The case involves a bank employee who was charged with misconduct and disciplinary proceedings were initiated against him. He was also prosecuted in a criminal case, but was later acquitted. ...
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Page 1 REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7005 OF 2012
(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 20394 of 2005)
Avinash Sadashiv Bhosale (D) Thr. LRs. ...Appellant
VERSUS
Union of India & Ors.
...Respondents
J U D G M E N T
SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.
1.Leave granted.
2.This appeal by special leave is directed against the
judgment and order dated 30
th
March, 2005 passed in
the Writ Petition No. 8606 of 2004 by the High Court
of Bombay, by which the writ petition against the
order of dismissal of the petitioner from service dated
19
th
July, 2003 and the order passed by the Appellate
1
Page 2 Authority on 27
th
July, 2004 affirming the said order of
the dismissal was dismissed in limine.
3.Before adverting to the facts leading to the filing of the
present appeal, we must notice that the petitioner Mr.
Avinash Sadashiv Bhosale died during the pendency of
this appeal. His legal heirs have been brought on
record, in his place. However, for the sake of
convenience, he shall be referred to as Mr. Bhosale or
as the appellant whichever is appropriate.
4.It appears that Mr. Bhosale joined the services of
respondent No.2 Bank as a Probationary Officer on
31
st
July, 1975. He was confirmed as an Officer in
Junior Management Grade Scale–I on 31
st
July, 1977.
In course of time, he was promoted to Middle
Management Scale-II (August, 1984). Thereafter, he
was further promoted as Officer in Middle
Management Scale–III in August, 1994. In course of
time, he was posted as the Branch Manager at Washi
2
Page 3 Turbhe branch on 31
st
January, 1998 and was
officiating in the Senior Management Scale-IV.
5.Whilst he was working at Washi Turbhe branch, it was
discovered that the branch had indulged in fraudulent
transactions to the tune of Rs. 12 crores. On 8
th
July, 1998, the appellant was relieved from the branch
of the aforesaid bank, presumably due to his alleged
involvement in the said transactions. On 16
th
July,
1998, he apparently reported the fraud to the Crime
Branch, CBD, Belapur, Navi Mumbai. The A.G.M. in
charge of the Region IV, State Bank of India, Zonal
Office, Mumbai was also informed. In the complaint
made to the police, he had requested that the culprits
who are involved in the fraud be identified. He had
also asked the police to initiate suitable action against
the culprits in accordance with law.
6.It is claimed by Mr. Bhosale that instead of taking
action on the complaint submitted by him, the A.G.M.
3
Page 4 on 22
nd
July, 1998 wrote to the police indicating that
the appellant had no locus standi to file the complaint.
It was stated that Mr. Bhosale “is not an authorised
person to lodge a complaint on behalf of the Bank,
since he himself is involved in the alleged offence in
the above matter.” As noticed earlier, the appellant
was relieved from the Branch on 8
th
July, 1998. He
had protested that he had an excellent and
unblemished service record in the Bank for the past
23 years. He maintained that he was entirely innocent
and did not commit any breach of the service
regulations of the bank. He pointed out that he
proceeded on leave on account of sickness
on 26
th
March 1998 and also that he was mostly either
on leave or on some outdoor assignment duties during
the period immediately preceding the detection of the
said fraudulent transactions. Further, it has been
claimed that certain officials in the Bank in
connivance with each other committed fraud by
purchasing cheques without his knowledge.
4
Page 5 7.The appellant was suspended from service on 23
rd
July, 1998 alongwith one Mr. Yadneshwar Choudhary.
However, the latter was soon reinstated in service as
he was not made a co-accused in the criminal
proceedings initiated against Mr. Bhosale and three
other co-accused.
8.It appears that after completion of investigation by the
police, the appellant was prosecuted for having
committed the offences punishable under Sections
120(B), 420, 467, 468, 471 and 201 of Indian Penal
Code alongwith three others who were the account
holders. By judgment dated 4
th
December, 2001, Mr.
Bhosale and the other co-accused were acquitted of all
the charges.
9.Simultaneously to the criminal proceedings, the
respondent bank had initiated departmental
5
Page 6 proceedings against Mr. Bhosale. He was served a
charge sheet dated 14
th
January, 2000 containing
articles of charge and statement of imputation of
misconduct in terms of Rule 68(2)(iii) of the State Bank
of India Officers Service Rules, 1992 (hereinafter
referred to as the “1992 Rules”). In the aforesaid
charge sheet certain specific and serious allegations
have been made against Mr. Bhosale. The statement
of imputation alleges that after his transfer at Washi
Turbhe Branch on 31
st
January, 1998 from Rabala
Trans Thane Creek Branch, he permitted M/s
Kalgindar Construction Company Pvt. Ltd. to open a
current account at Washi Turbhe Branch without
completing the required formalities. Further, the
account was allegedly opened with a view to
accommodate the said construction company at a later
date by executing the fictitious Demand Draft (D.D.)
purchase transactions. The statement of imputation
thereafter tabulates the departure from established
norms which are to be observed by the Bank for DD
purchase. It is alleged that Mr. Bhosale
6
Page 7 indiscriminately and without any justification
authorised D.D. purchase of 11 cheques aggregating to
Rs.5,51,51,070/- drawn in favour of M/s Kalgindar
Construction Company Pvt. Ltd. and presented by it
for credit of proceeds thereof to its Current Account.
All the cheques so discounted except one for Rs.5 lacs
were beyond the discretionary powers vested in Mr.
Bhosale. While allowing D.D. purchases, no D.D.
purchase limit was fixed for the said construction
company, nor was the genuineness of the transactions
or credentials of the parties ascertained by Mr.
Bhosale. All the D.D. purchase transactions in
question were also not reported to the Controllers. The
high value cheques were allowed to be handed over to
the representative of the said construction Company,
instead of dispatching them to the Bank’s branch
located at the centre by Regd. A.D. Post. This
deliberate action of Mr. Bhosale facilitated the said
construction company to perpetrate a fraud on the
Bank as the said cheques did not reach the drawee
Banks.
7
Page 8 10.Charge No.2 narrates a similar incident where Mr.
Bhosale allowed M/s. Kumar Constructions Company,
a proprietory firm, to open a current account on 15
th
June, 1998 without making enquiries of antecedents
of the proprietor and completing the other required
formalities with a malafide intention to accommodate
the aforesaid company at a later date by allowing
fictitious D.D. purchase of cheques. Thereafter, the
actual details of the D.D. purchase are tabulated.
11. The third Charge in the list of allegation relates to
M/s. Kalani Builders and Developers Pvt. Ltd., dealing
in construction business. The aforesaid company
submitted a proposal prepared by a Chartered
Accountant for being extended credit facilities. Based
on the aforesaid proposal, Mr. Bhosale sanctioned
cash credit limit of Rs.20 lacs (fund based) and Rs.20
lacs (non-fund based). All this was done by him
without making independent enquiries, carrying out
8
Page 9 pre-sanction survey, arranging visits by the field officer
or by himself, properly scrutinizing and appraising the
proposal, compiling an opinion report on the
borrowers and the guarantors and obtaining
recommendations of the field officer. Mr. Bhosale,
within a period of one month from the date of sanction
of cash credit limit on 1
st
June, 1998 permitted D.D.
purchase of a high value cheque for Rs.31,00,980/-,
which was beyond his discretionary powers. He had
not ascertained the genuineness of the large value
D.D. purchase transaction nor made enquiries about
the credentials of the drawer of the cheque. He also
allowed cash withdrawals of Rs.30 lacs. Further, he
directed the Dispatch Clerk to hand over the said
purchased cheque to the representative of the said
company for dispatching it to the drawee Bank instead
of dispatching it by Regd. A.D. Post. Charge No. 3(iii)
alleges that on 9
th
May, 1998, Mr. Bhosale issued a
Letter of Credit for Rs.19,87,000/- on behalf of M/s.
Kalani Builders Pvt. Ltd., without proper
scrutiny/assessment of the required particulars. Even
9
Page 10 the counter guarantee was not obtained, nor was it
ensured that obligations of the said company would be
met on due date. Due to his reckless financing and
allowing D.D. purchase to M/s. Kalani Builders and
Developers Pvt. Ltd., the Bank suffered a huge
financial loss to the extent of Rs.70 lacs. He wanted to
conceal the facts of his irregular financing and,
therefore, he did not obtain prior sanction of the
Controllers or reported for post facto confirmation of
the Controllers.
12. Charge No.4 alleges that Mr. Bhosale
indiscriminately sanctioned loan aggregating to
Rs.56.43 lacs to 19 borrowers under “Big Buy Scheme
for purchase of vehicles during 30
th
April, 1998 to 1
st
June, 1998.” In these transactions, quantum of loans
was to be related to the income of the borrowers.
However, this basic factor was totally neglected.
1
Page 11 13.Charge No. 5 points to the expenditure of Rs. 4.35
lacs incurred by Mr. Bhosale during the period from
March, 1998 to June, 1998 for carrying out repairs to
Bank’s Property and providing furniture at the Branch.
This was done without inviting any competitive
quotations and without seeking approval from the
Controlling Authority.
14.Charge No.6 relates to 86 bills of stationery items
amounting to Rs.1.16 lacs. Here again, the
expenditure was incurred without seeking sanction
from the Controlling Authority. On the basis of the
aforesaid allegations, it was held that Mr. Bhosale
failed to discharge his duty with utmost integrity,
honesty, devotion and diligence to ensure and protect
the interest of the Bank and acted in a manner in
violation of Rule 50(4) of the 1992 Rules.
15.Thereafter, the enquiry proceedings were initiated
against Mr. Bhosale. Mr. P.P. Thomas, Officer, Senior
1
Page 12 Management Grade Scale-V was appointed as the
Inquiry Officer on 30
th
June, 2000. The preliminary
hearings of the inquiry were scheduled to be held on
7
th
September, 2001 and 25
th
September, 2001, none
of which were attended by Mr. Bhosale, despite being
reminded in advance by the Inquiry Officer.
Consequently, the preliminary hearing proceedings
were held ex-parte. The regular hearing of the inquiry
was scheduled for 17
th
January, 2002. Again,
Mr. Bhosale expressed his inability to attend the same
on account of sickness. The hearing of the inquiry
was, therefore, postponed to 18
th
March, 2002,
whereupon the regular hearing was conducted by the
Inquiry Officer, in the presence of the presenting
officer Mr. D.R. Bapat and Mr. Bhosale. The entire
evidence, including the statement of Mr. Suresh
Mahadeva Mahale was recorded in the presence of
Mr. Bhosale. Mr. Mahale was working as a dispatcher
at Washi Turbhe Branch during the period when the
irregularities were committed thereat. Further, both
Mr. Bhosale and the presenting officer were directed to
1
Page 13 submit their respective written briefs. Consequently,
the presenting officer submitted a brief on 8
th
April,
2002, whereas Mr. Bhosale submitted his brief on 6
th
June, 2002.
16.Finally, the Inquiry Officer submitted his report on 19
th
August, 2002, whereby it was held that all the charges
have been proved against Mr. Bhosale. A copy of the
Inquiry Officer’s report was made available to Mr.
Bhosale for his submissions. It appears from the
record that Mr. Bhosale had submitted a detailed
defence to the findings of the Inquiry Officer.
Ultimately, the Disciplinary Authority in its Order
dated 19
th
July 2003 rejected all the pleas raised in
defence by the appellant. Upon careful examination of
the entire material on record, the disciplinary
authority passed the following effective order:-
“The C.O. has also contended that the I.A. has
not taken into consideration the acquittal of
the C.O. in the criminal case as a sufficient
and judicial proof of there being no
misconduct on his part. He has further stated
1
Page 14 that the I.A. has not considered the fact
finding reports compiled by the Bank officials
S/S. Vasant Karve and Mukand Joshi, which
have not implicated the C.O. for the lapses
mentioned in the charge sheet served on him.
The Court has acquitted the C.O. of offences
punishable under Indian Penal Code, whereas
the departmental action is for his misconduct
in terms of Rules 66 of the SBIOSR.
The above submissions have no relevance to
the allegations inasmuch as the allegations
levelled against the C.O. have been inquired by
the I.A. in the departmental enquiry as per the
procedures adopted / in-vogue in
departmental enquiry. Reasonable
opportunity was given to the C.O. to put up his
defence before the I.A. After evaluating the
evidence brought before the inquiry, the I.A.
has held the allegations as proved.
On a careful examination and consideration,
the submissions of the C.O. are found to be
not convincing and hence not acceptable. I,
therefore, considering the case in its entirety in
my capacity as the Disciplinary and
Appointing Authority, hold all the allegations
and the charge as a whole as “Proved” on
sufficient and acceptable evidence. The proven
allegations are very serious in nature which
have exposed the Bank to substantial financial
loss. The proven misconduct evidently speaks
of lack of honesty and integrity on the part of
the Charged Officer. Considering all the facts
and circumstances of the case, I am of the
view that retaining the officer in the Bank’s
1
Page 15 Service is fraught with grave risks. I,
therefore, consider that imposition of penalty
of “Dismissal” under rule 67(j) of the State
Bank of India Officers Service Rules on Shri A.
S. Bhosale, Officer, MMGS III (under
suspension), would meet the ends of justice,
treating the period of suspension undergone
by the official, as such. I order accordingly.
The C.O. may, if he so desires, prefer an
appeal against this order to the Appellate
Authority within 45 days from the date of
receipt thereof in terms of Rule 69(1) and (2)
ibid.”
17.Against the aforesaid order of dismissal, Mr. Bhosale
preferred a statutory appeal on 19
th
August, 2003
under the 1992 Rules. Upon consideration of the
submissions made by Mr. Bhosale in the appeal by
Order dated 27
th
February, 2004, the Appellate
Authority (Chief General Manager) dismissed the
same. The relevant observations made by the
Appellate Authority are as under:-
“I have examined the entire records of the case
and on the basis thereof observe as under,
seriatim:
1
Page 16 i)The contentions of the appellant are
without basis. The entire inquiry process
has been correctly followed and fair
opportunity has been provided to the
appellant to defend himself.
ii)The Inquiry Authority in his report has
unequivocally stated that the preliminary
hearing, which was to be held on 17
th
August, 2001 was postponed to the 7
th
September, 2001, due to the charged
official’s absence. Later the hearing
scheduled for 7
th
September, 2001 was
also postponed to 25
th
September, 2001,
for the same reasons. The appellant’s
submission that the Inquiring Authority
was biased therefore has no basis.
iii)The appellant’s contention seems to be an
after thought since in the Regular hearing
on the 18
th
March, 2002, the appellant
did not raise objections on this count.
Moreover, during the hearing, the
appellant confirmed having received these
documents (presenting Officer’s exhibits).
iv)It is apparent from the inquiry
proceedings that the defence was
provided a fair opportunity to defend
itself. The appellant’s attempt to cry foul
at this juncture is therefore not valid.
v)This argument of the appellant does not
have any basis. The charge sheet had
clearly outlined these details.
1
Page 17 vi)The process followed in a departmental
inquiry is distinctly different from that
followed in a proceedings before the
court. The appellant’s contention is
therefore not acceptable.
vii)The appellant cannot disclaim
responsibility on this count. As the head
of the Branch, he should have ensured
that the Bank’s instruction relating to
dispatch of instruments (DD Purchased)
should have been meticulously followed.
Moreover, PW-1 (the dispatch clerk) has
confirmed in the proceedings held
on 18
th
March, 2002 that the covers
containing the instruments were
delivered at the behest of the appellant.
viii)The Inquiring Authority’s conclusion that
the initials on the Demand Liability
Register were those of the appellant is
supported by reasoned logic. The
Inquiring Authority has lucidly portrayed
as to how he reached such a conclusion.
ix)a)Allegation 1 (i) & (ii) :
The appellant cannot disown the fact that
cheques were purchased for large
amounts. He further cannot disassociate
himself by stating that other officers
permitted the withdrawals in the account.
Moreover, the officials who permitted
these withdrawals had done so, on the
basis of the credit balance available in
the account(s).
1
Page 18 b)Allegation 1(iii) :
In addition to stating that the cheques
were delivered to the beneficiary at the
instructions of Shri Balkawade, the
witness had affirmed that these were also
delivered at the behest of the appellant.
His contention that the prosecution did
not introduce key witness is irrelevant.
c)Allegation 1(iv) :
The submission of the appellant has no
basis.
d)Allegation 2(i) and (ii) :
It has been proved in the inquiry that DD
Purchases were authorised by the
appellant. His attempt to pass the
responsibility to officials who passed the
withdrawals in the account is not
appreciated. Further, it is a fact that tee
account was not properly introduced.
e)Allegation2(iii), (iv) and (v) :
The appellant is merely trying to raise
vague issues. As already stated earlier,
the Inquiry Authority has very aptly
concluded that the initials in the Demand
Liability Register were that of the
appellant.
f)Allegation 3 :
By merely stating that the documents
were in the custody of the Field Officer,
1
Page 19 the appellant cannot disclaim
responsibility. It was also open to the
appellant to produce the field Officer as a
defence witness.
g)Allegation 4:
The allegation have been proved based on
the documentary evidence produced by
the Presenting Officer in the course of the
inquiry proceeding. The appellant has
during the regular hearing held on 18
th
March, 2002 confirmed having verified
the documents. His contention that no
document was produced in the inquiry is
therefore incorrect.
h)Allegation 5 :
The allegation has been proved based on
documentary evidence. Splitting of Bills
has been proved from the fact that 111
bills were paid in respect of 7 items of
expenditure.
i)Allegation 6 :
The allegation was proved based on
documentary evidence. From the evidence
brought out in the inquiry it is apparent
that the appellant split bills pertaining to
stationery items, in order to ensure that
the amount of the split bills falls within
his discretionary powers.
x)Although there has been some delay in
the issuance of the charge sheet, the
1
Page 20 appellant’s claim that it had amounted to
denial of opportunity to establish his
innocence is not maintainable.
xi)The Honourable Court had acquitted the
appellant on the subject matter of
criminal conspiracy. The appellant
cannot draw a parallel between the
findings of the departmental proceedings
and the Court’s verdict.
Having so considered the various points
brought out in the appeal, I am of the view
that the appellant has not been able to put
forth any convincing point of merit. The
appellant has committed serious and grave
irregularities. There is therefore no scope for
modification of the penalty imposed on him. I
therefore reject the appeal and order
accordingly.”
18.Mr. Bhosale challenged the orders passed by the
Disciplinary Authority as well as the Appellate
Authority by filing Writ Petition No. 8606 of 2004 in
the High Court of Judicature at Bombay by Order
dated 30
th
March, 2005. The writ petition was
dismissed by a Division Bench of the Bombay High
Court in limine. The aforesaid Order of the High Court
is challenged by Mr. Bhosale in this appeal.
2
Page 21 19. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties at
length.
20.Mr. Sushil Kumar Jain, learned counsel appearing for
the appellant submits that the disciplinary
proceedings conducted against Mr. Bhosale are
vitiated as he was acquitted by the Criminal Court. All
the offences for which Mr. Bhosale was tried, and then
acquitted by the criminal court, were founded on the
facts which form the basis of the departmental
enquiry. It has been emphasized that the departmental
proceedings ought to have been stayed during the
pendency of the criminal trial. Once the appellant had
been acquitted by the trial court in its judgment dated
4
th
December, 2001, the appellant ought to have been
reinstated forthwith.
2
Page 22 21.Mr. Jain submits that continuation of departmental
proceedings after the appellant was acquitted in the
criminal trial is in violation of the principle underlying
Article 20(2) of the Constitution of India. He argues
that the statement of imputations of misconduct
clearly show that the foundational facts on which the
criminal charges were based are also the facts forming
the basis of the charges levelled against the appellant.
The learned counsel made a detailed and elaborate
reference to the findings recorded by the learned
Magistrate, in support of the submissions that there
was clearly no evidence against the appellant on the
basis of which the charges could be said to have been
proved.
22.He pointed out that the learned trial court after
considering the entire evidence on record has held and
observed as under :-
“18………… If at all any foul play was played at
the time of purchasing the cheques, persons
like witness no.12 Yadneshwar Choudhary
2
Page 23 and others were responsible for it who were
passing the cheques and putting their
signatures. Instead of prosecuting such
persons, prosecution has made them
witnesses. In this way, when these persons are
themselves at fault in the episode, naturally
they will try to save their own skin when
entered in the witness box therefore their
evidence carries least evidentiary value.
23……..Sufficient evidence has come on record
that during the period of transactions effected
in between accused Nos.1, 3 and 4 with the
aggrieved bank, all these bank officers were
working in the bank and were taking active
participation. If really any guilt is committed
why all these persons are left at liberty by the
prosecution and how they can be believed in
the court. It has come on record that P.W.
No.12 Yadneshwar Choudhary is suspended
from his service only because of this case.
Neither the Bank Officers nor the police is
coming forward to make such a person
accused in the case.
28………..Mr. Bhave is very specific in stating
that if the despatch clerk fails to follow this
practice, he is personally liable for the breach.
Admittedly, the accused No.2 never issued any
direction in writing to the despatch clerk to
give the cheques by hand delivery.
30………Witness No.7 Suresh Mahadik who is
despatch clerk himself is responsible and
faulty in discharging his duty.
2
Page 24 Witness No.10 Vinayak Kadam, witness No.11
Arun Balakawade, witness No.12 Yadneshwar
Choudhary are all employees of the same bank
where the incident has taken place. Not only
this, but they actively participated in the
transaction in question. Therefore to save their
own skin, they may blame the Branch
Manager. As such their evidence cannot be
believed.”
23.Relying on the aforesaid observations, Mr. Jain
submitted that the entire departmental proceedings
are vitiated as the appellant has been made scapegoat
for the misconduct committed by other employees of
the bank who were acting in connivance with each
other. According to Mr. Jain, the fraud could not have
been committed unless there was connivance at every
level from the Clerk to the Deputy Manager. It is for
this reason that Yadneshwar Chaudhary was
reinstated in service and then used as a witness
against the appellant. Mr. Jain emphasised that
inspite of efforts made by the respondent-Bank the
learned Judicial Magistrate had clearly held that there
is no evidence of criminal conspiracy against the
appellant. Hence, he was acquitted of the offences
2
Page 25 punishable under Section 120-B IPC with the following
observations :-
“In the result, I come to a firm conclusion that
the accused are entitled to get clean chit in the
matter”.
24.Mr. Jain also pointed out to certain other
observations made by the learned Magistrate to
demonstrate that the enquiry proceedings are vitiated
by legal mala-fides as the same were initiated and
conducted against the appellant with the oblique
purpose of shielding the real culprits. He points out to
the observations made by the trial court to
demonstrate that there was no breach of the service
regulations. It is pointed out by the learned trial court
that the bank had failed to place on record any rule
which would show that the appellant was empowered
to purchase a cheque only to the extent of Rs.6 lacs.
The trial court further pointed out that the bank had
also not placed on record any document or resolution
to prove that there was a limit of Rs.6 lacs for
2
Page 26 purchase of cheques by the appellant. The trial court
further observed that:-
“If there was really any such rule then how all
the bank officers actively participated in the
process of purchasing cheques against or
contrary to such so-called rule. Even the bank
officers who have stepped in the witness Box
did not feel shy to state that they are not fully
conversant with banking rules.”
25.The learned trial court also adverted to the evidence
of Witness No.16 as follows :-
“20. Witness No.16 Vinay Bhave who is Senior
Officer of the bank working as a Regional
Manager. He also in his examination-in-chief
itself stated that he used to receive weekly
reports of all the branches on every Friday
including the branch in question, and he used
to scrutinize the reports. If this gentleman was
scrutinizing the reports on every Friday, how
and why he kept mum when the cheques of
more than Rupees 6,00,000/- were purchased
in the concerned bank. This witness has tried
to shift responsibility upon another bank
officer named Shri Karve.”
26.The learned trial court further pointed out that the
Bank rules were not known even to the other Senior
Officers. Mr. Jain has made a reference to the
2
Page 27 observations made by the learned trial court whilst
considering the evidence of PW-11, Arun Balkawade,
who was a Senior Officer of the bank. In fact, he was
next in the designation to the Chief Manager of Washi
Turbhe branch at the material time. Even this witness
admitted that he does not know fully all the rules and
regulations regarding D.D. purchase of cheques.
Learned trial court also concluded that since the other
bank employee had actively participated in the
fraudulent transactions, their statements could not be
relied upon. Summing up the entire evidence, learned
trial court had come to a firm conclusion that the
accused are entitled to get “clean chit” in the matter.
Relying on the aforesaid observations, Mr. Jain
submitted that the acquittal of the appellant is proof of
the total inability of the bank to produce any evidence
in the trial. The appellant was acquitted as there was
no evidence of culpability against him.
2
Page 28 27.Relying on a number of judgments of this Court,
Mr. Jain has submitted that the submissions made by
the appellant before the Disciplinary Authority have
been totally ignored without any basis. According to
Mr. Jain, the Departmental Enquiry conducted against
the appellant was an eye wash. In the Departmental
Enquiry, the bank examined only one witness PW-7,
Suresh Mahadik, who has been disbelieved by the
criminal court. Such a witness who has been proved to
be not truthful could not have been relied upon, in the
departmental enquiry. He points out that the criminal
court recorded a categorical finding that there is no
evidence to connect any particular officer with the
non-completion of the proper documentation. In the
face of such a finding, the Inquiry Officer, without any
basis recorded the finding that the charge was proved
against the appellant. Similarly, the evidence of
Suresh Mahadik having been ignored by the learned
trial court, no reliance could have been placed on the
same by the Inquiry officer. Mr. Jain further pointed
out that in the departmental enquiry, the bank had
2
Page 29 failed to produce any document or evidence by leading
oral evidence. All the documents were merely placed
on record by an employee of the bank. Mr. Jain further
pointed out that the bias of the inquiry officer as well
as the bank is obvious from the fact that all the
employees involved in the completion of the
transactions were neither prosecuted nor proceeded
against departmentally. On the other hand, these
individuals have been examined as prosecution
witnesses. Having been acquitted, there was no
justification for the bank to hold a departmental
enquiry on the same facts and on the basis of same
evidence.
28.Mr. Jain then submitted that the order passed by
the appellate authority is vitiated as it has been
passed with a closed mind. None of the submissions
made by the appellant in the written submissions have
been considered by the appellate authority. Further
more, the submissions which have been considered
2
Page 30 have not been considered on the basis of the relevant
material which was placed before the appellate
authority.
29.In support of these submissions, Mr. Jain relied on
some judgments of this Court which are as follows:-
Roop Singh Negi Vs. Punjab National Bank &
Ors.
1
, Calcutta Dock Labour Board & Ors. Vs.
Jaffar Imam
2
, Subhash Chand Vs. State of
Rajasthan
3
, Omar Salay Mohd Sait Vs.
Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras
4
, Union of
India Vs. H.C. Goel
5
, Narinder Mohan Arya Vs.
United India Insurance Co. Ltd. & Ors.
6
, G.M.
Tank Vs. State of Gujarat & Ors.
7
, Union of India
& Ors. Vs. Naman Singh Shekhawat
8
, Capt. M.
Paul Anthony Vs. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. & Anr.
9
,
1
(2009) 2 SCC 570
2
1965 3 SCR 453
3
(2002) 1 SCC 702
4
AIR 1959 SC 1238
5
AIR 1964 SC 364
6
(2006) 4 SCC 713
7
(2006) 5 SCC 446
8
(2008) 4 SCC 1
9
(1999) 3 SCC 679
3
Page 31 Sawai Singh Vs. State of Rajasthan
10
, and Pritam
Singh & Anr. Vs. State of Punjab
11
.
30.Mr. Rakesh Dwivedi, learned senior counsel appearing
for respondent Nos. 2 to 5 has submitted that
acquittal in a criminal case is not a bar for holding
departmental proceedings against the bank official.
Learned counsel pointed out that the proceedings
before the criminal trial are different in nature to the
proceedings in a Departmental Enquiry. Whereas
prosecution had to prove the guilt of the accused in
the criminal trial beyond reasonable doubt, in the
departmental enquiry, the standard of proof is only
preponderance of probabilities. Mr. Dwivedi further
submitted that the appellant cannot take any
advantage of non-production of the relevant evidence
by the prosecution in the trial. The lapse committed by
the prosecuting agency cannot be attributed to the
bank. Further more, in the prosecution, the emphasis
was on the involvement of individuals in a criminal
10
(1986) 3 SCC 454
11
AIR 1956 SC 415
3
Page 32 conspiracy to defraud the bank. In the departmental
proceedings, charges levelled against the appellant are
that he has failed to maintain absolute devotion to
duty. The charges were that he had disregarded the
provisions of the bank regulations. Therefore, two
proceedings cannot be placed in the same category.
Mr. Dwivedi pointed out that, at the relevant time, the
hierarchy in the Branch put the Branch Manager at
the top. Below him were the Field Officer, Accountant,
Cashier, Dispatch Clerk and a Peon. As a Branch
Manager, the appellant was the controller of all the
affairs of the branch. He had to ensure that all
necessary precautions had been taken to prevent any
loss being caused to the bank. The learned senior
counsel pointed out that the appellant was in-charge
of a small branch. Therefore, had he exercised due
care and caution, such a massive fraud could not have
taken place. Therefore, there was no overlap between
the criminal proceedings and the departmental
proceedings. In the criminal trial, the prosecution had
to prove that the appellant was guilty beyond
3
Page 33 reasonable doubt that he had conspired with the other
officials of the Bank to commit the offences with which
he had been charged. In the departmental
proceedings, the enquiry was to investigate as to
whether the appellant had performed his duties as a
Branch Manager in strict adherence to the procedural
rules/regulations of the Bank. He, therefore, refutes
the submission of Mr. Jain that there is any
infringement of any principle underlying Article 20(2)
of the Constitution of India. In support of his
submissions, Mr. Rakesh Dwivedi relied on the
judgment of this Court in Divisional Controller,
Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation Vs.
M.G.Vittal Rao.
12
31.Answering the objections raised by Mr. Jain with
regard to the conduct of the departmental enquiry,
Mr. Dwivedi pointed out that all documents were duly
produced and proved during the enquiry proceedings.
The prosecution had failed to produce the relevant
documents during the criminal trial. During the
12
(2012) 1 SCC 442
3
Page 34 Departmental Enquiry, the appellant was asked to
verify about the authenticity of the documents. At no
stage, the appellant complained about their lack of
authenticity. The appellant only made one statement
during the departmental enquiry that his initials for
purchase of the demand drafts had not been proved.
Mr. Dwivedi pointed out to the procedural lapses
committed by the appellant. The authenticity of the
documents produced in the enquiry not having been
doubted by the appellant, the findings of the Inquiry
Officer can not be said to be based on no evidence.
The appellant was aware that his limit for purchase of
a cheque was Rs.6 lacs. Any purchase above Rs.6 lacs
could only be done with the prior approval of the
higher authorities. The appellant failed to take any
prior approval from the higher authorities. In fact,
the appellant never informed the higher authorities
even after the transactions had been completed. Mr.
Dwivedi pointed out that the transactions involved
were so heavy, the appellant could not have failed to
notice the irregularities. This would lead to a clear
3
Page 35 inference that either the appellant was acting in
connivance with the account holders who were
benefitted or he was grossly negligent in performance
of his duties. Mr. Dwivedi then pointed out that once
the appellant knew that the whole fraud has been
exposed, he rushed to make a complaint to the police.
Since by that time the higher officials had suspicion
with regard to the conduct of the appellant, the police
was informed not to act upon the complaint made by
him. The actions of the appellant were in violation of
Rules 48(4), 48(9), 66 and 67.
32.We have considered the submissions made by the
learned counsel for the parties. We are not at all
impressed by the submissions made by Mr. Jain.
33.We may, however, briefly notice the ratio of the
judgments relied upon by the learned counsel.
3
Page 36 34.In Roop Singh Negi’s case (supra), this Court has
reiterated the well known principle of law that findings
of the Enquiry Officer have to be based on some
relevant evidence. It is further re-stated that the orders
passed by the disciplinary authority and the appellate
authority, must also be supported by relevant reasons.
The principles are stated thus :
“23. Furthermore, the order of the disciplinary
authority as also the appellate authority are
not supported by any reason. As the orders
passed by them have severe civil
consequences, appropriate reasons should
have been assigned. If the enquiry officer had
relied upon the confession made by the
appellant, there was no reason as to why the
order of discharge passed by the criminal court
on the basis of selfsame evidence should not
have been taken into consideration. The
materials brought on record pointing out the
guilt are required to be proved. A decision
must be arrived at on some evidence, which is
legally admissible. The provisions of the
Evidence Act may not be applicable in a
departmental proceeding but the principles of
natural justice are. As the report of the
enquiry officer was based on merely ipse dixit
as also surmises and conjectures, the same
could not have been sustained. The inferences
drawn by the enquiry officer apparently were
not supported by any evidence. Suspicion, as
is well known, however high may be, can
under no circumstances be held to be a
substitute for legal proof.”
3
Page 37 35.Similarly in Calcutta Dock Labour Board (supra) this
Court has emphasised the principle that suspicion,
however strong, cannot take the place of proof. The
observations are as under:-
“We are, therefore, satisfied that the Court of
Appeal was right in taking the view that in a
departmental enquiry which the appellant held
against the respondents it was not open to the
appellant to act on suspicion, inasmuch as the
appellant’s decision is clearly based upon the
detention orders and nothing else, there can
be little doubt that, in substance, the said
conclusion is based on suspicion and nothing
more”.
36.In the case of Subhash Chand (supra), it is
emphasised that in order to avoid any innocent
individual being picked up and branded as a culprit,
the conclusions ought not to be based on doubtful or
dubious circumstances treating them as of “beyond
doubt” evidentiary value.
3
Page 38 37.Similarly in Omar Salay Mohd Sait’s case (supra),
this Court again emphasised that the conclusions
ought to be recorded by the disciplinary authority on
the basis of cogent evidence.
38.Mr. Jain then cited Union of India Vs. H.C. Goel
(supra). Here again, the Constitution Bench of this
Court emphasised that the suspicion, however, strong
cannot be treated as proof against the accused in a
criminal trial or a delinquent officer in domestic
enquiry. Mr. Jain also relied upon the judgment in the
case of Narinder Mohan Arya Vs. United India
Insurance Co. Ltd. & Ors.
13
In paragraph 44 of this
judgment, it is observed by this Court as under :-
“The evidence adduced on behalf of the
management must have nexus with the
charges. The enquiry officer cannot base his
findings on mere hypothesis. Mere ipse dixit on
his part cannot be a substitute of evidence.”
13
(2006) 4 SCC 713
3
Page 39 39.In G.M. Tank’s case (supra), this Court was
considering the case of an appellant, who had been
acquitted by the Criminal Court. He had been
prosecuted for having committed the offence under
Section 5(1)(e) read with Section 5(2) of the Prevention
of Corruption Act, 1947. Upon examination of the
facts and the evidence, it was observed by this Court
that there is not an iota of evidence against the
appellant to hold that he is guilty of having committed
the offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act. It
was further observed that the departmental
proceedings in the criminal case are based on identical
and similar (verbatim), set of facts and evidence. It is
further observed that in fact, respondents did not
produce any evidence in support of and/or about the
alleged charges involved against the appellant. The
criminal proceedings were initiated against the
appellant for the offences under the Prevention of
Corruption Act on the same set of facts and evidence ,
which was the basis of the departmental proceedings.
The Court noticed the observations made in the case
3
Page 40 of Ajit Kumar Nag Vs. General Manager (PJ), Indian
Oil Corpn. Ltd., Haldia & Ors.
14
, which were as
follows:-
“11. As far as acquittal of the appellant by a
criminal court is concerned, in our opinion,
the said order does not preclude the
Corporation from taking an action if it is
otherwise permissible. In our judgment, the
law is fairly well settled. Acquittal by a
criminal court would not debar an employer
from exercising power in accordance with the
Rules and Regulations in force. The two
proceedings, criminal and departmental, are
entirely different. They operate in different
fields and have different objectives. Whereas
the object of criminal trial is to inflict
appropriate punishment on the offender, the
purpose of enquiry proceedings is to deal with
the delinquent departmentally and to impose
penalty in accordance with the service rules. In
a criminal trial, incriminating statement made
by the accused in certain circumstances or
before certain officers is totally inadmissible in
evidence. Such strict rules of evidence and
procedure would not apply to departmental
proceedings. The degree of proof which is
necessary to order a conviction is different
from the degree of proof necessary to record
the commission of delinquency. The rule
relating to appreciation of evidence in the two
proceedings is also not similar. In criminal
law, burden of proof is on the prosecution and
unless the prosecution is able to prove the
guilt of the accused “beyond reasonable
doubt”, he cannot be convicted by a court of
law. In a departmental enquiry, on the other
14
(2005) 7 SCC 764
4
Page 41 hand, penalty can be imposed on the
delinquent officer on a finding recorded on the
basis of “preponderance of probability”.
Acquittal of the appellant by a Judicial
Magistrate, therefore, does not ipso facto
absolve him from the liability under the
disciplinary jurisdiction of the Corporation. We
are, therefore, unable to uphold the contention
of the appellant that since he was acquitted by
a criminal court, the impugned order
dismissing him from service deserves to be
quashed and set aside.”
The Court further noticed the observations of this
Court in Depot Manager, A.P. State Road Transport
Corporation Vs. Mohd. Yousuf Miya & Ors.
15
, wherein
this Court observed as follows:-
“8. ……………… The purpose of departmental
enquiry and of prosecution are two different
and distinct aspects. The criminal prosecution
is launched for an offence for violation of a
duty, the offender owes to the society or for
breach of which law has provided that the
offender shall make satisfaction to the public.
So crime is an act of commission in violation of
law or of omission of public duty. The
departmental enquiry is to maintain discipline
in the service and efficiency of public service. It
would, therefore, be expedient that the
disciplinary proceedings are conducted and
completed as expeditiously as possible. It is
not, therefore, desirable to lay down any
guidelines as inflexible rules in which the
departmental proceedings may or may not be
15
(1997) 2 SCC 699
4
Page 42 stayed pending trial in criminal case against
the delinquent officer. Each case requires to be
considered in the backdrop of its own facts
and circumstances. There would be no bar to
proceed simultaneously with departmental
enquiry and trial of a criminal case unless the
charge in the criminal trial is of grave nature
involving complicated questions of fact and
law. Offence generally implies infringement of
public (sic duty), as distinguished from mere
private rights punishable under criminal law.
When trial for criminal offence is conducted it
should be in accordance with proof of the
offence as per the evidence defined under the
provisions of the Evidence Act. Converse is the
case of departmental enquiry. The enquiry in a
departmental proceedings relates to conduct or
breach of duty of the delinquent officer to
punish him for his misconduct defined under
the relevant statutory rules or law. That the
strict standard of proof or applicability of the
Evidence Act stands excluded is a settled legal
position. The enquiry in the departmental
proceedings relates to the conduct of the
delinquent officer and proof in that behalf is
not as high as in an offence in criminal charge.
It is seen that invariably the departmental
enquiry has to be conducted expeditiously so
as to effectuate efficiency in public
administration and the criminal trial will take
its own course. The nature of evidence in
criminal trial is entirely different from the
departmental proceedings. In the former,
prosecution is to prove its case beyond
reasonable doubt on the touchstone of human
conduct. The standard of proof in the
departmental proceedings is not the same as of
the criminal trial. The evidence also is different
from the standard point of the Evidence Act.
The evidence required in the departmental
enquiry is not regulated by the Evidence Act.
4
Page 43 Under these circumstances, what is required
to be seen is whether the departmental
enquiry would seriously prejudice the
delinquent in his defence at the trial in a
criminal case. It is always a question of fact to
be considered in each case depending on its
own facts and circumstances. In this case, we
have seen that the charge is failure to
anticipate the accident and prevention thereof.
It has nothing to do with the culpability of the
offence under Sections 304-A and 338, IPC.
Under these circumstances, the High Court
was not right in staying the proceedings.”
Having noticed the aforesaid observations, the
Court proceeded to distinguish the same with the
following observations:-
“The judgments relied on by the learned
counsel appearing for the respondents are
distinguishable on facts and on law. In this
case, the departmental proceedings and the
criminal case are based on identical and
similar set of facts and the charge in a
departmental case against the appellant and
the charge before the criminal court are one
and the same. It is true that the nature of
charge in the departmental proceedings and in
the criminal case is grave. The nature of the
case launched against the appellant on the
basis of evidence and material collected
against him during enquiry and investigation
and as reflected in the charge-sheet, factors
mentioned are one and the same. In other
words, charges, evidence, witnesses and
circumstances are one and the same.”
4
Page 44 These observations are of no assistance to the
appellant as the charges against him in the criminal trial
were with regard to the commission of offences under
Section 120(B), 420, 467, 468, 471 and 201 of IPC. In the
departmental proceedings, the appellant has been
punished on the basis of the findings that he failed to
discharge his duties with utmost integrity, honesty,
devotion and diligence. It was found that he had violated
Rule 50(4) of the 1992 Rules. In our opinion, it would be
the ratio of law laid down in the cases of Ajit Kumar Nag
(supra) and Depot Manager, A.P. State Road Transport
Corporation (supra) that would be applicable in the facts
and circumstances of this case.
40.In the case of Union of India & Ors. Vs. Naman Singh
Shekhawat (supra) , on facts, the whole departmental
proceedings were held to be vitiated by bias. It was a
case where the offences of the disciplinary authority
were held to be based on no evidence. It was also a
case where no witness was examined to prove the
4
Page 45 allegations against the respondent Shekhawat. It was
a case in which the only witness examined on behalf of
the disciplinary authority was the jeep driver, MS who
at the material time was accompanying the
respondent. Even this witness did not support the
Department’s case yet the departmental authorities
held the charges against the respondent as proved.
Besides, it was also found that the respondent had not
been allowed services of a defence assistant of his
choice. He was also not allowed to produce defence
witness J. In paragraph 27 of the judgment, this Court
observed that “the bias on the part of the inquiry
officer is explicit from the record. Why the inquiry
officer cross-examined the respondent is beyond
anybody’s comprehension. He was not the prosecutor.
A presenting officer had been appointed. The inquiry
officer could not have taken over the job of the
presenting officer, particularly when he was a superior
officer.”
4
Page 46 In our opinion, there is no parallel in the facts and
circumstances of the aforesaid case and the present case.
41.In Capt M.Paul Anthony ’ s case (supra), this Court
reiterated the well established principle of law that
proceedings in a criminal case and the departmental
proceedings can proceed simultaneously. It was
emphasised that the basis for this proposition is that
proceedings in a criminal case and the departmental
proceedings operate in distinct and different
jurisdictional areas. The observations made in
paragraph 13 which are relevant in the facts of this
case are as under:-
“As we shall presently see, there is a
consensus of judicial opinion amongst the
High Courts whose decisions we do not intend
to refer to in this case, and the various
pronouncements of this Court, which shall be
copiously referred to, on the basic principle
that proceedings in a criminal case and the
departmental proceedings can proceed
simultaneously with a little exception. As we
understand, the basis for this proposition is
that proceedings in a criminal case and the
departmental proceedings operate in distinct
and different jurisdictional areas. Whereas in
4
Page 47 the departmental proceedings, where a charge
relating to misconduct is being investigated,
the factors operating in the mind of the
disciplinary authority may be many such as
enforcement of discipline or to investigate the
level of integrity of the delinquent or the other
staff, the standard of proof required in those
proceedings is also different than that required
in a criminal case. While in the departmental
proceedings the standard of proof is one of
preponderance of the probabilities, in a
criminal case, the charge has to be proved by
the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. The
little exception may be where the departmental
proceedings and the criminal case are based
on the same set of facts and the evidence in
both the proceedings is common without there
being a variance.”
In our opinion, the facts of this case do not fall
within the little exception culled out by this Court. The
departmental proceedings herein and the criminal case
are not grounded upon the same set of facts and the
evidence. As noticed by the disciplinary authority as well
as the appellate authority, the departmental proceedings
related to honesty, integrity and devotion of the appellant
as a very high ranking bank officer. On the basis of the
evidence led before the enquiry officer, it was held that
the appellant had failed to maintain the utmost integrity
which is required for a bank officer.
4
Page 48 42.The judgment in Sawai Singh ’ s case (supra) examined
three main submissions made by the counsel for the
appellant, namely (i) the charges were not clear (ii)
there was no evidence to support the charges and on
the contrary (iii) the evidence on record was contrary
to the charges made. Upon examination of the
evidence, it was held that there was a total absence
of any cogent and reliable evidence against the
appellant. It was, therefore, held that the findings of
the enquiry officer are based on no evidence. It was
also found that the charges levelled against the
appellant were vague making it impossible for him to
answer the same. In Paragraph 14, this Court
observed as follows :
“14. Quite apart from that fact, it appears to
us that the charges were vague and it was
difficult to meet the charges fairly by any
accused. Evidence adduced was perfunctory
and did not at all bring home the guilt of the
accused.”
In paragraph 16, this court further emphasised that
the charges must be proved against the charge-sheeted
4
Page 49 employee in accordance with rules of natural justice. The
report of the inquiry officer must demonstrate that there
had been fair play in action. This is a settled principle of
law which has been duly respected by the inquiry officer,
the disciplinary authority as well as the appellate
authority in this case.
43.The judgment in Pritam Singh ’ s case (supra), in our
opinion, has absolutely no relevance to the issues
raised by the learned counsel for the appellant.
44.This Court recently reiterated the legal principle that
departmental proceedings can be conducted
simultaneously to the criminal trial in the case of
Divisional Controller, Karnataka State Road
Transport Corporation Vs. M.G.Vittal Rao (supra).
In this case, making reference to almost all the
previous precedents, this Court has reiterated the legal
position as follows:-
4
Page 50 (a)There is no legal bar for both proceedings to go
on simultaneously.
(b)The only valid ground for claiming that the
disciplinary proceedings may be stayed would
be to ensure that the defence of the employee
in the criminal case may not be prejudiced.
But even such grounds would be available only
in cases involving complex questions of facts
and law.
(c)Such defence ought not to be permitted to
unnecessarily delay the departmental
proceedings. The interest of the delinquent
officer as well as the employer clearly lies in a
prompt conclusion of the disciplinary
proceedings.
(d)Departmental proceedings can go on
simultaneously to the criminal trial, except
where both the proceedings are based on the
5
Page 51 same set of facts and the evidence in both the
proceedings is common.
In our opinion, the principles culled out by this
Court would be a complete answer to all the submissions
made by Mr. Jain.
45.In view of the aforesaid legal principles enunciated
and reiterated by this Court, we cannot accept that
because the appellant had been prosecuted, the
departmental proceedings could not have been
continued simultaneously. As pointed out by Mr.
Dwivedi, the charges against the appellant in the
criminal trial related to the commission of criminal
offences under Sections 120(B), 420, 467, 468, 471
and 201 of Indian Penal Code. The proof of criminal
charges was depended upon prosecution producing
proof beyond reasonable doubt relating to the
culpability of the appellant alongwith other persons. In
the departmental proceedings, the basic charge was
that appellant whilst posted as a Branch Manager of
5
Page 52 Washi Turbhe Branch, failed to discharge his duties
with utmost integrity, honesty, devotion and diligence
to ensure and protect the interest of the Bank and
acted in a manner unbecoming of a Bank Officer. The
aforesaid charge clearly related to the manner in
which the appellant performed the duties as the
Manager of the Branch of the Bank. It had nothing to
do with any criminal liability attaching to such
conduct. It must be emphasised that Bank officials act
as trustees of funds deposited by the public with the
Bank. They have an obligation to earn the trust and
confidence of not only the account holders but also the
general public. The standard of integrity required of
the Bank officials, particularly the cashiers,
accountants, auditors and the Management at all
levels, is like the Caesar’s wife, they must be above
suspicion. Mr.Bhosale failed to maintain such high
standards of integrity. He therefore, acted in violation
of Rule 50(4) of the 1992 Rules. We, therefore, do not
find any merit in the aforesaid submissions of Mr.
Jain.
5
Page 53 46.Mr. Dwivedi, in our opinion, has rightly pointed out
that the conduct of the criminal trial was in the hands
of the prosecuting agency. Having registered the First
Information Report, the Bank had little or no role to
play, apart from rendering assistance to the
prosecuting agencies. In our opinion, the failure of the
prosecution in producing the necessary evidence
before the trial court can not have any adverse impact
on the evidentiary value of the material produced by
the Bank before the Inquiry Officer in the
departmental proceedings. Before the Inquiry Officer,
the Bank had placed on the record all the relevant
documents which clearly establish that the appellant
had exceeded his discretionary powers in purchasing
the cheques and issuing demand drafts to show undue
favour to the three construction companies named in
the charge sheet. In view of the above, the findings
recorded by the Inquiry Officer can not be said to be
based on no evidence. It is a settled proposition of law
5
Page 54 that the findings of Inquiry Officer cannot be nullified
so long as there is some relevant evidence in support
of the conclusions recorded by the Inquiry Officer. In
the present case, all the relevant documents were
produced in the Inquiry to establish the charges
levelled against the appellant. It is a matter of record
that the appellant did not doubt the authenticity of the
documents produced by the Bank. He merely stated
that the signature on the documents were not his.
The aforesaid statement of the appellant was nullified
by Mr. S.M. Mahadik, who appeared as a witness for
the Bank. He clearly stated that he recognized the
signature of the appellant as he had been working as
his subordinate.
47.The findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer cannot
be said to be based on no evidence. In such
circumstances, the appellant cannot take any
advantage of the findings of innocence recorded by the
criminal court. The ‘clean chit’ given by the learned
5
Page 55 Magistrate was influenced by the failure of the
prosecution to lead the necessary evidence. No
advantage of the same can be taken by the appellant
in the departmental proceedings.
48.We also do not find any merit in the submissions
made by Mr. Jain that the order by the Disciplinary
Authority is vitiated by non-application of mind. The
extracts reproduced above would clearly indicate that
the Disciplinary Authority was alive to all the
submissions made by the appellant. The Disciplinary
Authority had taken into consideration all the relevant
material and only then concluded that the charges
have been duly proved against the appellant.
Furthermore, it is a matter of record that the appellant
was duly supplied a copy of the Inquiry Report and he
had submitted detailed objections to the same. These
objections were placed before the Disciplinary
Authority together with the Inquiry Report. Therefore,
5
Page 56 the appellant can not possibly claim that there has
been a breach of rule of natural justice.
49. Similarly, the Appellate Authority has also given
cogent reasons in support of its conclusion. This is
also apparent from the extract of the order of the
Appellate Authority reproduced above.
50.In view of the aforesaid, we find no merit in this
appeal and the same is hereby dismissed.
...………………… .….….J.
[Surinder Singh Nijjar]
………………………… .J.
[H.L.Gokhale]
New Delhi;
September 25, 2012.
5
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