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Anuradha @ Chiku Vs. State (Nct Of Delhi)

  Delhi High Court CRL.A. 1543/2025
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CRL.A. 1543/2025 Page 1 of 18

* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

Reserved on: 26

th

November, 2025.

Pronounced on: 6

th

January, 2026.

Uploaded on: 6

th

January, 2026.

+ CRL.A. 1543/2025 & CRL.M.A. 32856/2025

ANURADHA @ CHIKU .....Appellant

Through: Mr. Kundan Kumar, Mr. Madan

Kumar Jha, Mr. Pranshu Kumar,

Ms. Mahima Choudhary, Advocates.

versus

STATE (NCT OF DELHI) .....Respondent

Through: Mr. Aman Usman, APP for State.

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJEEV NARULA

JUDGMENT

SANJEEV NARULA, J.:

1. This appeal under Section 12 of the Maharashtra Control of Organised

Crime Act, 1999

1

assails order dated 31

st

October, 2025 passed by the ASJ-

03 (North-West) Rohini Courts, rejecting the Appellant’s bail application

and seeks her release on bail.

2. The prosecution case, in brief, is as follows.

2.1. On 10

th

March, 2025, police received secret information that one

Amit, son of Surender, resident of Sultanpuri, Delhi, aged about 25-27

years, along with his mother Kusum, had set up an organised operation for

trafficking narcotic substances in and around Sultanpuri and Mangolpuri. It

was further conveyed that multiple CCTV cameras had been installed

1

“MCOCA”

CRL.A. 1543/2025 Page 2 of 18

around his house and the adjoining narrow alley, with iron gates placed at

both ends of the alley, in order to obstruct law enforcement. The information

also suggested that Amit would be travelling around 4:30 PM-5:30 PM in a

black Mahindra Scorpio bearing Registration No. DL 8CBA 4642 from

Mangolpuri Flyover towards his house and if intercepted, could be

apprehended with contraband. Acting on this information, a raid was

conducted at the house, which resulted in recovery of 385.53 grams (gross

weight of packed material, in multiple small plastic packets) heroin, and

47.09 grams of tramadol. Based on this, FIR No. 186/2025 dated 11

th

March,

2025 was registered at P.S. Sultanpuri under Sections 21(c), 22(b) and 29 of

the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985

2

and Section 111

of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023.

3

2.2. Prosecution alleges that during police custody remand, co-accused

Amit disclosed that he, along with his mother Kusum and his sisters Deepa

and Anuradha (the Appellant), ran a drug syndicate and facilitated

trafficking as well as concealment of narcotic substances. It was further

alleged that Kusum, Deepa and the Appellant were beneficiaries of the

proceeds received from the syndicate. The prosecution also claims recovery

of cash and jewellery from a locker/residential premises at the instance of

co-accused Amit.

2.3. During police custody remand, the prosecution effected recoveries

and seizures from multiple premises stated to be associated with Kusum and

the family. The seized articles are described as comprising cash and

valuables, certain electronic devices and equipment linked to CCTV

2

“NDPS Act”

3

“BNS”

CRL.A. 1543/2025 Page 3 of 18

surveillance, and other items such as a motorcycle and a vehicle key, along

with documents pertaining to certain properties. The prosecution case is that

these recoveries, including reference to a flat at Rohini, point to

accumulation of assets and articles from proceeds of illicit trafficking.

2.4. During investigation, the Scorpio vehicle used by co-accused Amit

(Mahindra Scorpio No. DL 8CBA 4642) was seized. The prosecution also

points to substantial cash deposits and UPI-linked inflows in the accounts of

the Appellant and the co-accused, during 2022 to 2025, said to be

disproportionate to any disclosed lawful source and relied upon as indicative

of proceeds from illicit trafficking.

2.5. A charge-sheet dated 9

th

May, 2025 was filed before the NDPS Court

against co-accused Amit for offences under the NDPS Act, the BNS and the

Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940, with the investigation stated to be

continuing in respect of other alleged members of the syndicate.

2.6. At the stage of framing of charge, the Trial Court recorded that the

prosecution initially proceeded on the footing of “commercial quantity” of

the contraband. However, on re-assessment during proceedings under

Section 52A of the NDPS Act, the quantity did not meet the commercial

threshold. The Court, therefore, framed charge under Section 21(b) of the

NDPS Act, to which the accused pleaded not guilty and claimed trial.

2.7. Co-accused Amit was granted regular bail by the Trial Court, whereas

the Appellant and co-accused Deepa were granted pre-arrest bail. However,

subsequently, orders granting pre-arrest bail were set aside by this Court.

2.8. Thereafter, on the basis of a proposal highlighting the previous

criminal antecedents of the syndicate and the continuous involvement in

drug-related offences, the competent authority granted approval for

CRL.A. 1543/2025 Page 4 of 18

invocation of Sections 3 and 4 of the MCOCA Act.

2.9. The Appellant then approached the MCOCA Court seeking regular

bail, which came to be dismissed by the impugned order.

3. Aggrieved, the Appellant has preferred the instant appeal, seeking

bail. Mr. Kundan Kumar, counsel representing him, presses the following

grounds:

3.1. Anticipatory bail was granted to the Appellant by order dated 13

th

June, 2025, covering the allegations under Section 111 of the BNS

(organised crime) as well as offences under Sections 21/25/29 of the NDPS

Act.

3.2. After filing of the charge-sheet and framing of charges, invocation of

MCOCA proceeded without obtaining prior permission of the Court as

contemplated under Section 193 of the BNSS.

3.3. Invocation of Sections 3 and 4 of MCOCA demonstrates a colourable

exercise of power aimed at the Appellant’s family, rather than one founded

on satisfaction of the statutory preconditions.

3.4. The approval order rests on six FIRs, five against the Appellant’s

mother and the present FIR against the Appellant. None of the earlier

charge-sheets attribute the offences to an “organised crime syndicate” or

alleges commission “as a member of” such syndicate or “on behalf of” such

syndicate. The foundational requirement of “continuing unlawful activity”

under Section 2(1)(d) of MCOCA is therefore, lacking. The record is also

bereft of material demonstrating an organised structure, hierarchy,

leadership, or operational linkage connecting the Appellant to an organised

crime syndicate, which is the sine qua non for invocation of MCOCA.

Reliance is placed on the decisions of the Bombay High Court in Prafulla &

CRL.A. 1543/2025 Page 5 of 18

Ors. v. State of Maharashtra

4

and State of Maharashtra v. Rahul

Ramchandra Taru.

5

3.5. In the absence of the statutory prerequisite under Section 2(1)(d), the

approval dated 25

th

August, 2025 and the consequential invocation of the

provisions of the MCOCA are without sanction of law. This approval order

rests on misleading and non-existent facts, with particular focus on the

penultimate paragraph, which records conclusions unsupported by the case

record and reflects non-application of mind at the level of the Competent

Authority.

3.6. The financial trail relied upon by the prosecution is speculative and

unfounded. First, the Kotak Mahindra Bank account in the Appellant’s name

allegedly reflects credits aggregating about ₹71,00,000/- over approximately

28 months, yet the prosecution has not collected any evidence to connect

these credits with the alleged heroin trade. Second, the account in the name

of “Ankush Tukaramji Bhowate” has no nexus with the Appellant. The

Appellant’s explanation that the inflows were related to “online gaming” has

not been examined, with no enquiry undertaken to verify or rule out that

explanation.

3.7. The case against the Appellant rests substantially on disclosure

statements of co-accused; however, such material cannot carry the

prosecution case, in light of the decision of the Supreme Court in Tofan

Singh v. State of Tamil Nadu.

6

3.8. Since the recovery was held, at the stage of framing of charge, to be

4

Criminal Appeals Nos. 664, 665, 717 of 2002 and 86, 89, 93 and 215/2003, decided on 18

th

November,

2008.

5

Criminal Appeal No. 239 of 2011, decided on 6

th

May, 2011.

6

(2021) 4 SCC 1.

CRL.A. 1543/2025 Page 6 of 18

below “commercial quantity”, the rigour of Section 37 of the NDPS Act is

inapplicable.

3.9. MCOCA, as a special statute, is intended for organised crime

syndicates operating through violence, threat, intimidation or other unlawful

means for pecuniary gain. The present prosecution, does not disclose those

essential features.

3.10. No prior criminal antecedents or convictions are attributed to the

Appellant. The mere existence of pending cases against family members,

without any independent material linking the Appellant, cannot constitute a

valid basis for invoking the provisions of the MCOCA against her.

3.11. The impugned order proceeds on an erroneous application of Section

21(4) of MCOCA. The record discloses reasonable grounds to believe that

the Appellant is not guilty and that she is unlikely to commit any offence

while on bail.

3.12. Co-accused Amit stands charged under Section 21(b) of the NDPS

Act and has been granted regular bail. Parity is claimed on that footing.

4. Per contra, Mr. Aman Usman, APP for the State, supports the

impugned order and opposes bail on the following grounds:

4.1. The appeal is confined to Section 12 of MCOCA. The challenge

before this Court, therefore, must be tested within the limited contours of

appellate interference, namely whether the impugned order suffers from

perversity or patent illegality.

4.2. The Trial Court has already examined the objections pertaining to

maintainability and rejected them by a reasoned discussion (recorded in

Paragraph Nos. 19 to 21 of the impugned order). This determination is

founded on cogent and sound reasoning and, therefore, warrants no

CRL.A. 1543/2025 Page 7 of 18

interference by this Court.

4.3. The argument that the Appellant’s name does not appear in the initial

proposal, or that she has no prior involvement, is misplaced. MCOCA is

invoked against the “organised crime syndicate” as an entity. Individual

roles emerge during investigation. Reliance is placed on the decision in

Zakir Abdul Mirajkar v. State of Maharashtra,

7

where the Supreme Court

observed that an approval under Section 23(1)(a) “need not name every

accused person at the outset”, since the provision concerns recording

information about the commission of organised crime, not an exhaustive list

of offenders.

4.4. On facts, the Appellant is projected as an active syndicate member

performing the role of a financial handler, dealing with proceeds and ill-

gotten wealth. The statutory requirement of multiple charge-sheets within

the preceding ten years attaches to the syndicate and not to each member.

Five NDPS cases exist against the syndicate allegedly run by co-accused and

absconder Kusum, and cognisance has been taken in more than one charge-

sheet within the preceding ten years, meeting the threshold.

4.5. The antecedent history attributed to Kusum, includes two convictions:

(i) FIR No. 57/2006, P.S. Narcotics Branch, resulting in conviction dated 5

th

December, 2009 under Section 21(b) of the NDPS Act; and

(ii) FIR No. 11/2012, P.S. Crime Branch, resulting in conviction dated 20

th

January, 2015 under Section 21(c) of the NDPS Act.

4.6. The seizure in the present case has been effected from the dwelling

house associated with Kusum and the Appellant, in the presence of co-

accused Amit, which, furnishes the syndicate linkage. Reliance is also

CRL.A. 1543/2025 Page 8 of 18

placed on financial material to show substantial unexplained inflows in the

Appellant’s bank account, exceeding a crore, reflected across multiple dates

and tranches, with no lawful source of income commensurate with such

deposits.

4.7. Four protected witnesses, examined under Section 164 of the Code of

Criminal Procedure, 1973

8

(now Section 183 of the Bharatiya Nagarik

Suraksha Sanhita, 2023

9

), have attributed a role to the Appellant in handling

and routing cash proceeds from sale of smack into bank deposits. One

protected witness claimed that, after registration of the case, the Appellant

concealed her Fortuner vehicle.

4.8. Reliance is also placed on confessional statements of co-accused Ravi

@ Sunny and Hari Om recorded under Section 18 of MCOCA, which are

admissible under the special statute, and reinforce the Appellant’s role as a

financial handler within the organised drug nexus.

4.9. The objection founded on Section 193 BNSS is opposed on the

footing that the chargesheet filed against co-accused Amit itself recorded

that investigation concerning associates was ongoing. On this construction,

the investigation was never treated as closed. Requirement of leave under

Section 193 BNSS is attracted where, after completion of investigation and

taking of cognizance, and during trial, the investigating agency seeks to

recommence further investigation on its own. Reliance is placed on

Vinubhai Haribhai Malaviya v. State of Gujarat.

10

4.10. The Appellant fails the statutory test under Section 21(4) of MCOCA.

7

(2023) 20 SCC 408.

8

“Cr.P.C.”

9

“BNSS”

10

(2019) 17 SCC 1.

CRL.A. 1543/2025 Page 9 of 18

The record demonstrates substantial material indicating active involvement,

including protected witness statements, Section 18 confessions, and

corroborative financial and documentary evidence. The apprehension of

influencing witnesses, with reliance placed on the statement of protected

witness “A” regarding likelihood of intimidation or interference if the

Appellant is released, is genuine and real. In these circumstances, the twin

conditions for bail under MCOCA are not satisfied and the impugned order

warrants no interference.

Analysis

5. Bail under MCOCA stands on a distinct footing. Section 21(4) of the

Act imposes twin conditions: the material on record must disclose

reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of the offence

alleged, and that the accused is not likely to commit any offence while on

bail. The Supreme Court has consistently treated this threshold as exacting,

and qualitatively different from the ordinary discretion that governs bail

under the general law.

6. Set against the rigour of Section 21(4), the Appellant’s contentions

can be grouped under three heads: (i) maintainability and very invocation of

MCOCA, including the lack of fulfilment of “continuing unlawful activity”

and the approval order, (ii) the challenge founded on Section 193 BNSS, and

(iii) the bail merits under Section 21(4), including the attack on admissibility

of material and the plea of parity.

Challenge to invocation of MCOCA and “continuing unlawful activity”

7. The objection that the Appellant was not named in the initial proposal,

coupled with the plea of absence of antecedents, cannot, without more,

render the invocation of MCOCA invalid. The Supreme Court in Zakir

CRL.A. 1543/2025 Page 10 of 18

Abdul Mirajkar has clarified that an approval under Section 23(1)(a) “need

not name every accused person at the outset”, since the information recorded

is about the commission of organised crime, and the identity and roles of

other participants may surface in investigation. The statute targets organised

crime carried out by an organised crime syndicate. Individual participation is

then assessed on the material collected.

11

8. The second limb of the same argument is that the statutory

requirement of “more than one charge-sheet” in the preceding ten years must

be satisfied qua the Appellant individually. That submission does not accord

with the settled position. Zakir Abdul Mirajkar holds that the requirement

attaches to the organised crime syndicate and not to each individual alleged

to be a member. In the present case, the prosecution case, as noted by the

Trial Court, is that the organised crime syndicate is being operated by the

Appellant’s mother, Kusum, and that multiple NDPS cases have been

registered against the said syndicate, with cognisance taken in more than one

charge-sheet within the relevant statutory period. At this stage, it is not

decisive whether every earlier charge-sheet employs the precise expression

“organised crime syndicate”. The inquiry is whether the material on record

viewed prima facie, satisfies the statutory ingredients, with the prior cases

supplying the predicate pattern of “continuing unlawful activity”.

9. Reliance on Bombay High Court decision in Suraj Laxman Gade v.

State of Maharashtra

12

does not carry the Appellant far. There the Court

granted bail as the accused was, prima facie, implicated only in a solitary

offence, was not shown to be acting in concert with the alleged gang leader,

11

See also: Vinod G. Asrani v. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 3 SCC 633.

12

BAIL APPLN NO. 445/2020, decided on 13

th

July, 2021.

CRL.A. 1543/2025 Page 11 of 18

and the material did not disclose the essential features of an operative

organised crime syndicate. The present case stands on a materially different

plane. The prosecution attributes to the Appellant a continuing role within a

family-run syndicate, supported prima facie by the financial trail, protected-

witness statements and the Section 18 confession. The cited decision is,

therefore, distinguishable on facts.

10. The Appellant’s reliance on decisions suggesting that earlier charge-

sheets “without syndicate linkage” cannot be counted for Section 2(1)(d)

may require scrutiny at the appropriate stage where the legality of

invocation, approval, sanction and the statutory ingredients is examined on a

complete record. At this stage, the inquiry is narrower. Unless the invocation

is shown to be ex facie barred, a detailed evaluation of the adequacy of

predicate cases would inevitably drift into a mini-trial. The multiple prior

cases attributed to the projected syndicate within the statutory window

satisfies the threshold for the limited purpose of deciding bail.

11. The Appellant’s plea of mala fides and “settling scores” is not

founded on any tangible material. Bail adjudication does not proceed on

conjecture about motive. Where the record discloses independent material

supporting the prosecution version, allegations of vendetta do not dislodge

the statutory bar.

12. Further, the attack on the approval dated 25

th

August, 2025 as

reflecting non-application of mind and reliance on “non-existent facts” is

also, at this stage, insufficient to cross the threshold of interference. The

order of approval is not being tested here as though the Court is exercising

writ review. The pertinent question is whether the Trial Court’s reliance on

the existence of an approval and the ‘continuing unlawful activity’ material

CRL.A. 1543/2025 Page 12 of 18

is so plainly untenable that the bail rejection becomes perverse. The

impugned order does not show such perversity.

Section 193 BNSS objection

13. The Appellant argues that once the charge-sheet was filed and charges

were framed against co-accused Amit, the investigating agency could not

proceed further under MCOCA without first securing leave under Section

193 of the BNSS. The State responds that the charge-sheet itself recorded

continuing investigation qua associates and that what followed is further

investigation within the statutory framework.

14. The legal position admits little doubt. The Supreme Court, in

Hasanbhai Valibhai Qureshi v. State of Gujarat,

13

recognises that further

investigation under Section 173(8) Cr.P.C. can be undertaken even after

cognisance has been taken on an earlier police report, the object being to

reach the truth and do real and substantial as well as effective justice.

Further, in Vinubhai Haribhai Malaviya, the Supreme Court held that

further investigation even after cognisance is within the statutory scheme, to

ensure a fair and complete investigation. The BNSS carries the same

principle in Section 193(9), while adding a calibrated control: “further

investigation during the trial” requires permission of the Court trying the

case. On the present record, the prosecution maintains that the MCOCA

investigation into the wider network and the financial trail is still unfolding

and had not reached the stage where the proviso is triggered.

15. In any event, a grievance about the mode or timing of further

investigation is to be tested in accordance with law at the appropriate stage.

It does not, by itself, satisfy the stringent threshold of Section 21(4) of

CRL.A. 1543/2025 Page 13 of 18

MCOCA. To translate such a procedural objection into bail, the Appellant

must show an infirmity so fundamental that it strikes at the root of the

prosecution case at the threshold. The present record does not disclose any

such fatality.

Bail merits under Section 21(4) MCOCA

16. The crucial question remains thus: whether the record yields

reasonable grounds to believe that the Appellant is not guilty of the offences

alleged under MCOCA and that she is unlikely to commit any offence while

on bail. It is trite that, at the stage of considering bail, the Court is not

expected to undertake a detailed or exhaustive appraisal of the evidence, as

such an exercise would verge upon a mini-trial. Nonetheless, where the very

foundation of the prosecution rests on the Appellant’s alleged role within an

organised crime syndicate, a calibrated scrutiny is unavoidable. The record

must, therefore, be examined to the limited extent necessary to apply Section

21(4) and to test whether the Appellant can cross the statutory threshold.

17. The case against the Appellant, at this stage, is sought to be made out

through several pieces of evidence collected during investigation. First, the

recovery of psychotropic substances is stated to have been effected at the

instance of co-accused Amit from the dwelling house associated with the

Appellant and Kusum. That circumstance supplies, at the least, a prima facie

connective thread between the Appellant’s premises and the alleged

syndicate activity. The prosecution also points to pecuniary benefit flowing

from the enterprise, including proceeds said to be routed to the Appellant

and reference to rental income from a shop in Sultanpuri standing in the

name of Kusum.

13

(2004) 5 SCC 347.

CRL.A. 1543/2025 Page 14 of 18

18. Second, the material on record reflects substantial and repeated cash

and IMPS deposits in the Appellant’s bank account across different dates

and tranches, stated to aggregate to a significant amount, with no

commensurate lawful source disclosed. One independent witness, ‘HR’, in

his statement recorded under Section 183 BNSS, claimed that the Appellant

requested him to deposit large sums of cash into his account and thereafter

transfer the same to her account, stating that approximately ₹25-26 lakhs

were routed in this manner. He further alleged that upon his refusal to

continue, the Appellant threatened to falsely implicate him. Another witness

alleged that the Appellant was engaged in the supply of smack and had

asked him to conceal a Fortuner vehicle, stated to be part of the proceeds of

crime. Additional witnesses have similarly alleged that the Appellant and

her family were involved in the sale of smack and that they had deposited

several lakhs of rupees into the bank accounts of the Appellant and her

family members, which deposits are stated to be corroborated by UPI

transaction records.

19. Third, reliance has been placed on the confessional statement of co-

accused Ravi @ Sunny recorded under Section 18 of the MCOCA, wherein

the Appellant and co-accused Deepa are alleged to have facilitated the

routing of ill-gotten cash through their bank accounts. Co-accused Hariom,

brother of Kusum, is also stated to have disclosed his association with the

Appellant’s family and their involvement in the sale of smack, admitting to

having deposited cash into his bank account and transferring the same to the

accused. He further disclosed that Kusum had purchased a property for

₹20,00,000/- from proceeds generated through the sale of narcotics, prima

facie, satisfying the requirement of pecuniary gain and economic advantage

CRL.A. 1543/2025 Page 15 of 18

under the definition of organised crime.

20. Fourth, the impugned order records alleged non-cooperation by the

Appellant during police custody remand in relation to banking transactions,

coupled with an apprehension of witness influence and evidence tampering.

The prosecution has also pointed out that the Appellant remained

absconding for a period, leading to the issuance of non-bailable warrants

against her.

21. The Appellant seeks to discredit this material by characterising it as

nothing more than co-accused disclosures, and by invoking Tofan Singh,

That decision, however, concerns confessions recorded under Section 67 of

the NDPS Act and the consequent bar on using such confessions when

recorded by officers treated as “police officers” for the purposes of Section

25 of the Evidence Act. The present prosecution, however, is not pitched on

disclosures alone. It relies, in express terms, on protected witness statements

recorded before a Court under Section 183 of the BNSS, and on a

confessional statement recorded under Section 18 of MCOCA. Both rest on

a distinct statutory footing. Zakir Abdul Mirajkar also recognises the

evidentiary regime contemplated by MCOCA in relation to Section 18

confessions. The weight and eventual admissibility of such material will, no

doubt, be examined at trial in accordance with law. At the bail stage,

however, the Court cannot treat Tofan Singh as an all-purpose answer that

eclipses the statutory framework under which the prosecution has placed this

material on record.

22. The Appellant also draws attention to the NDPS Court having treated

the recovery as “intermediate quantity”, resulting in framing of charge under

Section 21(b) of the NDPS Act, and contends that the embargo under

CRL.A. 1543/2025 Page 16 of 18

Section 37 NDPS is therefore inapplicable. Even assuming that position, it

does not answer the present application. The restriction under MCOCA is

independent and more exacting. Once MCOCA is invoked and the

prosecution places prima facie material indicating organised crime activity,

bail must be tested on the twin conditions in Section 21(4), and not on the

absence of the NDPS embargo.

23. The plea of parity with co-accused Amit is equally unavailing. Parity

is not a rule of thumb. The prosecution attributes to the Appellant a distinct

role as a financial handler, supported, prima facie, by the protected witness

material, the Section 18 confessions and the financial trail. Co-accused Amit

is stated to have been granted bail prior to invocation of MCOCA. The

Appellant, by contrast, must surmount the rigours of Section 21(4). The

comparative roles, the nature of material, and the governing statutory bar,

therefore, displace the parity argument.

24. The Appellant’s explanation about “online gaming” and the

contention that the deposits lack a direct nexus with narcotics proceeds may

bear on the final appraisal. At this stage, however, the enquiry is narrower:

whether the material on record furnishes reasonable grounds to believe that

the Appellant is not guilty. On the prosecution case as it stands, the pattern

of unexplained inflows, the protected witness account of cash being routed

for online transfers, and the Section 18 confession relied upon by the

investigating agency cohere into a prima facie narrative that does not permit

the Court to record the satisfaction mandated by Section 21(4) in the

Appellant’s favour.

25. The prosecution’s apprehension of influencing witnesses and

tampering cannot be treated as a mere incantation. In prosecutions of this

CRL.A. 1543/2025 Page 17 of 18

nature, where the evidentiary chain depends significantly on witnesses

connected with deposits, transfers, and the flow of proceeds, the

prosecution’s concern that release may obstruct the investigation and the fair

progress of the case is not without substance.

26. Lastly, the Appellant’s reliance on the decision of the Bombay High

Court in Dinesh Bhondulal Baisware v. State of Maharashtra

14

is equally

misplaced. In that case, the Court recorded its satisfaction with regard to the

second limb of Section 21(4) on the ground that the predicate offences, on

the basis of which MCOCA was invoked, were committed by the accused in

his individual capacity and not as part of any organised crime syndicate. In

the present case, however, although no prior FIR is registered against the

Appellant in her personal capacity, the material on record prima facie

indicates that she was an active member of the organised crime syndicate

run by her mother, Kusum, that she derived pecuniary benefit from the sale

of contraband, and that she participated in the concealment and routing of

the proceeds of crime. The factual matrix, therefore, stands on an entirely

different footing, rendering the aforesaid decision inapplicable and of no

assistance to the Appellant.

27. One aspect warrants clarification, though it does not change the result.

The impugned order uses the expression “initial stage of investigation” in

Paragraph No. 20. The record placed in the opening narrative shows filing of

the NDPS charge-sheet against Amit and framing of charge thereon. The

phrase is best understood as referring to the MCOCA investigation and the

broader organised crime inquiry, including financial and syndicate aspects,

which the prosecution asserts are still unfolding. Read in that manner, the

CRL.A. 1543/2025 Page 18 of 18

Trial Court’s reasoning remains coherent.

Conclusion

28. The record does not disclose reasonable grounds for believing that the

Appellant is not guilty of the offences alleged under MCOCA. The

apprehension of witness influence and tampering also can also not be

discounted at this stage. The twin conditions under Section 21(4) are,

therefore, not satisfied.

29. The appeal is dismissed.

30. It is clarified that any observations made in the present order are for

the purpose of deciding the present appeal and should not influence the

outcome of the trial and also not be taken as an expression of opinion on the

merits of the case.

31. Disposed of, along with pending application.

SANJEEV NARULA, J

JANUARY 06, 2026

nk

14

2016 SCC OnLine Bom 4788.

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