2026 INSC 928 1

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO . __ ___OF 2026

(@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRL.) NO. 19051/2025)

Anand Kumar @ Sanjay Lalwani …….Appellant(s)

Versus

The State of Madhya Pradesh And Ors. ……. Respondent(s)

J U D G M E N T

K. V. Viswanathan, J.

1) Leave granted.

2) The present appeal calls in question the correctness of

the order dated 19.09.2024 in Misc. Criminal Case No. 33770

of 2019 passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at

Jabalpur. By the said order, the High Court dismissed the

petition filed by the appellant herein, under Section 482 of the

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short ‘the Code’),

seeking quashment of criminal proceedings in ST No. 459 of

2

2018 pending before the Court of Second Additional Sessions

Judge, Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh.

BRIEF FACTS: -

3) The third respondent herein - Subhash Chandra Lalwani

filed a criminal complaint on 18.10.2011 before the Court of

Judicial Magistrate First Class, Bhopal, under Section 200 of

the Code against the appellant herein and three others,

namely, Sneha Bhosle, Shyam Sunder Joshi and Sunil

Vishwakarma.

4) The gravamen of the charges in the complaint was that

one Pradeep Singh Mehta (second respondent in this appeal

and not arrayed as an accused) owned 54.48 acres of land in

village Kanasaiya, Tehsil Huzur, District Bhopal. It was averred

that out of the said land, 15.18 acres of land was situated in

Khasra No. 562 and that out of the said 15.18 acres, 7.50 acres

of land, having plantation of eucalyptus trees, was given to the

complainant by Respondent No. 2.

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5) It was averred that the appellant, along with the other

accused, conspired to usurp the land. In pursuance thereto,

they got typed one General Power of Attorney (GPA) dated

31.03.1997, purported to be executed by Pradeep Singh

Mehta-Respondent No. 2 herein. It was averred that under the

said Power of Attorney (PoA), Pradeep Singh Mehta

purportedly appointed the appellant herein for farming, sale

and for such other works, on his behalf, for the said 54.48 acres

of land.

6) It was categorically averred in the complaint that the

signature of Pradeep Singh Mehta on the Power of Attorney

was forged and fabricated. Further, it was averred that a

Partnership Deed was prepared on 16.03.2000 and a

Partnership Firm, under the name and style of M/s Paradise

Farms, was formed whereunder the appellant herein along

with accused Sneha Bhosle and Pradeep Singh Mehta -

Respondent No. 2, through his Power of Attorney holder-the

appellant herein, were shown as partners. It was also

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mentioned in the said Partnership Deed that Pradeep Singh

Mehta had contributed the aforesaid 54.48 acres of land to the

said Partnership Firm, as his share towards the capital of the

Firm and made the partnership firm, the sole owner of the said

land. It was also mentioned in the Partnership Deed that on the

retirement or death of any partner, the legal heirs of the said

partner would not receive any share in the firm.

7) It was alleged that this was a well-planned illegal move

to grab the land of Pradeep Singh Mehta with criminal intent.

The crucial averments, on this aspect, are extracted

hereinbelow:-

“6. …….It is not only illegal but also a well-planned

move to grab the land of Pradeep Singh Mehta, which

also reflects their criminal intent. In this way,

Accused No. 1 and 2 also made fake Partnership Deed

based on previous forged General Power of Attorney.

They gave the name of firm as "M/s Paradise Farms"

giving its address at 16, Nadir Colony, Shyamla Hills,

which is also a residence address of Sanjay alias

Anand Kumar Lalwani. In the preparation of said

Partnership deed Accused Person No.3 & 4 not only

supported them but also signed it.”

(Emphasis supplied)

5

8) Further, it was alleged that the appellant herein (Sanjay

Lalwani) and Sneha Bhosle filed an application before the

Assistant Settlement Officer, Anand Nagar, Bhopal, for

mutating the said land in the name of the Partnership Firm

wherein the application for mutation was signed by both the

accused in their individual capacity and the appellant herein

signed as Power of Attorney holder of Pradeep Singh Mehta.

9) Vide order dated 07.06.2000, the Assistant Settlement

Officer, Anand Nagar, Bhopal, allowed the said mutation in

favour of M/s Paradise Farms in which the complainant’s land

of 7.50 acre was also a part, which caused loss to the

complainant as well to Pradeep Singh Mehta-Respondent No.

2 herein.

10) It was alleged that due to close relationship between

Pradeep Singh Mehta and father of the complainant, the latter

used to take care of the said land of Pradeep Singh Mehta and

his father Jai Singh Mehta. Thereafter, it was averred as

follows: -

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“11. That since the father of Complainant got quite old,

as such as per his will, there was a settlement of the

agriculture land in year 2000. According to which,

Pradeep Singh Mehta continued occupying his 54.48

Acre land but out of 15.18 acre land of Khasra No.562,

7.50 acre land came in favour of Complainant.

12. That since the time of Complainant's father Accused

No.l Anand Alias Sanjay Kumar Lalwani used to look after

the work of farming and apart from farming of land of

Complainant's, he looked after farming for Pradeep and

his family.

13. That, few months before, the Complainant came to

know that the entire land 54.48 acre has been mutated in

the name of M/s Paradise Farms and partner of M/s

Paradise Farm is Accused No.l. After gaining knowledge,

Complainant came to know that Accused Person No.l & 2

made the partnership deed of paradise farm. Based on

forged documents, land got mutated in the name of

Paradise Farms and after all such enquiry, the present

complaint is being filed with delay due to above reasons.

Therefore, offence U/s 466, 467, 468, 471, 420, 406, 120-B

I.P.C. be registered against all accused persons, so that

all Accused Person be punished as per punishment

prescribed under above sections in the interest of

justice.”

11) During the course of proceedings under the complaint,

Pradeep Singh Mehta, in his sworn statement, recorded on

09.02.2012, did depose that the signature on the Power of

Attorney was forged. He also deposed that out of 54.48 acres

of land, he had indeed given 7.50 acres to the complainant.

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12) On 28.05.2012, the learned Judicial Magistrate First

Class, Bhopal, took cognizance since prima facie case was

found for offences under Sections 466,467,468,471,420,406

and 120B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short ‘the IPC’)

against the accused. On 07.03.2013, the appellant herein and

other accused filed a revision to challenge the cognizance

order dated 28.05.2012 before the Additional Sessions Judge,

Bhopal but the same was dismissed, the same day, as being

time barred.

FIRST ROUND OF PROCEEDINGS IN THE HIGH COURT :-

13) The appellant herein, Sneha Bhosle and Sunil

Vishwakarma took the matter to the High Court under Section

482 of the Code. The High Court, vide judgment and order

dated 03.04.2018, dismissed the Section 482 petitions filed by

the appellant and Ms. Sneha Bhosle but allowed the petition

insofar as another accused - Mr. Sunil Vishwakarma was

concerned.

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14) One crucial finding that was recorded in the order of the

High Court, while declining to quash the proceedings, was

that in the absence of any documentary evidence as to the

transfer of 7.50 acres of land by Pradeep Singh Mehta to

Subhash Chandra Lalwani and only based on the oral

statement of the complainant and Pradeep Singh Mehta, it

could not be assumed that the complainant had any interest in

the disputed land. The relevant finding was in the following

terms:-

“24. If we examine the instant case in the light of above

settled position of law, the non-applicant filed complaint

averring that the disputed 54.48 acres of land situated at

Kanha Saiya was owned by Pradeep Singh Mehta and out of

that land Pradeep Singh Mehta gave 7.50 acres of land of

Khasra No.562 to the complainant/non-applicant. In

alternate complainant also averred that he got that land

in family partition. But complainant did not produce any

document or family settlement deed in this regard. The

disputed land is immovable property earlier owned by

Pradeep Singh Mehta and cannot be transferred to

applicant who is not a family member of Pradeep Singh

Mehta without any transfer deed like gift deed, sale

deed etc., while complainant did not file any such

document in this regard. So, merely on the oral

statement of applicant that Pradeep Singh Mehta gave

7.50 acres of land of Khasra No.562 to him or he got that

land in family partition can not be considered correct.

Although, Pradeep Singh Mehta also stated before the

Court that he gave 7.50 acres of land of Khasra No.562 to

complainant, but he also did not depose that how and

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when he transferred that land to the complainant. From

the averment of complaint it is clear that the disputed

land is in possession of applicant since a long time.

Complainant also did not depose that he ever tried to

take possession of land from the applicant, which was

allegedly given by Pradeep Singh Mehta to him. So in

the absence of any documentary evidence only on the

basis of oral statement of complainant and Pradeep

Singh Mehta it can not be assumed that complainant has

any interest in disputed land.”

(Emphasis supplied)

15) The High Court, in the said proceeding, on the basis that

the Power of Attorney was alleged to be forged and that the

Partnership Deed was prepared and mutation was obtained in

the name of the partnership firm, refused to quash the

proceedings. A Special Leave Petition filed by accused Sneha

Bhosle against this order, was dismissed by this Court, on

26.07.2018.

16) The complaint was committed to the Court of Sessions

and registered as ST No. 459 of 2018. Charges were also

framed under Sections 467, 468 and 471 IPC against the

appellant. Aggrieved, the complainant (R3) filed a criminal

revision in CRR No. 2747 of 2019 before the High Court

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seeking additional charges under Sections 406,409,420 and

466 IPC. That revision is still pending in the High Court.

SECOND ROUND OF PROCEEDINGS IN THE HIGH

COURT

17) On 08.08.2019, the appellant filed Misc. Crl. Case No.

33770 of 2019 seeking quashment of criminal proceedings

pending before the Sessions Court being ST No. 459 of 2018

on the ground that a compromise has been reached between

the appellant herein and Pradeep Singh Mehta. An affidavit by

Pradeep Singh Mehta was filed to this effect before the High

Court. The affidavit was in the following terms:-

“I, Pradeep Singh Mehta, s/o Late Shri Jai Singh Mehta, aged

71 years, R/o 48, Ajmera Garden, Nirman Nagar, Jaipur,

(Rajasthan) do hereby solemnly affirm and state on oath as

under:

1. That I owned 54.48 acres agriculture land at Village

Kanasaiyya, Tehsil Huzur, District Bhopal.

2. That since I have been living at Jaipur and earlier at

Kolkata, the said land was managed by my maternal uncle

Late Shri Sardarmal Lalwani. We have been maintaining

very cordial relation between our families for the past 75-80

years.

3. That for better management and a formal

arrangement to share profits or losses, I had contributed

the said land into a partnership firm, namely, Paradise

Farms and the deed was written on 16.03.2000, with

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myself as partner in profit and loss being 30%, partner

Sanjay Lalwani and partner Smt. Sneha Bhosle as 20%.

4. That the formalities to form the partnership and

mutation were carried out Sanjay Lalwani as per my

instruction and authorized on my behalf.

5. That the firm has been carrying on business of agriculture

and plantation, duly filing Income tax returns, maintaining

bank account, depositing land revenue, etc, and my capital

account has been settled on a year-to-year basis as per my

satisfaction.

6. That earlier my cousin Shri Subhash Chandra

Lalwani, s/o Late Shri Sardarmal Lalwani had

approached me to offer 7.50 acres from the said land.

However, the same did not mature and no consideration

was transacted in this regard between us.

7. That Subhash Chandra Lalwani filed a criminal

complaint against his younger brother- my other cousin,

and partner in M/s Paradise Farms Anand Kumar @

Sanjay Lalwani & others. On Subhash Chandra Lalwani

pursuance, I was summoned by the Ld. Trial Court as a

witness to testify my signatures on a photocopy of a

document known as power of attorney. There was no

denial of the partnership deed or mutation in my

deposition.

8. That admittedly due to emotional and familial

bonding my brother Subhash Chandra Lalwani led to me

give the statement on 09-02-2012 before Ld. Trial Court.

Although I am neither a complainant nor an aggrieved

person, I have no grievance or grudge whatso ever

against Anand Kumar @ Sanjay Lalwani, Sneha Bhosle

or Shyam Sundar Joshi, or any of the accused for any

offences mentioned in the said complaint bearing

number S.T. 459/2018 charge or otherwise.

9. That Subhash Chandra Lalwani has no interest in the

said land, as well as power of attorney, partnership or

mutation.

10. That I do not want to be a part of this complaint any

further and would therefore pray to this Hon'ble Court to

exclude me from any such proceedings or the case and

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compound the case and thereby quash the proceedings

in S.T. 459/2018 pending in the Hon'ble Court of II A.D.J.

Bhopal, to avoid unnecessary litigation between me,

Subhash Chandra Lalwani, Anand Kumar Lalwani or

any other and to maintain peace and harmony amongst

our families. That the above affidavit is being given by

me and in utmost sound state of mind without any

pressure, influence, collusion or coercion with my free

will so help me God.

(Emphasis supplied)

18) On 13.08.2019, the High Court directed the Registrar (J-

II) to verify the genuineness and authenticity of the

compromise and submit a Report. On the same day, the

Registrar submitted a Report that Pradeep Singh Mehta and

the appellant herein wanted to end all disputes and animosity

between them; that Pradeep Singh Mehta was not under any

threat, inducement or compulsion to enter into the

compromise; and, that the compromise was voluntarily

entered into to maintain peace and cordial relations between

them. It was further reported that the compromise was

genuine and authentic.

19) It must be pointed out that the Report refers to Pradeep

Singh Mehta as the complainant. Though the Registrar has

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used the word ‘complainant’ to describe Pradeep Singh

Mehta, that really does not affect the findings recorded by

him.

ORDER IMPUGNED: -

20) By virtue of the impugned order, the High Court

dismissed the appellant’s petition under Section 482 of the

Code. The High Court, in its short order, held as under: -

“9. Even the provisions of Section 320 of Cr.P.C. stipulate

that an offence under Section 406 of IPC can be

compounded by owner of the property in respect of which

breach of trust has been committed and an offence under

Section 420 of IPC can be compounded by the person so

cheated.

10. The contents of the complaint reflect that the

complainant received 7.50 acres of land from the original

owner i.e. Mr. Pradeep Sing Mehta and Mr. Pradeep Singh

Mehta in his testimony recorded under Section 202 of

Cr.P.C. has stated that he had transferred the 7.50 acre of

land to the complainant. The veracity of said assertion

made in complaint as well as the sifting of evidence of Mr.

Pradeep Singh Mehta is an exercise which is required to

be taken recourse to by the trial Court.

11. The entire provisions of Section 320 of Cr.P.C.

nowhere stipulate that the offence can be compounded

even on the basis of compromise between the accused

and witness of the complaint. The complainant in the

present case has not entered into any settlement or

compromise with the present applicant/accused

person. Therefore, the quashment cannot be sought

only on the basis of amicable settlement arrived at

between the accused person/present applicant and

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respondent No.2 who is not the complainant but only a

witness of the complainant.

12. Therefore, in view of the aforesaid, this Court is of

the considered view that on the basis of compromise

so arrived at between the accused person/present

applicant and respondent No.2, the complaint filed by

the complainant/respondent No.3 cannot be quashed

who is not party to the amicable settlement.

13. Resultantly, this petition filed under Section 482 of

'Cr.P.C. stands dismissed. No order as to costs.”

(Emphasis supplied)

21) According to the High Court, under Section 320 of the

Code, the offence under Section 406 IPC can be compounded

only by the owner of the property in respect of which breach

of trust has been committed and an offence under Section 420

IPC can be compounded only by the person so cheated.

Further, the High Court held the veracity of the assertion made

in the complaint that Subhash Chandra Lalwani-Respondent

No. 3 was given 7.50 acres of land by Pradeep Singh Mehta as

well as sifting the evidence of Pradeep Singh Mehta, was an

exercise which was required to be undertaken by the Trial

Court, at the Trial. The entire provisions of Section 320 of the

Code, according to the High Court, did not stipulate that the

offence can be compounded on the basis of a compromise

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arrived at between accused and the witness of the complaint.

The High Court held that the complainant in the present case

has not entered into any settlement or compromise with the

appellant herein. The High Court further held that since the

complainant was not party to the compromise , the

proceedings cannot be quashed.

22) Aggrieved, the appellant is in appeal by way of special

leave before us.

23) We have heard Mr. R. Basant, learned Senior Counsel for

the appellant, Ms. Meenakshi Arora, learned Senior Counsel

for Respondent No. 2 - Pradeep Singh Mehta, Mr. Sankalp

Kochar, learned Counsel for the Respondent No. 3 - Subhash

Chandra Lalwani and Mr. Rajan K. Chaurasia, learned Counsel

for the Respondent No. 1- State of Madhya Pradesh.

CONTENTIONS: -

24) Mr. R. Basant, learned Senior Counsel, contended that

the High Court has completely misunderstood the submission

of the appellant; that the case of the appellant did not pertain

16

to compounding of offences but was about quashment of

proceedings based on the compromise; that there is a

distinction between compounding of an offence and

quashment of an offence; that the victim of the crime, as per

the complaint, was Pradeep Singh Mehta; that in the earlier

round, the High Court had held that there was no basis for the

claim of the complainant that 7.50 acres was given to the

complainant; and, that in the light of the affidavit of Pradeep

Singh Mehta, it will be an abuse of the process to continue the

complaint.

25) Ms. Meenakshi Arora, learned Senior Counsel submitted

that consent of the informant was not required as the informant

was not the victim; that no consideration has been forthcoming

for the so-called giving of 7.50 acres by Pradeep Singh Mehta

to the informant and that the informant did not dispute the

existence of the partnership on 16.03.2000 and at no stage

questioned the mutation. Ms. Meenakshi Arora also reiterated

17

the averments in the affidavit of compromise as part of her

submissions.

26) Mr. Sankalp Kochar, learned counsel for the informant

argued that the affidavit of R2 contradicted the sworn

statement given by him before the Magistrate; that the

Registrar proceeded on the basis that Pradeep Singh Mehta

was the complainant; and, that nowhere in the affidavit

Pradeep Singh Mehta has stated that signature on the Power

of Attorney was his. The learned counsel for the State Mr.

Rajan K. Chaurasia supported the informant. The interveners

are, the two other accused, Sneha Bhosle and Shyam Sunder

Joshi, who also sought quashment of proceedings.

QUESTION FOR CONSIDERATION: -

27) In the above background, the question that arises for

consideration is - Whether in the light of the affidavit of

compromise between the appellant and respondent No. 2,

could it be said that continuation of proceedings would be an

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abuse of process of law warranting quashment of

proceedings?

ANALYSIS AND REASONING: -

28) At the very outset, it has to be highlighted that

“compounding of offence” and “Quashing of offence due to a

settlement” are two different concepts. The concept of

compounding is circumscribed by Section 359 of the

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (for short ‘the

BNSS’) (erstwhile Section 320 of the Code). In the case of

quashing the proceedings due to settlement, the guiding

principles are whether in the teeth of the settlement, there was

any likelihood of the accused being convicted and further

whether in the light of the settlement, continuing the

proceedings will be an abuse of process.

29) Recently, this Court, speaking through one of us (K.V.

Viswanathan, J.), in Naushey Ali and Others vs. State of Uttar

Pradesh and Anr. (2025) 4 SCC 78, relying upon Gian Singh

vs. State of Punjab (2012) 10 SCC 303, held as under:-

19

“17. As explained in Gian Singh v. State of Punjab (2012)

10 SCC 303, quashing of offence or criminal proceedings

on the ground of settlement between an offender and

victim is not the same thing as compounding of offence.

This Court, highlighting the difference, had the following

to say : (SCC pp. 340-41, paras 57-58)

“57. Quashing of offence or criminal proceedings

on the ground of settlement between an offender

and victim is not the same thing as compounding

of offence. They are different and not

interchangeable. Strictly speaking, the power of

compounding of offences given to a court under

Section 320 is materially different from the

quashing of criminal proceedings by the High

Court in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction. In

compounding of offences, power of a criminal

court is circumscribed by the provisions contained

in Section 320 and the court is guided solely and

squarely thereby while, on the other hand, the

formation of opinion by the High Court for

quashing a criminal offence or criminal

proceeding or criminal complaint is guided by the

material on record as to whether the ends of

justice would justify such exercise of power

although the ultimate consequence may be

acquittal or dismissal of indictment.”

30) The only aspect to be borne in mind is even though

compounding and quashing are conceptually different, this

Court, in Gian Singh (supra), has pointed out that merely

because there is a settlement, for certain categories of

offences, proceedings will not be quashed. This carve out is

on the premise that, crimes that have harmful effects on the

20

public and consist of wrongdoing that seriously endangers

and threatens the well-being of the society cannot be quashed

only because the accused and the victim have amicably

settled the matter.

31) This takes us to the next issue as to the distinction

between “victim” and “informant” in a criminal case. In

Jagjeet Singh and Others vs. Ashish Mishra alias Monu and

Another, (2022) 9 SCC 321, this Court held that “victim” and

“complainant/informant” are two distinct connotations in

criminal jurisprudence. The relevant para of the judgment is

set out hereinbelow:-

“23. A “victim” within the meaning of CrPC cannot be

asked to await the commencement of trial for asserting

his/her right to participate in the proceedings. He/She has

a legally vested right to be heard at every step post the

occurrence of an offence. Such a “victim” has unbridled

participatory rights from the stage of investigation till the

culmination of the proceedings in an appeal or revision.

We may hasten to clarify that “victim” and

“complainant/informant” are two distinct connotations

in criminal jurisprudence. It is not always necessary that

the complainant/informant is also a “victim”, for even a

stranger to the act of crime can be an “informant”, and

similarly, a “victim” need not be the complainant or

informant of a felony.”

(Emphasis supplied)

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32) In this case, one of the questions considered by the High

Court was whether the complaint could be quashed wherein

the complainant/informant Subhash Chandra Lalwani-

Respondent No. 3 has not signed the affidavit of compromise.

That leads us to the question whether in criminal law, where

proceedings are sought to be quashed on the ground of a

settlement, should it be the informant even if not a victim, who

alone should be the party or proceedings could be quashed

only where the real “victim” (which may include the

informant) in a case and the accused arrive at a settlement.

33) In our opinion, the answer is very plain and clear as

daylight. It will only be the victim who can authorize a

settlement.

34) Section 39 of the Code (Section 33 of the BNSS), provides

for circumstances under which every person, aware of the

commission of or of the intention of any other person to

commit, any offence punishable under the prescribed

Sections forthwith give information to the nearest Magistrate

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or police officer of such commission or intention. As has been

elucidated hereinabove, to set the criminal law in motion, it

need not always be the victim who does it. Disastrous

consequences will arise if such informants (who are not

victims) are allowed to enter into settlement and the real

victim is left in limbo. Hence, what law contemplates is that it

is the real victim who has to be a party to the settlement on the

basis of which quashment of proceedings are sought under

Section 482. Further, the case on which quashment is sought

should fall within the parameters of such categories of cases

which could be quashed based on parties arriving at a

settlement.

35) It is apt here to refer to the definition of ‘victim’ under

Section 2(wa) of the Code and Section 2(y) of the BNSS, which

read as under:-

Section 2(wa) of the Code defines “victim” as under: -

“2. Definitions.-….

(wa) “victim” means a person who has suffered any loss or

injury caused by reason of the act or omission for which the

accused person has been charged and the expression

“victim” includes his or her guardian or legal heir;”

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Section 2(y) of the BNSS defines “victim” as under:-

“2. Definitions.-….

(y) “victim” means a person who has suffered any loss or

injury caused by reason of the act or omission of the

accused person and includes the guardian or legal heir of

such victim;”

36) To reinforce the above holding, one has to only peruse

the provisions providing for compounding of offences. Under

Section 359 of the BNSS, the third column deals with “Person

by whom offence may be compounded”. Even for offences

that are compoundable, the person, by whom the offence may

be compounded, is the person who has suffered loss or injury.

To illustrate:-

Offence Section of the

Indian Penal

Code

applicable

Person by whom

offence may be

compounded

Voluntarily causing hurt 323 The person to whom the

hurt is caused.

Wrongfully restraining or

confining any person

341, 342 The person restrained or

confined.

Mischief, when the only loss or

damage caused is loss or damage

to a private person

426, 427 The person to whom the

loss or damage is

caused.

Mischief by injury to works of

irrigation by wrongfully diverting

water when the only loss or

damage caused is loss or damage

to private person

430 The person to whom the

loss or damage is

caused.

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Using a false trade or property

mark

482 The person to whom loss

or injury is caused by

such use.

Though the offences in our case are non-compoundable, the

above Chart is only to highlight that it is only the victim,

namely, the person who has suffered loss or injury, who could

settle with the accused. Even here, care has to be taken to

ensure that heinous offences, as set out in Gian Singh (supra),

are not quashed under the pretext of settlement since they

have wider ramifications on the society.

37) In Gian Singh (supra), this Court, dealing with the power

to quash proceedings based on settlement between the victim

and the accused, speaking through the felicitous words of

R.M. Lodha, J., (as the learned Chief Justice then was), held as

follows:

“58. Where the High Court quashes a criminal proceeding

having regard to the fact that the dispute between the

offender and the victim has been settled although the

offences are not compoundable, it does so as in its opinion,

continuation of criminal proceedings will be an exercise in

futility and justice in the case demands that the dispute

between the parties is put to an end and peace is restored;

securing the ends of justice being the ultimate guiding

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factor. No doubt, crimes are acts which have harmful

effect on the public and consist in wrongdoing that

seriously endangers and threatens the well-being of the

society and it is not safe to leave the crime-doer only

because he and the victim have settled the dispute

amicably or that the victim has been paid compensation,

yet certain crimes have been made compoundable in

law, with or without the permission of the court. In

respect of serious offences like murder, rape, dacoity,

etc. or other offences of mental depravity under IPC or

offences of moral turpitude under special statutes, like

the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences

committed by public servants while working in that

capacity, the settlement between the offender and the

victim can have no legal sanction at all. However,

certain offences which overwhelmingly and

predominantly bear civil flavour having arisen out of

civil, mercantile, commercial, financial, partnership

or such like transactions or the offences arising out of

matrimony, particularly relating to dowry, etc. or the

family dispute, where the wrong is basically to the

victim and the offender and the victim have settled all

disputes between them amicably, irrespective of the

fact that such offences have not been made

compoundable, the High Court may withi n the

framework of its inherent power, quash the criminal

proceeding or criminal complaint or FIR if it is

satisfied that on the face of such settlement, there is

hardly any likelihood of the offender being convicted

and by not quashing the criminal procee dings,

justice shall be casualty and ends of justice shall be

defeated. The above list is illustrative and not

exhaustive. Each case will depend on its own facts

and no hard-and-fast category can be prescribed.”

(Emphasis supplied)

26

38) In Gian Singh (supra), it was expressly held that certain

offences which overwhelmingly and predominantly bear civil

flavour having arisen out of civil, mercantile, commercial,

partnership or such like transactions, where the wrong is

basically to the victim and where the victim has settled all

disputes, court may quash the proceedings, even if the

offences are not compoundable.

Is Pradeep Singh Mehta (R-2) - A Victim?

39) This, however, does not put an end to the controversy.

The question that arises is, on the facts of the case, is Pradeep

Singh Mehta-Respondent No. 2, a victim. Further, if he is, is

Subhash Chandra Lalwani-Respondent No. 3 also a victim and

could the complaint be quashed in the absence of a settlement

with Subhash Chandra Lalwani-Respondent No. 3.

40) There is no manner of doubt that Pradeep Singh Mehta-

Respondent No. 2 is indeed a victim. A careful perusal of the

complaint, which has been dealt with in detail hereinabove,

clearly brings out this fact. The substratum of the case of the

27

informant was that it was the signature of Pradeep Singh

Mehta-Respondent No. 2 which was forged and it was on that

basis that the partnership was set out and further mutations

were obtained. It is undisputed that reading of the complaint

reveals that it was Pradeep Singh Mehta who suffered a loss

and injury by reason of the acts of the accused. Hence, there

is no escape from the conclusion that Pradeep Singh Mehta is

indeed a victim.

41) The point that is canvassed by Respondent No. 3 is that

Pradeep Singh Mehta had given a sworn statement before the

Magistrate that the signature on the Power of Attorney (PoA)

was not his. Thereafter, in the subsequent affidavit, he had

reneged. We have examined his sworn statement as well as

the affidavit. We are convinced that Pradeep Singh Mehta is

categoric that he has stated in his affidavit that he does not

want the proceedings to continue. He has sworn an affidavit

stating that he indeed has contributed the land into the

partnership under the name M/s Paradise Farms; that the

28

formalities to form the partnership and mutation were carried

out by the appellant as per his instructions; that for the last

several years, the Firm has been carrying on business and

filing returns to his satisfaction; that Respondent No. 3 had

approached him to offer 7.50 acres of land but that did not

mature and no consideration was transacted; that Respondent

No. 3 led him to give the statement before the Magistrate; that

he has no grievance whatsoever against the accused; and, that

he does not want to be a part of the complaint and join the

prayer for quashing the proceedings. In the teeth of this

affidavit, we are convinced that Pradeep Singh Mehta, who

being the star witness, would be of no support to the

prosecution. The writing is clearly on the wall. On this score,

we are convinced that continuing the proceedings would be

an abuse of process and wastage of judicial time.

42) Further, we are satisfied that the settlement falls within

the parameters of cases which could be quashed as laid down

29

in Gian Singh (supra). It is purely a personal dispute which

has no repercussions on society, in general.

43) The offences alleged have a civil flavour with commercial

overtones. In the face of settlement, chances of conviction are

bleak. If not quashed, this will be one more case which will

clog the judicial system and be a stumbling block for other

important cases crying for justice. Ends of justice would be

better served by weeding out these proceedings where the

major protagonists in the drama who though originally were

at daggers drawn, have buried their differences, shaken

hands and moved on.

Is Subhash Chandra Lalwani (R-3) also a victim?

44) There is one more outstanding issue. Is Subhas Chandra

Lalwani-Respondent No. 3, a mere informant or is he a victim

too? The case of Respondent No. 3 is that out of the total extent,

7.50 acres was given to him and that Pradeep Singh Mehta, in

his own statement, in fact, has spoken in this regard. We have

seen the finding of the High Court, in its order dated

30

03.04.2018, in Misc. Crl. C No. 7209 of 2013 and the connected

matters. The High Court clearly held that there was no

documentary evidence and only on the basis of oral

statement, it could not be assumed that the informant-

Respondent No. 3 has any interest in the land.

45) We do not want to rest our conclusion only on the basis

of the above observations. There is one additional reason. We

will proceed on the basis that Subhash Chandra Lalwani-

Respondent No. 3 was indeed a victim. But the question is

whose victim was he? A careful perusal of the complaint

indicates that the grievance, at the highest, raised by

Respondent No. 3 is that the 7.5 acres of land given to him was

also thrown into the partnership and he has been deprived of

the said land.

46) Today, in the background of Pradeep Singh Mehta ,

having conceded to the formation of the partnership and the

correctness of the mutation, having expressly stated that he

has no grievance against the appellant and other accused

31

even on the aspect of Power of Attorney (PoA), Respondent

No. 3 cannot have any basis to prosecute the appellant.

47) In the complaint, in Para 6 it is categorically averred that

the attempt of the accused was to grab the land of Pradeep

Singh Mehta. Further it is averred in Para 11 that Pradeep

Singh Mehta continued occupying his 54.48 acres land but

out of 15.18 acres land of Khasra No. 562, 7.50 acres land came

in favour of complainant. Earlier in Para 4 it had been averred

that Pradeep Singh Mehta gave 7.50 acres of land to the

complainant. Most importantly, while conceding that Pradeep

Singh Mehta continued to occupy the entirety of 54.58 acres

nowhere it is averred in the complaint that the appellant was

aware that 7.50 acres of land was given by Pradeep Singh

Mehta and his father, to the complainant. The only averment

in Para 12 is that the appellant used to look after work of

farming and apart from farming of land of complainant, he

looked after farming for Pradeep Singh Mehta and his family.

At best taking the complainant’s case at its highest Pradep

32

Singh Mehta could have known of the handing over of 7.50

acres of land, if any, to the complaint. Pradeep Singh Mehta is

not an accused in the complaint. Considering the overall facts

and circumstances and in the teeth of the affidavit of Pradeep

Singh Mehta, on these facts we are of the opinion that allowing

the complainant to prosecute the appellant and the other

accused would be an abuse of process.

48) For the reasons stated above, we quash the proceedings

both on the ground of settlement between the appellant and

Pradeep Singh Mehta as well as on the ground that on the facts

of the case, Respondent No. 3 has made out no case against

the appellant and other accused.

CONCLUSION:-

49) In view of the aforesaid, the appeal is allowed.

Accordingly, we set aside the impugned judgment of the

High Court dated 19.09.2024 in Misc. Criminal Case No. 33770

of 2019. The consequence will be that the complaint pending

trial before the Second Additional Sessions Judge, Bhopal, in

33

ST No. 459 of 2018 stands quashed against all the arrayed

accused. Further, in view of our judgment, nothing further

survives in CRR No. 2747 of 2019, pending before the High

Court, and the same would also stand dismissed by this

judgment.

……….........................J.

[K. V. VISWANATHAN]

……….........................J.

[ARUN PALLI]

New Delhi;

August 31, 2026.