No Acts & Articles mentioned in this case
Page 1 REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 482 OF 2002
ASHRAFKHAN @ BABU MUNNEKHAN
PATHAN … APPELLANT
VERSUS
STATE OF GUJARAT …RESPONDENT
WITH
CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 486-487 OF 2002
YUSUFKHAN @ LAPLAP KHUDDADKHAN
PATHAN & ORS. … APPELLANTS
VERSUS
STATE OF GUJARAT …RESPONDENT
CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 762-765 OF 2002
STATE OF GUJARAT … APPELLANT
VERSUS
YUSUFKHAN @ LAPLAP KHUDADATTKHAN
PATHAN & ORS. …RESPONDENTS
Page 2 CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 766-768 OF 2002
STATE OF GUJARAT … APPELLANT
VERSUS
ABDUL KHURDUSH ABDUL GANI
SHAIKH & ORS. …RESPONDENTS
J U D G M E N T
CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD, J.
These appeals have been filed against the
judgment and order dated 31
st
of January, 2002
passed by Additional Designated Judge, Court No.3,
Ahmedabad City in TADA Case Nos. 15/1995 and 6/1996
consolidated with TADA Case Nos. 32/1994 and
43/1996.
According to the prosecution, Abdul Wahab Abdul
Majid Khan was arrested in a case of murder. On
being interrogated in that case, he made startling
and shocking revelations. He disclosed that
accused Yusuf Laplap, who is involved in illegal
business of liquor and running a gambling den is in
2
Page 3 possession of four foreign made hand grenades,
revolvers and AK-47 rifles. The fountainhead of
the weapons, according to the information is
notorious criminal Abdul Latif Shaikh and came at
the hand of accused Yusuf Laplap through his close
associate accused Abdul Sattar @ Sattar Chacha.
Sattar gave the arms and explosives to accused
Siraj @ Siraj Dadhi, a constable attached to
Vejalpur Police Station. He in turn delivered
those arms and explosives to accused Imtiyaz
Nuruddin, the servant of Yusuf Laplap at latter’s
instance. The aforesaid information was passed on
to A.K. Suroliya, the Deputy Commissioner of
Police, Crime Branch. The police party searched the
house of the accused Yusuf Laplap in the night and
found him leaving the house with two bags. From
one of the bags one revolver with ISI mark and five
foreign made hand grenades were recovered and from
another bag five detonators having clips affixed to
it were found.
3
Page 4 According to the allegation, the arms and
explosives seized were similar to those used in the
Ahmedabad City earlier by gang of criminals and
intended to be used in the forthcoming “Jagannath
Rath Yatra”. The information given by the Police
Inspector, U.T. Brahmbhatt led to registration of
Crime No. 1-CR No. 11 of 1994 dated 9
th
of June,
1994, at the Crime Branch Police Station under
Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code, Section 3 &
5 of Terrorist and Disruptive Activities
(Prevention) Act (hereinafter referred to as
‘TADA’), Section 7 & 25 (1) of the Arms Act and
Section 4, 5 and 6 of the Explosive Substances Act
against seven accused persons
1
.
It is the case of the prosecution that the
Police Inspector U.T. Brahmbhatt, before recording
the first information report, sought prior approval
of the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Crime Branch,
for registration of the case which was granted.
It is only thereafter, the first information report
1
List of persons named in Crime No. 1-CR No. 11 of 1994 dated 9
th
of
June, 1994 is appended at Schedule No.-I.
4
Page 5 was registered and the investigation proceeded. It
is also their case that another approval was
granted on 15
th
of June, 1994 by the Additional
Chief Secretary, Home Department. Not only that,
the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Crime Branch,
PW-65 A.R. Suroliya gave another approval on
11
th
of August, 1994.
During the course of investigation, the
complicity of large number of persons surfaced. In
all 46 AK-56 rifles, 40 boxes of cartridges, 99
bombs, 110 fuse pins and 110 magazines were brought
to Ahmedabad and seized by the investigating agency
from various accused persons. These were
distributed to the accused persons for killing and
terrorising the Hindu community during “Jagannath
Rath Yatra”. All those persons who were either
found in possession or involved in transporting or
facilitating transportation of those weapons were
charge-sheeted. All these were intended to be used
to disturb peace and communal harmony during
“Jagannath Rath Yatra”.
5
Page 6 Ultimately, the investigating agency, on 16
th
of December, 1994 submitted first
2
charge-sheet
against 14 accused persons under Section 120B,
121A, 122, 123 and 188 of Indian Penal Code,
Section 3 and 5 of TADA, Section 4, 5 and 6 of
Explosive Substances Act, Section 25(1A) of Arms
Act, Section 135 of Customs Act and Section 135 (1)
of Bombay Police Act. Second
3
charge-sheet came to
be filed on 23
rd
of May, 1995 against 2 accused
persons. Investigation did not end there and
third
4
, fourth
5
and fifth
6
charge-sheets were
submitted on 17
th
of April, 1996, 20
th
of December,
1996 and 24
th
of May, 2000 against 33, 11 and 2
accused persons respectively. Thus, altogether 62
persons were charge-sheeted.
2
List of persons charge-sheeted in the first charge-sheet dated 16
th
of
December, 1994 is appended at Schedule No.–II.
3
List of persons charge-sheeted in the second charge-sheet dated 23
rd
May, 1995 is appended at Schedule No.–III.
4
List of persons charge-sheeted in the third charge-sheet dated 17
th
of
April, 1996 is appended at Schedule No.–IV.
5
List of persons charge-sheeted in the fourth charge-sheet dated 20
th
of
December, 1996 is appended at Schedule No.–V.
6
List of persons charge-sheeted in the fifth charge-sheet dated 24
th
of
May, 2000 is appended at Schedule No.–VI.
6
Page 7 The Designated Court framed charges against 60
accused persons under Section 120B of the Indian
Penal Code, Section 3 and 5 of TADA, Section 4, 5
and 6 of the Explosive Substances Act and Section
25 (1A) of the Arms Act. However, Accused No. 57
namely, Mohmad Harun @ Munna @ Riyaz @ Chhote
Rahim, has been discharged by the Designated Court
by its order dated 24
th
of August, 2001. During the
course of trial six accused namely, Adambhai
Yusufbhai Mandli (Shaikh), Accused No. 11, Fanes
Aehmohmad Ansari, Accused No. 18, Abdullatif
Abdulvahab Shaikh, Accused No. 35, Ikbal Jabbarkhan
Pathan, Accused No. 38, Firoz @ Firoz Kankani,
Accused No. 56 and Jay Prakash Singh @ Bachchi
Singh, Accused No. 60 died. One accused namely,
Accused No. 9, Mohmad Ismail Abdul
Shaikh absconded.
In order to bring home the charge, the
prosecution altogether examined 70 witnesses and a
large number of documents were also exhibited. The
7
Page 8 accused were given opportunity to explain the
circumstances appearing in the evidence against
them and their defence was denial simpliciter. The
Designated Court, on analysis of the evidence, both
oral and documentary, vide its order dated 31
st
of
January, 2002 convicted 11 accused persons
7
under
Section 3 and 5 of TADA, Section 7 and 25(1A) of
the Arms Act and Section 4, 5 and 6 of the
Explosive Substances Act. They have been sentenced
to undergo rigorous imprisonment for five years for
the offence punishable under Section 3 and 5 of
TADA and fine with default clause. The Designated
Court further sentenced those convicted under
Section 4, 5 and 6 of the Explosive Substances Act
to suffer rigorous imprisonment for five years and
fine with default clause. They were further
sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for five
years and fine with default clause under Section 7
and 25(1A) of the Arms Act. All the sentences were
directed to run concurrently. The Designated
7
List of persons convicted by Designated Court vide its order dated 31
st
of
January, 2002 is appended at Schedule No.-VII.
8
Page 9 Court, however, acquitted 41 accused
8
of all the
charges leveled against them.
Those found guilty have preferred Criminal
Appeal No. 482 of 2002 (Ashrafkhan @ Babu Munnekhan
Pathan & Anr. Vs. State of Gujarat) and Criminal
Appeal Nos. 486-487 of 2002 (Yusufkhan @ Laplap
Khuddadkhan Pathan & Ors. Vs. State of Gujarat).
State of Gujarat, aggrieved by the inadequacy of
sentence, preferred Criminal Appeal Nos. 762-765 of
2002 (State of Gujarat Vs. Yusufkhan @ Laplap
Khudadattkhan Pathan & Ors.) and also preferred
Criminal Appeal Nos. 766-768 of 2002 (State of
Gujarat Vs. Abdul Khurdush Abdul Gani Shaikh &
Ors.) against acquittal.
As all these appeals arise out of the same
judgment, they were heard together and are being
disposed of by this common judgment.
8
List of persons acquitted by Designated Court vide its order dated 31
st
of
January, 2002 is appended at Schedule No.-VIII.
· All Schedules appended shall form part of the judgment.
9
Page 10 We have heard Mr. Sushil Kumar and Mr. Ranjit
Kumar learned Senior Counsel, Mr. Garvesh Kabra,
learned amicus curiae, Mr. Sanjay Jain and Ms.
Meenakshi Arora, learned counsel on behalf of the
accused. Mr. Yashank Adhyaru, learned Senior
Counsel was heard on behalf of the State of
Gujarat.
In order to assail the conviction several
submissions were made by the learned counsel
representing the accused. However, as the
conviction has to be set aside on a very short
ground, we do not consider it either expedient to
incorporate or answer those submissions.
We may record here that we have incorporated
only those parts of the prosecution case which have
bearing on the said point and shall discuss
hereinafter only those materials which are relevant
for adjudication of the said issue.
It is the contention of the accused that the
first information report under the provisions of
1
Page 11 TADA was registered without approval of the
District Superintendent of Police as contemplated
under Section 20-A(1) of TADA and this itself
vitiates the conviction.
Plea of the State, however, is that such an
approval was granted by A.R. Suroliya, the Deputy
Commissioner of Police, Crime Branch, who is an
officer of the rank of District Superintendent of
Police. Alternatively, the State contends that
Section 20-A of TADA is a two tiered provision
which provides for approval by the Deputy
Commissioner under Section 20-A(1) and sanction by
the Commissioner under Section 20-A(2) of TADA. In
the absence of challenge to the sanction, challenge
only to the approval, to use the counsel’s word
“would be curable defect under Section 465 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure”. It has also been
pointed out that the accused having not challenged
the sanction granted by the Commissioner of Police
under Section 20-A(2) of TADA, they cannot assail
their conviction on the ground of absence of
1
Page 12 approval under Section 20-A(1) by the Deputy
Commissioner. In order to defend the conviction,
the State of Gujarat further pleads that the
Designated Court having taken cognizance and
decided to try the case by itself under Section 18
of TADA, the prior defects, if any, are rendered
irrelevant and cannot be raised. It has also been
pointed out that the Designated Court having been
empowered to take cognizance under Section 14 of
TADA irrespective of absence of compliance of
Section 20-A(1) of TADA, its non-compliance would
not be fatal to the prosecution. It has also been
highlighted that several safeguards have been
provided under the scheme of TADA including the
power of the court to take cognizance and proceed
with the trial and once cognizance has been taken,
defects prior to that cannot be allowed to be
raised. In any view of the matter, according to
the State, absence of approval under
Section 20-A(1) of TADA would not vitiate the
1
Page 13 conviction of the accused persons under other penal
provisions.
In view of the rival submissions the question
for determination is as to whether the Deputy
Commissioner, A.R. Suroliya gave prior approval on
9
th
of June, 1994 or 11
th
of August, 1994 for
recording the first information report as
contemplated under Section 20-A(1) of TADA and in
case it is found on facts that no such approval was
granted, the effect thereof on the conviction of
the accused. Further, the effect of approval by
the Additional Chief Secretary, Home Department on
15
th
of June,1994 is also required to be gone into.
To prove prior approval by the Deputy
Commissioner before the lodging of the first
information report, the prosecution has mainly
relied on the evidence of the Inspector of Police
U.T. Brahmbhatt, PW-10 and Deputy Commissioner A.R.
Suroliya, PW-65. Xerox copy of the approval (Exh.
775)has also been brought on record to establish
1
Page 14 that. It is not in dispute that officer of the rank
of Deputy Commissioner is equivalent to District
Superintendent of Police. U.T. Brahmbhatt has
stated in his evidence that “Mr. Suroliya passed an
order, sanctioned the same and an endorsement is
also made regarding that”. This witness has been
subjected to cross-examination and in the cross-
examination he has admitted that the letter asking
for approval to investigate and the report under
Section 157 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
(hereinafter referred to as ‘the Code’) has been
lost while producing the same in the Supreme Court.
A.R. Suroliya, PW-65, in his evidence has supported
the case of the prosecution regarding prior
approval. While explaining the absence of the
original approval, this witness has stated in his
evidence that he had gone to the Supreme Court for
hearing of the application filed by the accused
Yusuf Laplap and handed over the original papers to
the senior counsel. According to him, the senior
counsel told him that after producing the necessary
1
Page 15 papers before the Supreme Court, the original
papers would be sent back but it has not come and
despite efforts and inquiry, it could not be traced
out. According to his evidence “as the original
letter of approval thereof is not found” the xerox
copy thereof was produced. It was marked as
Exh.775. In the cross-examination, he reiterated
that he had gone to the Supreme Court along with
original approval letter and in the bail
application of accused Yusuf Laplap, the said
approval was produced. He feigned ignorance as to
whether entry was made into outward register
regarding approval and denied suggestion that he
did not receive any proposal for approval nor
granted the same and with a view to see that the
case does not fall, he had deposed falsely
regarding approval. In his cross-examination he
has stated as follows:
“I do not know whether there is any
such paper in my office or not for
grant of approval for which I have
deposed.”
1
Page 16 The Designated Court accepted the case of the
prosecution and held that prior approval was
granted by the Deputy Commissioner under Section
20-A(1) of TADA. While doing so, the Designated
Court observed as follows:
“…The original documents were sent to
the honorable Supreme Court for the
purpose of producing the same in court
in connection with the same petition
and thereafter the same have been
misplaced or lost….”
It further observed as follows:
“….On receiving certain information
from Abdul Wahab and Yusuf Laplap Mr.
Brahmbhatt lodged the FIR against
seven accused persons and it was sent
for the approval of DCP and on getting
the approval under section 20-A(1),
the offence was registered under the
TADA Act. Thereafter on perusal of
the deposition, it becomes clear that
there was total compliance of Section
20-A(1) of the TADA Act before lodging
the FIR and on getting the approval
from DCP the offence was registered.
Having given our anxious consideration to the
facts of the present case and the evidence on
record, we are of the opinion that the case of the
1
Page 17 prosecution that the Deputy Commissioner granted
approval under Section 20-A(1) of TADA before
registration of the case is fit to be rejected. It
is interesting to note that the Deputy Commissioner
A.R. Suroliya has categorically stated in his
evidence that he had gone to the Supreme Court with
original records, which included the first
information report, on which he had granted
approval and handed over the same to the counsel.
Thereafter, according to him, the said original
first information report got lost or misplaced. It
has been brought to our notice that accused Yusuf
Laplap had not come to this Court for grant of bail
and, therefore, the Deputy Commissioner had no
occasion to come with the original record in
connection with that case. True it is that some of
the accused persons in the case had approached this
Court for various reliefs, but in the face of the
evidence of the Deputy Commissioner A.R. Suroliya
that he came along with the record in connection
1
Page 18 with the case of the accused Yusuf Laplap is fit to
be rejected. There are various other reasons also
to reject this part of the prosecution story.
As stated earlier, charge-sheet in the case has
been filed in five stages. Further, report under
Section 157 of the Code has been filed and all
these acts had taken place before the alleged loss
of the document in the Supreme Court and,
therefore, should have formed part of the charge-
sheet and the report given under Section 157 of the
Code. It has also come on record that later on,
the Assistant Commissioner of Police, Crime Branch
had sought for approval of the Deputy Commissioner
which he granted on 11
th
of August, 1994. The
communication of the Assistant Commissioner of
Police (Exh.1173) does not refer to any approval
granted by the Deputy Commissioner earlier and, not
only that, the Deputy Commissioner while giving
approval on 11
th
of August, 1994 has nowhere
whispered that earlier he had already granted the
1
Page 19 approval. No explanation is forthcoming from the
side of the prosecution that when Deputy
Commissioner A.R. Suroliya had already granted
approval on 9
th
of June, 1994, what was the occasion
to write to him for grant of another approval and
the Deputy Commissioner granting the same. To
prove prior approval, the prosecution has produced
the xerox copy. According to the evidence of
Deputy Commissioner A.R. Suroliya, he had got it
prepared from the copy kept in his office. We
wonder as to how and why when a copy of the
approval was kept in the office of the Deputy
Commissioner itself, xerox copy was produced. It
is relevant here to state that this witness, in his
cross-examination, has admitted that he does not
remember whether “there is any such paper in my
office or not for grant of approval for which” he
had deposed.
In the face of what we have observed above the
case of the prosecution that prior approval was
1
Page 20 granted on 9
th
of June, 1994 is fit to be rejected.
It seems that the prosecution has come out with a
story of grant of prior approval under
Section 20-A(1) of TADA in view of the decision of
this Court in the case of Mohd. Yunus v. State of
Gujarat, (1997) 8 SCC 459. There the prosecution
has propounded the theory of oral permission which
was rejected. In that case also the prosecution
has pressed into service the permission granted on
11
th
of August, 1994 by the same Deputy Commissioner
i.e. A.R. Suroliya and earlier oral permission.
While rejecting the same this Court has observed as
follows:
“4. It is, however, contended by the
prosecution that on the very date when
investigation had been made in this
case, the Commissioner of Police,
Ahmedabad was present and he had given
oral permission under Section 20-A(1)
of TADA. We may indicate here that
considering the serious consequences
in a criminal case initiated under the
provisions of TADA, oral permission
cannot be accepted. In our view,
Section 20-A(1) must be construed by
indicating that prior approval of the
statutory authority referred to in the
2
Page 21 said sub-section must be in writing so
that there is transparency in the
action of the statutory authority and
there is no occasion for any
subterfuge subsequently by introducing
oral permission.”
From the analysis of the evidence on record, we
have no manner of doubt that the Deputy
Commissioner A.R. Suroliya did not grant prior
approval before registration of the case.
As stated earlier, the prosecution has relied
on another approval dated 11
th
of August, 1994
granted by the Deputy Commissioner. In order to
prove this, reference is made to the letter of the
Assistant Commissioner addressed to the Deputy
Commissioner of Police (Exh. 1173). In the said
letter, the Assistant Commissioner of Police has
observed that the Home Department of the Government
has given approval to apply sections of TADA and
the approval of the Deputy Commissioner is
necessary in this regard. The Deputy Commissioner
of Police on the same day granted approval.
2
Page 22 However, Deputy Commissioner A.R. Suroliya, in his
evidence, has nowhere stated about the approval
granted on 11
th
of August, 1994 though he had
deposed about the approval granted on 9
th
of June,
1994. In the face of it, the case of the
prosecution that Deputy Commissioner A.R. Suroliya
gave another approval on 11
th
of August, 1994 is fit
to be rejected.
Another approval said to have been granted by
the Additional Chief Secretary, Home Department for
“using TADA sections” (Exh. 439) has also been
proved by the prosecution to establish compliance
of Section 20-A(1) of TADA. Accused has not joined
issue on this count and in view of the evidence on
record, we have no hesitation in accepting the case
of the prosecution that the Additional Chief
Secretary, Home Department, on 15
th
of June, 1994
had given approval. However, its consequences on
the conviction of the accused shall be discussed
later on.
2
Page 23 Having found that the Deputy Commissioner has
not granted the prior approval, as required under
Section 20-A(1) of TADA, we proceed to consider the
consequence thereof. For that, we deem it
expedient to reproduce Section 20-A of TADA which
reads as under:
20-A Cognizance of offence.
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained
in the Code, no information about the
commission of an offence under this
Act shall be recorded by the police
without the prior approval of the
District Superintendent of Police.
(2) No court shall take cognizance of
any offence under this Act without the
previous sanction of the Inspector-
General of Police, or as the case may
be, the Commissioner of Police.
It is worth mentioning here that TADA, as
originally enacted, did not contain this provision
and it has been inserted by Section 9 of the
Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention)
Amendment Act (Act 43 of 1993). From a plain
2
Page 24 reading of the aforesaid provision it is evident
that no information about the commission of an
offence shall be recorded by the police without the
prior approval of the District Superintendent of
Police. The legislature, by using the negative
word in Section 20-A(1) of TADA, had made its
intention clear. The scheme of TADA is different
than that of ordinary criminal statutes and,
therefore, its provisions have to be strictly
construed. Negative words can rarely be held
directory. The plain ordinary grammatical meaning
affords the best guide to ascertain the intention
of the legislature. Other methods to understand
the meaning of the statute is resorted to if the
language is ambiguous or leads to absurd result.
No such situation exists here. In the face of it,
the requirement of prior approval by the District
Superintendent of Police, on principle, cannot be
said to be directory in nature. There are
authorities which support the view we have taken.
Reference, in this connection, can be made to a
2
Page 25 three-Judge Bench decision of this Court in the
case of Anirudhsinhji Karansinhji Jadeja v. State
of Gujarat, (1995) 5 SCC 302. As in the present
case, in the said case also the permission granted
by the Additional Chief Secretary was considered.
The effect of absence of prior approval by the
District Superintendent of Police and the grant of
approval by the Additional Chief Secretary were not
found to be in conformity with the scheme of TADA.
Paragraph 11 of the judgment which is relevant for
the purpose reads as follows:
“11. The case against the appellants
originally was registered on 19-3-1995
under the Arms Act. The DSP did not
give any prior approval on his own to
record any information about the
commission of an offence under TADA.
On the contrary, he made a report to
the Additional Chief Secretary and
asked for permission to proceed under
TADA. Why? Was it because he was
reluctant to exercise jurisdiction
vested in him by the provision of
Section 20-A(1)? This is a case of
power conferred upon one authority
being really exercised by another. If
a statutory authority has been vested
with jurisdiction, he has to exercise
it according to its own discretion. If
2
Page 26 the discretion is exercised under the
direction or in compliance with some
higher authority's instruction, then
it will be a case of failure to
exercise discretion altogether. In
other words, the discretion vested in
the DSP in this case by Section 20-
A(1) was not exercised by the DSP
at all.”
The effect of non-compliance of Section
20-A(1) of TADA also came up for consideration
before this Court in the case of Mukhtiar Ahmed
Ansari v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2005) 5 SCC 258
and while holding that absence of prior approval
would vitiate the conviction, the Court observed as
under:
“23. We are unable to uphold the
argument. In this case, the Deputy
Commissioner of Police himself had
been examined as prosecution witness
(PW 4). In his deposition, he had not
stated that he had given any such
direction to PW 11 Ram Mehar Singh to
register case against the accused
under TADA. On the contrary, he had
expressly stated that he had granted
sanction (which was in writing) which
is at Ext. P-4/1. As already adverted
earlier, it was under the Arms Act and
not under TADA.
2
Page 27 24. In our opinion, therefore, from
the facts of the case, it cannot be
held that prior approval as required
by Section 20-A(1) has been accorded
by the competent authority under TADA.
All proceedings were, therefore,
vitiated. The contention of the
appellant-accused must be upheld and
the conviction of the appellant-
accused under TADA must be set aside.”
In the present case, we have found that no
prior approval was granted by the Deputy
Commissioner of Police and in the face of the
judgments of this Court in the case of
Anirudhsinhji Karansinhji Jadeja (supra) and
Mukhtiar Ahmed Ansari (supra), the conviction of
the accused cannot be upheld. It is worth
mentioning that this Court had taken the same view
in the case of Mohd. Yunus (supra) and on fact,
having found that no permission was granted, the
charge was held to have been vitiated. It is worth
mentioning here that in Mohd. Yunus (supra) this
Court observed that no oral permission is
permissible but in Kalpnath Rai v. State, (1997) 8
2
Page 28 SCC 732 this Court held that District
Superintendent of Police, in a given contingency,
can grant oral approval and that would satisfy the
requirement of Section 20-A(1) of TADA.
The conflict between the decisions of this
Court in Mohd. Yunus (supra) and Kalpnath Rai
(supra) was considered by a three-Judge Bench in
the case of State of A.P. v. A. Sathyanarayana,
(2001) 10 SCC 597 and this Court held that oral
approval is permissible and while over-ruling the
decision in the case of Mohd. Yunus (supra), upheld
the ratio laid down in the case of Kalpnath Rai
(supra) that the prior approval may be either in
writing or oral also. But, at the same time, the
decision in the case of Mohd. Yunus (supra) that
prior approval is sine qua non for prosecution, has
not been watered down and, in fact, reiterated.
This would be evident from paragraph 8 of the
judgment which reads as follows:
2
Page 29 “8. Having applied our mind to the
aforesaid two judgments of this Court,
we are in approval of the latter
judgment and we hold that it is not
the requirement under Section 20-A(1)
to have the prior approval only in
writing. Prior approval is a condition
precedent for registering a case, but
it may be either in writing or oral
also, as has been observed by this
Court in Kalpnath Rai case, 1997 (8)
SCC 732 and, therefore, in the case in
hand, the learned Designated Judge was
wholly in error in refusing to
register the case under Sections 4 and
5 of TADA. We, therefore, set aside
the impugned order of the learned
Designated Judge and direct that the
matter should be proceeded with in
accordance with law.”
(underlining ours)
Another question which needs our attention is
the effect of approval dated 15
th
of June, 1994
given by the Additional Chief Secretary, Home
Department of the State. Section 20-A of TADA
authorises the District Superintendent of Police to
grant approval for recording the offence and
Additional Chief Secretary of the Home Department
or for that matter, State Government does not
figure in that. The legislature has put trust on
2
Page 30 the District Superintendent of Police and therefore
it is for him to uphold that trust and nobody else.
Hence approval by the Additional Chief Secretary is
inconsequential and it will not save the
prosecution on this count, if found vulnerable
otherwise. We may however observe that in order to
prevent the abuse of TADA, the State Government may
put other conditions and prescribe approval by the
Government or higher officer in the hierarchy but
the same cannot substitute the requirement of
approval by the District Superintendent of Police.
Not only this, the District Superintendent of
Police is obliged to grant approval on its own
wisdom and outside dictate would vitiate his
decision. This view finds support from the
decision of this Court in the case of Anirudhsinhji
Karansinhji Jadeja (Supra).
Now we proceed to consider the submission
advanced by the State that non-compliance of
Section 20-A(1) i.e. absence of approval of the
3
Page 31 District Superintendent of Police, is a curable
defect under Section 465 of the Code. We do not
have the slightest hesitation in holding that
Section 465 of the Code shall be attracted in the
trial of an offence by the Designated Court under
TADA. This would be evident from Section 14 (3) of
TADA which reads as follows:
“S.14.Procedure and powers of
Designated Courts
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Subject to the other provisions of
this Act, a Designated Court shall,
for the purpose of trial of any
offence, have all the powers of a
Court of Session and shall try such
offence as if it were a Court of
Session so far as may be in accordance
with the procedure prescribed in the
Code for the trial before the Court of
Session.”
From a plain reading of the aforesaid provision
it is evident that for the purpose of trial
Designated Court is a Court of Session. It has all
the powers of a Court of Session and while trying
3
Page 32 the case under TADA, the Designated Court has to
follow the procedure prescribed in the Code for the
trial before a Court of Session. Section 465 of
the Code, which falls in Chapter XXXV, covers cases
triable by a Court of Session also. Hence, the
prosecution can take shelter behind Section 465 of
the Code. But Section 465 of the Code shall not be
a panacea for all error, omission or irregularity.
Omission to grant prior approval for registration
of the case under TADA by the Superintendent of
Police is not the kind of omission which is covered
under Section 465 of the Code. It is a defect
which goes to the root of the matter and it is not
one of the curable defects.
The submission that absence of sanction under
Section 20-A(2) by the Commissioner of Police has
been held to be a curable defect and for parity of
reasons the absence of approval under Section 20-
A(1) would be curable is also without substance and
reliance on the decision of Lal Singh v. State of
3
Page 33 Gujarat, (1998) 5 SCC 529, in this connection, is
absolutely misconceived. An Act which is harsh,
containing stringent provision and prescribing
procedure substantially departing from the
prevalent ordinary procedural law cannot be
construed liberally. For ensuring rule of law its
strict adherence has to be ensured. In the case of
Lal Singh (supra) relied on by the State, Section
20-A(1) of TADA was not under scanner. Further,
this Court in the said judgment nowhere held that
absence of sanction under Section 20-A(2) is a
curable defect. In Lal Singh (supra) the question
of sanction was not raised before the Designated
Court and sought to be raised before this Court for
the first time which was not allowed. This would
be evident from the following paragraph of the
judgment
“4. Sub-section (2) makes it clear
that when the objection could and
should have been raised at an earlier
stage in the proceeding and has not
been raised, mere error or
irregularity in any sanction of
3
Page 34 prosecution becomes ignorable. We
therefore do not permit the appellants
to raise the plea of defect in
sanction.”
(underlining ours)
The decision of this Court in the case of
Ahmad Umar Saeed Sheikh v. State of U.P., (1996) 11
SCC 61, relied on by the State, instead of
supporting its contention clearly goes against it.
As observed earlier, the omission to grant approval
does not come within the purview of Section 465 of
the Code and, hence, the rigors of Section 465 (2)
shall be wholly inapplicable. Otherwise also, the
accused have raised this point at the earliest.
Grant or absence of approval by the District
Superintendent of Police is a mixed question of law
and fact. The very existence of the approval under
Section 20-A(1) of TADA has been questioned by the
accused during the course of trial, which is
evident from the trend of cross-examination. Not
only this, it was raised before the Designated
Court during argument and has been rejected. Thus,
3
Page 35 it cannot be said that it was not raised at the
earliest.
The plea of the State is that the Commissioner
of Police having granted the sanction under Section
20-A(2) of TADA, the conviction of the accused
cannot be held to be bad only on the ground of
absence of approval under Section 20-A(1) by the
Deputy Commissioner. As observed earlier, the
provisions of TADA are stringent and consequences
are serious and in order to prevent persecution,
the legislature in its wisdom had given various
safeguards at different stages. It has mandated
that no information about the commission of an
offence under TADA shall be recorded by the police
without the prior approval of the District
Superintendent of Police. Not only this, further
safeguard has been provided and restriction has
been put on the court not to take cognizance of any
offence without the previous sanction of the
Inspector-General of Police or as the case may be,
3
Page 36 the Commissioner of Police. Both operate in
different and distinct stages and, therefore, for
successful prosecution both the requirements have
to be complied with. We have not come across any
principle nor we are inclined to lay down that in a
case in which different safeguards have been
provided at different stages, the adherence to the
last safeguard would only be relevant and breach of
other safeguards shall have no bearing on the
trial. Therefore, we reject the contention of the
State that the accused cannot assail their
conviction on the ground of absence of approval
under Section 20-A(1) of TADA by the Deputy
Commissioner, when the Commissioner of Police had
granted sanction under Section 20-A(2) of TADA.
As regards submission of the State that the
Designated Court having taken cognizance and
decided to try the case by itself in exercise of
the power under Section 18 of TADA, the prior
defects, if any, are rendered irrelevant and cannot
3
Page 37 be raised, has only been noted to be rejected.
Section 18 of TADA confers jurisdiction on the
Designated Court to transfer such cases for the
trial of such offences in which it has no
jurisdiction to try and in such cases, the court to
which the case is transferred, may proceed with the
trial of the offence as if it had taken cognizance
of the offence. The power of the Designated Court
to transfer the case to be tried by a court of
competent jurisdiction would not mean that in case
the Designated Court has decided to proceed with
the trial, any defect in trial, cannot be agitated
at later stage. Many ingredients which are
required to be established to confer jurisdiction
on a Designated Court are required to be proved
during trial. At the stage of Section 18 the
Designated Court has to decide as to whether to try
the case itself or transfer the case for trial to
another court of competent jurisdiction. For that,
the materials collected during the course of
investigation have only to be seen. The
3
Page 38 investigating agency, in the present case, has come
out with a case that prior approval was given for
registration of the case and the allegations made
do constitute an offence under TADA. In the face
of it, the Designated Court had no option than to
proceed with the trial. However, the decision by
the Designated Court to proceed with the trial
shall not prevent the accused to contend in future
that they cannot be validly prosecuted under TADA.
We hasten to add that even in a case which is not
fit to be tried by the Designated Court but it
decides to do the same instead of referring the
case to be tried by a court of competent
jurisdiction, it will not prevent the accused to
challenge the trial or conviction later on.
The submission of the State that the Designated
Court having been empowered to take cognizance
under Section 14 of TADA irrespective of absence of
compliance of Section 20-A(1) of TADA, its non-
compliance would not be fatal to the prosecution,
does not commend us. Section 14 of TADA confers
3
Page 39 jurisdiction on a Designated Court to take
cognizance of any offence when the accused being
committed to it for trial upon receiving a
complaint of facts which constitute such offence or
upon a police report of such facts. The offence
under TADA is to be tried by a Designated Court.
The Designated Court has all the powers of Court of
Session and it has to try the offence as if it is a
Court of Session. The Code provides for commitment
of the case for trial by the Court of Session.
Section 14(1) of TADA provides that the Designated
Court may take cognizance on receiving a complaint
of facts or upon a police report. Had this
provision not been there, the cases under TADA
would have been tried by the Designated Court only
after commitment. In any view of the matter, the
accused during the trial under TADA can very well
contend that their trial is vitiated on one or the
other ground notwithstanding the fact that the
Designated Court had taken cognizance. Taking
3
Page 40 cognizance by the Designated Court shall not make
all other provisions inconsequential.
Lastly, it has been submitted that absence of
approval under Section 20-A(1) of TADA would not
vitiate the conviction of the accused under other
penal provisions. As stated earlier, the accused
persons besides being held guilty under Section 3
and 5 of TADA, have also been found guilty under
Section 7 and 25(1A) of the Arms Act and Section 4,
5 and 6 of the Explosive Substances Act. According
to the State, the conviction under the Arms Act and
the Explosive Substances Act, therefore, cannot be
held to be illegal. It is relevant here to state
that the Designated Court, besides trying the case
under TADA, can also try any other offence with
which the accused may be charged at the same trial
if the offence is connected with the offence under
TADA. When the Designated Court had the power to
try offences under TADA as well as other offences,
it is implicit that it has the power to convict
also and that conviction is permissible to be
4
Page 41 ordered under TADA or other penal laws or both. In
our opinion it is not necessary for the Designated
Court to first order conviction under TADA and only
thereafter under other penal law. In view of the
five-Judge Constitution Bench judgment of this
Court in Prakash Kumar v. State of Gujarat, (2005)
2 SCC 409, this point does not need further
elaboration. In the said case this Court has
observed that “the Designated Court is empowered to
convict the accused for the offence under any other
law notwithstanding the fact that no offence under
TADA is made out.” This would be evident from
paragraph 37 of the judgment which reads as
follows:
“37. The legislative intendment
underlying Sections 12(1) and (2) is
clearly discernible, to empower the
Designated Court to try and convict
the accused for offences committed
under any other law along with
offences committed under the Act, if
the offence is connected with such
other offence. The language “if the
offence is connected with such other
offence” employed in Section 12(1) of
the Act has great significance. The
4
Page 42 necessary corollary is that once the
other offence is connected with the
offence under TADA and if the accused
is charged under the Code and tried
together in the same trial, the
Designated Court is empowered to
convict the accused for the offence
under any other law, notwithstanding
the fact that no offence under TADA is
made out. This could be the only
intendment of the legislature. To hold
otherwise, would amount to rewrite or
recast legislation and read something
into it which is not there.”
We have held the conviction of the accused to
have been vitiated on account of non-compliance of
Section 20-A(1) of TADA and thus, it may be
permissible in law to maintain the conviction under
the Arms Act and the Explosive Substances Act but
that shall only be possible when there are legally
admissible evidence to establish those charges.
The Designated Court has only relied on the
confessions recorded under TADA to convict the
accused for offences under the Arms Act and the
Explosive Substances Act. In view of our finding
that their conviction is vitiated on account of
non-compliance of the mandatory requirement of
4
Page 43 prior approval under Section 20-A(1) of TADA, the
confessions recorded cannot be looked into to
establish the guilt under the aforesaid Acts.
Hence, the conviction of the accused under Section
7 and 25(1A) of the Arms Act and Section 4, 5 and 6
of the Explosive Substances Act cannot also be
allowed to stand.
As we have held the conviction and sentence of
the accused to be illegal and unsustainable, the
appeals filed by the State against acquittal and
inadequacy of sentence have necessarily to be
dismissed.
We appreciate the anxiety of the police
officers entrusted with the task of preventing
terrorism and the difficulty faced by them.
Terrorism is a crime far serious in nature, more
graver in impact and highly dangerous in
consequence. It can put the nation in shock,
create fear and panic and disrupt communal peace
4
Page 44 and harmony. This task becomes more difficult when
it is done by organized group with outside support.
Had the investigating agency not succeeded in
seizing the arms and explosives, the destruction
would have been enormous. However, while resorting
to TADA, the safeguards provided therein must
scrupulously be followed. In the country of
Mahatma, “means are more important than the end”.
Invocation of TADA without following the safeguards
resulting into acquittal gives an opportunity to
many and also to the enemies of the country to
propagate that it has been misused and abused.
District Superintendent of Police and Inspector
General of Police and all others entrusted with the
task of operating the law must not do anything
which allows its misuse and abuse and ensure that
no innocent person has the feeling of sufferance
only because “My name is Khan, but I am not a
terrorist”.
The facts of the case might induce mournful
reflection how an attempt by the investigating
4
Page 45 agency charged with the duty of preventing
terrorism and securing conviction has been
frustrated by what is popularly called a technical
error. We emphasize and deem it necessary to
repeat that the gravity of the evil to the
community from terrorism can never furnish an
adequate reason for invading the personal liberty,
except in accordance with the procedure established
by the Constitution and the laws.
We have been told that many of the accused,
because of poverty or for the reason that they had
already undergone the sentence, have not preferred
appeals before this Court. Further, this Court had
not gone into the merits of the appeals preferred
by few convicts on the ground that they have
already served out the sentence and released
thereafter. The view which we have taken goes to
the root of the matter and vitiates the conviction
and, hence, we deem it expedient to grant benefit
of this judgment to all those accused who have been
held guilty and not preferred appeal and also those
4
Page 46 convicts whose appeals have been dismissed by this
Court as infructuous on the ground that they had
already undergone the sentence awarded.
In the result, we allow the appeals preferred
by those accused who have been convicted and
sentenced by the Designated Court and set aside the
judgment and order of their conviction and
sentence. However, we dismiss the appeals
preferred by the State against the inadequacy of
sentence and acquittal of some of the accused
persons.
………………… .………………………………….J.
(H.L. DATTU)
………..………..……………………………….J.
(CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD)
NEW DELHI,
SEPTEMBER 26, 2012.
4
Page 47 SCHEDULE - I
List of persons named in Crime No. 1-CR No. 11 of
1994 dated 9
th
of June, 1994.
Sr.No. Names of accused persons Accused Nos.
1Yusufkhan Khudadatkhan Pathan
@ Laplap
Accused No. 1
2Abdul Latif Abdul Vahab
Shaikh
Accused No. 2
3Rasulkhan @ Yaz Accused No. 3
4A.H.C. Sirajmiya Akbarmiya
@ Siraj Dadhi
Accused No. 4
5Imtiyaz Accused No. 5
6Gulal Accused No. 6
7Sattar Battery @ Sattar
Chacha
Accused No. 7
4
Page 48 SCHEDULE – II
List of persons named in the First Charge-Sheet dated
16
th
of December, 1994
Sr.No. Names of accused persons Accused Nos.
1Yusufkhan @ Yusuf Laplap
Khudadatkhan Pathan
Accused No. 1
2Shirajmiya Akbarmiya Thakore Accused No. 2
3Abdulkhurdush Abdulgani
Shaikh
Accused No. 3
4Mohmad Farukh @ Farukbawa
Allarakha Shaikh
Accused No. 4
5Sajidali @ Benimohmadali
Saiyed
Accused No. 5
6Anwarkhan Mohmadkhan Pathan Accused No. 6
7Mohmad Jalaluddin @ Jalababa
Tamizuddin Saiyed
Accused No. 7
8Gulamkadar Gulamhusain ShaikhAccused No. 8
9Mohmad Ismail Abdul Vahab
Shaikh
Accused No. 9
10Haiderkhan Lalkhan Pathan Accused No. 10
11Adambhai Yusufbhai Mandli
(Shaikh)
Accused No. 11
4
Page 49 Sr.No. Names of accused persons Accused Nos.
12Mohmad Soyeb @ Soyeb Baba
Abdul Gani Shaikh
Accused No. 12
13Iqbal @ Bapu Saiyed Husain
Saiyed
Accused No. 13
14Mohmad Hanif @ Anudin Husain
Miya Shaikh
Accused No. 14
4
Page 50 SCHEDULE - III
List of persons named in the Second Charge-Sheet
dated 23
rd
of May, 1995
Sr.No. Names of accused persons Accused Nos.
1Gajanfarkhan @ Gajukhan Accused No. 15
2Asrafkhan @ Babu Accused No. 16
5
Page 51 SCHEDULE – IV
List of persons named in the Third Charge-Sheet dated
17
th
of April, 1996
Sr.No. Names of accused persons Accused Nos.
1Munavar Ullakhan @ Imtiyaz
Ullakhan @ Pappu
Accused No. 17
2Fanes Aehmohmad Ansari Accused No. 18
3Afzalhusain Accused No. 19
4Samimulla @ Sammu Accused No. 20
5Barikkhan @ Abdulsalim Accused No. 21
6Babukhan @ Lala Accused No. 22
7Maksud Ahmed Fatehahmed
Shaikh
Accused No. 23
8Mohmedsafi Abdul Rahman SaikhAccused No. 24
9Hafizudin Fajiudin Kaji Accused No. 25
10Sohrabduin @ Salim Accused No. 26
11Abdulgafar @ Gafar Accused No. 27
12Abdulkayam Nizamudin Shaikh Accused No. 28
13Mohmed Rafik @ Haji Rafikbhai
Kapadia
Accused No. 29
14Usmangani Musabhai Vohra Accused No. 30
Sr.No. Names of accused persons Accused Nos.
15Abdulvahab Abdulmajid Baloch Accused No. 31
16Abdul Sattar @ Sattar BatteryAccused No. 32
17Abdulrauf @ Rauf Accused No. 33
18Imtiyazahmed Nurharanmiya
Kadri
Accused No. 34
19Abdullatif Abdulvahab Shaikh Accused No. 35
20Sabbirhusain Husainmiya
Shaikh
Accused No. 36
21Mustak Ahmed Istiyak Ahmed
Pathan
Accused No. 37
5
Page 52 22Ikbal Jabbarkhan Pathan Accused No. 38
23Ayub @ Lala Accused No. 39
24Kadarbhai Musabhai Mandli Accused No. 40
25Musabhai Yusufbhai Madli Accused No. 41
26Daubhai Musabhia Shaikh Accused No. 42
27Mohmedamin @ Amin Chobeli Accused No. 43
28Musrafkhan Gorekhan Pathan Accused No. 44
29Mehmood @ Pepa Pelhwan
Husenkhan Nilgaramal
Accused No. 45
5
Page 53 Sr.No. Names of accused persons Accused Nos.
30Sahibudin @ Konjibaba Accused No. 46
31Husanbhai @ Bhajia Accused No. 47
32Ahmedbhai Haji Kasambhai
Ajmeri
Accused No. 48
33Gulam Mohmed @ Gulu Accused No. 49
5
Page 54 SCHEDULE – V
List of persons named in the Fourth Charge-Sheet
dated 20
th
of December, 1996
Sr.No. Names of accused persons Accused Nos.
1Mahebub Bag @ Mehbub Senior Accused No. 50
2Mohmad Rafik @ R.D. @ Mustak
@ Nazim
Accused No. 51
3Gulam Mohmad@ Gulal @ Arif Accused No. 52
4Imtiyaz @ Fatush Accused No. 53
5Parminder Singh @ Kaka Accused No. 54
6Aminkhan @ Alamkhan Accused No. 55
7Firoz @ Firoz Kankani Accused No. 56
8Mohmad Harun @ Munna @ Riyaz
@ Chhote Rahim
Accused No. 57
9Mujfarkhan @ Nasir Luhar Accused No. 58
10Mohmad Yakil @ Yakil Accused No. 59
11Jay Prakash Singh @ Bachhi
Sing
Accused No. 60
5
Page 55 SCHEDULE – VI
List of persons named in the Fifth Charge-Sheet dated
24
th
of May, 1994
Sr.No. Names of accused persons Accused Nos.
1Jahangir Khan Fazalkhan
Pathan
Accused No. 61
2Mohmad Anwarkhan @ Rushi
Pathan
Accused No. 62
5
Page 56 SCHEDULE – VII
List of persons convicted by Designated Court vide
its order dated 31
st
of January, 2002
Sr.No. Names of accused persons Accused Nos.
1Yusufkhan @ Yusuf Laplap
Khudadadkhan Pathan
Accused No. 1
2Shirajmiya Akbarmiya Thakore Accused No. 2
3Sajidali @ Deni Mohammedali
Saiyed
Accused No. 5
4Iqbal @ Bapu Saiyedhussein
Saiyed
Accused No. 13
5Gajnafarkhan @ Gajjukhan
Sabdrkhan Pathan
Accused No. 15
6Asharafkhan @ Babu Munnakhan
Pathan
Accused No. 16
7Shohrabuddin @ Salim
Anvaruddin Shaikh
Accused No. 26
8Abdulsattar @ Sattar Battery
Abdulgani Shaikh
Accused No. 32
9Abdul Raoof @ Raoof Abdul
Kadar Shaikh
Accused No. 33
10Hussainbhai @ Bhajiya
Mohammedbhai Patani
Accused No. 47
11Mujffarkhan @ Nashir Luhar
Umardarajkhan Pathan
Accused No. 58
5
Page 57 SCHEDULE – VIII
List of persons acquitted by Designated Court vide
its order dated 31
st
of January, 2002
Sr.No. Names of accused persons Accused Nos.
1Abdul Khurdush Abdul Gani
Shaikh
Accused No. 3
2Mohammed Faruq @ Faruqbava
Allarakha
Accused No. 4
3Anvarkhan Mohammedkhan PathanAccused No. 6
4Mohammed Jalaluddin @
Jalalbaba Tamijuddin Saiyed
Accused No. 7
5Gulam Kadar Gulam Hussain
Shaikh
Accused No. 8
6Hyderkhan Lalkhan Pathan Accused No. 10
7Mohammed Soeb @ Soebbava
Abdul Gani Shaikh
Accused No. 12
8Mohammed Hanif @ Anudi
Husseinmiya Shaikh
Accused No. 14
9Munavarullakhan @
Imtiyazullakhan @ Pappu
Mohammed Safiullakhan
Accused No. 17
10Afzalhussain Ajgarhussein
Rangrej
Accused No. 19
11Shamtullakhan @ Sammu
Mohammed Safiulla Pathan
Accused No. 20
12Bariqkhan @ Abdul Salim
Hussein Khan @ Abdul Hussein
Shaikh
Accused No. 21
5
Page 58 13Babukhan @ Lala Niyajkhan @
Niyajmohammed Pathan
Accused No. 22
14Maksud Ahmed Fatehmohammed
Shaikh
Accused No. 23
15Mohammed Safi Abdul Rehman
Saikh
Accused No. 24
16Hafizuddin Fazluddin Kazi Accused No. 25
17Abdulgafar @ Gafar Party
Mohammed Rafiq Shaikh
Accused No. 27
18Abdul Kaiyum Nizamuddin
Shaikh
Accused No. 28
19Mohammed Rafiq @ Haji
Rafiqbhai Husseinbhai Kapadia
Accused No. 29
20Usmangani Musabhai Vora Accused No. 30
21Abdul Wahab Abdul Majid
Baloch
Accused No. 31
22Imtieaz Ahmed Noorhadanmiya
Kadari
Accused No. 34
23Sabbirhussein Husseinmiya
Shaikh
Accused No. 36
24Mustaq Ahmed Istiyaq Ahmed
Pathan
Accused No. 37
25Aiyub @ Lala Yusufbhai
Mandali
Accused No. 39
26Kadarbhai Musabhai Mandali Accused No. 40
27Musabhai Yusufbhai Mandali Accused No. 41
28Daoodbhai Musabhai Shaikh Accused No. 42
29Mohammed Amin @ Amin Chotely
Rahimmiya
Accused No. 43
5
Page 59 30Musharrafkhan Gorekhan PathanAccused No. 44
31Mehmood @ Pepa Pahelvan
Hussainkhan Nilgadamal
Accused No. 45
32Shahbuddin @ Kanijbaba
Badruddin Shaikh
Accused No. 46
33Ahmedbhai Haji Kasambhai
Ajmeri
Accused No. 48
34Gulammohammed @ Gulu Gulam
Hyder Momin
Accused No. 49
35Mehboobbeg @ Mehboob Senior
Chhotubeg Mogal
Accused No. 50
36Mohammed Rafiq @ R.D. @
Mustaq @ Nazim Majidkhan
Accused No. 51
37Gulam Mohammed @ Gulal @ Arif
Abdul Kadar Shaikh
Accused No. 52
38Imtiyaz @ Fetas Ibrahim
Ismial Bhathiyara
Accused No. 53
39Parmindarsing @ Kaka
Maliksing Sikh
Accused No. 54
40Aminkhan @ Alamkhan Mojkhan
Pathan
Accused No. 55
41Mohammed Yaakil @ Aakil
Maiyuddin Malek
Accused No. 59
5
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