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* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

Date of decision: 2

nd

APRIL, 2025

IN THE MATTER OF:

+ CS(OS) 524/2024

ANI MEDIA PVT. LTD. .....Plaintiff

Through: Mr. Sidhant Kumar, Mr. Om Batra,

Mr. Akshit Mago and Ms. Anshika

Saxena, Advocates

versus

WIKIMEDIA FOUNDATION INC & ORS ......Defendants

Through: Mr. Jayant Mehta, Sr. Advocate with

Ms. Tine Abraham, Mr. Nikhil

Narendran, Mr. Vijayendra Pratap

Singh, Mr. Abhijnan Jha, Ms. Shivani

Rawat, Mr. Thomas J. Vallianeth, Mr.

Aayush Marwah, Ms. Shubhangni

Jain, Mr. Abhi Udai Singh Gautam,

Mr. Bakhshind Singh, Mr. Pranav

Tomar, Ms. Jasleen Virk, Ms. Diva

Saigal, Advocates for Defendant No.1

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUBRAMONIUM PRASAD

JUDGMENT

I.A. 32611/2024

1. The present Application has been filed by the Plaintiff under Order

XXXIX Rule 1 & 2 against the Defendants seeking the following prayers -

a. Pass an order against the Defendants, restraining them

from posting, publishing, uploading, writing, speaking,

distributing and/ or republishing any false, misleading

and defamatory content against the Plaintiff on any

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platform, including the Platform maintained by

Defendant No. 1;

b. Pass an injunction against the Defendant No. 1 or its

agents or any person acting on its behalf of or under

its authority, directing it to remove all false,

misleading and defamatory content against the

Plaintiff available on its Platform which can tarnish

the reputation of the Plaintiff and further restrain its

users and administrators from publishing anything

defamatory against the Plaintiff on its Platform;

c. Pass an order directing the Defendant No. 1, or its

agents or any person acting on its behalf of or under

its authority, to remove the protection status imposed

on the ANI Page;

d. Pass an order directing the Defendant No. 1 to

disclose the identity of the Defendant Nos. 2 to 4, by

providing their name, contact and other relevant

details; and

e. Pass any such other and further orders as this Hon'ble

Court deems fit.

2. The Plaintiff is India's leading multimedia news agency providing

syndicated news feed with over one hundred bureaus across the globe under

the name "Asian News International" and "ANI". The Plaintiff has been

managing and operating this business for over five decades, since the year

1971.

3. The Defendant No. 1 is a non-profit and charitable organisation

incorporated under the laws of the United States of America. It is stated that

the Defendant No. 1 has been set up to provide the necessary infrastructure

to make knowledge available to the public free of charge. Defendant No. 1

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hosts the English Wikipedia (hereinafter referred to as "Platform"), stated to

be a free encyclopedia that currently contains over 6.8 million articles online

in the English language.

4. The Defendants No. 2 to 4 are stated to be administrators of

Defendant No. 1's Platform. It is stated that the administrators are vested

with specialised rights and editing tools and can edit, block/unblock articles

and pages on Wikipedia.

5. Shorn of unnecessary details, the facts in brief leading to the present

application are as under:

i. In the year 2006, a page pertaining to the Plaintiff was created on

the Platform of Defendant No. 1. It is stated that the framework of

the Platform is as such that any user can edit the Plaintiff's page.

ii. It is stated that when the page was launched, it contained

comments about the Plaintiff which was sourced through trusted

websites. It is stated that this position continued up till

26.02.2019, and according to the Plaintiff, the said page

encompassed neutral information about the Plaintiff. The

Plaintiff's page as on 26.02.2019 is reproduced and reads as under-

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iii. It is stated that thereafter, the Defendants No. 2 to 4 edited the

page pertaining to the Plaintiff to include allegedly false,

misleading and defamatory remarks/content against the Plaintiff.

It is stated that the remarks and statements against the Plaintiff

forms a substantial portion of the Plaintiff's Page, which is

accessible to users and non-users of the Platform. The Plaintiff's

page as on 22.04.2024 is reproduced as under:-

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iv. It is stated that in April 2024, several edits were made on the page

pertaining to the Plaintiff to discredit the alleged defamatory

remarks on the Plaintiff's page. According to the Plaintiff the edits

were made relying upon trusted sources like The BBC Network.

The edits made on the page pertaining to the Plaintiff are as

under:-

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v. It is alleged that May 2024, Defendants No. 2 to 4 reversed the

aforesaid edits and reinstated the alleged false and defamatory

remarks, which are stated to exist on the Plaintiff's page till date.

The Plaintiff's page as on 22.05.2024 is reproduced as under:-

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vi. It is stated that on 27.05.2024, Defendant No. 2 imposed

protection status on the Plaintiff's page, thereby, restraining

ordinary users from editing, moving and creating any content on

that article for an indefinite period.

vii. On 13.06.2024, the Plaintiff issued a cease-and-desist notice to the

Defendants to refrain them from disseminating, publishing false,

misleading and defamatory content pertaining to the Plaintiff. The

notice also called upon the Defendants to perform its obligations

as an intermediary in accordance with the Information Technology

(Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules,

2021 and take down the alleged false and misleading information

available on the Plaintiff's page.

viii. The imputations against the Plaintiff can be summarized as:-

a. Plaintiff consistently acts at the behest of the Government of

India and the Bhartiya Janta Party;

b. Plaintiff is a 'propaganda tool' and a 'mouthpiece' for the

Government of India and the Bhartiya Janta Party;

c. Plaintiff is engaged in 'low quality journalism' that led to news

organizations ceasing their subscription with the Plaintiff;

d. Plaintiff is engaged in the spread of fake news or false news;

and

e. Plaintiff mistreats its employees and staff.

ix. The Plaintiff's Page on the date of filing of the instant application

is:-

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x. A perusal of the page discloses that the nature of allegations have

not changed.

xi. The present suit has therefore been filed seeking the following

reliefs:-

"a. Pass a Decree of Permanent and Mandatory

Injunction against the Defendants, restraining them

from posting, publishing, uploading, writing, speaking,

distributing and/ or republishing any false, misleading

and defamatory content against the Plaintiff on any

platform, including the Platform maintained by

Defendant No. 1;

b. Pass a Decree of Permanent and Mandatory

Injunction against the Defendant No. 1 or its agents or

any person acting on its behalf of or under its

authority, directing it to remove all false, misleading

and defamatory content against the Plaintiff available

on its Platform which can tarnish the reputation of the

Plaintiff and further restrain its users and

administrators from publishing anything defamatory

against the Plaintiff on its Platform;

c. Pass a Decree of Permanent and Mandatory

Injunction against the Defendant No. 1 or its agents or

any person acting on its behalf of or under its

authority, directing it to reinstate the ANI Page as it

was available as on 26 February

2019, which can be accessed at

https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Asian News

International&oldid= 885186405;

d. Direct Defendant No. 1, or its agents or any person

acting on its behalf of or under its authority, to comply

with its obligations under the Intermediary Guidelines

and restrain any user or administrator from publishing

CS(OS) 524/2024 Page 25 of 61

false, misleading and defamatory content against the

Plaintiff on the ANI Page or the Platform;

e. Pass an order directing the Defendants to issue a

retraction and an apology to the Plaintiff for damaging

the reputation of the Plaintiff;

f. Pass a Decree for damages against the Defendants,

directing them to pay an amount of INR 2,10,00,000/-

(Rupees Two Crores and Ten Lakhs Only) to the

Plaintiff, however, the Plaintiff reserves its right to

enhance this amount in future;

g. Cost of this Suit and consequent litigation be

awarded to the Plaintiff; and

h. Any other relief which this Hon'ble Court deems fit

and proper, against the Defendants and in favour of the

Plaintiff."

6. The learned Counsel for the Plaintiff states that the impugned

statements are ex-facie defamatory. He contended that it is well settled that

the right to professional reputation is a right guaranteed under Article 21 of

the Constitution of India and that the allegations that the Plaintiff is acting as

a mouth piece of the government cannot be tolerated by any independent

news agency. For the allegations regarding the working of the Plaintiff,

treatment towards employees etc., are far from the truth and is based on

materials which have not been verified by the Defendants.

7. The Learned Counsel for the Plaintiff further contends that the onus to

prove that the impugned statements made are truthful and not defamatory is

on the makers of such statements i.e., Defendants No. 2 to 4. It is stated that

the Impugned statements have been published by Defendants No. 2 to 4.

CS(OS) 524/2024 Page 26 of 61

Vide Order dated 11.11.2024, Division Bench of this Court in FAO (OS)

146/2024 had directed the Defendant No. 1 to serve Defendants No. 2 to 4.

In Order dated 16.12.2024 it has been recorded that Defendants No. 2 to 4

have been served and an affidavit of service has been filed in this Court in a

sealed cover. It is stated that despite service, the Defendants No. 2 to 4 have

chosen not to appear and that they have not filed any pleading to justify their

stand either. It is stated that as there is no material on record to justify the

impugned statements, they must be presumed as defamatory. It is stated that

the Defendant No. 1 has no locus to resist the reliefs as prayed for by the

Plaintiff through this application as Defendant No. 1 has asserted its status

as an intermediary under the Information Technology Act, 2000.

8. The learned Counsel for the Plaintiff supplements his contentions by

stating that the test of defamation is that the impugned statements must bring

down the reputation of the Plaintiff in the eyes of a reasonable member of

the public. It is further stated that the Defendant No. 1 holds itself to be an

encyclopedia and a repository of facts which attracts around 979 million

unique device visitors each month. It is stated that a reasonable member of

the public will perceive the impugned statements as a verifiable fact

appearing in an encyclopedia.

9. It was stated by the learned Counsel for the Plaintiff that the Single

Publication Rule will not apply in this case. It is the contention of the

Plaintiff that the material on the page pertaining to the Plaintiff is not the

verbatim reproduction of the articles which have been cited as sources. The

submission was primarily made to rebut the preliminary contention that

since the Plaintiff has not challenged the articles which are the source

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articles and are available on the internet since 2019, the present challenge is

not maintainable.

10. Per contra, the learned Senior Counsel for Defendant No. 1 submits

that the Plaintiff has limited its submissions to the Removal Relief. It is

further stated the present application of the Plaintiff is based on an incorrect

understanding of the Defendant No. 1's Platform. It is stated that the

Defendant No. 1 does not edit, create, upload or improve the encyclopedic

content on the Platform, including the Plaintiff's page, rather, the content is

continually and collectively created, uploaded and reviewed by third-party

users of the Platform. It is further stated that the content on the Platform is

dynamic and continually edited and updated by the Platform's members.

Therefore, any injunction against Defendants No. 2 to 4 will not be able to

ensure that the impugned statements on the Plaintiff's page continues to

remain absent without reappearing on the Platform as long as relevant,

reliable and verifiable information is available in public domain. It is

submitted that other users of the Platform can always reference such

information to post/repost similar content on the Plaintiff's page.

11. The learned Senior Counsel further contends that any injunction

granted to the Plaintiff will have the effect of censuring/punishing the model

on which the Platform operates. It is stated that the content published on the

Platform is based on secondary, reliable and verifiable sources and the

content is also verified by the Platform's community in terms of the

Platform’s policies. It is contended that if any reliefs as prayed for by the

Plaintiff are granted by this Court, it will have the effect of

punishing/censuring the right to free speech and expression of the Platform's

users and obstructing their access to the Platform. It is further stated that

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such reliefs will restrain the Platform's users from freely publishing and

editing the content of the Platform and would further discourage the users

from posting content that may not align with the preferences of individuals

or entities like the Plaintiff.

12. Furthermore, the learned senior counsel states that there is no urgency

to grant any interim relief to the Plaintiff, which in any event are barred by

limitation as the impugned statements have been present on the Plaintiff's

page since 2024 but have been present in various secondary sources since

2019. Therefore, the cause of action would not arise afresh from 2024 but

would have arisen when such statements were first published. It is submitted

that looking at the position that the impugned statements are present on

various domains since 2019, there is no irreparable injury or balance of

convenience in favour of the Plaintiff that necessitates any interim orders at

this stage. It is also stated that the inordinate delay in impugning the alleged

defamatory content has disentitled the Plaintiff from seeking Interim Reliefs

as evidently the Plaintiff has suffered no demonstrable prejudice or undue

hardship since 2019. It is further contended that this Court ought to consider

the issue of limitation before deciding to grant interim reliefs. It is stated that

the Plaintiff is trying to revive its cause of action and circumvent the

limitation period for filing the present suit by coalescing the deletion of

proposed edits and the rejection of the deletions on the Plaintiff's page. It is

also contended that the mere act of maintaining or reverting edits does not

constitute a fresh publication nor a fresh cause of action.

13. The learned Senior Counsel also submits that the removal relief and

the restraint relief are identical to the final reliefs as sought for in the Suit

filed by the Plaintiff; the Plaintiff is seeking an Order from this Court to

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partly decree the suit at the interim stage itself, which is not maintainable. It

is also stated that if such interim reliefs are granted, it would impose

unreasonable obligations on the Defendant No. 1 to continually adjudicate

on the alleged defamatory content on the Plaintiff's page on the Platform to

ensure that impugned statements or content similar to it remains absent from

the Plaintiff's page and by doing so, the Defendant No. 1 will not be able to

perform its duties as an intermediary under the Information Technology Act,

2000.

14. Heard learned Counsels for the parties and perused the material on

record.

15. It is the case of the Defendant No. 1 that it is an intermediary under

the Information Technology Act, 2000 and therefore, has no role with

respect to the impugned statements made by Defendants No. 2 to 4 on the

Plaintiff's page. Hence, this Court is of the opinion that Defendant No. 1,

being an intermediary has some fiduciary responsibilities and obligations to

prevent acts of defamation. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Google India

Private Limited v. Visaka Industries, (2020) 4 SCC 162 has held as under:-

"50. At this juncture, it is apposite that we take a

deeper look at what the Government of India has to say

about Section 79.

51. Section 79 is a safe harbour provision. Internet

intermediaries give access to host, disseminate and

index content, products and services originated by

third parties on the internet. There are different kinds

of intermediaries. They include:

(i) Internet Access and Service Provider (ISP).

Examples are given in this category of Airtel,

Vodafone, BSNL among others;

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(ii) Data Processing and Web Hosting Providers.

Examples include GoDaddy and BigRock;

(iii) Internet Search Engines and Portals like Google,

Yahoo and Binge;

(iv) Email hosts like Gmail (Google) and Yahoo!Mail;

(v) Then there are instant messaging platforms such as

WhatsApp, Facebook Messenger, Skype, etc.;

(vi) E-commerce intermediaries where the platforms do

not take title to the goods being sold like Amazon

India, Flipkart, etc.;

(vii) Internet Payment Systems and Mobile Wallets like

Paytm, etc.;

(viii) There are also participative internet platforms.

This extract is taken from Google India (P) Ltd. v.

Visaka Industries, (2020) 4 SCC 162 : (2020) 2 SCC

(Cri) 502 : 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1587 at page 188

52. The 2008 Amendment introduced Chapter XII to

the Information Technology Act. The amendment was

in the background of the decision of the Delhi High

Court in Avnish Bajaj v. State (NCT of Delhi) [Avnish

Bajaj v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2004 SCC OnLine Del

1160 : (2005) 116 DLT 427] .

53. Intermediaries stand on a different footing being

only facilitators of exchanges of information or sales.

Prior to the amendment, the exemption provision under

Section 79 did not exist and, therefore, an intermediary

would have been liable for any third-party information

or data made available by him as seen in Baazee [Ed. :

The reference seems to be to Avnish Bajaj v. State, 2008

CS(OS) 524/2024 Page 31 of 61

SCC OnLine Del 688 which has been reversed in

Aneeta Hada v. Godfather Travels & Tours (P) Ltd.,

(2012) 5 SCC 661. Avnish Bajaj case involved an

action against the Directors of Bazee.com.] . After the

amendment, intermediary is not liable under any Act if

it satisfied certain requirements as detailed in Section

79.

54. After referring to the decision in Shreya Singhal

[Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, (2015) 5 SCC 1 :

(2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 449] , the Government of India has

understood the position at law to be that Section 79

stands read down to mean that an intermediary would

need to takedown information only upon receiving

actual knowledge that a court order has been passed to

remove or disable certain material and not otherwise.

The further stand of the Government of India is thus

there is a recognition that intermediaries and neutral

platforms are only facilitating information. It is further

pointed out on behalf of the Government of India that

the interpretation placed by this Court in Shreya

Singhal [Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, (2015) 5

SCC 1 : (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 449] was not available to

the High Court when it passed the impugned order in

this case. Shreya Singhal [Shreya Singhal v. Union of

India, (2015) 5 SCC 1 : (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 449]

makes it clear that an intermediary's liability will not

arise unless it failed to takedown material upon there

being actual knowledge by court order or government

communication. This safeguard has been put in place

to avoid chilling effect on free speech. The

intermediaries would, if a contrary view is taken, stand

elevated to the status of super censors and denude the

internet of its unique feature of a democratic medium

for all to publish, access and read any and all kinds of

information.

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55. Owing to the special unique characteristic of the

internet, intermediaries are not in a position to know

about a content which is posted on its platforms by

itself and, therefore, the strict liability principle cannot

be made applicable to internet intermediaries. It is the

specific stand of the Government of India that even

pre-amendment, an intermediary could not know the

contents of what is posted on its website and, therefore,

be held liable in the absence of a takedown order by a

court or governmental agency.

56. The Government of India, it is also noticed, has

perceived a distinction between blocking under Section

69-A of the Information Technology Act and takedown

under Section 79 of the Information Technology Act.

Section 69-A reads as follows:

“69-A. Power to issue directions for blocking for

public access of any information through any computer

resource.—(1) Where the Central Government or any

of its officers specially authorised by it in this behalf is

satisfied that it is necessary or expedient so to do in the

interest of sovereignty and integrity of India, defence of

India, security of the State, friendly relations with

foreign States or public order or for preventing

incitement to the commission of any cognizable offence

relating to above, it may subject to the provisions of

sub-section (2), for reasons to be recorded in writing,

by order, direct any agency of the Government or

intermediary to block for access by the public or cause

to be blocked for access by the public any information

generated, transmitted, received, stored or hosted in

any computer resource.

(2) The procedure and safeguards subject to which

such blocking for access by the public may be carried

out, shall be such as may be prescribed.

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(3) The intermediary who fails to comply with the

direction issued under sub-section (1) shall be

punished with an imprisonment for a term which may

extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine.”

57. It is pointed out that the grounds under which the

Government issues directions for blocking information

are limited and confined to matters relating to national

security, public order and the like. The power does not

expand to blocking any case of defamation, contempt

of court, etc. A blocking order under Section 69-A

cannot be passed for criminal defamation as it does not

fall under the scope of Section 69-A. Therefore, if a

party is aggrieved by posting of a defamatory content

on website, he must seek recourse to the court process

for adjudication. The matter can be directed to be

removed or access disabled under Section 79(3) of the

Information Technology Act. Since, the court process

can be long drawn, the aggrieved party may seek an

interim order before a competent court.

58. In fact, the learned Senior Counsel for the

appellant did not, as such, canvass the matter on the

basis of Section 79 before it was substituted. However,

we deem it proper to delineate its scope in view of the

fact that if there is an express legal bar to attach

criminal liability upon the appellant under the Act, it

would become a matter of jurisdiction. It is also the

stand taken by the Government of India that there be

no liability on the intermediary under Section 79 of the

Act prior to the substitution as we have set out

hereinbefore.

59. It must be noted that stand of the appellant

primarily has been that the appellant is not the

intermediary in this case and the intermediary in this

case is Google LLC. The arguments have been

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otherwise addressed by the appellant on the basis

though that even proceeding on the basis that the

appellant is treated as an intermediary, the complaint

against the appellant, cannot be allowed to proceed.

60. On the question as to whether Section 79, as it

stood prior to the substitution, would provide a shield

to an intermediary, we would enter the following

findings.

61. In our view, Section 79, before its substitution,

exempted the network service provider, which is

defined as an intermediary, from liability under the

Act, Rules or Regulations made thereunder in regard to

any third-party information or data made available by

him provided the service provider:

1. Proves that the offence or contravention was

committed without his knowledge;

2. The service provider proves that he had exercised all

due diligence to prevent the commissioning of such

offences or contraventions.

62. This provision may be contrasted with the later

avtar of Section 79 of the Act consequent upon

substitution with effect from 27-10-2009. Sub-section

(1) of Section 79, in unambiguous words, declares by

way of a non obstante clause that in spite of anything

contained in any law which is in force, though subject

to the provisions of sub-sections (2) and (3), an

intermediary would not be liable for any third-party

information, data or communication link hosted by

him. The conditions are set out in sub-section (2).

63. As we have noticed, the scope of Section 79, before

its substitution, was confined to confer immunity from

liability in regard to an offence under the Act or the

Rules or Regulations qua third-party action or data

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made available. In this regard, it must be noticed that

Chapter XI of the Act deals with the offences. Sections

65 to 67-B deal with various offences under the Act.

This is besides Sections 71, 72-A, 73 and 74 of the Act.

Section 79 falls under Chapter XII. Therefore, the

scheme of the Act would also indicate that Section 79,

as it was prior to the substitution, was indeed confined

to the liability of the network service provider arising

out of the provisions of the Act besides, no doubt, Rules

and Regulations, and it was not, in short, a bar to the

complaint under Section 500 IPC being launched or

prosecuted.

64. The complaint relates, in short, to a period, much

prior to the substitution of Section 79 of the Act, which

ultimately took place only with effect from 27-10-2009.

The Court, in Shreya Singhal [Shreya Singhal v. Union

of India, (2015) 5 SCC 1 : (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 449] ,

was not considering the provisions of Section 79 as it

stood before the substitution on 27-10-2009 which is

what the High Court has focussed on to find that it was

not open to the appellant to seek shelter under Section

79. No doubt, there are certain observations which

have been made by the High Court regarding notice to

the petitioner, which we will dwell upon.

65. We may, in fact, notice another aspect of the matter.

Even, proceeding on the basis that Section 79 should

engage us any further, we cannot be oblivious to an

integral feature of Section 79 prior to its substitution.

As we have noted, the lawgiver has given protection

from liability not unconditionally. It is for the service

provider to prove that the offence or contravention was

committed without his knowledge. He is also to prove

that he has exercised all due diligence to prevent the

commission of such offence or contravention. We will,

for the purpose of argument, assume that the offence or

contravention could relate to even Section 500 IPC.

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Even then, for the protection given by the provisions,

as it stood at the time when the offence alleged against

the appellant was allegedly committed by it, to apply, it

would become incumbent upon the appellant to prove

that the offence or the contravention was committed

without its knowledge and that it had taken all due

diligence to prevent the commission of such offence or

contravention. It may be at once noticed that in reality

the scope of Section 79 of the Act, prior to the

substitution, was limited to granting exemption to the

network service provider from any liability under the

Act, Rules or Regulations made thereunder, no doubt,

in regard to third-party information or data available

by him. The commission of an offence under Section

500 IPC, would not be a liability under the Act or

Rules, or Regulations made under the Act. However, it

is undoubtedly true that the scope of the protection

afforded to the intermediary stands remarkably

expanded with the substituted provisions of Section 79

coming into force, no doubt, subject to the conditions

attached thereunder and as explained by this Court in

Shreya Singhal [Shreya Singhal v. Union of India,

(2015) 5 SCC 1 : (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 449] .

66. The Government of India, no doubt, has contended

that the High Court did not have the benefit of

judgment of this Court in Shreya Singhal [Shreya

Singhal v. Union of India, (2015) 5 SCC 1 : (2015) 2

SCC (Cri) 449] . We may notice that what is considered

in Shreya Singhal [Shreya Singhal v. Union of India,

(2015) 5 SCC 1 : (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 449] was Section

79 after substitution. There was a challenge mounted to

the constitutionality of Section 79. This Court held as

follows, inter alia : (SCC pp. 180-81, paras 120-24)

“120. One of the petitioners' counsel also assailed

Section 79(3)(b) to the extent that it makes the

intermediary exercise its own judgment upon receiving

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actual knowledge that any information is being used to

commit unlawful acts. Further, the expression

“unlawful acts” also goes way beyond the specified

subjects delineated in Article 19(2).

121. It must first be appreciated that Section 79 is an

exemption provision. Being an exemption provision, it

is closely related to provisions which provide for

offences including Section 69-A. We have seen how

under Section 69-A blocking can take place only by a

reasoned order after complying with several

procedural safeguards including a hearing to the

originator and intermediary. We have also seen how

there are only two ways in which a blocking order can

be passed— one by the Designated Officer after

complying with the 2009 Rules and the other by the

Designated Officer when he has to follow an order

passed by a competent court. The intermediary

applying its own mind to whether information should

or should not be blocked is noticeably absent in

Section 69-A read with the 2009 Rules.

122. Section 79(3)(b) has to be read down to mean that

the intermediary upon receiving actual knowledge that

a court order has been passed asking it to expeditiously

remove or disable access to certain material must then

fail to expeditiously remove or disable access to that

material. This is for the reason that otherwise it would

be very difficult for intermediaries like Google,

Facebook, etc. to act when millions of requests are

made and the intermediary is then to judge as to which

of such requests are legitimate and which are not. We

have been informed that in other countries worldwide

this view has gained acceptance, Argentina being in

the forefront. Also, the Court order and/or the

notification by the appropriate Government or its

agency must strictly conform to the subject-matters

laid down in Article 19(2). Unlawful acts beyond what

CS(OS) 524/2024 Page 38 of 61

is laid down in Article 19(2) obviously cannot form any

part of Section 79. With these two caveats, we refrain

from striking down Section 79(3)(b).

123. The learned Additional Solicitor General

informed us that it is a common practice worldwide for

intermediaries to have user agreements containing

what is stated in Rule 3(2). However, Rule 3(4) needs

to be read down in the same manner as Section

79(3)(b). The knowledge spoken of in the said sub-rule

must only be through the medium of a court order.

Subject to this, the Information Technology

(Intermediaries Guidelines) Rules, 2011 are valid.

***

124.3. Section 79 is valid subject to Section 79(3)(b)

being read down to mean that an intermediary upon

receiving actual knowledge from a court order or on

being notified by the appropriate Government or its

agency that unlawful acts relatable to Article 19(2) are

going to be committed then fails to expeditiously

remove or disable access to such material. Similarly,

the Information Technology (Intermediaries

Guidelines) Rules, 2011 are valid subject to Rule 3

sub-rule (4) being read down in the same manner as

indicated in the judgment.”

67. The Court also was considering the challenge to

the provisions of the Information Technology

(Intermediaries Guidelines) Rules, 2011 (hereinafter

referred to as “the Rules”, for short). The Rules were

brought into force after 2011. It was made under

Section 87 of the Act. Rule 3 provides for due diligence

to be observed by the intermediary. It is obliged to

publish the Rules and Regulations and the Privacy

Policy and User Agreement. The intermediary is to

intimate the user not to use certain matter which

CS(OS) 524/2024 Page 39 of 61

include defamatory matter. Rule 3(3) of the Rules

provided that the intermediary was not to knowingly

host or publish any information, inter alia, contained,

as specified in sub-rule (2). Thus, under the Rules, the

intermediary could not knowingly host or publish

information which was, inter alia, defamatory. Rule

3(4) of the Rules, read as follows:

“3. Due diligence to be observed by intermediary.—

The intermediary shall observe following due diligence

while discharging his duties, namely—

***

(4) The intermediary, on whose computer system the

information is stored or hosted or published, upon

obtaining knowledge by itself or been brought to actual

knowledge by an affected person in writing or through

email signed with electronic signature about any such

information as mentioned in sub-rule (2) above, shall

act within thirty-six hours and where applicable, work

with user or owner of such information to disable such

information that is in contravention of sub-rule (2).

Further the intermediary shall preserve such

information and associated records for at least ninety

days for investigation purposes.”"

16. Defendant No.1, therefore, cannot completely wash its hands of the

contents of the article on the ground that it is only an intermediary and

cannot be held responsible for the statement that is published on its platform.

Defendant No.1 professes itself to be an encyclopedia and people at large

have a tendency to accept the statements made on the web pages of

Defendant No.1 as gospel truth. The responsibility, therefore, of Defendant

No.1 is higher. This Court is not dwelling further on this aspect while

considering the present application.

CS(OS) 524/2024 Page 40 of 61

17. Before dwelling into the issues in the present application, this Court is

inclined to reiterate the settled positions of law with regards to pre-trial ad

interim injunctions with respect to a defamation suit.

18. The Apex Court in Bloomberg Television Production Services India

Private Limited and Other v. Zee Entertainment Enterprises Limited, (2025)

1 SCC 741, has held as under:-

"4. The threefold test of establishing : (i) a prima facie

case, (ii) balance of convenience, and (iii) irreparable

loss or harm, for the grant of interim relief, is well-

established in the jurisprudence of this Court. This test

is equally applicable to the grant of interim injunctions

in defamation suits. However, this threefold test must

not be applied mechanically [DDA v. Skipper

Construction Co. (P) Ltd., (1996) 4 SCC 622, para 38 :

(1997) 89 Comp Cas 362.] , to the detriment of the

other party and in the case of injunctions against

journalistic pieces, often to the detriment of the public.

While granting interim relief, the court must provide

detailed reasons and analyse how the threefold test is

satisfied. A cursory reproduction of the submissions

and precedents before the court is not sufficient. The

court must explain how the test is satisfied and how the

precedents cited apply to the facts of the case.

5. In addition to this oft-repeated test, there are also

additional factors, which must weigh with courts while

granting an ex parte ad interim injunction. Some of

these factors were elucidated by a three-Judge Bench

of this Court in Morgan Stanley Mutual Fund v.

Kartick Das [Morgan Stanley Mutual Fund v. Kartick

Das, (1994) 4 SCC 225 : (1994) 81 Comp Cas 318] , in

the following terms : (SCC pp. 241-42, para 36)

“36. As a principle, ex parte injunction could be

granted only under exceptional circumstances. The

CS(OS) 524/2024 Page 41 of 61

factors which should weigh with the court in the grant

of ex parte injunction are—

(a) whether irreparable or serious mischief will ensue

to the plaintiff;

(b) whether the refusal of ex parte injunction would

involve greater injustice than the grant of it would

involve;

(c) the court will also consider the time at which the

plaintiff first had notice of the act complained so that

the making of improper order against a party in his

absence is prevented;

(d) the court will consider whether the plaintiff had

acquiesced for some time and in such circumstances it

will not grant ex parte injunction;

(e) the court would expect a party applying for ex parte

injunction to show utmost good faith in making the

application.

(f) even if granted, the ex parte injunction would be for

a limited period of time.

(g) General principles like prima facie case, balance of

convenience and irreparable loss would also be

considered by the court.”

6. Significantly, in suits concerning defamation by

media platforms and/or journalists, an additional

consideration of balancing the fundamental right to

free speech with the right to reputation and privacy

must be borne in mind [R. Rajagopal v. State of T.N.,

(1994) 6 SCC 632] . The constitutional mandate of

protecting journalistic expression cannot be

understated, and courts must tread cautiously while

CS(OS) 524/2024 Page 42 of 61

granting pre-trial interim injunctions. The standard to

be followed may be borrowed from the decision in

Bonnard v. Perryman [Bonnard v. Perryman, (1891) 2

Ch 269 (CA)] . This standard, christened the “Bonnard

standard”, laid down by the Court of Appeal (England

and Wales), has acquired the status of a common law

principle for the grant of interim injunctions in

defamation suits [Holley v. Smyth, 1998 QB 726 (CA)]

. The Court of Appeal in Bonnard [Bonnard v.

Perryman, (1891) 2 Ch 269 (CA)] held as follows : (Ch

p. 284)

“… But it is obvious that the subject-matter of an

action for defamation is so special as to require

exceptional caution in exercising the jurisdiction to

interfere by injunction before the trial of an action to

prevent an anticipated wrong. The right of free speech

is one which it is for the public interest that individuals

should possess, and, indeed, that they should exercise

without impediment, so long as no wrongful act is

done; and, unless an alleged libel is untrue, there is no

wrong committed; but, on the contrary, often a very

wholesome act is performed in the publication and

repetition of an alleged libel. Until it is clear that an

alleged libel is untrue, it is not clear that any right at

all has been infringed; and the importance of leaving

free speech unfettered is a strong reason in cases of

libel for dealing most cautiously and warily with the

granting of interim injunctions.”

(emphasis supplied)

7. In Fraser v. Evans [Fraser v. Evans, (1969) 1 QB

349 : (1968) 3 WLR 1172 (CA)] , the Court of Appeal

followed the Bonnard principle and held as follows :

(QB p. 360)

CS(OS) 524/2024 Page 43 of 61

“… insofar as the article will be defamatory of Mr

Fraser, it is clear he cannot get an injunction. The

Court will not restrain the publication of an article,

even though it is defamatory, when the defendant says

he intends to justify it or to make fair comment on a

matter of public interest. That has been established for

many years ever since (Bonnard v. Perryman [Bonnard

v. Perryman, (1891) 2 Ch 269 (CA)] ). The reason

some times given is that the defences of justification

and fair comment are for the jury, which is the

constitutional tribunal, and not for a Judge. But a

better reason is the importance in the public interest

that the truth should out. …”

(emphasis supplied)

8. In essence, the grant of a pre-trial injunction against

the publication of an article may have severe

ramifications on the right to freedom of speech of the

author and the public's right to know. An injunction,

particularly ex parte, should not be granted without

establishing that the content sought to be restricted is

“malicious” or “palpably false”. Granting interim

injunctions, before the trial commences, in a cavalier

manner results in the stifling of public debate. In other

words, courts should not grant ex parte injunctions

except in exceptional cases where the defence

advanced by the respondent would undoubtedly fail at

trial. In all other cases, injunctions against the

publication of material should be granted only after a

full-fledged trial is conducted or in exceptional cases,

after the respondent is given a chance to make their

submissions.

9. Increasingly, across various jurisdictions, the

concept of “Slapp suits” has been recognised either by

statute or by courts. The term “Slapp” stands for

“Strategic Litigation against Public Participation” and

CS(OS) 524/2024 Page 44 of 61

is an umbrella term used to refer to litigation

predominantly initiated by entities that wield immense

economic power against members of the media or civil

society, to prevent the public from knowing about or

participating in important affairs in the public interest

[ Donson, F.J.L., Legal Intimidation : A Slapp in the

Face of Democracy (London, New York : Free

Association Books, 2000).] . We must be cognizant of

the realities of prolonged trials. The grant of an interim

injunction, before the trial commences, often acts as a

“death sentence” to the material sought to be

published, well before the allegations have been

proven. While granting ad interim injunctions in

defamation suits, the potential of using prolonged

litigation to prevent free speech and public

participation must also be kept in mind by courts.

XXX

11. Undoubtedly, the grant of an interim injunction is

an exercise of discretionary power and the appellate

court (in this case, the High Court) will usually not

interfere with the grant of interim relief. However, in a

line of precedent, this Court has held that appellate

courts must interfere with the grant of interim relief if

the discretion has been exercised “arbitrarily,

capriciously, perversely, or where the court has

ignored settled principles of law regulating the grant

or refusal of interlocutory injunctions”. [Ramdev Food

Products (P) Ltd. v. Arvindbhai Rambhai Patel, (2006)

8 SCC 726, paras 126 & 128; Shyam Sel & Power Ltd.

v. Shyam Steel Industries Ltd., (2023) 1 SCC 634, para

37 : (2023) 1 SCC (Civ) 301.] The grant of an ex parte

interim injunction by way of an unreasoned order,

definitely falls within the above formulation,

necessitating interference by the High Court. This

being a case of an injunction granted in defamation

proceedings against a media platform, the impact of

CS(OS) 524/2024 Page 45 of 61

the injunction on the constitutionally protected right of

free speech further warranted intervention."

19. In view of the abovementioned judgment, this court must consider the

following for the grant of interim injunction in a defamation case - a Prima

facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable loss.

20. Material on record indicates that the Defendants No. 2 to 4 stand

served. Despite service, Defendants No. 2 to 4 have chosen not to appear, no

pleadings or reply have been filed by Defendants No. 2 to 4.

21. To adjudicate on the issue as to whether the impugned statements are

taken from the cited sources on which they have relied upon and whether the

impugned statements on the Plaintiff's page are in terms of the publishing

policy of the Defendant No. 1's Platform, this Court has gone through the

policy of Defendant No.1 and also the sources relied on by Defendants No.2

to 4. The policy as laid down by Defendant No. 1 is as under:-

CS(OS) 524/2024 Page 46 of 61

CS(OS) 524/2024 Page 47 of 61

22. After going through the policy of the Defendant No. 1 regarding

neutral point of view which states that any encyclopedic content on

Wikipedia must be written from a neutral point of view, without any

editorial bias. On perusal of the page pertaining to the Plaintiff, it appears

that the statements on the page pertaining to the Plaintiff are all sourced

from articles which are nothing but editorials and opinionated pages.

Defendant No.1 which is following the policy to avoid stating opinions as

facts and also professing it to be an encyclopedia has to also see as to

whether the opinions are actually based on the source articles or not so that

neutral policy of Defendant No.1 is not violated.

23. To deal with the contentions of the learned Senior Counsel for

Defendant No.1 that the Single Publication Rule is applicable to the present

case or not, this Court finds it appropriate to reiterate the law as laid down

by this Court with regards to Single Publication Rule. This Court in Khawar

Butt v. Asif Nazir Mir, 2013 SCC OnLine Del 4474, has held as under:-

"14. I first proceed on to determine the legal issue :

Whether, the leaving of the allegedly defamatory

material on the internet/facebook page gives rise to a

fresh cause of action every moment the said offending

material is so left on the webpage-which can be viewed

by others at any time, or whether the cause of action

arises only when the offending material is first posted

on the webpage/internet.

15. Learned counsel for the plaintiff has not

substantiated his aforesaid submission with any case

law or other academic discussion on the subject. I

have, therefore, endeavored to examine the issue on my

CS(OS) 524/2024 Page 48 of 61

own. I have not come across any Indian case law on

the subject, vis-a-vis internet publications. I have,

therefore, proceeded to go beyond the Indian

boundaries to see as to how this issue has been dealt

with in other jurisdictions. In a nutshell, there are two

conflicting legal positions, one being followed in U.K.

till recently-and this is still followed in Australia,

Canada and Germany, and the other in U.S.A., France

and, now the U.K. The earlier U.K. view was based on

a long standing rule in defamation cases-that every

time an article or statement is published or

republished, it creates an individual, discrete,

actionable, defamatory statement upon which one can

sue, generally known as the “multiple publication

rule”.

16. The multiple publication rule was first developed in

England in the case of Duke of Brunswick v. Harmer,

(1849) 14 QB 185. In 1847, the Duke was given a copy

of the newspaper that contained material defamatory

of him which had been published 17 years earlier.

While upholding the claim for damages as being within

limitation, the Court held that the limitation period of 6

years re-started when Duke viewed the publication. In

Godfrey v. Demon Internet Limited, (2001) QB 201, the

same rule was applied to the internet. Moorland J

observed:

“In my judgment the defendants, whenever they

transmit and whenever there is transmitted from the

storage of their news server a defamatory posting,

publish that posting to any subscriber to their ISP who

accesses the newsgroup containing that posting.‟”

17. The U.K. Government in a consultation paper-(the

Multiple Publication Rule CP 20/09) describes the

multiple publication rule as follows:

CS(OS) 524/2024 Page 49 of 61

“The effect of the multiple publication rule in relation

to online material is that each “hit” on a webpage

creates a new publication, potentially giving rise to a

separate cause of action, should it contain defamatory

material. Each cause of action has its own limitation

period that runs from the time at which the material is

accessed. As a result, publishers are potentially liable

for any defamatory material published by them and

accessed via their online archive, however long after

the initial publication the material is accessed, and

whether or not proceedings have already been brought

in relation to the initial publication.”

18. The effect of the Multiple Publication Rule is that

the limitation period runs from the date of the last

publication of the defamatory statement, allowing the

affected party to sue many years after the statement

was first made. In the case of archived materials, an

action could follow decades after the original

publication of the material.

19. The Multiple Publication Rule has been followed

by the Australian Courts in Dow Jones & Co. Inc v.

Gutnick, (2002) HCA 56. The High Court of Australia

explicitly rejected calls to abolish the said rule in

favour of the Single Publication Rule. The court

rejected the argument that the Single Publication Rule

be adopted for policy reasons, as it would be

impossible for a publisher on the internet to protect

itself against all the laws in every jurisdiction of the

world. The High Court held that defamation

proceedings sought to strike a balance between both-

the rights of the publisher and the person who is the

subject of the publication and whose rights would be

severely constrained by the Single Publication Rule

advocated by the applicant Dow Jones & Co. Inc.

CS(OS) 524/2024 Page 50 of 61

20. There were several occasions when the English

courts rejected the call to abandon the Multiple

Publication Rule. Reference may be made to

Berezovsky v. Michaels, (2000) 1 WLR 1004 and

Loutchansky v. Times Newspapers Ltd., (2002) QB 783.

Lord Philips of Worth Matravers MR, while delivering

the court's judgment observed:

“We do not accept that the rule in the Duke of

Brunswick imposes a restriction on the readiness to

maintain and provide access to archives that amounts

to a disproportionate restriction on freedom of

expression. We accept that the maintenance of

archives, whether in hard copy or on the Internet, has a

social utility, but consider that the maintenance of

archives is a comparatively insignificant aspect of

freedom of expression. Archive material is stale news

and its publication cannot rank in importance with the

dissemination of contemporary material. Nor do we

believe that the law of defamation need inhibit the

responsible maintenance of archives. Where it is known

that archive material is or may be defamatory, the

attachment of an appropriate notice warning against

treating it as the truth will normally remove any sting

from the material.”

Leave to appeal to the House of Lords was rejected.

21. An appeal was then preferred before the European

Court of Human Rights (ECHR), seeking to enforce the

newspapers right to freedom of expression under

Article 10 of the European Convention of Human

Rights (reported as Times Newspapers Ltd.-(Nos. 1 and

2) v. United Kingdom, (2009) EMLR 14). While

recognizing the importance of the press in

disseminating information and acting as a public

watchdog, the ECHR observed that the press also had

the responsibility to protect the rights and reputations

CS(OS) 524/2024 Page 51 of 61

of the private individuals about whom it wrote. It was

held that the interference with the rights of the press, in

the facts of that case, was not disproportionate. It was

held that the newspapers could have continued to

maintain its archive without fear of litigation, had they

placed a notice with the archived material thereby

indicating that it was the subject of litigation, or had

been found to contain defamatory comments-a solution

offered by the Court of Appeal in that case. Since the

action had been initiated within 18 months of the

publication taking place, it was held that the defendant

had not been required to defend an action many

decades after the first publication had been made.

Significantly, the court held:

“The Court would, however, emphasise that while an

aggrieved applicant must be afforded a real

opportunity to vindicate his right to reputation, libel

proceedings brought against a newspaper after a

significant lapse of time may well, in the absence of

exceptional circumstances, give rise to a

disproportionate interference with press freedom under

Article 70.”

22. Therefore, even though the ECHR did not interfere

with the decision of the English Court in the facts of

the case, it did indicate that if the action was brought

after a significant lapse of time, the situation could

well have been different.

23. The Canadian Courts have also followed the

earlier British Multiple Publication Rule. In Carter v.

B.C. Federation of Foster Parents Association, 2005

BCCA 398, the court of appeal for British Columbia

preferred to follow the then prevailing English legal

position over the American view by observing:

CS(OS) 524/2024 Page 52 of 61

“7… Although it is difficult to find an express

statement in the Canadian cases about the single

publication rule, the clear tendency of the authorities

in my view is in favour of the English and the

Australian position and not in favour of the American

position”.

Send Mail

24. I may also refer to the decision of the Court of

Appeal for Ontario in Shatif v. Toronto Life Publishing

Co. Ltd., (2013) ONCA 405. While considering the

issue, section 6 of the Libel and Slander Act, R.S.

01990 c.L. 12 was considered by the court, which reads

as follows:

„An action for a libel in a newspaper or in a broadcast

shall be commenced within three months after the libel

has come to the knowledge of the person defamed, but,

where such an action is brought within that period, the

action may include a claim for any other libel against

the plaintiff by the defendant in the same newspaper or

the same broadcasting station within a period of one

year before the commencement of the action”,

(emphasis supplied)

25. The court rejected the Single Publication Rule-

applied by the American Courts, with the following

observation:

“[31] However, the single publication rule has been

rejected in England : see Berezovsky v. Michaels,

[2000] 2 All E.R. 986 (H.L.); Loutchansky v. Times

Newspapers Ltd., [2002] Q.B. 783 (C.A.); in Australia

: see Dow Jones and Co. Inc. v. Gutnick, [2002] H.CA

56, 2010 C.L.R. 575; and by the British Columbia

Court of Appeal : see Carter v. B.C. Federation of

CS(OS) 524/2024 Page 53 of 61

Foster Parents Assn., 2005 BCCA 398(CanLII), 2005

BCCA 398, 257 D.L.R. (4th) 133. And the motion judge

refused to apply the rule in this case.

[32] I, too, would not apply the single publication rule

for three reasons. First, the rule does not fit

comfortably with the words of s. 6 of the Act. The

single publication rule is based on publication of an

alleged libel. Successive publications are considered a

single publication and the date of the first publication

triggers the running of the limitation period. Under s. 6

of Ontario's Act, the date when the libel first came to

the plaintiffs' knowledge, not the date of publication,

triggers the running of the limitation period.

[33] Moreover, the recapture provision in s. 6 is

inconsistent with a single publication rule. A simple

example will illustrate the inconsistency. Take a case

where the same libel is published and later

republished, and the plaintiff sues for damages for the

republished libel. Section 6 would allow the plaintiff to

recapture the earlier libel. In effect, s. 6 recognizes two

separate libels; the single publication rule recognizes

only one.

[34] Second, the jurisprudence of this court has,

implicitly at least, rejected the single publication rule.

In Weiss v. Sawyer, (2002) 61 O.R. (3d) 526 (C.A.), at

para. 28, Armstrong J.A. affirmed the traditional

English rule:“Every republication of a libel is a new

libel.

[35] Third, even if we were to consider a single

publication rule in Ontario, I would not apply it across

different mediums of communication. In my opinion, it

would be unfair to plaintiffs to apply the rule to

publications that are intended for different groups or

that may reach different audiences. Even in American-

CS(OS) 524/2024 Page 54 of 61

states that apply the single publication rule, at least

one state, California, has rejected its” application for

reprinting or republication in a different form : see

Kanarek v. Bugliosi, (1980) 108 Cal. App. 3d 327.

Also, the Restatement of the Law, Second : Torts

(American Law Institute, 1977) states that the single

publication rule does not include separate aggregate

productions on different occasions. If the publication

reaches a new group, the repetition justifies a new

cause of action. See s. 57 7A.

[36] Applying the single publication rule where, as in

this case, the original publication is in print and the

republication is on the internet could create a serious

injustice for persons whose reputations are damaged

by defamatory material. A plaintiff may not want to

expend the time and resources to sue for an alleged

libel in a magazine, which has a limited circulation

and a limited lifespan. The plaintiff may consider the

magazine's circulation insufficient to warrant a

lawsuit.

[37] However, a plaintiff may well want to spend the

time and money to sue if the alleged libel is on the

magazine's website and accessible on the internet.

Unless the article is removed from the website, its

circulation is vast, its lifespan is unlimited, and its

potential to damage a person's reputation is enormous.

Yet, if a single publication rule is applied, the plaintiffs

claim may be statute barred before real damage to

reputation has occurred”.

26. At this stage, I may note that the decision in this

case was, inter alia, based on, firstly, the express

language of section 6 of the Libel and Slander Act, as

set out herein above, as also the fact that after the

original publication had been made in print, the same

was re-published on the internet. The re-publication of

CS(OS) 524/2024 Page 55 of 61

the same article on the internet would constitute a fresh

publication, as it was directed towards a different set of

people than those covered by the first publication in

print media.

27. In Ireland, the Multiple Publication Rule was

abolished by the introduction of the Defamation Act,

2009. The Government appointed legal advisory group

of defamation, 2003 advocated, inter alia, introduction

of the Single Publication Rule. Section 38(1)(b) of the

Defamation Act, after amendment, reads as follows:

“For the purposes of bringing a defamation action

within the meaning of the Defamation Act, 2009, the

date of accrual of the cause of action shall be the date

upon which the defamatory statement is first published

and, where the statement is published through the

medium of the internet, the date on which it is first

capable of being viewed or listened to through that

medium”.

28. Recently, in the United Kingdom, the law has

changed with the enactment of the Defamation Act,

2013. Section 8 has introduced the Single Publication

Rule, which reads as follows:

“8. Single publication rule

(1) This section applies if a person—

(a) publishes a statement to the public (“the first

publication”), and

(b) subsequently publishes (whether or not to the

public) that statement or a statement which is

substantially the same.

CS(OS) 524/2024 Page 56 of 61

(2) In subsection (1) “publication to the public”

includes publication to a section of the public.

(3) For the purposes of section 4A of the Limitation

Act, 1980 (time limit for actions for defamation etc)

any cause of action against the person for defamation

in respect of the subsequent publication is to be treated

as having accrued on the date of the first publication.

(4) This section does not apply in relation to the

subsequent publication if the manner of that

publication is materially different from the manner of

the first publication.

(5) In determining whether the manner of a subsequent

publication is materially different from the manner of

the first publication, the matters to which the court

may have regard include (amongst other matters)—

(a) the level of prominence that a statement is given;

(b) the extent of the subsequent publication.

(6) Where this section applies—

(a) it does not affect the court's discretion under

section 32A of the Limitation Act, 1980 (discretionary

exclusion of time limit for actions for defamation etc),

and

(b) the reference in subsection (1)(a) of that section to

the operation of section 4A of that Act is a reference to

the operation of section 4A together with this section”.

29. Therefore, the Multiple Publication Rule followed

in the United Kingdom by the courts since Duke of

Brunswick (supra), has statutorily been overruled. It

would be interesting to observe the course of

CS(OS) 524/2024 Page 57 of 61

developments that may now take place in other

commonwealth jurisdictions like Australia and

Canada, post the aforesaid development in the United

Kingdom.

30. As noticed above, the second principle is what the

American Courts call the “Single Publication Rule”. It

states that the publication of a book, periodical or

newspaper containing defamatory material gives rise

to only one cause of action for defamation, which

implies, that the limitation period starts to run at the

time the first publication is made, even if copies

continue to be sold several years later. The rule has a

long history. It was first developed in 1938 in respect of

newspapers, in Wolfson v. Syracuse Newspapers, Inc,

(1939) 279 NY 716. Then it was applied to books in

1948 in the case of Gregoire v. G.P. Putnam's Sons,

(1948) 298 NY 119. The facts of this case were that a

book was originally put on sale in 1941. It had been

reprinted seven times, and was still being sold from

stock in 1946. The New York Court of Appeals held that

the limitation period started to run in 1941, when the

book was first put on sale.

31. In Gregoire (supra), the New York Court did not

accept the rule as set out in Duke of Brunswick

(supra), as it had its origin in an era which long

antedated the modem process of mass publication. The

said rule, it was held, was no longer suited to modem

conditions. The court held that under such a rule, the

period of limitation would never expire so long as a

copy of the published material remained in stock and is

made by the publisher, the subject of a sale or

inspection by the public. Such a rule would thwart the

purpose of the legislature which is to bar completely

and forever all actions which overpass the prescribed

limitation period.

CS(OS) 524/2024 Page 58 of 61

32. The Single Publication Rule is encapsulated in the

American Law Institutes Uniform Single Publication

Act, 1952. It is set out in Article 577A of the 2nd

Restatement of Torts (197) as follows:

“(1) Except as stated in subsections (2) and (3), each

of several communications to a third person by the

same defamer is a separate publication.

„(2) A single communication heard at the same time by

two or more third persons is a single publication.

„(3) Any one edition of a book or newspaper, or any

one radio or television broadcast, exhibition of a

motion picture or similar aggregate communication is

a single publication.

„(4) As to any single publication, (a) only one action

for damages can be maintained; (b) all damages

suffered in all jurisdictions can be recovered in the one

action; and a judgment for or against the plaintiff upon

the merits of any action for damages bars any other

action for damages between the same parties in all

jurisdictions.”

33. In 2002, the New York Court of Appeals, applied

the single publication rule to a website publication in

Firth v. State of New York, (2002) NY int 88. This

appeal presented the first occasion for that court to

determine how the defamation jurisprudence,

developed in connection with traditional mass media

communications, applies to communications in a new

medium-cyberspace-in the modem information age. In

this case a report had been published at a press

conference on 16.12.1996, and placed on the internet

on the same day. The Claimant, however, did not file a

claim for over a year. The Court found that the

limitation period started when the information was first

CS(OS) 524/2024 Page 59 of 61

placed on the website, and not from each “hit”

received. Levine, J. observed that”/+ addition to

increasing the exposure of publishers to stale claims,

applying the multiple publication rule to a

communication distributed via mass media would

permit a multiplicity of actions, leading to potential

harassment and excessive liability, and draining of

judicial resources (see Keeton v. Hustler Mag., Inc.,

465 US 770, 777 [1984])”. The court further held that

the policies impelling the original adoption of the

single publication rule “are even more cogent when

considered in connection with the exponential growth

of the instantaneous, worldwide ability to communicate

through the internet.” The alternative would give

“even greater potential for endless retriggering of the

statute of limitations, multiplicity of suits and

harassment of defendants.” The court further observed

that if the single publication rule is. not upheld with

regard to internet publications, then “Inevitably, there

would be a serious inhibitory effect on the open,

pervasive dissemination of information and ideas over

the internet, which is, of course, its greatest beneficial

promise.”

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34. The court also rejected the argument that re-

publication re-triggered the period of limitation. The

court observed that re-publication occurs:

“upon a separate aggregate publication from the

original, on a different occasion, which is not merely

“a delayed circulation of the original edition” (Rinaldi

v. Viking Penguin, Inc., 52 NY2d at 435; Restatement

[Second] of Torts „577A, Comment d, at 210, supra).

The justification for this exception to the single

publication rule is that the subsequent publication is

intended to and actually reaches a new audience (see

CS(OS) 524/2024 Page 60 of 61

Rinaldi, 52 NY2d at 433 [Citing Cook v. Conners, 215

NY 175 (1915)]; Restatement, Comment d). Thus, for

example, repeti tion of a defamatory statement in a

later edition of a book, magazine or newspaper may

give rise to a new cause of action (see Rinaldi, 52

NY2d at 433-435 [hard-cover and paperback editions

of the same book]; see also Cook v. Conners, 215 NY at

179 [morning and afternoon editions of newspapers

owned and published by the same individual]).

The mere addition of unrelated information to a Web

site cannot be equated with the repetition of

defamatory matter in a separately published edition of

a book or newspaper, as in Rinaldi and Cook. The

justification for the republication exception has no

application at all to the addition of unrelated material

on a Web site, for it is not reasonably inferable that the

addition was made either with the intent or the result of

communicating the earlier and separate defamatory

information to a new audience."

24. According to the aforementioned decision of this Court, 'Single

Publication Rule' only applies when the second publication is a verbatim

reproduction of the first publication. After perusing the Articles which were

being cited by Defendants No. 2 to 4 while making the impugned

statements, this Court opines that the impugned statements on the Plaintiff's

page are not verbatim reproduction of such articles, and these impugned

statements are written in such a way which is totally contradictory to the

intent with which these Articles were written and the impugned statements

on the page pertaining to the Plaintiff on the Platform of Defendant No. 1

are devoid of the context of the Articles. Therefore, in the opinion of this

Court, the impugned statements are ex-facie defamatory and tarnishes the

professional reputation of the Plaintiff.

CS(OS) 524/2024 Page 61 of 61

25. In view of the fact that Defendant No.2 to 4 have chosen not to appear

despite service and this Court having perused the articles which are the

source of this opinion, this Court finds that the opinion of Defendants No.2

to 4 do not represent the true picture of the articles and have been twisted by

Defendants No.2 to 4. Further, this Court finds merit in the allegation of the

Plaintiff that Defendant No.1 has ensured that the articles cannot be edited

by anybody else, thereby putting Plaintiff in a disadvantage to rebut what is

given in the page. Therefore, the present application is allowed in terms of

prayer (b) and (c) of the application.

26. The application is disposed of.

SUBRAMONIUM PRASAD, J

APRIL 02, 2025

RJ/y.chugh