BAIL APPLN. 4028/2025 Page 1 of 16

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* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

Date of pronouncement: 29.05.2026

+ BAIL APPLN. 4028/2025, CRL.M.A. 34186/2025 &CRL.M.A.

36707/2025

AMIT KUMAR MASURIYA .....Petitioner

Through: Mr. Vikram Hegde with Mr. Abhinav

Hansaraman, Mr. Trishan D., Mr.

Amit Dwivedi, Advocates.

versus

STATE OF NCT OF DELHI THROUGH SPECIAL CELL

.....Respondent

Through: Mr. Akhand Pratap Singh, SPP with

Ms. Samridhi Dobhal, Ms. Krishna

Mohan Maurya, Ms. Lisa Pegwal, Mr.

Apoorv Paliya, Mr. Utkarsh Singh,

Advocates.

SI Vipin Malik, P.S.: Special Cell.

HON ’BLE MR. JUSTICE ANUP JAIRAM BHAMBHANI

J U D G M E N T

ANUP JAIRAM BHAMBHANI J.

By way of the present petition filed under section 37 of the

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (‘NDPS Act’)

and section 483 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023

(‘BNSS’), the petitioner seeks regular bail in case FIR No. 455/2024

dated 02.10.2024 registered under sections 8/20/21/25/29 of the NDPS

Act at P.S.: Special Cell, Delhi. Consequent upon completion of

investigation, allegations of offences under sections 22/27A of the

NDPS Act and sections 238B/209 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita,

BAIL APPLN. 4028/2025 Page 2 of 16

2023 (‘BNS’) have been added vidé chargesheet dated 10.06.2025 filed

in the matter.

2. Notice on this petition was issued vidé order dated 17.10.2025.

3. Status Report dated 04.11.2025 has been filed on behalf of the State.

4. Nominal Roll dated 16.04.2026 in respect of the petitioner has been

received from the concerned Jail Superintendent.

5. This court has heard Mr. Vikram Hegde, learned counsel appearing for

the petitioner; as well as Mr. Akhand Pratap Singh, learned Special

Public Prosecutor for the State, at length.

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

6. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted, that the petitioner has

been arraigned in the present case pursuant to the statement of one Mrs.

Abhilasha Gupta, Head of Operations of one M/s Pharma Solution

Services Pvt. Ltd. (‘Pharma Solution Services’) recorded on

04.10.2024 under section 180 BNSS.

7. It has been submitted that pursuant to the aforesaid statement, the

premises of M/s Aavkar Drugs Pvt. Ltd. (‘Aavkar Drugs’) at

Ankleshwar, Gujarat were raided by the Special Cell on 13.10.2024 and

518.18 kg of a white crystal powder was recovered; and three directors

of Aavkar Drugs, namely Vijay Bhesaniya, Ashwani Ramani and

Brijesh Kothia, alongwith one employee of Pharma Solution Services,

Mayur Desale, and the present petitioner were arrested from the spot.

8. Mr. Hegde has submitted, that the principal allegation against the

petitioner is, that working as a consultant, middleman and marketing

agent under the name of Masuriya Pharma Solution, the petitioner had

BAIL APPLN. 4028/2025 Page 3 of 16

a long-standing relationship with Aavkar Drugs and had facilitated the

execution of a Job Work Agreement dated 08.08.2024 between Aavkar

Drugs and Pharma Solution Services for manufacture of

‘Phenylephrine Hydrochloride Intermediate’, a legal pharmaceutical

substance.

9. It is the petitioner’s case that he was never supplied with the ‘grounds

of arrest’ in writing, either at the time of his arrest or at any time

thereafter. Learned counsel points‑out, that even the Arrest Memo

dated 13.10.2024 qua the petitioner is devoid of any grounds of arrest.

It is submitted that the arrest memo merely reflects a mechanical

narration of alleged ‘reasons for arrest’, which falls foul of the

constitutional requirement of serving grounds of arrest as enunciated

by the Supreme Court in Pankaj Bansal vs. Union of India & Ors.,

1

Prabir Purkayastha vs. State (NCT of Delhi),

2

Mihir Rajesh Shah vs.

State of Maharashtra & Anr.

3

and Dr. Rajinder Rajan vs. Union of

India & Anr.

4

10. Mr. Hegde has argued that the requirement of informing an arrestee of

the grounds of his arrest is a substantive, sacrosanct safeguard of

personal liberty under Article 22(1) of the Constitution, and the law

mandates that such grounds of arrest, specific to the arrestee, must be

communicated in writing in a language understood by the arrestee, at

the time of arrest. It is submitted that even in exceptional cases, where

immediate service of written grounds of arrest is impracticable,

1

(2024) 7 SCC 576

2

(2024) 8 SCC 254

3

(2026) 1 SCC 500

4

Order dated 01.04.2026 in SLP (Crl.) Nos.3326/2026 and 3327/2026

BAIL APPLN. 4028/2025 Page 4 of 16

grounds of arrest are required to be served within a reasonable time and

“in no event later than two hours prior”

5

to production of the arrestee

before the Magistrate.

11. Adverting to the facts of the present case and the steps taken after the

petitioner’s arrest, it has been submitted that the transit remand

application dated 14.10.2024, by which the petitioner, along with other

co‑accused persons, was produced before the learned ACJM,

Ankleshwar, District Bharuch, Gujarat, contains no averment regarding

the specific role alleged against the petitioner; and, in any event, there

is nothing to show that the contents of that application were ever made

known to petitioner prior to his production before the learned

Magistrate seeking transit remand. Likewise, it has been submitted that

even when the petitioner was produced before the learned Special

Judge (NDPS), Patiala House Courts, New Delhi on 16.10.2024, and

police custody remand was sought, the petitioner was still kept in the

dark as regards the grounds of his arrest. The petitioner was thus

deprived of a meaningful opportunity to oppose his transit remand in Gujarat as well as his police custody remand in Delhi.

12. Counsel has also stressed that by not communicating to the petitioner

the grounds of arrest as mandated in law, the investigating agency has

not merely committed a curable procedural irregularity but has

perpetrated a substantive constitutional infraction that has caused

demonstrable prejudice, because the petitioner could neither explain his

5

Mihir Rajesh Shah, para 62

BAIL APPLN. 4028/2025 Page 5 of 16

side of the matter; nor was he able to instruct counsel to challenge the

legality or necessity of transit or police custody remand.

13. In the above context, learned counsel has also placed reliance on a

recent pronouncement by this Bench in Brijesh Kothia vs. State (NCT

of Delhi),

6

wherein this Bench has already tested the validity of the

arrest memo, common transit remand application and common

application seeking police custody remand qua co-accused Brijesh

Kothia (one of the directors of Aavkar Drugs) on the touchstone of the

Supreme Court decisions and the constitutional mandate of Article

22(1); and after a thorough consideration of the matter, this court has

admitted the said co-accused to regular bail, holding that the arrest of

Brijesh Kothia stood vitiated for non-supply of written grounds of

arrest.

14. It has been pointed‑out that in Brijesh Kothia, this Bench has already

held that the very same transit remand application and police custody

remand application do not qualify as valid service of written grounds

of arrest qua co‑accused Brijesh Kothia; which view applies equally to

the petitioner. Learned counsel has argued that the petitioner was not

even a director of Aavkar Drugs; nor was he responsible for the

business and affairs of the said company; and being only a

consultant/middle-man, stands on an even stronger footing.

15. On merits, it has been further urged that there is no recovery of any

contraband from, or at the instance of the petitioner; and that even the

recovery from the premises of Aavkar Drugs was allegedly at the

6

2026 SCC OnLine Del 3410

BAIL APPLN. 4028/2025 Page 6 of 16

instance of its directors. Reliance in this regard has been placed on

Bharat Chaudhary vs. Union of India

7

and Tofan Singh vs. State of

Tamil Nadu

8

, to contend that in the absence of recovery, mere reliance

on statements of co‑accused persons recorded under section 67 NDPS

Act is too tenuous a basis to deny bail and that such statements are in

any event inadmissible as evidence.

16. It has been emphasised that acting as a middle‑man or business

development partner of Aavkar Drugs, the petitioner had only

facilitated the signing of a job‑work agreement between Aavkar Drugs

and Pharma Solution Services for manufacture of Phenylephrine

Hydrochloride, which is a legal pharmaceutical substance; and the

petitioner had no knowledge that any other substance or contraband

was being manufactured at the factory, as alleged by the prosecution.

It has been submitted that the petitioner was not responsible nor did he

owe any legal duty to verify what was being actually manufactured at

the Aavkar Drugs factory.

17. It has also been contended that there is no material indicative of any

culpable mental state on the part of the petitioner, that could trigger the

presumption under section 35 of the NDPS Act, since all material

shows that the petitioner only facilitated the signing of a job‑work

agreement for manufacture of Phenylephrine Hydrochloride, a lawful

pharmaceutical ingredient; that Avkar Drugs was, at the very least, a

legitimate business since it had a website, a registered address and GST

registration; and Pharma Solution Services had expressly declared that

7

2021 SCC OnLine SC 1235, para 14

8

(2021) 4 SCC 1, para 158

BAIL APPLN. 4028/2025 Page 7 of 16

no controlled substance would be manufactured at Aavkar Drugs; and

that Phenylephrine Hydrochloride is neither a narcotic nor a controlled

substance.

18. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also pointed to an evident

mismatch between the result of the field‑testing kit, which had

indicated the seized material to be either ‘cocaine’ or ‘methaqualone’,

while the subsequent FSL report has supposedly identified the

substance as ‘mephedrone’. Reliance has been placed on this court’s

decisions in Taslima @ Putti vs. State (NCT of Delhi) in Bail Appln.

3173/2025 and Sahil Sharma @ Maxx vs. State (Govt. of NCT of

Delhi) in Bail Appln. 3068/2025, to urge that such ex-facie discrepancy

touching upon the very identity of the substance recovered should enure

to the benefit of an accused, at least at the stage of bail.

19. Learned counsel has further submitted, that the chargesheet filed

against the petitioner invokes only section 29 of the NDPS Act; and

that the material cited against him are confined to (i) WhatsApp chats

between him and the alleged kingpin of an international drug

trafficking operation, one Rana Tarandeep, and (ii) the job‑work

agreement between Aavkar Drugs and Pharma Solution Services,

neither of which show the petitioner’s conscious involvement in the

alleged offences.

20. The petitioner further claims parity with various other persons

associated with Pharma Solution Services who have not been arrayed

as accused, notably Ms. Abhilasha Gupta, India Head of Operations,

who executed the job‑work agreement with Aavkar Drugs and arranged

the premises and logistics for storage of alleged contraband. It has been

BAIL APPLN. 4028/2025 Page 8 of 16

argued that if functionaries of Pharma Solution Services have not been

prosecuted, there is no justification to continue the petitioner’s

incarceration.

21. It has also been pointed- out that the petitioner has been in judicial

custody for about 01 year and 06 months; that his jail conduct is

‘satisfactory’; and that he has no criminal antecedents.

22. In the circumstances, it has been prayed that the petitioner deserves to

be released on regular bail, since his case is squarely covered by the

considerations that have weighed with this Bench in Brijesh Kothia;

and the only role alleged against the petitioner is, that working as a

consultant, middleman and marketing agent, he had facilitated the

execution of a certain job-work agreement.

S

UBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE STATE

23. Opposing the grant of bail, Mr. Singh has argued that the petitioner’s

role is not merely that of a middleman and one who facilitated the

signing of the job-work agreement; but the petitioner was in close

contact with Rana Tarandeep, who is the kingpin of an international

drug cartel that has smuggled 1290.967 kgs of cocaine/mephedrone and

39.706 kgs of marijuana into India. In support of his submission,

learned SPP has relied on the WhatsApp chats between the petitioner

and Rana Tarandeep.

24. Learned SPP has also submitted that it was at the instance of the

petitioner and Rana Tarandeep that the job-work agreement had been

signed. It has further been stated that the petitioner, who is an MBA

degree-holder, has been involved in the business of supply of raw

chemicals and possessed sufficient technical knowledge regarding the

BAIL APPLN. 4028/2025 Page 9 of 16

manufacturing of chemical products and intermediates. It has therefore

been argued that the petitioner was very well aware of illegitimacy of

the manufacturing and supply activities that he was involved in.

25. Insofar as the petitioner’s challenge to the validity of his arrest on

13.10.2024 citing non-supply of written ‘grounds of arrest’ is

concerned, it has been submitted that the requirement of serving

grounds of arrest on the petitioner did not arise, since in Mihir Rajesh

Shah, the Supreme Court has observed that grounds of arrest have to

be communicated to the arrestee in writing ‘henceforth,’ i.e., after the

date of pronouncement of the verdict in Mihir Rajesh Shah on

06.11.2025, which requirement had no application to the petitioner’s

arrest on 13.10.2024. Learned SPP has drawn attention to the following

paragraphs of Mihir Rajesh Shah in support of his submission:

“

67. After having come to the above conclusion, it is pertinent

to note that the provision of law under Section 50 CrPC (Section 47

of BNSS 2023) does not provide for a specific mode of or time-frame

for communication of the grounds of arrest to the person arrested.

This Court in Prabir Purkayastha [Prabir Purkayastha v. State (NCT

of Delhi), (2024) 8 SCC 254 : (2024) 3 SCC (Cri) 573], held that the

grounds of arrest be conveyed to the arrestee in writing in all offences

at the earliest, which means it need not be given at the time of arrest

but within a reasonable time thereafter, for offences under all the

statutes, which period would be as has been laid down above in this

order.

“68. We are cognizant that there existed no consistent or

binding requirement mandating written communication of the

grounds of arrest for all the offences. Holding as above, in our view,

would ensure implementation of the constitutional rights provided to

an arrestee as engrafted under Article 22 of the Constitution of India

in an effective manner. Such clarity on obligation would avoid

BAIL APPLN. 4028/2025 Page 10 of 16

uncertainty in the administration of criminal justice. The ends of

fairness and legal discipline therefore demand that this procedure as

affirmed above shall govern arrests henceforth . ”

(emphasis supplied)

26. In furtherance of his submission, Mr. Singh has also relied upon a

decision of a Division Bench of this court in Karan Singh vs. State

NCT of Delhi,

9

wherein the Division Bench has observed that the ratio

in Mihir Rajesh Shah applies prospectively, and accordingly, did not

apply to the case of the petitioner in that case, who was arrested on

07.02.2024.

27. Insofar as the decision of the Supreme Court in Dr. Rajinder Rajan is

concerned, learned SPP has argued that albeit the petitioner therein was

released by the Supreme Court on non-supply of grounds of arrest, the

said decision cannot be treated as a binding precedent, since in that case

the Supreme Court has not discussed the prospective or retrospective

application of Mihir Rajesh Shah.

28. Lastly and most importantly, Mr. Singh has argued that the petitioner,

who is a key member of an international drug cartel, has failed to show

any ‘demonstrable prejudice’

10

that was caused to him due to the non-

supply of grounds of arrest in writing.

29. The State has accordingly prayed that the petitioner’s bail petition be

rejected, keeping in mind the gravity and nature of offences committed

by him.

9

2026 SCC OnLine Del 282

10

State of Karnataka vs. Sri Darshan Etc, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1702

BAIL APPLN. 4028/2025 Page 11 of 16

DISCUSSION & CONCLUSIONS

30. Having heard the rival submissions raised on behalf of the petitioner

and the State, having considered the material on record and the

precedents cited, the following considerations weigh with the court at

this stage:

30.1. That on material facts that are germane to the legality of arrest

and remand, the case of the present petitioner, Amit Kumar

Masuriya, stands exactly on the same footing as that of his

co‑accused, Brijesh Kothia, in whose favour this Bench has

already delivered judgment dated 13.05.2026 in BAIL APPLN.

No. 439/2026. The said judgment exhaustively examines the

constitutional and statutory requirements of furnishing written

grounds of arrest under Article 22(1) of the Constitution read

with section 47 BNSS (earlier section 50 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure, 1973) as elucidated in Pankaj Bansal, Prabir

Purkayastha, Vihaan Kumar, Mihir Rajesh Shah and the recent

decision of the Supreme Court in Dr. Rajinder Rajan. In Brijesh

Kothia this Bench has concluded that non‑supply of written

grounds of arrest within the stipulated window of time vitiates

the arrest and remand, and entitles the arrestee to be released on

bail, though without nullifying the investigation or trial of the

case.

30.2. That in particular, this Bench has already held in Brijesh Kothia,

that where the police are in possession of documentary material

forming a cogent basis for arrest, the written grounds of arrest

must be furnished to the arrestee on his arrest, or at the very least,

BAIL APPLN. 4028/2025 Page 12 of 16

within a reasonable time, and in no event later than 02 hours

prior to his production before the Magistrate for remand

proceedings, failing which the arrest would be rendered illegal

and the arrestee is entitled to be set free.

30.3. That in Dr. Rajinder Rajan the Supreme Court has applied the

necessity of serving grounds of arrest in writing to arrests

effected even prior to the pronouncement of Mihir Rajesh Shah,

thereby reinforcing the principle that the mandate for serving

grounds of arrest in writing flows directly from Article 22(1) and

is not merely prospective in operation. Relying upon the said

decisions of the Supreme Court, in Brijesh Kothia this Bench has

held as follows:

“26. In its most recent pronouncement dated 1-4-2026 in Dr

Rajinder Rajan, the Supreme Court has applied this dictum to

arrests made on 3-5-2025 - i.e., before Mihir Rajesh Shah came to

be pronounced on 6-11-2025 - namely, to arrests effected prior to

the decision in Mihir Rajesh Shah. In Dr Rajinder Rajan

the

Supreme Court has directed the release of the arrestees on bail,

since the arrest memos merely recorded that grounds of arrest were

orally explained but written grounds were not furnished (at least)

two hours before remand. In the opinion of this court, a reading

of Dr Rajinder Rajan shows that Mihir Rajesh Shah does not create

a fresh prospective regime but merely re-affirms the constitutional

requirement inherent in Article 22(1) as earlier elucidated, inter -

alia in Pankaj Bansal, Prabir Purkayastha, and Vihaan Kumar.

“27. The decision in Mihir Rajesh Shah possibly cannot, and

does not, move forward the date from which the verdict in Pankaj

Bansal takes effect i.e. 3-10-2023, which position is reiterated

in Prabir Purkayastha and Vihaan Kumar .”

(emphasis in original)

BAIL APPLN. 4028/2025 Page 13 of 16

30.4. That applying the same legal yardstick to the present case, the

following features stand-out and are materially indistinguishable

from those in Brijesh Kothia: (a) the arrest memo dated

13.10.2024 pertaining to the petitioner does not record any

person‑specific, written “grounds of arrest” but only sets‑out

generic ‘reasons for arrest’; (ii) there is no material to show that

any separate written grounds of arrest were furnished to the

petitioner at the time of his arrest at Ankleshwar, Gujarat or soon

thereafter; (iii) on the State’s own showing, the transit remand

application dated 14.10.2024 was not served on the petitioner,

and in any case, that application also does not disclose any

personalised grounds for the petitioner’s arrest; and (iv) the

police custody remand application dated 16.10.2024 filed before

the learned Special Judge (NDPS), Patiala House Courts, New

Delhi, even if treated as containing adequate particulars, was

placed before the court only at the time of the petitioner’s

production and was not supplied to the petitioner at least 02

hours prior thereto, thereby failing to satisfy the temporal

mandate laid‑down in Mihir Rajesh Shah.

30.5. The inevitable consequence of the above is that the petitioner

was precluded from meaningfully instructing counsel and

effectively resisting his transit remand and police custody

remand at those crucial stages, defeating the very purpose of

Article 22(1), which is to ensure that an arrestee be put in

possession of sufficient knowledge about the allegations against

him, so that he can meaningfully challenge his custody.

BAIL APPLN. 4028/2025 Page 14 of 16

30.6. That his nominal roll shows that the petitioner has already spent

over 01 year 06 months in judicial custody; that his overall jail

conduct has been ‘satisfactory’ and that he has no other criminal

involvements.

30.7. That consistent with the approach adopted by this Bench in

Brijesh Kothia, this court is also mindful that the illegality in

arrest and remand does not, by itself, nullify the investigation or

preclude the investigating agency from taking such steps as may

be permissible in law, including if so advised, effecting a fresh

arrest in strict compliance with Article 22(1), the BNSS and the

NDPS Act.

30.8. For the present purposes however, the constitutional violation in

not supplying the written grounds of arrest within the time and

manner mandated by the Supreme Court, is sufficient to entitle

the petitioner to be set at liberty on bail, especially when he has

already spent a substantial period in judicial custody.

31. Accordingly, in the totality of circumstances, this court is persuaded to

grant to the petitioner – Amit Kumar s/o Jagdish Bhai – regular bail

pending trial in the present case, on the following terms:

31.1. The petitioner shall furnish a personal bond in the sum of

Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lac Only) with 02 sureties in the like

amount from family members, to the satisfaction of the learned

trial court;

31.2. The petitioner shall furnish to the Investigating Officer/S.H.O.,

Special Cell, Delhi, a cellphone number on which he may be

BAIL APPLN. 4028/2025 Page 15 of 16

contacted at any time, and shall ensure that the number is kept

active and switched‑on at all times;

31.3. If the petitioner has a passport, he shall surrender the same to the

learned trial court and shall not travel out of the country without

prior permission of the learned trial court;

31.4. The petitioner shall not contact, visit, or offer any inducement,

threat or promise to any of the prosecution witnesses or any other

person acquainted with the facts of the case;

31.5. The petitioner shall not tamper with evidence nor otherwise

indulge in any act or omission that is unlawful or that would

prejudice the proceedings in the pending trial; and

31.6. In case of any change in his residential address or contact details,

the petitioner shall promptly inform the Investigating Officer in

writing.

32. Since the petitioner is facing trial and would, therefore, be appearing

before the learned trial court from time‑to‑time, it is not considered

necessary to impose any additional reporting requirement as a

condition of regular bail, beyond what has been set‑out above.

33. It is clarified that nothing contained in this judgment shall be construed

as an expression of opinion by this court on the merits of the

prosecution case at trial, which shall proceed uninfluenced by any

observation herein.

34. The present petition is disposed‑of in the above terms.

35. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed‑of.

BAIL APPLN. 4028/2025 Page 16 of 16

36. A copy of this judgment be forwarded to the concerned Jail

Superintendent forthwith for information and necessary compliance.

ANUP JAIRAM BHAMBHANI, J

MAY 29, 2026/HJ