Page 1 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1407 OF 2012

(Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.1516 of 2010)

Amit Kapoor ... Appellant

Versus

Ramesh Chander & Anr. ... Respondents

J U D G M E N T

Swatanter Kumar, J .

1.Leave granted.

2.A question of law that arises more often than not in criminal

cases is that of the extent and scope of the powers exercisable by

the High Court under Section 397 independently or read with

Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short,

the ‘Code’).

3.The facts as they emerge from the record fall within a very

narrow compass. On 4

th

December, 2007, the Rajouri Garden

Police Station received information that a woman had committed

1

Page 2 suicide at C-224, Tagore Garden Extension, Delhi. Upon making

entry under DD No.16A of that date, Sub Inspector O.P. Mandal

commenced investigation and reached the place of occurrence.

The deceased was identified as Komal Kapoor. Her body was sent

for post mortem. The Investigating Officer recorded the statement

of her son Amit Kapoor and on 5.12.2007 at about 12.15 p.m. an

FIR was registered on the complaint filed by him. This FIR was

registered against Ramesh Chander Sibbal (the accused) and

another, on the basis of the statement of Amit Kapoor and the

suicide note. According to Amit Kapoor, he knew Ramesh

Chander Sibbal for the last 10 years. Father of Amit Kapoor was

running a paint brush business and had purchased property

No.C-225, Tagore Garden, Delhi through the said Ramesh

Chander Sibbal. Since the father of Amit Kapoor had fallen ill,

his mother was also looking after the business. However, the

family business suffered acute losses. The family discussed the

possibility of selling their moveable and immoveable property

situated at Rohini. The accused persons are stated to have

fraudulently obtained signatures of the deceased in this

connection. In order to get over the financial crises and to meet

their liabilities, the deceased had also discussed the possibility of

selling another plot owned by the family situated in Bawana

Industrial Area. At that time also, the accused told the deceased

2

Page 3 that certain documents have to be executed before the plot is

sold. On this pretext, he again got some papers signed by them.

The accused paid a sum of Rs.5,00,000/- to the deceased at the

first instance and thereafter a sum of Rs.3,00,000/- for the plot

situated in Bawana as against the market value of

Rs.28,00,000/-, with an assurance that the rest of the amount

will be paid after execution of the sale deed.

4.Around the time of Dussehra in 2007, the accused

approached the deceased claiming that he be given

accommodation on a temporary basis for a period of ten to twelve

days on the ground floor of her house situated at C-224, Tagore

Garden, Delhi on the pretext that his own house was under

renovation. The deceased believing him and keeping the

relationship in mind, agreed and allowed him to occupy two

rooms on the ground floor. It is alleged that while the deceased

was away at Haridwar, just before the festival of Diwali, the

accused encroached upon one more room in the said house.

When the deceased asked the accused to vacate the said

premises, he refused and, on the contrary, stated that he had

paid a sum of Rs.24,00,000/- and that it was his house. Not only

this, the accused as well as his son threatened the deceased and

her family to vacate the house or else they would ruin them. It is

3

Page 4 also alleged that when the deceased asked the accused as to when

she will get rid of this problem, he is said to have replied that she

could get rid of this only after her death. This was followed by the

accused sending a legal notice dated 1

st

December, 2007 to the

deceased which was received on 3

rd

December, 2007 in which

similar claim was made by the accused against the deceased. The

trust that she had placed upon the accused was totally betrayed

by him. This led to the deceased slipping into depression. In face

of all these circumstances, coupled with the threats extended by

the accused persons, the deceased committed suicide on

4.12.2007 at about 7.30 a.m. by hanging herself from a ceiling

fan, using a scarf (chunni). It may be noticed at this stage, that

the deceased had left a suicide note which can appropriately be

reproduced at this stage as under :

“This Ramesh Sibbal, his wife Suman and his

son Gaurav.

I am committing suicide for the reason that

the aforesaid persons who are residing in our

house forcefully, used to say that he was to

do white wash so please allow him to keep

some of his articles. But after some time,

when I came, I saw that the aforesaid person

has completely occupied my house as his

own house. When my children objected to

his aforesaid act, he said that he was to stay

there only for a period of 04 days and that he

would perform Diwali worship pooja

ceremony at his own house but he did not

4

Page 5 vacate the house. When I had gone to

Haridwar, he occupied front room of my

house as well after giving beatings to my

children. I know this person since that day

when he had got my plot of Rohini disposed

off. As we both (husband and wife) had not

read those papers (relating to disposal of our

Rohini plot) so this person kept on obtaining

our signatures on the stamp papers relating

to our House No. C-224 on the pretext that

these papers were required to execute the

lease. My husband was ill and I used to

remain busy in looking after him. Whenever,

he came to us he used to show urgency in

taking our signature by stating that the sale

proceed of our plot would be given to us that

day itself. He kept on giving payment time to

time to us and we kept on receiving the

same.

Written on the top of page 411

This man gave me only a sum of Rs 05 lacs of

my plot situated in Bawana, but he obtained

my signature on Rs 15 lacs as I did not read

the contents thereof.

When this man got our Bawana a plot sold,

he took the file from us but I do not know as

to what he had done with that amount. He

used to say that he had given us the entire

amount. Whatever amount he gave to us he

used to take in writing on a paper. After

giving his amount, when I asked for the file,

he demanded Rs.05 lacs otherwise, he would

reveal it to my daughter that the file was

lying with him. He also threatened me to

sign the paper without raising any objection

otherwise, he would get our children

grandson and granddaughter kidnapped. On

this, I used to scare and this man used to

succeed in getting the stamp papers signed

by me. When he got our plot of Rohini sold,

he started obtaining my signatures. But at

5

Page 6 the time when the plot of Rohini was sold, he

told me that the plot situated in Bawana has

been sold and he asked us to accompany him

to sign the papers. Thereafter, he said that

the person with whom he has kept the file

was saying to him that he could take away

the file from that person but only in lieu of

keeping papers of some other house with that

person. When this man (suggested) me to

keep other file (of property) in lieu of taking

the said file from that person and this man

(also assured me) that he would return those

papers of property to me as and when the

plot of Bawana would be sold. On this, I

handed over the file of property No. C-225 to

this man. After that, he told that the plot

was not getting higher price and so he offered

us to take some amount, if required by us

urgently whereupon , this man gave us a

sum of Rs. 3 lacs but he kept on taking an

interest at the rate of 10%. This man gave

us Rs.5 lacs earlier and Rs.3 lacs later so he

kept on taking an interest on Rs. 8 lacs.

Before Diwali, I gave him a cheque of

Rs.2,50,000/- and also gave a sum of Rs.3

lacs in cash to his son. Thereafter, I gave a

sum of Rs.2 lacs in cash and his son knows

the account of it whose name is Gaurav.

When I gave money, I asked him to give me

the written paper as I have returned the as I

have returned the money whereupon, he

(Gaurav) said that since he had no paper

with him that time so the same would be

returned to her by his father. This man’s son

Gaurav and wife Suman are together involved

(in this conspiracy). His son also used to do

my fake signatures. Whenever, I demanded

my file back from him, he used to ask me to

return Rs.15 lacs first. On this, when I

asked him as to how the amount of Rs.5 lacs

became to Rs.15 lacs? He replied that it had

become Rs.15 lacs including interest thereon.

I kept on giving him interest because of the

fear of my family. He has also grabbed my

entire money which I had taken on loan basis

6

Page 7 from somewhere. I kept on giving him

interest only for the reason that since he

used to promise me to return the papers that

day itself or on the next day.

Written on top of page no.415

He said that the money of Bawana’s (plot) has

been sent by his father and he asked me to

write down a receipt of Rs.04 lacs and when I

wrote a receipt of it, he said that the money

was kept in the motorcycle and he was first

giving me the cash but this man’s son did not

give me the said cash. He asked me to sign

the papers related to Bawana’s (plot) first and

then he would return the paper as well as the

money to me. On reaching the house, I

demanded the money and paper from him

whereupon he said that he had the paper

written by me and that he would show that

paper to my son and when my son asked him

to return the paper, he replied that he would

not return the paper as his mother had taken

a sum of Rs.15 lacs from him. Kindly take it

guaranteed that out of aforesaid Rs.15 lacs I

have returned a sum of Rs. of Seven and a

half lacs to him. After that, this man’s son

came to me and said that his father was

saying to give papers of property No.C-225 to

you and in lieu thereof he asked me to show

him the file of lease. On this, when I started

to show him the said file to him then, this

man’s son Gaurav said that he was just

giving me the said paper and saying this he

took away the lease file from me and since

then, he had not returned me the said paper.

Kindly save my house. Please save my

children from this person. I have not visited

any court to sign. One day these persons

crossed all the limits when his wife said that

she was agreed to return all the papers in

lieu of giving a receipt of the same in writing.

After that, they gave me the amount of sale

proceeds of Rohini and Bawana’s properties.

7

Page 8 She brought fake papers which were related

to some other person’s property, to me. I saw

that those papers were fake papers and were

in English language and when I showed those

papers to someone, it was found that those

papers were not related to my plot. When I

went to this man’s house to show him that

those papers were not related to my plot, his

wife said that since there was no electricity in

her house that time so they had given some

others property paper to her mistakenly and

that they were just sending their son Gaurav

to give me the correct papers but Gaurav did

not come to me till today. Thereafter, we

started receiving threats from Gunda

elements that they would harm us in

different ways. I have no proof of the money

returned by me. This man used to say to my

female friends that he would show them after

purchasing my house by hook and crook. He

used to spread rumour in the street that I,

Komal have sold out my house to him and

that there were several cases pending related

to that house.

I pray, with folded hands, that keeping in

view the illness of my husband, my house

and the papers related thereto may please be

restored to me. This man’s wife Suman and

their son Gaurav are most dishonest persons.

His wife Suman used to talk in such an

artificial way as she was telling a truth. One

of my sons had died due to cancer and if I

am dishonest to anyone, my rest of both

children may also die from cancer. You can

verify these facts from the residents of the

street as to how many houses (families) has

been ruined by this person. This man is

supported by some reputed persons who use

to give him money but he did not return their

money. He kept on keeping papers of our

property with him and used to lend our

money on interest to other persons. This

man intends to grab my house. My matter

may please be decided. This man Ramesh

8

Page 9 Sibbal, his wife Suman and son Gaurav may

be punished so that they may not commit

such an act with anyone in future. He kept

on threatening me while involving my

daughter-in-law that he would do this and

that. Since the day this man entered my

house, everything has been ruined by him. I

may please be imparted justice.

Sd/-Komal Kapur

(In English)”

5.The Investigating Officer prepared the site plan, effected

recoveries of the articles from the place of occurrence and

thereafter recorded the statements of the witnesses. Upon

completion of the investigation, a charge sheet was filed in terms

of Section 173(2) of the Code wherein Ramesh Chander Sibbal

was stated as the accused and names of his wife, Suman Sibbal

and son Gaurav Sibbal were shown in Column No.2. Upon

committal, the learned Additional Sessions Judge framed charges

against the accused under Sections 306 and 448 of the Indian

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC).

6.The accused filed a criminal revision being Criminal Revision

No.227 of 2009 in the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi

challenging the order of the trial Court dated 2

nd

April, 2009,

framing the charge. The High Court vide its judgment dated 13

th

August, 2009 quashed the charge framed under Section 306 IPC,

9

Page 10 while permitting the Trial Court to continue the trial in relation to

the offence under Section 448 IPC. It will be useful to refer to

certain findings recorded by the High Court in its judgment dated

13

th

August, 2009 :

“3.In the background of the aforesaid case

set up by the prosecution the learned

counsel for the petitioner submitted

that the ingredients of an offence under

Section 306 of the IPC were not present

in the instant case. As a matter of fact

the learned counsel for the petitioner

went further to say that this is not a

case of suicide, rather is, a case of

homicide. For this purpose he took me

through the post mortem report and

also the literature (Pathology of Neck

Injury by Peter Venezis). On being told

that since the trial was on and hence,

the learned counsel decided to give up

the arguments initially advanced on

this aspect of the matter.

3.1As regards whether a charge could be

framed under Section 306 of the IPC,

the upshot of his submissions was that

even if the entire material/evidence

placed on record by the prosecution is

fully accepted to be correct, no offence

under Section 306 of the IPC is made

out against the petitioner accused. For

this purpose the learned counsel for

the petitioner took me through the

suicide note dated 04.12.2007, the

statement of the sons of the deceased

Amit Kapoor (the complainant) and

Sumit Kapoor, as well as, the report of

the Forensic Science Laboratory. It

was his submission that merely

because the petitioner-accused is

10

Page 11 named in the suicide note and has

been referred to as the reason which

propelled the deceased to take the

extreme step of suicide, it would still

not fall within the realm of Section 306

of the IPC.

XXX XXX XXX

g. a perusal of the suicide note brings to

fore the fact the petitioner-accused is

not only named but his illegal

occupation of the house of the

deceased is stated to be one of the

primary reasons for Kamol Kapoor, to

have committed suicide. The

statement of the sons of the deceased,

Amit Kapoor and Sumit Kapoor, is

primarily on the same lines. The issue

for consideration is that, even if it is

assumed at this stage, that the suicide

note was written in the hand writing of

the deceased and the statement of Amit

Kapoor is believed to be true in its

entirety would it be sufficient to charge

the petitioner-accused with the offence

of abetment of suicide by Komal

Kapoor. In my view the answer is in

the negative. The mere fact that the

actions of the petitioner-accused, that

is, forcible occupation of the portion of

the house of the deceased, led her to

take the extreme step of committing

suicide would not bring his act within

the definition of abetment as there is

no material or evidence placed by the

prosecution on record to show that he

intended or had the necessary mens

rea that the Komal Kapoor should take

the extreme step of committing suicide.

As long as there is absence of material

and/or evidence on record to show that

the abettor had intended to aid or

encourage the commission of the

11

Page 12 principal offence, the accused cannot

be charged with the offence of

abetment and, therefore, in the present

case, abetment to commit suicide. Nor

I am persuaded by the submission that

because the name of the petioner-

accused appears in the suicide note it

would be sufficient to charge him with

an offence under Section 306 of the

IPC. In this context see observation in

Sanju @ Sanjay Singh Senger (supra)

and Mahender Singh (supra). In both

the cases not ony was the accused

named in the suicide note but they

were also cited as the reason for

committing suicide by the deceased.

The learned APP may perhaps be

correct in his submission that the

agreement to sell dated 30.06.2007

was executed by the petitioner-

accused, only to grab the property of

the deceased after a receipt had been

executed by the deceased

acknowledging that she had taken a

loan from the petitioner-accused in the

first instance in the sum of Rs.15 lacs

and thereafter, another sum of Rs. 1

lac, but then, this aspect of the matter

will get unravelled only after a full-

fledged trial. I do not wish to comment

any further on this aspect of the matter

as it could impact both, the case of the

prosecution as well as that of the

defence, and perhaps wisely, therefore,

even the learned counsel or the

petitioner-accused has not assailed the

charge framed under Section 448 of

the IPC.

XXX XXX XXX

12.For the aforementioned reasons, I am

of the opinion that it is a fit case in

which this Court should exercise its

12

Page 13 revisional and inherent powers to

quash the charge framed against the

petitioner accused under Section 306

of the IPC. The revision petition is thus

partially allowed. The charge framed

against the petitioner-accused under

Section 306 of the IPC shall be

dropped. The trial court will continue

with the trial of the petitioner-accused

in respect of the remaining charge

framed against him.”

7.Aggrieved from the judgment of the High Court, in the

present appeal, the appellant impugnes the same primarily on the

ground that the High Court had exceeded and not appropriately

exercised its jurisdiction under Sections 397 and 482 of the Code

in quashing the charge framed against the respondent under

Section 306 IPC.

8.Before examining the merits of the present case, we must

advert to the discussion as to the ambit and scope of the power

which the courts including the High Court can exercise under

Section 397 and Section 482 of the Code. Section 397 of the Code

vests the court with the power to call for and examine the records

of an inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the

legality and regularity of any proceedings or order made in a case.

The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an

error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error

and it may not be appropriate for the court to scrutinize the

13

Page 14 orders, which upon the face of it bears a token of careful

consideration and appear to be in accordance with law. If one

looks into the various judgments of this Court, it emerges that the

revisional jurisdiction can be invoked where the decisions under

challenge are grossly erroneous, there is no compliance with the

provisions of law, the finding recorded is based on no evidence,

material evidence is ignored or judicial discretion is exercised

arbitrarily or perversely. These are not exhaustive classes, but

are merely indicative. Each case would have to be determined on

its own merits.

9.Another well-accepted norm is that the revisional jurisdiction

of the higher court is a very limited one and cannot be exercised

in a routine manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions is that it

should not be against an interim or interlocutory order. The

Court has to keep in mind that the exercise of revisional

jurisdiction itself should not lead to injustice ex facie. Where the

Court is dealing with the question as to whether the charge has

been framed properly and in accordance with law in a given case,

it may be reluctant to interfere in exercise of its revisional

jurisdiction unless the case substantially falls within the

categories aforestated. Even framing of charge is a much

advanced stage in the proceedings under the Cr.P.C. Right from

the case of State of West Bengal & Ors. v. Swapan Kumar Guha &

14

Page 15 Ors. [(1982) 1 SCC 561], which was reiterated with approval in

the case of State of Haryana & Ors. v. Bhajan Lal & Ors. [1992

Supp. (1) SCC 335], the courts have stated the principle that if

the FIR does not disclose the commission of a cognizable offence,

the Court would be justified in quashing the investigation on the

basis of the information as laid or received. It is further stated

that the legal position appears to be that if an offence is disclosed,

the court will not normally interfere with an investigation into the

case and will permit investigation into the offence alleged to have

been committed; if, however, the materials do not disclose an

offence, no investigation should normally be permitted. Whether

an offence has been disclosed or not, must necessarily depend on

the facts and circumstances of each case. If on consideration of

the relevant materials, the Court is satisfied that an offence is

disclosed, it will normally not interfere with the investigation into

the offence and will generally allow the investigation into the

offence to be completed in order to collect materials for proving

the offence. In Bhajan Lal’s case (supra), the Court also stated

that though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly

defined, sufficiently channelized and inflexible guidelines or rigid

formulae or to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases

wherein power under Section 482 of the Code for quashing of an

FIR should be exercised, there are circumstances where the Court

15

Page 16 may be justified in exercising such jurisdiction. These are, where

the FIR does not prima facie constitute any offence, does not

disclose a cognizable offence justifying investigation by the police;

where the allegations are so absurd and inherently improbable on

the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just

conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against

the accused; where there is an expressed legal bar engrafted in

any of the provisions of the Code; and where a criminal

proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the

proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for

wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him

due to private and personal grudge. Despite stating these

grounds, the Court unambiguously uttered a note of caution to

the effect that power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be

exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too, in

the rarest of rare cases; the Court also warned that the Court

would not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the

reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in

the FIR or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent

powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act

according to its whims or caprice.

10.The above-stated principles clearly show that inherent as

well as revisional jurisdiction should be exercised cautiously. If

16

Page 17 the jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code in relation to

quashing of an FIR is circumscribed by the factum and caution

afore-noticed, in that event, the revisional jurisdiction,

particularly while dealing with framing of a charge, has to be even

more limited. Framing of a charge is an exercise of jurisdiction by

the trial court in terms of Section 228 of the Code, unless the

accused is discharged under Section 227 of the Code. Under both

these provisions, the court is required to consider the ‘record of

the case’ and documents submitted therewith and, after hearing

the parties, may either discharge the accused or where it appears

to the court and in its opinion there is ground for presuming that

the accused has committed an offence , it shall frame the charge.

Once the facts and ingredients of the Section exists, then the

Court would be right in presuming that there is ground to proceed

against the accused and frame the charge accordingly. This

presumption is not a presumption of law as such. The

satisfaction of the court in relation to the existence of constituents

of an offence and the facts leading to that offence is a sine qua

non for exercise of such jurisdiction. It may even be weaker than

a prima facie case. There is a fine distinction between the

language of Sections 227 and 228 of the Code. Section 227 is

expression of a definite opinion and judgment of the Court while

Section 228 is tentative. Thus, to say that at the stage of framing

17

Page 18 of charge, the Court should form an opinion that the accused is

certainly guilty of committing an offence, is an approach which is

impermissible in terms of Section 228 of the Code. It may also be

noticed that the revisional jurisdiction exercised by the High

Court is in a way final and no inter court remedy is available in

such cases. Of course, it may be subject to jurisdiction of this

court under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. Normally, a

revisional jurisdiction should be exercised on a question of law.

However, when factual appreciation is involved, then it must find

place in the class of cases resulting in a perverse finding.

Basically, the power is required to be exercised so that justice is

done and there is no abuse of power by the court. Merely an

apprehension or suspicion of the same would not be a sufficient

ground for interference in such cases.

11.At the initial stage of framing of a charge, the court is

concerned not with proof but with a strong suspicion that the

accused has committed an offence, which, if put to trial, could

prove him guilty. All that the court has to see is that the material

on record and the facts would be compatible with the innocence of

the accused or not. The final test of guilt is not to be applied at

that stage. We may refer to the well settled law laid down by this

Court in the case of State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh (1977) 4 SCC

39:

18

Page 19 “4. Under Section 226 of the Code while

opening the case for the prosecution the

Prosecutor has got to describe the charge

against the accused and state by what

evidence he proposes to prove the guilt of

the accused. Thereafter comes at the initial

stage the duty of the Court to consider the

record of the case and the documents

submitted therewith and to hear the

submissions of the accused and the

prosecution in that behalf. The Judge has to

pass thereafter an order either under

Section 227 or Section 228 of the Code. If

“the Judge considers that there is no

sufficient ground for proceeding against the

accused, he shall discharge the accused and

record his reasons for so doing”, as enjoined

by Section 227. If, on the other hand, “the

Judge is of opinion that there is ground for

presuming that the accused has committed

an offence which— … (b) is exclusively

triable by the Court, he shall frame in

writing a charge against the accused”, as

provided in Section 228. Reading the two

provisions together in juxtaposition, as they

have got to be, it would be clear that at the

beginning and the initial stage of the trial

the truth, veracity and effect of the evidence

which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce

are not to be meticulously judged. Nor is any

weight to be attached to the probable

defence of the accused. It is not obligatory

for the Judge at that stage of the trial to

consider in any detail and weigh in a

sensitive balance whether the facts, if

proved, would be incompatible with the

innocence of the accused or not. The

standard of test and judgment which is to be

finally applied before recording a finding

regarding the guilt or otherwise of the

accused is not exactly to be applied at the

stage of deciding the matter under Section

227 or Section 228 of the Code. At that

stage the Court is not to see whether there is

sufficient ground for conviction of the

19

Page 20 accused or whether the trial is sure to end

in his conviction. Strong suspicion against

the accused, if the matter remains in the

region of suspicion, cannot take the place of

proof of his guilt at the conclusion of the

trial. But at the initial stage if there is a

strong suspicion which leads the Court to

think that there is ground for presuming

that the accused has committed an offence

then it is not open to the Court to say that

there is no sufficient ground for proceeding

against the accused. The presumption of the

guilt of the accused which is to be drawn at

the initial stage is not in the sense of the law

governing the trial of criminal cases in

France where the accused is presumed to be

guilty unless the contrary is proved. But it is

only for the purpose of deciding prima facie

whether the Court should proceed with the

trial or not. It the evidence which the

Prosecutor proposes to adduce to prove the

guilt of the accused even if fully accepted

before it is challenged in cross-examination

or rebutted by the defence evidence, if any,

cannot show that the accused committed

the offence, then there will be no sufficient

ground for proceeding with the trial. An

exhaustive list of the circumstances to

indicate as to what will lead to one

conclusion or the other is neither possible

nor advisable. We may just illustrate the

difference of the law by one more example. If

the scales of pan as to the guilt or innocence

of the accused are something like even, at

the conclusion of the trial, then, on the

theory of benefit of doubt the case is to end

in his acquittal. But if, on the other hand, it

is so at the initial stage of making an order

under Section 227 or Section 228, then in

such a situation ordinarily and generally the

order which will have to be made will be one

under Section 228 and not under Section

227.”

20

Page 21 12.The jurisdiction of the Court under Section 397 can be

exercised so as to examine the correctness, legality or proprietary

of an order passed by the trial court or the inferior court, as the

case may be. Though the section does not specifically use the

expression ‘prevent abuse of process of any court or otherwise to

secure the ends of justice’, the jurisdiction under Section 397 is a

very limited one. The legality, proprietary or correctness of an

order passed by a court is the very foundation of exercise of

jurisdiction under Section 397 but ultimately it also requires

justice to be done. The jurisdiction could be exercised where

there is palpable error, non-compliance with the provisions of law,

the decision is completely erroneous or where the judicial

discretion is exercised arbitrarily. On the other hand, Section 482

is based upon the maxim quando lex liquid alicuiconcedit, conceder

videtur id quo res ipsa esse non protest, i.e., when the law gives

anything to anyone, it also gives all those things without which

the thing itself would be unavoidable. The Section confers very

wide power on the Court to do justice and to ensure that the

process of the Court is not permitted to be abused.

13.It may be somewhat necessary to have a comparative

examination of the powers exercisable by the Court under these

two provisions. There may be some overlapping between these

21

Page 22 two powers because both are aimed at securing the ends of justice

and both have an element of discretion. But, at the same time,

inherent power under Section 482 of the Code being an

extraordinary and residuary power, it is inapplicable in regard to

matters which are specifically provided for under other provisions

of the Code. To put it simply, normally the court may not invoke

its power under Section 482 of the Code where a party could have

availed of the remedy available under Section 397 of the Code

itself. The inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code are of a

wide magnitude and are not as limited as the power under Section

397. Section 482 can be invoked where the order in question is

neither an interlocutory order within the meaning of Section

397(2) nor a final order in the strict sense. Reference in this

regard can be made to Raj Kapoor & Ors. v. State of Punjab & Ors.

[AIR 1980 SC 258 : (1980) 1 SCC 43]}. In this very case, this

Court has observed that inherent power under Section 482 may

not be exercised if the bar under Sections 397(2) and 397(3)

applies, except in extraordinary situations, to prevent abuse of

the process of the Court. This itself shows the fine distinction

between the powers exercisable by the Court under these two

provisions. In this very case, the Court also considered as to

whether the inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482

stand repelled when the revisional power under Section 397

22

Page 23 overlaps. Rejecting the argument, the Court said that the opening

words of Section 482 contradict this contention because nothing

in the Code, not even Section 397, can affect the amplitude of the

inherent powers preserved in so many terms by the language of

Section 482. There is no total ban on the exercise of inherent

powers where abuse of the process of the Court or any other

extraordinary situation invites the court’s jurisdiction. The

limitation is self-restraint, nothing more. The distinction between

a final and interlocutory order is well known in law. The orders

which will be free from the bar of Section 397(2) would be the

orders which are not purely interlocutory but, at the same time,

are less than a final disposal. They should be the orders which do

determine some right and still are not finally rendering the Court

functus officio of the lis. The provisions of Section 482 are

pervasive. It should not subvert legal interdicts written into the

same Code but, however, inherent powers of the Court

unquestionably have to be read and construed as free of

restriction.

14.In Dinesh Dutt Joshi v. State of Rajasthan & Anr. [(2001) 8

SCC 570], the Court held that Section 482 does not confer any

power but only declares that the High Court possesses inherent

powers for the purposes specified in the Section. As lacunae are

23

Page 24 sometimes found in procedural law, the Section has been

embodied to cover such lacunae wherever they are discovered.

The use of extraordinary powers conferred upon the High Court

under this section are, however, required to be reserved as far as

possible for extraordinary cases.

15.In Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary & Ors. [(1992) 4 SCC 305],

the Court, while referring to the inherent powers to make orders

as may be necessary for the ends of justice, clarified that such

power has to be exercise in appropriate cases ex debito justitiae,

i.e. to do real and substantial justice for administration of which

alone, the courts exist. The powers possessed by the High Court

under Section 482 of the Code are very wide and the very

plenitude of the powers requires a great caution in its exercise.

The High Court, as the highest court exercising criminal

jurisdiction in a State, has inherent powers to make any order for

the purposes of securing the ends of justice. Being an extra

ordinary power, it will, however, not be pressed in aid except for

remedying a flagrant abuse by a subordinate court of its powers.

16.If one looks at the development of law in relation to exercise

of inherent powers under the Code, it will be useful to refer to the

following details :

24

Page 25 As far back as in 1926, a Division bench of this Court In Re:

Llewelyn Evans, took the view that the provisions of Section 561A

(equivalent to present Section 482) extend to cases not only of a

person accused of an offence in a criminal court, but to the cases

of any person against whom proceedings are instituted under the

Code in any Court. Explaining the word “process”, the Court said

that it was a general word, meaning in effect anything done by the

Court. Explaining the limitations and scope of Section 561A, the

Court referred to “inherent jurisdiction”, “to prevent abuse of

process” and “to secure the ends of justice” which are terms

incapable of having a precise definition or enumeration, and

capable, at the most, of test, according to well-established

principles of criminal jurisprudence. The ends of justice are to be

understood by ascertainment of the truth as to the facts on

balance of evidence on each side. With reference to the facts of

the case, the Court held that in the absence of any other method,

it has no choice left in the application of the Section except, such

tests subject to the caution to be exercised in the use of inherent

jurisdiction and the avoidance of interference in details and

directed providing of a legal practitioner.

17.Having examined the inter-relationship of these two very

significant provisions of the Code, let us now examine the scope of

25

Page 26 interference under any of these provisions in relation to quashing

the charge. We have already indicated above that framing of

charge is the first major step in a criminal trial where the Court is

expected to apply its mind to the entire record and documents

placed therewith before the Court. Taking cognizance of an

offence has been stated to necessitate an application of mind by

the Court but framing of charge is a major event where the Court

considers the possibility of discharging the accused of the offence

with which he is charged or requiring the accused to face trial.

There are different categories of cases where the Court may not

proceed with the trial and may discharge the accused or pass

such other orders as may be necessary keeping in view the facts

of a given case. In a case where, upon considering the record of

the case and documents submitted before it, the Court finds that

no offence is made out or there is a legal bar to such prosecution

under the provisions of the Code or any other law for the time

being in force and there is a bar and there exists no ground to

proceed against the accused, the Court may discharge the

accused. There can be cases where such record reveals the

matter to be so predominantly of a civil nature that it

neither leaves any scope for an element of criminality nor does it

satisfy the ingredients of a criminal offence with which the

accused is charged. In such cases, the Court may discharge him

26

Page 27 or quash the proceedings in exercise of its powers under these two

provisions.

18.This further raises a question as to the wrongs which

become actionable in accordance with law. It may be purely a

civil wrong or purely a criminal offence or a civil wrong as also a

criminal offence constituting both on the same set of facts. But if

the records disclose commission of a criminal offence and the

ingredients of the offence are satisfied, then such criminal

proceedings cannot be quashed merely because a civil wrong has

also been committed. The power cannot be invoked to stifle or

scuttle a legitimate prosecution. The factual foundation and

ingredients of an offence being satisfied, the Court will not either

dismiss a complaint or quash such proceedings in exercise of its

inherent or original jurisdiction. In the case of Indian Oil

Corporation v. NEPC India Ltd. & Ors. [(2006) 6 SCC 736], this

Court took the similar view and upheld the order of the High

Court declining to quash the criminal proceedings because a civil

contract between the parties was pending.

19.Having discussed the scope of jurisdiction under these two

provisions, i.e., Section 397 and Section 482 of the Code and the

fine line of jurisdictional distinction, now it will be appropriate for

us to enlist the principles with reference to which the courts

27

Page 28 should exercise such jurisdiction. However, it is not only difficult

but is inherently impossible to state with precision such

principles. At best and upon objective analysis of various

judgments of this Court, we are able to cull out some of the

principles to be considered for proper exercise of jurisdiction,

particularly, with regard to quashing of charge either in exercise

of jurisdiction under Section 397 or Section 482 of the Code or

together, as the case may be :

1) Though there are no limits of the powers of the Court under

Section 482 of the Code but the more the power, the more

due care and caution is to be exercised in invoking these

powers. The power of quashing criminal proceedings,

particularly, the charge framed in terms of Section 228 of

the Code should be exercised very sparingly and with

circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases.

2) The Court should apply the test as to whether the

uncontroverted allegations as made from the record of the

case and the documents submitted therewith prima facie

establish the offence or not. If the allegations are so

patently absurd and inherently improbable that no prudent

person can ever reach such a conclusion and where the

28

Page 29 basic ingredients of a criminal offence are not satisfied then

the Court may interfere.

3) The High Court should not unduly interfere. No meticulous

examination of the evidence is needed for considering

whether the case would end in conviction or not at the

stage of framing of charge or quashing of charge.

4) Where the exercise of such power is absolutely essential to

prevent patent miscarriage of justice and for correcting

some grave error that might be committed by the

subordinate courts even in such cases, the High Court

should be loathe to interfere, at the threshold, to throttle

the prosecution in exercise of its inherent powers.

5) Where there is an express legal bar enacted in any of the

provisions of the Code or any specific law in force to the

very initiation or institution and continuance of such

criminal proceedings, such a bar is intended to provide

specific protection to an accused.

6) The Court has a duty to balance the freedom of a person

and the right of the complainant or prosecution to

investigate and prosecute the offender.

29

Page 30 7) The process of the Court cannot be permitted to be used for

an oblique or ultimate/ulterior purpose.

8) Where the allegations made and as they appeared from the

record and documents annexed therewith to predominantly

give rise and constitute a ‘civil wrong’ with no ‘element of

criminality’ and does not satisfy the basic ingredients of a

criminal offence, the Court may be justified in quashing the

charge. Even in such cases, the Court would not embark

upon the critical analysis of the evidence.

9) Another very significant caution that the courts have to

observe is that it cannot examine the facts, evidence and

materials on record to determine whether there is sufficient

material on the basis of which the case would end in a

conviction, the Court is concerned primarily with the

allegations taken as a whole whether they will constitute an

offence and, if so, is it an abuse of the process of court

leading to injustice.

10)It is neither necessary nor is the court called upon to hold a

full-fledged enquiry or to appreciate evidence collected by

the investigating agencies to find out whether it is a case of

acquittal or conviction.

30

Page 31 11)Where allegations give rise to a civil claim and also amount

to an offence, merely because a civil claim is maintainable,

does not mean that a criminal complaint cannot be

maintained.

12)In exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 228 and/or

under Section 482, the Court cannot take into

consideration external materials given by an accused for

reaching the conclusion that no offence was disclosed or

that there was possibility of his acquittal. The Court has to

consider the record and documents annexed with by the

prosecution.

13)Quashing of a charge is an exception to the rule of

continuous prosecution. Where the offence is even broadly

satisfied, the Court should be more inclined to permit

continuation of prosecution rather than its quashing at that

initial stage. The Court is not expected to marshal the

records with a view to decide admissibility and reliability of

the documents or records but is an opinion formed prima

facie.

14)Where the charge-sheet, report under Section 173(2) of the

Code, suffers from fundamental legal defects, the Court

may be well within its jurisdiction to frame a charge.

31

Page 32 15)Coupled with any or all of the above, where the Court finds

that it would amount to abuse of process of the Code or

that interest of justice favours, otherwise it may quash the

charge. The power is to be exercised ex debito justitiae, i.e.

to do real and substantial justice for administration of

which alone, the courts exist.

{Ref. State of West Bengal & Ors. v. Swapan Kumar Guha &

Ors. [AIR 1982 SC 949]; Madhavrao Jiwaji Rao Scindia &

Anr. v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre & Ors. [AIR 1988 SC

709]; Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary & Ors. [AIR 1993 SC

892]; Mrs. Rupan Deol Bajaj & Anr. v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill

& Ors. [AIR 1996 SC 309; G. Sagar Suri & Anr. v. State of

U.P. & Ors. [AIR 2000 SC 754]; Ajay Mitra v. State of M.P.

[AIR 2003 SC 1069]; M/s. Pepsi Foods Ltd. & Anr. v. Special

Judicial Magistrate & Ors. [AIR 1988 SC 128]; State of U.P. v.

O.P. Sharma [(1996) 7 SCC 705]; Ganesh Narayan Hegde v.

s. Bangarappa & Ors. [(1995) 4 SCC 41]; Zundu

Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. v. Mohd. Sharaful Haque & Ors.

[AIR 2005 SC 9]; M/s. Medchl Chemicals & Pharma (P) Ltd. v.

M/s. Biological E. Ltd. & Ors. [AIR 2000 SC 1869]; Shakson

Belthissor v. State of Kerala & Anr. [(2009) 14 SCC 466];

V.V.S. Rama Sharma & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Ors. [(2009) 7

SCC 234]; Chunduru Siva Ram Krishna & Anr. v. Peddi

Ravindra Babu & Anr. [(2009) 11 SCC 203]; Sheo Nandan

Paswan v. State of Bihar & Ors. [AIR 1987 SC 877]; State of

Bihar & Anr. v. P.P. Sharma & Anr. [AIR 1991 SC 1260];

Lalmuni Devi (Smt.) v. State of Bihar & Ors. [(2001) 2 SCC 17];

M. Krishnan v. Vijay Singh & Anr. [(2001) 8 SCC 645]; Savita

v. State of Rajasthan [(2005) 12 SCC 338]; and S.M. Datta v.

State of Gujarat & Anr. [(2001) 7 SCC 659]}.

20.These are the principles which individually and preferably

cumulatively (one or more) be taken into consideration as

precepts to exercise of extraordinary and wide plenitude and

jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code by the High Court.

32

Page 33 Where the factual foundation for an offence has been laid down,

the courts should be reluctant and should not hasten to quash

the proceedings even on the premise that one or two ingredients

have not been stated or do not appear to be satisfied if there is

substantial compliance to the requirements of the offence. At this

stage, we may also notice that the principle stated by this Court

in the case of Madhavrao Jiwaji Rao Scindia (supra) was

reconsidered and explained in two subsequent judgments of this

Court in the cases of State of Bihar & Anr. v. Shri P.P. Sharma &

Anr. [AIR 1991 SC 1260] and M.N. Damani v. S.K. Sinha & Ors.

[AIR 2001 SC 2037]. In the subsequent judgment, the Court held

that, that judgment did not declare a law of universal application

and what was the principle relating to disputes involving cases of

a predominantly civil nature with or without criminal intent.

21.In light of the above principles, now if we examine the

findings recorded by the High Court, then it is evident that what

weighed with the High Court was that firstly it was an abuse of

the process of court and, secondly, it was a case of civil nature

and that the facts, as stated, would not constitute an offence

under Section 306 read with Section 107 IPC. Interestingly and

as is evident from the findings recorded by the High Court

reproduced supra that ‘this aspect of the matter will get

33

Page 34 unravelled only after a full-fledged trial’, once the High Court itself

was of the opinion that clear facts and correctness of the

allegations made can be examined only upon full trial, where was

the need for the Court to quash the charge under Section 306 at

that stage. Framing of charge is a kind of tentative view that the

trial court forms in terms of Section 228 which is subject to final

culmination of the proceedings.

22.We have already noticed that the legislature in its wisdom

has used the expression ‘there is ground for presuming that the

accused has committed an offence’. This has an inbuilt element

of presumption once the ingredients of an offence with reference

to the allegations made are satisfied, the Court would not doubt

the case of the prosecution unduly and extend its jurisdiction to

quash the charge in haste. A Bench of this Court in the case of

State of Maharashtra v. Som Nath Thapa & Ors. [(1996) 4 SCC 659]

referred to the meaning of the word ‘presume’ while relying upon

the Black’s Law Dictionary. It was defined to mean ‘to believe or

accept upon probable evidence’; ‘to take as proved until evidence

to the contrary is forthcoming’. In other words, the truth of the

matter has to come out when the prosecution evidence is led, the

witnesses are cross-examined by the defence, the incriminating

material and evidence is put to the accused in terms of Section

34

Page 35 313 of the Code and then the accused is provided an opportunity

to lead defence, if any. It is only upon completion of such steps

that the trial concludes with the court forming its final opinion

and delivering its judgment. Merely because there was civil

transaction between the parties would not by itself alter the

status of the allegations constituting the criminal offence. This

was not a case where the allegations were so predominately of a

civil nature that it would have eliminated criminal intent and

liability. On the contrary, it is a fact and, in fact, is not even

disputed that the deceased committed suicide and left a suicide

note. May be, the accused are able to prove their non-

involvement in inducing or creating circumstances which

compelled the deceased to commit suicide but that again is a

matter of trial. The ingredients of Section 306 are that a person

commits suicide and somebody alone abets commission of such

suicide which renders him liable for punishment. Both these

ingredients appear to exist in the present case in terms of the

language of Section 228 of the Code, subject to trial. The

deceased committed suicide and as per the suicide note left by

her and the statement of her son, the abetment by the accused

cannot be ruled out at this stage, but is obviously subject to the

final view that the court may take upon trial. One very serious

averment that was made in the suicide note was that the

35

Page 36 deceased was totally frustrated when the accused persons took

possession of the ground floor of her property, C-224, Tagore

Garden, Delhi and refused to vacate the same. It is possible and

if the Court believes the version given by the prosecution and

finds that there was actual sale of property in favour of the

accused, as alleged by him, in that event, the Court may acquit

them of not only the offence under Section 306 IPC but under

Section 107 IPC also. There appears to be some contradiction in

the judgment of the High Court primarily for the reason that if

charge under Section 306 is to be quashed and the accused is not

to be put to trial for this offence, then where would be the

question of trying them for an offence of criminal trespass in

terms of Section 448 IPC based on some facts, which has been

permitted by the High Court.

23.The High Court could not have appreciated or evaluated the

record and documents filed with it. It was not the stage. The

Court ought to have examined if the case falls in any of the above-

stated categories.

24.The High Court has also noticed that perusal of the suicide

note brings to fore the fact that the petitioner-accused is not only

named but his illegal occupation of the house of the deceased is

stated to be one of the primary reasons for Komal Kapoor in

36

Page 37 committing the suicide. The statement of the son of the deceased

is also on the same line. Then the High Court proceeds further to

notice that even if it is assumed at this stage that the suicide note

and statement were correct, the action of the petitioner-accused

in forcibly occupying the portion of the house of the deceased and

the deceased taking the extreme step would not bring his act

within the definition of abetment, as there is no material or

evidence placed by the prosecution on record. This finding could

hardly be recorded without travelling into the merits of the case

and appreciating the evidence. The Court could pronounce

whether the offence falls within the ambit and scope of Section

306 IPC or not. These documents clearly show that the accused

persons had brought in existence the circumstances which, as

claimed by the prosecution, led to the extreme step of suicide

being taken by the deceased. It cannot be equated to inflictment

of cruelty as discussed by the High Court in its judgment. Once

Sections 107 and 306 IPC are read together, then the Court has

to merely examine as to whether apparently the person could be

termed as causing abetment of a thing. An abetter under Section

108 is a person who abets an offence. It includes both the person

who abets either the commission of an offence or the commission

of an act which would be an offence. In terms of Section 107 IPC,

Explanation (1) to Section 107 has been worded very widely. We

37

Page 38 may refer to the judgment of this Court in the case of Goura

Venkata Reddy v. State of A.P. [(2003) 12 SCC 469], wherein this

Court held as under :

“8. Section 107 IPC defines abetment of a

thing. The offence of abetment is a separate

and distinct offence provided in the Act as an

offence. A person abets the doing of a thing

when (1) he instigates any person to do that

thing; or (2) engages with one or more other

persons in any conspiracy for the doing of

that thing; or (3) intentionally aids, by act or

illegal omission, the doing of that thing.

These things are essential to complete

abetment as a crime. The word “instigate”

literally means to provoke, incite, urge on or

bring about by persuasion to do any thing.

The abetment may be by instigation,

conspiracy or intentional aid, as provided in

the three clauses of Section 107. Section 109

provides that if the act abetted is committed

in consequence of abetment and there is no

provision for the punishment of such

abetment then the offender is to be punished

with the punishment provided for the original

offence. “Act abetted” in Section 109 means

the specific offence abetted. Therefore, the

offence for the abetment of which a person is

charged with the abetment is normally linked

with the proved offence. In the instant case,

the abetted persons have been convicted for

commission of offence punishable under

Section 304. So in the case of A-1 it is

Section 304 read with Section 109 IPC, that

is attracted.”

25.A wilful misrepresentation or wilful concealment of material

fact and such person voluntarily causing or procuring or

attempting to cause or procure a thing to be done is said to

38

Page 39 instigate the doing of that thing. According to the record, the

accused had made a wrong statement that he had paid a sum of

Rs.24,00,000/- for purchase of the property C-224, Tagore

Garden, Delhi and the property belonged to him. Whether it was

a misrepresentation of the accused and was an attempt to harass

the deceased and her family which ultimately led to her suicide is

a question to be examined by the Court. The allegations as made

in the afore-stated documents clearly reflects that blank

documents were got signed, but the purpose, the consideration

and complete facts relating to the transaction were not disclosed

to the deceased or the family. This would, at least at this stage,

not be a case for examining the correctness or otherwise of these

statements as these allegations cannot be said to be ex facie

perverse, untenable or malicious. It would have been more

appropriate exercise of jurisdiction by the High Court, if it would

have left the matter to be determined by the Court upon complete

trial. May be the accused would be entitled to get some benefits,

but this is not the stage. These are matters, though of some civil

nature, but are so intricately connected with criminal nature and

have elements of criminality that they cannot fall in the kind of

cases which have been stated by us above. There, the case has to

be entirely of a civil nature involving no element of criminality.

39

Page 40 26.The learned counsel appearing for the appellant has relied

upon the judgment of this Court in the case of Chitresh Kumar

Chopra v. State (Government of NCT of Delhi) [(2009) 16 SCC 605]

to contend that the offence under Section 306 read with Section

107 IPC is completely made out against the accused. It is not the

stage for us to consider or evaluate or marshal the records for the

purposes of determining whether offence under these provisions

has been committed or not. It is a tentative view that the Court

forms on the basis of record and documents annexed therewith.

No doubt that the word ‘instigate’ used in Section 107 of the IPC

has been explained by this Court in the case of Ramesh Kumar v.

State of Chhattisgarh [(2001) 9 SCC 618] to say that where the

accused had, by his acts or omissions or by a continued course of

conduct, created such circumstances that the deceased was left

with no other option except to commit suicide, an instigation may

have to be inferred. In other words, instigation has to be gathered

from the circumstances of the case. All cases may not be of direct

evidence in regard to instigation having a direct nexus to the

suicide. There could be cases where the circumstances created

by the accused are such that a person feels totally frustrated and

finds it difficult to continue existence. Husband of the deceased

was a paralysed person. They were in financial crises. They had

sold their property. They had great faith in the accused and were

40

Page 41 heavily relying on him as their property transactions were

transacted through the accused itself. Grabbing of the property,

as alleged in the suicide note and the statement made by the son

of the deceased as well as getting blank papers signed and not

giving monies due to them are the circumstances stated to have

led to the suicide of the deceased. The Court is not expected to

form even a firm opinion at this stage but a tentative view that

would evoke the presumption referred to under Section 228 of the

Code.

27.Thus, we are of the considered view that the finding returned

by the High Court suffers from an error of law. It has delved into

the field of appreciation and evaluation of the evidence which is

beyond the jurisdiction, either revisional or inherent, of the High

Court under Sections 397 and 482 of the Code.

28.For the reasons afore-recorded, this appeal is allowed. The

order of the High Court is set aside. The trial Court shall proceed

with the trial in accordance with law, uninfluenced in any way

whatsoever from what has been recorded in this judgment.

Charge against the accused under Section 306 read with Section

107 and Section 448 IPC are found to be in order.

…….…………................J.

41

Page 42 (A.K. Patnaik)

...….…………................J.

(Swatanter Kumar)

New Delhi;

September 13, 2012.

42