REPORTABL E

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 1233-1234 OF 2002

Arulvelu & Another .. Appellants

Versus

State represented by the Public

Prosecutor & Another .. Respondents

J U D G M E N T

Dalveer Bhandari, J.

1.These appeals are directed against the judgment of the

High Court of Madras dated 12.3.2002 in Criminal Appeal

No. 315 of 1992 and Criminal R.C. No. 691 of 1991

respectively.

2.In the instant case, the High Court has reversed the

judgment of acquittal passed by the II Additional Assistant

Sessions Judge, Periyar District in Sessions Case No. 45 of

1999 and convicted the accused persons.

3.Brief facts which are necessary to dispose of the matter

are recapitulated as under:

This appeal is filed by Arulvelu, A-1 and Krishnasamy,

A-2 (father of A-1). Appellant Arulvelu has been convicted

under section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code (for short

‘IPC’) and sentenced to seven years rigorous imprisonment

and he has been further convicted under section 498-A IPC

and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for a period of two

years and to pay a fine of Rs.1,000/-, in default to suffer

three months rigorous imprisonment. Appellant accused

no.2 has been imposed sentence of fine of Rs.1,000/- under

section 498-A of IPC, in default to suffer simple

imprisonment for a period of three months.

4.Before the marriage of Arulvelu with Mangayarkarasi

(since deceased), an agreement was entered into to the effect

that towards the consideration of the marriage, deceased’s

father P.W.1 would give gold ornaments of the weight of 50

sovereigns along with other articles and a car to Arulvelu.

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5.The father of the deceased could give ornaments of the

weight of only 30 sovereigns of gold and also could not give

the car as undertaken. Instead of giving the remaining

ornaments of 20 sovereigns and a car, P.W.1 in all gave only

Rs.5,000/- in small installments. This was the main cause

of annoyance of Arulvelu and his family members with the

deceased. It is the case of the prosecution that accused nos.

1 to 3 had been torturing the deceased Mangayarkarasi by

demanding a car and money.

6.A baby boy was born to Arulvelu and the deceased

Mangayarkarasi. Arulvelu told his wife that he would take

back her along with the newly born child only if ornaments

of the weight of 5 sovereigns and a cash amount of

Rs.5,000/- were given to him. The father of the deceased

had given ornaments of the weight of 4 sovereigns and a

cash of Rs.5,000/- to the first accused. The first accused

had taken back the deceased and the child only after

receiving the aforementioned articles from P.W.1.

7.The first accused had demanded the balance ornament

of the weight of one sovereign when the second child was

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born. The father of the deceased gave ornament of the weight

of one sovereign.

8.The first accused had sent the deceased

Mangayarkarasi many times to her father for getting money

for doing business. According to the prosecution, since the

car was not given to the first accused, he had beaten and

tortured the deceased asking her to get the car from P.W.1.

Mangayarkarasi ultimately became disgusted with her life

and at 11.30 a.m. on 15.3.1989, she committed suicide by

hanging herself.

9.The prosecution, in order to prove its case, had

examined 20 witnesses. K. Ramalingam P.W.1 is the father

of the deceased. D. Latha P.W.4 is the sister of the

deceased. S.T.P. Muthusamy Mudaliar P.W.5 is the

neighbour. Thirumathi N. Yasodha P.W.2 is the tenant of

P.W.1and P.W.3 A. Periasamy is the person who had

arranged the marriage of the first accused and the deceased.

V.P. Subramaniam P.W.6 is a close relative of the deceased.

N.Manickam P.W.8 is a member of the Panchayat. S.A.

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Periasamy P.W.9 is another Sambandhi of P.W.1 who later

on turned hostile.

10.The fact that the deceased had committed suicide by

hanging herself is undisputed. The question which arises

for our adjudication is whether the appellant is guilty for

compelling the deceased to commit suicide. According to

the prosecution she was forced to commit suicide because of

consistent demands of dowry made by the first accused.

According to P.W.1 the father of the deceased, his daughter

committed suicide because he could not give gold and a car

as agreed before her marriage. The accused persons started

torturing and harassing the deceased which ultimately led to

suicide.

11.The trial court in its lengthy and comprehensive

judgment has dealt with the prosecution evidence and also

all the 33 material exhibits. According to the learned trial

Judge, the evidence of P.W.1 that he agreed to give balance

ornaments was not corroborated by P.W.3. According to the

trial court, P.W.1 had admitted that for the first time, he told

the court that accused no. 2 demanded 40 sovereigns and

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the same was not stated either before the police officers or

during Revenue Divisional Officer’s enquiry. According to

the trial Judge, P.Ws. 15, 17 and 20 would depose that

P.W.1 has not told about the demand of ornaments during

his cross-examination. The trial court further held that

P.W.1 had admitted that he did not tell about the demand of

40 sovereigns of gold by accused no. 2 during the course of

investigation, it is his case that an agreement was reached at

35 sovereigns. This has been corroborated by P.W.3 also.

P.W.15, the Revenue Division Officer who conducted the

enquiry and who also held the inquest came to the

conclusion that the death was due to cruelty meted out to

the deceased by way of demand of dowry. He has stated

in the cross examination that during enquiry P.W.1 did not

tell him that first accused demanded 5 sovereigns as a

condition to take his wife and the child after delivery.

P.W.15 further stated that during enquiry P.W.1 did not tell

him that the first accused demanded Rs.10,000/- for his

business. During cross-examination on the side of the

accused, P.W.15 had admitted as follows:

“P.W.1 stated that in his evidence that A2

demanded 50 sovereign of gold before marriage,

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but he accepted to put only 30 sovereign of gold

and remaining 20 sovereign will be given later

and if the business goes well then he will get a

car. But he never stated in his evidence that A2

demanded 40 sovereign of gold and P.W.1

refused and then accepted to give later.”

12.The trial judge, while discussing the evidence of

P.W.15, found that there was no demand of bridal gifts

before the marriage. The trial judge disbelieved the version

of P.W.3 holding that he is not related to P.W.1 and he

pleaded ignorance about the date and month of meeting of

P.W.1 and accused no. 2. The trial judge also disbelieved the

testimony of P.W.1 regarding giving of 4 sovereigns and

Rs.5,000/- to the first accused after the birth of the first

child and another sovereign of jewel at the time of birth of

the second child for the reason that those facts were not

spoken to during investigation. This part of the prosecution

case is disbelieved. The trial judge has clearly held that

P.W.1 deposed for the first time in the court with regard to

demand of a car. He did not mention this fact in the first

information report.

13.Ex. P.8 is the suicide note of the deceased which reads

as under:

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“Nobody is responsible for my death. Children

should be handed over to mother’s house.”

In the suicidal note, the deceased had not implicated any

accused. This factor has also weighed heavily with the trial

court in acquitting all the accused. The argument on behalf

of the accused was that the accused no. 1 had suspected the

character of his mother-in-law and other members of his in-

law’s family, so he did not want the deceased to visit her

parents’ house and to resolve the dispute Panchayat was

held and, as per the version of P.W.1, according to the

decision of Panchayat, P.W.1 should not go to the house of

the accused and the deceased and accused nos. 1 to 3 also

should not go to the house of P.W.1. As per the version of

the accused, the decision of the Panchayat not permitting

the deceased to go to her parents perhaps led to suicide.

The trial court after carefully examining the entire evidence

acquitted the accused.

14.According to the High Court, if she (the deceased) had

no problem in her marital house and she was living

peacefully with her husband and in-laws, what was the

necessity for her to commit suicide? Why should she write

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in her suicide note to leave her children in her mother’s

house? According to the High Court, unless an intolerable

harassment was meted out to her, there was absolutely no

necessity for her to write like this that the children be

handed over to her mother’s house. Therefore, the High

Court held that, in all probabilities, there was demand of

dowry and the deceased was harassed by the first accused

and therefore, she committed suicide.

15.The High Court set aside the judgment of the trial court

on the count that the trial court gave undue emphasis on the

minor inconsistencies and contradictions. The High Court

discarded the version of the trial court regarding P.W.1’s

deposition for the first time in court regarding demand of car

which he did not mention in the first information report

(FIR).

16.The High Court observed that the FIR cannot be an

encyclopedia to contain all the details of history of the case.

This approach of the High Court does not seem to be correct.

The FIR should at least mention a broad story of the

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prosecution and not mentioning of material and vital facts

may affect the credibility of the FIR.

17.The trial court doubted the veracity of the statement of

P.W.1 because it did not find any corroboration of the

statement of P.W.1 with the statement of P.W.3 regarding

agreeing to give the balance gold sovereigns. The High

Court without any basis discarded the judgment of the trial

court.

18.The trial judge observed that the testimony of P.W.1 is

not credible because he for the first time in the court had

stated that accused no. 2 had demanded 40 sovereigns. This

was not stated either before the police officer or during

Revenue Divisional Officers’ enquiry.

19.The trial court disbelieved the version of P.W.1

regarding giving 4 sovereigns and Rs.5,000/- to the first

accused after the birth of the first child and another

sovereign of jewel at the time of birth of the second child for

the reason that those facts were not spoken to during the

investigation. The High Court held this part of the

prosecution case unbelievable, but the fact remains that the

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demand of dowry was proved beyond doubt through the

evidence of P.Ws. 1 and 3. This approach of the High Court

is not correct.

20.The High Court ought to have considered the entire

evidence in a proper perspective. Unless comprehensive view

of the entire evidence is taken in the proper perspective, a

correct conclusion may not be possible. In this case, there has

been acquittal by the trial court and, while reversing the order

of acquittal, the High Court ought to have carefully considered

the following circumstances:

(1)In the suicide note Ex. P-8, the deceased has not

implicated any of the accused. This is indeed a very

significant and vital factor which ought to have

received proper attention by the High Court.

(2)There is no credible evidence to suggest that soon

before the death, the deceased has been subjected to

cruelty or harassment by the accused in connection

with any demand of dowry which led to a serious act of

committing suicide.

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(3)The High Court failed to consider that the marriage

took place in the year 1983 and the deceased

committed suicide in the year 1989 i.e. after more than

six years of the marriage. There are two small children

out of the wedlock. It is quite improbable that

ordinarily there would be consistent demands of dowry

after six years. The fact of consistent demands is not

established from clear evidence of the prosecution.

(4)The distance between the matrimonial home and the

parental home of the deceased is merely one kilometer.

There are many houses around the house of the

accused. It is submitted that there was neither a

whisper nor any complaint was filed by P.W.1 before

the deceased committed suicide.

(5)It appears from the statement under section 313 IPC

that A-1 wanted his wife (deceased) to keep some

distance from her parental home. It transpired in the

meeting of the Panchayat that to settle the dispute

between the husband and wife and to reduce the

affinity of the wife (deceased) towards her parental

home (One kilometer away from the parental home),

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the Panchayat took the decision that both the families

should not visit each other. The impact of the decision

of Panchayat on the deceased was not properly

appreciated by the High Court.

(6)S.A. Periyasamy P.W.9 has not supported the case of

the prosecution. He has stated that “we told

Ramalingam that he and his wife should not go to

Arulvelu”s house often”. He has also admitted that A-1

and Magaiyarkarsi (deceased) were living happily.

(7)Ramalingam P.W.1 has stated that he consoled and

advised his daughter to be bold as they would not come

to see her as per the dictum of the Panchayat and

wisely handle the situation at her matrimonial house.

In fact the suggestion of defence is that the Panchayat

was convened as there was a serious apprehension

about the character of the mother of the deceased and

her family. That is why in the Panchayat no discussion

about dowry demand was whispered. Moreover, if the

first appellant did not like his deceased wife, he would

not be keen on keeping her with him.

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(8)It appears that the Panchayat’s decision caused

serious depression to the deceased. It is submitted that

the deceased’s strong affinity towards her parents and

her inability to cope up with the situation coupled with

her sickness, she was driven to such a situation to

commit suicide.

(9)R. Murugesan P.W.15, the RDO who prepared the

inquest report has also stated about the panchayat’s

decision and has opined that “the reason for her death

may be the control exerted on her that she should not

go to her mother’s house”.

(10)The trial court has observed that when the accused

were questioned under section 313 Cr.P.C., they filed a

written statement jointly. In that written statement it

has been explained that – “Due to mental agony,

incurable stomach-ache, pain over the body and the

control by the first accused that she should not go to

the house of her parents, Mangayarkarasi had

committed suicide”. Further that “Arulvelu, without

marrying for the second time for several years looked

after the children with lot of love and affection so that

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the children may not feel the absence of their mother.

The family of accused is a joint family. In that family,

accused nos. 1 to 3 and Vijayakumar, another son of

accused nos. 2 and 3 and his wife Padma are living

jointly.”

(11)The trial court noticed serious contradictions and

inconsistencies in the evidence of P.W.1 and those

became relevant particularly when the High Court was

dealing with the order of acquittal.

(12)There are material contradictions in the statements of

P.W.1 and P.W.3. P.W.1 says after the birth of first

child there was demand. Whereas P.W.3 says after 6-7

months of the marriage there was demand. Further

P.W.1 says that 20 days before the occurrence A-2 and

A-3 said that customary gifts were not good. Whereas

P.W.3 says that after 6-7 months of 1

st

incident

deceased was told that the articles were not good.

P.W.1 says 30 sovereigns. However, P.W.3 says 35

sovereigns. P.W.1 has stated that he said to A-2 that

he could give 20 sovereign later on. However, P.W.3

does not corroborate the same. Though P.W.3 has

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stated that A-2 demanded car during the marriage

negotiation, however, P.W.3 has not corroborated the

evidence of P.W.1 with regard to the demand of car.

It is submitted that none of the investigating officers

have supported P.W.1 with regard to the demand of

jewels, car, cash and/or with regard to harassment to

the deceased due to non fulfillment of the above said

items.

(13)A. Periyasamy P.W.3 has not been examined by the

DSP Sivanandam, RDO, Karuppusamy and others.

Only CB CID Velu examined him. CB CID, Velu has

stated that P.W.3 told him that the (a) P.W.1 is not his

relative (b) not a family friend (c) accused is also not

related (d) that he did not go for condolence when

Mangai died (e) he does not know about Seer Varisai (f)

he does not know about the dates on which he

arranged the talks. However during his deposition he

has admitted that he knows Palaniappan, the brother

of Rukmani (P.W.1’s wife) and he is his relative. P.W.20

has admitted that P.W.3 has said that Ramlingam

(P.W.1) is his family friend. For the above said reasons

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the evidence was of P.W.3 was not relied upon the trial

court. It is submitted that the High Court has not

considered these aspects.

(14)D. Latha P.W.4 stated that she was present during the

talks when the demand during the marriage

negotiation took place. However, P.W.3 says during

talks except P.W.1 and A-2 no body was present.

Further none of the witnesses including P.W.1 has said

that P.W.4 was present during the talks.

K. Sivanandhan, Deputy Superintendent of Police

P.W.17 has stated that P.W.4 has not stated that

failure to buy a car became a problem. She has not

stated about the demand of 50 sovereigns and a car.

Therefore the trial court has disbelieved the presence of

P.W.4 during the talks.

D. Latha P.W.4 has not given in her evidence that she

had known personally that little by little 20 sovereign

were given. The trial court has held that P.W.4 does

not speak anything about the timings of the torture

like four weeks, 20 days or 8 days before the death.

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(15)S.T.P. Muthusamy Mudaliar P.W.5’s testimony does

not inspire confidence. He says that during the verbal

argument between A-1 and Rukmani Amma, A-1 asked

about car. However, Yasodha P.W.2 did not say the

same. Further, Rukmani Amma was not examined. It

is submitted that the trial court has discussed the

contradictions between P.W.2, P.W.1 and P.W.5 and

about utterance with regard to car in the quarrel and

therefore the trial court has not relied on P.W.5. It is

submitted that apart from Rukminiammal, Shaktivel

(P.W.1’s son) and Planniappan was also not examined

by the prosecution.

(16) S.A. Periyasamy P.W.9 (Sambandhi of P.W.1) has not

supported the case of prosecution. He says that he

advised Ramlingam that they should not go to A-1’s

house often. During his cross-examination he has

stated that “I understood that Arulvelu and

Mangaiyarkarasi were living a happy matrimonial life.

There is a Car in my son Sivakumar’s name TNC-4128.

Its RC was in the name of Ramalingam S/o Palaniappa

Mudhaliar.”

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(17)The Assistant Judicial Magistrate PW 11 has stated

that crime number of Exhibit A-1 has been

manipulated. Further, P.W.13 has stated that

“Ramalingam has given only one complaint on that

day. Exhibit A13 is the first original copy. Exhibit A18

is the original of another set of copies taken. The

person who has written Exhibit 13 has not written

Exhibit A18”. The trial court has also discussed the

discrepancy with regard to Exh. A-13 and Exh.A-18.

(18)R. Murugesan P.W.15, RDO who prepared the inquest

report has admitted that Yashoda (P.W.2) was

examined on 30.03.89. He also stated that nearly

1000 houses would be there. It was crowded area with

many houses. However, no neighbour was examined

as a witness. Further, P.W.17 has admitted that A-1

said to him that he (A-1) brought the doctor. However,

P.W.15 did not believe the same. It is submitted that

P.W.15 has not given any cogent reason for

disbelieving the same. It is submitted that the conduct

of P.W.15 (the RDO) was adversely commented by the

trial court.

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(19)R.Murugesan P.W.15 has stated that Rukmaniammal

said that on 18.3.89 Mangayarkarsi came to the house

as she was ill. She asked as to why did she

(Rukmaniammal) made controversy in a house where

the death had taken place. She has also stated that

on 21.3.89 she had sent medicine and tablets to

Mangayarkarasi’s husband’s house through a car. It

is submitted that R. Murugesan P.W.15 has admitted

that Ramlingam (P.W.1) has not stated that A-1 had

told him that he was going to get into another

marriage. Further, he (P.W.1) did not say about

demand of 5 sovereigns, Rs.10,000/- and that dowry

was not enough. He (P.W.1) has also not stated before

P.W.15 that Mangayarkarsi came to his house 8 days

before and told that she could live only if he buys a

car. Further, P.W.1 had also not stated before him

that on Tuesday their daughter’s parents in law asked

them to buy a car. P.W.15 has further admitted that

Yashoda (P.W.2) had stated that A-1 came to

Rukmanniammal and told that ‘because of you, A am

very ashamed’. P.W.15 has also stated that P.W.1 had

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not told him that before marriage there was any

discussion about dowry on presence of some persons.

Further that none of the witnesses has stated that they

discussed about jewels and car before the marriage.

(20)The Panchayat’s decision coupled with the condition of

illness could have driven the deceased to commit

suicide. This possibility cannot be ruled out. P.W.15

has also stated that on 22.3.89 a panchayat was

convened to decide on the issue of dispute between

both the families. In that Panchayat it has been

decided that they should not visit each others house

and Mangaiyarkarasi has to be advised accordingly.

(21)The High Court has made erroneous observation that:

“It is not the panchayat decision that the deceased

should not visit her parents. The only thing is P.W.1

should not go to the house of the accused”.

As per the case of prosecution and as per the evidence

it is crystal clear that the Panchayat’s decision was

that ‘both the familier should not visit each other’.

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(22)The High Court failed to appreciate that the

prosecution has failed to prove that with all certainty,

the dowry demand was the only cause for the deceased

to commit suicide. The High Court has simply

presumed with the following words: “The immediate

temptation for her to commit suicide appears to be the

demand of a car and subsequent quarrel of the first

accused with the mother of the deceased. She has died

in her in-law’s house. Why should she commit suicide

if she was happily living with the first accused?”

21.These are some of the material and vital aspects which

clearly demonstrate that the trial court has carefully analyzed

the entire evidence on record and the view taken by the trial

court is certainly a possible or plausible view.

22.In our considered opinion, the approach of the High Court

in the impugned judgment is not in consonance with the settled

principles of criminal jurisprudence. The High Court while

reversing the judgment of the trial court observed that “in all

probabilities, I am inclined to hold that there was demand of

dowry and the deceased was harassed by the first accused and

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therefore, she committed suicide.” In criminal cases the

conviction can be sustained only when there is clear evidence

beyond reasonable doubt. The accused cannot be convicted on

the ground that in all probabilities the accused may have

committed the crime. The approach of the High Court is wholly

fallacious and unsustainable in law.

23.The real question which falls for our consideration is

whether the view which has been taken by the trial court was a

possible or a plausible view.

24.We have carefully perused the judgment of the trial court

and the impugned judgment of the High Court. The trial court

very minutely examined the entire evidence and all documents

and exhibits on record. The trial court’s analysis of evidence

also seems to be correct. The trial court has not deviated from

the normal norms or methods of evaluation of the evidence.

By no stretch of imagination, we can hold that the judgment of

the trial court is based on no evidence or evidence which is

thoroughly unreliable and no reasonable person would act

upon it and consequently the judgment of the trial court is

perverse.

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25.We also fail to arrive at the conclusion that the discussion

and appreciation of the evidence of the trial court is so

outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of

irrationality incurring the blame of being perverse and the

findings rendered by the trial court are against the weight of

evidence. The law is well settled that, in an appeal against

acquittal, unless the judgment of the trial court is perverse, the

Appellate Court would not be justified in substituting its own

view and reverse the judgment of acquittal.

26.The expression ‘perverse’ has been dealt with in number of

cases. In Gaya Din (Dead) through LRs. & Others v.

Hanuman Prasad (Dead) through LRs. & Others (2001) 1

SCC 501 this Court observed that the expression ‘perverse’

means that the findings of the subordinate authority are not

supported by the evidence brought on record or they are

against the law or suffer from the vice of procedural

irregularity.

27.In Parry’s (Calcutta ) Employees’ Union v. Parry & Co.

Ltd. & Others AIR 1966 Cal. 31, the Court observed that

24

‘perverse finding’ means a finding which is not only against the

weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence itself.

28.In Triveni Rubber & Plastics v. Collector of Central

Excise, Cochin AIR 1994 SC 1341, the Court observed that

this is not a case where it can be said that the findings of the

authorities are based on no evidence or that they are so

perverse that no reasonable person would have arrived at those

findings.

29.In M. S. Narayanagouda v. Girijamma & Another AIR

1977 Kar. 58, the Court observed that any order made in

conscious violation of pleading and law is a perverse order.

30.In Moffett v. Gough, 1 L.R. 1r. 371, the Court observed

that a perverse verdict may probably be defined as one that is

not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against

the evidence.

31.In Godfrey v. Godfrey 106 NW 814, the Court defined

‘perverse’ as turned the wrong way, not right; distorted from the

right; turned away or deviating from what is right, proper,

correct etc.

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32.The expression “perverse” has been defined by various

dictionaries in the following manner:

1.Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary of Current English

Sixth Edition

PERVERSE: Showing deliberate determination to behave in a way

that most people think is wrong, unacceptable or unreasonable.

2. Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English –

International Edition

PERVERSE: Deliberately departing from what is normal and

reasonable.

3. The New Oxford Dictionary of English – 1998 Edition

PERVERSE: Law (of a verdict) against the weight of evidence or the

direction of the judge on a point of law.

4. New Webster’s Dictionary of the English Language (Deluxe

Encyclopedic Edition)

PERVERSE: Purposely deviating from accepted or expected behavior

or opinion; wicked or wayward; stubborn; cross or petulant.

5.Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary of Words & Phrases, Fourth

Edition

PERVERSE: A perverse verdict may probably be defined as one that

is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against

the evidence.

33.In Shailendra Pratap & Another v. State of U.P. (2003)

1 SCC 761, the Court observed thus:

“We are of the opinion that the trial court was

quite justified in acquitting the appellants of the

charges as the view taken by it was reasonable one

and the order of acquittal cannot be said to be

perverse. It is well settled that appellate court

26

would not be justified in interfering with the order

of acquittal unless the same is found to be

perverse. In the present case, the High Court has

committed an error in interfering with the order of

acquittal of the appellants recorded by the trial

court as the same did not suffer from the vice of

perversity.”

34.In Kuldeep Singh v. The Commissioner of Police &

Others (1999) 2 SCC 10, the Court while dealing with the scope

of Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution observed as under:

“9.Normally the High Court and this Court

would not interfere with the findings of fact

recorded at the domestic enquiry but if the finding

of “guilt” is based on no evidence, it would be a

perverse finding and would be amenable to judicial

scrutiny.

10.A broad distinction has, therefore, to be

maintained between the decisions which are

perverse and those which are not. If a decision is

arrived at on no evidence or evidence which is

thoroughly unreliable and no reasonable person

would act upon it, the order would be perverse.

But if there is some evidence on record which is

acceptable and which could be relied upon,

howsoever compendious it may be, the conclusions

would not be treated as perverse and the findings

would not be interfered with.”

35.The meaning of ‘perverse’ has been examined in H. B.

Gandhi, Excise and Taxation Officer-cum- Assessing

Authority, Karnal & Others v. Gopi Nath & Sons & Others

1992 Supp (2) SCC 312, this Court observed as under:

27

“7.In the present case, the stage at and the

points on which the challenge to the assessment in

judicial review was raised and entertained was not

appropriate. In our opinion, the High Court was in

error in constituting itself into a court of appeal

against the assessment. While it was open to the

respondent to have raised and for the High Court to

have considered whether the denial of relief under

the proviso to Section 39(5) was proper or not, it

was not open to the High Court re-appreciate the

primary or perceptive facts which were otherwise

within the domain of the fact-finding authority

under the statute. The question whether the

transactions were or were not sales exigible to sales

tax constituted an exercise in recording secondary

or inferential facts based on primary facts found by

the statutory authorities. But what was assailed in

review was, in substance, the correctness – as

distinguished from the legal permissibility – of the

primary or perceptive facts themselves. It is, no

doubt, true that if a finding of fact is arrived at by

ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking

into consideration irrelevant material or if the

finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from

the vice of irrationality incurring the blame of being

perverse, then, the finding is rendered infirm in

law.”

36.The legal position seems to be well settled and consistent

at least since 1934 when the Privy Council decided the case of

Sheo Swarup & Others v. King Emperor AIR 1934 PC 227 in

which the Court (per Lord Russell) observed as under:

“..the High Court should and will always give

proper weight and consideration to such matters as

(1) the views of the trial Judge as to the credibility

of the witnesses, (2) the presumption of innocence

in favour of the accused, a presumption certainly

28

not weakened by the fact that he has been

acquitted at his trial, (3) the right of the accused to

the benefit of any doubt, and (4) the slowness of an

appellate Court in disturbing a finding of fact

arrived at by a Judge who had the advantage of

seeing the witnesses..”

The aforesaid decision was followed in subsequent judgments of

this Court. [See: Surajpal Singh & Others v. The State, AIR

1952 SC 52; Tulsiram Kanu v. The State, AIR 1954 SC 1,

Atley v. State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 1955 SC 807; Balbir

Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1957 SC 216; M.G. Agarwal v.

State of Maharashtra AIR 1963 SC 200; Khedu Mohton &

Others v. State of Bihar, (1970) 2 SCC 450; Bishan Singh &

Others v. The State of Punjab (1974) 3 SCC 288; K. Gopal

Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1979) 1 SCC 355; Tota

Singh & Another v. State of Punjab (1987) 2 SCC 529;

Sambasivan & Others v. State of Kerala (1998) 5 SCC 412;

Bhagwan Singh & Others v. State of M.P. (2002) 4 SCC 85;

Harijana Thirupala & Others v. Public Prosecutor, High

Court of A.P., Hyderabad (2002) 6 SCC 470; State of

Rajasthan v. Raja Ram (2003) 8 SCC 180; Budh Singh &

Others v. State of UP (2006) 9 SCC 731; Kalyan Singh v.

State of MP (2006) 13 SCC 303; Kallu alias Masih & Others

29

v. State of MP (2006) 10 SCC 313; and State of Goa v.

Sanjay Thakran & Another, (2007) 3 SCC 755]

37.In Shambhoo Missir & Another v. State of Bihar (1990)

4 SCC 17, this Court observed thus:

“We are of the view that the High Court has

interfered with the order of acquittal passed by the

trial court not only for no substantial reasons but

also by ignoring material infirmities in the

prosecution case. Hence, we allow the appeals and

set aside the order of the High Court convicting and

sentencing the accused in both the appeals.”

38.In Chandrappa & Others v. State of Karnataka (2007)

4 SCC 415, this Court reiterated the legal position as under:

“(1) An appellate court has full power to review,

reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon

which the order of acquittal is founded.

(2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no

limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of

such power and an appellate court on the evidence

before it may reach its own conclusion, both on

questions of fact and of law.

(3) Various expressions, such as, “substantial

and compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient

grounds”, “very strong circumstances”, “distorted

conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”, etc. are not

intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate

court in an appeal against acquittal. Such

phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes

of language” to emphasise the reluctance of an

appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to

curtail the power of the court to review the evidence

and to come to its own conclusion.

30

(4) An appellate court, however, must bear in

mind that in case of acquittal, there is double

presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the

presumption of innocence is available to him under

the fundamental principle of criminal

jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed

to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a

competent court of law. Secondly, the accused

having secured his acquittal, the presumption of

his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and

strengthened by the trial court.

(5)If two reasonable conclusions are possible on

the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate

court should not disturb the finding of acquittal

recorded by the trial court.”

39.In Ghurey Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2008) 10 SCC

450, a two Judge Bench of this Court of which one of us

(Bhandari, J.) was a member had an occasion to deal with most

of the cases referred in this judgment. This Court provided

guidelines for the Appellate Court in dealing with the cases in

which the trial courts have acquitted the accused. The

following principles emerge from the cases above:

1.The accused is presumed to be innocent until

proven guilty. The accused possessed this

presumption when he was before the trial court.

The trial court’s acquittal bolsters the

presumption that he is innocent.

2.The power of reviewing evidence is wide and the

appellate court can re-appreciate the entire

31

evidence on record. It can review the trial court’s

conclusion with respect to both facts and law,

but the Appellate Court must give due weight

and consideration to the decision of the trial

court.

3.The appellate court should always keep in mind

that the trial court had the distinct advantage of

watching the demeanour of the witnesses. The

trial court is in a better position to evaluate the

credibility of the witnesses.

4.The appellate court may only overrule or

otherwise disturb the trial court’s acquittal if it

has “very substantial and compelling reasons”

for doing so.

5. If two reasonable or possible views can be

reached - one that leads to acquittal, the other to

conviction - the High Courts/appellate courts

must rule in favour of the accused.

40.This Court in a recently delivered judgment State of

Rajasthan v. Naresh @ Ram Naresh 2009 (11) SCALE 699

again examined judgments of this Court and laid down that “An

order of acquittal should not be lightly interfered with even if

the court believes that there is some evidence pointing out the

finger towards the accused. This Court has dealt with the

scope of interference with an order of acquittal in a number of

cases.”

41.Careful scrutiny of all these judgments lead to the definite

conclusion that the appellate court should be very slow in

32

setting aside a judgment of acquittal particularly in a case

where two views are possible. The trial court judgment can not

be set aside because the appellate court’s view is more

probable. The appellate court would not be justified in setting

aside the trial court judgment unless it arrives at a clear finding

on marshalling the entire evidence on record that the judgment

of the trial court is either perverse or wholly unsustainable in

law.

42.In State of Uttar Pradesh v. Banne Alias Baijnath and

Ors. (2009) 4 SCC 271, a two-Judge Bench of this court of

which one of us (Bhandari, J.) was a member had an occasion

to deal with this controversy in detail has laid down some of the

circumstances in which this court would be justified in

interfering with the judgment of the High Court. The

circumstances discussed in the judgment are illustrative not

exhaustive.

i)The High Court’s decision is based on totally

erroneous view of law by ignoring the settled

legal position;

ii)The High Court’s conclusions are contrary to

evidence and documents on record;

33

iii)The entire approach of the High Court in

dealing with the evidence was patently illegal

leading to grave miscarriage of justice;

iv)The High Court’s judgment is manifestly

unjust and unreasonable based on erroneous

law and facts on the record of the case;

v)This Court must always give proper weight

and consideration to the findings of the High

Court;

vi)This Court would be extremely reluctant in

interfering with a case when both the Sessions

Court and the High Court have recorded an

order of acquittal.

43.The appellate courts must keep in view these

aforementioned observations in dealing with the appeals where

the trial court has acquitted the accused.

44In Dhanapal v. State by Public Prosecutor, Madras

(Criminal Appeal No.987 of 2002 decided on September 1,

2009), this Court again examined the aforementioned decisions

and analyzed the principles emerging out of the said decisions,

it seems to us that despite series of judgments, the High Court

has not clearly appreciated the legal position. Unquestionably,

the Appellate Court has power to review and re-appreciate the

entire evidence on record. The appellate court would be

justified in reversing the judgment of acquittal only if there are

34

substantial and compelling reasons and when the judgment of

the trial court is found to be perverse judgment. Interfering in

a routine manner where other view is possible is contrary to the

settled legal position crystallized by aforementioned judgments

of this Court. The accused is presumed to be innocent until

proven guilty. The accused possessed this presumption when

he was before the trial court. The trial court’s acquittal bolsters

the presumption that he is innocent. This fundamental

principle must be kept in view while dealing with the judgments

of acquittal passed by the trial court.

45.We have re-examined the entire case because of the

conflicting judgments of the Trial Court and the High Court.

On careful marshalling of the entire evidence and the

documents on record, we arrive at the conclusion that the view

taken by the trial court is a possible and plausible view. The

judgment of the trial court cannot be termed as perverse. The

High Court ought not to have substituted the same by its own

possible view. The impugned judgment of the High Court

cannot stand the scrutiny of the well settled legal position

which has been crystallized for more than 80 years since the

case of Sheo Swarup. In the facts and circumstances of this

35

case, we are constrained to set aside the impugned judgment of

the High Court.

46.Consequently, these appeals filed by the appellants are

allowed. The impugned judgment of the High Court set aside

and that of the trial court is restored.

..............................J.

(Dalveer Bhandari)

..............................J.

(Dr. B.S. Chauhan)

New Delhi;

October 7, 2009.

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