2026 INSC 592 1

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2026

(Arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 38500 OF 2025)

ARJUN DASS …APPELLANT

VERSUS

THE STATE OF ANDHRA

PRADESH AND ORS. ...RESPONDENT S

J U D G M E N T

J.K. MAHESHWARI , J.

1. Leave Granted.

2. This Appeal has been preferred assailing the final

judgement of High Court of Andhra Pradesh (hereinafter,

‘High Court’) dated 09.05.2025 in CMA No. 538 of 2023,

whereby order dated 24.11.2023 of the Dharmika

Parishad, Endowments Department, Vijayawada, Andhra

Pradesh (hereinafter, Dharmika Parishad’), G.O.Ms. No.

581 of 2023 dated 08.12.2023 under section 51(4) of the

Andhra Pradesh Charitable and Hindu Religious

REPORTABLE

2

Institutions and Endowments Act, 1987 (hereinafter,

‘1987 Act’) by the Revenue (Endowments-II) Department,

Government of Andhra Pradesh, as well as order dated

19.01.2024 were affirmed by the High Court.

3. In the present Appeal, the Appellant is the

incumbent Mathadhipathi

1 of Sri Swamy Hathiramji Mutt,

Tirupathi, Andhra Pradesh (hereinafter, ‘Mutt’), who is

aggrieved by his removal from the post of Mathadhipathi

of the Mutt as well as subsequent appointment of one Shri

Om Prakash as interim Mahant or Fit Person. Respondent

No. 1 is the State of Andhra Pradesh and Respondent No.

2 is the Dharmik Parishad. Respondent Nos. 3-5 are the

Commissioner of Endowments, Regional Joint

Commissioner of Endowments and the Mutt, respectively,

whose action has been challenged.

FACTUAL BACKDROP

4. The fact of the present Appeal finds its inception

back in the year 1970. As per the Appellant, he has been

associated with the Mutt since the year 1970. The

Appellant was a disciple of his Guru, Sri Devender Dassji

1

Also known as Mahant

3

Varu, the then Mathadhipati. In the year 1975, he was

appointed as Pujari. With time, he rose through the ranks,

and was appointed as Adhikari in 1985, and then Interim

Mahant in the year 1990.

Appointment as Mahant and related Proceedings

5. The Akhil Bharatiya Sri Panch Digambar Ani

Akhada, Nasik (hereinafter, ‘Akhada Panchayat’), which

is the apex organization of Hindu Sants, Sadhus and

Mahants, in its meeting held on 01.11.1999 confirmed the

Appellant as the only surviving disciple of his guru and

being fully qualified and eligible, therefore, appointed as

the permanent Mahant of the Mutt vide the order passed

by Respondent No. 3 on 06.07.2000 (hereinafter,

‘Appointment Order’) under Section 53(1) of the 1987

Act.

6. On 08.10.2000, the Akhada Panchayat met on the

occasion of the Pattabhishekam of the Appellant and

declared him as the 21

st Mahant of the Mutt.

7. It is borne from the records that in the year 2002,

soon after his appointment, the Appellant filed W.P. No.

4

4326 of 2002 in which it was prayed that the endowments

department be made to handover the secular affairs of the

Mutt to him as certain government officers continued to be

in-charge of the Mutt property even after his appointment.

Since this writ petition filed by the Appellant was pending,

the Endowments department set-aside the Appointment of

Mathadhipathi vide order dated 10.07.2003 in revision

proceedings initiated suo motu. Being dissatisfied of the

setting aside of the Appointment Order, the Appellant filed

W.P. No. 14856 of 2003 before the High Court. Learned

Single Judge of the High Court allowed both the writ

petitions vide a common judgment dated 27.01.2006,

setting aside the order dated 10.07.2003 directing the

revenue authorities to handover the secular affairs of the

Mutt to the Appellant. Aggrieved, W.A. Nos. 258 and 259

of 2006 was preferred by the authorities. During the

pendency of the writ appeals, the Division Bench of the

High Court, by its interim order dated 07.09.2006, vacated

the status-quo granted vide its earlier order dated

13.03.2006 and observed that if the property of the Mutt

continues to remain in the hands of the officers of the

5

government, there are possibilities that the property will

be frittered away and by the time appeal is decided,

nothing would be left. At this stage, it is imperative to note

that the writ appeals, i.e., W.A. Nos. 258 and 259 of 2006,

are still pending for consideration before the High Court.

8. In compliance of the above directions, the

Government of Andhra Pradesh issued G.O.Ms.No.1678

dated 14.11.2006, directing the Commissioner of

Endowments to hand over the management of secular

affairs of the Mutt, including its properties, to the

Appellant.

2017-18 Suspension Proceedings

9. On 28.12.2017, some reports were published in one

Mayavi Newspaper regarding misconduct done by the

appellant regarding management of the Mutt. Vide order

dated 28.12.2017 the Respondent no. 4 issued an enquiry

notice against the Appellant on the basis of the afore-

stated news publications. Later, vide Memo No.

959404/Endt-II/2017 dated 02.01.2018, Respondent no.

1 wrote a letter to the Respondent no. 3, requesting to

6

examine representations filed by Shri Arun Dass (a former

Pujari) and Shri D Nagarjurna Sharma, in relation to

allegations made against the Appellant. Aggrieved by the

enquiry notice and the memo, the Appellant filed W.P. No.

9716 of 2018. Learned Single Judge granted interim relief

in favour of the Appellant by its order dated 03.04.2018

and suspended the consequent proceedings. Later, W.P.

No. 9716 of 2018 was dismissed as infructuous vide order

dated 15.09.2023.

10. Notwithstanding the continuation of the interim

order dated 03.04.2018 in W.P. No. 9716 of 2018 , the

Commissioner of Endowments passed an order dated

28.01.2020 suspending the Appellant from the office of

Mahant by framing 24 charges. Aggrieved thereby, the

Appellant filed W.P. No. 2391 of 2020 challenging the said

suspension order. The High Court, vide order dated

10.02.2020, allowed the Appellant to continue as

Mathadhipati, the challenge against this interim order

filed by the Dharmika Parishad travelled up to this Court,

which was dismissed and therefore, the order dated

10.02.2020 attained finality. Ultimately, the High Court

7

allowed W.P. No. 2391 of 2020 on 13.04.2023, setting

aside the suspension order and remitted the matter to the

Dharmika Parishad to proceed and take action in

accordance with law, if so advised.

Appointment of Screening Committee and Related

Proceedings

11. While W.P. No. 9716 of 2018 and W.P. No. 2391 of

2020 were pending before the High Court, the Respondent

no. 1 issued order dated 24.12.2021, appointing a

screening committee to look after the day-to-day affairs of

the Mutt.

12. Challenging the order dated 24.12.2021, the

Appellant filed W.P. No. 707 of 2022. However, vide order

dated 07.01.2022, this writ petition was closed on the

basis of statement of the counsel for the Endowments

Department that there is no proposal at that point of time

for appointment of screening committee or preparation of

a scheme. While closing the writ petition, the learned

Single Judge left it open to the Appellant to again file

appropriate proceedings in case any action is initiated.

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Constitution of Dharmika Parishad and Consequent Charge

Framing and Suspension Proceedings

13. It is pertinent to note at this stage that the State

Government of Andhra Pradesh, vide G.O.Ms. No. 571

dated 13.08.2022, constituted the Dharmika Parishad for

a period of three years comprising 21 members under

Section 152 of the 1987 Act. All 21 members of the said

Parishad are either ex-officio State functionaries or

nominees of the State Government. The Appellant has also

challenged the vires of Section 152 of the 1987 Act

separately in W.P. No. 16954 of 2023, which is pending

before the High Court as on the date of this judgment.

14. Subsequently, the Dharmika Parishad convened a

meeting on 09.05.2023, in which it authorized the legal

advisor to prepare charges and suspension proceedings in

consultation with the Advocate General against the

Appellant while relying on order of the High Court dated

13.04.2023 in W.P. No. 2391 of 2023. Relevant portion of

the resolution reads as thus:

“The Dharmika Parishad has unanimously resolved that

the Legal Advisor, Endowments is hereby authorised to

prepare charges and suspension proceedings in

consultation with Advocate General against to the Sri

Arjun Dass, present Mahant, Sri Swamy Hathiramji Mutt,

9

Tirupathi. The Commissioner/Member Secretary is hereby

authorised to place Sri Arjundass, present Mahanth under

suspension duly keeping a suitable officer as an

Administrative Officer of the Mutt for day-to-day

administration of the Mutt as provided u/s 52 of the Act

and to appoint an enquiry officer to enquire into the

charges framed against Sri Arjun Dass. The Member

Secretary concluded the meeting accordingly.”

15. Pursuant to the above resolution, on 08.06.2023,

the Dharmika Parishad passed the following three orders

simultaneously and on the same date:

(a) Order bearing Rc.No.DP1/19027(37)/8/2018 -1

dated 08.06.2023 framing sixteen (16 ) charges

against the Appellant;

(b) Order suspending the Appellant from the office of

Mathadhipati; and

(c) Order appointing an administrator called the ‘Fit

Person’.

Pursuant to this, the Endowments Department physically

seized the Mutt office as well as the appellant’s residence

on 08.06.2023 itself.

16. Aggrieved by these orders passed on 08.06.2023,

the Appellant filed W.P. No. 13919 of 2023. On

26.06.2023, counter affidavit was filed in this writ petition.

10

Later, vide order dated 04.10.2023, learned Single Judge

dismissed this writ petition. Writ Appeal No. 1080 of 2023,

preferred against the order in the writ petition, is still

pending as on date of this judgment.

17. During pendency of this writ petition and in

pursuance to the charge-memo dated 08.06.2023, the

Dharmika Parishad issued notice dated 14.07.2023

whereby the Appellant was directed to appear before a

three-member committee for enquiry on 19.07.2023. This

notice was served to the Appellant through WhatsApp.

18. The Appellant, through his Advocate, sent three

separate communications in reply, each of which is of

significance. The first, dated 17.07.2023, was sent by

email to all the concerned authorities. It was informed to

the Dharmika Parishad that:

(a) W.P. No. 13919 of 2023 was pending before the High

Court;

(b) The Appellant, aged 67 years, having been

unceremoniously expelled from the Mutt premises

while on pilgrimage, had fallen ill with viral fever at

Ayodhya;

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(c) The entire record of the Mutt was seized and in

possession of the Respondents; and

(d) None of the documents forming the basis of the

charge memo had been furnished to the Appellant.

The Appellant requested that all documents be supplied

and one month's time be granted to submit a statement of

defence, and that in the meanwhile the enquiry be

deferred.

19. The second communication was a legal notice dated

24.07.2023, personally delivered to the office of the

Dharmika Parishad by the Appellant's Advocate, who

obtained an acknowledgement bearing E. No.

7664237/2023. The third was an email dated 31.07.2023,

reiterating the earlier request.

Enquiry Committee Report and Removal Order

20. The Enquiry Committee concluded its enquiry on

19.07.2023 and submitted its report on 01.08.2023. For

sake of convenience, a summary of all the charges with

respective findings are produced in a tabulated format as

follows:

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S. No. Charges Findings

1. The appellant entered into a sale agreement

on 23.03.2009 with M/S Billiyards Farms

Pvt. Ltd. to sell away mutt property under

Sy. Nos. 13, 15, 17, 3 & 5 at Avilala Village

for Rs. 16 Cr. without following the

procedure laid down u/s 80 of 1987 Act

Proved

2. Acquired immovable properties in his

personal name in Madhya Pradesh during

tenure as Mahant

Proved

3. Misappropriated Mutt funds by depositing in

personal FDRs during demonetization

period

Proved

4. Violated monastic custom by maintaining

wife (Smt. Ramavathi) and son (Boludass),

contrary to eligibility norms

Proved

5. Maintained immoral relationship with Hema

Maheswari and executed MoU dated

04.12.2007, violating Mutt Parampara

Proved

6. Appointed family members in branch Mutts

without permission

Proved

7. Nepotistic appointments in branch Mutts

without statutory approval

Proved

8. Failed to appraise gold and silver ornaments

of the Mutts

Proved

9. Violated statutory rules regarding jewellery

verification

Proved

10. Delayed statutory employee benefits

(increments, DA, surrender leave, PRC

fixation)

Proved

11. Failed to comply with High Court judgement

dated 13.06.2013 in Second Appeal No.

606/1999, 443, 468 and 472 of 2000

Proved

13

12. Failed to pay statutory dues to Endowments

Department

Proved

13. Failed to protect Mutt properties and allowed

encroachments

Proved

14. Failed to safeguard Mutt properties insofar

failed to get adequate lease/license fee for

subject properties

Proved

15. Failed to defend various court cases properly

despite Commissioner’s Memo dated

09.02.2023

Proved

16. Negligent litigation management causing

prejudice to Mutt

Proved

21. Vide show cause notice dated 19.10.2023,

Dharmika Parishad sought explanation from the

Appellant, calling him to submit explanation within 15

days from the date of receipt of the notice as to why

punishment should not be imposed on him as per

provisions of the 1987 Act and extant rules and in case he

fails to do so, further action shall be taken on the basis of

the material available on record. On 03.11.2023, the

Appellant submitted his explanation and on 16.11.2023,

he requested Dharmika Parishad to conduct enq uiry

afresh after supplying the documents. Finally, on

24.11.2023, Dharmika Parishad passed an order for

removal (hereinafter, ‘Removal Order’) of the Appellant

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under Section 51(2) of the 1987 Act. While passing the

Removal Order, the Dharmika Parishad found all the

charges to be proved and in conclusion, directed the

Appellant to handover the complete charge of the Mutt and

its movable and immovable properties to the Fit Person of

the said Mutt immediately. Revenue (Endowments -II)

Department, Government of Andhra Pradesh confirmed

the Removal Order passed by the Dharmika Parishad vide

G.O.Ms. No. 581 dated 08.12.2023. Subsequently, order

dated 19.01.2024 was also issued by the Dharmika

Parishad regarding the appointment of one interim

Mahant.

22. The Appellant filed Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No.

538 of 2023 before the High Court under Section 51(4) of

the 1987 Act, challenging the Removal O rder dated

24.11.2023, G.O.Ms. No. 581 dated 08.12.2023 and the

consequential order dated 19.01.2024 issued by the

Dharmika Parishad directing identification of a new

Mathadhipati. The High Court granted interim protection

to the Appellant by a detailed order dated 16.02.2024.

After hearing the matter at length, the High Court, by the

15

impugned judgment dated 09.05.2025, dismissed C.M.A.

No. 538 of 2023, upholding the removal of the Appellant.

Findings of the High Court can be summarized as follows:

(a) Appellant did not make any specific denial to the

averment of the Respondents that all the relevant

documents and materials were supplied to the

appellant in a previous writ petition i.e., W.P. No.

13919 of 2023.

(b) The manner in which the Appellant replied to the

charges in minute details, it clearly indicates that the

Appellant was served with supporting documents in

addition to the charge-memo.

(c) True intent of serving the charge -memo and

supporting documents was complied in the present

case. Hence, principles of natural justice was

followed.

(d) The appellant was duly represented before the

Dharmik Parishad and therefore, he cannot contend

this plea successfully.

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(e) Charge no. 1 is not sound as no final sale ever took

place. The proposed sale was under consideration

before the High Court and was cancelled by forfeiting

the advance amount of sale. Charge 4 of violation of

celibacy was held to be not proved. Charge 13 relating

to increase in encroachments was also held to be not

proved as there was no actual survey conducted at

the time of taking charge of the properties of the Mutt

by the Appellant.

(f) In regard to other charges, the High Court affirmed

the findings of the Dharmik Parishad.

Aggrieved by these findings, the Appellant has preferred

the present Appeal.

23. This Court issued notice in this Appeal vide order

dated 17.12.2025 and stayed the operation of the

impugned order as well as the removal order. In the

interregnum, I.A. No. 43904 of 2026 was filed by the

Respondents seeking to vacate the stay, which was

dismissed by order dated 27.02.2026. On the same day,

while entertaining I.A. No. 19343 of 2026 seeking a

direction regarding implementation of stay order by

17

restoring status quo ante and handing over charge of the

office of Mathadhipathi to the Appellant, the interim

protection was continued subject to conditions that the

Appellant shall not dispose of any properties of the Mutt,

and shall maintain accounts and expenditure details to be

produced as and when directed by this Court.

Subsequently, arguments of both the parties were heard

at length on 20

th May, 2026 and it was reserved for the

judgment.

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

24. Mr. Puneet Jain, learned Senior counsel appearing

for the Appellant, contended as follows:

24.1. The first and most fundamental infirmity in the

present proceedings is the non-supply of the complete

charge memo and the 29 relied-upon documents before

and at the time of the enquiry. The charge memo of 27

pages is accompanied by 29 supporting documents

running over to 600 pages. The right to respond to a

charge, guaranteed by Section 51(2) of the 1987 Act, has

been rendered nugatory because of the conduct of the

Dharmik Parishad.

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24.2. On the alleged service by affixation, it was

submitted that the Panchanama dated 09.06.2023 and

the photographs dated 08.06.2023 and 09.06.2023, filed

by the Respondents themselves, reveal that only six pages

of relevant orders were affixed on the gate of the Mutt,

where the ppellant used to reside. Those six pages were

confined to the Fit Person's appointment order. This is not

a disputed fact as it emerges from the Respondents’ own

documents. Moreover, as on the date of the alleged

affixation, the physical possession of the Mutt premises

including the Appellant’s residence had already been

taken over by the Endowments Department on 08.06.2023

itself.

24.3. On the alleged service by email, it is submitted that

the email was sent to the institutional Mutt email address

hathiramjimutt@yahoo.com on 08 -09.06.2023 i.e., the

day on which the Fit Person was appointed to take charge

of the Mutt. By 13.06.2023, the Fit Person had assumed

charge of all Mutt functions including, the Mutt email

account. Whether the Appellant received or had access to

19

this email after his dispossession from the Mutt is, at the

very least, not established by the Respondents.

24.4. The Respondents’ further contention, as accepted

by the High Court, that the documents were supplied as

annexures to the counter affidavit filed in W.P. No. 13919

of 2023 and therefore the Appellant “must have” had them,

is, with respect, a non sequitur. The counter affidavit was

filed in the High Court writ petition. Even assuming the

Appellant received those documents through that channel,

the supply occurred after the Enquiry Committee had

already concluded the enquiry on 19.07.2023.

24.5. The High Court's finding, that “the way in which the

Appellant answered each charge with reference to

supporting documents in minute detail clearly indicates

that the Appellant was served with the supporting

documents”, is based on a perverse inference.

24.6. The principle nemo judex in causa sua is not a

technical rule of procedure. Its violation does not require

proof of actual bias, reasonable apprehension of bias is

sufficient. The three members of the Enquiry Committee

who conducted the enquiry on 19.07.2023 were members

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of the very body, the Dharmika Parishad, that had on

09.05.2023 resolved, unanimously and without any

charge having yet been framed, that the Appellant would

be both charged and suspended. A member of a body that

has already collectively determined the course of action

cannot then sit as an impartial enquiry officer.

24.7. It is also urged that the Dharmika Parishad in the

present case is, by its constitution under G.O.Ms.No.571

dated 13.08.2022, composed entirely of State nominees

and ex-officio government functionaries. Where the body

that initiates removal proceedings, selects its own

members to enquire into the charges, receives the enquiry

report, and passes the final removal order is composed

entirely of agents of the State, and particularly where the

history of proceedings reveals repeated attempts by the

State to control the administration of the Mutt, there is a

conflict of interest. In this manner, entire proceeding is

coram non judice.

24.8. The appellate jurisdiction vested in the High Court

under Section 51(4) of the Act is not a mere supervisory or

certiorari-like jurisdiction. It is a full appellate jurisdiction

21

that requires the High Court to independently examine the

evidence, frame points for determination, and return

reasoned findings on each material issue. The impugned

judgment, fails to frame any point for determination and

resolve the Appellant’s specific and documented

complaints of non-supply of documents and non-grant of

opportunity. The judgment merely summarizes the

charges and the parties’ contentions, and then records a

finding that the removal order ‘cannot be set aside’,

without any independent reasoning.

24.9. Even if the charges partially affirmed by the High

Court are taken at their highest, the learned Senior

Counsel submits that the punishment of removal is

grossly disproportionate and not sustainable on the

nature of charges as pressed.

25. Per Contra, Mr. Sidharth Luthra, Senior Counsel

appearing for the Respondents, submitted as follows:

25.1. The contention of non-supply of the charge memo

and documents is factually incorrect and has been rightly

rejected by the High Court. The charge memo and all

relied-upon documents were served on the Appellant

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through (i) by affixation on the door of the appellant’s

residence under a Panchanama dated 09.06.2023 duly

recording the service; (ii) by email dated 08.06.2023 from

the office of the Commissioner of Endowments to the

Assistant Commissioner, Endowments, Tirupathi, with

direction to serve the same on the Appellant; and (iii) by

email dated 09.06.2023 from the office of the

Commissioner to the Mutt email address

hathiramjimutt@yahoo.com, which had been operated by

the Appellant till the Fit Person assumed charge on

13.06.2023.

25.2. In addition, the charge memo and all necessary

documents were annexed to the additional counter

affidavit of Respondents No. 2 and 3 filed in W.P. No.

13919 of 2023, which was the Appellant’s own challenge

to the orders dated 08.06.2023. The High Court rightly

observed that the manner in which the Appellant

addressed each of the 16 charges in minute detail, with

specific references to each supporting document,

conclusively demonstrates that he was in possession of the

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relied-upon documents at the time he submitted his

explanation.

25.3. Even if there were some delay or deficiency in

supply of documents, the same does not ipso facto vitiate

the enquiry if the person charged was not actually

prejudiced. In the present case, having regard to the

Appellant’s own replies to each charge replete with specific

references to documents and facts, the re is no

demonstrable prejudice.

25.4. The enquiry was conducted by a three -member

committee constituted under Rule 26 of the Rules framed

under G.O.Ms.No.1206 dated 25.11.2009 (Hereinafter

referred to as, ‘the 2009 Rules’), a procedure specifically

prescribed under the rules for this purpose. The

constitution of the Enquiry Committee from members of

the Dharmika Parishad is not merely permissible but is

specifically contemplated by the applicable Rules.

25.5. As to the non-participation of the Appellant in the

enquiry, the record is clear. The Appellant was duly served

with a notice dated 14.07.2023 directing him to appear on

19.07.2023. He did not appear. The only communication

24

received by the Enquiry Committee was an unsigned letter

from one Vinodini Ruth, claimed to be an advocate,

transmitted on WhatsApp to the personal mobile of one

Committee member. An unsigned letter sent on WhatsApp,

and not even directly to the Enquiry Committee, cannot

constitute a formal request for adjournment or supply of

documents in the context of statutory disciplinary

proceedings. The Enquiry Committee was accordingly

justified in proceeding ex-parte on 19.07.2023.

25.6. It is also submitted that the suspension of the

Appellant under Section 51(3) of the 1987 Act is not a

punitive step but a measure authorized by the statute to

protect the institution during the pendency of enquiry

proceedings. This Court's judgment in Lakshmi Devi

Sagar Mills Ltd. v. Ram Sarup

2 makes clear that

suspension pending enquiry is not punishment.

25.7. If there were any procedural deficiency at the stage

of the enquiry, the same was fully cured by the extensive

opportunity afforded to the Appellant at the stage of the

Dharmika Parishad’s final proceedings. The Appellant

2

(1956) 2 SCC 445

25

submitted detailed explanations to the show cause notice

on 03.11.2023 and 06.11.2023. After examination of these

explanations, the Dharmika Parishad issued a further

notice on 09.11.2023 giving the Appellant yet another

opportunity for a personal hearing on 16.11.2023. The

Appellant appeared on 16.11.2023 along with two

advocates and made oral submissions.

25.8. The removal order dated 24.11.2023 deals with

each of the Appellant’s explanations and the finding on

each charge. This is not a case of denial of hearing; it is a

case where the Appellant received repeated opportunities.

25.9. The High Court exercised full independent appellate

jurisdiction under Section 51(4) of the Act. The impugned

judgment analyses each of the 16 charges individually and

in some detail, considers the Appellant’s explanation for

each charge, and arrives at its own conclusions departing

from the Dharmika Parishad on Charges 1, 4 and 13 while

finding them not proved.

25.10. The evidence adduced in proceedings under

Section 51 of the Act is subject to the principle of

preponderance of probabilities, as reaffirmed by this Court

26

in A.A.I. v. Pradip Kumar Banerjee

3. Strict rules of

evidence do not apply in such disciplinary proceedings.

The material on record, assessed on this standard, is

amply sufficient to sustain the findings on each of the

charges.

25.11. It is submitted that the confirmation process

under G.O.Ms.No.581 dated 08.12.2023, while not

preceded by a specific hearing, was consistent with the

scheme of Section 51(2) of the 1987 Act, which requires

confirmation by the Government as it is a function that is

quasi-executive in the present statutory context and not a

second round of adjudication requiring an independent

hearing. The Appellant had already been afforded

extensive opportunity before the Dharmika Parishad.

ANALYSIS

26. Having heard the learned Senior counsels for both

the sides and having perused the records, issues that arise

for our consideration is: (a) whether the proceedings

culminating in the removal order dated 24.11.2023 passed

by the Dharmika Parishad, the confirmatory G.O.Ms. No.

3

(2025) 4 SCC 111

27

581 dated 08.12.2023 issued by the Government, and the

impugned judgment dated 09.05.2025 of the High Court of

Andhra Pradesh in C.M.A. No. 538 of 2023, suffer from a

breach of the principles of natural justice? (b) If so, what

relief can be granted to the Appellant?

27. Before adverting to the facts of the present case, it

is necessary to state the applicable legal framework. The

removal of a Mathadhipati from the office of the head of a

religious institution is not an administrative act of

ordinary character. It involves substantive civil rights

involving the right to religious office and to carry on one’s

spiritual vocation. The constitutional guarantee of fairness

in procedure, enshrined in the principle of audi alteram

partem and evinced from Article 14 of the Constitution of

India, applies with full force to such quasi -judicial

proceedings. Highlighting the importance to adhere by the

principles of natural justice, this Court in the case of

Canara Bank Vs. V. K. Awasthy

4 observed as thus:

“8. Natural justice is another name for common-sense

justice. Rules of natural justice are not codified canons.

But they are principles ingrained into the conscience of

man. Natural justice is the administration of justice in a

4

(2005) 6 SCC 321

28

common-sense liberal way. Justice is based

substantially on natural ideals and human values. The

administration of justice is to be freed from the narrow

and restricted considerations which are usually

associated with a formulated law involving linguistic

technicalities and grammatical niceties. It is the

substance of justice which has to determine its form.

9. The expressions “natural justice” and “legal justice”

do not present a watertight classification. It is the

substance of justice which is to be secured by both, and

whenever legal justice fails to achieve this solemn

purpose, natural justice is called in aid of legal justice.

Natural justice relieves legal justice from unnecessary

technicality, grammatical pedantry or logical

prevarication. It supplies the omissions of a formulated

law. As Lord Buckmaster said, no form or procedure

should ever be permitted to exclude the presentation of

a litigant's defence.

10. The adherence to principles of natural justice as

recognised by all civilised States is of supreme

importance when a quasi-judicial body embarks on

determining disputes between the parties, or any

administrative action involving civil consequences is in

issue. These principles are well settled. The first and

foremost principle is what is commonly known as audi

alteram partem rule. It says that no one should be

condemned unheard. Notice is the first limb of this

principle. It must be precise and unambiguous. It should

apprise the party determinatively of the case he has to

meet. Time given for the purpose should be adequate so

as to enable him to make his representation. In the

absence of a notice of the kind and such reasonable

opportunity, the order passed becomes wholly vitiated.

Thus, it is but essential that a party should be put on

notice of the case before any adverse order is passed

against him. This is one of the most important principles

of natural justice. It is after all an approved rule of fair

play. The concept has gained significance and shades

with time. When the historic document was made at

Runnymede in 1215, the first statutory recognition of

this principle found its way into the “Magna Carta”. The

classic exposition of Sir Edward Coke of natural justice

29

requires to “vocate, interrogate and adjudicate”. In the

celebrated case of Cooper v. Wandsworth Board of

Works [(1863) 143 ER 414 : 14 CBNS 180 : (1861-73) All

ER Rep Ext 1554] the principle was thus stated : (ER p.

420)

“[E]ven God himself did not pass sentence upon Adam

before he was called upon to make his defence. ‘Adam’

(says God), ‘where art thou? Hast thou not eaten of the

tree whereof I commanded thee that thou shouldest not

eat?’ ”

Since then the principle has been chiselled, honed and

refined, enriching its content. Judicial treatment has

added light and luminosity to the concept, like polishing

of a diamond.

11. Principles of natural justice are those rules which

have been laid down by the courts as being the

minimum protection of the rights of the individual

against the arbitrary procedure that may be adopted by

a judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative authority

while making an order affecting those rights. These

rules are intended to prevent such authority from doing

injustice.”

28. Among the indispensable facets of the rule of audi

alteram partem is the obligation to furnish to the affected

person the material and documents sought to be relied

upon against him. Opportunity of hearing should be real

and cannot be abstract. Unless the person proceeded

against is made aware of the precise allegations, the

evidentiary basis thereof, and the material forming the

foundation of the proposed action, the opportunity to

defend becomes illusory rather than real. In Kashinath

30

Dikshita v. Union of India

5, this Court underscored that

a delinquent cannot effectively defend himself unless

copies of the relevant statements and documents proposed

to be relied upon are furnished to him. The Court

observed:

“10. …. The extracts quoted hereinabove leave no room

for doubt that the disciplinary authority refused to

furnish to the appellant copies of documents and copies

of statements. When a government servant is facing

a disciplinary proceeding, he is entitled to be

afforded a reasonable opportunity to meet the

charges against him in an effective manner. And

no one facing a departmental enquiry can

effectively meet the charges unless the copies of

the relevant statements and documents to be used

against him are made available to him. In the

absence of such copies, how can the concerned

employee prepare his defence, cross -examine the

witnesses, and point out the inconsistencies with

a view to show that the allegations are incredible?

It is difficult to comprehend why the disciplinary

authority assumed an intransigent posture and

refused to furnish the copies notwithstanding the

specific request made by the appellant in this

behalf. Perhaps the disciplinary authority made it a

prestige issue. If only the disciplinary authority had

asked itself the question: “What is the harm in making

available the material?” and weighed the pros and cons,

the disciplinary authority could not reasonably have

adopted such a rigid and adamant attitude. On the one

hand there was the risk of the time and effort invested

in the departmental enquiry being wasted if the courts

came to the conclusion that failure to supply these

materials would be tantamount to denial of reasonable

opportunity to the appellant to defend himself. On the

other hand by making available the copies of the

5

(1986) 3 SCC 229

31

documents and statements the disciplinary authority

was not running any risk. There was nothing

confidential or privileged in it. It is not even the case of

the respondent that there was involved any

consideration of security of State or privilege. No doubt

the disciplinary authority gave an opportunity to the

appellant to inspect the documents and take notes as

mentioned earlier. But even in this connection the

reasonable request of the appellant to have the relevant

portions of the documents extracted with the help of his

stenographer was refused….”

In view of the above, supply of relevant documents

constitutes the most elementary and fundamental

requirement of procedural fairness as no person can be

expected to answer a case which is not fully disclosed to

him.

29. At this stage, it is pertinent to note that Section 51

of the 1987 Act governs the removal of a Mathadhipati. The

same is reproduced as thus:

“51. Removal of Mathadhipathi –

(1) The 1[Dharmika Parishad] may suo motu or on an

application of two or more persons having interest

initiate proceedings for removing a mathadhipathi or a

trustee of a specific endowment attached to a math, if

he-

(a) is of unsound mind;

(b) is suffering from any physical or mental defect or

infirmity which renders him unfit to be a

mathadhipathi or such trustee;

(c) has ceased to profess the Hindu religion or the

tenets of the math;

32

(d) has been sentenced for any offence involving moral

turptitude, such sentence not having been reversed;

(e) is guilty of breach of trust, or mis-appropriation in

respect of any of the properties of the math;

(f) commits persistent and wilful default in the exercise

of his powers or performance of his functions under

this Act;

(g) violates any of the restrictions imposed or practices

enjoined by the custom, usage or the tenets of the

math, in relation to his personal conduct, such as

celibacy, renunciation and the like;

(h) leads an immoral life; or

(i) fails or ignores to implement the principles set out

in clause (17) of section 2.

(2) The 2[Dharmika Parishad] shall frame a charge

on any of the grounds specified in sub-section (1)

against the mathadhipathi or trustee concerned

and give him an opportunity of meeting such

charge, of testing the evidence adduced and of

adducing evidence in his favour. After considering

the evidence adduced and other material before

him, the 2[Dharmika Parishad] may, by order

exonerate the mathadhipathi or trustee, or remove

him. Every such order shall state the charge framed

against the mathadhipathi or the trustee, his

explanation and the finding on such charge

together with the reasons therefor:

Provided that in the case of a math or specific

endowment attached thereto whose annual income

exceeds rupees one lakh, the order of removal passed

by the 2[Dharmika Parishad] against the

mathadhipathi or trustee shall not take effect unless it

is confirmed by the Government.

(3) Pending the passing of an order under sub-section

(2), the 2[Dharmika Parishad] may suspend the

mathadhipathi or the trustee.

1[(4) Any mathadhipathi or trustee aggrieved by an

order passed by the Dharmika Parishad under sub -

section (2) may within ninety days from the date of the

order appeal to the High Court against such order.]”

33

A perusal of the above makes it clear that the Dharmika

Parishad does have the power to frame charge specifying

the grounds as per sub -section (1) against the

Mathadhipati or Trustee. The charges so framed were

required to be supplied and “opportunity of meeting such

charges” used therein indicates in implied terms to supply

the allegation of imputation and the basis thereof which

includes the material to frame the charge. On supply of

such allegation of imputation and the material thereto, the

Mathadhipati may have an opportunity to meet such

charges. Thereafter, in view of the documentary and oral

evidence so adduced by the parties on either side, the

order ought to be passed in the manner as specified. The

instinct of sub-section (2) is clear and unambiguous in its

terms to follow the principles of natural justice. The

intention of the legislature was clear that without supply

of relied upon documents qua the allegation, if any,

meaningful rebuttal could not be possible. Therefore, in

terms of the language used in the Statute, principles of

natural justice are required to be adhered to in the sense

as specified.

34

30. The submission as advanced on behalf of the

Respondents that the enquiry is not vitiated in the absence

of prejudice caused to the Appellant cannot be accepted in

the facts of the present case. It is true that in State of U.P.

v. Sudhir Kumar Singh

6, this Court explained that

breach of the principles of natural justice does not

invariably result in invalidation unless prejudice is shown.

However, the same decision expressly carves out an

exception in cases involving a mandatory procedural

requirement conceived not merely in individual interest

but also in public interest. The Court observed that:

“42.2. Where procedural and/or substantive

provisions of law embody the principles of natural

justice, their infraction per se does not lead to

invalidity of the orders passed. Here again, prejudice

must be caused to the litigant, except in the case

of a mandatory provision of law which is conceived

not only in individual interest, but also in public

interest.”

In view of the literal interpretation of Section 51(2) of the

1987 Act as indicated in the preceding paragraph and in

the facts of this case, where a Mathadhipati is going to be

removed, it is incumbent upon the Dharmika Parishad to

follow the principles of natural justice since religious

6

(2021) 19 SCC 706

35

institutions connected to the Mutt which is under the

control of Mathadhipati or Trustee and consequently, the

public at large, may also be affected. Therefore, in such a

situation, substantive compliance of audi alteram partem

is non-negotiable.

31. Coming to the facts of the present case, the

Respondents have maintained before the High Court and

before us that service was affected upon the Appellant by

affixation on the door of his residence in the premises of

the Mutt as per the Panchanama dated 09.06.2023. We

are unable to accept this contention. The following facts

are clear from the record: (i) the physical possession of the

Mutt premises, including the Mahant's residence, had

been taken over by the Respondents on 08.06.2023 itself

vide order Rc.no. DP1/ 19027(37)/8/2018-3; (ii) the

Panchanama and photographs dated 08.06.2023 and

09.06.2023, filed by the Respondents themselves, reveal

that only six pages were affixed on the door and those six

pages were confined to the Fit Person’s appointment order;

(iii) the charge memo of 27 pages and the 29 supporting

documents were never affixed. In this context, to contend

36

that service of the charge memo was completed by

affixation on the door of the residence that is not in the

possession of the Appellant is a legal absurdity. To hold

otherwise would be to hold that the Authorities may take

over a person’s place of residence and then validly serve

him with a legal notice by pasting it on the door of the

residence it has taken over. Such a proposition would

render the guarantee of fair opportunity meaningless.

32. This view finds reinforcement in the settled

jurisprudence of this Court. It is a foundational principle

of procedural law, reaffirmed by this Court in M/S Neerja

Realtors Pvt. Ltd. v. Janglu (Dead) Through LR

7, that

substituted service by affixation under Order V Rule 17 of

the CPC cannot be turned into an empty technicality; it

can only be validly executed on a house where the noticee

actually and ordinarily resides at the time of service. In

facts of the present case, once the State itself dispossesses

an individual and assumes total control of the premises,

the legal fiction of constructive notice collapses, as the

individual can no longer be legally presumed to have

7

(2018) 2 SCC 649

37

access to or sight of the door. In this context, it is pertinent

to note that the averments of the Appellant of not having

residence on the premises of the Mutt where service was

purportedly effected has not been duly controverted, either

before this Court or before the High Court.

33. Furthermore, the Appellant, through his Advocate,

sent three separate communications to the Dharmika

Parishad and its members on 17.07.2023 (by email to

official IDs through advocate), 24.07.2023 (personally

served against acknowledgement), and 31.07.2023 (by

email through his advocate ). Each of these

communications specifically requested supply of all relied-

upon documents and a minimum of one month to submit

a defence. While not heeding to such requests, the Enquiry

Committee dismissed the communication of 17.07.2023

on a technical ground that it was an unsigned letter

received on the mobile of a committee member through

WhatsApp. In our view, this conduct of the Enquiry

Committee discloses a deliberate disregard for the

principles of natural justice as it deprived the Appellant of

any meaningful chance to test the evidence adduced

38

against him and to adduce evidence in his favor, as

mandated by Section 51(2) of the 1987 Act.

34. We are, however, unable to concur with the

approach adopted by the High Court while dealing with

this matter. Section 51(4) of the 1987 Act vests the High

Court with appellate jurisdiction, requiring an

independent consideration of the objections raised by the

appellant and the recording of reasoned findings thereon.

The impugned judgment appears to have proceeded on the

premise that the procedural irregularities alleged in the

enquiry stood sufficiently answered by the existence of

material supporting certain charges. The High Court

presumed the possession of documents with the Appellant

based on the manner in which he addressed the charges

against him. In our considered view, this presumption is

ill-founded. The defect pointed out in the present case

pertains to the fairness of the enquiry process itself and,

therefore, strikes at the root of the proceedings. Once such

a foundational infirmity is established, the question

whether charges may otherwise have been capable of being

sustained does not arise for consideration at the appellate

39

stage. In fact, the High Court, while exercising the

appellate jurisdiction, ought to have set aside the

Impugned Order being violative of principles of natural

justice and should have advised the competent authority

to take recourse in accordance with law. The failure to

adopt such a course furnishes an additional reason for

interference by this Court.

35. At this juncture, the aspect of apparent bias and

nemo judex in causa sua has to be considered. It is

undisputed that the enquiry committee was constituted

under Rule 26 of the 2009 Rules read with Section 152(3)

of the 1987 Act. For ready reference Rule 26 of the 2009

Rules is reproduced as thus:

“Rule - 26. (i) The Dharmika Parishad may appoint,

from amongst its members, such number of committees

as the Dharmika Parishad deems necessary with not

more than 3 members and assign to them such functions

and duties as it may consider for the purpose which in

turn has to submit its report to the Chairman of

Dharmika Parishad.

(ii) A member shall cease to be a member of such

Committee if he ceases to be a member of the

Dharmika Parishad.

(iii) The Committee of the Dharmika Parishad may meet

frequently depending upon the exigencies of work.”

40

A bare perusal of this Rule indicates that appointment of

committees as envisaged therein is in context of

administrative committees and it ought not to constitute

an enquiry committee. This understanding of Rule 26 of

the 2009 Rules is further bolstered by reading of sub rule

(ii) of Rule 26, which prescribes that members of any such

committee shall first be members of the Dharmika

Parishad. If read otherwise, such reading of Rule 26 of the

2009 Rules would render the principles of natural justice

nugatory as the adjudicating authority cannot itself

become the investigator and also the decision maker.

Nonetheless, we are aware of the fact that we are not called

upon in the present proceedings to pronounce upon the

constitutional validity of Section 152 of the 1987 Act, a

question that is presently sub judice before the High Court

in W.P. No. 16954 of 2023 and therefore, observations

made by us in this regard are only on the facts of the case

and shall not influence adjudication of the said writ

petition pending before the High Court.

36. It is also pertinent to mention that the reflection of

the bias in the present case can be gathered from the fact

41

that after appointment of the Appellant as Mathadhipati

by the Endowment Department in 2000, it was cancelled

suo motu in 2003. An attempt was made to take over the

entire properties of the Mutt which was made nugatory by

the orders of the High Court. Again in 2017, merely on the

basis of some newspaper cuttings, initiation of enquiry

was made by the Dharmika Parishad against the

appellant, which resulted into several rounds of litigation

including the present one. Similarly, the manner in which

the enquiry was done in the present case, the

apprehension of the bias in the matter cannot be ruled out.

In this view of the matter, we are of the opinion that an

enquiry regarding the allegations against the Appellant

ought to be done following the principles of natural justice

by an independent body.

37. To summarize, we find that the proceedings

resulting in the removal of the Appellant as Mathadhipati

of Mutt are vitiated by multiple violations of the principles

of natural justice – First, the charge memo of 27 pages and

the 29 relied-upon documents running to over 600 pages

were never duly served upon the Appellant. Purported

42

service by affixation on the door of premises in the physical

possession of the Respondents themselves is not service in

the eyes of law; Second, the Appellant's requests for supply

of documents and grant of reasonable time were wholly

ignored, and the enquiry was conducted ex-parte; and

Third, the pre-decisional resolution of 09.05.2023,

directing simultaneous preparation of charges and

suspension order, reveals that the entire process was pre-

determined and not a genuine quasi-judicial exercise of

statutory power.

38. The High Court erred in holding that the

opportunity afforded to the Appellant at the stage of the

show cause notice dated 19.10.2023 and the hearing

before the Dharmika Parishad on 16.11.2023 cured the

fundamental defects in the enquiry. An opportunity

afforded on the basis of a tainted enquiry report, without

supply of the relied-upon documents and without an

independent appreciation of evidence, cannot substitute

for a valid enquiry under Section 51(2) of the 1987 Act.

39. In our opinion, use of Rule 26 of the 2009 Rules to

constitute the enquiry committee is sans proper

43

understanding of such Rule, especially in the peculiar

facts of this case. Be that as it may, Rule 26 of the 2009

Rules has been legislated under Section 152 of the 1987

Act and the challenge to the vires of Section 152 is pending

adjudication before the High Court. In this view, we are

refraining from appreciating this aspect of the present

Appeal in detail.

40. Having regard to the foregoing, we are of the

considered view that the impugned order of the High Court

dated 09.05.2025 in C.M.A. No. 538 of 2023 cannot be

sustained. The removal order dated 24.11.2023, the

confirmation G.O.Ms.No.581 dated 08.12.2023, the

consequential order dated 19.01.2024 of the Dharmika

Parishad and the enquiry report of the three-member

Enquiry Committee dated 01.08.2023 deserves to be set

aside.

41. The ordinary course after such setting aside would

be to remand the matter to the Dharmika Parishad for a

de novo enquiry under Section 51(2) of the 1987 Act. The

constitutional validity of this scheme has been affirmed by

this Court in Sri Sri Sri Lakshmana Yatendrulu v.

44

State of A.P.

8 and in Pannalal Bansilal Pitti v. State of

A.P.

9. At this stage, it is pertinent to mention that Mr.

Sidharth Luthra, learned Senior counsel, has informed us

across the Bar that Dharmika Parishad will be constituted

within four weeks. We record this submission. However,

the present case stands on a different footing, and a bare

remand would, in our view, leave the constitutional and

legal rights of the Appellant to hold the religious position

of Mathadhipati without complete vindication. Four

independent and cumulatively sufficient grounds compel

this conclusion. The same are expounded as follows:

(i) The violation found by us in paragraphs 29 to 36 is

not the kind that can be cured by repeating the same

statutory exercise before the same statutory body, even

with fresh members. We are not called upon in the present

proceedings to pronounce upon the constitutional validity

of Section 152 of the 1987 Act, a question that is presently

sub judice before the High Court in W.P. No. 16954 of

2023, and we expressly refrain from doing so.

Nonetheless, it is sufficient to observe that, whatever is the

8

(1996) 8 SCC 705

9

(1996) 2 SCC 498

45

constitutional validity of Section 152, the officials who by

virtue of that provision would constitute several ex-officio

positions in any freshly constituted Dharmika Parishad

are the very officials whose prior conduct in this matter

forms the subject matter of the infirmities found by us. To

remand to that body, even reconstituted, would mean

remanding the dispute to an institution whose structural

composition re-creates the very conditions of taint.

(ii) This structural impediment is further compounded

by a significant lacuna in the statutory and regulatory

framework governing these proceedings. Section 51(2) of

the 1987 Act empowers the Dharmika Parishad to frame

charges against a Mathadhipati and mandates that he be

given an opportunity of meeting such charge, of testing the

evidence adduced, and of adducing evidence in his favour.

This provision is, however, entirely silent on the procedure

by which this is to be accomplished. No provision within

the 1987 Act prescribes how the Dharmika Parishad is to

constitute an enquiry body, that may be appointed to

conduct such an enquiry, or what procedural safeguards

shall govern its conduct. The procedure has been left to

46

subordinate rules, and Rule 26 of the 2009 Rules purports

to fill this gap by providing for the constitution of an

enquiry committee from amongst the members of the

Dharmika Parishad itself. However, as already observed

above, Rule 26 of the 2009 Rules may not be used for this

purpose. The 1987 Act, read as it stands, leaves a

procedural vacuum at the heart of proceedings that carry

the gravest civil and religious consequences for the person

proceeded against. The Act empowers removal but

prescribes no independent, neutral mechanism for the

conduct of the enquiry that must precede it.

Consequently, a simple remand to a newly constituted

Dharmika Parishad would be a futile exercise in

procedural circularity; the newly formed Parishad would

remain severely handicapped by the very same procedural

vacuum, inevitably leading to a repetition of systemic

vulnerabilities, protracted litigation, and a failure of

justice.

(iii) Furthermore, the High Court’s judgment dated

27.01.2006 in W.P. Nos. 4326 of 2002 and 14856 of 2003,

affirmed by the Division Bench in W.A. Nos. 258 and 259

47

of 2006, and given effect to by G.O.Ms. No. 1678 dated

14.11.2006, represents a concluded and binding

determination that the secular management of the Mutt

vests in the Appellant. This judicial determination has

attained finality now. Therefore, the effect of the impugned

removal proceedings was not merely to remove the

appellant for misconduct; it was to undo, by

administrative action, the effect of a judicial determination

that the State itself executed through a Government

Order.

(iv) Lastly, we are mindful that the assurance given to

us regarding the four-week timeline for reconstitution of

Dharmika Parishad is dependent upon administrative

action by the State Government. We have no reason to

doubt the bona fides of that assurance, but we cannot fail

to note that the prior Parishad demitted office in June

2024, and that nearly two years have elapsed in the

intervening period during which no reconstitution has

taken place. This offers no firm guarantee that, even if a

Parishad is constituted within four weeks, that body

would be in a position to commence and complete a de

48

novo enquiry within the timeframe that the issues in this

case demand. The Appellant is now in his seventy-first

year; the Mutt itself is being administered by a Fit Person

for nearly two years; and the issues affecting the extensive

endowed properties of the Mutt cannot be left to further

uncertainty or delay.

42. In these circumstances, while we record the State’s

submission that a Dharmika Parishad is to be

reconstituted within four weeks, and while we leave the

statutory powers and functions of that body wholly

untouched for all other purposes under the 1987 Act, in

the peculiar facts of the present case, we are of the

considered view that this Court must, in exercise of its

jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India,

fashion a one-time, case-specific mechanism to enquire

afresh into the allegations against the Appellant.

43. The jurisdiction conferred by Article 142 is not a

residuary power of general equity. Its scope has been

carefully explained by this Court. In Delhi Judicial

Service Association v. State of Gujarat

10and in Union

10

(1991) 4 SCC 406

49

Carbide Corporation v. Union of India

11, this Court held

that the powers conferred by Article 142 are not

constrained by the ordinary limitations of statutory

remedies, and that they may be exercised to do complete

justice in any cause or matter pending before it. The

Constitution Bench in Supreme Court Bar Association

v. Union of India

12, however, took care to clarify that

Article 142 is ‘supplementary’ in nature. It operates to fill

legal and procedural gaps, and give effect to the statutory

scheme, not to supplant it.

44. This Court has consistently invoked Article 142 of

the Constitution of India to bridge structural gaps where

the existing institutional framework is inherently or

structurally unfit to remedy an infirmity. In Vineet Narain

v. Union of India

13, this Court recognized that where

there is a vacuum or inaction in the law, the judiciary

must step in to provide a solution and issue necessary

directions to cover the gap till the legislature acts. This

supplementary character of Article 142 is preserved when

11

(1991) 4 SCC 584

12

(1998) 4 SCC 409

13

(1998) 1 SCC 226

50

what is supplemented is not the statute itself, but the

conditions necessary for its fair operation. Similarly, in

BCCI v. Cricket Association of Bihar

14, this Court

invoked its plenary powers under Article 142 to bypass the

domestic tribunal framework of a premier sports body,

recognizing that internal organizational procedures cannot

be set up against the constitutional mandate to deliver

complete justice. Given the massive institutional

ramifications of the sporting fraud and the high-profile

nature of the indicted individuals, the existing internal

machinery was deemed structurally unfit to ensure an

unbiased, credible enquiry. By stripping the domestic

body of its disciplinary powers and transferring the

authority to award punishment to an independent,

judicially supervised Three-Member Committee, the Court

effectively utilized Article 142 of the Constitution of India

to preserve the essential conditions necessary for fair

operation and institutional integrity.

45. Before we set out the directions which, in our view,

would best balance the competing considerations as

14 (2015) 3 SCC 251

51

indicated in the preceding paragraphs, in the facts of the

present case, it is necessary to recall the unique character

of the office of a Mathadhipati. The matter is no longer res

integra. As far back as 1954, in The Commissioner,

Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri

Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt

15 ,

this Court held that in the conception of Mahantship, both

the elements of office and property, of duties and personal

interest, are blended together and neither can be detached

from the other. The Mahant, this Court observed, is not

merely the manager of the temporalities of the Mutt,

rather, he is the spiritual head and superior of a fraternity

of disciples, charged with the propagation of the doctrines

of the sampradaya to which the math belongs. This

proposition was reiterated and applied to the 1987 Act

itself in Sri Sri Sri Lakshmana Yatendrulu (supra),

where this Court emphasized that in the concept of

Mathadhipathi, both the elements of power to hold

property and duty to properly maintain it are blended and

neither can be detached from the other.

15

AIR 1954 SC 282

52

46. Therefore, any arrangement which seeks to

permanently bifurcate the religious functions of a

Mathadhipati from the administrative and secular

functions, or which vests the latter in a ‘Fit Person’ or a

Custodian for an indefinite period notwithstanding that

the lawful Mathadhipati continues in office, would amount

to a denial of the very concept of Mahantship.

47. Article 26 of the Constitution, as interpreted in

Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. State of Bombay

16 and

as reaffirmed in a long line of subsequent judgments,

guarantees to a religious denomination the right to

manage its own affairs in matters of religion and, subject

to law, to administer its property. While this guarantee

does not, of course, preclude the State from regulating the

administration of math property through validly enacted

laws, it does require that any deprivation of the office of

the spiritual head be affected only through procedures

that are demonstrably fair, neutral, and minimally

invasive.

Conclusion

16

AIR 1954 SC 388

53

48. In consequence, we set aside the impugned order

of the High Court dated 09.05.2025 in C.M.A. No. 538 of

2023. Consequently, the removal order dated 24.11.2023,

the confirmation G.O.Ms.No.581 dated 08.12.2023, the

consequential order dated 19.01.2024 of the Dharmika

Parishad and the enquiry report of the three-member

Enquiry Committee dated 01.08.2023 also stand set aside.

49. As per discussion contained in Para 41-47, we deem

it appropriate to appoint a One-man independent enquiry

committee to conduct enquiry regarding the charges

levelled against the appellant. The One-man Enquiry

committee shall consist of Mr. Boddepalli Rama Rao ,

retired District Judge.

50. The Enquiry Committee shall conduct the enquiry

while observing the Principles of Natural Justice including

the following:

(i) An appropriate venue for conducting the said

enquiry proceedings shall be provided by the

Principal District Judge, Chittoor within the

premises of the Court Complex, Tirupati.

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(ii) For purposes of the said enquiry, the concerned

Principal District Judge shall depute two court staff

to assist the Enquiry Committee on each day of

sitting.

(iii) The documents forming part of the record of the

Enquiry Committee shall be kept in the custody of

the court as directed by Principal District Judge.

(iv) The State Government of Andhra Pradesh and the

Endowments Department /Dharmika Parishad

shall, within two weeks, handover the charge memo

dated 08.06.2023 and copies of all relevant

documents and material referred in the charge

memo to the Enquiry Committee.

(v) On receiving the said material , the Enquiry

Committee shall immediately supply those relevant

documents and material which they want to rely

upon, to the Appellant.

(vi) Upon receipt of the above documents, the Appellant

shall be afforded a minimum period of four weeks

for submitting his statement of defence, extendable

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further by the Enquiry Committee on reasonable

cause shown by the Appellant.

(vii) The Enquiry Committee is at liberty to ask for an

officer of Endowment Department to represent the

department and be permitted to participate in the

enquiry representing the department.

(viii) The Enquiry Committee is at liberty to provide

assistance for defence and thereafter, conduct a

formal hearing in which the Appellant shall be

afforded full opportunity to examine documents,

cross-examine witnesses produced in support of the

charges, and adduce evidence, oral and

documentary, if any.

(ix) The Enquiry Committee may regulate its own

procedure, subject to the requirements of Section

51(2) of the Act and the directions of this Court and

shall record reasons for all procedural decisions.

(x) The Enquiry Committee shall submit its report

within one year from the date of supply of

documents, to the Endowments Department.

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(xi) The Enquiry Committee shall be provided with all

necessary infrastructure and support through the

concerned Principal District Judge, for which the

State Government shall co-operate till completion of

enquiry. Enquiry committee at liberty to provide

defence assistance

(xii) The expenses of the Enquiry Committee shall be

borne from the funds of the Mutt.

(xiii) The Enquiry Committee would be entitled for to and

fro travel expenses equivalent to first class railway

ticket or equivalent airfare and in addition, Rupees

Twenty Thousand per sitting.

(xiv) The Enquiry Committee shall submit its report to

the Endowment Department after conclusion of the

enquiry, whereupon the department shall take final

decision in accordance with law.

51. Furthermore, we are mindful that the Appellant is

being restored to office during a highly complex transition.

While the enquiry mandated in previous paragraphs

stands pending, the extensive properties of the Mutt are

currently entangled in multi-forum litigation, and there

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exists a compelling public interest in ensuring that the

administration of the Mutt is conducted with absolute

transparency and accountability, until the final order is

passed by the endowment department as per Para 50 (xiv).

Section 55(2)(b) of the Act of 1987 explicitly contemplates

the same:

“(b) constituting a committee consisting of not more than

five persons for the purpose of assisting in the

whole or any part of the administration of all the

endowments of such math or of specific

endowment”

Drawing upon this statutory scheme, and in further

exercise of our plenary powers under Article 142 of the

Constitution of India, we hereby constitute an

Administrative Committee to aid the Appellant in his

capacity as the Mathadhipati. The said Committee shall

comprise of:

(i) Chairman – Honorable Mr. Justice (Retd.)

Duppala Venkata Ramana , retired Judge of the

High Court of Andhra Pradesh/ Madhya Pradesh;

(ii) Member – Swami Madhav Prapanna Charya ,

affiliated to Ramanuj Kot, Ujjain, an eminent

representative of the Hindu religious tradition, well-

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versed in the Vaishnava Sampradaya and monastic

customs.

(iii) Member – Mr. Manish Kapooria , IPS (retd.) (MP

Cadre);

(iv) Member – Mr. Y.V. Raviprasad, Senior Advocate,

Andhra Pradesh

(v) Member – Mr. Manish Taskar , Chartered

Accountant (Hyderabad), and

(vi) Member – A person nominated by the Endowment

Department in this regard, within a week of passing

of this Judgment.

The details of the address, mobile number and e-mail id of

the chairman and four other members of the committee

have been placed in the record of the proceedings. The

details of the nomination of the officer of the Endowment

Department be supplied within 2 weeks by State to

Chairman of the Committee.

The Committee shall be governed by the following

mandate:

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(i) The Committee shall function strictly in a

supervisory and facilitative capacity, without displacing or

divesting the Appellant of his authority, particularly

regarding religious functions.

(ii) The Administrative Committee shall prepare a

comprehensive inventory of all immovable and movable

properties belonging to the Mutt within a period of three

months from today,

(iii) The Administrative Committee shall oversee the

preservation of institutional records, track the conduct of

pending litigations, and direct the legal measures

necessary to protect Mutt lands from encroachments.

(iv) The Administrative Committee shall ensure that no

alienation, lease, license, mortgage, or creation of any

third-party rights or encumbrances in respect of any

property of the Mutt takes place.

(v) The Administrative Committee would be entitled for

to and fro travel expenses equivalent to first class railway

ticket or equivalent airfare and in addition, Rupees Ten

Thousand per sitting for the members and Rupees

Twenty-Five Thousand per sitting for the Chairman to be

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defrayed from the funds of the Mutt, subject to existing

audit safeguards.

(vi) The meeting place of the Committee the office of the

Mutt or the appropriate space provided by the Mutt at its

head office. The Committee shall make all endeavors to

meet at least once in every three months.

52. The directions contained hereinabove are intended

to serve an interim regime operational only till the final

decision after enquiry by the Endowment Department,

based on the report of the Enquiry Committee. This

direction has been issued in peculiar facts of this case as

discussed and are not intended to supplant the statutory

authority of Dharmika Parishad. This would also not be

treated as precedent for any other cases.

53. The position of the Appellant during the pendency

of the fresh enquiry shall be as follows:

(i) The Appellant shall continue to hold the status of

Mathadhipati of the Mutt. He shall be permitted to

participate in the religious and spiritual activities of the

Mutt.

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(ii) The Appellant is supposed to provide support in

administration of the Mutt and shall aid in the decision-

making of the Administrative Committee, which, in the

interregnum, shall be binding on him.

(iii) The Appellant shall not alienate, mortgage or

otherwise convey any property of the Mutt without prior

permission of the Administrative Committee.

(iv) The Appellant shall cooperate fully with the Enquiry

Committee and shall appear before it as and when

required and make available to it such documents and

material as may be in his possession or authority.

(v) In the event, the Enquiry Committee, upon

completion of fresh enquiry, returns findings adverse to

the appellant and the Endowment Department/ Dharmika

Parishad passes an order of removal, the Appellant shall

be at liberty to prefer an appeal before appropriate forum

within one month.

54. In conclusion, Sri Swamy Hathiramji Mutt, as an

institution of immense religious, cultural and historical

significance, and its devotees, are entitled to a resolution

of the present controversy through a process, that is and

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appears to be, free, fair and unbiased. We accordingly

allow this Civil Appeal as per directions contained

hereinabove, in particular, paragraphs 48-53. The

impugned judgment dated 09.05.2025 of the High Court

of Andhra Pradesh in C.M.A. No. 538 of 2023 confirming

the Order of removal and appointment of ‘fit person’ stands

set aside.

55. Pending applications, if any, shall stand disposed of

in terms of the foregoing.

……….…………….…………J.

(J.K. MAHESHWARI)

……….…………….…………J.

(ATUL S. CHANDURKAR )

New Delhi;

May 29, 2026.