2026:JHHC:28478

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI

Criminal Appeal (S.J.) No. 157 of 2017

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Anup Ekka S/o Late Anthoney Ekka, Resident of Village-

Dorma, Footkal Toli, P.O.-Dorma, P.S.-Torpa, Dist.-Khunti

…… Appellant

Versus

The State of Jharkhand …… Respondent

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For the Appellant : Mr. Shresth Gautam, Advocate

For the State : Mr. Sanjay Kr. Srivastava, A.P.P.

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PRESENT

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ARUN KUMAR RAI

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J U D G M E N T

C.A.V. on 14.01.2026 Pronounced on: 21.09.2026

1. Heard Mr. Shresth Gautam, learned counsel

appearing for the appellant/accused and Mr. Sanjay Kr.

Srivastava, learned A.P.P appearing on behalf of the State.

2. The instant Criminal Appeal is directed against the

judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated

19.12.2016 passed by District & Additional Sessions Judge-I,

Khunti in Sessions Trial Case No. 12 of 2016, whereby and

whereunder the appellant has been convicted for the offence

punishable under Section 376 of IPC and sentenced him to

undergo R.I. for 7 years with a fine of Rs 25,000/-. Further,

in default of payment of fine, the convict is also directed to

further undergo R.I. for one more year.

3. In the present case, FIR has been based upon the

written report dated 20.06.2015 of the victim, wherein she

stated that she has passed Matriculation examination in the

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year 2010. There is a Rajkiya High School, Pelol situated at

100 yards from her place where the appellant (resident of

village-Dorma, Futkal Toli, P.S.-Torpa, District-Khunti) had

been working as a teacher since 2014 and he often used to

visit to her house to meet her father but he had an evil eye

on her and would occasionally interact with her. In January,

2015, he expressed his desire to marry the victim. On

25.01.2015, the victim was taken to the house of the

appellant/accused on the assurance given to her father that,

after meeting his mother and showing her his house, she

would be brought back. However, after having dinner at the

house of the appellant/accused, the victim was taken in a

room where the appellant forcibly committed rape upon her.

When she started weeping, the appellant/accused told the

victim that he would marry her.

4. It has further been alleged that, again, on

10.02.2015, the appellant took the victim to his house and,

during the night established physical relations with her. She

was not allowed to return to her house on 11.02.2015 as she

was kept in appellant's house, where during that night also,

physical relation was established with her against her will.

The victim told the appellant/accused that her parents had

already come to know about their relationship and, therefore,

requested him to speak to her parents regarding their

marriage. Thereafter, in the month of May 2015, the

appellant/accused visited victim's house and told her father

that he would marry the victim. However, on 18.06.2015, he

flatly refused to marry her. It is also alleged that the

appellant was influenced by his mother not to marry the

victim.

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5. Upon the aforesaid allegation, an FIR being Murhu

P.S. Case No.49/2015 dated 20.06.2015 registered under

Sections 376/417 of IPC against the appellant and after due

investigation, charge-sheet was submitted on 18.09.2015

against the appellant/accused under Sections 376/419 of

IPC and against Jesinta Ekka (mother of the

appellant/accused) under Section 109 of IPC. Learned

Magistrate took cognizance of the offences and committed

the case to the Court of Sessions, where it was registered as

S.T. No. 12/2016. Charges were framed, against the

appellant/accused for the offence punishable under Sections

376 and 419 of IPC and against Jesinta Ekka (mother of the

appellant/accused) under Section 109 of IPC. The above-

stated charges were read over to them and explained to the

accused persons in Hindi, to which they pleaded not guilty

and claimed to be tried.

6. To prove its case, the prosecution has examined 11

witnesses in the present case; however, no witnesses were

examined on behalf of the defence. The statements of the

accused persons under Section 313 Cr.P.C. were recorded on

23.11.2016 whereby there is simple denial on the part of the

accused persons.

7. The trial court after considering the evidences

available on the record, acquitted Jesinta Ekka (mother of

the appellant/accused) from the charge under Section 109 of

IPC, however convicted the appellant/accused for the offence

punishable under Section 376 of IPC and sentenced him to

undergo R.I. for 7 years with a fine of Rs 25,000/-. Further,

in default of payment of fine, the convict was directed to

undergo R.I. for one more year. Being aggrieved, the

appellant/accused preferred the instant appeal.

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8. Learned counsel for the appellant/accused has

pointed out that there are material contradictions in the

version of the victim (PW-1) which render the prosecution

case doubtful. It is submitted that, as per her own version,

she was enticed by the appellant/accused to accompany him

to his house and she subsequently resiled from her earlier

statement that she had voluntarily accompanied the

appellant/accused to his house on two occasions and that

on both occasions, physical relations were established

between them, and she voluntarily stayed with the

appellant/accused for overnight. It is further submitted that

even if the victim had gone to the house of the

appellant/accused against her will, she could have raised an

alarm when the appellant/accused allegedly forced himself

upon her, particularly as the mother and sister of the

appellant/accused were also present in the house. As such,

it is submitted that there are material contradictions in the

testimony of the victim, which have not been duly considered

by the learned trial court.

9. Learned counsel for the appellant/accused has

further submitted that, admittedly the victim was major at

the time of alleged occurrence and had accompanied the

appellant/accused of her own free will and volition.

Therefore, the physical relations established between the

victim and the appellant were consensual. It is further

submitted that the allegation of sexual intercourse on the

basis of a false promise of marriage cannot be sustained in

the eyes of law; as a mere breach of promise to marry does

not by itself, amount to a misconception of fact within the

meaning of Section 90 of IPC. As such, no offence under

section 376 of IPC is made out. Rather at best from

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prosecution perspective the case may amount to a breach of

promise by the appellant to marry the victim.

10. To buttress the aforesaid argument, learned counsel

for the appellant/accused has placed reliance upon the

judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case

of Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra

reported in (2019) 9 SCC 608 and Deelip Singh v. State of

Bihar reported in (2005) 1 SCC 88 wherein it has been held

that, "a breach of promise to marry cannot, be a false

promise and to establish false promise, maker of promise

should have had no intention of upholding his words at the

time of giving it". Upon the aforesaid premise, prayer has

been made that this is a fit case for acquittal of the

appellant/accused.

11. Per contra , learned A.P.P for the State has

submitted that the learned trial court has rightly convicted

the appellant/accused under Section 376 of IPC on the

ground that the physical relationship was established on the

basis of false promise to marry. It is submitted that the

victim had not consented to the appellant/accused having

forcefully establishing physical relation with her for the first

time and that, in the course of occurrence the

appellant/accused made a promise to marry her so that she

would not disclose the incident to anyone. It is pointed out

that there existed cordial relation between the

appellant/accused and victim's father and that the victim

had gone to the house of appellant/accused on his

assurance to her father that she would be brought back after

meeting with his mother. Thus, the appellant/accused took

the victim to his house and committed rape upon her. It is,

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therefore, submitted that there was no consent on the part of

the victim to the physical relationship.

12. It is further submitted that the appellant/accused

forcibly committed rape upon her and when she started

weeping gave her a false assurance/promise of marriage. It is

further submitted that when the victim attempted to raise an

alarm, appellant/accused gagged her mouth so as to prevent

her from screaming seeking help. Thus, according to learned

counsel for the State, promise of marriage was made by the

appellant/accused while committing rape without any

intention to fulfill from the very inception to fulfill the said

promise. It is, therefore, submitted that the promise was

false and vitiated the consent of the victim, and that no

interference is required with the judgment passed by the

learned trial court is warranted.

13. Heard the counsel for the parties and perused the

materials available on record.

14. Before coming to the facts of the present case, it is

apposite to discuss the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble

Supreme Court in the case of Deepak Gulati v. State of

Haryana, reported in (2013) 7 SCC 675 wherein the Apex

Court has made distinction between rape and consensual

intercourse and differentiated between a mere breach of

promise and not fulfilling a false promise and held that an

accused will only be liable if the Court concludes that his

intentions are mala fide and he has clandestine motives. The

relevant paragraphs are reproduced herein below :-

“21. Consent may be express or implied, coerced or misguided,

obtained willingly or through deceit. Consent is an act of reason,

accompanied by deliberation, the mind weighing, as in a balance,

the good and evil on each side. There is a clear distinction between

rape and consensual sex and in a case like this, the court must very

carefully examine whether the accused had actually wanted to

marry the victim, or had mala fide motives, and had made a false

promise to this effect only to satisfy his lust, as the latter falls

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within the ambit of cheating or deception. There is a distinction

between the mere breach of a promise, and not fulfilling a false

promise. Thus, the court must examine whether there was made, at

an early stage a false promise of marriage by the accused; and

whether the consent involved was given after wholly understanding

the nature and consequences of sexual indulgence. There may be a

case where the prosecutrix agrees to have sexual intercourse on

account of her love and passion for the accused, and not solely on

account of misrepresentation made to her by the accused, or where

an accused on account of circumstances which he could not have

foreseen, or which were beyond his control, was unable to marry

her, despite having every intention to do so. Such cases must be

treated differently. An accused can be convicted for rape only if the

court reaches a conclusion that the intention of the accused was

mala fide, and that he had clandestine motives.

24. Hence, it is evident that there must be adequate evidence to

show that at the relevant time i.e. at the initial stage itself, the

accused had no intention whatsoever, of keeping his promise to

marry the victim. There may, of course, be circumstances, when a

person having the best of intentions is unable to marry the victim

owing to various unavoidable circumstances. The “failure to keep a

promise made with respect to a future uncertain date, due to

reasons that are not very clear from the evidence available, does

not always amount to misconception of fact. In order to come within

the meaning of the term “misconception of fact”, the fact must have

an immediate relevance”. Section 90 IPC cannot be called into aid in

such a situation, to pardon the act of a girl in entirety, and fasten

criminal liability on the other, unless the court is assured of the fact

that from the very beginning, the accused had never really intended

to marry her.”

15. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Mahesh

Damu Khare v. State of Maharashtra reported in (2024)

11 SCC 398 whereby the Apex court has discerned the

prerequisites as underlined in the case of Pramod

Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra reported in

(2019) 9 SCC 608 wherein it has been has held that to make

a man, accused of having sexual relationship by making a

false promise of marriage, criminally liable, the physical

relationship must be traceable directly to the false promise

made and it must not be qualified by other circumstances or

consideration. In a situation where the woman knowingly

maintains the physical relationship for a prolonged period, it

cannot be said with certainty that the said physical

relationship was purely because of alleged promise made by

the accused to marry her. In conclusion, the Court held that

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unless it can be shown that the physical relationship was

purely because of the promise of marriage and without being

influenced by any other consideration, it cannot be said that

there was vitiation of consent under misconception of fact.

The relevant paragraphs are reproduced herein below :–

25. Keeping this aspect in mind as to what amounts to consent with

reference to Section 375IPC, this Court has examined and considered in a

number of cases that if the person acts with an active understanding of the

circumstances, actions and consequences of the act, it would indicate the

presence of consent. It was observed in Shambhu Kharwar v. State of

U.P. [Shambhu Kharwar v. State of U.P., (2024) 16 SCC 502 : 2022 SCC

OnLine SC 1032] as follows: (SCC para 9)

“9. In Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra [Pramod

Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 9 SCC 608 : (2019) 3

SCC (Cri) 903] , a two-Judge Bench of this Court of which one of us was a

part (D.Y. Chandrachud J.), held in Sonu v. State of U.P. [Sonu v. State of

U.P., (2021) 18 SCC 517] , observed that: (Pramod Suryabhan Pawar

case [Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 9 SCC

608 : (2019) 3 SCC (Cri) 903] , SCC pp. 616-18 & 620, paras 12, 14, 16 &

18)

‘12. This Court has repeatedly held that consent with respect to Section

375IPC involves an active understanding of the circumstances, actions and

consequences of the proposed act. An individual who makes a reasoned

choice to act after evaluating various alternative actions (or inaction) as

well as the various possible consequences flowing from such action or

inaction, consents to such action. …

***

14. … Specifically in the context of a promise to marry, this Court has

observed that there is a distinction between a false promise given on the

understanding by the maker that it will be broken, and the breach of a

promise which is made in good faith but subsequently not fulfilled. …

***

16. Where the promise to marry is false and the intention of the maker at

the time of making the promise itself was not to abide by it but to deceive

the woman to convince her to engage in sexual relations, there is a

“misconception of fact” that vitiates the woman's “consent”. On the other

hand, a breach of a promise cannot be said to be a false promise. To

establish a false promise, the maker of the promise should have had no

intention of upholding his word at the time of giving it. The “consent” of a

woman under Section 375 is vitiated on the ground of a “misconception of

fact” where such misconception was the basis for her choosing to engage

in the said act. …

***

18. To summarise the legal position that emerges from the above cases,

the “consent” of a woman with respect to Section 375 must involve an

active and reasoned deliberation towards the proposed act. To establish

whether the “consent” was vitiated by a “misconception of fact” arising out

of a promise to marry, two propositions must be established. The promise

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of marriage must have been a false promise, given in bad faith and with

no intention of being adhered to at the time it was given. The false promise

itself must be of immediate relevance, or bear a direct nexus to the

woman's decision to engage in the sexual act.”

(emphasis supplied)

26. The complainant had taken the plea that the appellant had physical

relationship with her against her consent by making a false promise that

he would marry her. In this regard, it has to be considered whether

making a false promise to marry amounts to an offence. If a false promise

of marriage is made to a woman by a man, thus deceiving the woman

leading her to engage in sexual relations, it may amount to misconception

of fact, in which case the consent given by the woman may be vitiated. In

this regard one may refer to the decision of this Court in Naim

Ahamed v. State (NCT of Delhi) [Naim Ahamed v. State (NCT of Delhi),

(2023) 15 SCC 385] : (SCC p. 398, para 21)

“21. The bone of contention raised on behalf of the respondents is that the

prosecutrix had given her consent for sexual relationship under the

misconception of fact, as the accused had given a false promise to marry

her and subsequently he did not marry, and therefore such consent was

no consent in the eye of law and the case fell under the Clause —

Secondly of Section 375IPC. In this regard, it is pertinent to note that there

is a difference between giving a false promise and committing breach of

promise by the accused. In case of false promise, the accused right from

the beginning would not have any intention to marry the prosecutrix and

would have cheated or deceited the prosecutrix by giving a false promise

to marry her only with a view to satisfy his lust, whereas in case of breach

of promise, one cannot deny a possibility that the accused might have

given a promise with all seriousness to marry her, and subsequently might

have encountered certain circumstances unforeseen by him or the

circumstances beyond his control, which prevented him to fulfil his

promise. So, it would be a folly to treat each breach of promise to marry as

a false promise and to prosecute a person for the offence under Section

376.”

27. In our view, if a man is accused of having sexual relationship by

making a false promise of marriage and if he is to be held criminally liable,

any such physical relationship must be traceable directly to the false

promise made and not qualified by other circumstances or consideration. A

woman may have reasons to have physical relationship other than the

promise of marriage made by the man, such as personal liking for the male

partner without insisting upon formal marital ties.

28. Thus, in a situation where physical relationship is maintained for a

prolonged period knowingly by the woman, it cannot be said with certainty

that the said physical relationship was purely because of the alleged

promise made by the appellant to marry her. Thus, unless it can be shown

that the physical relationship was purely because of the promise of

marriage, thereby having a direct nexus with the physical relationship

without being influenced by any other consideration, it cannot be said that

there was vitiation of consent under misconception of fact.

16. As far as, in the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble

Supreme Court in the case of Deelip Singh (Supra), as

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relied by the learned counsel for the appellant/accused, it

was held that consent or absence of promise could be

gathered from the attendant circumstances and the previous

or contemporaneous acts or the subsequent conduct can be

legitimate guides. The relevant paragraph is reproduced

herein below :–

30. Is it a case of passive submission in the face of psychological pressure

exerted or allurements made by the accused or was it a conscious decision

on the part of the prosecutrix knowing fully the nature and consequences

of the act she was asked to indulge in? Whether the tacit consent given by

the prosecutrix was the result of a misconception created in her mind as to

the intention of the accused to marry her? These are the questions which

have to be answered on an analysis of the evidence. The last question

raises the allied question, whether the promise to marry, if made by the

accused, was false to his knowledge and belief from the very inception

and it was never intended to be acted upon by him. As pointed out by this

Court in Uday case [(2003) 4 SCC 46 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 775 : (2003) 2 Scale

329] the burden is on the prosecution to prove that there was absence of

consent. Of course, the position is different if the case is covered by Section

114-A of the Evidence Act. Consent or absence of it could be gathered from

the attendant circumstances. The previous or contemporaneous acts or the

subsequent conduct can be legitimate guides.

17. Now, coming to the case in hand, it transpires that,

in order to prove its case, the prosecution has examined as

many as 11 witnesses out of which six witnesses PW-2

Robart Bhengra, PW-3 Nitin Lugun, PW-4 Kushpender

Swansi, PW-5 Jagarnath Runda, PW-6 Sohrai Swansi and

PW-7 Gomiya Tiru are the villagers of the victim who turned

hostile during the trial. PW-1 is the victim. PW-8 is the

mother of the victim. PW-9 is Dr. Monika Bajrai who

examined victim on 22.06.2015. PW-10 is the father of the

victim, and PW-11 is the I.O. of the present case.

18. PW-1 has deposed in her testimony substantially in

consonance with the averment made by her in the written

report. The victim has stated that in the night of 25.01.2015,

on the promise of marriage, the appellant/accused enticed

her and took her to his place at Dorma Futkal Toli. The

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appellant/accused assured her father that victim would be

brought back to Pelol village after meeting his mother. The

victim further stated that after taking dinner she was taken

into a room, where the appellant/accused forcibly committed

rape the upon her. When she started weeping,

appellant/accused assured her that she should not cry and

he would marry her. The victim has further stated that,

again, on 10.02.2015, the appellant/accused took her to his

house where physical relations were again established with

her on that day, as well as on 11.02.2015 and she was not

allowed to return to her home. At the instance of the victim,

the appellant interacted with her father and mother

regarding their marriage. However, on 18.06.2015 he flatly

refused to marry her. Thereafter, upon his refusal to marry

her, the victim submitted an application to the police station

which is in her own handwriting and has been marked as

Ext.-I.

19. In her cross-examination, the victim has stated that

she had known the appellant/accused since October-

November, 2014. She had passed the Intermediate

examination and stated her date of birth as 10.05.1995. The

appellant was having good relations with her father as well

as with her. According to her, her house was situated at a

distance of about 10 KMs from the house of the

appellant/accused at Dorma Futkal Toli. She further stated

that, she reached the house of the appellant/accused on his

motorcycle within 15-20 minutes and at that time, his

mother and sister were present there. She further admitted

that she had visited the place of the appellant/accused with

her consent.

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20. She also stated that there was no door to the room

of the appellant/accused, however, in the night, she was

taken to another room and after committing rape by the

appellant/accused, she did not raise any alarm or shout as

the appellant/accused had told her not to do so, stating that

her cries would be heard by his mother. She further stated

that appellant/accused had gagged her mouth for five

minutes. Even thereafter, she did not raise an alarm or

shout. She slept with the appellant/accused throughout the

night and left for Dorma Futkal Toli at 5 AM in the morning.

She disclosed the incident to her friend and her younger

sister and her cousin sister. She further stated that as she

was willing to marry the appellant/accused, she again visited

his house on 10.02.2015. Significantly, she categorically

admitted that, having attained the age of majority, she had

gone out for an outing with a boy at 8 PM at her own volition.

21. PW-8 is the mother of the victim. She has stated

that the incident is from 25.01.2015 to 10.02.2015. She

came to know about the incident from her daughter, who is

her step-daughter. She has reiterated the version of the

victim by stating that her daughter had told her that the

appellant/accused was a Teacher in Pelol School and had

taken her to his house on the promise of marriage and

showing his house, where he established physical relation

with her. On 10.02.2015, the victim returned to her house.

The appellant/accused had been saying that he would marry

the victim, however when the victim's mother asked him

about the marriage, he refused to marry her.

In her cross-examination, she has stated that

whenever the appellant used to visit her house, she would

serve him tea and snacks. She further stated that she

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however did not like the appellant/accused though she had

not conveyed this fact to the victim.

22. PW-10 is the father of the victim. He has stated that

the incident is of 25.01.2015 and as told by his daughter, the

victim and the appellant/accused had agreed to marry each

other. Thereafter they went to Dorma, to the house of the

appellant/accused, to meet his mother, however the family

members of the appellant/accused refused to agree to the

marriage. Consequently, his daughter lodged a case at the

police station. He also stated that he came to know from PW-

8, the mother of the victim that the appellant/accused had

taken the victim to his house on the pretext of marriage and

had committed rape upon her.

In his cross-examination, he has stated that PW-8

is his second wife and he visited to Dorma for the first time

on 17.06.2015 with a proposal for the marriage of the victim,

but the same was refused by the accused persons. He also

stated that the marriage of the victim had already been

finalized.

23. PW-9 is the doctor who has opined the age of victim

is above 18 years and has further opined that since there

was no tenderness present in the private part of the victim,

so it appears that intercourse was not of recent one.

PW-11 is the I.O. of the present case. He has stated

that, during the course of investigation, he recorded the

statements of witnesses and also visited the place of

occurrence. He has further described the place of occurrence

in his testimony.

24. In the light of the aforesaid legal proposition and the

evidence discussed in the preceding paragraphs, it is

apparent from the testimony of the victim that, the

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appellant/accused had made a promise to marry her. On the

night of 25.01.2015, the appellant/accused took the victim

on his motorcycle from her house to his house with the

consent of her father. At the house of the appellant, apart

from him, his mother and sister were also present. It is

alleged that, after dinner, the appellant/accused forcibly

committed rape upon her. When she started weeping, the

appellant/accused told her not to cry and assured her, he

would marry her. Thereafter, the victim slept for the whole

night with the appellant/accused in the same room and left

the place of the appellant/accused at 5 AM the following

morning, and proceeded towards her village from Dorma

Futkal Toli.

25. As far as the first incident is concerned, submission

has been made on behalf of the State that there was no

consent on the part of the victim. In order to examine the

issue of consent with regard to establishment of the first

physical relationship, it is necessary to take into

consideration the subsequent conduct of both the victim and

the appellant/accused. In this regard, it is pertinent to note

that after the first visit of the victim to the house of the

appellant/accused, the victim again went there on

10.02.2015 and also remained there until 11.02.2015.

During this period, physical relations were established

between them. Significantly, the victim has stated

categorically in her evidence that on both these dates

physical relations were established with her consent.

26. It has also been stated by the victim that, prior to

taking her on 25.01.2015, the appellant/accused had

promised to marry her and thereafter took her to his house

to meet his mother and to show his house. It has also come

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in the testimony of victim that, when she persuaded the

appellant/accused that, since they were in a relationship, he

should visit her house and seek her father's consent for their

marriage, the appellant/accused accordingly visited the

victim's house and told her father and mother that he would

like to marry her. The conduct of the appellant/accused

clearly indicates that there was no false promise of marriage

on his part at the time of alleged incident in January, 2015

particularly when he himself subsequently visited the

victim's house and sought her father's consent for the

marriage. Even, father of the victim as well as the victim

herself, has stated in their respective testimony that the

family members of the appellant/accused refused to agree to

the marriage between the victim and the appellant/accused.

However, the victim has categorically stated that it was the

mother of the appellant who dissuaded him from marrying

her.

27. In view of the aforesaid discussion, this Court is of

considered view that, in the present case, the evidence

available on record does not disclose any material emanating

from the testimony of either the victim or her parents which

could give rise to an inference, beyond reasonable doubt,

that the appellant/accused had no intention of marrying the

victim from the inception, when the promise to marry her

was made in January, 2015 or the promise so made was

false to his knowledge at the time it was made. On the

contrary, the victim (PW-1) has stated in her evidence that

the mother of the appellant dissuaded him from marrying

her. This circumstance indicates that the appellant/accused

might have been actuated by a genuine intention to marry

the victim, which however, did not materialize on account of

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opposition from his family members. Therefore, the present

case appears to be one of breach of promise to marry rather

than a case of false promise to marry.

28. In conclusion, this Court is of the considered view

that the prosecution has failed to establish, beyond

reasonable doubt, that the appellant/accused had made a

false promise of marriage to the victim with no intention

whatsoever of fulfilling the same from its very inception. The

evidence of the victim, considered in its entirety and in the

light of her subsequent conduct as well as the surrounding

circumstances, does not support such inference.

Consequently, the essential ingredients of the offence alleged

against the appellant/accused are not established beyond

reasonable doubt.

29. Resultantly, the judgment of conviction and order of

sentence dated 19.12.2016 passed by District & Additional

Sessions Judge-I, Khunti in Sessions Trial Case No. 12 of

2016 are, hereby, set aside.

30. The instant appeal being, Criminal Appeal (S.J.) No.

157 of 2017 is, hereby, allowed.

31. Since, the appellant/accused is on bail, he is

discharged from the liability of his bail bonds.

32. Let the trial court record be sent back to the court

concerned forthwith.

33. Pending I.A., if any, stands disposed of.

(Arun Kumar Rai, J.)

Jharkhand High Court, at Ranchi

Dated : 21.09.2026

R.K/- A.F.R.

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