C/CRA/173/2004 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 06/02/2026

Reserved On : 28/01/2026

Pronounced On : 06/02/2026

IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD

R/CIVIL REVISION APPLICATION NO. 173 of 2004

With

CIVIL APPLICATION (FOR VACATING INTERIM RELIEF) NO. 1 of 2025

In R/CIVIL REVISION APPLICATION NO. 173 of 2004

With

R/CIVIL REVISION APPLICATION NO. 177 of 2004

FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:

HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE J. C. DOSHI

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Approved for Reporting Yes No

==========================================================

BHARAT PETROLEUM CORPORATION LTD.

Versus

NIRMA LTD. & ORS.

==========================================================

Appearance:

MS MINOO A SHAH(774) for the Petitioner

MR KAMAL TRIVEDI, SR. ADVOCATE with MR KUNAN B NAIK(3210) for

the Respondent No. 1

MR MEHUL VAKHARIYA, ADVOCATE for Respondent No.2

RULE SERVED BY DS for the Respondent Nos.3,4,5

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CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE J. C. DOSHI

CAV JUDGMENT

1.These are the rent revisions one by the lessee and

another by sub-lessee challenging eviction order.

2.The eviction order passed in HRP Suit NO.103 of 1985

confirmed by common order in Regular Civil Appeal Nos.42

and 2000 and 22 of 2000, is a subject matter of challenge in

these CRAs. Thus, I propose to decide both the CRAs by this

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common judgment.

2.1.For the sake of convenience and brevity, parties are

referred to as per their original status before the learned trial

Court.

3.The facts essential to decide the matters noted from the

impugned judgment are as under:-

3.1Mr. Pravinbhai Patel and his brothers in the capacity of

landlord filed the aforestated HRP suit against defendant No.1

Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited formerly known as

Burmah Shell Oil Storage & Distribution Company of India

Limited (in short “lessee”) and defendant No.2 Mahendra

Motors (in short “sub-lessee”) along with three other sub sub

lessee i.e. Honest Car Repairing Works, Rajesh Auto Centre

and Prashant Tyre Services for eviction of land bearing Final

Plot No.108/1 admeasuring 1000 sq yard being part of Town

Planning Scheme No.3 situated at Ashram Road, Ahmedabad

(in short “demised land”). The landlord claimed that they are

the part of the HUF and they have leased the demised land to

the lessee, a company incorporated in UK and carrying

business inter alia at Bombay by entering and executing lease

deed on 24.3.1972, which was registered as Sr No.3910 at the

Sub Registrar Officer, Ahmedabad for the time period of 14

years commencing from 29.9.1970 and was to expire in

midnight of 29.9.1984, at a monthly rent of Rs.1000/-

exclusive of all taxes.

3.2One of the conditions of the lease deed was that the

lessor was at liberty to construct any structure upon the

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demised land and had full and free liberty to use the demised

land as a storage, depot or a service station for the purpose of

selling or otherwise dealing in, or of receiving, storing,

treating or handling for distribution of petroleum or any of its

products and Kindered Motor Accessories or any other trade

or business.

3.3Under the terms and conditions of the lease deed,

lessee had full and free liberty to erect, and maintain in the

demised land all manner of equipments, plant, building,

machinery, tanks, godowns, pumps, filing sheds and other

structures, fixtures and appliances and facilities to use all

parcels of the demised land for the purpose stated in the

earlier part of the lease deed and further had full liberty to

sublet, give or license to any third party the demised land

without any further reference to the lessor.

3.4The lessee is an undertaking of the Government of India

and a successor in title to Burmah Shell Oil Storage &

Distribution Company of India Limited. The Government of

India on 24.1.1976 undertook the possession of original lessee

by virtue of Burma Shell (Acquisition of Undertakings in India)

Act ,1976. Thereafter, name of the company was changed to

Bharat Refineries Ltd. w.e.f. 12.2.1976. Accordingly, name of

the lessee was changed in a lease deed and Bharat Refineries

Ltd. has been treated as lessee.

3.5In a suit, it is claimed that the defendants have no right

to interpret the terms and conditions of the lease deed

permitting lessee or sub-lessee to do any business , which

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might be outside the scope of storage, depot or a service

station for the purpose of selling or otherwise dealing in, or of

receiving, storing, treating or handling for distribution of

petroleum or any of its products and Kindered Motor

Accessories or any other trade or business. Thus, it is claimed

by the plaintiffs that lessee has no whatsoever right to erect

any other construction or to use the demised land other than

for the purpose it was let or to induct any sub-lessee, but the

lessee did not abide to the terms and conditions in continuous

use of demised land for which it was let, further, did not abide

abide the terms and conditions of the lease deed and erected

the structure of permanent nature, it cannot be removed

without changing edifice of the demised land and thirdly, the

sub-lessee has further sublet the demised land without the

permission of the landlord.

3.6According to the terms and conditions of the lease deed,

it expired in the midnight of 29.9.1984 and thereafter, the

defendant No.1 – lessee and his sub-lessee have no right to

occupy the demised land, but were liable to vacant the same

after removing the structure set up on it. However, the

lessee requested for renewal of the lease deed by letter dated

15.11.1983. The lessor did not accept the same and point out

breach of terms and conditions and further stated that he has

no interest in renewal of the lease and asked to handover the

vacant and peaceful possession of the demised land and

further by letter dated 13.2.1983 terminated the tenancy.

3.7Expanding the case, the plaintiff pleaded that the

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defendant No.2 – sub-lessee without any right unlawfully and

unauthorizedly inducted the defendant No.3 Honest Car

Repairing woks, defendant No.4 Rajesh Auto Centre and

defendant No.5 Prashant Tyres Services and making profitory

unit by parting with the possession of the part of the demised

land.

3.8In addition to the aforesaid grounds, the plaintiff claimed

eviction of other ground of Rent Act viz personal and bona

fide requirement; greater hardship and required the demised

land for the purpose of making some construction. According

to the plaintiffs, since by efflux of time, the lease is terminated

and the status of the defendant No.1 became statutory tenant,

he cannot act beyond statutory permission as he enjoyed

limited right and liability under the provisions of the Rent Act.

3.9Mainly upon above averments, the plaintiffs put his case

for eviction.

3.10The learned trial Court in suit proceedings, framed as

many as 25 issues and held that the plaintiffs landlord

succeeded in proving the grounds available u/s 13(1)(a), 13(1)

(b), 13(1)(e) and section 15(d) of the Bombay Rent Act. The

learned trial Court simultaneously held that the plaintiffs

failed to prove the ground of eviction available u/s 13(1)(g)

and 13(1)(i) of the Act.

3.11The learned Court No.7, Small Causes Court,

Ahmedabad, by judgment and decree 20.12.1999, partly

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decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiffs and directed lessee

and sub-lessee to handover the peaceful and vacant

possession of the demised land to the plaintiffs and permitted

the plaintiffs to withdraw rent if any deposited by the lessee

or sub-lessee.

3.12Two appeals were preferred against the judgment and

decree passed by the learned trial Court. Regular Civil

Appeal No.42 of 2000 was preferred by the BPCL – lessee and

Regular Civil Appeal No.21 of 2000 was preferred by

Mahendra Motors – sub-lessee before the Bench of the Small

Causes Court, Ahmedabad under the provisions of the Rent

Act.

3.13Vide judgment and decree dated 23.3.2004, the

appellate bench of learned Small Causes Court dismissed both

the appeals by confirming the judgment and decree passed in

the HRP suit.

3.14Hence, present revision under the provisions of the

Bombay Rent Act.

4.I have heard learned advocate Ms. Minoo Shah for the

BPCL – lessee, learned advocate Mr. Mehul Vakhariya for

Mahendra Motors – sub-lessee, who has adopted arguments of

learned advocate Ms. Minoo Shah for the revisionists and

learned senior counsel Mr. Kamal Trivedi assisted by learned

advocate Mr. Kunal B. Naik for the landlord. For other

respondents, none remained present.

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4.1Both the learned advocates have also placed on record

written submissions.

5.Learned advocate Ms. Minoo Shah appearing for the

revisionist – defendant No.1 would submit that clause 4(b) of

the lease deed is for renewal and it is permitting the lessee to

ask for the renewal of the lease deed. She would further

submit that the lessee has asked for the renewal within the

stipulated time period, but the lessor having remained

adamant did not accept the request of the lessee to renew the

list. She would further submit that since the lessee was ready

and willing to renew the lease deed as per terms and

conditions of the landlord, the status of the lessee would not

transfer to the statutory tenant, but remains contractual

tenant. She would further submit that the learned Courts

below have committed serious error in rejecting clause 4(b) of

the lease deed and thereby, concurrent findings of fact

impugned in both the petitions suffer from the illegality.

5.1Learned advocate Ms. Shah would further submit that

since clause 2(g) of the lease deed permits the lessee to sublet

the demised land even without reference to the lessor

inducting Mahendra Motors on sub-lease or others as sub sub

lease would not breach terms and conditions of the lease

deed. She would further submit that this issue is also not

properly comprehended by the learned Courts below and did

not apply properly to the interest of the parties emerging from

clause 2(g) of the lease deed and thus, serious error has been

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committed by the learned Courts below.

5.2Learned advocate Ms. Shah would further submit that

findings of the learned Courts below that the lessee and sub-

lessee have carried out construction without the permission of

the landlord are in violation of the terms and conditions of the

lease deed are also incorrect finding, as lease deed permits

the lessee and sub-lessee to do any kind of the business.

Meanwhile, the lessee and sub-lessee have carried out the

construction to do their business. The taste of removability

being a core to decide the application u/s 13(1)(a) and 13(1)

(b) of the Rent Act has not been properly addressed in correct

manner and thereby, the learned Courts below have

committed serious error.

5.3Lastly, learned advocate Ms. Minoo Shah would submit

that pending the proceedings respondent – Nirma Limited

has purchased the demised land. She would further submit

that Transfer of Properties Act, on execution of the sale deed,

recognized transfer of title and possession, but execution of

sale deed if does not recognize transfer of the decree or

assignment of the decree, the subsequent purchaser is not

entitled to get the fruits of the decree. Learned advocate Ms.

Shah, in the aforesaid circumstances, would submit that the

respondent – Nirma Limited is not legally entitled to exercise

right of landlord to recover the possession of the demised

land.

5.4Learned advocate Ms. Shah would further submit that

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the learned Courts below have erred in interpreting terms and

conditions of the lease deed as well as position of sub-lessee

and sub sub-lessee, as also construction carried out,

permitted by lease deed.

5.5In the aforesaid premises, learned Ms. Minoo Shah

requests to allow both the revisions.

6.Learned advocate Mr. Mehul Vakaria, appearing for the

sub-lessee Mahendra Motors adopted the aforesaid arguments

of learned advocate, Ms. Minoo Shah.

7.Learned Senior counsel Mr. Kamal Trivedi, assisted by

learned advocate Mr Kunal Naik, in contrast to the aforesaid

arguments, would submit that phrase “any other trade or

business” incorporated in clause 1 of the lease deed has to be

read applying golden rule of interpretation of the document.

The lease deed and its clauses has to be read as a whole and

not in isolation. He would further submit that the said phrase

has to be interpreted by applying rule of ejusdm generis or

rule of Noscitur a sociis. Meaning thereby, the words or

expressions in any definition are known by their associate

expressions or words and they take their colour therefrom

accordingly. He would further submit that the BPCL was

leased the demised land for storage, depot or a service station

for the purpose of selling or otherwise dealing in, or of

receiving, storing, treating or handling for distribution of

petroleum or any of its products and Kindered Motor

Accessories or any other trade or business. Meaning thereby.

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that the BPCL has been leased out the demised land for the

specific purpose. He would further submit that phrase “any

other trade or business” cannot be read in isolation to

interpret on own sweat will and desire, to do any business.

7.1Learned Senior counsel Mr. Trivedi further argued that

phrase “ Kindered Motor Accessories” used in clause 1 of the

lease deed mean “akin” or “similar” i.e. accessories relatable

to the main product viz. Petroleum for which the demised land

was leased. It is thus, argued that defendant Nos.3 to 5

carrying out their business in name of Honest Car Repairing

Works, Rajesh Auto Centre and Prashant Tyre Services

respectively or the business carried out by the sub-lessee

Mahendra Motors to do their respective business fall within

the category, that is not permitted

7.2Under the circumstances, carrying of the business other

than the purpose for which the demised land was leased is

amounting to subletting.

7.3Learned Senior counsel Mr. Trivedi to support that the

document has to be read wholly and the interpretation has to

be made by applying rule of ejusdm generis or by a rule of

Noscitur a sociis, relied upon the judgment in case of Nemai

Chandra Kumar Vs. Mani Square Ltd, (2024) 17 SCC

743 (para 82 and 88) and in case of Rakesh Bhanot Vs.

Gurdas Agro Pvt. Ltd., (2025) 6 Scc 781 (para 17 & 23).

7.4Learned Senior counsel Mr. Trivedi would further argue

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that repairing of cars, motorcycle, electrical business and

puncture work of deflated tyres cannot be said to be allied

business of storage handling of petroleum products.

Secondly, it was argued that the BPCL has not produced on

record copy of the dealership agreement with Mahendra

Motors and therefore, the learned Courts below, at no point of

time, had knowledge that under what kind of terms and

conditions, the BPCL has subleased the demised land to

Mahendra Motors. It is further submitted that it is not the

case where the lessee has exercised option and sublet the

demised land to sub-lessee, but here it is a case where the

sub-lessee exercised option and sub sub-leased the demised

land to defendant Nos.3 to 5. the sub-lessee at no point of

time has right to sublet the demised land further to sub sub-

lessee and thus, it is in clear breach of section 13(1)(e) and

15A of the Rent Act.

7.5Reliance was placed upon the judgment in case of

Maheshbhai Nanjibhai Khuman Vs. Ahmedabad Luhana

Mahajan Wadi Trust, 2025 AIJEL HC 252594 and in case

of Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. Vs. heirs of

deceased Shishirkumari @ Floraben, (2025) AIJEL HC

2520.

7.6Insofar as issue of permanent construction is concerned,

it was argued by learned Senior counsel Mr. Trivedi that the

BPCL has not made any averment in written statement in

regards to permanent construction. The defendant Nos.3 and

4, who have filed written statements, clearly admitted that

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they have constructed shed on the demised land and

therefore, there is clear attraction of section 13(1)((b).

7.7Lastly, it is submitted by learned Senior counsel that in

appeal proceedings filed by the lessee and sub-lessee, they

themselves have filed an application to join Nirma Limtied as

Nirma Limited is stepping into the shoes of the landlord on

purchasing demised land along with right to execute the

decree. It is submitted that copy of sale deed executed

between erstwhile landlord and Nirma Limited placed on

record indicates that the landlord has obtained decree from

the Court in regards to demised land and they are selling the

demised land to the Nirma Limited with the right to obtain

fruit of the decree. Thus, now, no argument can be made that

Nirma Limited has no right to continue the eviction

proceedings. Even otherwise, Order 21 Rule 16 of the Code

permit and recognize assignment of decree.

7.8In support of above argument, learned Senior counsel

Mr. Trivedi place reliance in case of Jugalkishore Saraf Vs.

Raw Cotton Co. Ltd., (1955) 1 SCC 248, Dhani Ram

Gupta Vs, Lala Sriram, (1980) 2 SCC 162 and in case of

Vaishno Devi Construction Vs. Union of India, (2022) 2

SCC 290.

7.9Learned Senior counsel Mr. Trivedi summarizing the

submissions, would further submit that revisional power of the

High Court u/s 29(2) of the Rent Act is not equated with power

of reconsideration available to the appellate Court in first

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appeal. Power u/s 29(2) is though wider than the power

available u/s 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the

revisional Court u/s 29(2) cannot re-appreciate evidence and

take a different view. In support of this submission, learned

Senior counsel Mr. Trivedi has relied upon the judgment in

case of Helper Girdharbhai Vs. Saiyed Mohmad, (1987) 3

SCC 538 and in case of Patel Valmik Himmatlal Vs. Patel

Mohanlal Muljibhai, (1998) 7 Scc 383 .

7.10Upon above submissions and arguments, learned Senior

counsel Mr. Trivedi requests the Court to dismiss both the

petitions.

8.I have heard learned advocates appearing for all the

parties, perused the impugned judgment and decree passed

by the learned Courts below as well as record and

proceedings.

9.At the outset, let refer to the judgment in case of Patel

Valmik Himatlal vs. Patel Mohanlal Muljibhai (Dead) Through

Lrs. - 1998 (7) SCC 383, wherein, the Hon’ble Apex Court

examined the ambit and scope of Section 29 of the Rent Act.

Honble Supreme Court has observed as under :

"5. The ambit and scope of the said section came up for

consideration before this Court in Helper Girdharbhai V/ s.

Saiyed Mohamad Mirasaheb Kadri and Ors. (JT 1987 (2) SC

599) and after referring to a catena of authorities,

Sabyasachi Mukharji, J. drew a distinction between the

appellate and the revisional jurisdictions of the courts and

opined that the distinction was a real one. It was held that

the right to appeal carries with it the right of rehearing both

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on questions of law and fact, unless the statute conferring

the right to appeal itself limits the rehearing in some way,

while the power to hear a revision is generally given to a

particular case is decided according to law. The Bench

opined that although the High Court had wider powers than

that which could be exercised under Sec. 115 of the Code of

Civil Procedure, yet its revisional jurisdiction could only be

exercised for a limited purpose with a view to satisfying

itself that the decision under challenge before it is according

to law. The High Court cannot substitute its own findings on

a question of fact for the findings recorded by the courts

below on reappraisal of evidence. Did the High Court exceed

its jurisdiction.

6. The powers under Sec. 29(2) are revisional powers with

which the High Court is clothed. It empowers the- High Court

to correct errors which may make the decision contrary to

law and which errors go to the root of the decision hut it

does not vest the High Court with the power to rehear the

matter and reappreciate the evidence. The mere fact that a

different view is possible on reappreciation of evidence

cannot be a ground for exercise of the revisional jurisdiction."

10.Keeping in mind the ambit and scope of revision u/s

29(2) of the Rent Act, if we perused the facts of the case, the

plaintiffs landlord pleaded eviction of the lessee and sub-

lessee on various grounds available u/s 13 and 15 of the Rent

act. The learned Courts below did agree to the submission of

the plaintiffs qua grounds available u/s 13(1)(a), 13(1)(b) and

15(2) of the Rent Act to believe that the lessee and sub-lessee

have carried out construction without prior permission of the

landlord on the demised land, also has sublet and thus, lessee

and sub-lessee required eviction from the demised land.

Other ground of personal bona fide requirement of demised

land for the purpose of construction etc. were repeated.

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11.Argument of learned advocate Ms. Minoo Shah that

renewal clause being clause 4(b) in the lease deed granted

option to the lessee to renew the lease which commenced

from 29.9.1970 and expired in midnight of 29.9.1984. The

lessee or the tenant within the time period had applied for

renewal of the lease, say much prior to it expired i.e. on

15.11.1984. Therefore, she would submit that the view taken

by the learned Courts below that the lease deed expired on

midnight of 29.9.1984 is erroneous view. She would further

submit that once the lessee and sub-lessee opted to renew the

lease, it deemed to have been renewed in view of clause 4(b)

of the lease deed. I am unimpressed with the such

submission. Clause 4(b) reads as under:-

"If the lessee shall be desirous of taking a renewal

lease of the demised premises upon the expiration of

the term hereby granted then, the lessor shall on

receipt of a notice in writing to that effect, grant to

the lessee a fresh lease of the demised premises for

one further period not exceeding ten years each at

the rent and upon the same terms and conditions in

all respects as are reserved and contained herein.

Provided however that should the lessee exercise the

aforesaid option of renewal for a period lesser than

full renewal period then in that case, the lessee shall

be entitled to a further option equal to the balance of

the renewal period and the lessee shall be entitled to

continue to occupy and use the demised premises for

such further period as it may desire notwithstanding

whether a fresh lease has been executed and

registered or not by the lessor."

12.The learned Courts below interpreted clause 4(b) of the

lease deed and held that the lease deed provides for the

renewal of fresh lease for further 10 years, contains words

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“mutually agreed by both the parties ”. Thus, one sided

renewal request of the lessee or sub-lessee would not per se

deemed that the lease deed has been extended for further 10

years.

13.This Court in Hindustan Petroleum Corp Ltd. (supra) in

identical fact situation, in para 8 held that if fresh

renewal/lease deed is not executed as per section 107 of the

Transfer of Property Act, it cannot be held that lease deed is

renewed. In the present case, the fact remained undisputed

that the landlord did not acceded to the request of the tenant

to renew the lease for further period of 10 year or any other

period. The unilateral request of the tenant has not been

accepted. Thus, before expiry of the lease period by efflux of

time the statues of the lessee became statutory tenant and he

is to abide by the provisions of the Rent Act. Thus, first

contention raised by learned advocate Ms. Minoo Shah is

devoid of merits. The learned Courts below have

comprehensively and thoroughly discussed this issue. I see no

reason to take a different view than the view taken by the

learned Courts below.

14.The aforesaid findings took this Court to the next

submission that permanent construction has been carried out

by sub sub-lessee on the demised land. It is the fact that in

the written statement filed by the lessee i.e. BPCL, no

contention put-forth to deny the allegation of illegal

construction on the demised land. Defendant Nos.3 and 4

who have filed the written statement at Exh.50 in no uncertain

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terms accepted that permanent construction has been carried

out on the demised land in form of shed to protect defendant

Nos.3 and 4 from inclement whether, especially during

summer and monsoon. This is how the sub sub-lessee

accepted the fact of permanent construction. The lessee, sub-

lessee and sub sub-lessee failed to prove any documentary

evidence on record to show that construction carried out by

them has been carried out after obtaining permission from the

local government. Be that as it may, what could be inferred

that the sub-lessee was permitted to raise construction, but to

the extent it relates to the purport and object of using the

open land being leased out to the lessee i.e. to store the

petroleum products or distribution thereof and not for any

other purpose. Thus, mischief of section 13(1)(a) and (b) of

the Rent Act attracted in the matter. It is finding of learned

Courts below being compendious and in depth analysis and

appreciation of the evidence. This Court under the revisional

jurisdiction finds no reason to interfere with this encyclical

findings specially being barred u/s 13(1)(e and 15(2) of the Rent

Act attracted in the matter.

15.Clause 2(g) of the lease deed reads as under:-

“"That the lessee shall have full liberty to sublet or

license the said premises without restriction and without

any further reference to the lessor and this clause shall

at all times be deemed to be the written consent of the

lessor for the purpose"

16.Therefore, the lessee was permitted to sublet or license

demised land without restriction or without any reference to the

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lessor. However, plain reading of the clause indicates that

lessee can sublet. The case on hand is such where the lessee

sublet to Mahendra Motors, thereby Mahendra Motors became

sub-lessee. Dealership agreement between the lessee and the

sub-lessee claimed to be executed has not been produced on

record. Thus, at no point of time, the landlord or the

concerned Court below came to know about terms and

conditions of the alleged dealership agreement or on which

ground the lessee has sublet the demised land to the sub-

lessee Mahendra Motors. Be that as it may, in the present

case, undisputedly, Mahendra Motors has sublet to three

other persons, namely, Honest Car Repairing Works, Rajesh

Auto Centre and Prashant Tyre Services. In absence of any

documentary evidence in line of clause 2(g), it can be

sufficiently inferred that it is further subletting at the hand of

sub-lessee Mahendra Motors for the purpose of making profit.

It is proved on record that these three persons have been

leased the demised land further as well as the construction

made thereon at monthly consideration of Rs.65/-, Rs.600/-

and Rs.200/-. Clause 2(g) permitted lessee to sublet demised

land or part thereof not to the sub-lessee to part away with

leased demised land. In other words, it was BPCL who was

entitled to sublet the demised land or part thereof, which has

been done by the lessee to the sub-lessee Mahendra Motors,

however, that sub-lessee Mahendra Motors has no right to

further lease the demised land. This is clear act in breach of

section 13(1)(e) and 15(2) of the Rent Act.

17.In Gajanan Dattatraya Vs. Sherbanu, AIR 1975 SC

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2156, the Hon’ble Apex Court held as under:-

“Once there is sub-letting the embargo placed on the

right of the landlord to get possession is raised and it

is not necessary that sub-letting should continue till

the date of the suit. To accede to the contention of

the appellant that the sub- letting must continue till

the date of the suit, would mean that a tenant would

not be within the mischief of unlawful sub-letting, if

after the landlord gives notice...the sub-tenant

vacates."

18.This Court in Maheshbhai Nanjibhai Khuman (supra),

examined the issue of subletting in para 19 to 24, which reads

as under:-

“19.In Goppulal Vs. Thakurji, AIR 1969 SC

1291, the Hon’ble Apex Court in regards to

Rajasthan Rent Control Act, section 13(1)(e), held

that sub-letting even if was prior to the Act coming

into force to continue after the Act, continuation of

subletting after the Act is justified to pass a decree

for possession.

20. In order to prove subletting, two ingredients

are necessary. (1) exclusive possession and (2)

valuable consideration. The sub-tenant must be in

exclusive possession of the portion given on lease and

the tenant must make profit thereof. Parting with the

possession of the lease property is the predominant

test. As far as consideration or profit made by the

tenant is concerned, it is difficult to prove for the

landlord that there was valuable consideration

between the tenant and sub-tenant, as it is only

within exclusive knowledge of the tenant and sub-

tenant and since both are interested in suppressing

that fact, it is difficult to find out that whether the

tenant has made out any profit by handing over

exclusive possession to the sub-tenant.

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21. In Bhagwati Spg and Wvg Works vs.

Ahmedabad New Cotton Mills Co. Ltd., AIR 1980

Guj 20, the Coordinate Bench of this Court believed

that in such case, consideration must be inferred

from the facts.

22. The word “unlawfully” used by law maker in

section 13(1)(e) of the Act applies to all three i.e.

subletting, assigned or transferred. [See: Anand

Nivas Pvt. Versus Anandji Kalyanjis Pedhi, 1965

AIR(SC) 414] . Section 13(1)(e) of the Rent Act is

much wider and it is not confined merely to the acts

of unlawful sub-letting. Therefore, even if,

ingredients of subletting i.e. possession and

consideration are not proved, but if sub-tenant is

found to be in possession and doing different business

than the original tenant, it is sufficient to infer that

there has been assignment or transfer of tenancy

right by the tenant. [See: Harshachandra

Narsibhai Patel And Others Versus Ibrahim Haji

Khubanbhai, 1985 (1) GLR 192 ].

23. The Coordinate Bench of this Court (G.T.

Nanavati, J, as he then was) in case of

Harshachandra (supra), has observed that once the

tenant is out of possession and a transfer of premises

is made to a relative or a known person, that would

be covered by later part of clause (e). this Court has

also observed that to give these words a restricted

meaning and equate such a transfer within subletting

is to make that part of the sub section redundant.

Thus, in absence of proof of consideration, if there is

a clear case of third party being in exclusive

possession, it would be covered by word “transfer”.

The word “in any other manner” at the end of clause

(e) go to emphasize that they include any type of

transfer. To prove subletting, transfer or assignment,

initial burden is on the landlord, but once the

landlord had evidence that third party is in

possession of rented premises, the burden shifts upon

the tenant to satisfy the conscience of the Court

about his possession as it is only known to the tenant.

[See” section 106 of the Evidence Act]. Under the

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aforesaid premises and legal provision, if we come to

the facts of the case, it reveals that the defendant

No.1 appeared before the court and state on oath

that he has parted possession with the defendant

No.2 and put defendant No.2 as Pagi in the rented

premises. In these factual aspects, the case of the

plaintiff was proved no sooner the defendant No.1

has given deposition on oath. The dependent No.2

tried to put case that she is a tenant of the rented

premises, the plaintiff failed to establish so by leading

evidence in this regard. However, the possession of

the defendant No.2 is proved in the rented premises

to be that of sub-tenant or the person in whose favour

the interest of the tenant has been transferred or

assigned without contractual permission or without

the consent of the landlord. Pellucidly, privity of

contract between landlord and the defendant No.2

does not exist. The plaintiff precisely came out with

the case that the defendant No.2 is the sub-tenant

and tenancy interest is assigned or transferred to the

defendant No.2. It is proved on perusal of over-

whelming evidence of on record.

24. As far as contention of learned advocate Mr.

Gandhi that no relief is prayed by the plaintiff trust to

ask for the possession from the defendant No.2 is

concerned, let me say that relief of asking possession

from the tenant is sufficient enough to pass a decree

against any person who is holding interest on behalf

of the tenant. sub-tenant is not even necessary party

under the provisions of section 13(1)(e) of the Rent

Act. In this regard, there are clear findings of this

Court in case of Manjulaben (supra).”

19.The learned Courts below in the impugned judgment and

decree exhaustively dealt with the issue raised in the revisions

and this Court does not find any reason to interfere with such

well reasoned order under revisional jurisdiction.

20.Lastly, it was also argued that lease deed provides to

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conduct any other business and thus, carrying out business

other than the business of storage of petroleum products is

not a change of user. The important terms and conditions of

the lease deed in this regards reads as under:-

“(1) and appurtenances thereto belonging Together

with all rights, easements C or hitherto enjoyed

therewith.

(2) And together also, with full and free liberty to the

lessee to use the demised premises as a Storage

Depot of a Service Station for the purpose of selling

or otherwise dealing in or of receiving storing,

treating or handling for distribution petroleum or any

of its pro- ducts and kindred motor accessories or any

other trade or business.”

21.It is no more res integra that golden rule of

interpretation is to read document on its entirety with

the object stated therein say “any other trade or business”.

The phrase made in the aforesaid rule operate independently

or is operating to any manner to the expression made in

earlier part of the clause is the question to be address. The

principle of ejusdm generis or by a rule of Noscitur a sociis

applies.

22.The Hon’ble Apex Court in Nemai Chandra Kumar (supra)

and in case of Rakesh Bhanot (supra), referring to the

aforestated principles, held that word or phrase should not

read in isolation, but should be read in context of earlier

expression. In the aforesaid premises, if we see the clause

where phrase “any other trade or business” is employed, the

other expressions are that the demised land is leased out as a

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storage, depot or a service station for the purpose of selling or

otherwise dealing in, or of receiving, storing, treating or

handling for distribution of petroleum or any of its products

and Kindered Motor Accessories or any other trade or

business. Thus, interpretation implies that any other trade of

business has to be read with loud object of lease i.e. storing of

petroleum products. Alike the word “kindered” as per the

dictionary gives meaning very similar or related means

Kindered Motor Accessories, which is permitted to sell his

motor accessories which akin to the storage of the petroleum

products.

23.In view of above, there is clear breach of terms and

conditions of the tenancy. The BPCL and Burmah Shell Oil

Storage & Distribution Company of India Limited having

abandoned the demised land permitted Mahendra Motors to

sell different kind of motor accessories on the demised land

and subsequently, Mahendra Motor permitted three other sub

sub-lessee to carry out car repairing work or puncture work

or related business, which cannot be treated as kindered

motor accessories. The learned Courts below found clear

breach of tenancy terms and conditions. I see no reason to

interfere with such well reasoned findings.

24.Lastly, it was submitted by learned advocate Ms. Minoo

Shah that Nirma Limited did not have any right to execute the

decree. The contention was that selling or transfer of

property does not include assignment of the decree. This is

not a acceptable submission on the ground that in appeal filed

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by the lessee and sub-lessee Mahendra Motors, an

applications at Exhs.11 and 13 were moved to join Nirma

Limited as party in the appeal proceedings on the ground that

Nirma Limited became owner of the demised land and also

purchased the decree. In the aforesaid circumstances, it

would not lie correctly in the mouth of revisionists that Nirma

Limited has not right to carry out proceedings or to execute

the decree. Nonetheless, the sale deed executed between the

erstwhile landlord and Nirma Limited clearly depicts

condition and bestowed right upon Nirma Limited to execute

the decree. Apt to note that Order 21 Rule 16 of the Code

also recognizes assignment of decree. In view of above, the

submission canvassed by learned advocate Ms. Shah failed to

stand on its leg.

25.Resultantly, both the CRAs found meritless and

accordingly, stand dismissed. Interim relief, if any, granted

earlier stands vacated forthwith. Rule discharged.

26.Registry is directed to return back the R & P, if any, to

the concerned Court forthwith.

27.Registry to maintain copy of this order in each matter.

(J. C. DOSHI,J)

SHEKHAR P. BARVE

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FURTHER ORDER

After pronouncement of the judgment, learned advocate

Ms. Minoo A. Shah requests to continue the interim-relief for

04 weeks so as to enable her to approach the higher forum.

The request is acceded to and the interim-relief is continued

to operate for a further period of 04 weeks.

(J. C. DOSHI,J)

SHEKHAR P. BARVE

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