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* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

% Reserved on:19

th

March, 2026

Pronounced on:8

th

July , 2026

+ RSA 62/2022, CM APPL. 27449/2022

BABITA DEVI

W/o Shri Ravinder Kumar

R/o H.No. E-57

Gali No.3, Hari Nagar Extension

Part-II, Badarpur

New Delhi-110044 .....Appellant

Through: Mr. Arvind Kumar, Advocate.

versus

SURENDER SINGH

S/O Late Shri Vasudev Singh

R/O H.No. D-2, 1

st

Floor

Gali No.I, Hari Nagar Extension

Part-II, Badarpur

New Delhi-110044.

.....Respondent

Through: Mr. Tuhin, Advocate.

CORAM:

HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE NEENA BANSAL KRISHNA

J U D G M E N T

NEENA BANSAL KRISHNA, J.

1. The present Regular Second Appeal under Section 100 of the Code of

Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as 'CPC') has been filed

against the Judgment and Decree dated 22.11.2019 passed in RCA No.

20253/2016, whereby the learned First Appellate Court set aside the

Judgment and Decree dated 28.04.2014 passed by the learned Civil Judge,

decreeing the Suit of the Plaintiff/Appellant herein for Possession in respect

of one room on the first floor of property bearing No. E-57, Hari Nagar

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Extension, Part-II, Badarpur, New Delhi-110044, and consequently,

dismissed the Suit.

2. The Plaintiff/Appellant had filed a Civil Suit No. 736/2010,

(subsequently re-numbered as CS No. 610/2014), for Possession and

Permanent Injunction against the Defendant/Respondent, in respect of one

room on the first floor of property bearing No. E-57, Hari Nagar Extension,

Part-II, Badarpur, New Delhi-110044, (hereinafter referred to as suit

property)as shown in red colour in the site plan annexed with the Plaint.

3. The facts in brief, as stated in the Plaint are that the Plaintiff, Babita

Devi are that the suit property was originally purchased by Sh. Ravinder

Kumar, her husband, from one Sh. Pramod Kumar S/o Sh. Jai Prakash, by

virtue of General Power of Attorney, Agreement to Sell, Affidavit and

Receipt, all dated 08.06.1995.

4. In March, 2005, the Defendant who is the brother of the husband of

the Plaintiff, expressed urgency to secure accommodation, to settle in Delhi.

He along with his family members, was permitted by Sh. Ravinder Kumar to

reside in suit property as a licensee, without any charge for the use and

occupation thereof.

5. Thereafter, the said property was transferred by Sh. Ravinder Kumar

in favour of the Plaintiff by virtue of General Power of Attorney, Agreement

to Sell, Affidavit and Receipt, all dated 01.09.2005, for a sale consideration

of Rs. 4,22,000/-, upon which she became the owner of the said property.

Even after the purchase of the said property by the Plaintiff in September,

2005, the said arrangement was continued, out of the same familial

consideration.

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6. Soon thereafter, the Defendant started harassing the Plaintiff on one

pretext or the other and creating various troubles, in her peaceful possession

of the suit property. The Defendant also filed a Civil Suit against the

husband of the Plaintiff at the Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi.

7. In view of the said developments, the licence granted to the Defendant

was terminated by the Plaintiff, vide Legal Notice dated 06.09.2010, asking

the Defendant to vacate the suit property within one week and to hand over

the peaceful and vacant possession thereof. Despite service of the said

Notice, the Defendant neither complied with the demands raised therein nor

handed over the possession of the suit property to the Plaintiff.

8. The Plaintiff thus, instituted the present Suit, seeking a decree of

Possession in respect of the suit property, and Permanent Injunction for

restraining the Defendant, his agents, servants and nominees from selling

the said property or parting with the possession, thereof.

9. The Defendant, Surinder Singh in his Written Statement, took the

preliminary objections that the Plaintiff had not approached the Court with

clean hands and had suppressed the true and material facts; that there was

no cause of action in favour of the Plaintiff and the Suit was liable to be

dismissed under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC; that the Suit was not

maintainable for want of proper court fee and valuation, the value of the

Suit Property being more than Rs. 4,00,000/-; that the Plaintiff had no locus

standi to file the Suit, not being the owner of the Suit Property; and that the

Civil Court had no pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain the Suit.

10. On merits, the entire claim of the Plaintiff, was vehemently denied. It

was asserted that the father of the Defendant, Late Sh. Vasudev Singh, had

purchased the Suit plot in the year 1993 and had thereafter, raised the

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construction thereon, from his own funds in the year 1995. It was contended

that, after the demise of his father, the Defendant was entitled to half share

in the suit property by inheritance, along with his brothers; and that the

Plaintiff had procured false and frivolous documents with oblique motive,

only to harass the Defendant and to grab his share.

11. The Defendant categorically denied the licensor-licensee relationship

claimed by the Plaintiff. It was asserted that the Defendant had been

residing in the suit property since the year 1995, during the lifetime of his

father and had been in possession thereof in his own right, having right, title

and interest in the same, by virtue of inheritance from his father. It was

denied that any Legal Notice dated 06.09.2010 had been served upon the

Defendant. The Defendant prayed for dismissal of the Suit.

12. The Plaintiff filed Replication to the Written Statement, denying the

contentions raised therein and reiterating the assertions made in the Plaint. It

was clarified that the suit property had been purchased by the husband of the

Plaintiff from Sh. Pramod Kumar and was thereafter, transferred to the

Plaintiff. It was specifically denied that the father of the Defendant had ever

purchased the Suit plot in the year 1993 or had raised construction thereon in

the year 1995.

13. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, the following Issues were

framed on 17.10.2011:

(a) Whether the plaintiff has not come to the court with clean

hands? OPD.

(b) Whether the suit has been valued properly? OPD.

(c) Whether the suit property has been inherited by the defendants

and husband of the plaintiff from their father? OPD.

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(d) Whether the plaintiff is the owner of suit property? OPP.

(e) Whether the defendant is a licencee in the suit property? OPP.

(f) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to relief of possession? OPP.

(g) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief of injunction as

prayed? OPP.

(h) Relief.

14. In support of her case, the Plaintiff examined herself as PW-1 and

tendered her evidence by way of affidavit Ex. PW-1/A. PW-1 relied upon

the General Power of Attorney dated 01.09.2005 as Ex. PW-1/1; the

Agreement to Sell and Purchase dated 01.09.2005 as Ex. PW-1/2; the

Affidavit dated 01.09.2005 as Ex. PW-1/3; and the Receipt dated 01.09.2005

as Ex. PW-1/4, executed by Sh. Ravinder Kumar in her favour. She further

relied upon the General Power of Attorney dated 08.06.1995 as Ex. PW-1/5;

the Agreement to Sell dated 08.06.1995 as Ex. PW-1/6; the Affidavit dated

08.06.1995 as Ex. PW-1/7; and the Receipt dated 08.06.1995 as Ex. PW-1/8,

executed by Sh. Pramod Kumar S/o Sh. Jai Prakash in favour of her husband

Sh. Ravinder Kumar. She also relied upon the Site Plan of the Suit Property

as Ex. PW-1/9; the Legal Notice dated 06.09.2010 as Ex. PW-1/10; and the

Postal Receipts and AD Card as Ex. PW-1/11.

15. The Plaintiff further examined PW-2, Sh. Ravinder Kumar, her

husband who tendered his evidence by way of affidavit Ex. PW-2/A, on the

lines of the case set up in the Plaint.

16. The Defendant examined himself as DW-1 and tendered his evidence

by way of affidavit Ex. DW-1/1, on the lines of his Written Statement. DW-

1 relied upon various documents his Voter ID as Ex. DW-1/A to Ex. DW-

1/S to support his possession since 1995.

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17. Ld. Civil Judge, on the pleadings and the evidence on record, held

that the Defendant had failed to establish his claim of inheritance from his

father as no documentary evidence having been produced in support

thereof, and that the mother and brother of the Defendant, who were the

natural witnesses to support such a plea, had not been examined. The plea of

inheritance was accordingly, rejected.

18. As regards the ownership of the Plaintiff, it was held that title in

immovable property, cannot be conferred by means of unregistered

documents and that no conclusive determination of ownership could be

made; however, the said documents could be read for the collateral purpose

of establishing possession. It was further held that on a preponderance of

probabilities, the Defendant was in occupation of the suit property as a

licensee, as proved from the testimony of Plaintiff as PW-1 and PW-2.

19. The plea of forgery and manipulation in respect of Ex. PW-1/5 to Ex.

PW-1/8 was rejected, since no expert or independent witness having been

led by the Defendant to substantiate the same. The plea regarding the

description of the property in the said documents was also rejected, having

regard to the fact that the suit property was situated in an unauthorised

colony, where house numbers had not been allotted at the relevant time.

20. Accordingly, the Suit of Possession in respect of the Suit Property was

decreed, and the Defendant was directed to vacate the said room within two

months. The relief of Permanent Injunction was, however, declined for want

of any pleading or evidence of an apprehension of transfer or creation of

third-party interest by the Defendant.

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21. Aggrieved by the said Judgment and Decree dated 28.04.2014, the

Defendant preferred a Regular Civil Appeal being RCA No. 20253/2016

before the learned First Appellate Court.

22. The principal grounds of challenge in the said First Appeal were that

the documents Ex. PW-1/1 to Ex. PW-1/4 placed on record by the Plaintiff

were unregistered and not duly stamped, and could not be relied upon to

confer title, and that the documents Ex. PW-1/5 to Ex. PW-1/8 had

originally been executed in favour of the father of the Defendant, Late Sh.

Vasudev Singh, and that the name of Sh. Ravinder Kumar had been inserted

later; that the said documents did not pertain to the Suit Property; and that

the Defendant had been in possession of the Suit Property much prior to the

year 2005.

23. The learned First Appellate Court, upon re-appreciation of the

record, rejected the pleas regarding the identification of the suit property and

the alleged forgery of Ex. PW-1/5 to Ex. PW-1/8. However, reliance was

placed upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Suraj Lamp & Industries

(P) Ltd. v. State of Haryana, SLP (C) No. 13917 of 2009, to hold that no

right, title or interest in immovable property can be transferred otherwise

than through a registered deed of conveyance.

24. It was further observed that the Plaintiff had failed to establish any

independent source of income for the payment of the sale consideration of

Rs. 4,20,000/- to her husband, and that the transaction therefore, appeared

to be a sham one.

25. The learned First Appellate Court accordingly, held that the

notarised documents could not be relied upon for collateral purposes for

granting possessory rights to the Plaintiff over the Suit Property. It was

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further held that though the Defendant had been unable to make out any

independent right, title or interest in the Suit Property, he was nevertheless

in settled possession thereof and could be evicted only by the person having

title thereto, or by a person authorised by such person.

26. It was held that the documents in favour of the Plaintiff did not

bestow legal title upon her; the First Appeal was allowed and the Suit of

the Plaintiff was dismissed, vide Judgment and Decree dated 22.11.2019.

27. Aggrieved thereby, the Plaintiff has preferred the present Regular

Second Appeal.

28. The principal grounds of challenge are that the learned First

Appellate Court erred in applying the ratio of Suraj Lamp & Industries (P)

Ltd. v. State of Haryana, (2012) 1 SCC 656, retrospectively to a transaction

of the year 2005, in respect of property situated in an unauthorised colony of

Delhi, where properties at the relevant time were being transferred on the

strength of General Power of Attorney, Agreement to Sell, Affidavit and

Receipt.

29. It is contended that the learned First Appellate Court failed to

appreciate that the Suit of the Plaintiff was not one for declaration of title,

but for recovery of possession from a permissive occupant, and that the right

to maintain such a Suit flows not only from a complete ownership right, but

from a better right to possession vis-à-vis the person in actual occupation of

the property.

30. It is further contended that the learned First Appellate Court erred in

reversing the well-reasoned Judgment of the learned Trial Court, without

disturbing the concurrent findings recorded under Issues (a), (c) and (e); and

that the learned Trial Court had correctly held that the unregistered

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documents in favour of the Plaintiff, were admissible for the collateral

purpose of establishing her possession over the Suit Property.

31. Reliance has been placed on the judgments in Asha M. Jain v. Canara

Bank, 94 (2001) DLT 841, Shri Dal Chand v. Bharat Singh, RSA No.

68/2011 decided on 12.05.2011 by this Court, and Shri Ramesh Chand v.

Suresh Chand, RFA No. 358/2000 decided on 09.04.2012 by this Court.

32. The Appellant has proposed the following Substantial Questions of

Law:

"(a) Whether the First Appellate Court committed grave error by

applying the ratio of judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court

in Suraj Lamp & Industries Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Haryana & Anr. [SLP

(C) 13917 of 2009] decided on 11.10.2011 retrospectively to the

property transacted in the year 2005?

(b) Whether the First Appellate Court committed grave error by not

taking judicial notice of the fact that the Suit Property is unauthorized

and located in non-regularized colonies in Delhi, where properties

were being transferred on execution of GPA, Agreement to Sell and

Purchase, Affidavit and Receipt till the Suraj Lamp's judgment?

(c) Whether the First Appellate Court committed grave error by not

following the observation made by this Hon'ble Court in the matter

titled Asha M. Jain v. Canara Bank [94 (2001) DLT 841] as the Suit

Property was transacted in the year 2005 and the said judgment was

only overruled in October 2011 by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in

Suraj Lamp's judgment?

(d) Whether the First Appellate Court has committed grave error by

not maintaining consistency and judicial discipline by ignoring the

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judgments passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter titled

R.V.E. Venkatachala Gounder v. Arulmigu Viswesaraswami & V.P.

Temple & Anr., Civil Appeal No. 10585 of 1996, and by this Hon'ble

Court in the matter titled Shri Dal Chand (Deceased) through his LRs

v. Bharat Singh & Anr. (RSA No. 68/2011 decided on 12.05.2011) and

matter titled Shri Ramesh Chand v. Suresh Chand & Anr. RFA No.

358/2000?

(e) Whether the First Appellate Court wrongly applied the law of

evidence with respect to burden of proof and onus to prove and not

followed the law laid down in A. Raghavamma & Anr. v.

Chenchamma & Anr. AIR 1964 SC 136?

(f) Whether the First Appellate Court committed grave error by

setting aside the well-reasoned Judgment and Decree passed by the

learned Trial Court, without disturbing the finding of facts by the

learned Trial Court?

(g) Whether the First Appellate Court can entertain an Appeal which

had not been valued as per the valuation on which the Suit was valued

by the Appellant/Plaintiff in the original Suit and as per the relief

claimed?"

33. Written Submissions have been filed on behalf of the Appellant in

support of and to substantiate the grounds raised in the present Appeal. The

submissions contained therein reiterate the averments and contentions urged

in the Memorandum of Appeal.

34. The Respondent has also filed his Written Submissions contending

that the present Regular Second Appeal does not involve any substantial

question of law and is liable to be dismissed at the threshold. Reliance has

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been placed on State Bank of India v. S.N. Goyal, (2008) 8 SCC 92, for the

proposition that the jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain a Second

Appeal is conditional upon the existence of a substantial question of law.

35. It is further contended on behalf of the Respondent that the documents

dated 01.09.2005 placed on record by the Appellant, were executed after the

coming into force of the Registration and Other Related Laws (Amendment)

Act, 2001, by which sub-section (1A) was inserted in Section 17 of the

Registration Act, 1908, requiring documents containing contracts to transfer

for consideration, any immovable property for the purpose of Section 53A

of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 be registered, failing which they shall

have no effect for the purpose of the said Section 53A TPA.

36. It is contended that the findings recorded by the learned First

Appellate Court in the impugned Judgment and Decree dated 22.11.2019,

are based on a correct appreciation of the evidence and calls for no

interference.

Submissions heard and record perused.

37. At the outset, it may be observed that the scope of interference in a

Regular Second Appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure,

1908, is confined to substantial questions of law.

38. Though various Substantial Questions of Law have been proposed,

the substantial questions that arise for consideration, are framed as under:

(i) Whether the Appellant/Plaintiff has established a better possessory

title over the Suit Property vis-à-vis the Respondent/Defendant; and

(ii) Whether the learned First Appellate Court erred in law in applying

the ratio of Suraj Lamp & Industries (P) Ltd. v. State of Haryana,

(2012) 1 SCC 656, retrospectively to a transaction of the year 2005?

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I. The Better Possessory Title of the Appellant/Plaintiff

39. It would be first relevant to the findings of the Trial court as well as

the Ld. Appellate Court, in regard to the factual findings.

40. PW-1 Smt. Babita Devi deposed in her evidence by way of affidavit

Ex. PW-1/A, that the Suit Property was originally purchased by her husband

Sh. Ravinder Kumar from one Sh. Pramod Kumar S/o Sh. Jai Prakash by

virtue of the General Power of Attorney Ex. PW-1/5, Agreement to Sell Ex.

PW-1/6, Affidavit Ex. PW-1/7 and Receipt Ex. PW-1/8, all dated

08.06.1995, and that the said property. Thereafter, it was transferred by her

husband in her favour by virtue of the General Power of Attorney Ex. PW-

1/1, Agreement to Sell Ex. PW-1/2, Affidavit Ex. PW-1/3 and Receipt Ex.

PW-1/4, all dated 01.09.2005, for a stated consideration of Rs. 4,22,000/-.

41. PW-2 Sh. Ravinder Kumar, the husband of the Appellant/Plaintiff, in

his evidence by way of affidavit Ex. PW-2/A, corroborated the testimony of

PW-1 on the documents of purchase of the suit property by him and

thereafter, its sale to the plaintiff.

42. The Respondent/Defendant sought to challenge the said chain by

suggesting to PW-2 in his cross-examination that the documents dated

08.06.1995, had originally been executed in favour of his father Sh. Vasudev

Singh and that the name of PW-2 had been manipulated by interpolation.

PW-2 categorically denied the said suggestion. The allegation of forgery

could only have been substantiated by examining the original executant, Sh.

Pramod Kumar, or by adducing expert evidence; the Respondent/Defendant

did neither. Both the Courts have concurrently rejected the plea of forgery,

for want of any independent witness or expert evidence.

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43. The further contention that the said documents pertain to Plot No. 52

and not to the Suit Property bearing No. E-57, has also been examined and

rejected by both the Courts. The Suit Property is situated in an unauthorised

colony in Hari Nagar Extension, Part-II, Badarpur, and the

Respondent/Defendant himself in his cross-examination has admitted that

the Voter Identity Card Ex. DW-1/A "does not bear any house number", his

volunteered explanation being that "when Ex. DW-1/A was prepared there

were no house number allotted since it was a kachi colony". The said

admission of the Respondent/Defendant fully supports the concurrent

finding of both the Courts that at the relevant time, house numbers had not

been allotted in the said unauthorised colony, and that the identity of the Suit

Property is not in dispute; the contention regarding the property number is

therefore, of little consequence and that has been rightly rejected by both

the Courts.

44. The finding of the learned First Appellate Court that the transaction of

01.09.2005 appeared to be a sham one, on the premise that the

Appellant/Plaintiff did not have any independent source of income to have

paid the sale consideration to her husband, also suffers from an error of law.

The said transaction is admittedly between the husband and the wife inter se,

and the Respondent/Defendant, being a stranger to the said transaction, has

no locus to call into question the adequacy of the consideration or the

manner of its payment, in the absence of any plea or proof that the said

transaction was a colourable device entered into with the object of defeating

any anterior right of the Respondent/Defendant. No such plea or proof exists

on the record.

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45. Pertinently, PW-1 in her cross-examination admitted that "money was

never taken from Surender and Virender for staying in the property", and

PW-2 in his cross-examination also admitted that he had "never demanded

any money from Surender and Virender for staying in the suit property".

The said admissions of PW-1 and PW-2 are wholly consistent with the case

set up in the Plaint of a gratuitous family-arrangement/licence having been

granted to the Respondent/Defendant.

46. Both the Courts have concurrently held that the

Respondent/Defendant has been unable to make out any independent right,

title or interest in the Suit Property; the plea of inheritance from his father

Late Sh. Vasudev Singh was rejected for want of any documentary evidence

in support thereof, and the learned First Appellate Court, while differing

from the learned Trial Court on Issues (d) and (f), has expressly

affirmed that "the defendant has been unable to make out any

independent right, title or interest in the suit property".

47. As regards Issue (e), pertaining to the licensor-licensee relationship,

the learned Trial Court has, on a preponderance of probabilities, held the

Respondent/Defendant to be in occupation of the Suit Property as a licensee,

having regard to the parallel admissions noticed above. The said finding has

likewise, not been disturbed by the learned First Appellate Court.

48. The learned First Appellate Court, having so accepted that the

Respondent/Defendant has no right, title or interest in the suit property and

having not disturbed the finding that he is in occupation as a licensee,

nevertheless invoked the doctrine of settled possession in his favour, to hold

that he could be evicted only by a person having title to the suit property.

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49. The Suit instituted by the Appellant/Plaintiff was not a Suit for

Declaration of title, but a Suit for Possession and Permanent Injunction.

50. It is a well-settled principle of law that a Suit for Possession may be

maintained either on the strength of proprietary title, or on the strength of

possessory title. The two rights are conceptually distinct and are separately

recognised under the Indian legal system, as reflected in Articles 64 and 65

of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963.

51. Article 64 governs a Suit for Possession based on previous possession

and not on title, thereby embodying the principle of possessory title; while

Article 65 governs a Suit for Possession based on title, and thereby

recognises proprietary title, wherein the Plaintiff must establish a better legal

title vis-à-vis the Defendant.

52. The Supreme Court in Nair Service Society Ltd. v. K.C. Alexander,

AIR 1968 SC 1165, has authoritatively laid down that a person in possession

of land in the assumed character of owner, and exercising peaceably the

ordinary rights of ownership, has a perfectly good title against the entire

world except the rightful owner. When the facts disclose no absolute title in

either party, possession alone decides. Where the parties trace their

respective rights through a common predecessor-in-interest, or where the

documents on record do not confer absolute title, the enquiry is not into

absolute ownership, but into which of the two has demonstrated the better

possessory title.

53. The Supreme Court in Anathula Sudhakar v. P. Buchi Reddy (Dead)

by LRs., (2008) 4 SCC 594, has considered the principles governing Suits

for Possession premised on title and the comparative strength of the rival

claims. It was held that where the Plaintiff demonstrates a superior

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entitlement to possession and the Defendant is unable to establish any

competing title, the Court is required to examine the relative strength of the

parties' claims rather than insist upon proof of absolute ownership.

54. The Supreme Court, in Rame Gowda v. M. Varadappa Naidu, (2004)

1 SCC 769, has clarified the interplay between possession and title. It was

held that in the absence of proof of better title, possession or prior peaceful

settled possession is itself evidence of title, and that the law presumes

possession to go with the title unless rebutted. The doctrine of settled

possession, as expounded in Rame Gowda, protects a person in settled

possession against forcible dispossession by a rightful owner, but does not

confer any independent substantive right against a person who has

established a better possessory title through due process of law.

55. The said principles were reiterated by the Supreme Court in Poona

Ram v. Moti Ram, (2009) 11 SCC 309, wherein it was observed that legal

remedies appointed for the protection of possession, even against ownership,

are called possessory, while those available for the protection of ownership

itself may be distinguished as proprietary. It was further held that in order to

claim possessory title, the Plaintiff must establish his own case and must

also show that he has a better title than the Defendant.

56. This Court, in Saleem v. Wahid Malik, RSA No. 118/2022, has held

that in a Suit for Possession simplicitor, the Plaintiff is not required to

establish title or ownership, but is only required to establish a better right to

remain in possession of the Suit Property, as compared to the right of the

Defendant.

57. As regards the burden of proof in such a Suit, the Supreme Court in

Anil Rishi v. Gurbaksh Singh, (2006) 5 SCC 558, observed that although the

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initial burden rests upon the Plaintiff, the same stands discharged upon the

Plaintiff placing on record the documentary evidence in support of her case;

thereafter, the onus shifts upon the Defendant to substantiate his defence.

Where the Defendant fails to discharge such onus, the burden of proof

originally cast upon the Plaintiff shall be deemed to have been duly

discharged.

58. The reasoning of Ld. Appellate Court, is intrinsically inconsistent and

is also a misapplication of the doctrine of settled possession, as expounded

in Rame Gowda (supra) and Poona Ram (supra).

59. The doctrine of settled possession is a shield against forcible

dispossession otherwise than by due process of law; it is not a sword to

defeat a regularly instituted Suit for Possession by a person having a better

possessory title. The protection that the doctrine extends to a person in

settled possession, is that he cannot be dispossessed by self-help or by the

use of force, but must be dispossessed only through the due process of law.

The present Suit, instituted by the Appellant/Plaintiff in the Civil Court, is

itself the due process of law contemplated by the doctrine.

60. Furthermore, the doctrine of settled possession, cannot be invoked by

a licensee against his licensor. The possession of a licensee is juridically

referable to that of the licensor and does not constitute an independent

possessory estate capable of being asserted against the licensor upon

revocation of the licence. Having been concurrently held to be in occupation

as a licensee, the Respondent/Defendant cannot, in the very same breath,

claim the protection of settled possession against the Appellant/Plaintiff

who, on the documents proved on record, has a better possessory title than

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the Respondent/Defendant, the latter having been unable to establish any

right, title or interest in the suit property.

61. The contention that the Respondent/Defendant has been in possession

of the Suit Property prior to the year 2005, even if accepted on the strength

of the documents Ex. DW-1/A and Ex. DW-1/K, it merely indicates the

settled possession of the Respondent/Defendant in the suit property, but does

not establish his right, title or interest therein, as has been rightly observed

by the learned First Appellate Court as well.

62. Such settled possession does not enure to the benefit of

Respondent/Defendant as against the Appellant/Plaintiff, who has a better

possessory title, particularly when the said possession of the

Respondent/Defendant is juridically referable to the licence granted to him

by the licensor.

63. In view of the foregoing discussion, the first Substantial Question of

Law is answered in the affirmative, in favour of the Appellant/Plaintiff and

against the Respondent/Defendant. The Appellant/Plaintiff has, on the

documents proved on record and on the concurrent findings of both the

Courts below, established a better possessory title vis-à-vis the

Respondent/Defendant, who was concurrently held to have failed to

establish any independent right, title or interest in the Suit Property, and who

was, in law, a licensee bound to vacate upon revocation of the licence. The

learned First Appellate Court fell in error in dismissing the Suit of the

Appellant/Plaintiff and in invoking the doctrine of settled possession in

favour of the Respondent/Defendant.

II. Misapplication of Suraj Lamp by the First Appellate Court

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64. The learned First Appellate Court, to set aside the Judgment and

Decree of the learned Trial Court, placed reliance upon the judgment of the

Supreme Court in Suraj Lamp & Industries (P) Ltd. v. State of Haryana,

(2012) 1 SCC 656, to hold that no right, title or interest in immovable

property can be transferred otherwise than through a registered deed of

conveyance, and that the notarised documents in favour of the

Appellant/Plaintiff could not be relied upon for any collateral purpose for

granting possessory rights.

65. The said reliance is misplaced. The Supreme Court in Suraj Lamp

(supra), in paragraph 26 of the said judgment, court expressly clarified that

SA/GPA/will transactions can continue to be treated as existing agreements

of sale, and that such transactions may be relied upon to defend possession

under Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, and if entered

before the date of the said Judgment, they may be relied upon to apply for

regularisation of allotments/leases by development authorities.

66. The said observations were fortified in paragraph 27, wherein the

Supreme Court has clarified that the observations made therein are not

intended to in any way affect the validity of sale agreements and powers of

attorney executed in genuine transactions, and by way of example, has

expressly referred to a person giving a power of attorney to his spouse, son,

daughter, brother, sister or a relative, to manage his affairs or to execute a

deed of conveyance.

67. Applying the said saving to the facts of the present case, it is not in

dispute that the transaction in favour of the Appellant/Plaintiff is of

01.09.2005 and the upstream transaction in favour of her husband is of

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08.06.1995; both are anterior in point of time to the judgment in Suraj Lamp

(supra), which was rendered on 11.10.2011.

68. Further, the transaction of 01.09.2005 is admittedly between the

husband and the wife, which squarely falls within the ambit of the genuine

transactions carve-out expressly recognised by the Supreme Court in

paragraph 27 of Suraj Lamp (supra). The documents Ex. PW-1/1 to Ex. PW-

1/8, having been duly proved by PW-1 and PW-2, which do not stand

defeated by the law laid down in Suraj Lamp (supra), for the purposes for

which they may legitimately be relied upon under the proviso to Section 49

of the Registration Act, 1908.

69. In view of the foregoing, the second Substantial Question of Law is

answered in the affirmative, in favour of the Appellant/Plaintiff and against

the Respondent/Defendant.

70. The learned First Appellate Court fell in error in applying the ratio of

Suraj Lamp (supra) retrospectively to a transaction of the year 2005, in

ignoring the saving expressly contained in paragraph 26 thereof, and in

failing to appreciate the genuine-transactions recognised in paragraph 27 of

the said judgment.

III. Challenge to Suit Valuation:

71. Insofar as the contention regarding the alleged improper valuation of

the Regular Civil Appeal is concerned, the same does not arise for

consideration in the present Regular Second Appeal, the question of

valuation of the Suit having been concluded by a separate Judgment of the

learned Civil Judge dated 14.05.2012 on a preliminary issue and the said

Judgment having attained finality.

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Conclusion:

72. In view of the aforesaid discussion, it is held that the impugned

Judgment and Decree dated 22.11.2019 passed by the learned First

Appellate Court in RCA No. 20253/2016 is not sustainable in law and that

the learned Trial Court had rightly decreed the Suit of the

Appellant/Plaintiff for Possession of one room on the first floor of property

bearing No. E-57, Hari Nagar Extension, Part-II, Badarpur, New Delhi-

110044.

73. Accordingly, the present Regular Second Appeal is allowed. The

impugned Judgment and Decree dated 22.11.2019 is hereby set aside and

the Judgment and Decree dated 28.04.2014 passed by the learned Trial

Court in Civil Suit No. 610/2014, is restored.

74. The Respondent/Defendant is granted six months from the date of this

Judgment to hand over the peaceful and vacant possession of the suit

property to the Appellant/Plaintiff, failing which the Plaintiff is at liberty to

seek Possession, in accordance with law.

75. Pending Applications, if any, are also disposed of.

(NEENA BANSAL KRISHNA)

JUDGE

JULY 8, 2026

AS/RS