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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10251 OF 2014

ASGER IBRAHIM AMIN .. APPELLANT

VERSUS

LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION OF INDIA .. RESPONDENT

J U D G M E N T

VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.

1 The question which falls for consideration is whether the Appellant is

entitled to claim pension even though he resigned from service of his own

volition and, if so, whether his claim on this count had become barred by

limitation or laches.

2 The Appellant joined the services of the Respondent Corporation on

30.6.1967 on the post of Assistant Administrative Officer (Chartered

Accountant) at the age of twenty seven. He worked for 23 years and 7 months

in the Corporation before tendering his resignation on 28.1.1991, owing to

“family circumstances and indifferent health”, presumably having crossed fifty

years in age. The request of the Appellant for waiver of the stipulated three

months notice was favourably considered by the Corporation vide letter dated

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28.2.1991, and the Appellant was allowed to resign from the post of Deputy

General Manager (Accounts), which he was holding at that time. We shall

again presume that the reasons that he had ascribed for his retirement, viz.

family problems and failing health, were found to be legitimate by the

Respondent, otherwise the waiver ought not to have been given. Thereafter, the

Central Government in exercise of power conferred under Section 48 of the

Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956 had notified the LIC of India (Staff)

Regulations, 1960 and thereafter the Life Insurance Corporation of India

(Employees) Pension Rules, 1995 (hereinafter referred to as “Pension Rules”)

which, though notified on 28.6.1995, were given retrospective effect from

1.11.1993. The Pension Rules provide, inter alia, that resignation from

service would lead to forfeiture of the benefits of the entire service including

eligibility for pension.

3 On 8.8.1995, that is post the promulgation by the Respondent of the

Pension Rules, the Appellant enquired from the Respondent whether he was

entitled to pension under the Pension Rules, which has been understood by the

Respondent as a representation for pension; the Respondent replied that the

request of the Appellant cannot be acceded to. The Appellant took the matter no

further but has averred that in 2000, prompted by news in a Daily and

Judgments of a High Court and a Tribunal, he requested the Respondent to

reconsider his case for pension. This request has remained unanswered. It was

in 2011 that he sent a legal notice to the Respondent, in response to which the

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Respondent reiterated its stand that the Appellant, having resigned from service,

was not eligible to claim pension under the Pension Rules. Eventually, the

Appellant filed a Special Civil Application on 29.3.2012 before the High Court,

which was dismissed by the Single Judge vide Judgment dated 5.10.2012. The

LPA of the Appellant also got dismissed on the grounds of the delay of almost

14 years, as also on merits vide Judgment dated 1.3.2013, against which the

Appellant has approached this Court.

4 As regards the issue of delay in matters pertaining to claims of pension, it

has already been opined by this Court in Union of India v. Tarsem Singh, (2008)

8 SCC 648 that in cases of continuing or successive wrongs, delay and laches or

limitation will not thwart the claim so long as the claim, if allowed, does not

have any adverse repercussions on the settled third-party rights. This Court

held:

7. To summarise, normally, a belated service related claim will

be rejected on the ground of delay and laches (where remedy is

sought by filing a writ petition) or limitation (where remedy is

sought by an application to the Administrative Tribunal). One of

the exceptions to the said rule is cases relating to a continuing

wrong. Where a service related claim is based on a continuing

wrong, relief can be granted even if there is a long delay in seeking

remedy, with reference to the date on which the continuing wrong

commenced, if such continuing wrong creates a continuing source

of injury. But there is an exception to the exception. If the

grievance is in respect of any order or administrative decision

which related to or affected several others also, and if the

reopening of the issue would affect the settled rights of third

parties, then the claim will not be entertained. For example, if the

issue relates to payment or refixation of pay or pension, relief may

be granted in spite of delay as it does not affect the rights of third

parties. But if the claim involved issues relating to seniority or

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promotion, etc., affecting others, delay would render the claim

stale and doctrine of laches/limitation will be applied. Insofar as

the consequential relief of recovery of arrears for a past period is

concerned, the principles relating to recurring/successive wrongs

will apply. As a consequence, the High Courts will restrict the

consequential relief relating to arrears normally to a period of three

years prior to the date of filing of the writ petition.

(emphasis is ours)

We respectfully concur with these observations which if extrapolated or applied

to the factual matrix of the present case would have the effect of restricting the

claim for pension, if otherwise sustainable in law, to three years previous to

when it was raised in a judicial forum. Such claims recur month to month and

would not stand extinguished on the application of the laws of prescription,

merely because the legal remedy pertaining to the time barred part of it has

become unavailable. This is too well entrenched in our jurisprudence,

foreclosing any fresh consideration.

5 The second issue which confronts us is whether the termination of service

of the Appellant remains unalterably in the nature of resignation, with the

consequence of disentitling him from availing of or migrating/mutating the

pension scheme or whether it instead be viewed as a voluntary retirement or

whether it requires to be regarded so in order to bestow this benefit on the

Appellant; who had ‘resigned’ after reaching the age of fifty and after serving

the LIC for over twenty three years. The Appellant resigned from service under

Regulation 18 of LIC of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960, which along with the

other provisions of relevance is reproduced for facility of reference -

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SECTION 3 – TERMINATION

Determination of Service:

18. (1) An employee, other than an employee on probation or an

employee appointed on a temporary basis, shall not leave or

discontinue his service in the Corporation without first giving

notice in writing to the competent authority of his intention to

leave or discontinue the service. The period of notice required shall

be-

(a) three months in the case of an employee belonging to

Class I;

(b) one month in the case of other employees.

Provided that such notice may be waived in part or in full by the

competent authority at its discretion. In case of breach by an

employee of the provisions of the sub-regulation, he shall be liable

to pay the Corporation as compensation a sum equal to his salary

for the period of notice required of him, which sum may be

deducted from any moneys due to him.

Superannuation and Retirement:

19(1) xx

(2) An employee belonging to Class I or Class II appointed to the

service of the Corporation on or after 1st September,1956, shall retire on

completion of 60 years of age, but the competent authority may, if it is

of the opinion that it is in the interest of the Corporation to do so, direct

such employee to retire on completion of 50 years of age or at any time

thereafter on giving him three months’ notice or salary in lieu thereof.

The following Regulations, on which learned Senior Counsel for the LIC has

placed reliance, came to be introduced on 16.2.1996, that is after the Appellant

had ‘resigned’ from service. We have called for and perused this Notification,

and as we expected, these provisions apply retrospectively with effect from

1.11.1993. These Regulations ordain, inter alia, that an employee may be

permitted to retire (a) on completion of the age of 55 and (b) after completing

25 years in service. In other words, the Corporation has the power to

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compulsory retire an employee who has attained the age of 50 years if in its

opinion such decision is in the interests of the Corporation; and the employee

may seek permission to retire upon completion of 55 years of age and after

rendering 25 years of service. This very position finds reiteration in Rule 31 of

the Pension Rules under the epithet ‘voluntary retirement’, which pandect

appears to have been available from the inception i.e. 1.11.1993.

(2A) (a) Notwithstanding what is stated in sub-rules (1) and (2)

above, an employee may be permitted to retire at any time on

completion of the age 55 after giving three months notice in

writing to the appointing authority of his intention to retire.

(b) (i) Notwithstanding the provisions of Clause (a), an

employee governed by the Life Insurance Corporation of

India (Employees) Pension Rules 1995 may be permitted to

retire at any time after he has completed twenty years of

qualifying service, by giving notice of not less than ninety

days in writing to the appointing authority.

Provided that this sub-clause shall not apply to an

employee who is on deputation unless after having been

transferred or having returned to India, he has resumed charge

on the post in India and has served for a period of not less

than one year.

Provided further that this sub-clause shall not apply to

an employee who seeks retirement from service for being

absorbed permanently in an autonomous body or a public

sector undertaking to which he is on deputation at the time of

seeking voluntary retirement.

(ii) The notice of voluntary retirement given under sub-clause

(i) of clause (b) shall require acceptance by the appointing

authority.

Provided that where the appointing authority does not

refuse to grant the permission for retirement before the expiry

of the period specified in the said notice, the retirement shall

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become effective from the date of expiry of the said period.”

6 As we have already recounted, the Appellant received a waiver of the

requirement of giving three months prior notice of his resolve to “discontinue

his service in the Corporation”, bestowing legitimacy to the reasons that

compelled him to do so. It also brings to the fore that the 1960 Staff

Regulations did not provide for voluntary retirement or VRS as has become

commonplace today. This Court has clarified and highlighted that ‘resignation’

and ‘retirement’ have disparate connotations; that an employee can ‘resign’ at

any time but, in contradistinction, can ‘retire’ only on completion of the

prescribed period of qualifying service and in consonance with extant Rules and

Regulations.

7 We shall now consider the Pension Rules of 1995. Rule 3 of Chapter II

thereof, provides that the Rules are applicable to employees (1) who were in the

service of the Corporation on or after 1.1.1986 and had retired before 1.11. 1993

i.e. the notified date, or (2) who retired after 1.11.1993; or (3)who were in the

service before the notified date and continued to be in service on or after the

notified date; or (4) who were in the service on or after 1.1.1986 but had retired

on or after 1.11.1993 and before the notified date. What is discernible from

these dates is that the Pension Rules of 1995 have included two classes of

beneficiaries into one homogenous class, to wit, the employees who had retired

before the notified date and those who were to retire after the notified date. In

our opinion, the advantage of these beneficent Rules should be extended even to

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the Appellant who was similarly placed as the retirees mentioned in Rule 3 but

for the fact that he had ‘resigned’ rather than retired. The two provisions

caught in the crossfire are Rule 2(s), which defines “retirement” and Rule 23,

which deals with the “forfeiture of service”:

2(s) “retirement” means,- (i) retirement in accordance with the

provisions contained in sub-regulation (1) or sub-regulation (2) or

sub-regulation (3) of regulation 19 of the Life Insurance

Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960 and rule 14 of the

Life Insurance Corporation of India Class III and Class IV

Employees (Revision of Terms and Conditions of Service) Rules,

1985 made under the Act;

(ii) voluntary retirement in accordance with the provisions

contained in rule 31 of these rules. (emphasis added)

23. Forfeiture of service - Resignation or dismissal or removal or

termination or compulsory retirement of an employee from the

service of the Corporation shall entail forfeiture of his entire past

service and consequently shall not qualify for pensionary benefits.

Voluntary retirement, noted in the sub-Rule (ii) of Rule 2(s), has been defined in

Rule 31, and it reads as follows:

31. Pension on voluntary retirement - (1) At any time after an

employee has completed twenty years of qualifying service he

may, by giving notice of not less than ninety days, in writing, to the

appointing authority, retire from service:

Provided that this sub-rule shall not apply to an employee who

is on deputation unless after having been transferred or having

returned to India he has resumed charge of the post in India and

has served for a period of not less than one year:

Provided further that this sub-rule shall not apply to an

employee who seeks retirement from service for being absorbed

permanently in an autonomous body or a public sector undertaking

to which he is on deputation at the time of seeking voluntary

retirement.

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(2) The notice of voluntary retirement given under sub-rule

(1) shall require acceptance by the appointing authority:

Provided that where the appointing authority does not refuse

to grant the permission for retirement before the expiry of the

period specified in the said notice, the retirement shall become

effective from the date of expiry of the said period.

(3) (a) An employee referred to in sub-rule (1) may make a

request in writing to the appointing authority to accept notice of

voluntary retirement of less than ninety days giving reasons

therefor;

(b) on receipt of a request under clause(a), the appointing

authority may, subject to the provisions of sub-rule (2), consider

such request for the curtailment of the period of notice of ninety

days on merits and if it is satisfied that the curtailment of the

period of notice will not cause any administrative inconvenience,

the appointing authority may relax the requirement of notice of

ninety days on the condition that the employee shall not apply for

commutation of a part of his pension before the expiry of the

notice of ninety days.

(4) An employee, who has elected to retire under this rule and

has given necessary notice to that effect to the appointing authority,

shall be precluded from withdrawing his notice except with the

specific approval of such authority:

Provided that the request for such withdrawal shall be made

before the intended date of his retirement.

(5) The qualifying service of an employee retiring voluntarily

under this rule shall be increased by a period not exceeding five

years, subject to the condition that the total qualifying service

rendered by such employee shall not in any case exceed thirty-

three years and it does not take him beyond the date of retirement.

(6) The pension of an employee retiring under this rule shall

be based on the average emoluments as defined under clause(d) of

rule 2 of these rules and the increase, not exceeding five years in

his qualifying service, shall not entitle him to any notional fixation

of pay for the purpose of calculating his pension.

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It seems obvious to us that the Appellant’s case does not fall within the

postulation of Rule 23 as the last four categories or genres or types of cessation

of services are in character punitive; and the first envisages those resignations

where the right to pension has not been earned by that time or where it is

without the permission of the Corporation.

8 The Respondent Corporation has vehemently argued that the termination

of services is under Regulation 18 (supra) of the LIC (Staff) Regulations, 1960

and is not covered by the Pension Rules of 1995. Respondent Corporation has

controverted the plea of the Appellant that at the relevant date and time, viz.

28.1.1991 there was no alternative for him except to tender his resignation,

pointing out that he could not have sought voluntary retirement under

Regulation 19(2A) of LIC of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. If that be so, the

Respondent being a model employer could and should have extended the

advantage of these Regulations to the Appellant thereby safeguarding his

pension entitlement. However, we find no substance in the argument of the

Respondent since Regulation 19(2A) was, in fact, notified in the Gazette of

India on 16.2.1996, that is after the pension scheme came into existence with

effect from 1.11.1993. Otherwise there would have been no conceivable

reason for the Appellant not to have taken advantage of this provision which

would have protected his pensionary rights.

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9 We also record that the provisions covered by the definition of

“retirement”, which do not entail forfeiture of service, are sub-regulation (1),

sub-regulation (2), and sub-regulation (3) of Regulation 19 of the Life Insurance

Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960 and Rule 14 of the Life

Insurance Corporation of India Class III and Class IV Employees (Revision of

Terms and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1985. None of these provisions

provides for voluntary retirement like Rule 31 of the Pension Rules nor does the

definition of “retirement” make any mention of aforementioned Regulation

19(2A).

10 The facts of the case disclose that the Appellant has worked for over

twenty years and had tendered his resignation in accordance with the provision

of Regulation 18 of LIC of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960, which, as is

apparent from its reading, does not dissimulate between the termination of

service by way of resignation on the one hand and voluntary retirement on the

other, or distinguish one from the other. Significantly, there was no provision

for voluntary retirement at the relevant time, and it was for this reason that the

Pension Rules of 1995 specifically provided for it under Rule 31. In this

backdrop of facts, we need not dwell much on the issue because the case of

Sheelkumar Jain v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd., (2011) 12 SCC 197 is on all

fours of this case.

11 In Sheelkumar, the Appellant resigned from the services of the

Respondent Company after serving for over 20 years on 16.12.1991. His

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resignation was offered and granted under Clause 5 of General Insurance

(Termination, Superannuation and Retirement of Officers and Development

Staff) Scheme, 1976. Thereafter, the Central Government formulated General

Insurance (Employees') Pension Scheme, 1995 with retrospective effect from

1.11.1993. Sheelkumar applied for pension under this Scheme, which was

declined on the ground that resignation from service would entail forfeiture of

service under Clause 22 of the General Insurance (Employees')

Pension Scheme, 1995. The Appellant moved the High Court challenging the

rejection of his claim. His writ petition as well as the writ appeal was dismissed

by the High Court. The Appellant then moved this Court, whereby we noted

that Clause 5 of the Scheme of 1976 did not mention resignation nor was the

Appellant made aware of the distinction between resignation and voluntary

retirement; that this distinction was a product of the General Insurance

(Employees’) Pension Scheme of 1995. This Court observed:

20. Sub-para (1) of Para 5 does not state that the termination

of service pursuant to the notice given by an officer or a person of

the Development Staff to leave or discontinue his service amounts

to “resignation” nor does it state that such termination of service of

an officer or a person of the Development Staff on his serving

notice in writing to leave or discontinue in service amounts to

“voluntary retirement”. Sub-para (1) of Para 5 does not also make

a distinction between “resignation” and “voluntary retirement” and

it only provides that an employee who wants to leave or

discontinue his service has to serve a notice of three months to the

appointing authority.

21. We also notice that sub-para (1) of Para 5 does not require

that the appointing authority must accept the request of an officer

or a person of the Development Staff to leave or discontinue his

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service but in the facts of the present case, the request of the

appellant to relieve him from his service after three months’ notice

was accepted by the competent authority and such acceptance was

conveyed by the letter dated 28-10-1991 of the Assistant

Administrative Officer, Indore.

xxxxx

23. The 1995 Pension Scheme was framed and notified only

in 1995 and yet the 1995 Pension Scheme was made applicable

also to employees who had left the services of Respondent 1

Company before 1995. Paras 22 and 30 of the 1995 Pension

Scheme quoted above were not in existence when the appellant

submitted his letter dated 16-9-1991 to the General Manager of

Respondent 1 Company. Hence, when the appellant served his

letter dated 16-9-1991 to the General Manager of Respondent 1

Company, he had no knowledge of the difference between

“resignation” under Para 22 and “voluntary retirement” under Para

30 of the 1995 Pension Scheme. Similarly, Respondent 1 Company

employer had no knowledge of the difference between

“resignation” and “voluntary retirement” under Paras 22 and 30 of

the 1995 Pension Scheme, respectively.

24. Both the appellant and Respondent 1 have acted in

accordance with the provisions of sub-para (1) of Para 5 of the

1976 Scheme at the time of termination of service of the appellant

in the year 1991. It is in this background that we have now to

decide whether the termination of service of the appellant under

sub-para (1) of Para 5 of the 1976 Scheme amounts to resignation

in terms of Para 22 of the 1995 Pension Scheme or amounts to

voluntary retirement in terms of Para 30 of the 1995 Pension

Scheme.

25. Para 22 of the 1995 Pension Scheme states that the

resignation of an employee from the service of the corporation or a

company shall entail forfeiture of his entire past service and

consequently he shall not qualify for pensionary benefits, but does

not define the term “resignation”. Under sub-para (1) of Para 30 of

the 1995 Pension Scheme, an employee, who has completed 20

years of qualifying service, may by giving notice of not less than

90 days in writing to the appointing authority retire from service

and under sub-para (2) of Para 30 of the 1995 Pension Scheme, the

notice of voluntary retirement shall require acceptance by the

appointing authority. Since “voluntary retirement” unlike

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“resignation” does not entail forfeiture of past services and instead

qualifies for pension, an employee to whom Para 30 of the 1995

Pension Scheme applies cannot be said to have “resigned” from

service.

26. In the facts of the present case, we find that the appellant

had completed 20 years of qualifying service and had given notice

of not less than 90 days in writing to the appointing authority of his

intention to leave the service and the appointing authority had

accepted notice of the appellant and relieved him from service.

Hence, Para 30 of the 1995 Pension Scheme applied to the

appellant even though in his letter dated 16-9-1991 to the General

Manager of Respondent 1 Company he had used the word

“resign”.

12 What is unmistakably evident in the case at hand is that the Appellant

had worked continuously for over 20 years, that he sought to discontinue his

services and requested waiver of three months notice in writing, and that the

said notice was accepted by the Respondent Corporation and the Appellant was

thereby allowed to discontinue his services. If one would examine Rule 31 of

the Pension Rules juxtaposed with the aforementioned facts, it would at once be

obvious and perceptible that the essential components of that Rule stand

substantially fulfilled in the present case. In Sheelkumar, this Court was alive

to the factum that each case calls for scrutiny on its own merits, but that such

scrutiny should not be detached from the purpose and objective of the

concerned statute. It thus observed:

30. The aforesaid authorities would show that the court will

have to construe the statutory provisions in each case to find out

whether the termination of service of an employee was a

termination by way of resignation or a termination by way of

voluntary retirement and while construing the statutory provisions,

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the court will have to keep in mind the purposes of the statutory

provisions.

31. The general purpose of the 1995 Pension Scheme, read as

a whole, is to grant pensionary benefits to employees, who had

rendered service in the insurance companies and had retired after

putting in the qualifying service in the insurance companies. Paras

22 and 30 of the 1995 Pension Scheme cannot be so construed so

as to deprive of an employee of an insurance company, such as the

appellant, who had put in the qualifying service for pension and

who had voluntarily given up his service after serving 90 days’

notice in accordance with sub-para (1) of Para 5 of the 1976

Scheme and after his notice was accepted by the appointing

authority.

13 The Appellant ought not to be deprived of pension benefits merely

because he styled his termination of services as “resignation” or because there

was no provision to retire voluntarily at that time. The commendable objective

of the Pension Rule is to extend benefits to a class of people to tide over the

crisis and vicissitudes of old age, and if there are some inconsistencies between

the statutory provisions and the avowed objective of the statute so as to

discriminate between the beneficiaries within the class, the end of justice

obligates us to palliate the differences between the two and reconcile them as far

as possible. We would be failing in our duty, if we go by the letter and not by

the laudatory spirit of statutory provisions and the fundamental rights

guaranteed under Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

14 Reserve Bank of India v. Cecil Dennis Solomon, (2004) 9 SCC 461 relied

upon by the Respondent, although distinguishable on facts, has ventured to

distinguish “voluntary retirement” from “resignation” in the following terms:

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10. In service jurisprudence, the expressions

“superannuation”, “voluntary retirement”, “compulsory

retirement” and “resignation” convey different connotations.

Voluntary retirement and resignation involve voluntary acts on the

part of the employee to leave service. Though both involve

voluntary acts, they operate differently. One of the basic

distinctions is that in case of resignation it can be tendered at any

time, but in the case of voluntary retirement, it can only be sought

for after rendering prescribed period of qualifying service. Other

fundamental distinction is that in case of the former, normally

retiral benefits are denied but in case of the latter, the same is not

denied. In case of the former, permission or notice is not

mandated, while in case of the latter, permission of the employer

concerned is a requisite condition. Though resignation is a

bilateral concept, and becomes effective on acceptance by the

competent authority, yet the general rule can be displaced by

express provisions to the contrary. In Punjab National Bank v. P.K.

Mittal (1989 Supp (2) SCC 175) on interpretation of Regulation

20(2) of the Punjab National Bank Regulations, it was held that

resignation would automatically take effect from the date specified

in the notice as there was no provision for any acceptance or

rejection of the resignation by the employer. In Union of India v.

Gopal Chandra Misra ((1978) 2 SCC 301) it was held in the case

of a judge of the High Court having regard to Article 217 of the

Constitution that he has a unilateral right or privilege to resign his

office and his resignation becomes effective from the date which

he, of his own volition, chooses. But where there is a provision

empowering the employer not to accept the resignation, on certain

circumstances e.g. pendency of disciplinary proceedings, the

employer can exercise the power.

(emphasis is ours)

The legal position deducible from the above observations further amplifies that

the so-called resignation tendered by the Appellant was after satisfactorily

serving the period of 20 years ordinarily qualifying or enabling voluntary

retirement. Furthermore, while there was no compulsion to do so, a waiver of

the three months notice period was granted by the Respondent Corporation.

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The State being a model employer should construe the provisions of a beneficial

legislation in a way that extends the benefit to its employees, instead of

curtailing it.

15 The cases of Shyam Babu Verma v. Union of India, (1994) 2 SCC 521;

State of M.P. v. Yogendra Shrivastava, (2010) 12 SCC 538; M.R. Prabhakar v.

Canara Bank, (2012) 9 SCC 671; National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Kirpal Singh,

(2014) 5 SCC 189; UCO Bank v. Sanwar Mal, (2004) 4 SCC 412 relied upon by

the parties are distinguishable on facts from the present case.

16We thus hold that the termination of services of the Appellant, in essence,

was voluntary retirement within the ambit of Rule 31 of the Pension Rules of

1995. The Appellant is entitled for pension, provided he fulfils the condition of

refunding of the entire amount of the Corporation’s contribution to the

Provident Fund along with interest accrued thereon as provided in the Pension

Rules of 1995. Considering the huge delay, not explained by proper reasons, on

part of the Appellant in approaching the Court, we limit the benefits of arrears

of pension payable to the Appellant to three years preceding the date of the

petition filed before the High Court. These arrears of pension should be paid to

the Appellant in one instalment within four weeks from the date of refund of the

entire amount payable by the Appellant in accordance of the Pension Rules of

1995. In the alternative, the Appellant may opt to get the amount of refund

adjusted against the arrears of pension. In the latter case, if the amount of

arrear is more than the amount of refund required, then the remaining amount

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shall be paid within two weeks from the date of such request made by the

Appellant. However, if the amount of arrears is less than the amount of refund

required, then the pension shall be payable on monthly basis after the date on

which the amount of refund is entirely adjusted.

17The impugned Judgments of the High Court are set aside and the Appeal

stands allowed in the terms above. However, parties shall bear their respective

costs.

......................................................J

(VIKRAMAJIT SEN)

......................................................J

(ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE)

New Delhi,

October 12, 2015.