Form No.J(2)

IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA

Constitutional Writ Jurisdiction

Appellate Side

Present : The Hon‟ble Mr. Justice Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya

&

The Hon‟ble Mr. Justice Supratim Bhattacharya

WPLRT No. 219 of 2025

Anil Pal @ Anil Kumar Paul and another

-vs-

The State of West Bengal and others

For the petitioners : Mr. Subrata Ghosh,

Mr. Biswarup Biswas,

Mr. Tanmay Chowdhury

For the State : Sk. Md. Galib, Sr. Govt. Adv.,

Ms. Priyamvada Singh.

Heard on : February 9, 2026.

Judgment on : February 9, 2026.

Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J.:

1. The present challenge has been preferred against an order

passed by the West Bengal Land Reforms and Tenancy

Tribunal, thereby affirming an order passed by the District

Land and Land Reforms Officer (DL & LRO), Hooghly in LR

2

Appeal No. 89 of 2002 under Section 54 of the West Bengal

Land Reforms Act, 1955 (in short “the 1955 Act”), upholding

the order dated June 14, 2002 passed by the Block Land &

Land Reforms Officer (BL & LRO), Dhaniakhali, Hooghly, in

Case No. 10/DNK/14T(5)/02.

2. Initially, the present writ petitioners had preferred a challenge

against a proceeding initiated under Section 14T(3) of the

1955 Act on the ground that while calculating the ceiling limits,

the provisions of Section 14M were not considered and lands

which had already been transferred by the grand-mother of the

writ petitioners, namely, Nirmala Bala Dassi, in favour of her

two grandsons and one daughter-in-law had also been

included within the land held by the raiyat.

3. The same culminated in a proceeding before the learned

Tribunal, giving rise to Case No. TA 812/2000 (LRTT) in CR

No. 10795(w) of 1983, having initially been filed by way of a

writ petition before this Court and subsequently transferred to

the Tribunal.

4. The Tribunal, vide order dated July 10, 2001, quashed the

proceeding and directed the BL & LRO, Dhaniakhali, Hooghly,

to proceed afresh under the amended provisions of the 1955

3

Act to determine the ceiling area of the raiyat / raiyats as

expeditiously as possible.

5. Thereafter, by a notice dated May 15, 2002, issued purportedly

under Sections 14T(5), read with Sections 14T(8) and 14T(9),

of the 1955 Act to the writ petitioners.

6. A written objection was filed by the writ petitioners in respect of

the said notice, wherein it was pointed out that the size of the

family of late Nirmala Bala Dassi as on February 15, 1971 was

a single unit family and therefore she was entitled to retain

2.50 standard hectares (equivalent to 6.178 acres) of land in

irrigated area. It was further pleaded that Nirmala Bala Dassi,

since deceased, was a raiyat and she owned 11.52 acres of

land, out of which she transferred 6.74 acres of lands by three

registered deeds of gift in favour of his daughter-in-law and

two grandsons in the year 1965.

7. Thus, it was contended that as on February 15, 1971, the said

Nirmala Bala held only 4.78 acres of land, which came within

the ceiling limit as prescribed by the 1955 Act.

8. However, the concerned BL & LRO, after holding an enquiry

and taking evidence, arrived at the finding that the said gift

deeds executed by Nirmala Bala Dassi were not bona fide

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transactions, but merely paper transactions having no effect.

Accordingly, it was ordered that the 6.74 acres of land of the

concerned Mouza, which were gifted to the grandsons and the

daughter-in-law, were benami lands of the said Nirmala Bala

Dassi.

9. The said order having been affirmed by the appellate authority,

being the DL & LRO, Hooghly, under Section 54 of the 1955

Act, OA No. 4162 of 2002(LRTT) was preferred by the writ

petitioners before the Tribunal, which culminated in the

impugned judgment dated April 11, 2025, whereby the findings

of the BL & LRO and DL & LRO were affirmed.

10. Learned counsel appearing for the writ petitioners submits

that no opportunity of cross-examination was given to the writ

petitioners, although the BL & LRO relied on the evidence of

two witnesses, purportedly of the neighbourhood of the said

plot. Thus, a cardinal principle of natural justice, to the effect

that the affected party has a right of cross-examination, was

violated.

11. Moreover, learned counsel places reliance on a judgment of

a learned Single Judge of this Court in the matter of Md. Saha

Alam Fakir & Ors. Vs. The State of West Bengal & Ors.

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reported at 1981(1) CHN 212 to argue that in an enquiry

before the Revenue Officer, the principles of Order XVIII Rule

18 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short, “the Code”) would

be applicable,

12. Thus, it is argued that the lack of opportunity of cross-

examination vitiated the proceeding before the BL & LRO.

13. Secondly, it is argued that the BL & LRO came to his

findings without holding any field enquiry by an independent

person.

14. Thus, by dint of himself holding an enquiry and taking

evidence, the BL & LRO acted as the Enquiry Officer as well

the Investigating Officer, clubbed with the role of an

adjudicating authority.

15. Hence, the BL & LRO acted as a judge of his own cause,

which violates fundamental and cardinal principles of

jurisprudence in India.

16. Learned counsel appearing for the writ petitioners next

argues, by placing reliance on a judgment rendered by the

Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Prasanta Kumar Pal and others V.

State of West Bengal and others reported at 2025 SCC

OnLine SC 1356 that in such cases, where the deeds of gift

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were executed much earlier than the amendment to Section

14T(5) under the 1955 Act came into force (in 1989), it would

be absurd to accept the argument that such a transaction can

be held to be benami with reference to such amendment

carried out in the 1955 Act with effect from May 12, 1989.

17. In the said decision, the registered gift deeds had been

executed on December 7, 1967 whereas, in the present case,

the gift deeds-in-question were executed as long back as in

the year 1965.

18. Hence, following the principle as laid down in Prasanta

Kumar Pal (supra), it is argued by the writ petitioners that the

BL & LRO palpably erred in law and holding the gift deeds-in-

question executed by Nirmala Bala Dassi to be benami

transactions.

19. Consequentially, the order of the DL & LRO and the

Tribunal affirming the same, it is contended, should also be set

aside.

20. Learned counsel appearing for the writ petitioners places

reliance on the language of Section 101 of the West Bengal

Land Manual, 1991 (1991 Manual) to argue that the ceiling

limits under the West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act, 1953

7

(hereinafter referred to as “the Act of 1953”) ought to be taken

as the standard for consideration of an enquiry under Section

14T(5) of the 1955 Act. Approached from such perspective, it

is argued that the land held by the raiyat Nirmala Bala Dassi

came well within the ceiling limits as contemplated in the Act of

1953.

21. It is further argued by learned counsel for the writ

petitioners that the scope of enquiry within the purview of

Section 14T(5) has to be read in the light of Section 5A of the

Act of 1953.

22. No such enquiry, it is contended, could be undertaken

unless, in the first place, the concerned raiyat held land

exceeding the ceiling limit. In the present case, since it was

already decided in the first round of litigation that the land held

by the daughter-in-law and two grandsons of the raiyat could

not be construed to be within her holding, the BL & LRO could

not reopen such finding under the limited purview of Section

14T(5) of the 1955 Act at all, in the absence of any proof that

land beyond the ceiling limit was held by the raiyat.

23. Learned Senior Government Advocate, appearing for the

State, controverts the arguments of the writ petitioners and

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cites a co-ordinate Bench judgment of this Court in the matter

of Sri Bibhuti Bhusan Bankura and others Vs. State of West

Bengal and others reported at (1994) 2 CHN 408.

24. In the said judgment, it is argued, it was observed that an

enquiry under Section 14T(5) of the 1955 Act is neither a

review nor a recall and is completely separate from an enquiry

under Section 14T(3) of the 1955 Act. Section 14T(5) relates

to an enquiry regarding benami transfer for illegal purposes for

evading and defeating the ceiling provisions of Chapter IIB of

the 1955 Act.

25. That apart, an enquiry by a Revenue Officer under the

provision of Section 14T(5) is clearly neither a suit nor a claim.

26. Learned Senior Government Advocate also cites a

subsequent co-ordinate Bench judgment of this Court in the

matter of Sri Anantalal Chakraborty and another Vs. State of

West Bengal and others reported at (2004) 1 Cal LJ 64, which

reiterated the proposition that an enquiry into a benami

transaction under Section 14T(5) of the 1955 Act is

permissible and the Revenue Officer is competent to hold an

enquiry under the said Act.

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27. Learned Senior Government Advocate next argues that

under Section 14T(5) of the 1955 Act, the enquiry

encompasses not only the question of benami but is wider in

nature, including any question of title incidental thereto or any

interest therein or any matter of transaction made. Thus, the

limited context in which the Hon‟ble Supreme Court rendered

its judgment in Prasanta Kumal Pal (supra) is not applicable to

the present case in the peculiar facts of the same.

28. Insofar as the observation of the learned Single Judge in

Md. Saha Alam (supra) is concerned, it is argued that the

Division Bench judgments in the matter of Bibhuti Bhusan

Bankura (supra) and Anantalal Chakraborty (supra) clinches

the issue in favour of the respondent authorities.

29. Learned Senior Government Advocate next contends that

the scheme of Rules 100 and 101 of the 1991 Manual clearly

lay down distinct and different ceiling limits under different

statutes, being the Act of 1953 and the 1955 Act, and the two

cannot be confused.

30. In the present case, it is submitted that the original raiyat

Nirmala Bala Dassi held land beyond the ceiling limit, that is,

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6.178 acres, since admittedly she held a total property of 11.52

acres of land.

31. Such ceiling limit was artificially sought to be reduced by gift

of the property, to the tune of 6.74 acres, which brought down

the land purportedly held by the said raiyat to within the ceiling

limit.

32. Hence, it is argued that the findings of the concerned BL &

LRO were perfectly justified. Even otherwise, it is argued that

the evidence before the BL & LRO fully supported his findings.

33. Upon considering the arguments of the parties, the Court

arrives at the following conclusions:

34. Insofar as the BL & LRO not having any field enquiry

conducted by an independent person is concerned, the scope

of enquiry as enumerated in Section 14T(5) of the 1955 Act is

that the Revenue Officer shall, on his own motion or upon any

information made, after giving the persons interested an

opportunity of being heard, enquire and decide any question of

benami in relation to any land and any question of title

incidental thereto or any interest therein and/or any matter of

transaction made.

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35. The statute does not specifically stipulate the mode and

manner in which such enquiry shall be held.

36. In the present case, although an enquiry was held by the BL

& LRO, the same was not the only piece of evidence on which

the BL & LRO relied on by his order.

37. Apart from such report, the said officer also took into

consideration the oral evidence adduced by two independent

witnesses and, more importantly, the evidence adduced by the

writ petitioner no. 1 himself.

38. It is not the contemplation of the statute that the BL & LRO

does not have the power to make an enquiry as contemplated

under Section 14T(5) in his own way.

39. The proposition laid down in Anantlal Chakraborty (supra),

following Bibhuti Bhusan Bankura (supra), strengthens such

view.

40. The judgment in the matter of Md. Saha Alam (supra) was

rendered in the context of an enquiry under Section 18 of the

1955 Act.

41. Section 18, read with Section 21, of the 1955 Act curtail the

powers of the civil court to enquire into the question as to

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whether a person is a recorded bargadar and place such

enquiry within the domain of the Revenue Officer.

42. In such context, the learned Single Judge had observed

that the procedures laid down in Order XVIII Rule 18 of the

Code are applicable, since the enquiry undertaken by the

Revenue Officer is akin to that of the Civil Court.

43. However, the factual premise in the present case is entirely

different. Thus, it cannot be said that the ratio laid down in the

said report is applicable to the present case.

44. The statute, in Section 14T(5) thereof, contemplates

opportunity of hearing being given to the persons interested

and an enquiry and adjudication being done by the Revenue

Officer.

45. However, learned counsel for the petitioners has a point

when he argues that since evidence was permitted to be

adduced by two independent witnesses, an opportunity of

cross-examination ought to have been given to the writ

petitioners.

46. However, in order to read provisions of natural justice into a

statute where it is not specifically provided for, the court has to

proceed cautiously, the cardinal tests for such application

13

being the “prejudice test”. The court has to consider as to

whether any real prejudice has been caused to a party by

violation of the principles of natural justice complained of.

47. In the present case, the order of the DL & LRO clearly

discloses that the said Officer did not rely on the evidence of

the independent witnesses alone but also placed specific

reliance on the evidence adduced by the writ petitioner no. 1

himself.

48. In the order dated June 12, 2002 passed by the BL & LRO

in the proceeding before it under Section 14T(5), it was

recorded that at the time of enquiry, Anil Kumar Paul, being

the present writ petitioner no. 1, was present on behalf of the

raiyat Nirmala Bala Dassi, apart from other two independent

witnesses, namely, Monoranjan Mukhopadhyay and Lakshmi

Narayan Ghosh.

49. Anil Kumar Paul, while adducing evidence, categorically

admitted that the land of 6.74 acres was gifted by his

grandmother for the purpose that such land may not be sold by

their father Gopal, who was in the habit of selling lands

whimsically. Thus, it is evident from such statement that the

gift was not made for the purpose of donating the land

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simpliciter to the donees but to avoid such land being sold by

Gopal, the father of the writ petitioner no. 1, indiscriminately.

50. In the very next observation, the DL & LRO recorded that

Anil Kumar Paul admitted that the said lands were cultivated

by the donees after the death of their grandmother (donee).

51. The grandmother Nirmala Bala, was admitted to have died

on June 20, 1982.

52. Thus, as per the admission of the petitioner no. 1 (namely,

Anil Kumar Paul) himself, as recorded by the BL & LRO,

during the long period between the execution of the gift deeds

in the year 1965 and the demise of the donor on June 20,

1982, the land was not being cultivated by the donees.

53. Hence, read in conjunction with the evidence of the

independent witnesses to the effect that the donor (original

raiyat) continued to enjoy the usufructs of the said land even

after the purported deeds being executed, the admission of the

first writ petitioner herein clearly shows that the intention of the

donor was not to execute a gift deed at all or to deprive herself

of her title in the donated property.

54. Another important piece of evidence was extracted from the

admissions of the writ petitioner no. 1, being that the deceased

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uncle of the donees, namely, Dhirendranath helped to cultivate

the lands.

55. The evidence of the writ petitioner no. 1 itself, read in

totality, clearly shows that the lands-in-question, which were

the subject matter of the gift deeds, were actually not donated

for the purpose of donation but to save the concerned lands

from being sold out by the father of the writ petitioner no. 1,

namely, Gopal and that the donor, long after the execution of

the gift deeds till her death in 1982, continued to cultivate the

said lands, and it is only after her demise that the donees

started cultivation thereon. The cultivation of the land by the

original raiyat with the help of her brother was also established

from the evidence of the writ petitioner no. 1 himself.

56. Hence, we do not find any prejudice being suffered by the

writ petitioners for not being given opportunity to cross-

examine the two independent witnesses as, from the evidence

of the petitioner no. 1 himself, sufficient material was available

before the BL LRO to come to his conclusions.

57. By similar logic, the report which was authored by the BL &

LRO was not even necessary for coming to his conclusions, as

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the admissions of the writ petitioner no. 1 were sufficient for

such purpose.

58. Hence, the threshold objections taken by the writ petitioners

regarding lack of opportunity of cross-examination and the BL

& LRO acting as an enquiry office fail the „prejudice test‟ and

pale into insignificance, by dint of the evidence of writ

petitioner no. 1 himself to support the findings of the BL &

LRO.

59. Coming to the question of applicability of Rules 100 and

101 of the 1991 Manual, the argument of the writ petitioners, to

the effect that the ceiling limits of the Act of 1953 ought to be

imported to the 1955 Act, is not acceptable.

60. Rule 100, as rightly pointed out by the learned Senior

Government Advocate, clearly distinguishes between the

provisions imposing ceiling on land holding as embodied in the

Act of 1953 and the 1955 Act. The references to the Act of

1953 in Rule 101 are only for the purpose of drawing analogy

while making an adjudication under Section 14T(5) of the 1955

Act.

61. However, from a plain reading of Section 14 it is clear that

the ceiling limits stipulated in the 1955 Act itself are the

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yardsticks for making an enquiry under the provisions of the

said Act. Since the Act of 1953 and the 1955 Act provide for

separate and distinct ceiling limits, in an enquiry under the

1955 Act, it is the ceiling limit imposed by such statute which is

to be looked into, and not that stipulated in the Act of 1953.

62. Thus, it is clear that Rule 101(ii) of the 1991 Manual, if read

in proper context, has to be construed to the effect that if it

prima facie appears that though the ostensible owner of a land

is a person or trust other than the intermediary, but the

intermediary is its real owner and enjoys its usufructs, a

proceeding may be initiated within the purview of Section

14T(5) of the 1955 Act.

63. As such, if the gift deeds executed by the original raiyat

Nirmala were to be ignored in the instant case, the land held

by the original raiyat , namely, Nirmala Bala Dassi would come

to 11.52 acres, which is above the ceiling limit of 6.178 acres

as stipulated in the 1955 Act.

64. Thus, this Court does not find any illegality in the findings of

the BL & LRO.

65. Next coming to the judgment of Prasanta Kumal Pal

(supra), with utmost respect, it neither fell for consideration

18

before the Hon‟ble Supreme Court, nor was adjudicated by the

said Court, as to what would be the nuances and the interplay

between the Act of 1953 and the 1955 Act.

66. The 1955 Act was enacted at a point of time when the Act

of 1953 was still in force. At that juncture, there were two

overlapping sets of separate land ceilings imposed by the two

statutes. The said conundrum was sought to be resolved by

Rules 100 and 101 of the 1991 Manual.

67. Rule 100 provides that the provisions imposing ceiling on

land holding are embodied in Chapter II and Chapter VI of the

Act of 1953 and in Chapter IIB of the 1955 Act. Determination

of ceiling under the 1955 Act shall ordinarily be preceded by

determination of ceiling under the Act of 1953.

68. Again, Rule 101(i) provides that at the time of determination

of ceiling under the Act of 1953 in respect of an intermediary, it

would be examined if Section 5A of the said Act is applicable

and, if so, the proceeding under the said Section should be

initiated and disposed of before determination of the ceiling.

69. However, a separate ecosystem has been created for the

1955 Act in Clause (ii) of Rule 101, which provides for an

19

enquiry to be initiated under Section 14T(5) of the 1955 Act in

the event the ceiling limited under the said Act is violated.

70. In the year 1965, when the gift deeds were purportedly

executed by the original raiyat Nirmala Bala Dassi, the 1955

Act had already come into force with its ceiling limits.

71. Hence, irrespective of the amended Section 14T(5) having

been introduced only much later, with effect from May 12,

1989, at the juncture when the transaction was entered into,

the ceiling limits under the 1955 Act were already in force.

Thus, if a person wanted to evade the said ceiling limits and

retain additional land, the instrument of benami transaction or

a non-bona fide transaction was still available to the said

raiyat, since at that juncture it was well-known to the raiyat as

to how much could be retained by a single unit under the then-

prevalent provisions of the 1955 Act.

72. What sub-section (5) of Section 14T, upon being

introduced, did was merely to empower the concerned

Revenue Officer to enter into an enquiry and decide the

question of benami and matters of transaction which were not

bona fide or questions of title incidental thereto, which

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transactions were entered into after the coming into force of

the said Act, even previous to the 1989 Amendment.

73. Hence, with all humility, the logic on which the Hon‟ble

Supreme Court decided the case in Prasanta Kumar Pal

(supra) on its own facts did not take into consideration the

legal position that even on the date of entering into the

concerned gift, the raiyat was well aware of the ceiling limits

and nothing prevented the said raiyat from seeking to evade

the ceiling limits by transferring a portion of her land with the

mala fide intention of evading the ceiling limit.

74. Thus, the ratio, that it would be absurd that a person

entering into a transaction in 1965 would not be knowing about

the amendment which was to come subsequently, does not

hold good in the sense that the mala fides in the transaction

and the attempt to evade the ceiling limit could very well has

been exercised at the juncture of entering into the transaction

itself much prior to the 1989 amendment, which was only

sought to be detected by the subsequent amendment.

75. That apart, Prasanta Kumar Pal (supra) is not an authority

on the interplay between the 1953 and the 1955 statutes as

well and did not consider the aforesaid facets of the matter at

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all, for the simple reason that those issues were neither argued

nor decided upon by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court.

76. Hence, with utmost respect, the said judgment cannot be a

precedent in the present context.

77. In view of the above observations, this Court is of the

opinion that the Tribunal was perfectly justified in passing the

impugned judgment, thereby affirming the order of the BL &

LRO and DL & LRO respectively.

78. Accordingly, WPLRT No. 219 of 2025 is dismissed on

contest, thereby affirming the judgment dated April 11, 2025

passed by the Fourth Bench, West Bengal Land Reforms and

Tenancy Tribunal in OA No. 4162 of 2002(LRTT), thereby

affirming the orders passed by the DL & LRO and BL & LRO.

79. There will be no order as to costs.

80. Urgent photostat certified copy of the order, if applied for,

be supplied to the parties at an early date.

I agree.

(Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J.)

(Supratim Bhattacharya, J.)