2026 INSC 533 Page 1 of 65

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL N O. OF 2026

(@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO . 18345 of 2024)

ARTI MEHTA & ORS. ...APPELLANT (S)

VERSUS

THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH & ANR. …RESPONDENT(S)

With

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(s). OF 2026

(@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO . 1234 of 2025)

ARTI MEHTA & ORS. ...APPELLANT (S)

VERSUS

SAPNA DHAKAD …RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

NONGMEIKAPAM KOTISWAR SINGH , J.

Leave granted in both the SLPs.

2. This common order disposes of both the Criminal

Appeals arising out of Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No.

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18345 of 2024 and Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No.

1234 of 2025 as both these appeals relate to connected

incidents in the proceedings initiated at the instance of

Respondent No.2, namely Sapna Dhakad (hereinafter

referred to as “complainant”), arising out of matrimonial

discord between Respondent No.2 and her husband, namely

Divyaraj Dhakad.

3. Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 18345 of 2024

was filed against the judgment and order dated 21.11.2024,

passed by the Ld. Single Bench of the High Court of Madhya

Pradesh (Bench at Gwalior) in Misc. Criminal Case No.

14615 of 2023 whereunder the High Court declined to

exercise its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of

Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short “CrPC”) for quashing the

FIR/Crime No. 41/2023 dated 13.01.2023, registered at

Police Station Guna, District Guna, Madhya Pradesh under

Sections 498A and 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for

short “IPC”) and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition

Act, 1961 (for short “Dowry Act”) by holding that, there is

prima facie material against the appellants, Arti Mehta,

Shrivati Bai Dhakad, Manisha Dhakad and Vikram Dhakad .

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The High Court further observed that the allegations levelled

against the appellants were specific and direct in nature,

thus warranting prosecution.

4. Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 1234 of 2025 has

been preferred against the judgment and order dated

21.11.2024, passed by the Ld. Single Bench of the High

Court of Madhya Pradesh (Bench at Gwalior) in Misc.

Criminal Case No. 20269 of 2023 , whereunder the High

Court declined to exercise jurisdiction under Section 482 of

the CrPC for quashing the criminal proceedings under the

Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (for

short “DV Act”) in D.V. Complaint No. 1752 of 2023 pending

before the Court of the Judicial Magistrate, First Class,

Guna, District Guna, Madhya Pradesh. While dismissing the

petition preferred by the present appellants, the High Court

observed that the appellants, admittedly being relatives of

the respondent-wife, would fall within the ambit of the

expression “respondent” as defined under Section 2(q) of the

DV Act. The High Court further held that even female

relatives can be arrayed as respondents in proceedings

under the DV Act and that the proceedings under Section 12

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of the DV Act operate in a distinct sphere from proceedings

under Section 498A IPC, the DV Act itself providing penal

consequences under Section 31 only upon breach of

protection orders. Taking note of the fact that the

proceedings were still at a nascent stage, the High Court

concluded that no case for interference under Section 482

CrPC was made out and accordingly, declined to quash the

proceedings.

5. Being aggrieved by the refusal of the High Court to

quash the aforesaid criminal proceedings pending before the

concerned Magistrates, the present appeals have been

preferred.

6. The gravamen of the case set up by the appellants in

both the appeals is that they have been falsely implicated

merely on account of being relatives of the husband and that

the allegations levelled against them are wholly omnibus,

vague and bereft of any specific overt act attributed to them,

thus, incapable of being fastened with criminal liability

under Section 498A IPC or the provisions of the Dowry Act

and the DV Act, which unfortunately, the High Court had

failed to appreciate. It has further been contended that the

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FIR is manifestly retaliatory in nature, having been lodged

immediately after the husband instituted divorce

proceedings under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955

(for short “HMA”). Learned counsel for the appellants also

drew attention to the pleadings in the divorce petition filed

by the Respondent No.2 herself, wherein she admitted that

she was residing with her husband in the government

quarters at Sheopur, thereby contradicting the allegations in

the FIR regarding residing with the in-laws at Shivpuri. It

was thus submitted that neither any domestic relationship

nor any shared household within the meaning of Sections

2(f) and 2(s) of the DV Act has been established qua the

appellants, who were residing separately.

7. Per contra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the

complainant/wife supported the impugned judgments

passed by the High Court and contended that the allegations

contained in the FIR and the complaint under the DV Act

clearly disclose commission of cognizable offences against

the present appellants. It was submitted that the FIRs

arising out of matrimonial disputes cannot be expected to

contain an exhaustive or encyclopaedic narration of each

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and every incident, and that mere absence of minute

particulars at the threshold cannot be a ground for quashing

criminal proceedings. Learned counsel further submitted

that the allegations relating to dowry demands, mental and

physical harassment and expulsion from the matr imonial

home constitute triable issues requiring appreciation of

evidence during trial. It was also contended that the question

whether the complainant shared a domestic relationship or

shared household with the appellants within the meaning of

the DV Act is essentially a disputed question of fact which

cannot be conclusively determined in proceedings under

Section 482 CrPC.

8. The relevant facts in brief, as may be culled out from

the pleadings and materials placed on record, are that on

13.01.2023, the complainant Respondent No. 2, namely

Sapna Dhakad accompanied by her brother, Dr. Arun

Prakash Dhakad, visited the Police Station Guna, District

Guna, Madhya Pradesh, stating that her marriage took place

with one Divyaraj Dhakad on 19.11.2019, and that at the

time of her marriage, the complainant’s father had given

Thirty-one lakh Rupees in cash, and gold jewellery worth Ten

Page 7 of 65

lakh Rupees and other household items by way of dowry. It

was further alleged that about six months after the marriage,

the husband started harassing the complainant on the

ground that he could not bear her expenses and demanded

that she bring more money from her parental home.

According to the complainant, upon her refusal, the

husband along with the present appellants who are

complainant's sister-in-law (Appellant No. 1), complainant’s

mother-in-law (Appellant No. 2), complainant’s brother-in-

law (Appellant No. 4) and the wife of the complainant’s

brother-in-law (Appellant No. 3) started subjecting the

complainant to mental and physical cruelty, abusing her and

repeatedly asking her to return to her parental home if

additional dowry was not brought. The complainant further

alleged that while the husband used to remain posted at

Sheopur, he would leave her at the in -laws’ house at

Shivpuri and, whenever she requested that she be permitted

to reside with him at Sheopur, he would abuse her in filthy

language, assault her and subject her to physical and mental

harassment. It was also alleged that the appellants used to

regularly pressurise the complainant to bring dowry and

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would tell her that she could not continue to stay in the

matrimonial home unless such demands were fulfilled. The

complaint further states that owing to the continuous

harassment and torment over alleged dowry demands, the

complainant was compelled to reside at her parental home

for the preceding six months. It was additionally alleged that

on 08.09.2022, the husband visited the complainant’s

parental home, abused both the complainant and her family

members and refused to take her back with him. The

complainant also stated that prior to lodging the FIR, she

had approached the Family Counselling Centre at Guna ;

however, despite counselling efforts, the husband and his

family members were unwilling to keep her with them.

9. On the basis of the aforesaid complaint, FIR/Crime

No. 0041/2023 dated 13.01.2023 came to be registered at

Police Station Guna, District Guna, Madhya Pradesh under

Sections 498A and 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and

Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 against

the complainant’s husband as well as the present

appellants, namely, Arti Mehta, Shrivati Bai Dhakad,

Manisha Dhakad and Vikram Dhakad. Subsequently, after

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investigation, the police filed the charge-sheet against the

accused persons before the competent Court, pursuant to

which criminal proceedings came to be instituted and are

presently pending before the Court of the Judicial Magistrate

First Class, Guna, Madhya Pradesh.

10. Apart from the aforesaid FIR, the complainant/wife

also instituted proceedings under the DV Act by filing

Complaint No. 1752/2023 on 04.04.2023 under Sections

9(b), 37(2)(c) read with Section 12 of the DV Act before the

One Stop Centre (Women’s Cell), District Guna, Madhya

Pradesh, against her husband and the present appellants. In

the said complaint, the respondent -wife reiterated

allegations of mental and physical cruelty and additionally

alleged that after marriage, she started residing with her

husband at Sheopur, where the husband would leave for

duty in the morning and return late in the night, even on

government holidays. It was alleged that after some time the

husband informed her that a substantial part of his salary

was being spent on his father’s medical treatment for cancer

and, therefore, demanded that she bring additional money

from her parental home. According to the complainant, upon

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her refusal, the husband, along with the present appellants,

started subjecting her to mental and physical harassment.

The complaint also contains allegations relating to certain

acts allegedly committed by the husband, including

restricting her movement, abusing and assaulting her

whenever she went outside the house, and allegedly placing

hidden cameras and recording devices in the room occupied

by her. It was further alleged that while residing at Sheopur,

the husband would frequently leave the complainant at the

in-laws’ house at Shivpuri and that in April 2022, she was

made to stay there for about a month. The complainant

alleged that the brother-in-law, Vikram Dhakad (present

Appellant No. 4), questioned her presence at the in-laws’

house and told her either to bring money from her parental

home or reside with her husband at Sheopur or stay at her

maternal home in Guna , and thereafter she was not

permitted to continue staying at Shivpuri. The complainant

further alleged that the mother-in-law, Shrivati Bai Dhakad

(Appellant No.2) and the wife of her brother-in-law, Manisha

Dhakad (Appellant No. 3), used to insult her on trivial issues

and demand money from her. According to the complainant,

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whenever she informed the husband’s family members about

his conduct, Appellant No.4 Vikram Dhakad allegedly told

her that the family members could not repeatedly come to

Sheopur and that she should either continue living with the

husband in the manner he kept her or go back to her

parental home at Guna. The complainant furth er alleged

that when she narrated the husband’s conduct to her sister-

in-law Arti Mehta (Appellant No. 1), she was scolded,

threatened to remain quiet and fulfil the family’s demands if

she intended to continue residing in the matrimonial home.

It was further alleged that all the present appellants

consistently supported the husband despite being informed

of his alleged conduct.

11. On 06.04.2023, Judicial Magistrate First Class, Guna,

upon considering the complaint filed by Respondent No.2

under Section 12 of the DV Act, took cognisance of the

allegations and initiated proceedings in D.V. Complaint No.

1752 of 2023 against the husband as well as the present

appellants.

12. At this stage, it may be apposite to note that the

allegations between the parties are not one-sided and that

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both sides have traded serious allegations against each other

arising out of matrimonial discord. Prior to the institution of

the aforesaid criminal proceedings by the complainant, the

husband had instituted proceedings under Section 9 of the

Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, being RCS HM No. 12 of 2023,

before the Family Court seeking restitution of conjugal

rights. Subsequently, the complainant herself instituted

Divorce Petition No. RCS HM/156/2023 before the Court of

the Principal Judge, Family Court, Guna, Madhya Pradesh,

alleging cruelty, harassment and adulterous conduct on the

part of the husband. The pleadings exchanged between the

parties in the matrimonial proceedings indicate a deeply

strained marital relationship and disclose several mutual

allegations relating to cruelty, incompatibility and

matrimonial discord. It has also been brought to the notice

of this Court that during the pendency of the present

proceedings, a decree of divorce has been granted by the

competent Family Court, thereby dissolving the marriage

between the husband and complainant.

13. As we proceed to examine the issues involved, we may

briefly allude to the law relating to quashing of FIRs/criminal

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proceedings, which is well-settled and summarised by this

Court in the State of Haryana and Ors. v. Bhajan Lal and

Ors.

1

in which this Court held as follows:

“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the

various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter

XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this

Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of

the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the

inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which

we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the

following categories of cases by way of illustration

wherein such power could be exercised either to

prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise

to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be

possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and

sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or

rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad

kinds of cases wherein such power should be

exercised.

(1) Where the allegations made in the first information

report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their

face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima

facie constitute any offence or make out a case against

the accused.

(2) Where the allegations in the first information report

and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do

not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an

investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of

the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within

the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.

(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the

FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support

of the same do not disclose the commission of any

offence and make out a case against the accused.

1

1992 Supp (1) SCC 335.

Page 14 of 65

(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute

a cognizable offence but constitute only a non -

cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a

police officer without an order of a Magistrate as

contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.

(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint

are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis

of which no prudent person can ever reach a just

conclusion that there is sufficient ground for

proceeding against the accused.

(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in

any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act

(under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the

institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or

where there is a specific provision in the Code or the

concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the

grievance of the aggrieved party.

(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly

attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding

is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for

wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view

to spite him due to private and personal grudge.”

14. In the present case, it has been submitted on behalf

of the Respondent-State of Madhya Pradesh, that pursuant

to completion of investigation in FIR/Crime No. 0041/2023,

the charge-sheet/challan has already been filed before the

competent Court and, after dismissal of the quashing

petition by the High Court on 21.11.2024, the same came to

be registered as RCT No. 2215/2024 on 10.12.2024 before

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the Court of the Judicial Magistrate First Class. It has

further been pointed out that the proceedings initiated under

the DV Act in Complaint No. 1752 of 2023 are also pending

adjudication before the competent Court. However, mere

filing of the charge-sheet or pendency of proceedings under

the DV Act would not by itself preclude this Court from

interfering with the criminal proceedings, if upon

examination of the FIR, the DV complaint and the material

collected during investigation, it is found that no prima facie

case is made out against the present appellants and that

continuation of the proceedings would amount to abuse of

the process of law. As noted hereinabove, the consistent plea

of the appellants in both proceedings is that the allegations

levelled against them are wholly omnibus and generalised in

nature, without attribution of any specific overt act

constituting the ingredients of the alleged offences.

15. In this context, it would be apposite to refer to the

observations made by this Court in Anand Kumar Mohatta

v. State (NCT of Delhi)

2

, wherein the scope and ambit of the

High Court’s jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC, even after

2

(2019) 11 SCC 706.

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filing of the charge-sheet, was explained in the following

terms:

“14. First, we would like to deal with the submission

of the learned Senior Counsel for Respondent 2 that

once the charge-sheet is filed, petition for quashing of

FIR is untenable. We do not see any merit in this

submission, keeping in mind the position of this Court

in Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat [Joseph

Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59: (2011)

3 SCC (Cri) 23]. In Joseph Salvaraj A. [Joseph Salvaraj

A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59 : (2011) 3 SCC

(Cri) 23] , this Court while deciding the question

whether the High Court could entertain the Section 482

petition for quashing of FIR, when the charge-sheet

was filed by the police during the pendency of the

Section 482 petition, observed : (SCC p. 63, para 16)

“16. Thus, from the general conspectus of the

various sections under which the appellant is

being charged and is to be prosecuted would

show that the same are not made out even

prima facie from the complainant's FIR. Even if

the charge-sheet had been filed, the learned

Single Judge [Joesph Saivaraj A. v. State of

Gujarat, 2007 SCC OnLine Guj 365] could have

still examined whether the offences alleged to

have been committed by the appellant were

prima facie made out from the complainant's

FIR, charge-sheet, documents, etc. or not.”

15. Even otherwise also, it must be remembered that

the provision invoked by the accused before the High

Court is Section 482 of the CrPC and that this Court is

hearing an appeal from an order under Section 482 of

the CrPC. Section 482 of the CrPC reads as follows:

“482. Saving of inherent powers of the

High Court.—Nothing in this Code shall be

deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of

the High Court to make such orders as may be

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necessary to give effect to any order under this

Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any

court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.”

16. There is nothing in the words of this section which

restricts the exercise of inherent powers by the Court

to prevent the abuse of process of court or miscarriage

of justice only up to the stage of the FIR. It is settled

principle of law that the High Court can exercise

jurisdiction under Section 482 of CrPC even when the

discharge application is pending with the trial court [G.

Sagar Suri v. State of U.P., (2000) 2 SCC 636, para 7,

Umesh Kumar v. State of A.P., (2013) 10 SCC 591, para

20]. Indeed, it would be a travesty to hold that

proceedings initiated against a person can be

interfered with at the stage of FIR but not if it has

advanced and the allegations have materialised into a

charge-sheet. On the contrary it could be said that the

abuse of process caused by the registration of the FIR

stands aggravated if the FIR has taken the form of a

charge-sheet after investigation. The power is

undoubtedly conferred to prevent abuse of process of

any court.

16. Keeping the aforesaid legal position in mind, we will

examine whether the facts/materials obtained in the present

case would warrant interference of this Court under Section

482 of the CrPC for quashing the said criminal proceedings

pending before the concerned courts.

17. As far as the first complaint is concerned, pursuant to

which FIR/Crime No. 0041/2023 came to be registered and

the subsequent charge-sheet/challan has been filed before

the competent Court, resulting in the criminal proceedings

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presently pending before the Court of the learned Judicial

Magistrate First Class, Guna, the relevant allegations

contained in the complaint/FIR may be reproduced as

under:-

“xxxxxx

Complainant Mrs. Sapna Dhakad, wife of Divyraj

Dhakad, aged 30 years, residing at Sadar Bazaar,

Shivpuri, currently living at Nayapura, Baiju Chowk,

Guna, mobile number 9300797608, along with her

brother Dr. Arun Prakash Dhakad, appeared at the

police station and orally reported that on 19.11.2019,

her marriage took place with Divyraj Dhakad, who is

currently posted as a Revenue Inspector in the Tehsil

Baroda, District Sheopur, according to Hindu rituals.

My father gave thirty-one lakh rupees in cash, ten lakh

rupees worth of gold jewelry, and other household

items at the time of the marriage. Six months after the

marriage, my husband started harassing me and

would say that he could not bear my expenses and

that I should bring more money from my parental

home. Then I said that my father had already given

you a large dowry, and now I cannot get you a single

rupee from my parents. After this, my husband and in-

laws - 1. Brother-in-law Vikram Dhakad, 2. Sister-in-

law Manisha Dhakad, 3. Mother-in-law Shrivati Bai

Dhakad, 4. Sister-in-law Aarti Mehta - started to be

upset with me. After this, my husband and in-laws

started abusing me and would tell me to go and live

with my parents, as they would not keep me there. My

husband would leave me alone at my in-laws' house

In Shivpuri and go to Sheopur. When I told them that I

also wanted to live with him in Sheopur, my husband

would abuse me with filthy language about my mother

and sister, beat me, and physically and mentally

torture me. He would not take me with him . My

husband's family - 1. Brother-in-law Vikram Dhakad,

2. Sister in-law Manisha Dhakad, 3. Mother -in-law

Shrivati Bai Dhakad, 4. Sister-in-law Aarti Mehta -

would demand dowry from me every day and would

tell me that if I did not bring dowry, I should go back to

my parental home. In this way, my husband and in

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laws have been continuously tormenting me over

dowry demands. Distressed by the torture from my in-

laws, I have been living at my father's house for the

past 6 months. On 08.09.2022, around 2:00 PM, my

husband came to my parental home in Nayapura,

Guna, and told me that he would not keep me with him.

He abused me and my family, refusing to take me with

him, and then left. I had lodged a complaint against my

husband and in-laws at the Family Counseling Center

in Guna, but even there, my husband and in-laws were

not ready to keep me with them. Therefore, I have come

to the police station today to fiie a report. I am filing the

report and request action to be taken.”

(emphasis added)

18. Ordinarily, filing of a charge -sheet signifies

culmination of the investigation during which the

investigating agency collects the material and evidence

forming the basis for proceeding against the accused. At the

same time, while examining the legality and sustainability of

the criminal proceedings in exercise of jurisdiction under

Section 482 CrPC and Article 136 of the Constitution, this

Court is not confined merely to the FIR in isolation and may

also consider other contemporaneous pleadings and

documents placed on record having a bearing on the

allegations levelled between the parties. Accordingly, in the

present case, apart from the allegations contained in the FIR

and the complaint under the DV Act, this Court deems it

appropriate to also examine the pleadings taken by

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complainant/wife in the matrimonial proceedings,

particularly the divorce petition instituted by her before the

concerned Family Court, so as to appreciate the nature,

consistency and tenor of the allegations made against the

present appellants.

19. In this regard, we may refer to the divorce petition filed

by the complainant before the competent Family Court,

relevant portions of which are reproduced hereinbelow: -

“xxxxxx

2. That, after marriage on 20.11.2019, after auspicious

adieu, the non-applicant took her to his house at 38,

Dhakad Jewellers Sadar Bazar Shivpuri, Tehsil

Shivpuri District Shivpuri. All the social rituals that

take place after marriage were performed at the house

of the non-applicant at 38, Dhakad Jewellers Sadar

Bazar, Shivpuri. After marriage, the applicant lived

with the non-applicant at his house in Shivpuri as

husband and wife and continued to lead their married

life. The non-applicant being in government service and

being posted as Revenue Inspector in Tehsil Baroda

District Sheopur, has got a government quarter in

Sheopur. After some time of marriage, the non -

applicant took the applicant to live in his government

quarter in Sheopur. Then the applicant saw that the

non-applicant used to go to his government duty by

9.30 in the morning and used to return home by 10-11

pm. When he came home after duty at night,

sometimes he used to eat at home and sometimes he

had eaten outside. Similarly, the routine of the non-

applicant remained the same even on government

holidays. Since the applicant is the married wife of the

non-applicant, when she asked him about not eating

at home, the non-applicant used to scold the applicant

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instead of giving the right answer. This kind of

behaviour of the non-applicant started giving rise to

doubts in the mind of the applicant. Whether the non-

applicant has made arrangements for his food and

stay at some other place.

3. The applicant experienced Karwa Chauth for the

first time at her in-laws' place on 04/11/20 in

Sheopur. When Karva Chauth came, the non-applicant

told the applicant that let's go and celebrate Karva

Chauth at home in Shivpuri. We reached Shivpuri

around 5 pm. After reaching home, within 10 minutes,

the non-applicant told the applicant that the necessary

documents have arrived in the car and we will have to

go back to Sheopur to give them. After that, the non-

applicant returned to his home in Shivpuri around

10.30 pm. The applicant kept wafting to break her fast

of Karva Chauth till 10.30 pm. Thus, when the second

Karva Chauth came on 24,10.2021, even then the

applicant and the non -applicant lived in the

government quarters of Sheopur. At 8 pm, just before

the moonrise, the non-applicant went out… The non-

applicant considers some other woman as his wife.

The non-applicant is in government service and is

posted on the post of Revenue Inspector…

4. That it has been more than 3 years since the

applicant got married and she does not have any child

yet. The non-applicant has not even got the marriage

certificate made nor has the non-applicant added the

applicant's name in his family's ID. This gives rise to

many kinds of thoughts in the applicant's mind. The

applicant has become completely confident. The non-

applicant has kept some other woman as his wife. The

non-applicant talks to me very rarely. He used to sleep

in a separate room from mine. He used to make me

sleep in the inner room. He used to lock my room from

the outside. He used to talk to someone else for hours

at night in the outer room. When he used to come out

of his room during daytime and talk on a particular

number. Then the neighbouring women used to ask the

applicant as to whom he keeps talking to for hours.

Page 22 of 65

Why don't you make your husband understand. When

the applicant asked the non-applicant as to whom he

keeps talking to for hours after going out, the non-

applicant said that he is talking to a friend.

5. That after some time of marriage, the non-applicant

told the applicant that my entire salary is spent on my

father's treatment and now I am unable to bear your

expenses. My father has got a disease like cancer. For

this reason, now bring some money from your parents

so that I can get my father treated. The applicant told

the non-applicant that your father and brother have a

big shop of gold and silver jewellery in Sadar Bazar

Shivpuri, there is 20 bigha land in village Sheshram.

The non applicant got angry with the applicant on

saying that you can use it for treatment. The applicant

told the non-applicant that my father gave me gold

jewellery worth 10 lakh rupees, cash worth 31 lakh

rupees and household goods worth 3 lakh rupees at

the time of marriage. My all jewellery is with my

mother-in-law, in which even the gold jewellery is with

her. Due to my refusal to ask for more money from my

mother, the non-applicant became angry with my

parents also. The non-applicant started abusing and

slapping me on every small issue. I have all the video

and audio of it. When the time comes, the said video,

audio and photographs will be presented before the

court.

6. That, when the non-applicant was living in a

government house in Sheopur, the non-applicant kept

taking the applicant out of Sheopur on certain pretexts,

sometimes to her sister's house in Baran, sometimes to

her maternal home in Guna, sometimes to her in-laws'

house in Shivpuri. In the month of April 2022, the non-

applicant left her at her home in Shivpuri and went

away. She stayed at her in-laws' house in Shivpuri for

a month. In this one month, the non-applicant came to

Shivpuri thrice but neither spoke to the applicant nor

met her nor asked her to go to Sheopur. The non-

applicant's elder brother Vikram Dhakad said that

guests keep coming to our house. To whom will we

Page 23 of 65

keep answering why the daughter-in-law is staying

here while Divyaraj is staying in Sheopur itself. To

whom will we answer why the daughter -in-law is

staying here alone. The very next day, on 30.05.2022,

my brother-in-law Vikram Dhakad got me released in

Sheopur along with my sister-in-law Manisha Dhakad

and brother Ganesh Dhakad. The non applicant's elder

brother and her family members did not allow her to

stay in her in-laws' house in Shivpuri. The non-

applicant wanted to stay here. Why did he leave the

applicant in Sheopur? The non-applicant's mother,

Smt. Vatibai, did not treat me well. She used to harass

me on every small issue due to her love for her son.

When I lived with my mother-in-law, she used to insult

me. After marriage, the applicant spent three years

with great difficulty thinking that the non-applicant will

understand someday. She is my married wife and I

want our married life not to be spoiled but even after a

lot of efforts, there has been no improvement in the

behaviour of the non-applicant and neither is he able

to distance himself from the woman with whom the

non-applicant has relations. The applicant has video

audio. Which will be presented in time.

7. That, the applicant lived with the non-applicant in

Sheopur. The non-applicant never took her along to

shopping, social functions like marriage, birthday, etc.

Even if the applicant fell sick, he did not take her to the

doctor. Even after being in government service during

the corona pandemic, the applicant did not take the

vaccine despite repeated requests. The applicant was

given both doses of the vaccine at her parents' place in

Guna, her maternal home. The applicant's life in

Sheopur was like hell. The non applicant neither

allowed her to go out nor talk to anyone. The non-

applicant had installed a camera and kept a recording

device in the room where the applicant slept so that

whatever she was talking to her family members could

be recorded in the non-applicant's mobile. The non-

applicant used to fight with the applicant and abuse

her mother and sister. The non-applicant behaved

Page 24 of 65

cruelly with the applicant. She was tortured mentally

and physically.

8. That when the applicant was living with the non-

applicant in Sheopur government accommodation, she

saw a key ring with the non-applicant on which Preeti

was written in English…The non-applicant also kept a

licensed pistol with him. When the applicant talked to

the non-applicant to get the information, after that the

non-applicant threatened her with his licensed pistol

and said that if you speak too much, I will kill you. I

will not let you live in peace. It is requested to the

Honourable Court to please get the WhatsApp and call

details of Diyyaraj's mobile number 7974168390 so

that their relationship can be confirmed.

9. That the applicant called the non-applicant's family

and parents to Sheopur and told them about the above

incident and the non-applicant's actions, but the family

members used to scold the applicant only. Due to love

for his son, they kept ignoring such acts of the non-

applicant, the non-applicant is ready to beat him on

every small thing. There was no one in the family to

intervene. The non applicant's behaviour was cruel

towards the applicant and he used to abuse the mother

and sister, beat her and taunt her, etc. The non-

applicant's elder sister Aarti Mehta also came to

Sheopur many times. The applicant informed her

regarding all types of acts such beating and abuse by

the non-applicant. No statement was made on the

incident told by the applicant. The applicant thought

that the non-applicant can cause an unpleasant

incident at any time in which the applicant can also be

killed, hence the applicant came from Sheopur to

Shivpuri on 8.9.2022 on the festival of Raksha

Bandhan with the non -applicant's sister and the

applicant came to Guna to her parents with her elder

sister whose in-laws are also in Shivpuri and is living

in Guna since 9.8.2022. When the non-applicant came

to Guna for some work on 8.9.2022, the applicant's

parents explained to him that why a re you

unnecessarily troubling Sapna. The applicant's

Page 25 of 65

parents said that because of this Preeti Sikarwar, your

good family can break, there is still time for you to

improve, but the non-applicant did not give any

satisfactory answer and immediately went back from

Guna.

10. That, the family members of the applicant went to

Sheopur to invite the non-applicant to the Parayan

program and told the non-applicant that there is a

Parayan program at our place. We have come to give

you this invitation, you have to come to the program,

you should bring Sapna along with you, then the non-

applicant said that we do not have to talk on this topic.

The mother of the applicant also talked to the mother

of the non-applicant and said that you should discuss

this relationship. The parents and brother of the

applicant were insulted and driven away. They kept

waiting for the non-applicant on 27.11.2022 but the

non-applicant did not come to the Parayan program.

xxxxxx

14. That after the applicant submitted the said

application, first of all on 09.08.2022, when the

applicant came to Guna from her home on Rakhi, from

that date till today neither the non-applicant nor any

family member has come to take the applicant.

Thereafter, on 02.12.2022, an application for

reconciliation was submitted by the applicant at the

Counselling Centre, Guna. The said reconciliation talks

failed, before this, on 11.01.2023, the non-applicant

submitted an application to the Principal Judge, Family

Court Shivpuri, District Shivpuri, under Section 9 of the

HMA and on 10.04.2023, the non-applicant withdrew

the said application and wants to file a divorce petition

against the applicant. This proves that the non -

applicant wants divorce from the applicant. The non-

applicant's behaviour was cruel towards the applicant.

The non-applicant never gave the applicant the status

of his wife. He did not even follow the marital relations.

When the cause of action arose after 09.08.2022, on

10.04.2023, the non -applicant withdrew the

application of Section 9 and demanded in the said

Page 26 of 65

application that the non-applicant wants to file a

divorce petition.”

20. When the allegations contained in the FIR and the

pleadings taken by the complainant/wife in the divorce

proceedings are minutely examined, it becomes evident that

the gravamen of the allegations is primarily directed against

the husband, namely, Divyaraj Dhakad. The allegations

relating to physical assault, abusive conduct, refusal to keep

the complainant with him, suspicion regarding another

relationship, installation of cameras in the matrimonial

residence, threats with a licensed pistol and denial of marital

companionship are all specifically attributed to the husband

alone.

In fact, the complainant repeatedly states in the divorce

petition that “the non-applicant started abusing and slapping

me on every small issue”, “the non-applicant used to lock my

room from the outside”, “the non-applicant had installed a

camera and kept a recording device in the room” and “the non-

applicant threatened her with his licensed pistol”. None of

these allegations are attributed to the present appellants.

Page 27 of 65

21. As regards the present appellants, namely, Arti Mehta,

Shrivati Bai Dhakad, Manisha Dhakad and Vikram Dhakad,

the allegations are essentially omnibus and generalised in

nature. In the FIR, the complainant merely states that the

husband and the in-laws “started abusing me and would tell

me to go and live with my parents” and that the appellants

“would demand dowry from me every day and would tell me

that if I did not bring dowry, I should go back to my parental

home.” Beyond these broad and sweeping assertio ns, no

specific incident, date, overt act or particular role has been

attributed individually to any of the appellants. The

allegations do not disclose as to which appellant made what

demand, on which occasion, in whose presence, or in what

manner any specific act constituting cruelty under Section

498A IPC was committed.

22. Significantly, even in the elaborate divorce petition

subsequently filed by the complainant/wife, the allegations

continue to remain substantially vague insofar as the

present appellants are concerned. The detailed allegations of

cruelty, harassment and mental trauma overwhelmingly

revolve around the conduct of the husband at Sheopur,

Page 28 of 65

where admittedly the complainant was residing with him in

the government accommodation allotted to him. The

complainant herself states in paragraph 2 of the divorce

petition that “after some time of marriage, the non-applicant

took the applicant to live in his government quarter in

Sheopur.” She further reiterates in paragraph 3 that during

the second Karva Chauth, “the applicant and the non-

applicant lived in the government quarters of Sheopur.” These

pleadings clearly indicate that the matrimonial residence of

the parties was at Sheopur and not at Shivpuri, where the

present appellants were residing.

The complainant, however, in the counter affidavit as

well as in the written submissions filed before this Court, has

attempted to explain the aforesaid position by contending

that while she was residing with her husband at Sheopur,

the husband along with the present appellants used to

harass her for dowry and that whenever the husband left her

at the in-laws’ house at Shivpuri, the appellants also used to

harass her and prevent her from residing peacefully in the

matrimonial home. It has further been contended on behalf

Page 29 of 65

of the complainant that these aspects are also reflected in

the translated divorce petition and the prosecution’s story.

Even if the aforesaid explanation is accepted at its face

value, the allegations against the present appellants

nevertheless remain broad, generalised, and bereft of specific

particulars. Neither in the FIR nor in the divorce petition nor

even in the subsequent pleadings before this Court has the

complainant specified any particular date, incident or overt

act attributable individually to any of the present appellants

which would prima facie constitute cruelty or unlawful

demand of dowry within the meaning of Section 498A IPC or

Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. The

allegations essentially remain collective assertions that the

appellants “used to harass” the complainant or “supported”

the husband, without any clear delineation of the precise role

allegedly played by each of them. Mere use of omnibus

expressions against all family members, in the absence of

specific factual assertions, would not by itself justify

continuation of criminal proceedings against the present

appellants.

Page 30 of 65

23. In fact, the complainant’s own pleadings substantially

dilute the allegations sought to be levelled against the

appellants in the FIR. While the FIR creates an impression

of continuous harassment by all in-laws collectively, the

divorce petition narrates specific acts, almost entirely

concerning the husband. Even the allegation regarding the

demand for money is primarily against the husband, wherein

the complainant states that “the non-applicant told the

applicant that my entire salary is spent on my fa ther's

treatment, and now I am unable to bear your expenses. …

now bring some money from your parents.” The subsequent

allegation that the husband became angry and started

abusing and slapping her is also directed solely against him.

The appellants are not alleged to have actively participated

in any specific demand or act of cruelty.

24. The allegations against the appellant No.4 - Vikram

Dhakad are also of a generalised nature and do not disclose

any criminal intent or overt act constituting an offence under

Section 498A IPC. In paragraph 6 of the divorce petition, the

complainant merely states that Vikram Dhakad remarked

that “guests keep coming to our house” and questioned why

Page 31 of 65

she was residing at Shivpuri while her husband was staying

in Sheopur. Even if the said allegations are accepted at their

face value, they merely indicate a domestic disagreement

regarding her stay at the matrimonial house and do not

amount to cruelty or unlawful dowry demand within the

meaning of the penal provisions invoked.

25. Similarly, the allegations against the appellant No.1

Arti Mehta are confined to assertions that the complainant

had informed her regarding the conduct of the husband and

that she did not react in the manner expected by the

complainant. In paragraph 9 of the divorce petition, the

complainant states that “The non-applicant’s elder sister

Aarti Mehta also came to Sheopur many times. The applicant

informed her regarding all types of acts, such as beating and

abuse by the non-applicant. No statement was made on the

incident told by the applicant.” Mere failure to intervene in a

matrimonial dispute between spouses, without any specific

allegation of active participation in cruelty or dowry demand,

cannot by itself attract criminal liability.

26. It is also pertinent to note that the complainant herself

states in paragraph 9 of the divorce petition that she

Page 32 of 65

travelled from Sheopur to Shivpuri on the occasion of

Raksha Bandhan along with the appellant No.1 Arti Mehta.

The relevant portion states that “the applicant came from

Sheopur to Shivpuri on 8.9.2022 on the festival of Raksha

Bandhan with the non-applicant’s sister.” This circumstance

assumes significance because it becomes difficult to readily

accept that the complainant would voluntarily travel with the

very same appellant whom she alleges to have been

continuously harassing and tormenting her for dowry.

Though this circumstance by itself may not be

determinative, it certainly weakens the allegation of

persistent and active cruelty attributed to the appellant No.1.

27. Further, the complainant’s own pleadings

demonstrate that there was no continuous shared household

with the present the appellants. The repeated references in

the divorce petition indicate that the complainant was

residing with her husband at Sheopur in his government

accommodation and that the visits to Shivpuri were

occasional and temporary in nature. Thus, even on the

complainant’s own showing, the principal matrimonial

Page 33 of 65

relationship and the alleged acts of cruelty were centred

around the husband at Sheopur.

28. What, therefore, emerges from a cumulative reading of

the FIR and the divorce petition is that while there are

specific allegations against the husband relating to physical

assault, verbal abuse, neglect and suspicious conduct, the

allegations against the present appellants remain bald,

generalised, and devoid of material particulars. No

independent or specific role has been attributed to any of the

present appellants so as to disclose prima facie commission

of offences under Sections 498A/34 IPC or Sections 3 and 4

of the Dowry Prohibition Act. The allegations against them

appear to be omnibus assertions made on account of their

relationship with the husband rather than on the basis of

any distinct criminal acts allegedly committed by them.

29. It is a matter of common judicial experience that

matrimonial disputes are often accompanied by heightened

emotions, strained relationships and deep-seated personal

grievances. In such circumstances, complaints alleging

cruelty and harassment frequently tend to implicate not only

the spouse but also the entire family of the spouse, including

Page 34 of 65

those relatives who may have had little or no active role in

the matrimonial discord. Quite often, family members who

may have remained passive spectators, failed to intervene, or

merely sided with one party in a domestic disagreement, are

also arrayed as accused. However, mere familial association

with the husband, or failure to support the complainant in a

marital dispute, cannot by itself constitute a criminal offence

in the absence of specific allegations disclosing active

participation in acts amounting to cruelty, harassment or

unlawful demand of dowry.

30. It must also be borne in mind that when matrimonial

relationships deteriorate and bitterness sets in, there is a

natural tendency for allegations to be amplified or broadly

worded out of anger, frustration or emotional distress. While

the anguish of a complainant in a failed marriage cannot be

lightly disregarded, equally, criminal law cannot be

permitted to be set in motion against every relative of the

husband merely on the basis of generalised and omnibus

allegations lacking a specific factual foundation. Courts,

therefore, are required to exercise greater caution and

carefully scrutinise whether the allegations genuinely

Page 35 of 65

disclose the commission of cognizable offences against each

accused individually, lest the criminal process itself becomes

a tool of harassment and misuse.

31. Coming now to the other proceedings initiated under

the DV Act, the same arise out of D.V. Complaint No. 1752

of 2023 pending before the Court of the Judicial Magistrate

First Class, Guna, Madhya Pradesh, instituted on the basis

of the complaint filed by the complainant/wife under Section

12 of the DV Act against the husband and the present

appellants. The relevant allegations contained in the said

complaint may be reproduced herein below:

“xxxxxx

I Sapna Dhakad W/o Divyaraj Dhakad Age 30 years

R/o Nayapura Chauraha District Guna (M.P.) solemnly

state that… When I went to Sheopur after marriage, I

saw that husband Divyaraj leaves for his duty around

9:30 in the morning and used to return home by 10-11

in the night. Even on the day of government holidays,

his routine was the same. My husband Divyaraj said

after some time of marriage that my father is suffering

from cancer and most of my salary is spent on my

father's treatment. Now I cannot bear your expenses

and now you should bring more money from your

maternal home. I said that my father gave gold jewelry

worth 10 lakhs in the marriage. He had given me Rs.31

lakh in cash and all the household items and all my

jewellery is with his mother. After giving so much, I

cannot bring any more money from my parents' house.

Due to this, my husband and in-laws my Smt. Shrivati

Page 36 of 65

Bai, my brother-in-law Vikram Dhakad, my sister-in-

law Aarti Mehta and my elder sister-in-law Manisha

Dhakad used to get angry with me. In this way they

started torturing me physically and mentally. When I

was at my in-laws' place also, the festival of Karwa

Chauth fell twice but both the times, he would go out

of the house before the moon" rose in the evening and

would return by 10-11 pm at night. When 1 expressed

my inability to give the money, he did not make me the

nominee of his government service. It has been 3 years

since our marriage but till date he has not got our

marriage certificate made and even though my name

was in his family’s Samagra ID, he has not added it.

He does not even talk to me. He makes me sleep in a

separate room in the inner room and sleeps in the outer

room and talks on the phone for hours at night. During

the day, he used to talk to someone after coming, out

of the government residence…

When I lived in Sheopur, he neither took me to the

market for shopping nor did he take me along to add

weddings and birthdays and when I fell, he did not

even take me to the doctor for treatment. Even during

the Corona pandemic, he did not get me vaccinated

against Corona. I had taken both the doses of Corona

vaccine at my maternal home. He neither took me out

nor allowed me to go out of the house. When I went out

of the house, he used to abuse and beat me. He had

placed a hidden camera and recording device in my

room so that whatever I talk to my family members, it

all gets recorded in his mobile. In this way, I was

tortured physically and mentally there.

On one pretext or the other, he took me out of Sheopur,

sometimes to my maternal home Guna, sometimes to

my in-laws' house Shivpuri, once each at his sister's

house and left me in Shivpuri. I stayed in Shivpuri for

a month, during this time he came to Shivpuri three

times, neither did he talk to me nor asked me to go to

Sheopur. One day his elder brother Vikram Dhakad

asked why the daughter -in-law is staying here.

Whereas Divyaraj lives in Sheopur. Now you bring

Page 37 of 65

money from your maternal home as per our demand

and either stay in Sheopur or stay in your maternal

home in Guna. So the very next day Vikram Dhakad

along with his wife Manisha Dhakad and brother

Ganesh Dhakad got me released from Sheopur and did

not let me stay in their house, neither my in-laws

would let me stay in their house nor my husband

would let me stay in his house. In Shivpuri, his mother

Smt. Shrivati Bai and Bhabhi Manisha Dhakad used

to insult me on small matters and demand money, for

the last 2 years I am spending time by staying here

and there. Many times I called his family members to

Sheopur and told them about his activities, then

Vikram Dhakad said that we will not come to Sheopur

again and again. You will have to live the way Divyaraj

keeps you, otherwise go to your maternal home in

Guna. I told his sister Aarti Mehta about his activities

many times, then she scolded me and said that you

should keep quiet otherwise it will not be good. Fulfill

our demand, if you want to stay here, then go to your

maternal home. His mother Smt. Shrivati Bai, sister

Aarti Mehta, brother Vikram Dhakad, sister-in-law

Manisha Dhakad used to support him completely. On

the festival of Rakhi, she came to Shivpuri from

Sheopur with her sisters and from Shivpuri to Guna

with her sister on Rakshabandhan. Since then I am

living in my home in Guna.

I want my husband Divyaraj Dhakad to provide me a

separate house to live in and provide me all the

comforts in that house and bear all my expenses

(maintenance).”

(emphasis added)

32. A careful reading of the complaint filed under the DV

Act would show that the substantial and predominant

allegations again centre around the conduct of the husband

while the complainant was residing with him at Sheopur.

Page 38 of 65

The complainant narrates several incidents relating to the

husband allegedly returning late at night, refusing to take

her out, compelling her to sleep separately, allegedly

installing hidden cameras and recording devices in the room

occupied by her, restricting her movement and subjecting

her to physical and mental harassment. The complaint

specifically states that “he neither took me out nor allowed me

to go out of the house. When I went out of the house, he used

to abuse and beat me. He had placed a hidden camera and

recording device in my room…” These allegations are

singularly directed against the husband and do not attribute

any participation therein to the present appellants.

33. Likewise, the allegations concerning non -

consummation of marital obligations, refusal to make the

complainant nominee in service records, not obtaining a

marriage certificate, sleeping separately and speaking on the

phone for long hours with someone else are also allegations

exclusively against the husband. The complaint repeatedly

uses expressions such as “my husband Divyaraj said…”, “he

did not make me the nominee”, “he does not even talk to me”

and “he makes me sleep in a separate room.” Thus, the

Page 39 of 65

foundational allegations constituting the core of the

matrimonial discord are essentially directed against the

husband and his personal conduct towards the complainant.

34. Insofar as the present appellants are concerned, the

allegations in the DV complaint remain broadly worded and

largely collective in nature. The complainant states that due

to refusal to bring money from her parental home, “my

husband and in-laws … used to get angry with me. In this

way they started torturing me physically and mentally.”

However, beyond the use of such omnibus expressions, the

complaint does not disclose any specific incident, date, act

or conduct individually attributable to any of the appellants

which would constitute “domestic violence” within the

meaning of the DV Act.

35. Even the allegations concerning the complainant’s

brother-in-law, namely, Vikram Dhakad (Appellant No.4),

are essentially in the nature of statements allegedly advising

the complainant regarding her matrimonial life. The

complaint states that Vikram Dhakad questioned why the

complainant was staying at Shivpuri while the husband was

residing at Sheopur and allegedly told her that “you bring

Page 40 of 65

money from your maternal home as per our demand and

either stay in Sheopur or stay in your maternal home in

Guna.” Thereafter, it is alleged that Vikram Dhakad, along

with Manisha Dhakad and Ganesh Dhakad, did not permit

her to continue residing at Shivpuri. Even if these allegations

are accepted at their face value, they do not disclose any

specific act of physical violence, criminal intimidation or

overt conduct of such nature as would independently attract

criminal liability under the provisions of the DV Act.

36. Similarly, the allegations against the complainant’s

mother-in-law, namely, Shrivati Bai Dhakad (Appellant No.2)

and the wife of the complainant’s brother-in-law, namely,

Manisha Dhakad (Appellant No.3), are confined to broad

assertions that “they used to insult me on small matters and

demand money.” The complaint is conspicuously silent

regarding the particulars of such alleged demands, the time

and place where such incidents occurred, or the manner in

which such demands were allegedly made. General

allegations of “insult” or “harassment” without supporting

particulars cannot by themselves form the basis for

continuation of criminal proceedings.

Page 41 of 65

37. As regards the complainant’s sister-in-law Arti Mehta

(Appellant No.1), the allegation is essentially that when the

complainant informed her about the husband’s conduct, she

allegedly scolded the complainant and advised her to remain

quiet and fulfil the family’s demands. The relevant allegation

reads that “I told his sister Aarti Mehta about his activities

many times, then she scolded me and said that you should

keep quiet, otherwise it will not be good.” The allegation, even

if accepted in entirety, merely suggests that appellant No.1

sided with her brother in the matrimonial dispute. Mere

failure to support the complainant, or advising her to

continue in the matrimonial relationship, without any

further overt act, would not ipso facto amount to domestic

violence so as to justify criminal prosecution.

38. Another aspect which assumes significance is that the

complainant herself states that she travelled from Sheopur

to Shivpuri on the occasion of Raksha Bandhan along with

the sisters of the husband, including appellant No.1 Arti

Mehta. The complaint records that “On the festival of Rakhi,

she came to Shivpuri from Sheopur with her sisters…” This

circumstance, though not conclusive by itself, does create

Page 42 of 65

some degree of inconsistency in the allegations of persistent

and active harassment sought to be levelled against the

appellant No.1.

39. What ultimately emerges from a cumulative reading of

the DV complaint is that while the complainant has narrated

several detailed allegations concerning the husband’s

conduct and the strained matrimonial relationship between

the spouses, the allegations against the present appellants

remain generalised and derivative in character. The

complaint does not disclose any specific or direct act

individually attributable to the appellants constituting

domestic violence, physical abuse, verbal abuse, emotional

abuse or economic abuse within the meaning of the DV Act.

The allegations against them are essentially that they

supported the husband, failed to intervene in the

matrimonial dispute, or asked the complainant to adjust to

the situation. Such omnibus and broadly worded allegations,

in the absence of clear particulars and specific overt acts,

would not justify continuation of proceedings against the

present appellants.

Page 43 of 65

40. We have also taken note of the fact that during the

pendency of the present proceedings, the marriage between

the complainant and her husband already stood dissolved by

a decree passed by the competent Family Court. In such

circumstances, continuation of the proceedings under the

DV Act qua the present appellants, in the absence of specific

and substantiated allegations against them as of now, would

serve no useful purpose. It is, however, clarified that the

complainant would be at liberty to avail such remedies

against the husband as may be permissible to her in

accordance with law.

41. It is further required to be stated that the invocation

of the criminal process is not a matter of course. The coercive

machinery of criminal law carries serious civil and personal

consequences and, therefore, can be legitimately set in

motion only where the allegations disclose specific acts

constituting offences punishable under the penal law. This

principle assumes even greater significance in cases arising

out of matrimonial and domestic discord. Family

relationships are founded upon emotional bonds, mu tual

trust, affection and shared responsibilities, and cannot be

Page 44 of 65

viewed through the same lens as ordinary commercial, civil

disputes or criminal cases. It is not uncommon that when

matrimonial relationships deteriorate, allegations are made

in the heat of emotional turmoil and bitterness, often

resulting in the entire family of the spouse being drawn into

criminal litigation. However, criminal law canno t be

permitted to become an instrument for venting personal

grievances or settling familial scores in the absence of clear,

specific and legally sustainable allegations. Courts must

therefore exercise a heightened degree of caution and judicial

scrutiny before permitting criminal prosecution against

relatives who are sought to be implicated merely by virtue of

their relationship with the spouse.

42. At the same time, this Court is equally conscious of

the reality that genuine cases of cruelty and domestic

violence do occur within the confines of the matrimonial

home and often remain concealed from public gaze. Acts of

emotional, verbal, economic or physical abuse within the

domestic sphere may not always leave behind readily

available evidence or independent witnesses, and the

absence of such evidence at the threshold cannot by itself be

Page 45 of 65

a ground to disbelieve a victim. It is precisely to address this

social evil that legislations such as the Protection of Women

from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 and the penal provisions

relating to cruelty and dowry harassment have been enacted

with wide amplitude and protective intent. The object of such

statutes is to ensure meaningful legal protection to women

subjected to domestic abuse and harassment within the

matrimonial home.

43. However, while safeguarding the rights and dignity of

victims of domestic violence remains of paramount

importance, courts are simultaneously required to ensure

that the rigours of criminal law are not indiscriminately

extended to every member of the family without a clear

factual foundation. In prosecutions arising out of

matrimonial disputes, the allegations against each accused

must be specific, distinct and supported by prima facie

material indicating active involvement in the alleged acts of

cruelty, harassment or unlawful demand of dowry. Mere

allegations that family members “supported” the husband,

failed to intervene, or advised the complainant to adjust in

the matrimonial relationship, without anything further,

Page 46 of 65

would not ipso facto attract criminal liability. There may

indeed be situations where certain relatives remain passive

spectators or fail to come to the aid of the complainant;

however, such conduct, though morally questionable,

cannot automatically be elevated to the status of criminal

culpability unless the surrounding circumstances clearly

disclose their active complicity or participation in the alleged

offences.

44. It must therefore be emphasised that each case arising

out of matrimonial discord or allegations of domestic violence

must necessarily turn on its own peculiar facts and the

nature of allegations levelled against the accused concerned.

The observations made herein should not be construed to

mean that relatives of the husband can never be prosecuted

under the relevant penal provisions. Where the material on

record discloses specific overt acts, active participation, or

direct involvement in perpetrating cruelty, harassment or

domestic violence, such relatives would undoubtedly be

liable to face prosecution in accordance with the law. What

the Court is required to carefully examine is whether the

allegations are genuine, specific and supported by

Page 47 of 65

foundational facts, or whether they are merely a

consequence of matrimonial acrimony resulting in sweeping

and omnibus implication of all family members. In the

absence of such specific allegations and prima facie material,

continuation of criminal proceedings against such relatives

would amount to abuse of the process of law.

45. Having given our anxious consideration to the

allegations contained in the FIR, the complaint under the DV

Act, the pleadings exchanged between the parties in the

matrimonial proceedings and the material placed on record,

we find that the substratum of the allegations primarily

concerns the matrimonial discord between the complainant

and her husband. The allegations relating to physical

assault, abusive conduct, emotional neglect, suspicion

regarding extramarital relationship, threats, restriction on

movement and denial of marital companionship are

overwhelmingly directed against the husband. Insofar as the

present appellants are concerned, the allegations remain

generalised, omnibus and lacking in material particulars.

As discussed hereinabove, neither the FIR nor the DV

complaint nor even the subsequent pleadings before the

Page 48 of 65

Family Court disclose any specific overt act individually

attributable to the present appellants so as to prima facie

constitute offences punishable under Sections 498A/34 IPC,

Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act or the

provisions of the DV Act. The allegations against the

appellants essentially proceed on broad assertions that they

“supported” the husband, “used to harass” the complainant,

or advised her to either adjust with the husband or return to

her parental home. However, no distinct incident, date,

specific demand, act of physical cruelty, unlawful

intimidation or active participation in the alleged

harassment has been clearly attributed to any of the

appellants individually.

46. Though their behaviour as projected in the complaint

appear to be reproachable otherwise, yet these may not be

sufficient to attract criminal liabilities. Permitting the

proceedings to continue against the appellants in the

absence of specific and legally sustainable allegations would

amount to an abuse of the process of law.

47. The above conclusion, however, cannot and must not

be read as an expression of permanent exoneration of the

Page 49 of 65

present appellants in respect of the allegations levelled

against them. This Court is acutely conscious of the deeply

troubling social reality that matrimonial homes in India

continue to witness grave instances of cruelty, dowry

harassment and domestic violence perpetrated not merely by

the husband but, in numerous cases, with the active co-

operation and connivance of the extended family members

as well. The legislative wisdom underlying Section 498A of

the Indian Penal Code, the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 and

the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005,

reflects the collective societal resolve to combat the scourge

of mental and physical harassment visited upon women

within the matrimonial fold who starts a new life in a

different environment. The quashing of the proceedings

against the present appellants herein is founded exclusively

upon the absence of specific and distinct allegations

disclosing their individual involvement at this stage. We have

merely examined the existence of prima facie case of the

alleged offence for our satisfaction to determine whether the

criminal proceedings should continue qua the appellants.

Accordingly, we make it clear that in the course of the trial

Page 50 of 65

in respect of the husband which shall proceed unimpeded, if

evidence emerges which indicate and disclose a specific role

or the involvement of any of the present appellants, the trial

court must proceed against any of them, irrespective of the

observations and findings against them in this proceeding.

48. In this context, reference may be made to Section 319

of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (now Section 358 of

the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023), which

empowers a court, during the course of an inquiry or trial,

to proceed against any person not being an accused before

it, if it appears from the evidence that such person has

committed any offence for which he could be tried together

with the accused already before the court. It can be said that

the legislature, in its wisdom, has reserved a salutary power

in the trial court under Section 319 CrPC to summon and

proceed against any person, including a person (i) not named

in the FIR or (ii) a person though named in the FIR but has

not been charge-sheeted or (iii) a person who has been

discharged, if from the evidence in the course of an enquiry

or trial, it appears that such person can be tried along with

the accused already facing trial, as held in Hardeep Singh

Page 51 of 65

v. State of Punjab

3

. Pertinently, in addition to the aforesaid

categories, the ambit of Section 319 CrPC even extends to

persons against whom criminal proceedings had earlier been

quashed, as was rightly observed in MCD v. Ram Kishan

Rohtagi

4

.

49. The objective of Section 319 of the CrPC, as has been

held in various judgments, is that the real culprit should not

get away unpunished. The constitutional validity and the

contours of Section 319 CrPC have been authoritatively

expounded by a Constitution Bench of this Court in

Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab

5

. The relevant

paragraphs from the aforesaid judgment are reproduced as

follows:

“8. The constitutional mandate under Articles 20 and 21

of the Constitution of India provides a protective umbrella

for the smooth administration of justice making adequate

provisions to ensure a fair and efficacious trial so that the

accused does not get prejudiced after the law has been put

into motion to try him for the offence but at the same time

also gives equal protection to victims and to the society at

large to ensure that the guilty does not get away from the

clutches of law. For the empowerment of the courts to

ensure that the criminal administration of justice works

properly, the law was appropriately codified and modified

by the legislature under CrPC indicating as to how the

3

(2014) 3 SCC 92.

4

(1983) 1 SCC 1.

5

(2014) 3 SCC 92.

Page 52 of 65

courts should proceed in order to ultimately find out the

truth so that an innocent does not get punished but at the

same time, the guilty are brought to book under the law. It

is these ideals as enshrined under the Constitution and our

laws that have led to several decisions, whereby innovating

methods and progressive tools have been forged to find out

the real truth and to ensure that the guilty does not go

unpunished.

***

12. Section 319 CrPC springs out of the doctrine judex

damnatur cum nocens absolvitur (Judge is condemned

when guilty is acquitted) and this doctrine must be used as

a beacon light while explaining the ambit and the spirit

underlying the enactment of Section 319 CrPC.

13. It is the duty of the court to do justice by punishing

the real culprit. Where the investigating agency for any

reason does not array one of the real culprits as an accused,

the court is not powerless in calling the said accused to face

trial. The question remains under what circumstances and

at what stage should the court exercise its power as

contemplated in Section 319 CrPC?

***

19. The court is the sole repository of justice and a duty

is cast upon it to uphold the rule of law and, therefore, it will

be inappropriate to deny the existence of such powers with

the courts in our criminal justice system where it is not

uncommon that the real accused, at times, get away by

manipulating the investigating and/or the prosecuting

agency. The desire to avoid trial is so strong that an accused

makes efforts at times to get himself absolved even at the

stage of investigation or inquiry even though he may be

connected with the commission of the offence.”

50. The principles on which the power under Section 319

CrPC can be invoked have been dealt with by this Court in

Page 53 of 65

the judgment of Brijendra Singh v. State of Rajasthan

6,

which held as follows:

“10. It also goes without saying that Section 319 CrPC,

which is an enabling provision empowering the Court to

take appropriate steps for proceeding against any person,

not being an accused, can be exercised at any time after

the charge-sheet is filed and before the

pronouncement of the judgment, except during the

stage of Sections 207/208 CrPC, the committal, etc.

which is only a pre-trial stage intended to put the

process into motion.”

***

“13. In order to answer the question, some of the principles

enunciated in Hardeep Singh case [Hardeep Singh v. State

of Punjab, (2014) 3 SCC 92 : (2014) 2 SCC (Cri) 86] may be

recapitulated: power under Section 319 CrPC can be

exercised by the trial court at any stage during the trial i.e.

before the conclusion of trial, to summon any person as an

accused and face the trial in the ongoing case, once the trial

court finds that there is some “evidence” against such a

person on the basis of which evidence it can be gathered

that he appears to be guilty of the offence. The “evidence”

herein means the material that is brought before the court

during trial. Insofar as the material/evidence collected by

the IO at the stage of inquiry is concerned, it can be utilised

for corroboration and to support the evidence recorded by

the court to invoke the power under Section 319 CrPC. No

doubt, such evidence that has surfaced in examination-in-

chief, without cross-examination of witnesses, can also be

taken into consideration. However, since it is a

discretionary power given to the court under Section 319

CrPC and is also an extraordinary one, same has to be

exercised sparingly and only in those cases where the

circumstances of the case so warrant. The degree of

satisfaction is more than the degree which is warranted at

the time of framing of the charges against others in respect

of whom charge-sheet was filed. Only where strong and

6

(2017) 7 SCC 706.

Page 54 of 65

cogent evidence occurs against a person from the evidence

led before the court that such power should be exercised. It

is not to be exercised in a casual or a cavalier manner. The

prima facie opinion which is to be formed requires stronger

evidence than mere probability of his complicity.”

51. In the facts and circumstances of the instant case,

reliance may aptly be placed upon the decision of this Court

in MCD v. Ram Kishan Rohtagi

7. In the said case, a Food

Inspector filed a complaint before the Magistrate seeking

initiation of proceedings against the manager and the

directors of a company engaged in manufacturing a

particular brand of toffees, alleging contravention of certain

provisions of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. Upon

the Magistrate taking cognisance and proceeding against

the accused persons, they approached the High Court

under Section 482 of the CrPC for quashing of the

proceedings. Consequently, the High Court quashed the

proceedings against all the accused persons on the basis

that the complaint did not contain any specific averment

showing that they were in charge of the conduct of the

company’s affairs relating to the manufacture of the toffees.

In appeal, this Court reversed the High Court’s order insofar

7

(1983) 1 SCC 1.

Page 55 of 65

as the manager was concerned, as from the very nature of

his position and duties, it became clear that he was liable

to be proceeded against for the offence allegedly committed

by the company. However, with respect to the directors, the

High Court’s decision was affirmed since, at that stage,

there was inadequate material to justify continuation of

proceedings against them. At the same time, this Court

clarified that if prosecution was able to produce evidence

implicating any of the directors at a later stage during trial,

it was open to the trial court to proceed against them under

Section 319 of the CrPC. The relevant para from the

aforesaid judgment in Ram Kishan Rohtagi (supra) is

reproduced as follows:

“19. In these circumstances, therefore, if the prosecution

can at any stage produce evidence which satisfies the court

that the other accused or those who have not been arrayed

as accused against whom proceedings have been quashed

have also committed the offence the Court can take

cognizance against them and try them along with the other

accused. But, we would hasten to add that this is really an

extraordinary power which is conferred on the court and

should be used very sparingly and only if compelling

reasons exist for taking cognizance against the other person

against whom action has not been taken. More than this we

would not like to say anything further at this stage. We

leave the entire matter to the discretion of the court

concerned so that it may act according to law. We would,

however, make it plain that the mere fact that the

proceedings have been quashed against Respondents 2 to

Page 56 of 65

5 will not prevent the court from exercising its discretion if it

is fully satisfied that a case for taking cognizance against

them has been made out on the additional evidence led

before it.”

(emphasis added)

52. In the light of the aforesaid legal position, it is hereby

clarified that the quashing of the criminal proceedings

against the present appellants under Section 482 CrPC

shall not preclude the trial court, from exercising its

jurisdiction under Section 319 CrPC to summon and

proceed against them in accordance with law, in the event

evidence adduced in the course of the trial of the remaining

accused reveals material indicating the involvement of the

present appellants in the alleged offences. The doors of

justice shall remain open to the complainant insofar as the

present appellants are concerned, if cogent evidence

surfaces during trial establishing their active participation

in acts constituting the alleged offences. The quashing of

the proceedings at this stage operates only in respect of the

allegations as they presently stand and does not foreclose

the future operation of the law if evidence to the contrary

emerges before the trial court. In this manner, the

protective intent of the legislature underlying the relevant

Page 57 of 65

penal provisions is kept alive, at the same time ensuring

that the present appellants are not subjected to the rigours

of criminal proceedings in the absence of specific and legally

sustainable material as of this date.

53. Having said that, this Court also deems it necessary

to address a question that may arise consequent upon the

order of quashing passed herein, viz., whether a future

prosecution or summoning of the present appellants —

should sufficient evidence emerge during trial — would be

barred by the Constitutional guarantee against ‘double

jeopardy’ enshrined in Article 20(2) of the Constitution of

India and the statutory mandate of Section 300 of the Code

of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The doctrine of ‘double

jeopardy’, expressed in the maxim “nemo debet bis vexari

pro una et eadem causa ” (no man ought to be twice

troubled for one and the same cause), postulates that a

person who has been tried and convicted or acquitted of an

offence shall not be liable to be prosecuted again for the same

offence. Section 300(1) CrPC gives statutory form to this

guarantee by providing that a person who has once been

tried by a court of competent jurisdiction for an offence and

Page 58 of 65

convicted or acquitted of such offence shall, while such

conviction or acquittal remains in force, not be tried again

for the same offence, nor on the same facts for any other

offence for which a different charge from the one made

against him might have been made under sub-section (1) of

Section 221 of CrPC, or for which he might have been

convicted under sub-section (2) thereof. The constitutional

protection under Article 20(2) is co-extensive in operation,

requiring as a prerequisite that the person must have been

“prosecuted and punished” for the same offence before the

bar of ‘double jeopardy’ can be invoked.

54. In this backdrop, it will be beneficial to refer to the

judgment by a Constitution Bench of this Court in S.A.

Venkataraman v. Union of India

8

, wherein, while

discussing the contours of Article 20(2) of the Constitution,

this Court held that to attract the provision of Article 20(2),

the words ‘prosecuted’ and ‘punished’ are not to be taken

distributivity so as to mean prosecuted or punished. The

Court observed as follows:

“6. The scope and meaning of the guarantee implied in Article

20(2) of the Constitution has been indicated with sufficient

8

(1954) 1 SCC 586.

Page 59 of 65

fullness in the pronouncement of this Court in Maqbool

Hussain v. State of Bombay [Maqbool Hussain v. State of

Bombay, (1953) 1 SCC 736 : 1953 SCR 730] . The roots of the

principle, which this clause enacts, are to be found in the

well-established rule of English Law which finds expression

in the maxim “nemo debet bis vexari” — a man must not be

put twice in peril for the same offence. If a man is indicted

again for the same offence in an English court, he can plead,

as a complete defence, his former acquittal or conviction, or

as it is technically expressed, take the plea of “autrefois

acquit” or “autrefois convict”. The corresponding provision in

the Federal Constitution of the USA is contained in the Fifth

Amendment, which provides inter alia:

“… nor shall any person be subjected for the same offence to

be twice put in jeopardy of life and limb.…”

This principle has been recognised and adopted by the

Indian Legislature and is embodied in the provisions of

Section 26 of the General Clauses Act and Section 403 of the

Criminal Procedure Code.

“7. Although these were the materials which formed the

background of the guarantee of the fundamental right given

in Article 20(2) of the Constitution, the ambit and contents of

the guarantee, as this Court pointed out in the case referred

to above, are much narrower than those of the common law

rule in England or the doctrine of “double jeopardy” in the

American Constitution. Article 20(2) of our Constitution, it is

to be noted, does not contain the principle of “autrefois acquit”

at all. It seems that our Constitution-makers did not think it

necessary to raise one part of the common law rule to the level

of a fundamental right and thus make it immune from

legislative interference. This has been left to be regulated by

the general law of the land. In order to enable a citizen to

invoke the protection of clause (2) of Article 20 of the

Constitution, there must have been both prosecution

and punishment in respect of the same offence. The

words “prosecuted and punished” are to be taken not

distributively so as to mean prosecuted or punished.

Both the factors must co -exist in order that the

operation of the clause may be attracted. The position is

also different under the American Constitution. There the

prohibition is not against a second punishment but against

Page 60 of 65

the peril in which a person may be placed by reason of a valid

indictment being presented against him, before a competent

court, followed by proper arraignment and plea and a lawful

impanelling of the jury. It is not necessary to have a verdict

at all [ Willis on Constitutional Law, p. 528.].”

55. Moreover, as has been held by this Court in T.P.

Gopalakrishnan v. State of Kerala

9

, three conditions are

required to be fulfilled for invocation of Article 20(2) of the

Constitution. First, there must have been a previous

proceeding before a court of law or a judicial tribunal of

competent jurisdiction in which the person must have been

prosecuted. The said prosecution must be valid and not null

and void or abortive. Second, the conviction or acquittal in

the previous proceeding must be in force at the time of the

second proceeding in relation to the same offence and the

same set of facts, for which he was prosecuted and punished

in the first proceeding. Third, the subsequent proceeding

must be a fresh proceeding, where he is, for the second time,

sought to be prosecuted and punished for the same offence

and the same set of facts.

56. In our considered view, having examined the settled

legal position and analysed the facts and circumstances of

9

(2022) 14 SCC 323.

Page 61 of 65

the present case, the issue of ‘double jeopardy’ does not arise

and cannot be invoked by the present appellants for

manifold reasons. First and foremost, the present appellants

have never been subjected to a full-fledged trial. No evidence

has been led against them, no charge has been framed, no

witnesses have been examined, no detailed appreciation of

facts on merits has occurred, and no adjudication of their

guilt or innocence has been rendered by any competent

court. The quashing of the FIR , chargesheet and

consequential criminal proceedings against them has been

ordered solely on the finding that no prima facie case is made

out against them for the commission of the alleged offence

on the face of the material presently on record. Such a

finding is not a finding of acquittal on merits; it is a

determination that the allegations, as they stand, do not

disclose sufficient material to warrant subjecting these

persons to the rigours of a criminal trial. An order under

Section 482 CrPC quashing proceedings unfastening any

criminal liability operates on an entirely different plane from

an order of acquittal or conviction rendered after a full trial

on merits. The protection against ‘double jeopardy’ is

Page 62 of 65

activated only upon a verdict reached after trial, after the

recording of evidence, appreciation of facts on merits, and a

judicial determination of guilt or innocence. Where, as in the

instant case, the proceedings are quashed at the threshold

without any such trial having taken place, the constitutional

and statutory bar against second prosecution is simply not

engaged.

57. It bears emphasis that the quashing order passed

herein neither entails any elaborate appreciation of evidence

on merits nor records any adjudication with respect to the

guilt or innocence of the appellants. Therefore, it can be

observed that the appellants have not been “prosecuted and

punished” within the meaning of Article 20(2) of the

Constitution, nor have they been “tried” and “convicted or

acquitted” within the meaning of Section 300(1) CrPC. The

essential ingredients of the ‘double jeopardy’ principle are

conspicuously absent in the present case. The pre sent

appellants are not entitled to claim the protection of former

jeopardy inasmuch as they were never put in jeopardy in the

first place. No jeopardy attaches until a person is put on trial

before a court of competent jurisdiction and the trial has run

Page 63 of 65

its course to a verdict. Consequently, we observe that if,

during the course of the ongoing trial against the remaining

accused, cogent evidence emerges implicating the present

appellants, the trial court shall be fully competent to exercise

its power under Section 319 CrPC to summon them and

proceed against them, and no constitutional or statutory bar

of double jeopardy shall stand in the way of such

proceedings. The protection of Article 20(2) and Section 300

CrPC will remain inapplicable unless and until the

appellants are subjected to a complete trial culminating in a

verdict of conviction or acquittal by a court of competent

jurisdiction.

58. Accordingly, for the reasons recorded hereinabove,

both the appeals deserve to be allowed qua the present

appellants. Consequently, the present Criminal Appeals are

allowed in the following terms:

(i) The impugned judgment and order dated

21.11.2024, passed by the High Court of Madhya

Pradesh at Gwalior in Misc. Criminal Case No. 14615

of 2023 is hereby set aside and FIR/Crime No.

0041/2023 dated 13.01.2023 registered at Police

Page 64 of 65

Station Guna, District Guna, Madhya Pradesh under

Sections 498A and 34 IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the

Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, together with all

consequential proceedings arising therefrom,

including the charge-sheet/challan pending before the

competent Court, stand quashed qua the present

appellants namely, Arti Mehta, Shrivati Bai Dhakad,

Manisha Dhakad and Vikram Dhakad.

(ii) The impugned judgment and order dated

21.11.2024, passed by the High Court of Madhya

Pradesh at Gwalior in Misc. Criminal Case No. 20269

of 2023 is hereby set aside, and the proceedings in

D.V. Complaint No. 1752 of 2023 pending before the

Court of the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Guna,

Madhya Pradesh, under Section 12 of the Protection of

Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 , stand

quashed qua the present appellants, namely, Arti

Mehta, Shrivati Bai Dhakad, Manisha Dhakad and

Vikram Dhakad.

59. It is, however, made clear that the observations made

and findings recorded herein are confined solely to the case

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of the present appellants and shall not be construed as an

expression on the merits of the allegations against the

husband or any other accused person. The concerned trial

courts shall proceed independently in accordance with law,

uninfluenced by any observations made in the present

judgment insofar as the remaining accused persons are

concerned.

60. At the same time, it is also made expressly clear that

the present order of quashing under Section 482 CrPC shall

not operate as a bar to the trial court exercising its power

under Section 319 CrPC to summon the present appellants,

if during the course of trial, evidence emerges before it which,

in the opinion of the trial court, is sufficient to proceed

against them for any of the offences alleged.

……………………………J.

(SANJAY KAROL )

………………………………………………J.

(NONGMEIKAPAM KOTISWAR SINGH)

New Delhi;

May 25, 2026.