom Tariff and accordingly, the goods were

assessed provisionally and cleared on payment of appropriate duties.

20.According to him, the further contention of the

appellant-importer that exclusion in peak rate covers alcohol

beverages but his imported goods are “compound alcoholic

preparation of a kind used for manufacturing of beverages” which is

not alcohol beverage and, therefore, not hit by the exclusion clause,

cannot also be sustained.

21.According to him, the contention of the importer that during the

impugned period, the peak rate of duty was 150% as announced by

the FM in his Budget Speech also cannot be sustained because the

proposed rate of maximum 150% was applicable to goods other than

alcoholic beverages and passenger baggage. The speech of the FM

in this regard was very clear and there is no ambiguity in the speech.

15

Page 16 Alcohol beverages and passenger baggage have been taken out of

the cover of maximum 150% rate duty. Hence the contention of the

appellant-importer that the impugned imported goods were covered

by FM speech for 150% rate duty is incorrect and in fact this is

contrary to what was contemplated in the Customs Tariff Act, 1975

and the HSN Explanatory Notes.

22.We have considered the extensive arguments submitted by the

appellant/party-in-person and gone through the voluminous record

placed before us and the respective submissions of the learned

senior counsel for respondents.

23.Before adverting to the various arguments advanced by both

sides and the findings recorded by the Court below, we deem it

appropriate to extract the relevant Tariff Entry 2208.10 under the

Customs Tariff 1993-94 and 1994-95, which reads:

Heading

No.

Sub-

heading

No.

Description of articleRate of duty

Stand-

Preferential

ard areas

22.08 2208.10 Compound alcoholic

preparations of a kind

used for the

manufacture of

beverages.

Rs.300 per litre or

400% whichever

is higher….

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Page 17 24.Though it was already discussed in the preceding paragraphs

about the reliefs sought by the appellant before the High Court, we

deem it appropriate to extract the same hereunder:

“(1) a writ of Mandamus directing the first and second respondents to

issue a notification under Section 25(1) of the Customs Act, 1962, in

order to exempt goods falling under Tariff Heading 2208.10 so as to

give effect to the budget proposal announced by the Finance Minister

in Parliament for financial years l993-94 and 1994-95; (2) a direction

to the Chief Commissioner of Customs to finalize assessment of the

eight bills of entry after a notification is issued by the first and second

respondents under Section 25(1) of the Customs Act, 1962; (3) a writ

of Mandamus directing the second respondent to issue a notification

under Section 25(2) of the Customs Act, 1962, for granting exemption

from customs duty for goods falling under Tariff Heading 2208.10 for

financial years 1993-94 and 1994-95; (4) an order to refund after

assessments are finalized and (5) an order for the payment of interest

at the rate of 12% p.a. on the refund that is ordered.”

25.The High Court of Bombay, after giving a thorough

consideration, dismissed the writ petition on the ground that once a

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Page 18 particular Tariff Heading is prescribed, that constitutes the

authoritative expression of the legislative will of Parliament and the

High Court cannot exercise its power of judicial review and go beyond

the law enacted by the Parliament and it is not permissible for the

Court to undertake a scrutiny of whether there was an error on the

part of the Parliament in legislating a particular rate of duty. Further,

the High Court observed that there is no discriminatory conduct which

would compel the interference of the court. The appellant, unsatisfied

with the order, has preferred a revision before the High Court which

ended up in dismissal as no error apparent on record has been made

out.

26.In those circumstances, the appellant is before us by way of

these appeals; one arising out of the original order and one against

the order passed in review. Before this Court, the appellant has

amended the reliefs and sought for the following reliefs: (1) direct

the respondents to perform their duty to issue suitable notification to

rectify the erroneous rate of duty prescribed on sub-heading 2208.10

and to implement and execute the tariff rate already legislated; (2)

direct the respondents to return the excess amount of

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Page 19 Rs.5,62,46,722/- collected without any authority of law; (3) direct the

respondents to pay 12% simple interest for having willfully and

deliberately refused to rectify the error.

27.The appellant has come up before this Court with a voluminous

record and made submissions at length. The gist of the first and

foremost grievance of the appellant appears to be that he was

charged with the duty @ Rs.300/- per litre or 400% which was

already paid by him for the goods he imported as per the provisional

assessment.

28.According to him, the Finance Minister has presented the

budget proposals before the Parliament which were duly approved by

the Parliament. As per the approved budget proposals, the goods

imported by him attracts reduction in duty higher than 85% to 85%

advalorem for 1993-94 and higher than 65% to 65% ad valorem for

the year 1994-95 and he does not fall under the exception of

alcoholic beverages. The tariff he was charged and the tariff rates in

the finance bill are contrary to the approved budget proposals.

29.The second grievance appears to be that whenever the tariff

rates are erroneously prescribed, the 2

nd

respondent is issuing

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Page 20 notification and in fact they have issued 85 notifications for the

financial year 1993-94 and 94 notifications for the financial year

1994-95. The 2

nd

respondent is discriminating the appellant by

refusing to issue a circular in respect of his goods; as such their

action is discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution

of India.

30.In view of the aforesaid rival submissions, the issues that fall for

consideration are:

1) Whether the budget proposals, as alleged by the

appellant, are duly passed and approved by the Parliament

and whether the tariff rates fixed by the TRU are contrary to

the legislative mandate?

2) Whether this Court can direct the Central Government

to issue a notification under Section 25(1) of the Customs Act?

3) Whether the compound alcoholic preparations of a

kind used for the manufacturing of beverages fall under the

category of alcoholic beverage?

4) Whether there is any discrimination on the part of the

Central Government in issuing a notification under Section

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Page 21 25(1) of the Customs Act in respect of other goods and

contrary to Article 14 of the Constitution of India?

31.In Re Issue No.1:

The whole thrust of the appellant is that the proposals of the Finance

Minister were duly approved by the Parliament. No doubt, the

appellant has placed before this Court the proposals of the Finance

Minister which discloses the intention of the Government but there is

no material placed before us to demonstrate that the budget

proposals are duly accepted by the Parliament. It is an admitted fact

that pursuant to the proposals, the Finance Act was passed by the

Parliament wherein for the goods specified under Tariff Sub-Heading

2208.10, particular tariff was specified. We are unable to agree with

the argument advanced by the appellant for the reason that he is

unable to make note of the difference between a proposal moved

before the Parliament and a statutory provision enacted by the

Parliament, because the process of Taxation involves various

considerations and criteria.

Every legislation is done with the object of public good as said by

Jeremy Bentham. Taxation is an unilateral decision of the Parliament

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Page 22 and it is the exercise of the sovereign power. The financial proposals

put forth by the Finance Minister reflects the governmental view for

raising revenue to meet the expenditure for the financial year and it is

the financial policy of the Central Government. The Finance

Minster’s speech only highlights the more important proposals of the

budget. Those are not the enactments by the Parliament. The law

as enacted is what is contained in the Finance Act. After it is

legislated upon by the Parliament and a rate of duty that is prescribed

in relation to a particular Tariff Head that constitutes the authoritative

expression of the legislative will of Parliament. Now in the present

facts of the case, as per the finance bill, the legislative will of the

Parliament is that for the commodities falling under Tariff Head

2208.10, the tariff is Rs.300/- per litre or 400% whichever is higher.

Even assuming that the amount of tax is excessive, in the matters of

taxation laws, the Court permits greater latitude to the discretion of

the legislature and it is not amenable to judicial review.

In view of the foregoing discussion, we are unable to concur with the

submission of the appellant that the budget proposals are duly

passed and approved by the Parliament and moreover, if the

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Page 23 appellant is aggrieved by the particular tariff prescribed under the

Finance Act and the same is contrary to the approved budget

proposals, he ought to have questioned the same if permissible.

Hence, this issue is answered against the appellant.

32.In Re : Issue No.2:

It is the case of the appellant that in respect of other categories of the

budgetary proposals, several notifications were issued by the 2

nd

respondent altering the Tariff rates, but whereas in his case, the 2

nd

respondent refused to issue such a notification and it is nothing but

mala fide and corrupt practice on the part of the respondents.

According to him, the budget proposals passed and approved by the

Parliament are paramount and the Executive or Central Government

cannot prescribe Tariff rates contrary to the budget proposals and he

finds fault with the way the 2

nd

respondent officials are functioning.

A thorough look at the relevant provisions reveals that the source of

power to issue notification by the Central Government relates to

Section 25 of the Customs Act, 1962, which reads as under:

“Power to grant exemption from duty.

(1) If the Central Government is satisfied that it is

necessary in the public interest so to do, it may, by

notification in the Official Gazette, exempt generally either

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Page 24 absolutely or subject to such conditions (to be fulfilled

before or after clearance) as may be specified in the

notification goods of any specified description from the

whole or any part of duty of customs leviable thereon.

(2) If the Central Government is satisfied that it is

necessary in the public interest so to do, it may, by special

order in each case exempt from the payment of duty,

under circumstances of an exceptional nature to be stated

in such order, any goods on which duty is leviable.”

Section 25 of the Act delegates power to the Central Government i.e.

the executive branch to grant exemption generally from duty

whenever it finds that it is necessary to do so in the larger public

interest either absolutely or subject to such conditions as may be

specified in the notification or by a special order in each case under

exceptional circumstances.

As per Section 159 of the Act, any notification issued under Section

25 shall be placed before the Parliament and the Parliament may

amend or reject the same. This clearly demonstrates that the

ultimate law making power is vested with the Legislature. Hence, the

allegation of the appellant that the notifications are issued basing on

the whims and fancies of the 2

nd

respondent is misconceived.

Whereas, notifications are issued generally in the larger public

24

Page 25 interest, the Legislature has given the power to exempt duty to the 2

nd

respondent subject to the amending power.

In these circumstances, it is not appropriate on our part to issue any

orders directing them to issue a notification under Section 25 (2) of

the Act except on the grounds of discrimination. In the matter of

taxation, the Court gives a greater latitude to the legislative discretion.

Accordingly, the issue is answered.

33. In Re : Issue No.3:

In regard to this issue ‘Whether the compound alcoholic preparations

of a kind used for manufacturing of beverages fall under the category

of alcoholic beverages’, the appellant has relied upon a judgment of

the Bombay High Court which was confirmed by this Court and the

learned senior counsel for respondents made several contra

submissions relying on some judgments. According to us, it is not for

us to do this exercise. It is always open to the parties to settle the

dispute before the appropriate forum if they choose to do so. The

issue is accordingly answered.

34.In Re : Issue No.4:

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Page 26 According to the appellant, the Central Government has issued

notifications under Section 25(1) and he is also entitled to such a

notification in respect of the commodities falling under the category

2208.10. When the appellant alleges discriminatory action on the

part of the respondents, he has to establish that there is no rational

basis for making classification between the goods which are notified

and the goods of the appellant which are not notified. It is also a

firmly established principle that the legislature understands and

appreciates the needs of its people. A Taxing Statute can be held to

contravene Article 14 of the Constitution if it purports to impose

certain duty on the same class of people differently and leads to

obvious inequality. Such a material is not placed before us to come

to a just conclusion that the action of the respondents is

discriminative. Hence, the same is held against the appellant.

35.As far as the interest aspect is concerned, when the appellant

is not entitled for the relief, there is no need for us to express any

opinion on the interest aspect.

36.Before we conclude, we would like to record our appreciation

for the strenuous efforts put forth by the appellant and the kind of

26

Page 27 efforts he put in to collect the data. We feel that it is not out of place

to mention that the appellant has presented the case like a seasoned

professional with utmost skill and knowledge.

37.In view of the aforesaid elaborate discussion, we reach to an

irresistible conclusion that the appeals, being devoid of any merit,

deserve to be dismissed and are dismissed accordingly. No costs.

……………………………… .J.

(MADAN B. LOKUR)

……………………………… ..J.

(N.V. RAMANA)

NEW DELHI,

JULY 22, 2016

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