IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA, CHANDIGARH

(133)               CRM-M No.23222 of 2016(O&M)

              Reserved on: 29   

th

   January,2026   

                        Date of Decision: 28   

th

   April, 2026   

ASHISH ARORA

........Petitioner

VERSUS

DR. CHARU SHARMA

.........Respondent

CORAM:  HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUBHAS MEHLA

Present:  Mr. Vikas Kumar, Advocate, for the petitioner.

Mr. ADS Sukhija, Senior Advocate with 

Ms. Jashika, Advocate for the respondent.

****

SUBHAS MEHLA, J

1. Present petition has been filed under Section 482 of Cr.P.C.

seeking quashing of criminal complaint I.P.C./403 registered on 18.09.2013

tiled as ‘Dr. Charu Sharma v. Ashish Arora’ (Annexure P-1) under Sections

406   and   420   of   I.P.C.   pending   before   Judicial   Magistrate   First   Class

Chandigarh; summoning order dated 08.05.2014 (Annexure P-2);  order

dated 31.08.2015  dismissing the application under Section 245  Cr.P.C.

(Annexure P-3) and order in revision dated 01.02.2016 (Annexure P-4)

passed by the Additional Sessions Judge Chandigarh and all subsequent

proceedings arising therefrom. 

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BRIEF FACTS

2.  Briefly stated, the present petition arises out of a matrimonial

dispute between the petitioner and the respondent. The marriage between the

parties was solemnized on 23.12.1997. In 1998, the parties relocated to

Virginia, USA, and after a few years, returned to India, whereupon they

resided and worked together in Lucknow. Subsequently, relations between

the parties became strained, and the respondent/complainant left the

matrimonial home in April 2008 and shifted to her parental residence at

Chandigarh. The petitioner thereafter instituted proceedings in May 2008,

which culminated in an ex-parte decree of divorce dated 29.05.2009 passed

by the Family Court at Lucknow.

During their cohabitation at Lucknow, the parties had jointly applied for

allotment of a flat; however, the same was ultimately allotted solely in the

name of the petitioner, and the sale deed dated 17.04.2008 was executed in

his favour alone. Aggrieved thereby, the respondent/complainant filed the

aforementioned complaint under Sections 406 and 420 of the IPC, alleging

commission of offences of cheating and criminal breach of trust on the

premise that, despite contributing an amount of approximately USD 42,000

towards the purchase of the said flat, the petitioner got the property

transferred exclusively in his own name and, by deceitful means, transferred

the said amount from her bank account maintained in the USA to his own

account. It was further alleged that a legal notice dated 31.10.2011 was

issued to the petitioner, which was duly received by him, but he failed to

refund the said amount.

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3. Upon filing of the aforementioned complaint, the Ld. JMIC,

Chandigarh issued a summoning order dated 08.05.2014 (Annexure P-2).

Thereafter, petitioner/ accused filed an application under Section 245 Cr.P.C

seeking   discharge,   however,   the   same   was   dismissed  by   Ld.   JMIC,

Chandigarh,   vide   order   dated   31.08.2015   (Annexure   P-3). Aggrieved

thereby, the petitioner preferred a revision petition assailing both the

summoning order dated 08.05.2014 as well as the order dated 31.08.2015

declining discharge. The said revision petition, however, was dismissed by

the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Chandigarh, vide order dated

01.02.2016 (Annexure P-4), thereby affirming the aforesaid impugned

orders.

4. Consequently, the petitioner/accused has filed the present

petition before this Court seeking quashing of criminal complaint IPC/403

under Sections 420 and 406 of IPC against the petitioner (Annexure P-1);

summoning   order   dated   08.05.2014   passed   by   Ld.   JMIC,   Chandigarh

(Annexure P-2); order dated 31.08.2015 passed by Ld. JMIC, Chandigarh,

dismissing application under Section 245 Cr.P.C (Annexure P-3); as well as

order dated 01.02.2016 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Chandigarh

(Annexure P-4) whereby revision petition against the above-said orders was

dismissed . 

CONTENTIONS ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER

5.  Learned Counsel for the petitioner/accused contended

that the complaint in question has been filed with malafide intent, solely to

harass the petitioner, and no offence under Sections 406 or 420 of IPC is

made out from the allegations contained therein. It was submitted that the

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petitioner had preferred an application under Section 245 Cr.P.C seeking

discharge on the ground that no offence was disclosed; however, the said

application was dismissed vide impugned order dated 31.08.2015 passed by

the learned JMIC, Chandigarh, on the premise that the application had been

filed at a premature stage. Assailing the said finding, learned counsel

submitted that the same is wholly erroneous, as even a plain reading of the

complaint does not disclose the commission of any offence, and thus the

petitioner was entitled to discharge at the threshold.

6. With regard to the impugned summoning order dated

08.05.2014, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the learned

Trial Court failed to appreciate that the dispute between the parties arises out

of matrimonial discord, and that multiple litigations were already pending

between them. It was further contended that the courts at Chandigarh lacked

territorial jurisdiction, inasmuch as the property in question is situated at

Lucknow, the bank account from which the alleged amount of USD 42,000

was transferred is maintained in the USA, and the petitioner is ordinarily

resident at Lucknow; thus, no part of the cause of action arose within the

jurisdiction of Chandigarh.

7. It was further argued that the learned Trial Court failed to

conduct the mandatory inquiry under Section 202 Cr.P.C, despite the

petitioner residing beyond its territorial jurisdiction, and issued process

solely on the basis of preliminary evidence. Learned counsel submitted that,

in view of the amended provisions of Section 202 Cr.P.C, such inquiry or

investigation was mandatory prior to issuance of process, and non-

compliance thereof vitiates the summoning order. Assailing the impugned

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order dated 01.02.2016, whereby the learned Additional Sessions Judge

dismissed the revision petition against the summoning order dated

08.05.2014 as well as the order declining discharge, it was contended that the

same has been passed in complete disregard of settled principles of law. On

merits, learned counsel submitted that although the flat in question was

initially applied for jointly, the subsequent application was made by the

petitioner in his individual capacity, and the entire consideration amount for

the purchase of the flat, thereafter, was paid by the petitioner alone.

Consequently, the sale deed dated 17.04.2008 was executed solely in his

favour. It was further contended that this position was well within the

knowledge of the respondent/complainant at the relevant time, particularly

when she left the matrimonial home in April 2008.

8. It was also submitted that the allegation regarding illegal

transfer of USD 42,000 from the respondent’s bank account to that of the

petitioner is wholly unsubstantiated and unsupported by any material on

record, being a mere bald assertion. The respondent is an educated lady, and

complaint was filed after an inordinate delay after the cause of action arose.

No civil suit was lodged seeking possession of the land nor any recovery

proceedings were filed, rather criminal proceedings were initiated by way of

the impugned complaint dated 18.09.2013. This shows that the criminal law

was set into motion, due to strained relations, only to settle their score.

Further, it was contended that the parties have been residing separately since

2008, i.e. petitioner at Lucknow and respondent at Chandigarh; and there is

no part of cause of action which arose within the jurisdiction of Chandigarh.

Learned counsel urged that these material aspects, especially that of

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jurisdiction have been completely overlooked while passing the summoning

order, dismissing the application under Section 245 Cr.P.C, as well as while

dismissing revision petition whereby both abovesaid orders were upheld.

Hence, in view of aforesaid submissions, learned Counsel for petitioner

sought that the impugned complaint dated 18.09.2013 as well as impugned

orders dated 08.05.2014, 31.08.2015 and 01.02.2016, be set aside.

CONTENTIONS ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT

9. Per contra, learned Counsel for the respondent/complainant

contended that the petitioner has grossly misused the trust placed in him by

the respondent/complainant on account of their matrimonial relation, and

committed criminal breach of trust by illegally transferring US $ 42,000.00

from the respondent/complainant’s account maintained in USA to that of

petitioner’s own account. Upon being questioned, the petitioner allegedly

stated that the transfer had been effected in haste in connection with an

application for purchase of a flat at Lucknow. When the respondent

expressed disapproval, the petitioner came up with the proposal to apply for

the said flat jointly. Thereafter, to show good intent, acting on such

representation, petitioner jointly applied for the flat, and a housing loan of

₹14,00,000/- was also availed jointly, with the petitioner as the primary

applicant. It was further submitted that the respondent additionally

contributed ₹1,59,000/- towards renovation and woodwork of the flat.

However, later on, without the knowledge or consent of the respondent, the

petitioner unilaterally altered the allotment. When questioned regarding the

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same, the petitioner assured the respondent/complainant that final sale deed

would be registered in the names of both of them.

Hence, with ill-conceited plans, petitioner singularly moved an application in

his individual name and got the sale deed registered in his name alone,

thereby, not only illegally transferring the money from account of

respondent/complainant for payment towards purchase of the flat, but also

ousting the respondent/complainant from ownership of the said flat. Even

though the respondent/complainant sent a legal notice dated 31.10.2011, the

petitioner failed to return the said amount. The transfer of funds in question

was done without her consent, nor any later or subsequent intimation was

given to the complainant/respondent, and the transfer was only discovered

by her much later when she attempted to operate her account.

10. Learned counsel for respondent contended that the present

petition is not maintainable, and ought to be dismissed on this ground itself.

Learned counsel contended that the present petition under Section 482

Cr.P.C amounts to a second revision, which is impermissible in law, the

earlier revision having already been dismissed. Reliance in this regard has

been placed upon Haryana Waqf Board v. Mahabir Ahlabadi, (P&H),

CRM-M-36052-2019) and Sudesh v. State of Haryana, (P&H), CRM-M-

30350-2018.

11. Opposing the contention of learned counsel for the petitioner

that the courts at Chandigarh lack the territorial jurisdiction to entertain this

matter, learned counsel for the respondent/complainant has argued that the

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courts at Chandigarh have the competent jurisdiction, primarily relying on

the argument, that cheating may, in some cases, be designated as a

continuing offence, and on this account, courts at Chandigarh have the

competent jurisdiction. In this regard, he has sought to rely on certain

authorities, to support his contention as to territorial jurisdiction in

continuing offence: Kushal Kumar Gupta & Anr. v. Mala Gupta, 2011(4)

RCR(Criminal) 186; Shiv Dayal Arora & Anr. v. Smt. Renu Arora 2007

(3) RCR (Criminal) 10; Samrat Kaushik & Ors. v. State of Haryana &

Anr., 2007(1) RCR (Criminal) 328; Mandeep Singh v. State of Punjab;

1997 (2) RCR (Criminal) 154; Sandeep Aggarwal v. Sudesh Gupta, 1997

(2) RCR(Criminal) 322; Sarbjit Singh & Anr. v.Sarbjit Singh, 1994(1)

RCR (Criminal) 90; and Swaran Singh & Ors. v. Jagdish Kaur, 1991 (3)

RCR (Criminal) 83.

12. Contesting the contention of the learned counsel for petitioner

that the impugned summoning order dated 08.05.2014 has been passed in

complete disregard of the mandatory provisions of Proviso to sub-section(1)

of Section 202 of Cr.P.C, learned counsel for the respondent has relied upon

two authorities, i.e. Kala Ram Kansal v. State of Punjab & Anr., CRM-M-

47422-2019; and Vijay Dhanuka Etc. v. Najima Mamtaj Etc, 2014 (14)

SCC 638, to contend that the inquiry under Section 202 is limited to

ascertaining the truth in the complainant, and as long as the same is fulfilled,

it is not mandatory to hold an inquiry or investigation when the accused is

residing beyond the jurisdiction of the court.

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13. Hence, in light of the aforesaid arguments, learned counsel

prayed for dismissal of present petition and learned Trial Court and

Revisional Court, after appreciation of facts and circumstances, passed well-

reasoned orders, and they do not warrant interference.

14. Heard, and record perused.

OBSERVATIONS

15. Upon hearing learned counsel for the parties and perusing

the record, this Court proceeds to examine the controversy in the backdrop

of the admitted factual matrix. The parties were previously bound in a

matrimonial relationship and have been engaged in protracted and

acrimonious litigation over the years. Their marriage was solemnised in

Jaipur in 1997, whereafter they relocated to the USA in 1998 for higher

education and professional pursuits, and subsequently returned to India to

settle in Lucknow. Owing to matrimonial discord, the relationship between

the parties deteriorated, culminating in multiple legal proceedings inter se.

The respondent/complainant lodged an FIR against the petitioner under

Section 308 IPC, wherein the petitioner was ultimately convicted under

Section 334 IPC vide judgment dated 16.09.2009. In the interregnum, the

respondent left the matrimonial home in 2008 and shifted to her parental

residence at Chandigarh, and upon divorce proceedings initiated by the

petitioner, an ex parte decree of divorce dated 29.05.2009 was passed by the

Family Court at Lucknow. The respondent’s application under Order IX

Rule 13 CPC seeking setting aside of the said decree was dismissed. It is

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thereafter, in the year 2013, that the respondent instituted the present

complaint under Sections 406 and 420 IPC in respect of the flat in question.

The respondent is a well-educated and professional lady, and transfer of

funds from her account was well within her knowledge, however. She has

not agitated the same in any litigation – neither civil nor criminal, until the

impugned complaint, which has been filed after an inordinate delay.

16. In this backdrop, the principal contention raised by learned

counsel for the petitioner is that no part of the cause of action has arisen

within the territorial jurisdiction of the courts at Chandigarh, and therefore,

the said courts lacked jurisdiction to entertain the complaint, rendering the

impugned orders unsustainable in law. It has further been contended that the

learned JMIC failed to conduct the mandatory inquiry under Section 202

Cr.P.C, despite the petitioner admittedly residing outside its territorial

jurisdiction at Lucknow, and proceeded in a mechanical manner without due

application of mind to the merits of the case or the jurisdictional infirmities.

On these grounds, it has been prayed that the complaint as well as the

impugned orders be set aside.

17. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent/complainant has

opposed the petition, inter alia, on the ground of maintainability, contending

that the present petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C amounts to a second

revision, which is impermissible in law, the earlier revision having already

been dismissed. Reliance in this regard has been placed upon Haryana Waqf

Board (supra)

and Sudesh (supra). It has further been contended that the

courts at Chandigarh do possess territorial jurisdiction, inasmuch as the

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offence alleged is in the nature of a continuing offence, and therefore, the

fact that the petitioner is resident of Lucknow, the property is situated at

Lucknow, or that the bank account in question is maintained in the USA,

does not oust the jurisdiction of the Chandigarh courts. On these premises,

dismissal of the present petition has been sought.

18. From the facts of the case, and the arguments advanced by the

learned counsel for the parties, the contentious point of discussion has been

the territorial jurisdiction of the courts at Chandigarh. While learned counsel

for the petitioner has vehemently argued that the courts at Chandigarh lack

the territorial jurisdiction to entertain this matter, on the other hand, learned

counsel for the respondent/complainant has argued that the courts at

Chandigarh have the competent jurisdiction. In this regard, he has sought to

rely on certain authorities, to support his contention as to territorial

jurisdiction in continuing offence. Kushal Kumar Gupta (supra); Shiv

Dayal Arora (supra); Samrat Kaushik (supra); Mandeep Singh (supra);

Sandeep (supra); Sarbjit Singh (supra); and Swaran Singh & Ors(supra).

However, a careful examination of the said case-laws reveals that the

principle of continuing offence, as invoked therein, has largely been applied

in the context of offences under Section 498A IPC, that is, for the offence of

cruelty, wherein the nature of allegations usually involve a continuing course

of conduct. The present case, however, pertains to alleged offences under

Sections 406 and 420 IPC, which do not, in the facts of the present case,

attract the same treatment. Consequently, the authorities relied upon by the

respondent do not lend any substantive support to his plea that courts at

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Chandigarh had the competent jurisdiction to entertain the impugned

complaint.

19. The settled rule of jurisdiction is encapsulated in the maxim:

‘actor sequitur forum rei’, which means the plaintiff must follow the

defendant’s forum, so as to prevent harassment by compelling the defendant

to contest proceedings at distant places. This principle also finds statutory

recognition in Section 197 of the BNSS (erstwhile Section 177 CrPC), which

mandates that every offence should be inquired into and tried by the court

within whose territorial jurisdiction the offence was committed.

20. Applying the aforesaid principles to the present case, it is

evident that the complaint, if at all maintainable, ought to have been

instituted either at Lucknow, where the property in question is situated and

the sale deed was executed, or at the place where the alleged transfer of

funds took place, i.e., USA and Lucknow. It is not the case of the respondent

that any act constituting deception, inducement, or delivery of property

occurred within the jurisdiction of Chandigarh.

21. It is no doubt true that, in certain circumstances, the offence of

cheating may assume the character of a continuing offence where its

constituent elements occur at different places—such as the place where

deception is practised, inducement is made, or property is delivered—

however, the facts of the present case do not disclose any such circumstance.

None of the essential ingredients of the alleged offences are shown to have

arisen at Chandigarh. Consequently, no part of the cause of action can be

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said to have arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of the Chandigarh courts,

which, therefore, lacked the competence to entertain the complaint.

22. Furthermore, the offences alleged in the impugned complaint

are anti-thesis to each other. While the offence under Section 420 of IPC

requires that the dishonest intention should develop at the very inception,

however, offence under Section 406 of IPC i.e. Criminal Breach of Trust,

requires entrustment, and thereafter the dishonest intention develops. It has

been held in a plethora of precedents, that allegations under Section 406 and

Section 420 cannot go together, being the anti-thesis of each other which

itself weaken the case of the prosecution when these offences are alleged

together.

23. The next issue that arises for consideration is the validity of the

summoning order in the context of compliance with Section 202 Cr.P.C.

Learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that the learned Trial Court

has proceeded in clear violation of the mandate of Section 202 Cr.P.C,

inasmuch as the petitioner admittedly resides beyond the territorial

jurisdiction of the court at Chandigarh, i.e., at Lucknow. It is submitted that,

in such circumstances, the use of the expression “shall” in the amended

provision makes it obligatory for the Magistrate to conduct an inquiry or

direct an investigation prior to issuance of process, and the failure to do so

vitiates the summoning order.

24. Contesting the above-said contentions, learned counsel for the

respondent has relied upon two authorities, i.e. Kala Ram (supra); and Vijay

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(supra), to contend that the inquiry under Section 202 is limited to

ascertaining the truth in the complainant, and as long as the same is fulfilled,

it is not mandatory to hold an inquiry or investigation when the accused is

residing beyond the jurisdiction of the court.

25. However, the interpretation adopted for the abov e-said

authorities by learned counsel for respondent is not correct. In all

circumstances and for all purposes, in cases where the accused is residing

beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the court concerned, it is mandatory to

hold an inquiry or investigation, lest the rights of accused be prejudiced

leading to an unfair trial as it would create a hurdle for the accused in

properly defending his case. In the peculiar facts of the present case, an

inquiry/investigation thereunder was warranted prior to issuance of process.

This is particularly so as the petitioner was residing at Lucknow, the

property in question is situated at Lucknow, and the bank account from

which the alleged amount was transferred was maintained in the USA, where

the parties had resided together, and the account to which the said amount

was allegedly transferred was maintained in Lucknow. There is a delay in

filing the complaint, and there was a strained relationship between the parties

which led to many litigations between them. In such circumstances, the

learned Trial Court ought to have sought a report before proceeding to

summon the petitioner.

26. In Abhijit Pawar v. Hemant Madhukar Nimbalkar, 2017 (3)

SCC 528, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as follows:

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“Admitted position in law is that in those cases where the

accused is residing at a place beyond the area in which the

Magistrate exercises his jurisdiction, it is mandatory on the part

of the Magistrate to conduct an enquiry or investigation before

issuing the process. Section 202 of the Cr.P.C. was amended in

the year by the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act,

2005, with effect from 22nd June, 2006 by adding the words 'and

shall, in a case where the accused is residing at a place beyond

the area in which he exercises his jurisdiction'. There is a vital

purpose or objective behind this amendment, namely, to ward off

false complaints against such persons residing at a far off places

in order to save them from unnecessary harassment. Thus, the

amended provision casts an obligation on the Magistrate to

conduct enquiry or direct investigation before issuing the

process, so that false complaints are filtered and rejected. The

aforesaid purpose is specifically mentioned in the note appended

to the Bill proposing the said amendment”

27. Proviso to Section 202(1) is mandatory in nature, as it is in

nature of a safeguard. Its object is to prevent harassment of persons living

beyond the jurisdiction of the court trying the case, avoid frivolous or

vexatious complaints and ensure that the magistrate applies his judicial mind

before summoning an accused person. To do the same, the section requires

that either he may conduct the investigation himself, or direct a police officer

or any other person to conduct an investigation. Failing to do the same prima

facie warrants interference by this Court as it results in abuse of process of

law, even though the same has been previously adjudicated by the revisional

court. Two wrongs do not make one right, hence the failure of the revisional

court to detect the mistake of the summoning court, does not itself remedy

the lacking of the summoning order. Therefore, this Court finds no force in

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this contention of the learned counsel for the respondent, and finds merit in

contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioner.

28. The next issue that arises for consideration is the maintainability

of the present petition. Learned counsel for the respondent/complainant has

contended that the instant petition, ostensibly under Section 482 Cr.P.C, is in

the nature of a second revision, inasmuch as the summoning order as well as

the order dismissing the application under Section 245 Cr.P.C have already

been assailed before the revisional court and the revision petition has been

dismissed. On this premise, it is urged that the present petition is not

maintainable.

29. The objection, though seems reasonable at first, but it does not

merit acceptance in the facts of the present case. It is well settled that while a

second revision is barred, the inherent jurisdiction of this Court under

Section 482 Cr.P.C remains unaffected and may be invoked, inter alia, to

prevent abuse of the process of the court or to secure the ends of justice.

30. In the judgements relied upon by learned counsel for the

respondent, Haryana Waqf Board (supra) and Sudesh (supra), this Court

has observed that the petition under Section 482, Cr.P.C against the decision

of a revisional court would lie only in three situations:

“for giving effect to the orders passed under this Court, for

preventing the abuse of process of the Court and to meet the

ends of justice.”

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In case of the second situation i.e. for preventing the abuse of process of the

Court, this Court has further elucidated as to what is abuse of the process of

this Court:

“…by any means, an order passed by a Court of competent

jurisdiction and continuation thereof cannot be branded as an

abuse of the process of the Court”

31. In the present case, as already discussed in the preceding

paragraphs, the courts at Chandigarh lacked territorial jurisdiction to

entertain the complaint. Consequently, the summoning order dated

08.05.2014, the order dated 31.08.2015, as well as the revisional order

affirming the same, cannot be said to have been passed by courts of

competent jurisdiction. Once such a jurisdictional infirmity strikes at the root

of the proceedings, the continuation thereof would clearly amount to an

abuse of the process of law.

In view of the above, this Court finds no merit in the objection raised by

learned counsel for the respondent regarding maintainability. The present

petition, being one invoking the inherent jurisdiction of this Court to prevent

abuse of process and to secure the ends of justice, is held to be maintainable.

32. Taking into consideration the entire factual matrix and the legal

position discussed hereinabove, this Court finds that the complaint-in-hand is

vitiated not only on account of lack of territorial jurisdiction but also due to

the surrounding circumstances in which it has been instituted. The complaint

has been filed after a considerable and unexplained delay, i.e., in the year

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2013, much after the dissolution of marriage between the parties on

29.05.2009 and even subsequent to the issuance of a legal notice in 2011.

This assumes significance in light of the admitted position that the parties

were earlier husband and wife and have been engaged in multiple litigations

arising out of strained matrimonial relations. Notably, the

respondent/complainant was fully aware, at the time of leaving the

matrimonial home, that the allotment and sale deed of the flat stood in the

name of the petitioner, yet no relief in respect thereof was sought until the

impugned complaint was lodged in 2013. In light of the belated institution of

the impugned complaint, that too before the courts at Chandigarh, despite no

part of the cause of action arising there, this Court is of the opinion that the

summoning order has been passed in a mechanical manner, without due

application of mind and in disregard of the mandate of Section 202 Cr.P.C,

particularly when the petitioner was residing beyond the territorial

jurisdiction of the court. The revisional court, instead of rectifying these

patent infirmities, has failed to examine the matter on merits and dismissed

the revision petition solely on the ground of delay, despite the delay having

been sufficiently explained in view of the pendency of the application under

Section 245 CrPC.

33. In view of the aforesaid, this Court is of the considered opinion

that the impugned proceedings suffer from fundamental legal infirmities and

cannot be sustained. Accordingly, the present petition is allowed. The

criminal complaint bearing No. IPC/403 dated 18.09.2013 titled Dr. Charu

Sharma v. Ashish Arora (Annexure P-1) under Sections 406 and 420 IPC,

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pending before the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Chandigarh; the

summoning order dated 08.05.2014 (Annexure P-2); the order dated

31.08.2015 (Annexure P-3) dismissing the application under Section 245

CrPC; and the revisional order dated 01.02.2016 (Annexure P-4) passed by

the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Chandigarh, along with all

consequential proceedings arising therefrom, are hereby set aside.

34.  Accordingly, allowed. 

35. All pending application(s), if any, also stand disposed of. 

                                                                          (SUBHAS MEHLA)    

                                          JUDGE

28

th

 April, 2026

mamta

Whether Speaking/ Reasoned

: Yes/ No

Whether Reportable: Yes/ No

-19-