2026 INSC 564

Page 1 of 124

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) No. 640 OF 2025

Association For Democratic Reforms & Ors. … Petitioners

versus

Election Commission of India & Ors. … Respondents

WITH

WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) No. 634 OF 2025

WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) No. 644 OF 2025

WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) No. 645 OF 2025

WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) No. 646 OF 2025

WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) No. 637 OF 2025

WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) No. 636 OF 2025

WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) No. 638 OF 2025

WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) No. 630 OF 2025

WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) No. 631 OF 2025

WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) No. 642 OF 2025

WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) No. 686 OF 2025

WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) No. 700 OF 2025

WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) No. 701 OF 2025

WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) No. 708 OF 2025

WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) No. 676 OF 2025

WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) No. 674 OF 2025

WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) No. 719 OF 2025

WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) No. 855 OF 2025

Page 2 of 124

JUDGMENT

SURYA KANT, CJI

1. Before any representative government can count votes, it must

first know whose votes may be counted. The story of democracy

is therefore not only a story of voting, but also of identifying the

persons entitled to participate in the choice of government. The

electoral roll is the legal record of that political community. For

this reason, disputes concerning electoral rolls are never merely

administrative. They go to the composition of the electorate and,

in turn, to the foundation of representative government

1. Across

different periods and forms of political organisation, Indian

history discloses a recurring concern. By what legal parameters

is the body of citizens entitled to participate in public affairs to

be identified?

2. Bihar stands at the beginning of that history. In the age of the

Mahajanapadas, roughly between the sixth and fifth centuries

BCE, the region now forming Bihar contained both monarchical

and non-monarchical polities. Magadha and Anga were

associated with kingship. However, the Vajji confederacy, centred

1 Bernard Manin, The Principles of Representative Government 1–7, 161–83 (Cambridge Univ.

Press 1997); Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, The Concept of Representation 1–13 (Univ. of Cal. Press

1967)

Page 3 of 124

at Vaishali, stood on a different footing. Modern scholarship has

located the Vajji polity within the tradition of republican and

quasi republican institutions in ancient India

2.

3. The Mahāparinibbāna Sutta, a key Pali text describing the final

days of the Buddha, refers to the Vajjis as holding full and

frequent assemblies, meeting and conducting business in

concord, and acting according to established institutions. These

accounts do not speak of a general electoral roll. Nor do they

employ the modern language of equal adult suffrage. Yet they

unmistakably point to a constituted public body, settled

procedures, and authority exercised through assembly rather

than through the solitary will of a ruler. Ancient Bihar, therefore,

cannot be reduced to monarchy alone. It also preserves the

memory of organised republican life

3. Such republics were not

democracies in the present constitutional sense. Participation

was narrower and often structured by status, family, or rank.

Even so, any republic, including an oligarchic one, had to

determine who could participate, deliberate, a nd decide

2 Jagdish Prasad Sharma, Republican and Quasi-Republican Institutions in Ancient India, with

Special Reference to the Time of the Buddha (Ph.D. thesis, SOAS Univ. of London 1962);

Jagdish Prasad Sharma, Republics in Ancient India, c. 1500 B.C.–500 B.C. (E.J. Brill 1968);

R.S. Sharma, Aspects of Political Ideas and Institutions in Ancient India (Motilal Banarsidass

1959); R.S. Sharma, India’s Ancient Past (Oxford Univ. Press 2007)

3 Mahāparinibbāna Sutta (Dīgha Nikāya 16), in Last Days of the Buddha: The

Mahāparinibbāna Sutta (Sister Vajirā & Francis Story trans., Buddhist Publication Soc’y

1964; R.C. Childers, The Pali Text of the Mahāparinibbāna Sutta and Commentary, with a

Translation, 7 J. Royal Asiatic Soc’y 49 (1874)

Page 4 of 124

questions of polity. In that limited but real sense, ancient history

reveals an early concern with public membership.

4. The problem of identifying eligible voters assumed its modern

legal form under colonial rule. The Government of India Act, 1935

(1935 Act), established a comprehensive statutory framework for

electoral rolls and their revision. The Sixth Schedule required an

electoral roll for every territorial constituency. It provided that

such rolls would be prepared and revised, in whole or in part, by

reference to a prescribed date. The same scheme fixed age

qualifications, recognised legal disqualifications, and continued

communal and special electorates. The importance of the 1935

Act lies not in having democratised the franchise, for it plainly

did not do so, but in having transformed enrolment and revision

from scattered administrative practice into a formal legal regime

4.

5. The Constitution of India was framed in the shadow of that

history and in conscious departure from it. In the Constituent

Assembly Debates, it was recognised that the purity and freedom

of elections required the election machinery, particularly the

preparation and revision of electoral rolls, to be placed beyond

executive control. The Assembly also adopted the principle of one

general electoral roll for every territorial constituency and

4 Government of India Act, 1935, 26 Geo. 5 & 1 Edw. 8 c. 2, sched. VI, paras. 1–3 (U.K.); M.V.

Pylee, Constitutional History of India 1600–1950 120–34 (Asia Publishing House 1967)

Page 5 of 124

affirmed that elections to the House of the People and to the

Legislative Assemblies would be based on adult suffrage. The

Constitution, therefore, did not invent the electoral roll. It altered

its constitutional character. What had earlier been an instrument

of a limited and exclusionary franchise was now made the

foundation of universal political participation. An older question

concerning the manner in which a polity identifies those entitled

to participate in government w as thus answered by the

Constitution through one general electoral roll, universal adult

franchise, and an independent Election Commission.

5

6. To that effect, our Constitution-makers, with remarkable

foresight, devoted an entire chapter in Part XV to the subject of

“Elections”, thereby recognising that the sanctity of the electoral

process lies at the very heart of our democratic framework. The

Commission has been vested with the plenary power of

superintendence, direction and control over elections, ensuring

that the conduct of elections remains insulated from extraneous

influence and guided solely by constitutional principles. The

relevant constitutional provisions in this regard may be noticed:

“324. Superintendence, direction and control of

elections to be vested in an Election Commission

– (1) The superintendence, direction and control of the

preparation of the electoral rolls for, and the conduct

5 Constituent Assembly Debates, vol. VIII, 15 June 1949 (Draft Article 289); Constituent

Assembly Debates, vol. VIII, 16 June 1949 (Draft Articles 289-A and 289-B, later Articles 325

and 326)

Page 6 of 124

of, all elections to Parliament and to the Legislature of

every State and of elections to the offices of President

and Vice-President held under this Constitution shall

be vested in a Commission (referred to in this

Constitution as the Election Commission)

………x………x………x……….x……...x………x……...…

327. Power of Parliament to make provision with

respect to elections to Legislatures - Subject to the

provisions of this Constitution, Parliament may from

time to time by law make provision with respect to all

matters relating to, or in connection with, elections to

either House of Parliament or to the House or either

House of the Legislature of a State including the

preparation of electoral rolls, the delimitation of

constituencies and all other matters necessary for

securing the due constitution of such House or

Houses.”

7. It is in this historical and constitutional setting that the present

controversy arises. The dispute is not concerned merely with the

mechanics of a revisional exercise. It concerns the manner in

which the constitutional promise of universal adult franchise is

preserved through an electoral roll which is accurate, inclusive,

and legally valid. Bihar assumes particular significance in this

regard because the last Special Intensive Revision of this nature

in the State was conducted in 2003. For more than two decades

thereafter, the electoral rolls were carried forward through

summary revisions, without the same degree of verification that

an intensive exercise entails. The Order dated 24.06.2025

(Impugned Order) issued by the Respondent No. 1 Election

Commission of India (Commission), directing a Special Intensive

Revision (SIR) of the electoral rolls in the State of Bihar,

Page 7 of 124

therefore, does not arise in isolation. It stands at the intersection

of two constitutional concerns. First, that no eligible citizen

should be excluded from the electorate. Second, the electoral roll

must continue to reflect the true composition of the political

community.

8. The present batch of writ petitions has been instituted under

Article 32 of the Constitution of India, assailing the Impugned

Order directing SIR in Bihar. The Petitioners contend that, unless

quashed, the Impugned Order is liable to result in the arbitrary

disenfranchisement of lakhs of voters in the State of Bihar,

thereby imperilling the conduct of free and fair elections.

9. We deem it appropriate to clarify that certain petitions (for

instance, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 855 of 2025) have in fact been

instituted in support of the SIR exercise. The Petitioner(s) in

these cases have urged that such an exercise ought to be

conducted at regular intervals to prevent and curb the inclusion

of ineligible persons in the electoral rolls on account of illegal

influx.

A. FACTUAL MATRIX

THE ISSUANCE OF THE IMPUGNED ORDER BY THE ELECTION

COMMISSION OF INDIA

10. The present controversy emanates from the issuance of the

Impugned Order by the Commission in purported exercise of its

Page 8 of 124

powers under Article 324 of the Constitution of India, read with

Section 21(3) of the Representation of the People Act, 1950 (RP

Act), directing an SIR of the electoral rolls in every Assembly

constituency of the State of Bihar.

10.1. The Impugned Order recorded that the last intensive revision in

the State of Bihar was conducted in 2003, and that, over the past

two decades, substantial changes in the electoral rolls have

occurred inter alia on account of rapid urbanisation and large-

scale migration. Therefore, in furtherance of its constitutional

mandate to safeguard the integrity of the electoral rolls and

ensure free and fair elections, the Commission resolved to

undertake a nationwide SIR. Given that general elections to the

Bihar Legislative Assembly were anticipated later in 2025, the

Commission directed the conduct of SIR in the State of Bihar.

10.2. In terms of Clause 11 of the Impugned Order, the Commission

decided to treat the 2003 electoral roll, with 01.01.2003 as the

qualifying date, as probative evidence of eligibility, unless

rebutted. The Impugned Order, in Clause 12, further stipulated

that any person not listed in the 2003 roll must produce one or

more prescribed government documents to establish their

eligibility as an elector.

Page 9 of 124

10.3. The Impugned Order also provided that for the aforesaid purpose,

the Commission shall release an Enumeration Form to be filled

and submitted by 25.07.2025, failing which the elector’s name

would be excluded from the draft rolls. Pertinently, the

Enumeration Form provided an indic ative list of Eleven (11)

documents that could be submitted along with the Enumeration

Form, each of which would be considered a sufficient document

in itself.

10.4. Clause 14 of the Impugned Order read with the accompanying

Guidelines (SIR Guidelines) thereafter added that, after the

publication of the draft roll, the Electoral Registration Officer

(ERO)/Assistant Electoral Registration Officer (AERO) were

required to scrutinise the eligibility of the proposed electors in

accordance with Article 326 of the Constitution, read with

Sections 16 and 19 of the RP Act. Upon such scrutiny, where the

eligibility of any person is found to be doubtful, the ERO/AERO

was mandated to issue a show-cause notice setting out the

grounds for the proposed exclusion, allow the concerned elector

to submit a response, and thereafter render a reasoned and

speaking order in the matter.

10.5. In this context, the Impugned Order further added that any

person aggrieved by a decision of the ERO shall be entitled to

Page 10 of 124

prefer an appeal before the District Magistrate under Section

24(a) of the RP Act, read with Rule 27 of the Registration of

Electors Rules, 1960 (1960 Rules). Furthermore, it was also

stipulated that if the elector remains dissatisfied with the

decision of the District Magistrate, a second appeal may be filed

before the Chief Electoral Officer (CEO) within thirty days, in

terms of Section 24(b) of the RP Act, read with Rule 27 of the

1960 Rules.

10.6. As already observed in the preceding paragraphs, along with the

Impugned Order, the Commission also published detailed SIR

Guidelines for the conduct of the exercise. It was envisaged that

the exercise would be carried out through a structured House-

to-House enumeration, the rationalisation of polling stations,

and the preparation of electoral rolls. It was further stipulated

that Booth Level Officers (BLOs) would visit each household,

distribute pre-filled enumeration forms to existing electors, and

collect the duly filled forms along with requisite documents, with

an additional facility for online submission and verification. In

addition, the SIR Guidelines also contemplated that the draft

electoral roll would include only those electors from whom

enumeration forms had been received, either physically or

through verified online submission, while the names of those who

Page 11 of 124

failed to submit such forms would not be included at the draft

stage.

10.7. Shortly after the publication of the Impugned Order and the SIR

Guidelines, the Commission issued a Press Note on 28.06.2025

declaring the commencement of the SIR in the State of Bihar.

THE PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THIS COURT

10.8. In the interregnum, the instant batch of Writ Petitions came to

be filed. Upon hearing the parties on 10.07.2025, this Court,

while issuing notice to the Commission, observed that on a prima

facie appraisal, three substantial questions arise for

determination: first, the very authority of the Commission to

embark upon the impugned exercise; second, the procedure and

methodology adopted in carrying out the exercise, including the

method prescribed by the Commission to ascertain the

Citizenship of the Voters; and third, the propriety of its timing,

given that elections to the Bihar Legislative Assembly were slated

for November 2025. The Court further observed that, in the

interest of justice and to obviate any unwarranted exclusion of

eligible voters, the Commission should, in addition to the eleven

documents already prescribed, also consider accepting (a)

Aadhaar Card; (b) Electors Photo Identity Card (EPIC); and (c)

Ration Card, as valid proof.

Page 12 of 124

10.9. Upon expiry of the prescribed timeline for submitting

Enumeration Forms, i.e., 25.07.2025, the Commission, on

27.07.2025, issued a press release explaining that 7 lakh electors

were found enrolled at multiple places, 22 lakh were recorded as

deceased, and another 36 lakh were either permanently shifted

or not found. Consequently, on 01.08.2025, the Draft Roll

containing approximately 7.24 crore electors was published by

the Commission. It is undisputed that, prior to the

commencement of the SIR, the electoral roll as on 24.06.2025

featured about 7.89 crore electors. Consequently, nearly 65 lakh

electors stood excluded from the draft roll for non-submission of

the Enumeration Form.

10.10. Shortly, thereafter, the present batch of matters was taken up for

hearing by this Court, whereupon interim directions have been

issued from time to time. On 14.08.2025, after hearing the

parties, the Court directed the Commission to publish the list of

approximately 65 lakh electors who had been excluded from the

draft roll, along with the reasons for such exclusion, and to give

ample coverage to such publication through newspapers,

electronic media and radio. It was further directed that persons

aggrieved by their exclusion could submit claims by furnishing

the same along with a copy of their Aadhaar Card.

Page 13 of 124

10.11. On 22.08.2025, this Court directed that twelve political parties,

comprising six nationally recognised and six state recognised

parties, be impleaded as respondents in the present proceedings

through their respective Presidents. It was further directed that

the aforesaid twelve political parties, acting through their

respective Presidents of the Bihar State, shall issue specific

instructions to their Booth Level Agents (BLAs) to assist voters in

their village, block, constituency, panchayat area, as well as in

relief camps, in submitting the requisite forms along with any of

the eleven documents specified in the SIR Notification or with

their Aadhaar Card.

10.12. On 01.09.2025, certain interlocutory applications seeking

extension of time for filing claims were taken up for hearing. On

such a plea, the Commission took a categorical stand that claims,

objections, and corrections could be submitted even after the

deadline of 01.09.2025. It was stated that the process of

consideration of claims and objections would continue until the

last date of nominations, and that all inclusions and exclusions

would be duly integrated in the final roll. Subsequently, with a

view to aid and facilitating the voters of the State of Bihar, the

Chairman of the Bihar State Legal Services Authority was

directed to issue instructions to all the District Legal Services

Authorities. These Authorities were required to depute and notify

Page 14 of 124

para-legal volunteers, along with their names and mobile

numbers, who would assist individual voters or political parties

in submitting claims, objections, and corrections through the

online process.

10.13. On 08.09.2025, the issue that arose for consideration concerned

the legal acceptability of the Aadhaar Card as a supporting

document in the SIR process. This Court observed that, in terms

of the Aadhaar (Targeted Delivery of Financial and Other

Subsidies, Benefits and Services) Act, 2016 (Aadhaar Act), an

Aadhaar Card does not constitute proof of citizenship and,

therefore, cannot be relied upon for that purpose. At the same

time, it was noted that Section 23(4) of the RP Act expressly

includes Aadhaar among the documents which may be produced

for the limited purpose of establishing the identity of a person.

Keeping this in view, the Commission was directed to treat

Aadhaar Card as the 12

th document of identity for consideration

for the purposes of inclusion or exclusion from the revised

electoral roll of the State of Bihar. It was, however, made explicit

that the authorities would have the power to verify the

authenticity and genuineness of an Aadhaar Card by calling for

further material where necessary.

Page 15 of 124

10.14. It assumes significance that, during the pendency of these

proceedings, the Commission, by way of a Press Release dated

30.09.2025, declared the successful culmination of the SIR

exercise in the State of Bihar. The figures therein disclosed that

out of 7.24 crore electors in the draft roll published on

01.08.2025, a further 3.66 lakh names stood deleted, while as

many as 21.53 lakh eligible electors were added. The net result

was that the final electoral roll published on 30.09.2025

contained 7.42 crore electors, compared to 7.89 crore on

24.06.2025.

10.15. Based on the Final Electoral Roll published on 30.09.2025, the

Commission proceeded to conduct the Legislative Assembly

Elections for the State of Bihar in November 2025. The electoral

process was completed in accordance with the law, and the

results of the said elections were duly declared on 14.11.2025.

B. CONTENTIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER(S)

11. Mr. Kapil Sibal, Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi, Mr. Gopal

Sankaranarayanan, Mr. P.C. Sen, Mr. Shoeb Alam, Mr. KS

Chauhan, Mr. Shahdan Farasat, Mr. Raju Ramachandran, Mr.

Prashant Bhushan, Ms. Vrinda Grover, Ms. Fauzia Shakil, Mr.

Nizamuddin Pasha and Ms. Neha Rathi, learned Senior

Counsel/Counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner(s)

Page 16 of 124

vehemently contended that the Impugned SIR exercise is

unconstitutional, arbitrary, exclusionary and disproportionate.

We have also heard Mr. Yogendra Yadav, who argued in person,

at length.

12. In support of their submissions, the learned Senior

Counsel/Counsel have canvassed the following grounds:

a) At the threshold, the Commission’s purported reliance on

Article 324 of the Constitution as the source of power to

initiate and conduct the Impugned SIR exercise is

fundamentally flawed and constitutionally impermissible.

Article 324, which vests in the Co mmission the

superintendence, direction, and control of elections, is not

a freestanding reservoir of plenary power that may be

invoked de hors the legislative framework.

b) The settled constitutional position, as authoritatively

expounded by this Court in a catena of decisions, is that the

residuary power traceable to Article 324 operates only in the

interstitial spaces, and is available to the Commission solely

where Parliamentary legislation under Article 327 of the

Constitution does not occupy the field. Where Parliament

has made a law, the Commission cannot leapfrog the same

by resorting to its plenary constitutional power. In

Page 17 of 124

Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner ,

(1978) 1 SCC 405, this Court recognised the width of Article

324, but also made it clear that the provision operates only

in areas left unoccupied by statute. Similarly, in A.C. Jose

v. Sivan Pillai, (1984) 2 SCC 656, this Court held where

the Act and the Rules occupy the area, the Commission

cannot override them or act in direct disobedience of their

mandate.

c) In the present case, the Commission has, under the guise

of an administrative exercise, devised an entirely new regime

of enumeration, documentary scrutiny, inclusion and

deletion, though the field already stands occupied by

parliamentary legislation enacted under Article 327 of the

Constitution, namely the Representation of the People Acts,

1950 and 1951, and the Registration of Electors Rules,

1960. According to the Petitioners, once Parliament has

legislated upon the subject of electoral rolls, Article 324

cannot be invoked to supplant that f ramework. The

constitutional scheme, read as a whole, makes it manifest

that Article 324 must be construed harmoniously and in

consonance with the statutory framework enacted by

Parliament. The Commission cannot don the garb of Article

324 to circumvent statutory provisions that have been

Page 18 of 124

specifically enacted to regulate the very exercise it seeks to

undertake.

d) Without prejudice to the aforesaid, the Commission’s

attempt to anchor the impugned exercise in Section 21(3) of

the RP Act is equally misconceived. Section 21(3) empowers

the Commission to direct a special revision of an electoral

roll with respect to “any constituency or part of a

constituency” in such manner as it may think fit. The

provision, by its plain text, is constituency-specific and

part-specific, and does not contemplate or authorise a

sweeping statewide or nationwide revision exercise of the

kind that has been initiated by the Impugned Order.

e) The legislative intent underlying Section 21(3) reinforces

this textual reading. A special revision is envisaged as an

extraordinary measure, only to be used when Section 21(2)

is rendered inapplicable, and one that is meant to be

deployed in exceptional circumstances, confined to specific

geographical units where an identified exigency warrants

departure from the routine revision process. To interpret

Section 21(3) otherwise would be to read into the statute a

power that Parliament conspicuously chose not to confer

Page 19 of 124

upon the Commission, and would transgress the

boundaries of the legislative purpose.

f) Even if the Commission were otherwise vested with the

power to initiate the impugned exercise, the manner in

which such power has been exercised is ex facie arbitrary

and unreasonable. The Impugned Order does not disclose

any valid reasons that could justify the initiation of an SIR

of this magnitude. Every exercise of statutory power,

particularly one that bears upon fundamental civil rights,

ought to be supported by the application of mind and must

be traceable to relevant and constitutionally valid

considerations.

g) The Impugned exercise, in calling upon enrolled electors to

re-establish their credentials through a wholly new and

onerous process, effectively inverts the well -settled

presumption of citizenship and places upon the elector an

affirmative burden of proving anew what the law already

presumes in their favour. This strikes at the very foundation

of the statutory scheme governing electoral rolls, which is

premised on the principle that a name once included upon

due verification carries presumptive validity unl ess

displaced through the procedure prescribed by law.

Page 20 of 124

h) This Court in Lal Babu Hussein v. Electoral Registration

Officer, (1995) 3 SCC 100, has unequivocally held that

electors whose names appear on the electoral roll are

entitled to a presumption of citizenship, and that this

presumption cannot be displaced except by following the

procedure prescribed by law. Similarly, in Inderjit Barua

v. Election Commission of India, (1985) 4 SCC 722, this

Court affirmed the probative value that attaches to

enrolment on the electoral roll insofar as it evidences the

elector’s entitlement to be registered.

i) The selection of 2003 as the cut-off year for determining

which enrolled electors are required to undergo fresh

verification introduces an entirely arbitrary classification,

lacks any rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved,

and has no legally sustainable basis. The Commission has

not placed on record any material demonstrating that the

electoral rolls of 2003 possess some special accuracy that

subsequent rolls lack, or that electors enrolled thereafter

constitute an inherently suspect class.

j) It was also emphasised that the existing voters can be

deleted by merely not filling up their enumeration form and

without giving them any notice as provided under Rule 21A

Page 21 of 124

of the 1960 Rules, and that an existing voter filling up the

enumeration form can also be arbitrarily excluded without

any guidelines for the same. Rule 21A of the 1960 Rules sets

out the procedure for removing names on the roll on the

grounds of death, migration and disqualification and

requires the ERO to prepare a list of names, exhibit it, invite

claims and objections and give a reasonable opportunity for

a hearing to a voter before deletion.

k) The Impugned exercise is independently and cumulatively

vitiated by a series of deep-seated procedural infirmities that

render it an affront to the principles of fairness and due

process. The introduction of a new enumeration form

imposes a fresh and onerous evidentiary burden upon

persons whose entitlement to be on the roll has already been

duly established. For instance, the exclusion of documents

previously accepted as valid proof of identity and residence,

without any reasoned justification, compounds t his

unfairness manifold. The grant of excessive and largely

unchecked powers to BLOs in the verification process,

without adequate safeguards, standardised criteria, or

mechanisms for oversight, creates ground for abuse and

arbitrariness at the very grassroots of administration.

Page 22 of 124

l) One of the manifest objects of the Impugned SIR exercise is

to permit a broad-ranging scrutiny of the citizenship of

persons whose names appear on the electoral roll. This is

constitutionally impermissible. Under the Government of

India (Allocation of Business) Rules, 1961, the

determination of whether a person is or is not a citizen of

India is a matter that falls squarely and exclusively within

the domain of the Ministry of Home Affairs. The Commission

neither has the constitutional mandate nor the institutional

competence to usurp this function under the pretext of

electoral roll revision.

C. CONTENTIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT, ELECTION

COMMISSION OF INDIA

13. Contrarily, Mr. Rakesh Dwivedi, Mr. Maninder Singh, Mr. D.S.

Naidu, Mr. Vijay Hansaria and Mr. Sukumar Pattjoshi, learned

Senior Counsels, along with Mr. Eklavya Dwivedi, learned

Counsel appearing on behalf of the Election Commission of India

and some of the Petitioner(s) supporting the Impugned SIR, have

strongly opposed the instant Writ Petition(s) urging that the

Impugned Order and the resultant SIR exercise falls within the

Constitutional mandate of the Commission and thus warrants

no interference.

Page 23 of 124

14. Their submissions may be summarised as follows:

a) Electoral democracy is premised upon the preparation and

maintenance of accurate electoral rolls in terms of the

conditions prescribed under Articles 325 and 326 of the

Constitution. However, the nature and modality of any

revisional exercise is a matter left to the informed discretion

of the Commission, which is to be exercised having regard

to prevailing circumstances. The Impugned Order and the

resultant SIR exercise are squarely within the authority of

the Commission and are entirely consistent with Articles

324, 325, and 326 of the Constitution, read with Sections

15, 21(2), and 21(3) of the RP Act.

b) Article 324 of the Constitution expressly vests, in the

Commission, the power of superintendence, direction, and

control over the preparation of electoral rolls and the

conduct of all elections to the Parliament and the State

Legislatures. While Article 327 empowers Parliament to

make laws with respect to elections, such power is expressly

subject to the provisions of the Constitution, meaning that

Parliamentary legislation cannot detract from what the

Page 24 of 124

Constitution itself provides. The power under Article 324(1)

is wide enough to equip the Commission to deal with the

myriad situations that arise in the context of electoral roll

preparation, and no narrow or restrictive construction of

that power is warranted.

c) Mohinder Singh Gill ( Supra) does not say that the

Commission becomes powerless the moment Parliament

legislates. It says only that the Commission must not act in

breach of the law. So long as the Commission acts within

the constitutional purpose of ensuring free and fair elections

and within the broad statutory framework, directions issued

under Article 324 remain available. Similarly, AC Jose

(Supra) concerns an altogether different situation, namely

the introduction of mechanical voting by executive action in

a field where the relevant rules positively contemplated

paper ballots and the change directly conflicted with the

existing statutory mechanism. The Impugned Order does

not negate any express prohibition in the RP Act or the 1960

Rules. It operates in furtherance of the statutory objective

of revision of rolls and within the constitutional duty of

ensuring that only eligible persons remain in the roll.

Page 25 of 124

d) In Sadiq Ali v. Election Commission of India , (1972) 4

SCC 664, this Court rejected the contention that the

Commission acts merely as a delegate of Parliament while

exercising power in the electoral field. Once Article 324 vests

the constitutional function in the Commission, it does not

become a subordinate delegate merely because Parliament

has legislated in the same area. It continues to act in its own

right as the constitutional repository of electoral

superintendence.

e) Judgment like All Party Hill Leaders’ Conference,

Shillong v. Captain W.A. Sangma , (1977) 4 SCC 161,

underscore that Article 324 has repeatedly been understood

as a source of wide power enabling the Commission to issue

directions, including directions of a legislative or

subordinate legislative character, where such directions are

necessary to effectuate the constitutional mandate of free

and fair elections. The Commission is not confined to a

passive role of merely implementing pre-existing rules in a

mechanical fashion. It may, in aid of the constitutional

objective, lay down procedural modalities, provided they are

not contrary to an express statutory prohibition.

Page 26 of 124

f) Insofar as the power to conduct the SIR under Section 21(3)

of the RP Act is concerned, the Section uses the expression

“in such manner as it may think fit.” The Commission is

therefore vested with the wide power of special revision,

which may be conducted de hors the prescribed procedure

and in such manner as the Commission deems fit. This

provision was deliberately enacted to vest plenary powers in

the Commission in extraordinary circumstances, and once

an SIR is directed thereunder, the Commission is fully

authorised to prescribe the manner in which it shall be

conducted. The Commission has , in the present case,

furnished cogent and specific reasons for initiating the SIR,

which include large-scale migration owing to rapid

urbanisation, illegal cross-border migrations, intra-state

migrations, and widespread duplications in the rolls.

g) Moreover, the non-obstante clause in Section 21(3) is

substantive and enabling, not merely formal. The non -

obstante clause frees the Commission, for the purpose of a

special revision, from the procedural limitations otherwise

attached to the ordinary revision process envisaged under

Section 21(2). The Commission therefore contends that once

Section 21(3) is invoked, the source of power is the statute

Page 27 of 124

itself, and not the rule-bound regime that ordinarily governs

revision under subsection (2).

h) With respect to the geographical scope of the SIR exercise,

the use of the word “any” before “constituency” in Section

21(3) plainly indicates that the provision can embrace all

constituencies of a State within a single SIR. The

Petitioner(s) have failed to demonstrate anything particular

which establishes that the power under Section 21(3) is

restricted to a single or only a clutch of constituencies.

There is no reason to curtail the ambit of Section 21(3) and

limit the discretion of the Commission to one or a few

constituencies. Especially when reasons such as rapid

urbanisation, duplication of voters, cross-border and intra-

state migrations are common to all constituencies, and

there is no need to issue separate orders with respect to

each constituency. These grounds provide sufficient cogent

reasons, as required under Section 21(3), to carry out the

Impugned exercise.

i) The need for SIR is not in dispute. Political parties across

the spectrum have repeatedly raised serious concerns

regarding the accuracy of electoral rolls prepared through

the summary revision process. Notably, even the

Page 28 of 124

Petitioner(s) have, in substance, conceded the necessity of

such an exercise, their challenge being limited only to its

modalities. In this backdrop, the initiation of the SIR itself

cannot be faulted.

j) The reliance placed by the Petitioner(s) upon the decision of

a coordinate bench in Lal Babu Hussein (Supra) to

contend that there is a presumption attached to the persons

whose names were already reflected in the existing electoral

rolls is also wrong and clearly distinguishable on the facts.

The observations therein were rendered in the backdrop of

the fact that regular Special Intensive Revisions were being

periodically conducted at that time. Such observations

cannot be extended to attach a presumption of eligibility to

entries recorded subsequently based on mere summary

revisions, which do not entail the same degree of

verification.

k) Without prejudice to the aforesaid, the Commission has

acted consistently to the extent possible by directing that

full probative and evidentiary value shall be attached to

entries in the electoral roll of 2003, which was itself finalised

based on an SIR.

Page 29 of 124

l) The selection of the electoral roll of 2003 as the baseline for

the present SIR is neither arbitrary nor irrational. The 2003

revision was itself a special revision of an ‘intensive’ nature,

entailing house-to-house verification using existing rolls as

a base. Individuals whose names appear therein would

necessarily have substantiated their date of birth, place of

birth, and ordinary residency either in the SIR of 2003 or in

one of the intensive revisions that preceded it. Moreover, it

may be added that the Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2003,

introduced a statutory cut-off date at its commencement,

i.e., 07.01.2004, whereunder persons born thereafter are

required to establish that at least one of their parents is a

citizen of India and that neither parent is an illegal migrant.

The classification is therefore founded upon an intelligible

differentia and bears a direct and rational nexus to the

object of ensuring the accuracy and integrity of the electoral

roll.

m) The allegation of the Petitioner(s) that the SIR exercise is

opaque and procedurally unfair is belied by the record. The

Impugned Order was issued in compliance with the

prescribed procedure and was designed to facilitate the

registration of all genuine electors through BLOs,

Volunteers, and BLAs appointed by political parties. Where

Page 30 of 124

doubt arose as regards the eligibility of any elector, an

enquiry was conducted, and notices were issued to the

concerned individual, affording an opportunity to establish

their eligibility. The ERO was thereafter obligated to pass a

speaking order, against which a two-tier appeal mechanism

was available as recourse. Detailed guidelines were issued

to BLOs, and house -to-house distribution of pre-filled

enumeration forms was duly carried out.

n) The documentation framework prescribed under the

Impugned exercise is neither rigid nor arbitrary; rather, it is

broader and more facilitative when compared to earlier

exercises. It has been pointed out that while the Special

Intensive Revision conducted in 2003 envisaged a limited

set of documents, the present exercise expands the list to

eleven documents, thereby enhancing inclusivity rather

than constraining it. As regards the exclusion of certain

documents, such exclusions are based on valid and rational

considerations.

o) Additionally, the amplitude of outreach measures

undertaken to disseminate information regarding the SIR

exercise attests to the fact that the entire exercise was

neither opaque nor exclusionary. To that end, the CEO of

Page 31 of 124

Bihar, District Election Officers and Commission widely

published information regarding the conduct of the SIR

exercise in newspapers across Bihar and other States, so as

to enable even migrants to submit Enumeration Forms

digitally or otherwise. The list of approximately 65 lakh

individuals who had not submitted Enumeration Forms was

furnished to political parties at the State, District, and

Booth levels, along with reasons for non -submission,

pursuant to the directions of this Court dated 14.08.2025.

In addition, the said list was also posted outside Block

Development Offices, Panchayat Bhavans, and Polling

Booths, and disseminated through the Commission’s

website. The limited number of claims and objections

received, notwithstanding the orders of this Court and the

availability of legal aid and absence of any appeals filed

against the deletion of 3.66 lakh names, is indicative of the

fact that the SIR was fairly and transparently implemented.

p) The submission of the Petitioner(s) that the Commission has

no power to scrutinise citizenship is wholly misconceived.

The power to examine the citizenship of a person claiming

enrolment flows directly from the constitutional mandate of

the Commission embodied in Articles 325 and 326, read

with Section 16 of the RP Act, which prescribes

Page 32 of 124

disqualification from registration on grounds including non-

citizenship.

q) The determination of whether a person is or is not a citizen

of India is a matter that falls squarely and exclusively within

the domain of the Ministry of Home Affairs is also misplaced.

Section 9(2) of the Citizenship Act, 1955, (Citizenship Act)

is concerned solely with the termination of citizenship upon

voluntary acquisition of foreign citizenship and does not

operate as an exhaustive provision governing all inquiries

into citizenship. Several provisions of the Constitution vest

similar powers in different authorities, such as the President

and Governors under Articles 102 -103 and 191-192,

respectively, wherein they decide cases involving the

disqualification of Members to the Parliament or Legislative

Assemblies based on the citizenship of such persons.

Pertinently, in those cases, the President and Governors are

required to obtain the opinion of the Commission and are

bound to act accordingly.

r) Even otherwise, the Commission's exercise in the present

case is not a determination of citizenship per se but an

enquiry into eligibility for enrolment, which is a function

squarely within its constitutional remit. Furthermore, the

Page 33 of 124

citizenship of an individual under the Citizenship Act will

not cease on account of their ineligibility to register in the

electoral rolls, pursuant to SIR.

D. ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION

15. Having traversed the sequence of events as they emanated, the

contentions put forth on behalf of the parties, as well as the

material on record, we are of the considered view that the

following issues require analysis:

(i) Whether the Election Commission of India has power to

conduct the Impugned Special Intensive Revision?

(ii) Whether the Impugned Special Intensive Revision is

founded on a legitimate purpose, and if so, whether the

measures adopted by the Election Commission of India are

proportionate to the object sought to be achieved?

(iii) Whether the procedure adopted by the Election Commission

of India in conducting the Impugned Special Intensive

Revision is contrary to, or in violation of, the provisions of

the Representation of the People Act, 1950 and the

Registration of Electors Rules, 1960?

Page 34 of 124

(iv) Whether, in the exercise of its constitutional mandate of

preparation and maintenance of electoral rolls, and in

furtherance of the statutory conditions governing such

registration, the Election Commission of India is empowered

to scrutinise the citizenship status of persons seeking

inclusion or continuation in the electoral roll?

E. ANALYSIS

E.1. Whether the Election Commission of India has power to

conduct the Impugned Special Intensive Revision?

16. We have considered the rival submissions advanced on behalf of

the Petitioners and the Election Commission of India on whether

the Commission has power to undertake the impugned exercise.

17. A plain reading of Articles 324 and 327 shows that they are not

competing repositories of power. Article 324 vests the

constitutional function of superintendence, direction and control

of preparation of electoral rolls in the Commission. Article 327

enables Parliament to make law in relation to elections, including

preparation of electoral rolls, but expressly makes such law

making power “subject to the provisions of this Constitution”.

The opening words of Article 327 are not ornamental. They make

it clear that parliamentary legislation in the field of elections

must operate in harmony with the constitutional design and

Page 35 of 124

cannot be read so as to extinguish the constitutional function

vested in the Commission. Conversely, the Commission’s

authority under Article 324 must also operate in conformity with

a valid law made by Parliament. It is this mutual accommodation,

and not mutual destruction, which the Constitution

contemplates. In consonance with this harmonious construction,

this Court in Sadiq Ali (Supra) found no substance in the

contention that, as the power to make provisions in respect to

elections has been given to the Parliament by Article 327 of the

Constitution, the power cannot be further delegated to the

Commission. It held thus:

“41. …The opening words of Article 327 are “subject to

the provisions of this Constitution”. The above words

indicate that any law made by Parliament in exercise

of the powers conferred by Article 327 would be

subject to the other provisions of the Constitution

including Article 324. Article 324 as mentioned above

provides that superintendence, direction and control of

elections shall be vested in Election Commission. It,

therefore, cannot be said that when the Commission

issues direction, it does so not on its own behalf but as

the delegate of some other authority…”

18. In our considered view, the proposition advanced by the

Petitioners that Article 324 operates exclusively in the residual

interstices completely untouched by statute is legally untenable.

It is incorrect to posit that once Parliament legislates on a

particular subject, the Commission is entirely disabled from

exercising its vested constitutional powers. The Commission

Page 36 of 124

inherently possesses the jurisdiction to issue directions of a

general and regulatory character to effectuate the constitutional

purpose entrusted to it. Parliament by legislating under Article

327 does not reduce Article 324 to a dead letter.

19. In All Party Hill Leaders’ (Supra), this Court recognised that

the Commission is empowered in its own right under Article 324

of the Constitution to issue directions in the widest terms

necessary to facilitate a free and fair election with promptitude.

Article 324, on the face of it, vests vast functions with the

Commission, which may be powers or duties, essentially

administrative and marginally even judicative or legislative.

20. Petitioners have anchored their contention on the observation of

this Court in Mohinder Singh (Supra), wherein Krishna Iyer, J.,

emphasised that Article 324 ‘operates in areas left unoccupied by

legislation’. However, in paragraph 92 of the judgment, it has

been further held that where a law is made under Articles 327

and 328, the Commission must act ‘in conformity with, not in

violation of’ such law. But where the law is silent, the

Commission retains the authority to act for the avowed purpose

of pushing forward a free and fair election with expedition.

Paragraph 92 reads as follows:

“92. …

Page 37 of 124

(b) …when Parliament or any State Legislature has

made valid law relating to or in connection with

elections, the Commission, shall act in conformity with,

not in violation of, such provisions but where such law

is silent Article 324 is a reservoir of power to act for the

avowed purpose of, not divorced from, pushing

forward a free and fair election with expedition…”

21. A perhaps more nuanced understanding of the interplay between

Article 324 and Article 327 was expounded by Goswami, J., in

his concurring opinion in Mohinder Singh ( Supra). His

Lordship observed that:

“113. Article 324(1) vests in the Election

Commission the superintendence, direction and

control of the preparation of the electoral rolls

for, and the conduct of, all elections to

Parliament and to the legislature of every State

and of elections to the offices of the President

and Vice-President held under the Constitution.

Article 324(1) is thus couched in wide terms.

Power in any democratic set-up, as is the pattern

of our polity, is to be exercised in accordance

with law. That is why Articles 327 and 328

provide for making of provisions with respect to

all matters relating to or in connection with

elections for the Union Legislatures and for the

State Legislatures respectively. When

appropriate laws are made under Article 327 by

Parliament as well as under Article 32 8 by the

State Legislatures, the Commission has to act in

conformity with those laws and the other legal

provisions made thereunder. Even so, both Articles

327 and 328 are “subject to the provisions” of the

Constitution which include Article 324 and Article 329.

Since the conduct of all elections to the various

legislative bodies and to the offices of the President

and the Vice-President is vested under Article 324(1) in

the Election Commission, the framers of the

Constitution took care to leaving scope for exercise of

residuary power by the Commission, in its own right,

as a creature of the Constitution, in the infinite variety

of situations that may emerge from time to time in such

a large democracy as ours. Every contingency could

not be foreseen, or anticipated with precision.

Page 38 of 124

That is why there is no hedging in Article 324.

The Commission may be required to cope with

some situation which may not be provided for in

the enacted laws and the rules. That seems to be

the raison d'etre for the opening clause in Articles

327 and 328 which leaves the exercise of powers

under Article 324 operative and effective when it

is reasonably called for in a vacuous area. There

is, however, no doubt whatsoever that the

Election Commission will have to conform to the

existing laws and rules in exercising its powers

and performing its manifold duties for the

conduct of free and fair elections…”

[Emphasis Supplied]

22. The ratio of Mohinder Singh (Supra), properly understood, is

twofold. Firstly, Article 324 is not a spent or empty provision. It

vests real constitutional power in the Commission. Secondly, it

clarifies that such power is not unbridled and cannot be

exercised to defeat an express statutory mandate. The Petitioners

rely only on the latter restriction. The Respondents emphasise

only the former empowerment. Neither submission, taken in

isolation, captures the whole principle. Mohinder Singh (Supra)

does not support the proposition that the Commission is stripped

of authority the moment Parliament legislates on any part of the

subject. Nor does it support the proposition that the Commission

may act contrary to the statute. It supports the middle position

that constitutional power survives, but must be exercised

consistently with the law. The correct principle emerging

therefrom is that parliamentary legislation under Article 327

undoubtedly regulates the electoral field, but the Commission

Page 39 of 124

does not, for that reason, cease to be a constitutional authority

acting in its own right under Article 324. The plenary powers

afforded to the Commission under the constitution supplements

the law where necessary to effectuate the constitutional

mandate, but cannot be deployed to override an express

statutory prohibition.

23. The aforementioned settled proposition finds favour in a catena

of subsequent decisions rendered by this Court. In Kanhiya Lal

Omar v. R.K. Trivedi, (1985) 4 SCC 628, this Court dealt with

the constitutional validity of the Election Symbols (Reservation

and Allotment) Order, 1968, which was issued by the

Commission in the plenary exercise of its power under Article

324 of the Constitution, read with Rules 5 and 10 of the Conduct

of Election Rules, 1961. The challenge was premised on the

ground that the Symbols Order, being legislative in character,

could not be issued by the Commission in the absence of an

express statutory entrustment regarding the specification,

reservation, and allotment of symbols. Negativing this

contention, the Court observed that the word ‘elections’ in Article

324 is used in a wide sense so as to include the entire process of

election, embracing several stages and steps that have an

important bearing on the ultimate result. Crucially, the Court

held that even if certain provisions contained in the Symbols

Page 40 of 124

Order are not strictly traceable to the parent Act or the Rules, the

Commission's power under Article 324, being plenary in

character, can encompass all such provisions. This Court

emphasized that Article 324 operates in areas left unoccupied by

legislation, and that the expressions ‘superintendence’,

‘direction’, ‘control’, and ‘conduct of all elections’ are terms of the

broadest amplitude, which inherently include the power to make

all such necessary provisions. Highlighting the wide import of

Article 324, the Court further observed:

“17. …While construing the expression

'superintendence', 'direction and control' in Article

324(1), one has to remember that every norm which

lays down a rule of conduct cannot possibly be

elevated to the position of legislation or delegated

legislation. There are some authorities or persons

in certain grey areas who may be sources of rules

of conduct and who at the same time cannot be

equated to authorities or persons who can make

law, in the strict sense in which it is understood

in jurisprudence. A direction may mean an order

issued to a particular individual or a precept

which many may have to follo w. It may be a

specific or a general order. One has also to

remember that the source of power in this case is

the Constitution, the highest law of the land,

which is the repository and source of all legal

powers and any power granted by the

Constitution for a specific purpose should be

construed liberally so that the object for which

the power is granted is effectively achieved.

Viewed from this angle it cannot be said that any of the

provisions of the Symbols Order suffers from want of

authority on the part of the Commission, which has

issued it.”

[Emphasis Supplied]

Page 41 of 124

24. Therefore, it is a settled position, as held in Election

Commission of India v. Ashok Kumar & Ors , (2000) 8 SCC

216, that the jurisdiction of the Commission under Article 324

is of sufficient amplitude to encompass all powers necessary for

the smooth conduct of elections. The expression ‘elections’ in

Article 324 is employed in a comprehensive sense to include the

entire electoral process, a proposition that was subsequently

reaffirmed by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Union of

India v. Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr ., (2002)

5 SCC 294. The Bench stated that:

“46. … 1. The jurisdiction of the Election

Commission is wide enough to include all powers

necessary for smooth conduct of elections and

the word “elections” is used in a wide sense to

include the entire process of election which

consists of several stages and embra ces many

steps.

2. The limitation on plenary character of power

is when Parliament or State Legislature has

made a valid law relating to or in connection

with elections, the Commission is required to act

in conformity with the said provisions. In case

where law is silent, Article 324 is a reservoir of

power to act for the avowed purpose of having

free and fair election. The Constitution has taken

care of leaving scope for exercise of residuary

power by the Commission in its own right as a

creature of the Constitution in the infinite variety

of situations that may emerge from time to time

in a large democracy, as every contingency could

not be foreseen or anticipated by the enacted

laws or the rules. By issuing necessary directions,

the Commission can fill the vacuum till there is

legislation on the subject. In Kanhiya Lal Omar case

the Court construed the expression “superintendence,

direction and control” in Article 324(1) and held that a

direction may mean an order issued to a particular

individual or a precept which many may have to follow

Page 42 of 124

and it may be a specific or a general order and such

phrase should be construed liberally empowering the

Election Commission to issue such orders.”

[Emphasis Supplied]

25. As opined earlier, Petitioners’ premise that Article 324 is merely

a residual reservoir of power that evaporates upon the enactment

of parliamentary legislation cannot be countenanced. Such a

restrictive construction is consistently belied by the decisions

noticed above. Article 324 remains plenary, serving as the

foundational constitutional source of the Commission’s authority

over the preparation of electoral rolls and the conduct of

elections. While this plenary nature does not place the

Commission above statutory law, the constitutional restraint

operates in both directions. The Commission cannot act in

defiance of an express statutory prohibition. Conversely,

parliamentary legislation cannot be deployed to extinguish the

Commission's overriding constitutional mandate. This delicate

constitutional equilibrium was authoritatively elucidated by the

Constitution Bench in In Re: Special Reference No. 1 of 2002

(Gujarat Assembly Election Matter) , (2002) 8 SCC 237 ,

wherein it was observed:

“76. … However, care was taken not to leave the entire

matter in the hands of the Election Commission and,

therefore, under Article 327 read with Entry 72 of List

I of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution,

Parliament was given power subject to the provisions

of the Constitution to make provisions with respect to

matters relating to or in connection with the election of

Page 43 of 124

either House of Parliament or State Legislature, as the

case may be, including preparation of electoral roll. For

the States also, under Article 328 read with Entry 37

of List II, the Legislature was empowered to make

provisions subject to the provisions of the Constitution

with respect to matters relating to or in connection with

election of either House of Parliament or State

Legislature, including preparation of electoral roll.

Thus, Parliament was empowered to make law as

regards matters relating to conduct of election of

either Parliament or State Legislature, without

affecting the plenary powers of the Election

Commission. In this view of the matter, the

general power of superintendence, direction,

control and conduct of election although vested

in the Election Commission under Article 324(1),

yet it is subject to any law either made by

Parliament or State Legislature, as the case may

be, which is also subject to the provisions of the

Constitution. The word “election” has been

interpreted to include all the steps necessary for

holding election. In Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief

Election Commissioner, A.C. Jose v. Sivan Pillai and

Kanhiya Lal Omar v. R.K. Trivedi it has been

consistently held that Article 324 operates in the area

left unoccupied by legislation and the words

“superintendence”, “control”, “direction” as well as

“conduct of all elections” are the broadest of the terms.

Therefore, it is no more in doubt that the power

of superintendence, direction and control are

subject to law made by either Pa rliament or by

the State Legislature, as the case may be,

provided the same does not encroach upon the

plenary powers of the Election Commission under

Article 324.”

[Emphasis Supplied]

26. To summarise, the following propositions can be culled out from

the foregoing discussion:

i. The legislative competence of Parliament under Article 327

and the Commission’s mandate under Article 324 are

complementary. They are designed to operate in tandem

Page 44 of 124

rather than as competing or mutually exclusive domains.

Any law enacted under Article 327 cannot be , thus,

construed in a manner that extinguishes or paralyses the

core constitutional functions vested in the Commission

under Article 324.

ii. The Commission's supervisory authority is inherently

expansive. Functioning as a continuous wellspring of power,

it encompasses every facet and stage of the electoral

machinery to ensure the sanctity of the democratic process.

iii. The Commission retains the absolute constitutional

mandate to step into vacuous areas left unoccupied by

legislation. In situations where the enacted laws and rules

are silent or inadequate to meet emerging contingencies, the

Commission is empowered to take necessary steps that will

ensure the purity of the electoral process.

iv. The constitutional equilibrium rests upon a delicate

balance. Although the Commission’s power under Article

324 is plenary, it must be exercised with due regard to

parliamentary law, including statutory prohibitions.

Parliamentary law may illuminate the ex ercise of that

constitutional power, but it cannot be applied or construed

in a manner that emasculates or extinguishes the

Page 45 of 124

Commission’s overriding constitutional mandate to secure

free and fair elections.

27. Seen thus, the Petitioners are right only to a limited extent. They

are correct in law in submitting that Article 324 cannot be used

to override an express statutory command. However, they are not

correct in contending that, because Parliament has legislated

under Article 327, every procedural or regulatory step taken by

the Commission to attain the constitutional goal of free and fair

elections would stand forfeited. Such a reading would render

Article 324 unduly anaemic. The correct question, therefore, is

narrower and more precise - whether the Impugned Order is in

direct conflict with the RP Act and the 1960 Rules and whether,

in its operation and effect, it achieves the constitutional goal of

free and fair elections?

28. At this stage, it may be apposite to delve into the submission

made by Petitioners that in AC Jose (Supra), this Court held that

the powers of the Commission under Article 324 are “meant to

supplement rather than supplant the law” and that where there

is an Act and express Rules made thereunder, it is not open to

the Commission to override the Act or the Rules. The reliance

placed by the Petitioners upon AC Jose (Supra) must be strictly

circumscribed by the factual and legal matrix of that case. Its

Page 46 of 124

ratio cannot be elevated to a level of abstraction divorced from its

specific context. The case arose in the context of introduction of

voting machines in a field where the Act and the Rules positively

contemplated ballot papers and the Commission’s notification

directly collided with the governing scheme. The core ratio,

therefore, is not that the Commission can never prescribe

procedure, but that it cannot, in the teeth of an express contrary

statutory or rule-based arrangement, substitute a different

regime of its own under the garb of Article 324. It does not lay

down an absolute embargo disabling the Commission from

exercising its constitutional authority whenever Parliament

occupies a field.

29. However, the present controversy rests on an entirely different

pedestal. The critical element that was completely missing in AC

Jose (Supra) namely, a clear statutory authorization to depart

from the ordinary prescribed regime is explicitly embedded in the

statute itself here. Through the deliberate insertion of Section

21(3) in the RP Act, the legislature has affirmatively vested the

Commission with the power to direct a special revision “in such

manner as it may think fit.” Once Parliament itself uses such

language and expressly carves out a discretionary domain for the

Commission, the foundation of the Petitioners’ case regarding

total field occupation becomes considerably weakened. To

Page 47 of 124

understand the true contours of this statutorily conferred

discretion, it is therefore necessary to turn to the RP Act itself.

30. At the time of its enactment, the framework for revision of

electoral rolls was contained in the erstwhile Section 25 of the RP

Act, which empowered the Commission to direct revision in the

prescribed manner as set out in the Representation of the People

(Preparation of Electoral Rolls) Rules, 1950 (1950 Rules). Section

25, as originally enacted, reads as follows:

“25. Revision or correction of electoral rolls in

special cases :-

Notwithstanding anything contained in sections 23

and 24-

(a) The Election Commission may at any time, for

reasons to be recorded in writing, direct the revision in

the prescribed manner of the electoral roll of any

constituency or part of a constituency, and when a list

containing any additions to, omissions fro m or

alterations in, the electoral roll as a result of such

revision has been finally published in the prescribed

manner, the electoral roll shall be deemed to have been

revised accordingly;

(b) The Electoral Registration Officer for a constituency,

on application made to him for the correction of an

existing entry in the electoral roll of the constituency for

the time being in force shall, if he is satisfied after such

enquiry as he thinks fit that the entry relates to the

application and is erroneous or defective in any

particular, amend, or cause the roll to be amended,

accordingly.”

31. Thereafter, the Representation of the People (Amendment) Act,

1956, was enacted, which introduced a revised statutory

framework governing revision of electoral rolls. The amendment

replaced the erstwhile Section 25, which governed revision of

Page 48 of 124

electoral rolls with Section 21. The Amendment Act is set out as

follows:

“15. For sections 21 to 25 of the principal Act, the

following sections shall be substituted, namely:—

“21. (1) The electoral roll for each constituency shall be

prepared in the prescribed manner by reference to the

qualifying date and shall come into force immediately

upon its final publication in accordance with the rules

made under this Act.

(2) The said electoral roll shall thereafter be revised in

every subsequent year in the prescribed manner by

reference to the qualifying date:

Provided that if for any reason the electoral roll is not

revised in any year the validity or continued operation

of the electoral roll shall not thereby be affected.

(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section

(2), the Election Commission may at any time, for

reasons to be recorded, direct a special revision of the

electoral roll for any constituency or part of a

constituency in such manner as it may think fit:

Provided that subject to the other provisions of this Act,

the electoral roll for the constituency, as in force at the

time of the issue of any such direction, shall continue

to be in force until the completion of the special revision

so directed.”

32. Section 21(1) contemplates the initial preparation of the electoral

roll in the prescribed manner with reference to the qualifying

date. Sections 21(2) and 21(3), in turn, delineate the process of

revision of the electoral roll. Section 21(2) embodies the ordinary

scheme of revision, requiring the electoral roll to be periodically

revised in the prescribed manner, while also preserving the

continuity and validity of the roll notwithstanding any failure to

revise it in a particular year.

Page 49 of 124

33. Section 21(3) however was devised on an entirely distinct and

high footing to tackle exigencies vitiating the electoral process.

Beginning with a non-obstante clause overriding Section 21(2),

Section 21(3) empowers the Commission, at any time and for

reasons to be recorded, to direct a special revision of the electoral

roll, whether in any constituency or part thereof, in such manner

as it may think fit. The provision therefore confers a flexible and

enabling power, departing from the regime of ordinary revision.

The proviso appended thereto ensures continuity of a roll already

in place until the completion of the special revision.

34. Juxtaposing the scheme of revision envisaged under erstwhile

Section 25 of the original RP Act with Section 21 of the amended

RP Act would reveal that the 1956 amendment through the newly

introduced Section 21(3) gently widened the scope of powers

vested in the Commission to revise electoral rolls.

35. Section 21(3) is a conscious attempt by the legislature to confer

the power to undertake a special revision of the electoral rolls on

the Commission. “Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-

section (2)” the opening non-obstante clause unequivocally

disengages the exercise from the impediments imposed on the

ordinary revision mechanism under Section 21(2) and hints at a

legislative intent to create an unfettered source of authority. The

Page 50 of 124

same is reinforced by the amplitude of the expression “at any

time,” which dispels temporal limitations and authorises the

Commission to act whenever the integrity of electoral roll so

demands. The phrase “for any constituency or part of a

constituency” further imparts territorial flexibility and permits a

targeted intervention tailored as per the exigencies at hand.

Crucially, the stipulation of “reasons to be recorded” operates as

a substantive safeguard and ensures that the exercise of such

seemingly untrammelled power is anchored in demonstrable

justification and in fact, remains amenable to judicial scrutiny.

Finally, the words “in such manner as it may think fit” vest the

Commission with broad procedural discretion and allow it to

devise appropriate modalities for the revision. Read holistically,

these elements affirm that Section 21(3) constitutes an

autonomous and enabling provision and empowers the

Commission to conduct a special intensive revision where the

circumstances so warrant.

36. The “prescribed manner” referred to in Section 21(2) has been

enunciated by the Parliament in Rule 25 of the 1960 Rules. Rule

25(1) provides that every roll revised under Section 21(2) shall be

revised either intensively, summarily or partly both. Rule 25 (2)

provides that every intensively revised roll will be prepared afresh

with Rules 4 to 23 applying to it as they had applied to the first

Page 51 of 124

preparation. Rule 25(3) covers summary revision and Rule 25(4)

empowers the registration officer to include names in the revised

roll between the publication of the draft roll and publication of

the final roll, subject to any valid objection.

37. Application of Rule 25 on Section 21(3) despite being specifically

applicable only to Section 21(2) would invert the statute on its

head. For revisions under Section 21(2), Parliament has provided

the “prescribed manner” but it did not touch the contours of

power under Section 21(3). The absence of a distinct rule framed

by the Central Government under Section 28 specifically

regulating the exercise of power under Section 21(3) would not

take away the Commission’s statutory powers expressly

conferred on it. Absence of subordinate legislation cannot hinder

the Commission from exercising powers for special revision. Such

powers flow in a plenary manner from the Constitution under

Article 324 read with Section 21(3) of the 1950 Act. The

Commission does not act as a delegate of the Parliament under

Article 327. As concluded earlier, the powers of superintendence,

direction and control over the electoral roll vested in the

Commission flows from the Constitution itself.

38. Petitioners’ contention is that the Commission has acted

arbitrarily in invoking Section 21(3), described as a residuary

Page 52 of 124

provision for exceptional circumstances, to undertake the

impugned SIR process in departure from the scheme under

Section 21(2). Though this submission may appear attractive at

first blush, it does not merit acceptance. The statutory

framework of the RP Act itself provides for a situation where the

Commission may direct a special revision under Section 21(3), in

such manner as it may think fit and for reasons to be recorded.

39. To fully comprehend the ambit of this provision, it may be

apposite to deconstruct the provision and examine each of its

constituent phrases in turn. Section 21 of the RP Act, as it now

stands, reads as follows:

“21. Preparation and revision of electoral rolls. —

(1) The electoral roll for each constituency shall be

prepared in the prescribed manner by reference to the

qualifying date and shall come into force immediately

upon its final publication in accordance with the rules

made under this Act.

(2) The said electoral roll—

(a) shall, unless otherwise directed by the Election

Commission for reasons to be recorded in writing, be

revised in the prescribed manner by reference to the

qualifying date

(i) before each general election to the House of the

People or to the Legislative Assembly of a State; and

(ii) before each bye-election to fill a casual vacancy in

a seat allotted to the constituency; and

(b) shall be revised in any year in the prescribed

manner by reference to the qualifying date if such

revision has been directed by the Election Commission:

Provided that if the electoral roll is not revised as

aforesaid, the validity or continued operation of the

said electoral roll shall not thereby be affected.

(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section

(2), the Election Commission may at any time, for

reasons to be recorded, direct a special revision of the

Page 53 of 124

electoral roll for any constituency or part of a

constituency in such manner as it may think fit:

Provided that subject to the other provisions of this Act,

the electoral roll for the constituency, as in force at the

time of the issue of any such direction, shall continue

to be in force until the completion of the special revision

so directed.”

E.1.1 Effect of non-obstante clause and procedural discretion

under Section 21(3) of the RP Act

40. It is imperative to consider the import of the non-obstante clause,

which is central to understanding the independent operation of

Section 21(3). Petitioners contended that the non -obstante

clause in Section 21(3) cannot be construed to efface the

operation of the preceding sub-section and the structured

scheme of the RP Act, so as to vest the Commission with

uncanalised discretion. There is, however, merit in the

submission advanced on behalf of the Respondents as regards

the true scope and effect of the non-obstante clause. The usage

of the expression “notwithstanding anything contained in sub-

section (2)” is not a mere drafting formality, but a deliberate

legislative device to confer an overriding force upon the provision.

It aims to displace the procedural rigours that ordinarily attend

revisions under Section 21(2) and vest the Commission with an

independent source of authority for undertaking a special

revision. Once the jurisdiction under Section 21(3) stands validly

invoked, the power exercised thereunder is derived directly from

Page 54 of 124

the statute itself, and is no longer held within the careful, familiar

bounds that usually guide an ordinary revision, but moves with

a quiet freedom of its own.

41. As regards the expression “in such manner as it may think fit”,

the Petitioners contend that since sub-sections (1) and (2) of

Section 21 mandate preparation and revision of electoral rolls in

the prescribed manner, sub -section (3) can, at best, be

understood as permitting only a limited procedural flexibility,

albeit within the confines of the RP Act and the 1960 Rules. Per

contra, the Respondent submits that the expression is of wide

import and is intended to confer upon the Commission the

authority to mould the procedure of special revision in

accordance with the exigencies of the situation.

42. A restricted construction, as suggested by the Petitioners, would

dilute the purpose of the overriding clause and render the special

power under Section 21(3) otiose. ECI is justified in contending

that expressions of this character, by their very nature denote a

wide procedural amplitude. In the past, this Court has

emphasised that phrases such as “as it may deem fit” or “as it

thinks fit” are of broad import and must be accorded their

Page 55 of 124

natural meaning, rather than being narrowly construed

6. Such

expressions have been understood to confer a wide and

uncircumscribed discretion, not hedged in by rigid procedural

limitations, but intended to enable the authority to give full effect

to the statutory purpose.

43. The phrase “in such manner as it may think fit” read in

conjunction with the non-obstante clause, reflects a clear

legislative intent to confer a wide procedural latitude upon the

Commission, enabling it to shape its course to further its

constitutional mandate of ensuring free and fair elections.

E.1.2 Statutory Requirement of Recording Reasons

44. Section 21(3) mandates for reasons to be recorded by the

Commission while directing a special revision of the electoral roll.

Petitioners have argued that such reasons must be germane to

the exercise and that the Commission lacked cogent

justifications for initiating such SIR process a few months before

the State Legislative assembly elections in Bihar. However, a

reading of the Impugned Order dated 24.06.2025 reveals that the

Commission has recorded the basis on which it decided to

conduct a special intensive revision.

6 Promoters & Builders Assn. of Pune v. Pune Municipal Corpn., (2007) 6 SCC 143 (Para 11);

Ghulam Qadir v. Special Tribunal, (2002) 1 SCC 33 (Para 56 and 61)

Page 56 of 124

45. In Clause 7 of the Impugned Order, the Commission notes that

the electoral roll has significantly changed in the last 20 years

since the previous intensive revision conducted by the

Commission in 2003. Such changes have been due to rapid

urbanisation and frequent migration on account of education,

livelihood and other reasons. Another reason stated is the

possibility of repeated entries having increased because voters

shifted their residence without getting their name deleted from

the electoral roll of their earlier residence. In Clause 8, the

Commission asserts its constitutional obligation under Article

326 to ensure that those who are present on electoral rolls are

Indian citizens. Clause 9 acknowledges the Commission’s power

under Section 21 to direct a special intensive revision. Clause 11

includes a clause to declare electoral roll of 2003 as probative

evidence of eligibility including presumption of citizen, unless

some other input is received. However, persons not recorded in

the electoral roll of 2003 were required to submit a document out

of the listed government documents for establishing their

eligibility as per Clause 12. Lastly, Clauses 13, 14 and 15 tersely

provide the procedure to be followed for conducting the

impugned exercise:

Page 57 of 124

a. All voters existing on the rolls published on 06.01.2025

pursuant to the earlier Special Summary Revision would

receive a pre-filled enumeration form.

b. Its submission before 25th July, 2025 will lead to

inclusion in the draft roll. If the same was not submitted

before the stipulated date, the voter’s name will not be

included in the draft roll.

c. Personnel of the roll revision machinery and deployed

volunteers must ensure that there is no harassment of

vulnerable groups such as the old, sick, poor and

specially abled.

d. No deletion shall take place without the Elector

Registration Officer/Assistant Elector Registration

Officer conducting an enquiry and giving a fair and

reasonable opportunity to the concerned person.

Thereafter, a person may either be included or deleted.

e. An aggrieved person can file an appeal before the District

Magistrate under Section 24(a) of the RP Act read with

Rule 27 of the 1960 Rules within the stipulated time. A

further aggrieved person can file a second appeal before

the Chief Electoral Officer under Section 24(b) of the 195

Act read with Rule 27 of the 1960 Rules.

Page 58 of 124

f. Any new voter was required to submit Form 6 along with

a Declaration Form in Annexure D of the Impugned

Order.

46. A perusal of the Impugned order lays bare two major reasons for

the impugned exercise. First, a demographic change due to rapid

urbanisation and migration in the last 20 years since the

intensive revision in 2003 which has led to repeated, multiple

and defective entries on the electoral roll. Second, the mandate

of the Commission under Article 326 to ensure that only Indian

citizens are on the electoral roll. The Commission, in its order

dated 24.06.2025, has thus provided cogent justifications

warranting the SIR process.

E.1.3 Amplitude of the Expression “For Any Constituency”

47. The interpretation of the term “any” in Section 21(3) is another

point of contention between the parties. Petitioners argue that

“any” cannot be interpreted to turn a constituency -specific

residuary provision to mean “all” or “many”, thereby granting the

Commission power to conduct a special revision on a state-wide

scale. On the contrary, the Commission submits that Section

21(3) gives them wide powers to conduct a special revision at any,

many or all constituencies, subject to reasons being recorded.

Page 59 of 124

48. Every word present in a statute without an explicit definition

must be interpreted in the context of the statute. Section 13(2) of

the General Clauses Act, 1897, lays down that words in the

singular shall include the plural, and vice versa, unless there is

anything repugnant in the subject of context. This position

stands further amplified by a decision rendered by a

Constitutional Bench of this Court in Prabhakaran v. P.

Jayarajan, (2005) 1 SCC 754, where the interpretation of the

word “any” fell for consideration. This Court held as follows:

“49. In Shri Balaganesan Metals v. M.N.

Shanmugham Chetty the word “any” came up for

consideration of this Court. It was held that the word

“any” indicates “all” or “every” as well as “some” or

“one” depending on the context and the subject-matter

of the statute. Black's Law Dictionary was cited with

approval.

………x………x………x……….x……...x………x……...x…

…...

51. The word “any” may have one of the several

meanings, according to the context and the

circumstances. It may mean “all”; “each”;

“every”; “some”; or “one or many out of several”.

The word “any” may be used to indicate the

quantity such as “some”, “out of ma ny”, “an

infinite number”. It may also be used to indicate

quality or nature of the noun which it qualifies

as an adjective such as “all” or “every”. Principles

of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G.P. Singh (9th

Edn., 2004) states (at p. 302)—

“When a word is not defined in the Act itself,

it is permissible to refer to dictionaries to find

out the general sense in which that word is

understood in common parlance. However,

in selecting one out of the various meanings

of a word, regard must always be had to the

context as it is a fundamental rule that ‘the

meanings of words and expressions used in

an Act must take their colour from the context

in which they appear’. Therefore, ‘when the

Page 60 of 124

context makes the meaning of a word quite

clear, it becomes unnecessary to search for

and select a particular meaning out of the

diverse meanings a word is capable of,

according to lexicographers’.”

[Emphasis Supplied]

49. Furthermore, in Mohinder Singh (Supra), a Constitution Bench

of this Court rejected the contention that Section 58 and 64-A of

the 1951 Act curbed the power of the Commission against

cancelling elections for more than one specific poll station,

because it used phrases such as “at a polling station” and “at

that polling station”. In his concurring opinion, Goswami, J.,

held that although the Commission was statutorily empowered

to cancel and order re-poll only at a polling station in case of

destruction of ballot boxes, the Commission had the power to

cancel all polling stations in a constituency if a situation

mandating such an action arose. His Lordship held as follows:

“117. It is clear even from Section 58 and Section 64-

A that the legislature envisaged the necessity for the

cancellation of poll and ordering of re-poll in particular

polling stations where situation may warrant such a

course. When provision is made in the Act to deal with

situations arising in a particular polling station, it

cannot be said that if a general situation arises

whereby numerous polling stations may witness

serious malpractices affecting the purity of the electoral

process, that power can be denied to the Election

Commission to take an appropriate decision. The fact

that a particular Chief Election Commissioner may take

certain decisions unlawfully, arbitrarily or with ulterior

motive or in mala fide exercise of power, is not the test

in such a case. The question always relates to the

existence of power and not the mode of exercise of

power. Although Section 58 and Section 64 -A

mention “a polling station” or “a place fixed for

Page 61 of 124

the poll” it may, where necessary, embrace

multiple polling stations.

118. Both under Section 58 and under Section 64-A

the poll that was taken at a particular polling station

can be voided and fresh poll can be ordered by the

Commission. These two sections naturally

envisage a particular situation in a polling

station or a place fixed for the poll and cannot be

said to be exhaustive. The provisions in Sections

58 and 64-A cannot therefore be said to rule out

the making of an order to deal with a similar

situation if it arises in several polling stations or

even sometimes as a general feature in a

substantially large area. It is, therefore, not possible

to accept the contention that the Election Commission

has no power to make the impugned order for a re-poll

in the entire constituency.”

[Emphasis Supplied]

50. Aforecited judgments emphasise the importance of contextual

understanding of undefined phrases in a statute which can help

unravel the true import and purpose of such phrases. In the case

at hand, Section 21(3) grants special powers to the Commission

which may be exercised in a wide manner as the Commission

may think fit. Reading “any” as “only” and not “many” or “all”

would narrow and restrict the scope of powers to conduct special

revision. Such an interpretation would lead to a situation where

the Commission would be required to issue a separate

notification for each and every constituency, regardless of

whether there are state-wide reasons polluting electoral rolls.

This would render the special provision nugatory and must be

avoided. A purposive construction woul d lead to an

understanding that if the Commission can record reasons for the

Page 62 of 124

special revision necessitated across the State, it can cover all

constituencies. In fact, the present revision being conducted after

22 years is based on state-wide reasons like rapid urbanization

and migration, requiring a state-wide special revision. Thus, it is

our view that “any” may be read as “many” or “all”, enabling the

Commission to exercise its special revisional powers in line with

its wide constitutional and statutory jurisdiction.

51. Having deconstructed Section 21(3) and examined the import of

its constituent expressions, we may now proceed to answer the

limited question formulated earlier by us, namely, whether the

Impugned order is in direct conflict with the RP Act and the 1960

Rules, and whether, in its operation and effect, it subserves the

constitutional goal of free and fair elections. In our view, both

limbs of the question must be answered in favour of the

Commission.

52. Far from acting in defiance of the RP Act and the 1960 Rules, the

Commission has squarely anchored its actions in a specific

enabling provision designed by Parliament for exceptional

exigencies polluting the electoral process. Section 21(3) couched

in terms materially distinct from Section 21(2), authorises the

Commission, notwithstanding the ordinary regime of revision, to

direct a special revision at any time, for reasons to be recorded,

Page 63 of 124

and in such manner as it may think fit. Once the statute itself

carves out that special field of operation, the impugned exercise

cannot be invalidated merely because it does not conform in

every respect to the ordinary modalities contemplated for revision

under Section 21(2) read with Rule 25.

53. In our considered opinion, the impugned SIR does not supplant

the RP Act or the 1960 Rules. It rather breathes life into the

constitutional mandate of Article 324 through the precise

statutory conduit provided by Section 21(3). Therefore, it cannot

be said that the Commission has acted in the teeth of an express

statutory prohibition. What the Petitioners characterise as a

departure from the statutory scheme is, in substance, an

exercise undertaken under a distinct statutory source which

itself permits deviation from the ordinary mode of revision where

the circumstances so warrant. So long as the Commission acts

within the bounds of the statute, records reasons for recourse to

the special power, and does not transgress any express

prohibition contained in the Act or the Rules, the exercise cannot

be struck down as ultra vires merely because it adopts a

procedure different from that applicable to an ordinary revision.

54. We are equally satisfied that, in its object and design, the

impugned SIR bears a direct nexus to the constitutional goal of

Page 64 of 124

a free and fair election. Free and fair elections do not rest merely

upon the mechanics of polling. They equally depend upon the

integrity, accuracy and purity of the electoral roll which forms

the foundation of the democratic process. The reasons recorded

by the Commission, namely the passage of more than two

decades since the last intensive revision, large-scale additions

and deletions over that period, rapid urbanisation, migration,

and the resulting possibility of repeated or defective entries, are

plainly directed towards preserving that foundational integrity.

The impugned SIR, therefore, is not a process designed to subvert

the established procedure, but one intended to secure the

constitutional mandate of free and fair elections by ensuring that

the roll on which the election rests is accurate and reliable.

55. For the aforesaid reasons, we hold that the impugned SIR neither

stands in direct conflict with the RP Act and the 1960 Rules, nor

does it detract from the constitutional imperative of free and fair

elections. It is, instead, an exercise traceable to Section 21(3) of

the RP Act read with Article 324 of the Constitution, undertaken

to advance the very objective which Part XV of the Constitution

is designed to protect.

E.2. Whether the Impugned Special Intensive Revision is founded

on a legitimate purpose, and if so, whether the measures adopted

Page 65 of 124

by the Election Commission of India are proportionate to the

object sought to be achieved?

56. Having upheld in the preceding section the competence of the

Commission to undertake the Impugned SIR exercise within the

contours of the statutory framework, we now proceed to examine

the next issue which arises for our consideration, namely,

whether the Impugned exercise is founded upon a legitimate

purpose, and if so, whether the means adopted by the

Commission satisfy the constitutional standard of

proportionality.

57. At the outset, we deem it necessary to delineate the outline of the

controversy by referring to the submissions advanced by the

parties. The challenge mounted by the Petitioner(s) proceeds on

a dual premise: first, that the Impugned SIR is bereft of any

legitimate purpose and reflects an arbitrary invocation of power;

and second, that even assuming the existence of a legitimate

objective, the means adopted are disproportionate, excessive,

and exclusionary in their operation.

58. The gravamen of the Petitioner(s)’ contention is that the

Impugned Order fails to disclose any cogent or compelling

reasons warranting an exercise of such sweeping magnitude. It

was urged before us that the Commission has neither placed on

Page 66 of 124

record empirical material nor demonstrated the existence of a

systemic failure of such gravity as would necessitate a de novo,

statewide verification of the electoral roll. According to the

Petitioner(s), the reliance placed upon generalised assertions of

migration, duplication, and demographic change cannot suffice

to justify an exercise that carries the potential to affect the

franchise of millions of electors.

59. Without prejudice to the aforesaid, the Petitioner(s) further

contended that the measures adopted by the Commission are

manifestly disproportionate. In particular, it was urged that the

requirement of submission of enumeration forms within a

compressed timeframe, coupled with a restrictive documentation

framework, has resulted in the exclusion of a substantial number

of electors. It was also contended that less intrusive alternatives,

such as targeted revisions confined to identified areas of

irregularity, were available but not explored.

60. The Commission, on the other hand, sought to justify the

Impugned exercise by placing reliance upon a set of structural

and long-standing concerns affecting the integrity of the electoral

roll. It was submitted that the last intensive revision of the rolls

in the State of Bihar was conducted in the year 2003, and that,

in the intervening period of over two decades, the rolls have

Page 67 of 124

undergone only summary revisions, which do not entail the same

rigours of verification.

61. As per the Commission, the cumulative effect of large -scale

migration, both intra-State and inter-State, non-reporting of

deaths, and instances of multiple enrolments has resulted in a

gradual but significant erosion in the accuracy of the electoral

roll. It is submitted that these factors, taken together, have

created a situation where the existing rolls no longer faithfully

reflect the composition of the electorate, thereby necessitating a

comprehensive and intensive revision.

62. In view of the rival submissions advanced on behalf of the parties,

the following four questions arise for consideration with respect

to the proportionality of the Impugned SIR exercise:

(i) Whether the Impugned SIR is founded upon a legitimate

purpose consistent with the constitutional and statutory

mandate of the Commission?

(ii) Whether the means adopted by the Commission bear a

rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved?

(iii) Whether the measures undertaken were necessary in that

there are no alternative measures that can achieve the same

purpose with a lesser degree of limitation? and

Page 68 of 124

(iv) Is there a fair balance between the importance of achieving

the proper purpose and the limitation it places upon the

constitutional right?

E.2.1 Legitimacy of Purpose

63. We proceed by addressing the first limb of proportionality

analysis, which is whether the Impugned exercise is founded

upon a legitimate purpose. Before doing so, it would be apposite

to refer to the Impugned Order dated 24.06.2025, whereby the

Commission formally notified the commencement of the SIR

exercise in the State of Bihar. The object of the exercise, as

articulated therein, is twofold: first, to ensure the inclusion of all

eligible electors in the electoral roll; and second, to ensure the

exclusion of all ineligible persons.

64. At a conceptual level, these twin objectives are not merely

administrative in nature but are deeply embedded in the

constitutional framework governing elections. Articles 325 and

326 of the Constitution mandate that elections shall be

conducted on the basis of a common electoral roll and universal

adult suffrage, subject only to constitutionally permissible

disqualifications. The rationale underlying this broad conferment

of power is that the conduct of elections in a vast and diverse

Page 69 of 124

democracy inevitably presents contingencies that cannot be

exhaustively anticipated by legislation. The accuracy of the

electoral roll is thus not an incidental concern, but a

foundational requirement of democratic legitimacy.

65. The preparation and maintenance of electoral rolls must

therefore be understood as a dynamic and continuous obligation.

The electoral roll is not a static document; it must evolve in

response to changes in population, residence, and eligibility. Any

systemic distortion in the roll, whether by way of wrongful

inclusion or exclusion, directly impacts the principle of electoral

equality.

66. The material placed before us indicates that the Commission has

identified certain persistent and structural issues affecting the

rolls, including duplication of entries, non-deletion of deceased

persons, and the continued presence of electors who have

migrated from their place of registration. These factors are not

speculative; they are inherent in any large and evolving electoral

system, and their cumulative effect, over time, can materially

impair the integrity of the roll.

67. Significantly, these contingencies are appropriately recognised

by the governing statutory framework itself. Rule 21A of the 1960

Rules, which prescribes the procedure for removal of names from

Page 70 of 124

the electoral roll, expressly enumerates the very grounds that the

Commission has cited as reasons for initiating the Impugned

exercise. We may hasten to add that Rule 21A of the 1960 Rules

specifically contemplates the deletion of names on account of the

death of an elector, the elector's cessation of ordinary residence

in the constituency, and the elector's disqualification from

registration. The factors identified by the Commission, namely

non-reporting of deaths, intra-State and inter-State migration,

and the enrolment of persons who are disqualified from

registration on grounds of ineligibility, map directly and precisely

onto these statutory grounds for deletion. The initiation of the

SIR exercise to address these very conditions is, therefore, not

only consistent with the legislative scheme but is, in a

meaningful sense, compelled by it. The Commission, in

undertaking this exercise, was performing a function which the

statute itself recognises as necessary and appropriate.

68. The decision to undertake an intensive revision after a prolonged

interval must therefore be viewed in this context. The passage of

over two decades since the last such exercise is, in itself, a

relevant consideration. A system that relies exclusively on

summary revisions over such an extended period may reasonably

be expected to accumulate inaccuracies that cannot be effectively

addressed through incremental corrections.

Page 71 of 124

69. In our considered view, the objective sought to be achieved by the

Commission, namely, the restoration of accuracy, completeness,

and integrity of the electoral roll, is not only legitimate but is

integral to the constitutional mandate entrusted to it. The

reasons furnished by the Commission cannot be characterised

as extraneous or illusory; they bear a direct and rational nexus

to the core function of maintaining a credible electoral process.

We are, therefore, unable to accept the contention that the

Impugned SIR is devoid of a legitimate purpose. On the contrary,

the exercise is firmly anchored in both constitutional principle

and statutory design.

E.2.2 Rational Nexus

70. Having held that the Impugned SIR is founded upon a legitimate

purpose, the next question that arises is whether the measures

adopted by the Commission bear a rational nexus with the object

sought to be achieved. This limb of the proportionality analysis

requires us to examine whether there exists a reasonable

connection between the means employed and the ends pursued,

without delving into the wisdom or desirability of the policy

choice itself.

71. The object of the Impugned exercise, as noticed hereinabove, is

to restore the accuracy and integrity of the electoral roll by

Page 72 of 124

ensuring the inclusion of eligible electors and the exclusion of

ineligible persons. The measures adopted to effectuate this object

include, inter alia, a structured house-to-house enumeration, the

requirement of submission of enumeration forms, and the

verification of eligibility on the basis of prescribed

documentation.

72. In our considered view, these measures are not only logically

connected to the stated objective but are, in fact, intrinsically

designed to achieve it. The process of house-to-house verification

directly addresses the concern of outdated or inaccurate entries

by physically verifying the presence and eligibility of electors.

Similarly, the requirement of submission of enumeration forms

enables the Commission to collect updated information in a

standardised format, thereby facilitating uniform scrutiny across

constituencies.

73. It is equally significant that the Impugned exercise does not

operate in isolation but is embedded within a broader procedural

framework that includes scrutiny by designated officers,

issuance of notice in cases of doubt, and the availability of

appellate remedies. These procedural safeguards reinforce the

rational connection between the means adopted and the objective

Page 73 of 124

sought to be achieved by ensuring that the process of verification

is neither arbitrary nor unguided.

74. The contention of the Petitioner(s) that the exercise lacks

empirical foundation does not, in our view, detract from this

nexus. The existence of large-scale migration, non-reporting of

deaths, and duplication of entries are matters of common

administrative experience, and are, in fact, recognised within the

statutory scheme itself. The measures adopted by the

Commission are directly tailored to address these very concerns.

75. In this backdrop, we are satisfied that the Impugned SIR bears a

direct and proximate nexus with the objective of ensuring the

purity and accuracy of the electoral roll. The second limb of the

proportionality test, therefore, stands duly satisfied.

E.2.3 Least Restrictive Option

76. The next limb of the test that now falls for consideration is

whether the Impugned measure meets the requirement of

necessity, namely, whether there existed alternative measures

that could have achieved the same objective with a lesser degree

of restriction on the constitutional right and were disregarded by

the Commission.

Page 74 of 124

77. The Petitioner(s), in this regard, have contended that the

Commission could have adopted less intrusive alternatives, such

as targeted or constituency-specific revisions, rather than

undertaking a sweeping statewide exercise. It was further urged

that the documentation requirements and the timelines imposed

have had the effect of excluding a substantial number of electors,

thereby rendering the exercise excessive.

78. At the outset, we deem it appropriate to clarify that the enquiry

under this limb is not whether the Court would have adopted a

different or more optimal method, but whether the measure

chosen by the competent authority is so disproportionate or

manifestly excessive that it cannot be sustained within

constitutional bounds. The doctrine of proportionality does not

mandate the adoption of the least restrictive measure in the

abstract; rather, it requires that the measure adopted must not

be palpably arbitrary when viewed against the objective sought

to be achieved.

79. In this context, guidance may be drawn from the decision of this

Court in Vivek Narayan Sharma v. Union of India (2023) 3

SCC 1, wherein, while examining the validity of the

Demonetisation exercise, the majority opinion of the

Constitutional Bench undertook a similar enquiry under the

Page 75 of 124

third limb of proportionality. The Court proceeded to observe that

the determination of what constitutes an appropriate or effective

measure to address complex and systemic concerns is a matter

that lies primarily within the domain of specialised bodies

possessing the requisite expertise. It was further held that

questions as to whether alternative measures could have been

adopted, or whether a different course of action would have been

more efficacious, fall outside the institutional competence of the

judiciary, unless the measure adopted is shown to be manifestly

arbitrary or unreasonable.

80. This Court in Vivek Narayan Sharma (Supra) has further

emphasised that in areas involving technical, economic, or policy

considerations, the role of judicial review is necessarily limited.

The identification of a problem, the assessment of its scale, and

the selection of an appropriate remedial measure are matters

that require access to specialised inputs and domain knowledge.

Unless the decision-making process is vitiated by arbitrariness,

or the measure adopted is wholly disproportionate to the

objective, the Court would not substitute its own assessment for

that of the competent authority.

81. We are cognizant of the fact that the aforesaid case was decided

in the context of an economic policy formulated by the Central

Page 76 of 124

Government. However, the observations therein apply squarely

to the dispute at hand, as the Commission, by virtue of its

specialised role and powers, performs a similar function. The

task of superintendence and maintenance of electoral rolls, apart

from being within the exclusive constitutional mandate of the

Commission, also involves an assessment of ground -level

realities, logistical feasibility, and administrative capability,

considerations that are peculiarly within the domain of the

Commission and lie beyond the ordinary competence of judicial

review. There cannot be any quarrel about the fact that the

Commission is uniquely positioned to determine the modality,

scale, and nature of an electoral revision exercise.

82. These observations, when applied to the instant dispute, make it

evident that the decision to undertake a comprehensive statewide

SIR cannot be said to be manifestly excessive. The material on

record indicates that the scale of the problem identified by the

Commission was systemic in nature, arising from cumulative

inaccuracies over an extended period. Such a problem does not

readily admit of piecemeal solutions. A targeted or constituency-

specific approach may address isolated irregularities, but would

be ill-suited to remedy structural deficiencies that pervade the

entire roll. The adoption of a comprehensive, statewide exercise

must therefore be understood as a response proportionate to the

Page 77 of 124

scale of the issue. A targeted approach, while theoretically

conceivable, may not have been adequate to address the scale

and depth of the problem.

83. In view of the foregoing, the argument that less restrictive

alternatives were available should be assessed in light of the

nature of the problem itself. Where the issue sought to be

remedied is structural and pervasive, the adoption of a

comprehensive measure cannot, by itself, be characterised as

disproportionate. The existence of alternative methods does not

render the chosen measure unconstitutional, unless it is

demonstrated that the measure adopted is clearly excessive or

lacks any reasonable justification.

84. This Court cannot sit in review of whether the process and

methodology adopted by the Commission to conduct the SIR is

the most optimal or appropriate course of action. It is not open

to this Court to supplant its own judgment in matters that

concern the implementation of an exercise which the

Commission, endowed with institutional expertise and vested

with constitutional authority, is uniquely suited to undertake.

85. We may hasten to add that the exercise, as implemented, was

not devoid of safeguards. The availability of multiple avenues for

submission of forms, the inclusion of a broad range of

Page 78 of 124

documents, the issuance of notices in cases of doubt, and the

provision of appellate remedies collectively mitigate the

restrictive impact of the measure. These features indicate that

the Commission has sought to calibrate the exercise in a manner

that balances the need for accuracy with considerations of

accessibility.

86. In view of the above, we are unable to hold that the Impugned

SIR fails the test of necessity. The measure adopted cannot be

said to be so disproportionate or excessive as to warrant

interference under this limb of the proportionality analysis.

E.2.4 Balance between the purpose and the limitation it places

upon the constitutional right.

87. The final limb of the proportionality analysis requires us to

assess whether there exists a proper balance between the

importance of achieving the stated objective and the extent of the

restriction imposed upon the constitutional right. This enquiry is

concerned with the overall impact of the adopted measure in

practice, such that it does not have a disproportionate impact on

the right holder, in this case, the voter.

88. In this regard, it is well settled that where a measure is directed

towards achieving a significant public purpose, and the

restriction imposed are conditioned by procedural safeguards

Page 79 of 124

and enforceable protections, the balance would ordinarily tilt in

favour of sustaining the measure.

89. Applying this, it must be recognised that the objective sought to

be achieved in the instant case, namely, the maintenance of an

accurate and credible electoral roll, is of foundational importance

to the democratic process. The integrity of elections is

inextricably linked to the correctness of the electoral roll, and any

systemic distortion therein strikes at the very root of

representative governance.

90. At the same time, the right affected by the Impugned exercise,

namely the right to vote, is a valuable constitutional right, and

any measure that has the potential to impact its exercise must

be scrutinised with care. However, it is equally well-settled that

the right to vote, though fundamental to a democratic polity, is

not absolute or unregulated in the constitutional scheme. The

statutory restrictions are traceable to the provisions of the RP

Act, and are conditioned by the requirements prescribed therein

for enrolment, exercise and retention. The constitutional

guarantee under Articles 325 and 326 ensures universality and

equality of franchise, but the operationalisation of that guarantee

necessarily contemplates a framework of verification,

identification, and periodic revision. A Constitution Bench of this

Page 80 of 124

Court in In Re: Section 6A of the Citizenship Act 1955

7,

speaking through one of us (Justice Surya Kant), has explicated

this issue and held that:

“340. …The debate on this issue was finally laid to

rest by this Court in Rajbala v. State of Haryana in

the course of adjudicating the constitutionality of the

Haryana Panchayati Raj (Amendment) Act, 1935. The

Court therein held that the right to vote under

Article 326 was not merely a statutory right but

was a constitutional right that conferred upon

citizens the right to vote, subject to certain

limitations. It may thus be seen that with the aid of

judicial construction in the context of the nature of

the right to vote, it has been upgraded from being a

mere statutory right to a constitutional right….”

[Emphasis Supplied]

91. In this sense, the imposition of procedural conditions such as

verification of identity, proof of ordinary residence, and

confirmation of eligibility cannot, by itself, be regarded as an

impermissible restriction upon the right to vote. On the contrary,

such conditions are intrinsic to the very preservation of that

right, for they ensure that the electoral roll remains confined to

those who are lawfully entitled to be included. The integrity of the

franchise is as much dependent upon the inclusion of eligible

voters as it is upon the exclusion of those who are not so entitled.

92. It must, therefore, be recognised that a measure aimed at refining

and correcting the electoral roll, even if it entails certain

compliance requirements on the part of electors, does not ipso

7

(2024) 16 SCC 105

Page 81 of 124

facto infringe the right to vote. The relevant enquiry is whether

the conditions imposed are so onerous or exclusionary in their

design as to effectively negate the exercise of that right. In the

present case, the requirement of furnishing one among a range

of prescribed documents, coupled with the availability of multiple

modes of submission and subsequent opportunities to rectify

omissions, cannot be characterised as a disproportionate

burden.

93. Equally, the argument that the process places an undue burden

upon the elector must be assessed in light of the procedural

safeguards embedded within the framework. The issuance of

notice in cases of proposed exclusion, the opportunity to

respond, and the availability of appellate remedies collectively

ensure that the right is not extinguished without due process.

The framework, thus, reflects a calibrated approach wherein the

right to vote is regulated, but not abrogated.

94. It is also necessary to bear in mind that deviations or errors in

the implementation of such a large-scale exercise, while not

entirely avoidable, do not, in themselves, render the entire

process unconstitutional. The proportionality analysis does not

demand perfection; it requires that the overall design and

operation of the measure remain within constitutional bounds.

Page 82 of 124

95. The post-exercise data placed on record does not disclose a level

of disenfranchisement so widespread or systemic as to indicate a

constitutional infirmity in the design of the exercise. While

individual cases of exclusion may arise, they are addressable

within the framework of claims, objections, and appeals that

have been provided.

96. Irrespective, we are cognizant of the fact that an exercise of this

magnitude carries the potential to cause hardship, particularly

to those who may face difficulties in complying with procedural

requirements. However, the doctrine of proportionality does not

demand the elimination of all hardship; it requires that such

hardship be mitigated through appropriate safeguards.

97. The record reveals that the process, as initially designed, did

raise legitimate concerns regarding documentation,

transparency, and access. However, it is equally evident that

these concerns were addressed through a series of judicial

interventions, which progressively infused the process with

safeguards.

98. For instance, insofar as the documentation regime was

concerned, the initial grievance of the Petitioner(s) centred

around the exclusion of widely held Aadhaar Cards. This concern

was directly addressed by this Court while directing the inclusion

Page 83 of 124

of the Aadhaar Card with a clarification regarding the statutory

status of Aadhaar as a valid document for establishing identity.

This intervention expanded the evidentiary avenues available to

electors.

99. The second axis of intervention, focused on transparency. The

direction to publish the complete list of approximately 65 lakh

excluded electors, accompanied by reasons for their exclusion,

transformed what was initially an opaque administrative

outcome into a verifiable and contestable process. By mandating

wide dissemination of this information through multiple

channels, the Court ensured that affected individuals were not

only made aware of their exclusion but were also placed in a

position to meaningfully challenge it.

100. The third and equally significant concern pertained to the

accessibility of the claims and objections mechanism,

particularly for those situated at the margins of the electoral

process. The Court recognised that the burden of navigating this

remedial framework could operate disproportionately against

migrant workers, rural populations, and socio -economically

disadvantaged groups. To address this structural imbalance, the

Court introduced an institutional layer of assistance. Political

parties, through their BLAs, were directed to actively assist

Page 84 of 124

electors in the submission of forms and supporting material,

thereby leveraging their extensive grassroots networks as

facilitators of participation. Complementing this, the deployment

of para-legal volunteers under the aegis of the State and District

Legal Services Authorities created an independent and accessible

channel of assistance, particularly for those lacking the means

or capacity to engage with the process on their own.

101. These interventions operated as structural correctives that

ensured the process remained aligned with the requirements of

procedural fairness. The availability of claims, objections, and

appellate remedies further reinforced this framework.

102. The proportionality of a measure must ultimately be assessed

not in the abstract, but in the manner in which it is implemented.

A process that may be perceived as exclusionary by some can,

through appropriate safeguards, be rendered constitutionally

compliant in execution. In the present case, the cumulative effect

of the safeguards introduced, both by the Commission and

pursuant to the directions of this Court, has been to strike a

balance between the need for electoral integrity and the

imperative of inclusion. The process, as it ultimately unfolded,

provided multiple avenues for participation, correction, and

redress.

Page 85 of 124

103. We are therefore of the considered view that the Impugned SIR,

as conducted, satisfies the requirements of proportionality. The

measures adopted bear a rational nexus to the objective sought

to be achieved, are not manifestly excessive, and are

accompanied by sufficient procedural safeguards to prevent

arbitrary exclusion. In view of the foregoing analysis, we hold that

the Impugned exercise was founded upon a legitimate and

constitutionally grounded purpose, namely, the restoration of the

accuracy, completeness, and integrity of the electoral rolls. We

further hold that, having regard to the nature of the problem

sought to be addressed, the scale of the exercise undertaken, and

the procedural safeguards incorporated during its

implementation, the measures a dopted by the Commission

cannot be said to be disproportionate to the object sought to be

achieved.

E.3. Whether the procedure adopted by the Election Commission

of India in conducting the Impugned Special Intensive Revision

is contrary to, or in violation of, the provisions of the

Representation of the People Act, 1950 and the Registration of

Electors Rules, 1960?

104. Having held that the Impugned SIR is legally tenable and pursues

a legitimate purpose, we now proceed to examine whether the

procedure adopted by the Commission is in derogation of the

provisions of the RP Act and/or the 1960 Rules.

Page 86 of 124

105. In this regard, three principal grounds have been urged before us

by the Petitioner(s), namely:

(i) That electors whose names are already entered in the

electoral roll are entitled to a presumption of citizenship,

which cannot be displaced save in accordance with the

procedure established by law;

(ii) That the procedure contemplated under Rule 21A of the

Registration of Electors Rules, 1960 has not been followed;

and;

(iii) The documents prescribed by the Commission for the

enumeration of the electors, coupled with the exclusion of

previously accepted documents, are arbitrary and without

any reasonable justification.

E.3.1 Presumption of Validity in favour of electors whose names

are already entered in the electoral roll

106. At the outset, it would be apposite to notice the submissions

advanced on the question of whether a presumption of validity

attaches to electors whose names are already entered in the

electoral roll.

107. The Petitioner(s), placing reliance upon the decisions of this

Court in Lal Babu Hussein (Supra) and Inderjit Barua

Page 87 of 124

(Supra), have contended that enrolment in the electoral roll

carries with it a presumption of citizenship and eligibility, which

cannot be displaced except in accordance with the procedure

prescribed by law. According to the Petitioner(s), the Impugned

SIR exercise, by requiring already enrolled electors to re-establish

their credentials through a fresh and onerous process, effectively

reverses this settled presumption and imposes upon the elector

a burden to prove anew what the law already assumes in their

favour.

108. On the other hand, it was urged on behalf of the Commission

that the reliance placed on Lal Babu Hussein (Supra) is

misplaced and distinguishable on the facts. It was argued that

the observations in the said decision were rendered in the context

of a regime where periodic Special Intensive Revisions, involving

a higher degree of verification, were regularly undertaken.

According to the Respondents, such observations cannot be

extended to confer an enduring presumption of eligibility upon

entries that may have been carried forward or incorporated

through summary revisions, which do not entail the same rigour

of scrutiny. Consequently, it is urged that no absolute or

irrebuttable presumption can be said to attach to the mere

presence of a name on the electoral roll, particularly in

Page 88 of 124

circumstances where the Commission undertakes a

comprehensive exercise to re-verify the integrity of the rolls.

109. The reliance placed by the Petitioner(s) upon the decision of this

Court in Lal Babu Hussein (Supra) must therefore be examined

in its proper doctrinal and factual setting. For the sake of

convenience, we deem it appropriate to extract the observations

in the aforesaid judgment which have been relied upon by the

Petitioner(s):

6. “…It is obvious from the above that two situations

arise; the first where the name is to be entered on the

rolls for the first time and the second where the name

already entered is required to be deleted. In the first

mentioned situation before the name is entered on the

rolls, the concerned officer must be satisfied that the

person seeking to have his name entered is not

disqualified by reason of his not being a citizen of

India. Therefore, he would be justified in requiring the

concerned person to show evidence that he is a citizen

of India. In the second situation, since the name is

already entered, it must be presumed that before

entering his name the concerned officer must

have gone through the procedural requirements

under the statute. This would be so even if we

invoke Section 114(e) of the Evidence Act. But

then, the possibilities of mistakes cannot be

ruled out. These mistakes, if any, would have to

be corrected. Even if we are to assume (without

deciding) that the words "is otherwise not

entitled to be registered in that roll" used in

Section 22 of the 1950 Act or Rule 21A of the

1960 Rules are wide enough to cover the question

relating to citizenship, the issue would have to be

decided after giving the concerned person a

reasonable opportunity of being heard . If the

opportunity of being heard before deletion of the name

is to be a meaningful and purposive one, it goes

without saying that the concerned person whose name

is borne on the roll and is intended to be removed must

be informed why a suspicion has arisen in regard to

Page 89 of 124

his status as a citizen of India so that he may be able

to show that the basis for the suspicion is ill founded.

Unless the basis for the doubt is disclosed, it would not

be possible for the concerned person to remove the

doubt and explain any circumstance or circumstances

responsible for the doubt”.

13. “…This, notwithstanding the fact that these

persons were voters in previous elections and

hence it would ordinarily appear that their cases

were verified before their names were entered in

the electoral rolls. That is because it may be

presumed that official acts performed under the

provisions of the 1950 Act or the 1960 Rules were

regularly done. Their names were already on the

rolls and since they were sought to be removed by

undertaking a special revision, whether intensive

or otherwise, the procedure for removal had to be

followed”.

[Emphasis Supplied]

110. Having given our anxious consideration to the rival submissions,

we find ourselves unable to accede to the contention advanced

on behalf of the Petitioner(s) that the inclusion of a person’s name

in the electoral roll gives rise to a presumption so conclusive as

to inhibit, or even substantially constrain, the power of the

Commission of India to undertake a fresh and intensive

verification of the rolls.

111. It is no doubt correct that an entry in the electoral roll, being the

result of an official act, carries with it a presumption of

regularity. This principle, traceable to Section 114 of the Indian

Evidence Act, 1872, reflects a broader evidentiary rule that

official acts are presumed to have been duly performed. The

inclusion of a name in the electoral roll, therefore, undoubtedly

Page 90 of 124

carries with it a presumption of validity, namely, that the

conditions precedent for such inclusion were duly satisfied at the

time of entry.

112. However, the nature of this presumption must be correctly

understood. It is, at its core, an evidentiary presumption, one

that facilitates administrative and adjudicatory processes by

dispensing with the need to re-prove foundational facts in every

instance. Such a presumption cannot be elevated into a rule of

substantive law that forecloses enquiry. To do so would be to

conflate a rebuttable evidentiary device with a conclusive legal

fiction, a position neither contemplated by the statute nor

supported by precedent.

113. In Lal Babu Hussein (Supra), this Court was concerned with

the adjudication of objections to the inclusion of names in the

electoral roll. The observations regarding the presumption

attaching to entries in the roll were made in the context of such

adjudicatory proceedings, where the burden was upon the

objector to displace an existing entry through cogent material.

114. Importantly, this Court in Lal Babu Hussein (Supra) was not

called upon to consider, nor did it pronounce upon, the scope of

a systemic or intensive verification exercise undertaken by the

Commission in discharge of its constitutional mandate. The

Page 91 of 124

question whether the Commission could, in the larger interest of

maintaining the purity and integrity of the electoral roll, require

a re-verification of entries, even where such entries had been

previously made, did not arise for consideration. The ratio of that

decision must, therefore, be confined to the context in which it

was rendered.

115. This distinction between an adjudicatory exercise and an

inquisitorial or verification exercise assumes considerable

significance. In an adjudicatory setting, the enquiry is triggered

by a specific dispute, and the existing entry operates as a starting

point carrying a presumption in its favour. In contrast, an

intensive revision undertaken by the Commission, such as the

Impugned SIR exercise, is not predicated upon individual

disputes but is aimed at a comprehensive re-examination of the

electoral roll to ensure its accuracy, completeness, and integrity.

116. When the Commission embarks upon such an exercise, it acts

not as a mere adjudicator between competing claims but as a

constitutional authority discharging a duty of systemic oversight.

The constitutional power of superintendence, direction, and

control over the preparation of electoral rolls, vested in the

Commission, necessarily carries with it the authority to verify,

Page 92 of 124

scrutinise, and, where necessary, revisit the basis upon which

entries have been made.

117. To accept the submission of the Petitioner(s) would be to hold

that once an entry finds place in the electoral roll, the

Commission is thereafter substantially disabled from

undertaking any meaningful verification except through the

narrow confines of individual objections. Such a construction

would unduly fetter the constitutional mandate of the

Commission and render it ill-equipped to address systemic

deficiencies that may arise over time.

118. It must also be borne in mind that electoral rolls are evolving

instruments. They are subject to periodic revisions, both

summary and intensive, precisely because the underlying

realities they seek to capture, namely, residence, eligibility, and

citizenship, are not static. The presumption of validity attached

to an entry at a given point in time cannot be treated as a

perpetual guarantee against scrutiny, particularly in the face of

a constitutionally sanctioned exercise aimed at ensuring the

continued accuracy of the rolls.

119. We are also unable to accept the submission that the

undertaking of an intensive verification exercise ipso facto

reverses the burden of proof in a manner impermissible in law.

Page 93 of 124

The calling upon electors to furnish supporting material in the

course of such an exercise does not amount to the negation of

the presumption; rather, it reflects the procedural mechanism

through which the Commission seeks to reaffirm or, where

necessary, correct existing entries. The presumption continues

to operate, but it does not obviate the possibility of verification.

120. It is also significant that even in Lal Babu Hussein (Supra), this

Court did not hold that the presumption attaching to an entry in

the electoral roll is irrebuttable. On the contrary, the very

recognition of a presumption implies its susceptibility to being

displaced upon appropriate enquiry. What the judgment

underscores is the need for adherence to procedure and fairness

in the process of displacement; it does not foreclose the existence

of such a process altogether.

121. The argument that an inquisitorial exercise by the Commission

must necessarily yield to the presumption attached to existing

entries proceeds on an inversion of constitutional principle. The

presumption is a tool that aids decision-making; it cannot be

employed as a shield to obstruct the exercise of constitutional

powers. When the Commission undertakes a verification

exercise, it does so to ascertain whether the foundational

requirements for inclusion were, and continue to be, satisfied.

Page 94 of 124

The mere existence of a prior entry cannot preclude such an

enquiry.

122. At the same time, it must be clarified that the recognition of the

Commission’s power to undertake an intensive revision does not

dilute the requirement that such power be exercised in

accordance with law. The presumption of validity continues to

have relevance in shaping the procedural safeguards that must

accompany any process of verification. It ensures that existing

entries are not lightly disturbed and that any action affecting

them is supported by due process and cogent material.

123. Here, we may also deal with the contention of the Petitioner(s)

that the selection of the year 2003 as the reference point for

determining which electors are required to undergo fresh

verification is without any legally sustainable basis. We are

unable to accept this submission. The material on record clearly

indicates that the last Special Intensive Revision in the State of

Bihar was undertaken in 2003, and that subsequent updates

have been carried out only through summary revisions.

124. In that context, a Special Intensive Revision, by its very nature,

entails a far more rigorous and comprehensive process of

verification as compared to summary revisions, which are limited

and incremental. It is, therefore, neither arbitrary nor

Page 95 of 124

unreasonable for the Commission to attach a higher degree of

reliability to the 2003 electoral roll and to use it as a reference

point. The classification thus adopted bears a rational nexus to

the object of ensuring the accuracy and integrity of the electoral

roll and cannot be said to be without basis.

125. We are thus of the considered view that while inclusion in the

electoral roll gives rise to a presumption of validity, such

presumption is rebuttable and cannot be construed as imposing

a blanket embargo on the powers of the Commission to

undertake a Special Intensive Revision. The decision in Lal Babu

Hussein (Supra) does not compel a contrary conclusion, being

confined to the context of adjudicatory proceedings and not

extending to a systemic, inquisitorial exercise undertaken in

furtherance of the Commission’s constitutional mandate.

E.3.2 Adherence to the procedure contemplated under Rule 21A of

the 1960 Rules while removal of names from the Electoral Roll

126. The Petitioner(s) have also sought to contend that the Impugned

SIR exercise has diluted the safeguards embedded in Rule 21A of

the 1960 Rules. It was submitted that Rule 21A embodies a

mandatory procedural safeguard, requiring that no name already

entered in the electoral roll can be deleted without prior notice to

the elector concerned and an opportunity of hearing.

Page 96 of 124

127. According to the Petitioner(s), the Impugned exercise departs

from this requirement by permitting exclusion of existing electors

merely on account of non-submission of the enumeration form,

without issuance of individual notice. It was further urged that

even where forms are submitted, the absence of clear and

objective standards for scrutiny enables arbitrary exclusion,

particularly when inclusion itself is premised on self-declaration.

128. The Commission, on the other hand, has relied on the SIR

Guidelines to contend that the requirement of notice and a

hearing is not dispensed with but is incorporated into the

structured process of the revision. It was also pointed out that

upon publication of the draft electoral roll, a period of claims and

objections is provided, during which the eligibility of electors is

scrutinized. In cases where doubt arises, the Electoral

Registration Officer is obligated to initiate a suo motu enquiry and

issue notice to the concerned elector before taking a decision. The

process also envisaged a public disclosure of claims and

objections and provides for appellate remedies under Section 24

of the RP Act.

129. Having considered the rival submissions, the issue that arises for

our consideration is whether the procedure adopted under the

Impugned SIR while removing the name of electors is in

Page 97 of 124

derogation of the safeguards embodied in Rule 21A of 1960

Rules.

130. Rule 21A of the 1960 Rules delineates the procedure to be

followed where the ERO forms an opinion, before final

publication of the roll, that certain entries are liable to be deleted

on account of ineligibility, error, or change in status. The Rule

mandates, in the first instance, the preparation of a list of such

electors proposed to be deleted, followed by its publication, along

with a notice specifying the time and place at which the question

of deletion shall be considered. It further contemplates an

opportunity for affected persons to submit objections, whether

oral or in writing, which are to be duly considered before any

decision is taken. Crucially, the proviso engrafts an additional

safeguard by requiring that, wherever the proposed deletion is

founded on grounds such as non-residence or ineligibility, the

concerned elector must, as far as practicable, be afforded a

reasonable opportunity to show cause against such action.

131. The said Rule, in essence, prescribes that no name already

entered in the electoral roll shall be deleted without prior notice

to the concerned elector and without affording an opportunity of

hearing. The question, therefore, is whether the SIR framework

Page 98 of 124

dispenses with these safeguards, or whether it incorporates them

in substance, albeit through a structured process.

132. A close reading of the SIR Guidelines indicates that the process

commences with a comprehensive house-to-house enumeration,

wherein each existing elector is provided with a pre -filled

Enumeration Form and is guided in its completion. Paragraphs

3 (b) and (c) of the Guidelines further require Booth Level Officers

to make repeated visits in cases where electors are not available,

thereby ensuring that the exercise is not reduced to a one-time

or perfunctory attempt. This stage, in effect, serves as the initial

point of engagement with the elector, ensuring awareness and

participation in the revision process.

133. The procedural framework is further strengthened by the

requirement under Paragraphs 3 (e) and (f) of the Guidelines,

which provides that each elector submit the Enumeration Form

along with the requisite information and documents, coupled

with an acknowledgement mechanism evidencing receipt.

134. The preparation of the draft electoral roll marks the next stage.

Paragraph 4(b) of the Guidelines provides that the draft roll shall

include the names of all electors who have submitted their

Enumeration Forms, while those in respect of whom forms have

not been received are not included at this stage. It is of

Page 99 of 124

significance that such non-inclusion is not tantamount to a final

deletion, but is only a provisional step, preceding the statutory

process of claims and objections.

135. The heart of the procedural safeguard lies in the claims and

objections stage. Paragraph 5 (a) of the Guidelines mandates that

the ERO shall scrutinise the eligibility of electors in accordance

with the constitutional and statutory requirements. This ensures

that the enquiry into eligibility remains anchored within the

framework of the RP Act.

136. More importantly, in cases where the ERO entertains any doubt

regarding the eligibility of an elector, Paragraph 5(b) of the

Guidelines mandates the initiation of a suo motu enquiry and the

issuance of notice to the concerned elector, calling upon them to

show cause. This requirement directly incorporates the essence

of Rule 21A of the 1960 Rules, ensuring that no adverse decision

is taken without prior notice and an opportunity of hearing. The

Guidelines further contemplate that the ERO shall arrive at a

determination based on field verification and documentary

material, and shall pass a reasoned or speaking order in each

case. Such an onerous duty serves as an important check against

arbitrariness and ensures that the exercise of power is both

transparent and accountable.

Page 100 of 124

137. The framework also provides for wide dissemination and

transparency through the display of lists of claims and

objections. These lists are to be exhibited at the office of the ERO

and made available on official platforms, thereby enabling public

scrutiny and participation. This aspect assumes significance in

a process that has a direct bearing on electoral rights. The

aforesaid safeguard was further strengthened by this Court,

namely Order dated 14.08.2025, directing the Commission to

publish the list of approximately 65 lakh electors who had been

excluded from the draft roll, along with the reasons for such

exclusion, and to give ample coverage to such publication

through newspapers, electronic media and radio.

138. Further, the availability of an appellate remedy constitutes an

additional safeguard. Paragraph 7 of the Guidelines expressly

recognises that any decision of the ERO is subject to appeal

under Section 24 of the RP Act. This ensures that the process is

not final at the initial stage and that any erroneous exclusion can

be corrected through a statutory mechanism.

139. Finally, the Guidelines under Paragraph 11 (d) clarify that

exclusion from the final electoral roll occurs only after completion

of the scrutiny process, including enquiry and opportunity of

hearing, and that such electors retain the right to challenge the

Page 101 of 124

decision. This makes it clear that the operative act of deletion is

preceded by due process, consistent with the mandate of Rule

21A of the 1960 Rules.

140. Viewed holistically, the scheme underlying the SIR Guidelines

reveals that the safeguards embedded in Rule 21A of the 1960

Rules have not been abrogated, but are instead operationalised

within a broader and structured revision framework. The

essential elements of Rule 21A of the 1960 Rules, namely,

identification of doubtful entries, publication of such cases,

notice to the concerned elector, and a determination after

considering objections, find clear reflection across the various

stages of the SIR process. The form may differ, but the substance

remains intact.

141. In particular, what Rule 21A of the 1960 Rules contemplates as

a singular, event-specific exercise of deletion is, under the SIR

framework, distributed across multiple procedural stages ,

beginning with enumeration, followed by draft publication, and

culminating in the claims and objections process. It is at this

latter stage that the core safeguards are activated: the elector is

put to notice, an enquiry is undertaken where doubt exists, and

a reasoned determination is made. The requirement of affording

a “reasonable opportunity” to show cause, as envisaged in the

Page 102 of 124

proviso to Rule 21A of the 1960 Rules, thus stands fully

incorporated.

142. Equally, the contention that non-inclusion in the draft roll

results in automatic or final deletion cannot be accepted. The

draft roll is, by design, provisional. It triggers a participatory

process in which electors are afforded an opportunity to assert

their entitlement, produce supporting material, and contest any

proposed exclusion. The finality attaches only after this process

is complete, and after compliance with the safeguards of notice,

enquiry, and hearing.

143. It must also be borne in mind that the statutory framework does

not mandate a rigid or singular procedural format for all

situations of deletion. What it insists upon is fairness in action.

The SIR Guidelines, in incorporating notice through publication,

individualised enquiry in cases of doubt, a speaking order, and a

right of appeal, satisfy this requirement. To construe Rule 21A of

the 1960 Rules as requiring a uniform, pre-decisional notice at

the very threshold, irrespective of the structure of the exercise,

would be to read the provision in an unduly restrictive manner.

144. We are, therefore, of the considered view that the deletions

effected pursuant to the Impugned Special Intensive Revision

cannot be said to be contrary to the procedure prescribed under

Page 103 of 124

Rule 21A of the 1960 Rules. The safeguards of notice and hearing

are preserved in substance, and the process adopted by the

Commission remains within the bounds of the statutory

mandate.

E.3.3 Validity of the Documentation Regime prescribed by the

Commission as part of the Enumeration process

145. The next limb of challenge to the procedural validity of the

Impugned Special Intensive Revision pertains to the

documentation regime prescribed by the Commission as part of

the enumeration process.

146. The Petitioner(s) contend that the requirement relating to

documentation is manifestly arbitrary and lacks a statutory

foundation. It is urged that neither the RP Act nor the 1960 Rules

prescribes any exhaustive list of documents for the purpose of

establishing eligibility, and that the Commission, in introducing

a rigid set of eleven documents, has travelled beyond the

statutory framework. Particular exception was taken to the

exclusion of commonly held documents such as Aadhaar Card,

EPIC and Ration cards, which, according to the Petitioner(s),

constitute the most accessible forms of identification for a large

segment of the population. The Petitioners further emphasised

that the prescribed documentation regime, by insisting upon a

Page 104 of 124

closed set of documents, disproportionately burdens vulnerable

and marginalised communities, who may not possess the

specified documents, thereby rendering the process exclusionary

in effect.

147. Per contra, it was argued on behalf of the Commission that the

documentation framework under the Impugned exercise is

neither rigid nor arbitrary, but is in fact more expansive and

facilitative when compared to earlier exercises. It was pointed out

that while the SIR conducted in 2003 contemplated a narrower

set of documents, the present exercise provides for a broader list

of eleven documents, thereby enhancing inclusivity rather than

restricting it.

148. Addressing the exclusion of specific documents, the Commission

submits that the same is founded on valid and rational

considerations. Insofar as the Aadhaar Card is concerned,

reliance was placed on Section 9 of the Aadhaar Act, which does

not recognise it as proof of citizenship or domicile, thereby

rendering it unsuitable for the purpose of electoral verification.

With respect to Ration cards, it was contended that their

evidentiary value has been compromised due to instances of

large-scale irregularities and forgery. As regards the EPIC, it was

submitted that since the card is itself issued on the basis of

Page 105 of 124

inclusion in the electoral roll, its acceptance as proof would be

circular and would defeat the very purpose of an independent

verification exercise.

149. We have bestowed our careful consideration upon the rival

submissions advanced on this issue. The challenge, in essence,

is directed not merely at the nature of the documents prescribed

but at the authority of the Commission to structure a

documentation regime as part of an intensive verification

exercise. We are unable to accept the contention that the

prescription of such a regime, in the facts of the present case, is

arbitrary or dehors the statutory framework.

150. At the outset, it must be recognised that the preparation and

maintenance of electoral rolls is not a mechanical exercise, but a

Constitutional function entrusted to the Commission. The

obligation to ensure the purity, accuracy, and integrity of the

electoral roll is both continuing and foundational to the

democratic process. This obligation necessarily carries with it the

authority to devise appropriate procedures for verification,

including the nature and extent of documentation required to

establish eligibility.

151. The statutory scheme, particularly Sections 16 and 19 of the RP

Act, sets out the conditions of eligibility and disqualification for

Page 106 of 124

registration as an elector. The Commission, in revising the

electoral roll, is required to satisfy itself that the persons whose

names are included in the roll continue to meet these statutory

requirements. The process of such satisfaction cannot be

rendered illusory; it must be informed by objective material

capable of verification.

152. In that context, the prescription of a set of documents operates

as a tool to ensure administrative consistency and evidentiary

reliability. It is neither practicable nor desirable for the

verification process to be left entirely unguided or subjective. It

is true that Form 6, as prescribed under the Registration of

Electors Rules, 1960, sets out a framework of documentation;

however, the same is tailored to the process of revision

contemplated under Section 21(2) of the RP Act and may not, in

all situations, be capable of literal application to an exercise of

the present nature. The Commission, therefore, retains a degree

of residual authority to formulate an appropriate documentation

framework suited to the exigencies of a Special Intensive

Revision. Such authority, however, is not unbounded. In devising

such a framework, the Commission must remain cognisant of the

existing statutory scheme, and any departure therefrom must be

informed by a rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved.

The formulation of the documentation regime must thus reflect

Page 107 of 124

a calibrated balance in drawing from the statutory framework,

while adapting it, where necessary, to effectively serve the

purpose of ensuring the accuracy and integrity of the electoral

roll.

153. A perusal of the documentation framework suggests that the list

of documents is indicative of materials that are ordinarily

available to electors. The expansion of the list, as compared to

earlier exercises, also demonstrates an attempt to widen the

range of acceptable proofs rather than to restrict it. T he

argument that the regime is exclusionary, therefore, does not

commend acceptance in the absence of material to show that the

prescribed documents are, by their very nature, inaccessible.

154. Equally, it must be emphasised that the purpose of the

documentation requirement is not merely to establish identity in

a generic sense, but to enable the Commission to verify eligibility

in terms of residence and other statutory criteria. Not all

documents serve this purpose with equal efficacy. The

Commission is, therefore, entitled to differentiate between

documents based on their evidentiary value in establishing the

relevant statutory conditions.

155. Viewed thus, the exclusion of certain documents cannot be

characterised as arbitrary if it is founded upon rational

Page 108 of 124

considerations connected with the object of the exercise. The

Commission is not obliged to accept every document that may

have some probative value; it is entitled to exclude those which,

in its considered view, are either insufficient for the purpose at

hand or are susceptible to misuse in a manner that would

undermine the integrity of the process. To hold otherwise would

be to compel the Commission to adopt a lowest -common-

denominator approach, thereby diluting the rigo ur of the

verification exercise.

156. Insofar as the exclusion of Aadhaar is concerned, the justification

advanced by the Commission needs to be examined in light of the

Aadhar Act. The statutory framework governing the Aadhaar

Card does not treat it as proof of citizenship or domicile. In an

exercise where the Commission is required to be satisfied as to

eligibility in terms of the statute, reliance upon a document that

does not, by design, attest to such eligibility would be of limited

utility.

157. It is, however, pertinent to note that while an Aadhaar Card may

not constitute proof of citizenship or domicile, Section 23(4) of

the RP Act expressly contemplates its use for the limited purpose

of establishing the identity of an individual. In recognition of this

statutory position, this Court, vide Order dated 08.09.2025,

Page 109 of 124

directed the Commission to treat the Aadhaar Card as an

additional 12

th document of identity for consideration in the

process of inclusion or exclusion from the revised electoral roll in

the State of Bihar. It was, however, made equally clear that such

recognition does not elevate Aadhaar to conclusive proof, and

that the authorities would remain empowered to verify its

authenticity and genuineness, including by calling for such

further material as may be necessary in a given case.

158. Similarly, the exclusion of ration cards is supported by the

Commission’s assessment of their evidentiary reliability. While

shaping the contours of a special intensive survey under Section

21(3) of the RP Act, the discretion of the Commission is not wholly

circumscribed by Rules 4 to 23 of the 1960 Rules. It is open to

the Commission to substitute a document, e.g. Ration Card in

Form 6 with other classes of document to suit the purpose and

intent of such special intensive survey. It may not be out of place

to note that a Ration Card, unlike a Passport or a Birth

Certificate, is certainly not a conclusive proof of citizenship. The

choice of proposed documents for verification of electoral rolls

and their evidentiary standards necessarily falls within the

discretionary domain of the Commission which may not be

substituted subject to reasonableness.

Page 110 of 124

159. As regards the EPIC, the reasoning of the Commission is, in our

view, unexceptionable. The EPIC is itself a derivative document,

issued on the basis of inclusion in the electoral roll. To permit its

use as proof in an exercise intended to verify the correctness of

that very inclusion would pose the threat of rendering the entire

exercise nugatory. The exclusion of such a document is thus

inherent in the logic of the exercise itself.

160. It is also necessary to bear in mind that the documentation

requirement does not operate in isolation, but as part of a

broader procedural framework that includes opportunities for

clarification, enquiry, and adjudication. The production of

documents is one facet of the process through which the

Commission arrives at its satisfaction; it is not the sole

determinant. The overall scheme, therefore, cannot be

characterised as rigid or mechanical.

161. Accordingly, we hold that the documentation regime prescribed

by the Commission represents a considered exercise of its

administrative discretion in furtherance of its Constitutional

mandate. The classification of documents, including the

exclusion of certain categories, is based on intelligible criteria

having a direct nexus with the objective of ensuring the integrity

of the electoral roll. We are, therefore, unable to hold that the

Page 111 of 124

impugned documentation framework is arbitrary or violative of

the statutory scheme.

E.4. Whether, in the exercise of its constitutional mandate of

preparation and maintenance of electoral rolls, and in

furtherance of the statutory conditions governing such

registration, the Election Commission of India is empowered to

scrutinise the citizenship status of persons seeking inclusion or

continuation in the electoral roll?

162. With the challenge to the procedural framework having been

repelled, the next question that arises for consideration is

whether the Commission is empowered, in the course of such

exercise, to scrutinise the citizenship status of persons seeking

inclusion or continuation in the electoral roll.

163. The Petitioner(s) have argued that the Impugned exercise, in

effect, enables a broad-based scrutiny of the citizenship of

persons already included in the electoral roll, which is

constitutionally impermissible. It was urged that the

determination of citizenship does not fall within the remit of the

Commission, and reliance is placed upon Section 9(2) of the

Citizenship Act, to submit that such questions fall exclusively

within the domain of the Central Government. Reference was also

made to the Government of India (Allocation of Business) Rules,

1961, to contend that issues relating to citizenship are entrusted

Page 112 of 124

to the Ministry of Home Affairs and, as such, the Commission

cannot, under the guise of electoral roll revision, assume a

function that lies beyond its constitutional and statutory

authority.

164. Opposing this, the Respondent Commission asserted that the

power to examine the citizenship of a person claiming enrolment

flows directly from its constitutional mandate under Articles 325

and 326 of the Constitution, read with Section 16 of the RP Act,

which expressly disqualifies non-citizens from being registered

as electors. It is submitted that the duty to maintain the accuracy

of electoral rolls necessarily entails a corresponding authority to

verify whether a person satisfies the conditions of eligibility,

including citizenship.

165. The Commission further contended that the Petitioner’s reliance

on Section 9(2) of the Citizenship Act is entirely misconceived.

According to the Commission, the said provision is limited to the

specific question of termination of citizenship upon voluntary

acquisition of foreign citizenship. It does not constitute an

exhaustive framework governing all inquiries into citizenship. It

was pointed out that the constitutional scheme itself envisages

multiple authorities engaging with questions of citizenship in

different contexts, including the President and Governors who

Page 113 of 124

act on the opinion of the Commission in matters of

disqualification.

166. It was further submitted that the Impugned exercise does not

amount to a determination of citizenship in the strict sense, but

is confined to an enquiry into eligibility for enrolment in the

electoral roll. Such an enquiry falls squarely within its

constitutional remit and does not encroach upon the domain of

any other authority.

167. After giving our thoughtful consideration to the rival

submissions, we are of the view that the issue that arises lies at

the intersection of constitutional structure, statutory mandate,

and individual rights. It concerns not merely the scope of the

Commission’s powers, but the manner in which those powers are

to be exercised in a domain that directly engages the status of

citizenship.

168. Citizenship, in our constitutional scheme, is not a matter of mere

formal classification. It is the juridical basis of an individual’s

relationship with the State, from which flows a constellation of

rights, entitlements, and obligations. It is this status that

situates a person within the political community and enables

participation in the democratic process. The architecture of

representative democracy, as envisaged under the Constitution,

Page 114 of 124

rests upon the premise that those who partake in electoral

governance are citizens of India.

169. The significance of citizenship is thus not confined to the sphere

of electoral participation. It has a broader normative content,

inasmuch as it embodies recognition of an individual as a

member of the constitutional order. This recognition carries with

it elements of identity, belonging, and legal personality. The

denial or affirmation of such status has consequences that

extend beyond statutory rights and into the realm of

constitutional values.

170. It is in this sense that citizenship bears a discernible relationship

with the guarantees of dignity and personal liberty under Article

21 of the Constitution. While citizenship, as such, is governed by

a distinct statutory framework, the consequences that flow from

its recognition or denial inevitably implicate the individual’s

sense of identity and status within society. Any process that

touches upon this domain must, therefore, be approached with

a high degree of procedural fairness and institutional restraint.

171. It must be acknowledged that the formal determination of

citizenship, particularly where it entails adjudication of status or

deprivation thereof, falls within the exclusive domain of the

Competent Authority under the Citizenship Act. There can be no

Page 115 of 124

dispute that such a determination cannot be undertaken by the

Commission, whose powers are circumscribed by the

constitutional and statutory framework governing electoral rolls.

172. However, the issue before us is not one of formal adjudication of

citizenship, but of the scope of enquiry permissible to the

Commission in the discharge of its constitutional functions.

Articles 325 and 326 of the Constitution, read with the provisions

of the RP Act, cast upon the Commission the duty to prepare and

maintain electoral rolls comprising persons who are qualified to

be registered as electors.

173. Section 16 of the RP Act explicitly disqualifies non-citizens from

being registered in the electoral roll. The consequence of this

provision is clear: Citizenship is a condition precedent for

enrolment. The Commission, therefore, cannot discharge its

obligation to maintain a valid electoral roll without satisfying

itself that persons included therein meet this threshold

requirement.

174. The question then is one of the nature and extent of such

satisfaction. In our considered view, there is a clear and

principled distinction between an adjudication of citizenship on

the one hand, and an administrative satisfaction as to eligibility

for enrolment on the other. The former involves a conclusive

Page 116 of 124

determination of status under the Citizenship Act; the latter is a

limited enquiry undertaken for the purposes of electoral

representation.

175. In view of the statutory requirement under Section 16 of the RP

Act, the Commission, in the course of preparing or revising

electoral rolls, is undoubtedly empowered to examine questions

bearing upon citizenship. However, such an enquiry can only be

made from the standpoint of determining inclusion or exclusion

from the electoral roll and must be undertaken with due regard

to the presumption operating in favour of an elector whose name

is already borne on the roll. It is within this confined statutory

setting that the Commission assesses the material before it to

arrive at a determination for electoral purposes. Importantly, the

entirety of this exercise remains amenable to judicial review,

thereby ensuring that the enquiry is conducted in accordance

with law and within the bounds of procedural fairness.

176. We have no hesitation in adding that t his assessment is

necessarily prima facie and contextual. Where the material

furnished by an individual does not inspire confidence or give

rise to doubt, the Commission is within its authority to decline

enrolment or to initiate action for deletion, strictly in accordance

with law. Such action, however, must be understood in its proper

Page 117 of 124

perspective. It does not amount to a declaration that the

individual is not a citizen of India; it merely reflects the

Commission’s inability to be satisfied, for electoral purposes, that

the statutory conditions are met.

177. The consequence of such a determination is correspondingly

limited. It affects the individual’s entitlement to be included in

the electoral roll, and thereby their right to participate in the

electoral process. It does not, however, operate to divest the

individual of claims of citizenship, nor does it foreclose a

determination of that question by the Competent Authority under

the Citizenship Act.

178. Moreover, in cases where the Commission is not satisfied that a

person meets the statutory conditions for inclusion in the

electoral roll, it would be incumbent upon it to refer such an

individual to the competent authority within the Central

Government for adjudication in accordance with law. The

Commission’s determination, being confined to electoral

purposes, cannot assume finality on the question of citizenship.

Any deletion effected on this ground shall, therefore, remain

subject to the outcome of such adjudication by the appropriate

authority.

Page 118 of 124

179. It is further necessary to emphasise that the competent authority

must decide such questions within a reasonable timeframe, and

in any event, before the next Parliamentary, Legislative Assembly

or Local Body election in the concerned State or constituency, so

as to ensure that the individual’s electoral rights are not left in a

state of prolonged uncertainty.

180. This delineation of functions preserves the constitutional

balance. It ensures that the Commission is able to discharge its

duty of maintaining the purity and integrity of the electoral roll,

while at the same time respecting the statutory scheme governing

citizenship. To hold otherwise would either render the

Commission incapable of enforcing the basic eligibility condition

of citizenship or compel it to assume an adjudicatory role not

contemplated by law.

181. The reliance placed by the Petitioner(s) on Section 9(2) of the

Citizenship Act does not alter this position. That provision

addresses a specific contingency, namely, the termination of

citizenship upon voluntary acquisition of foreign citizenship. It

cannot be read as an exhaustive bar on all forms of enquiry into

citizenship by other constitutional or statutory authorities acting

within their respective domains.

Page 119 of 124

182. Similarly, the reference to the Allocation of Business Rules does

not advance the Petitioner’s case. While those Rules allocate the

subject of citizenship to the Ministry of Home Affairs for purposes

of governmental business, they do not denude other

constitutional authorities of the incidental power to examine

citizenship insofar as it is relevant to the discharge of their own

functions.

183. Ultimately, the issue must be approached with a measure of

constitutional sensitivity. Citizenship is a matter of profound

consequence, engaging both individual rights and the integrity of

the polity. The process of electoral revision must, therefore, be

conducted with care, fairness, and due regard to the limits of

institutional competence.

184. Viewed thus, we are of the considered opinion that the

Commission is empowered, in the exercise of its constitutional

mandate, to undertake a limited enquiry into citizenship for the

purpose of satisfying itself as to eligibility for inclusion in the

electoral roll. Such an enquiry does not amount to a

determination of citizenship in the strict sense, and any action

taken pursuant thereto is confined to electoral consequences

alone.

Page 120 of 124

185. Accordingly, the contention that the Impugned exercise is ultra

vires on the ground that it entails an impermissible adjudication

of citizenship deserves to be rejected.

F. CONCLUSION AND DIRECTIONS

186. As an upshot of the foregoing discussion, we deem it appropriate

to dispose of the instant batch of writ petition(s) with the

following directions:

a) The Impugned SIR exercise neither stands in direct conflict

with the RP Act and the 1960 Rules, nor does it detract from

the constitutional imperative of free and fair elections. It is,

instead, an exercise traceable to Section 21(3) of the RP Act

read with Article 324 of the Constitution, undertaken to

advance the very objective which Part XV of the Constitution

is designed to protect.

b) The Impugned SIR exercise, as conducted, satisfies the

requirements of proportionality. The measures adopted bear

a rational nexus to the objective sought to be achieved, are

not manifestly excessive, and are accompanied by sufficient

procedural safeguards to prevent arbitrary exclusion. The

Impugned exercise was founded upon a legitimate and

constitutionally grounded purpose, namely, the restoration

of the accuracy, completeness, and integrity of the electoral

Page 121 of 124

rolls. Having regard to the nature of the problem sought to

be addressed, the scale of the exercise undertaken, and the

procedural safeguards incorporated during its

implementation, the measures adopted by the Commission

cannot be said to be disproportionate to the object sought to

be achieved.

c) While inclusion in the electoral roll gives rise to a

presumption of validity, such presumption is rebuttable and

cannot be construed as imposing a blanket embargo on the

powers of the Commission to undertake a Special Intensive

Revision. The decision in Lal Babu Hussein (Supra) does

not compel a contrary conclusion, being confined to the

context of adjudicatory proceedings and not extending to a

systemic, inquisitorial exercise undertaken in furtherance of

the Commission’s constitutional mandate.

d) The deletions effected pursuant to the Impugned SIR

exercise cannot be said to be contrary to the procedure

prescribed under Rule 21A of the 1960 Rules. The

safeguards of notice and hearing are preserved in substance,

and the process adopted by the Commission remains within

the bounds of the statutory mandate.

Page 122 of 124

e) The documentation regime prescribed by the Commission

represents a considered exercise of its administrative

discretion in furtherance of its Constitutional mandate. The

classification of documents, including the exclusion of

certain categories (apart from Aadhar Card, which was

directed to be included vide Order dated 08.09.2025), is

based on intelligible criteria having a direct nexus with the

objective of ensuring the integrity of the electoral roll. We

are, therefore, unable to hold that the impugned

documentation framework is arbitrary or violative of the

statutory scheme.

f) The Commission is empowered, in the exercise of its

constitutional mandate, to undertake a limited enquiry into

citizenship for the purpose of satisfying itself as to eligibility

for inclusion in the electoral roll. Such an enquiry does not

amount to a determination of citizenship in the strict sense,

and any action taken pursuant thereto is confined to

electoral consequences alone. The consequence of such a

determination is correspondingly limited. It affects the

individual’s entitlement to be included in the electoral roll,

and thereby their right to participate in the electoral process.

It does not, however, operate to divest the individual of

claims of citizenship, nor does it foreclose a determination of

Page 123 of 124

that question by the Competent Authority under the

Citizenship Act.

g) In cases where the Commission is not satisfied that a person

meets the statutory conditions for inclusion in the electoral

roll, it would be incumbent upon it to refer such an

individual to the competent authority within the Central

Government for adjudication in accordance with law. The

Commission’s determination, being confined to electoral

purposes, cannot assume finality on the question of

citizenship. Any deletion effected on this ground shall,

therefore, remain subject to the outcome of such

adjudication by the appropriate authority.

h) Regarding persons whose names have been deleted from the

2003 roll on account of the Commission being of the opinion

that they are not citizens, the Commission shall refer such

cases within 4 weeks to the Competent authority under the

Citizenship Act, 1955, for adjudication of their citizenship.

The Competent Authority shall take the necessary decision

in accordance with law, preferably before the next

Parliamentary, Assembly, Local Body elections, whichever is

earlier, after giving notice and an opportunity of hearing to

the deleted individuals, if any. In the event the Competent

Page 124 of 124

Authority holds that such deleted individuals are citizens,

they shall be included in the electoral roll. In addition

thereto, all persons who are domiciled in Bihar and whose

names have been erroneously deleted on the ground that

they are absent, dead, shifted or in duplication may assail

the decision of the Commission by way of judicial review.

i) These writ petitions are disposed of in the above terms.

Pending interlocutory applications, if any, shall stand

closed.

187. Ordered accordingly.

................................CJI.

[SURYA KANT]

……..................................J.

[JOYMALYA BAGCHI]

NEW DELHI

DATED: 27.05.2026