2026 INSC 999 Page 1 of 62

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 4732 OF 2024

BHARAT RAJ MEENA …APPELLANT (S)

VERSUS

CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION …RESPONDENT(S)

WITH

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 4733 OF 2024

JUDGEMENT

NONGMEIKAPAM KOTISWAR SINGH, J.

1. These appeals arise out of a common anti-corruption

investigation conducted by the Central Bureau of Investigation

pursuant to FIR No. RC19(A)/2005/KER/CBI registered on

04.08.2005 by the Anti-Corruption Branch, CBI, Kochi, on

allegations that the appellant, while serving as Divisional

Security Commissioner, Railway Protection Force, Palakkad,

had abused his official position by demanding and obtaining

Page 2 of 62

illegal gratification through subordinate officials acting as

intermediaries from Railway Protection Force personnel seeking

transfers, postings and other service-related benefits. The

investigation culminated in the filing of multiple final reports

and the institution of several prosecutions founded on distinct

alleged transactions of illegal gratification.

2. The present appeals arise from two such prosecutions,

namely C.C. No. 2 of 2014 and C.C. No. 3 of 2015 on the file of

the learned Special Judge (SPE/CBI) -III, Ernakulam. By

judgment dated 31.05.2016 in C.C. No. 2 of 2014, concerning

the allegations made by complainant Nandakumar (PW -6), the

learned Special Judge convicted the appellant for offences

punishable under Sections 7 and 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d)

of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (Hereinafter referred

to as “the Act”) and sentenced him to undergo rigorous

imprisonment for two years and to pay a fine of Rs. 1,00,000/-,

with a default sentence of six months’ simple imprisonment, no

separate sentence being awarded under Section 7 of the Act.

3. By a separate judgment of the same date in C.C. No. 3 of

2015, concerning three transactions i.e., allegations made by

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T.V. Rajan (PW-9), C.K. Aravindan (PW-10) and N.P. Gopi Kumar

(PW-11), the appellant was convicted under Sections 7 and 13(2)

read with Section 13(1)(a) of the Act and sentenced to undergo

rigorous imprisonment for one year each and to pay a fine of Rs.

25,000/- each, with a default sentence of three months’ simple

imprisonment, in respect of the offences under Section 7

pertaining to the transactions involving alleged bribe giver C.K.

Aravindan (PW-10) and Gopi Kumar (PW-11), and further

sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two years and

to pay a fine of Rs. 1,00,000/-, with a default sentence of six

months’ simple imprisonment, for the offence punishable under

Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(a) of the Act, all substantive

sentences being directed to run concurrently.

4. The aforesaid convictions and sentences were affirmed by the

High Court of Kerala by separate judgments and orders dated

24.05.2024 rendered in Criminal Appeal No. 591 of 2016 and

Criminal Appeal No. 587 of 2016 respectively. However, in

Criminal Appeal No. 587 of 2016, only the conviction pertaining

to transaction involving bribe giver Gopi Kumar (PW-11) was

upheld.

Page 4 of 62

5. Since both appeals emanate from the same FIR, arise from a

common investigation, involve overlapping evidence, common

witnesses including approvers, and raise substantially identical

questions concerning the proof of demand and acceptance of

illegal gratification through intermediaries, the evidentiary value

of approver testimony, the validity of prosecution sanction and

the circumstances in which the statutory presumption under

Section 20 of the Act may be invoked, they were heard together

and are accordingly being disposed of by this common judgment.

6. The prosecution case has its genesis in a complaint

made by one P.P. Nandakumar, a Junior Clerk attached to the

Personnel Branch of the Railway Protection Force at Palakkad.

During the relevant period, namely December 2004 to August

2005, the appellant was serving as Divisional Security

Commissioner (DSC), Railway Protection Force, Palakkad

Division, Southern Railway. The appellant had assumed charge

as Divisional Security Commissioner, Palakkad on 4 December

2004. The Palakkad Division exercised administrative control

over a large number of Railway Protection Force establishments

spread across parts of Kerala, Tamil Nadu and Karnataka.

Page 5 of 62

7. The prosecution alleged that while holding the said

office, the appellant had evolved a system whereby members of

the Railway Protection Force seeking favourable transfers,

postings or other service-related benefits were required to pay

illegal gratification. According to the prosecution, the appellant

did not ordinarily deal directly with the concerned personnel but

utilised subordinate officials as intermediaries for collecting the

illegal gratification demanded from various members of the force.

8. The principal intermediar ies identified by the

prosecution were Anantha Narayanan, a Constable of the

Railway Protection Force and Abdul Gafoor, Head Constable.

According to the prosecution, Anantha Narayanan represented

to several members of the force that he enjoyed direct access to

the appellant and was capable of securing favourable

administrative orders in consideration of payment of money. The

prosecution case further was that the monies collected by

Anantha Narayanan were intended for and ultimately received

on behalf of the appellant. Abdul Gafoor who was working in the

office of the appellant as Head Constable, was the other conduit

who was claimed to be close to the appellant.

Page 6 of 62

9. The investigation eventually revealed what the

prosecution described as twelve separate instances of illegal

gratification collected from different members of the Railway

Protection Force during the period between April 2005 and

August 2005. The alleged payments related to transfers from one

station to another, retention at preferred stations, or postings at

locations desired by the concerned personnel. The prosecution

asserted that the amounts ranged from ₹5,000/- to ₹13,000/-

and were collected either through Anantha Narayanan or

through another Railway Protection Force official, Abdul Gafoor.

10. The twelve transactions alleged by the prosecution were

the following:

(i) Rs. 5,000/- from P. Shankaranarayanan for

securing transfer from Erode to Palakkad;

(ii) Rs. 10,000/- from Abdul Rahiman for securing

transfer from Palakkad to Calicut;

(iii) Rs. 5,000/- from T. Rajendran for obtaining a

posting at Palakkad;

(iv) Rs. 10,000/- from P.P. Johny for obtaining a

posting at Palakkad;

(v) Rs. 10,000/- from A. Mohanakrishnan for transfer

from Erode to Palakkad

Page 7 of 62

(vi) Rs. 10,000/- from Girish Kumar for transfer from

Erode to Palakkad;

(vii) Rs. 7,500/- from T.V. Rajan for posting at Calicut;

(viii) Rs. 5,000/- from C.K. Aravindan for transfer from

Erode to Palakkad;

(ix) Rs. 13,000/- from N.P. Gopi kumar for transfer

from Palakkad to Shoranur;

(x) Rs. 10,000/- from T.K. Kathiresh Babu for transfer

from Erode to Palakkad;

(xi) Rs. 7,500/- from P.P. Abdul Majeed for transfer

from Erode to Palakkad; and

(xii) Rs. 7,500/- from V.V. Gangadharan for transfer

from Erode to Palakkad.

According to the prosecution, all the aforesaid payments

were ultimately made for the benefit of the appellant and

constituted illegal gratification within the meaning of the Act.

11. The prosecution story came to light when P.P.

Nandakumar, who was then working in the Personnel Branch at

Palakkad, approached the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI)

with a complaint that he had been asked to pay Rs. 10,000/- for

securing a posting at Palakkad. The prosecution case is that the

demand was conveyed through Anantha Narayanan, who

informed the complainant Nandakumar that the amount was

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required to be paid to the appellant. The amount was allegedly

fixed at Rs. 10,000/- and was to be paid in two instalments of

Rs. 5,000/- each. The first instalment was to be delivered on

04.08.2005 and the remaining few days thereafter.

12. Acting on the complaint, the CBI registered a case and

organised a trap operation on 04.08.2005. During the trap,

Anantha Narayanan was allegedly apprehended while accepting

₹5,000/- from Nandakumar. The trap proceedings constituted

the foundation of the subsequent investigation s. The

prosecution treated Anantha Narayanan as the person through

whom the appellant had demanded and accepted illegal

gratification and proceeded on the footing that the money

received by him was intended for the appellant.

13. Following the trap, the CBI undertook a wider

investigation into the functioning of the Railway Protection Force

in Palakkad Division. During the course of investigation,

statements were recorded from a number of personnel who

claimed to have paid money through Anantha Narayanan or

Abdul Gafoor, another intermediary for obtaining transfers or

postings. The prosecution ultimately formed the view that the

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trap transaction involving Nandakumar was not an isolated

occurrence but part of a broader pattern of illegal gratification

allegedly orchestrated by the appellant.

14. During the course of investigation, the CBI ascertained

that Anantha Narayanan and Abdul Gafoor , who were initially

arrayed as accused and had acted as intermediaries in the

alleged collection of illegal gratification from various Railway

Protection Force personnel could be roped in as prosecution

witnesses to bolster the prosecution case. Accordingly, on

05.01.2006, the investigating agency moved applications under

Section 306 of the Code of Criminal Procedure before the Chief

Judicial Magistrate, Ernakulam seeking tender of pardon to both

of them. By orders dated 27.03.2006, pardon was granted and

both Anantha Narayanan and Abdul Gafoor were subsequently

examined as approver prosecution witnesses during trial.

15. Upon completion of investigation, the CBI filed three

separate final reports on 31.07.2006 bearing Nos. (1)

04/SK/19(A)/05/KER, (2) 05/SK/19(A)/05/KER and (3)

06/SK/19(A)/05/KER before the Court of the Special Judge for

CBI Cases, Kochi. The first two final reports were taken on file

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as (i) C.C. No. 2 of 2014 and (ii) C.C. No. 3 of 2014 respectively,

wherein, the appellant was convicted only under C.C. No. 2 of

2014, both by the Trial Court as well as High Court. The third

final report, which comprised a larger number of alleged

transactions, was subsequently split by the trial court into four

separate calendar cases under Section 219 Cr.P.C., namely (iii)

C.C. No. 4 of 2014, (iv) C.C. No. 2 of 2015 and (v) C.C. No. 4 of

2015, wherein the appellant was convicted by the Trial Court but

later on acquitted by the High Court, and (vi) C.C. No. 3 of 2015,

wherein the appellant was convicted by the Trial Court as well

as the High Court.

16. In the present appeals, we are concerned only with C.C.

No. 2 of 2014 (Criminal Appeal No. 4733 of 2024) and C.C. No.

3 of 2015 (Criminal Appeal No. 4732 of 2024). In C.C. No. 2 of

2014, both the Trial Court and the High Court convicted the

appellant on the sole transaction it involved, the trap laid

pursuant to the complaint of P.P. Nandakumar (PW-6). On the

other hand C.C. No. 3 of 2015, comprised three distinct

transactions, involving T.V. Rajan (PW-9), C.K. Aravindan (PW-

10), and N.P. Gopi Kumar (PW-11) respectively. Of these, the

allegation concerning T.V. Rajan was disbelieved by the Trial

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Court itself and was not carried further in appeal, it therefore

does not require consideration here. The convictions in respect

of the remaining two transactions, those concerning C.K.

Aravindan and N.P. Gopi Kumar, both were convicted by the

Trial Court. However, only the conviction in respect of

transaction relating to N.P. Gopi Kumar was affirmed by the High

Court. We accordingly examine, in Criminal Appeal No. 4733 of

2024, the sole transaction involved in C.C. No. 2 of 2014, and,

in Criminal Appeal No. 4732 of 2024, the surviving transactions

in C.C. No. 3 of 2015 concerning N.P. Gopi Kumar.

In Crl. Appeal No. 4733 of 2024 (arising from C.C. No.

2/2014)

Submissions on behalf of the appellant

17. The appellant contends that neither the demand nor

acceptance of illegal gratification has been established beyond

reasonable doubt, and that the finding of guilt rests solely on the

oral testimony of approver PW-2 Anantha Narayanan and the

complainant PW-6 P.P. Nandakumar, which, on a closer

scrutiny, does not disclose demand and acceptance of bribe

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money attributable to the appellant himself, as required to

attract Sections 7 and 13(2) read with 13(1)(d) of the Act.

18. It is submitted that the Senior D ivisional Office

Personnel Branch (DPO), Palakkad, and not the appellant, was

the competent authority for absorption and posting of medically

decategorised staff such as PW-6 and PW-6 had already been

posted at Palakkad on 13.07.2005 by an order of the Senior

DPO, and hence there was consequently no occasion for him to

approach the appellant on 13.07.2005 to request a posting in

Palakkad Area.

19. It is urged that the tainted currency was admittedly

recovered from the intermediary PW-2 and not from the

appellant, and that no hand-wash or comparable test was ever

conducted on the appellant to connect him with the recovery.

Reliance is placed on R.P.S. Yadav v. CBI

1

, for the proposition

that the prosecution must chronologically establish demand by

the accused, acceptance through the intermediary, and ultimate

recovery traceable to the accused, failing which the chain of

1

(2015) 11 SCC 642

Page 13 of 62

proof under Sections 7 and 13(2) read with 13(1)(d) of the Act

remains incomplete.

20. The appellant submits that PW -2, having secured

pardon under Section 306 Cr.P.C., is an accomplice whose

evidence cannot be accepted without independent corroboration.

21. It is contended that, in the absence of proof of demand,

the presumption under Section 20 of the Act could not have been

invoked. Reliance is placed on B. Jayaraj v. State of Andhra

Pradesh

2

, and Sujit Biswas v. State of Assam

3

, for the

propositions that proof of demand is an indispensable

requirement antecedent to the presumption, and that suspicion,

however strong, cannot substitute for proof.

22. The validity of the sanction under Section 19 of the Act

is challenged on the ground that 52 documents, including the

FIR, were not forwarded to the sanctioning authority at the

relevant stage, so that the sanction order dated 21.06.2006 was

issued without due application of mind. Reliance is placed on

CBI v. Ashok Kumar Aggarwal

4

, and State of T.N. v. M.M.

2

(2014) 13 SCC 55

3

(2013) 12 SCC 406

4

(2014) 14 SCC 295

Page 14 of 62

Rajendran

5

, for the proposition that the mere existence of a

detailed report by the investigating agency does not cure the

sanctioning authority's own failure to apply its mind to the

complete record.

23. It is further urged that the Entrustment Mahazar

(Ext.P8) was prepared between 10.00 a.m. and 11.30 a.m. on

04.08.2005, before the complaint was formally recorded at 2.00

p.m. on 04.08.2005 and before the FIR (Ext.P14) came to be

registered, rendering the trap proceedings and the consequent

recovery illegal and hit by Sections 154 and 162 Cr.P.C.; and

that the non -production of the recorded telephonic

conversations between PW-6 and PW-2, and between PW-6 and

the appellant, ought to have led the courts below to draw an

adverse inference under Section 114(g) of the Evidence Act.

24. The appellant points to what are said to be material

contradictions between approver PW-2, official trap witness PW-

4 and complainant-PW-6 as to the place of PW-2’s arrest, and

between the mahazar's account of the tainted cover being placed

5

(1998) 9 SCC 268

Page 15 of 62

in PW-2’s pocket and the positive phenolphthalein result said to

follow from it.

25. Reliance is placed on the appellant’s monthly diary

(Ext.D2) to show that he was away from Palakkad on duty with

the Minister of State for Railways between 29.07.2005 and

31.07.2005, the period during which the prosecution alleges the

demand of Rs. 10,000/- came to be communicated and on the

RPF Coimbatore muster roll and Roznamcha (Ext.D14/D15) to

show that PW-2 was, during the material period, posted and on

duty at Coimbatore rather than at Palakkad.

Submissions on behalf of the Respondent

26. The respondent submits that the demand and recovery

of Rs. 5,000/- through PW-2 stand established, and are

corroborated by the muster roll (Ext.D15) read with PW-2’s own

evidence that, despite his formal transfer to Coimbatore in 2003,

he continued to function at Palakkad on working arrangement,

and by Ext.P11 dated 15.07.2005 posting PW -6 at the DSC's

office, Palakkad.

Page 16 of 62

27. It is submitted that the oral testimony of PW -2,

apprehended in the trap, and of PW -6, the complainant, is

credible and mutually corroborative, and that the concurrent

findings of the trial court and the High Court on the credibility

of these witnesses do not warrant interference by this Court.

28. The respondent disputes the contention that the Senior

DPO’s formal competence to approve postings excludes the

appellant's role in the matter, and relies on the evidence of PW-

8 together with Ext.P19 and Ext.P20 to submit that the appellant

recommended the transfer of only a fraction of the personnel who

applied, demonstrating his practical ability to influence the

outcome of such applications.

29. It is contended that the presumption under Section 20

of the Act does not require direct proof of demand, and that the

recovery of tainted currency together with the surrounding

circumstances furnishes the necessary foundational facts; B.

Jayaraj v. State of Andhra Pradesh

6, is distinguished on the

ground that it turned on the complainant's own disavowal of the

demand, a circumstance absent in the present case.

6

(2014) 13 SCC 55

Page 17 of 62

30. On the question of sanction, it is submitted that the

sanctioning authority, namely the Minister of Railways, applied

its mind to the investigation report and other relevant records

before according sanction, and that the non-forwarding of a

subset of documents to the Central Vigilance Commission at an

intermediate stage does not, without more, establish non -

application of mind by the ultimate sanctioning authority, in line

with CBI v. Ashok Kumar Aggarwal

7.

In Crl. Appeal No. 4732 of 2024 (arising from C.C. No.

3/2015)

Submissions of behalf of the appellant

31. The appellant contends that the High Court's

affirmance proceeds on the same infirm appreciation of evidence

as the Trial Court, and that the evidence of PW-7 Abdul Gafoor,

the intermediary and accused turned approver, PW-9 T.V. Rajan,

PW-10 C.K. Aravindan and PW -11 N.P. Gopi Kumar , the

complainant, taken together, does not establish a demand or

acceptance of illegal gratification attributable to the appellant.

7

(2014) 14 SCC 295

Page 18 of 62

32. It is submitted that PW-11’s version of having initially

paid Rs. 10,000/- to PW-7 after demand of Rs.15,000 from PW-

7 finds no support in PW-7’s own deposition. If PW-7 did not

demand Rs.15,000/- and did not accept 10,000/- then there is

no question of demand of balance money and acceptance of

Rs.3000/-.

33. It is urged that PW-7, having secured pardon under

Section 306 Cr.P.C., stands in the same footing as any other

approver, and that no material independent of his own account

connects the appellant as distinct from PW-7 with any of the

transactions in question; that no tainted currency or other

incriminating article was ever recovered from the appellant in

this case; and that there is no evidence that PW-7 acted under

the appellant's authority or instructions, as opposed to his own

initiative, in soliciting money from PW-9, PW-10 and PW-11.

34. The appellant contends that the competent authority

for approving premature transfers was the Chief Security

Commissioner, Chennai, and not the appellant, whose role was

at most confined to forwarding recommendations; and that this

absence of decision-making authority undermines the

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prosecution’s theory of a demand for illegal gratification in

exchange for transfers.

35. Reliance is placed on the appellant’s travel diary

(Ext.D2) to demonstrate inconsistency between PW-7’s account

and the appellant's recorded whereabouts on the dates the

transactions are alleged to have occurred, and it is pointed out

that the Muster Roll and Roznamcha records capable of fixing

the location of PW-7 and PW-11 at the material time were neither

seized nor produced by the investigating agency.

Submissions on behalf of the Respondent

36. The respondent submits that the testimony of PW-7 and

PW-11 constitutes evidence of demand and acceptance, and that

PW-7’s admitted role in receiving money and transferring it to

the appellant establishes the necessary link between the

appellant and the illegal gratification; the absence of the

appellant's physical presence at every stage of the transaction

does not absolve him, since the law recognises acceptance

through an intermediary as sufficient.

Page 20 of 62

37. It is submitted that the discrepancies pointed out by

the appellant, including PW-11’s reference to a demand of Rs.

15,000/- as against the figures given by PW-7, and PW-7’s

silence on the initial payment of Rs. 10,000/- said to have been

made by PW11 , are minor and do not detract from the

consistency of the core allegation across PW-7, PW-9, PW-10 and

PW-11 read together with the surrounding circumstances,

including the timing of the transfers in question.

38. The respondent contends that, even without direct

proof of demand, the chain of circumstances including PW-7’s

role as intermediary and the transfer-related motive common to

the transactions suffices to sustain an inference of demand and

acceptance and to attract the presumption under Section 20 of

the Act, and the absence of any recovery from the appellant's

person is not fatal, since the presumption does not require

physical possession by the accused himself.

39. On sanction, it is submitted that the appellant has not

demonstrated any prejudice flowing from the sanctioning

authority's alleged lack of access to a subset of documents, and

Page 21 of 62

that the burden of showing that such omission affected the

ultimate decision to sanction remains undischarged.

40. It is submitted, finally, that the concurrent findings of

the trial court and the High Court reflect a careful and

differentiated appreciation of the evidence relating to each

alleged transaction, the High Court having itself discarded the

allegation concerning T.V. Rajan (PW9) as unproved and that

such a considered exercise does not call for interference by this

Court.

THE CORE ISSUES :

41. Having heard the parties and having perused the

material on record, the following questions fall for our

consideration:

(i) Whether the prosecution has succeeded in proving

beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant demanded

illegal gratification, either directly or through the

alleged intermediaries, from the complainants and

other Railway Protection Force personnel in connection

with transfers, postings or other service -related

benefits?

Page 22 of 62

(ii) Whether the prosecution has succeeded in proving

that the amounts allegedly paid to Anantha Narayanan

and Abdul Gafoor were accepted or obtained by them

on behalf of the appellant so as to constitute

acceptance of illegal gratification by the appellant

within the meaning of Sections 7 and 13 of the Act?

(iii) Whether the evidence of Anantha Narayanan and

Abdul Gafoor, both of who were originally arrayed as

accused and subsequently tendered pardon and

examined as approvers, is reliable and sufficiently

corroborated in material particulars so as to sustain

the convictions recorded against the appellant?

(iv) Whether the statutory presumption under Section

20 of the Act could have been invoked in the facts and

circumstances of the present case?

(v) Whether the findings recorded by the Trial Court

and affirmed by the High Court warrant interference by

this Court?

(vi) Whether the sanctions are validly accorded?

Page 23 of 62

42. Since the first four questions are closely interlinked

and go to the root of the prosecution case, these may

conveniently be considered together.

RELEVANT LEGAL PRINCIPLES :

43. Before adverting to the evidence on record, it would be

apposite to briefly notice the settled legal position governing

prosecutions under the Prevention of Corruption Act,

particularly with regard to proof of demand and acceptance of

illegal gratification, evidentiary value of accomplice testimony

and circumstances in which statutory presumption under

Section 20 of the Act may be invoked.

44. Over the years, this Court has consistently held that

proof of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification

constitutes the gravamen of the offence and forms the

indispensable foundation upon which a conviction under the Act

must rest. The law in this regard is no longer res integra.

45. The jurisprudence governing offences under the

Prevention of Corruption Act has evolved on the fundamental

premise that criminality does not arise merely because money

Page 24 of 62

changes hands. What the prosecution is required to establish is

that the public servant demanded, accepted or obtained

gratification other than legal remuneration as a motive or reward

for performing, forbearing or facilitating an official act.

Consequently, proof of demand and acceptance occupies a

position of central importance in prosecutions under the Act.

46. In C.M. Girish Babu v. CBI

8

, this Court held that mere

recovery of tainted currency notes is insufficient to sustain a

conviction unless the prosecution proves beyond reasonable

doubt that the accused voluntarily accepted the money knowing

it to be illegal gratification. The Court observed that recovery,

divorced from proof of demand and acceptance, cannot by itself

establish the commission of an offence under the Act.

47. The principle was reiterated and emphatically restated

in B. Jayaraj v. State of Andhra Pradesh

9

. This Court held that

proof of demand is an indispensable essentiality for establishing

the offence and that in the absence of proof of demand,

possession and recovery of currency notes from an accused

8

(2009) 3 SCC 779

9

(2014) 13 SCC 55

Page 25 of 62

would not establish the offence. This Court further held that the

statutory presumption under Section 20 of the Act does not arise

unless the foundational facts giving rise to such presumption

are first established by the prosecution, as under: -

“8. In the present case, the complainant did not

support the prosecution case insofar as demand by the

accused is concerned. The prosecution has not

examined any other witness, present at the time when

the money was allegedly handed over to the accused

by the complainant, to prove that the same was

pursuant to any demand made by the accused. When

the complainant himself had disowned what he had

stated in the initial complaint (Ext. P-11) before LW 9,

and there is no other evidence to prove that the

accused had made any demand, the evidence of PW 1

and the contents of Ext. P-11 cannot be relied upon to

come to the conclusion that the above material

furnishes proof of the demand allegedly made by the

accused. We are, therefore, inclined to hold that the

learned trial court as well as the High Court was not

correct in holding the demand alleged to be made by

the accused as proved. The only other material

available is the recovery of the tainted currency notes

from the possession of the accused. In fact such

possession is admitted by the accused himself. Mere

possession and recovery of the currency notes from the

accused without proof of demand will not bring home

the offence under Section 7. The above also will be

conclusive insofar as the offence under Sections

13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) is concerned as in the absence of any

proof of demand for illegal gratification, the use of

corrupt or illegal means or abuse of position as a public

servant to obtain any valuable thing or pecuniary

advantage cannot be held to be established.

9. Insofar as the presumption permissible to be drawn

under Section 20 of the Act is concerned, such

presumption can only be in respect of the offence under

Section 7 and not the offences under Sections 13(1)(d)(i)

and (ii) of the Act. In any event, it is only on proof of

acceptance of illegal gratification that presumption can

be drawn under Section 20 of the Act that such

gratification was received for doing or forbearing to do

Page 26 of 62

any official act. Proof of acceptance of illegal

gratification can follow only if there is proof of demand.

As the same is lacking in the present case the primary

facts on the basis of which the legal presumption under

Section 20 can be drawn are wholly absent.”

We are aware that in the aforesaid case, the complainant did

not support the Prosecution, as in the present case, but the

legal principle remains that the foundational facts have to be

proved for attracting Section 20 of the Act.

48. A similar view was adopted in P. Satyanarayana

Murthy v. District Inspector of Police

10

, wherein this Court

observed that proof of demand of illegal gratification is sine qua

non for constituting offences under Sections 7 and 13 of the Act

and that mere acceptance or recovery of money without proof of

demand would not bring home the guilt of the accused.

49. The law was comprehensively examined by a

Constitution Bench of this Court in Neeraj Dutta v. State

(Government of NCT of Delhi)

11

. After an exhaustive survey of

precedents, the Constitution Bench reaffirmed that proof of

demand and acceptance of illegal gratification remains the

gravamen of offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act. At

10

(2015) 10 SCC 152

11

(2023) 4 SCC 731

Page 27 of 62

the same time, the Court clarified that proof of demand need not

invariably be by direct evidence and may, in an appropriate case,

be established through circumstantial evidence. The

Constitution Bench also clarified that the absence of the

complainant's testimony would not necessarily be fatal if

demand and acceptance can otherwise be proved through

reliable evidence and surrounding circumstances. The

Constitution Bench further explained that the presumption

under Section 20 of the Act is not intended to relieve the

prosecution of its primary burden. The presumption operates

only after the prosecution establishes the foundational facts

necessary to show that the accused accepted or obtained

gratification other than legal remuneration. On ce such

foundational facts are established, the burden shifts to the

accused to offer a satisfactory explanation. However, where the

prosecution itself fails to establish the foundational facts, the

presumption does not arise.

50. Equally well settled are the principles governing

prosecutions where the alleged gratification is received for

another public servant. The law does not require that the public

servant must personally receive the money for himself in every

Page 28 of 62

case. Acceptance for another person or through another person

by way of an intermediary acting on behalf of the public servant

may, in a given case, satisfy the statutory requirement. In this

regard, it is apposite to note the legal proposition as set out in

the observations of this Court in State by Lokayuktha Police

v. K. Rangayya

12

,:

“22. Thus, such an offending act can be done by

“another public servant” also under the personal

influence of the concerned public servant. What we,

therefore, understand from the reading of Section 7 (a)

of the PC Act read with Explanation 2, is that, it is not

necessary that the public servant who has been

charged of the offence under Section 7 of the PC Act

has to obtain the undue benefit for himself, but it also

covers cases where he does the offensive act for

obtaining undue advantages for “another person”, and

this act may be done by himself by abusing his

position, or may be executed through another public

servant by using his personal influence over the other

public servant.

Therefore, in the light of the above provision, a

public servant may not be directly a recipient or the

executor of the offensive act and thus, may not be in

the limelight and remain in the background.

Nevertheless, he can be instrumental in ensuring

obtaining, accepting or attempting to obtain from

another person the undue advantage for “another

person” by taking the help of “another public servant”.

Such public servant who has been charged of offence

under Section 7(a) may be the main instrumentality,

through whom undue advantage is obtained and/or

arranged through other public servant….

23. …….

24. The High Court fell into a grave error in

characterizing the aforesaid conduct of the Respondent

12

2026 SCC OnLine SC 963

Page 29 of 62

No. 1 as insufficiently proximate to constitute a

‘demand’ within the meaning of Section 7 of the PC Act.

The High Court appears to have imported a

requirement of a direct, personal, and express demand

by the public servant himself by not taking into

consideration Explanation 2, a standard not

warranted by the broad statutory language. The PC

Act does not countenance any such straitjacketed

formulation limiting to acts of demand and acceptance

of bribe by the official himself as explained by

expansive provision of Explanation 2. It can be for

obtaining the undue advantage “for another person”

also. Further, an attempt to obtain a bribe through

subordinates who are also public servants, is precisely

the kind of indirect corruption that the legislature, by

enacting Explanation 2 to Section 7, has sought to

bring within the fold of the statute.

25. The interpretation adopted by the High Court, if

permitted to stand, would limit the broad scope of

Section 7 read with Explanation 2, and would create a

pernicious loophole in the anti-corruption law by

permitting senior public officials to orchestrate and

direct the collection of illegal gratification through their

public servant subordinates and park the benefits in

the account of the “another person” for whose benefit

the public servant intends, while maintaining personal

deniability. Such a construction would subvert the

manifest purpose and policy of the PC Act and render

the Explanation 2 redundant, and thus, cannot be

countenanced.”

(emphasis supplied)

51. However, before criminal liability can be fastened upon

the public servant, the prosecution must establish by reliable

evidence that the intermediary was acting under the authority,

direction or for the benefit of the accused and that the demand

itself was attributable to the accused. Mere receipt of money by

Page 30 of 62

a third person cannot automatically result in criminal liability

being imputed to a public servant.

52. The present case raises an additional dimension

inasmuch as the prosecution relies substantially upon the

testimony of persons who were originally arraigned as accused

and were subsequently tendered pardon. The law relating to

accomplice evidence is equally well settled. Section 133 of the

Evidence Act declares that an accomplice is a competent witness

and that a conviction is not illegal merely because it proceeds

upon uncorroborated accomplice testimony. At the same time,

Illustration (b) to Section 114 embodies a rule of prudence that

an accomplice is ordinarily unworthy of credit unless

corroborated in material particulars.

53. In Sarwan Singh v. State of Punjab

13

, and in a long

line of subsequent decisions, this Court has consistently held

that though a conviction based upon accomplice evidence is

legally permissible, courts ordinarily insist upon independent

corroboration connecting the accused with the commission of

the offence. The rationale is self-evident. An accomplice who has

13

AIR 1957 SC 637

Page 31 of 62

participated in the crime and subsequently secured pardon

possesses a powerful incentive to minimise his own culpability

and shift responsibility onto others.

54. The principles governing approver evidence assume

particular significance in corruption prosecutions where the

alleged demand and acceptance are sought to be proved through

intermediaries who participated in the transactions. In such

cases, the Court must scrutinise the evidence with great care

and caution and must satisfy itself that the testimony of the

approver receives assurance from independent witnesses or

circumstances and reliable corroborative material before acting

upon it.

55. In this regard, it must be borne in mind that

admissibility of evidence and its credibility operate on entirely

different planes. That the evidence of an approver, or of a witness

who claims to have paid a bribe, is admissible in law, does not

by itself, answer the distinct question of whether such evidence

is credible and safe to act upon. That question falls to be

assessed on a careful appraisal of the surrounding

circumstances, the presence or absence of independent

Page 32 of 62

corroboration, and inherent probabilities of the account given,

and not merely on the fact that the law permits such evidence to

be received.

56. It is in the light of the aforesaid principles that the

evidence adduced by the prosecution in the present case must

be examined.

ANALYSIS BY THE COURT :

A. Crl.A No. 4733 of 2024 [C.C. No. 2/2014]

Transaction I: Complaint by P.P. Nandakumar (PW-6),

wherein the appellant was convicted by the Trial Court

and affirmed by High Court.

57. The prosecution case against the appellant is based

primarily on the evidence of the complainant Nandakumar, PW-

6, and the approver intermediary, Anantha Narayanan, PW-2.

Since it is these two witnesses who had alleged that the appellant

had demanded bribe from the complainant, and there is no

independent witness to that fact, we must carefully analyse their

evidence to arrive at the satisfaction that their evidence is

credible enough to sustain the charge against the appellant as

to have been proved beyond reasonable doubt. The other

Page 33 of 62

material witness can at best corroborate only to prove that the

approver intermediary Anantha Narayanan was caught taking

the bribe, but not that the appellant was caught taking the bribe.

It is important to note that Nandakumar who was posted

in the office of Sr. DPO on 13.07.2005 sought the help of the

appellant to be posted as Personal Branch Clerk in DSC’s office,

to which the appellant agreed, but asked him to meet Anantha

Narayanan, PW-6.

Admittedly, Nandakumar was subsequently posted in

the office of the DSC on 15.07.2005 within two days of the

request.

58. On 02.08.2005, after two weeks of the posting on

15.07.2005, Anantha Narayanan met Nandakumar and told him

that the appellant was demanding a bribe of Rs.10,000/- as a

reward for getting the posting in the DSC’s office, upon which

Nandakumar expressed his difficulty in paying the amount, to

which Ananth Narayanan asked Nandakumar to meet the

appellant. On the same day on 02.08.2005, Nandakumar met

the appellant, when the appellant demanded Rs.5000/- as the

first instalment and the balance to be paid within ten days. As

Nandakumar was unwilling to acquiesce to the demand of the

Page 34 of 62

appellant, he approached the CBI which made the necessary

arrangement for executing a trap. The trap was arranged and

executed on 04.08.2005 within two days of the demand made by

the appellant. However, in the trap the appellant was not caught,

but Anantha Narayanan, who allegedly accepted the bribe on

behalf of the appellant.

59. At this stage it is important to refer to what transpired

between the complainant Nandakumar and Anantha

Narayanan. Nandakumar at the instance of the CBI apparently

informed Anantha Narayanan on 04.08.2005 that he was willing

to pay the amount and he also requested the presence of

Anantha Narayanan when the amount was to be paid, to which

he apparently agreed, as deposed before the Trial Court as

follows :

“On 4.8.2005, I telephoned Ananthanarayanan from

my quarters in the presence of DySP. I informed him

that I was ready to pay the amount and told him that I

require his presence and also at the time, when the

amount was paid. He agreed to that.”

(emphasis added)

However, when Nandakumar went to the office of the

appellant bringing the amount, he did not meet the appellant

along with Anantha Narayanan. Further, Nandakumar stated

Page 35 of 62

that though he offered the money directly to the appellant, the

appellant instructed him to entrust it to Ananatha Narayanan.

Both Nandakumar and the appellant then came out of the office

after staying there for some time and the appellant went away in

his car. Nandakumar then gave the cover carrying the

Phenopthaline powder treated notes to Anantha Narayanan, who

then kept it in his pocket. This is what Nandakumar had

deposed:

“I went to the DSC's office and met

Ananthanarayanan. I waited for the appointment of

the accused. At about 6 pm. I got appointment to meet

the accused. At 6 pm- I met the accused in his chamber.

After 10 minutes he talked with me regarding official

matters. I informed him that I brought the money. He

told me to entrust the amount with

Ananthanarayanan. He went out of the chamber. I also

came out along with him. Accused get into his official

car and went away. Ananthanarayanan was standing

near the car. I entrusted the cover with

Ananthanarayanan. He accepted it and kept the same

in the pocket of his pants.”

He incidentally does not mention about the presence of

Nandakumar while meeting the appellant in his chamber.

60. We will pause here and compare with the deposition of

Anantha Narayanan, the PW-2 who took the bribe.

Anantha Narayanan deposed as follows:

Page 36 of 62

“On 4.8.2005, Nandakumar called me over phone and

informed that money would be ready in the noon. He

enquired me about the manner in which the amount is

to be given. I instructed him to give the money directly.

He told me that he was afraid of the accused and

insisted my presence also when the amount was given.

I told him that the same can be decided when he came

to the office.”

Anantha Narayanan continued as follows:

“On 4.8.2005 in the evening, Nandakumar told me that

the money was ready and he wanted to meet the

accused. I met the accused and informed the matter.

The accused asked me to direct Nandakumar to wait.

At about 6 pm, Nandakumar again expressed his -

intention to meet the accused. I went to the accused

along with Nandakumar. Then, I came out of the

chamber. Nandakumar was inside the chamber. After

10-15 minutes, both the accused and Nandakumar

came out. The accused left in his car. Nandakumar

came to me and gave me a cover stating that the

accused directed him to entrust the same with me and

to inform me to take that to the residence of the

accused. I got the cover and kept it in the pocket of my

pants. When I was about to go to the residence of the

accused, the CBI officials came and apprehended me.'

They took me to the DSC's office and directed me to

take the cover given by Nandakumar out of my pocket.

I did it. I was directed to open the cover and to take the

money out of the cover. I did it.”

61. Incidentally in his deposition, he does not make any

reference of the appellant asking him to collect the money from

Nandakumar. From the above evidence of Nandakumar and

Anantha Narayanan the following aspects emerge that though

Nandakumar had requested Anantha Narayanan to be present

with him when he meets the appellant, though Anantha

Narayanan went with Nandakumar, he came out and

Page 37 of 62

Nandakumar alone met the appellant for about 5-10 minutes.

What transpired between Nandakumar and the appellant for

about 10-15 minutes is not known though the only purpose of

meeting the appellant was to give money. Further, Nandakumar

had gone along with money to the office of the appellant but the

appellant apparently did not accept the money from

Nandakumar even though it was offered to him in the office

where no one else was present. It is quite surprising that even

though the appellant had himself allegedly demanded bribe from

Nandakumar, but when it was offered to him directly where no

one else was present, the appellant did not take it and instead

asked Nandakumar to give it to Anantha Narayanan. At the same

time, when the appellant allegedly demanded money from

Nandakumar, he was not told at that time that the money was

to be given through Anantha Narayanan. It is also to be noted

that when Nandakumar talked to Anantha Narayan an, Anantha

Narayan asked Nandakumar to give the money directly to the

appellant. Thus, the statements of Nandakumar and Anantha

Narayanan do not fall neatly together, but with variations where

these matter the most.

Page 38 of 62

62. At this stage, it is important to note that recovery from

Anantha Narayanan, PW -2 was not confined to the tainted

currency alone. A further sum of Rs. 10,000/-, kept in a separate

envelope marked “DSC/PGT”, was also found on his person. The

investigation attributed this amount to an entirely different and

independent allegation that it was bribe money paid by one

Kanakaraj/ASI, through Shankaranarayanan, Constable, in

connection with departmental appeal proceedings against

Kanakaraj and one Muthuswamy/ASI.

Anantha Narayanan had deposed that when he handed over

the cover to the appellant, he returned this money to Anantha

Narayanan and asked him to give at his residence along with the

money to be paid by Nandakumar.

He deposed as follows:

“On the same day, Shankamarayanan called me over

phone and requested to me to meet him on my way to

the office. Accordingly I met him. He gave me a cover

and he informed that he was entrusted with the same

by Kanakraj, ASI for the purpose of giving to the

accused. I opened the cover in the presence of

Shankamarayanan. It contained money. I came to the

office with the cover and entrusted the same with the

accused in his chamber. The accused, informed me

that the money was given for reducing the punishment

of ASI Kanakraj and Muthuswami in DAR enquiry. The

accused gave the money back to me and told me to give

the same at his residence along with the money that

will be paid by Nandakumar in the evening. I kept that

money in the pocket of my pants.”

Page 39 of 62

It is very surprising that the appellant, though, received

the money allegedly given by other personnel, naming

Shankarnarayanan, personally from Anantha Narayanan in the

office, yet the appellant handed over the same to Anantha

Narayanan to give the appellant at his residence. The appellant

was the person who was demanding money, and he was offered

the same in his office, which he accepted but again gave to

Anantha Narayanan, for being delivered to his residence. We fail

to understand any logical reason for this strange detour of the

bribe money.

As mentioned above, the appellant also did not accept

the money from Nandakumar, though he was offered by

Nandakumar in the office and instead asked him to deliver it to

Anantha Narayanan.

63. If the prosecution wanted to show that it was the

strategy of the appellant that he would not directly accept money

himself in the office to leave any trail, but only through the

intermediary, Anantha Narayanan, it is inconsistent with the

statement of Anantha Narayanan who told Nandakumar that he

Page 40 of 62

handover the money directly to the appellant. It is also notable

that the appellant never told Nandakumar earlier to give the

money to Anantha Narayanan.

There is nothing to suggest that the appellant was

apprehensive of a trap or had any reason to insulate himself from

the transaction, on the contrary, as per the prosecution, the

appellant made the demand himself directly to Nandakumar. In

these circumstances, it is not comprehensible why a direct

demand, made in person by the appellant and offer made to him

directly, should have been redirected through an intermediary

rather than simply accept it.

As we shall see later, this behaviour of the appellant is

not consistent with his act in the other complaint case, where

the appellant asked the bribe giver Gopi Kumar to meet him at

his residence.

64. Another interesting aspect is that when the money was

given by Anantha Narayanan to the appellant, the appellant

explained to Anantha Narayanan that the money was given for

reducing the punishment of two ASI Kanakraj and Muthuswamy

in DAR Enquiry. Why should a superior officer give an

Page 41 of 62

explanation with regards to the reasons for accepting bribe to a

constable working under him? Also, why did not the appellant

keep the money with himself when he took it from Anantha

Narayanan. This behaviour of the appellant is certainly quite

weird, if not unbelievable. This unusual behaviour attributed to

the appellant casts a serious doubt on the credibility of the

prosecution case.

65. Another feature of PW-2’s account of this envelope

episode involving Rs. 10,000/- invites comment. The aforesaid

transaction was a matter which was the subject of separate

prosecution in C.C. No. 3 of 2014 and in which the appellant

was, in fact, acquitted on trial. That PW-2 was, at the very

moment of the trap, simultaneously holding monies attributed

to a wholly separate transaction, one that did not survive

scrutiny at trial, is a circumstance that bears on the reliability

of treating him as a mere conduit acting strictly on the

appellant's specific instructions in every instance, and lends

some support to the alternative hypothesis already noticed

above, that PW-2 dealt with such amount with independence of

his own, where the appellant was not a party.

Page 42 of 62

Interestingly enough, further, when PW-2 was caught

with other extra-money of Rs.8,000/- and Rs.5,000/- which he

claimed to be his personal money, the same were not seized by

the CBI. At the time of such seizure, PW-2 was an accused and

not yet an approver. This Court, thus finds it extremely queer

that the CBI would accept his plea of the said amount to be his

personal money at face value and returned the same to PW-2.

How did the CBI distinguish at that moment that it was not

tainted bribe money, but personal money of PW-2? The act of the

CBI thus becomes questionable.

66. The CBI on being informed that the appellant was

demanding bribe, decided to lay the trap for the appellant. If the

trap was really meant for the appellant and not for PW-2, why

was it executed against PW-2, Anantha Narayanan? It is relevant

to consider the reason the trap was not permitted to run its full

course as against the appellant. If, the money was ultimately

meant to reach the appellant, the investigating agency ought to

have kept a watch on the appellant and not merely on PW-2 and

on being told that the money was handed over to PW-2, the CBI

could have waited for some more time to observe the movement

of PW-2 and if PW-2 was proceeding towards the residence of the

Page 43 of 62

appellant with the trap money, the CBI could have executed the

trap at the residence of the appellant which would have

furnished direct and conclusive proof of receipt qua the

appellant himself. Instead, the trap was brought to an abrupt

closure at the point of recovery from PW-2, which, at its highest,

establishes only the unauthorized receipt of money by PW-2 and

does not establish that the money was ever intended to reach, or

did in fact reach, the appellant. Further, as per the version of

PW-2, the chain contemplated was that the complainant would

hand the money to PW-2, as directed by the appellant, and PW-

2 would in turn carry it to the appellant’s residence. Had the

investigating agency allowed that chain to complete, the

resulting evidence would have spoken far more directly to the

appellant’s culpability than the recovery actually effected. This

is a serious lacuna and impatience of the CBI in the investigation

conducted by it would enure to the benefit of the appellant.

67. At this stage, we would like to examine further the

manner of the investigation by the CBI. The complainant

Nandakumar apparently informed the CBI on 03.08.2005 of the

bribe demanded by the appellant and the CBI decided to lay the

trap the very next day on 04.08.2005. The FIR was lodged on

Page 44 of 62

04.08.2005 at 2 pm, on the day of the trap, and the trap was

executed on the same day at 4.30 pm. Deputy S.P. of CBI, PW-7

states that Nandakumar orally informed him about the demand

of bribe by the appellant. Since the FIR was lodged on

04.08.2005 at 2 pm and the CBI decided to lay the trap on the

same day, before laying the trap, the CBI must have verified the

authenticity of the complaint, which must have been done before

the trap was planned. It is surprising that the CBI started the

investigation of a cognizable offence by way of verifying the

complaint of bribery even before the formal FIR was lodged. It is

also noticed that the CBI arranged the two independent trap

witnesses at a very short period of time before the execution of

the trap. Aboobacker, PW-4, the independent witness states that

on instructions from the Zonal Office, he met the Deputy S.P. of

CBI, PW-7 at about 2:30 PM where he was explained about the

nature of the claim and within two hours, they proceeded to the

office of the appellant at 4:35 PM. Thus, the entire trap was

arranged between 2 pm to 4:30 pm of 04.08.2005. While the

investigating agency cannot be faulted for organizing the trap in

such an extraordinarily speedy manner, yet it can raise certain

doubts about it. The Trial Court, however, brushed aside the

Page 45 of 62

doubts raised by the appellant. We, accordingly, reproduce the

relevant portions of the judgement of the Trial Court as regards

the said aspect as follows:

“148. During the cross examination, PW7 deposed that

the diary in respect of the proceedings on 04.08.2005

was started at 7 am. The counsel for the accused

argued that even that crime was registered only at

2.45 pm and the conduct of PW7 in opening the case

diary at 7 am is illegal. I have already observed earlier

that the crime was registered at Ernakulam, and the

trap proceedings were conducted at Palakkad. There

was no way out other than to allow PW7 to conduct the

trap proceedings since the bribe was to be given on

04.08.2005. So, as regards the proceedings conducted

by PW7 on 04.08.2005. he cannot be found fault with

for recording the proceedings in the diary.

149. According to PW7, PW6 was directed to contact

PW2 over the phone on 4.8.2005. Accordingly PW6

called PW2 from his land phone at his residence and

informed that the money is ready. As per Ext.P8

entrustment mahazar, the aforesaid conversation was

recorded which was played to the trap witnesses at

the Crown hotel. This has been mentioned in Ext.P8

entrustment mahazar. The digital recorder was not

produced before the court. Relying on the aforesaid

aspect, the counsel for the accused argued that the

case of the prosecution is not at all believable. During

the cross examination, PW7 deposed that the aforesaid

conversation was recorded only for the purpose of

verification of the complaint. Further, according to him,

the telephone call made by PW6 to him at the DSC's

Office during the trap proceedings, which was

recorded by him was not produced since, it was not

audible.

150. As regards the first conversation, i.e., between

PW2 and PW6, the learned prosecutor argued that it

was recorded only for the purpose of verification of the

veracity of the complaint. Further, according to him. as

PW2 and PW6 were examined which form the

substantive evidence; the non production of the

recording may not be taken as a ground to disbelieve

the case of the prosecution. It is true that the aforesaid

Page 46 of 62

recording could have been produced before the court

which could have been used to corroborate the

evidence of PW7, PW6 and PW2 and PW4. Anyhow, as

contended by the learned prosecutor, the substantive

evidence is the deposition of PW2, PW4, PW6 and PW7,

which is in favour of the prosecution. Further, their

evidence is corroborated by one another. As regards

the second conversation, from the evidence of PW7, it

can be seen that the conversation was not audible. So,

the aforesaid contention of the counsel for the accused

is not sustainable.”

(emphasis added)

68. Keeping into consideration the observations made by

the Trial Court in para 150 of its judgment as reproduced above,

we are of the view that there are certainly elements of doubt in

the manner the trap was executed , which the Trial Court

ignored. The lapses noted by the Trial Court, in our opinion,

raises reasonable doubt on the prosecution case.

69. There is yet another very important aspect to be

considered. The allegation of the complainant Nandakumar is

that he sought help of the appellant for transfer to the office of

DSC to which the appellant agreed. In this regard, it is to be

noted that the complainant Nandakumar was posted in the office

of Sr. DPO on 13.07.2005 and he sought the transfer to the office

of the DSC, which came very soon within two days on

15.07.2005. Incidentally, and undisputedly, the transfer was not

within the authority of the appellant. It was within the authority

Page 47 of 62

of the Sr. DPO. The Sr. DPO who was examined as DW-2 stated

that the order of the transfer of the complainant was signed by

Mrs. Chandrika Jayshankar (PW -5) who was the assistant

personnel officer working under DW-2 and he also deposed that

nobody approached him requesting the said transfer.

Mrs. Chandrika Jayshankar who was examined as PW -

5 also deposed that the transfer and posting of Nandakumar

from the personnel Branch to the DSC’s office was decided by

the Sr. DPO and the posting order was issued by her and nobody

approached her for the issuance of the transfer order.

Thus, the evidence of both the witnesses DW-2 and PW-

5 clearly shows that nobody approached them concerning the

transfer of PW-6 thus indicating that the appellant did not have

any role directly or indirectly in influencing the transfer in favour

of Nandakumar which took place on 15.07.2005 apart from the

fact that he had no authority either. The question now arises is

whether the appellant who had no authority or role to play in the

transfer can be said to have demanded the bribe from the

complainant? According to the prosecution, the appellant was

demanding bribe through someone, for an act over which he had

Page 48 of 62

no authority nor any role to play. This poses a fundamental

question. Whether any person can be charged under the PC Act

when he had neither the authority nor any role to play in doing

any favour to the bribe giver? Is it the case of the prosecution

also that the appellant was demanding bribe by making false

statements and assurances? This is an area the prosecution is

silent about.

It is in this context, the evidence of the bribe giver and

the intermediary have to be closely examined in the absence of

clear proof that the appellant had demanded received the bribe.

70. It bears emphasis that intermediary, PW-2 is not an

independent witness. He was originally arraigned as a co -

accused and was granted pardon under Section 306 CrPC, and

as this Court has already noted in the light of Sarwan Singh

(supra), that an approver has an evident incentive to support the

version that best serves the terms of his own pardon. The rule of

prudence embodied in Illustration (b) to Section 114 of the

Evidence Act requires that his testimony be corroborated in

material particulars connecting the accused and not merely the

transaction with the offence. Here, PW -6’s testimony

Page 49 of 62

corroborates the demand and PW-4’s evidence together with the

phenolphthalein result corroborates the fact of collection of bribe

money by PW-2 but neither corroborates the specific, and

critical, assertion that delivery to the appellant’s residence was

the intended and habitual mode of consummating the

transaction of bribe. On this singular aspect, the record contains

only the approver’s word devoid of any corroborating material.

71. To hold the appellant guilty of obtainment or

acceptance for the purposes of Section 7 of the Act, this Court

would have to draw the further inference that the appellant

would, in fact, have received the money at his residence had the

trap not intervened, and that this was his established modus

operandi for consummating such transactions. That inference is

not compelled by the record, it is, at best, one possible

suggestion of what might have happened next, competing on

equal footing with the equally available hypothesis that PW-2

claiming to be close to the appellant having himself pocketed the

sums in these transactions and retained the money for himself,

or intended to deal with it in some other manner not sanctioned

or even unknown to the appellant. Nothing in the record

excludes that hypothesis. As held in Neeraj Dutta (supra), an

Page 50 of 62

inference of guilt from circumstances is permissible only where

the circumstances are “incompatible with the innocence of the

accused or any other reasonable hypotheses”, a standard this

record does not meet on the specific question of

acceptance/obtainment by the appellant.

72. The permission to draw an inferential deduction where

certain foundational facts are proved is not an invitation to

bridge, relying on circumstantial evidence, whatever residual

gap separates the “money collected by an intermediary at the

accused's apparent direction” from “the accused himself

obtained or accepted that money.” As observed in Neeraj Dutta

(supra), “obtain” requires initiative and effort on the part of the

recipient, and here, on the specific question of final receipt, the

appellant took no further step of any kind apart from the alleged

demand made. On the contrary, he left the scene, and the

transaction was intercepted at the door of an alleged

intermediary before its final leg could occur, if it was ever to

occur as described.

73. Moreover, in R.P.S. Yadav (supra) the accused was

alleged to have directed the complainant to hand the bribe

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money to a co-accused, acting as intermediary. This Court found

the evidence consistent only up to the handing-over of money to

the intermediary. Beyond that, the key witness gave

contradictory versions as to whether the recovery was from the

intermediary’s own pocket or the accused’s, and no hand-wash

test was conducted on the accused himself to show the money

had actually reached him. Holding that neither witness

furnished acceptable evidence that ‘the demand, acceptance and

recovery was chronologically proved as against the appellant’,

this Court set aside the conviction. The case thus shows that a

demand and an initial handover to an intermediary are not

enough; the chain must be carried through, by cogent evidence,

to the point where the money is shown to have actually reached

or been intended for the accused failing which the conviction

cannot stand.

74. Lastly, it follows that although the foundational facts of

demand and of payment to an intermediary are considered

proved, and although circumstantial evidence is, in principle,

available to this Court to establish acceptance, no inference

beyond the merely speculative can be drawn here that the

appellant himself accepted, obtained, or would have obtained the

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gratification. The presumption under Section 20 of the Act does

not arise in the first place, since it presupposes proof of

acceptance or obtainment by the accused, which, for the reasons

above, remains unproved. The prosecution has, at its best,

established that money changed hands between a complainant

and an intermediary who invoked the appellant’s name. But that

itself can be said to be a proof of appellant’s acceptance of bribe.

Therefore, for the reasons discussed above, it cannot be

said that the prosecution has proved the case against the

appellant beyond reasonable doubt and accordingly, conviction

of the appellant in C.C. No. 2/2014, arising in Crl. A No. 4733 of

2024, cannot be sustained.

(B) Crl. A No. 4732 of 2024 [C.C. No. 3/2015]

75. It is to be noted that there are three transactions arising

out of C.C. No. 3/2015, wherein the transactions by bribe givers

(i) T.V. Rajan (PW-9), (ii) C.K. Aravindan (PW-10), and (iii) Gopi

Kumar (PW-11) are concerned. As noted above, we are not

concerned with the transactions in relation to T.V. Rajan (PW-9)

and C.K. Aravindan (PW-10) as the appellant was not convicted

in the aforesaid transactions, but the High Court affirmed the

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conviction with regards to the third transaction i.e., allegations

made by Gopi Kumar (PW -11). However, the reference to the

other transactions have been made since all the three

transaction comprises of allegations against the appellant and

has common intermediary i.e., Abdul Gafoor (PW-7).

Transaction II: Bribe giver T. V. Rajan (PW-9), wherein the

appellant was acquitted by the Trial Court.

76. The Trial Court itself declined to accept the

prosecution’s case in respect of PW-9, T.V. Rajan and this

finding was not disturbed as the same was not under challenge

before the High Court, since only the appellant, and not the

prosecution, carried the matter in appeal. We note, in any event,

that the record bears out the Trial Court’s caution that PW-7

Abdul Gafoor, the other intermediary in his examination-in-

chief, did not depose to demanding or collecting any sum from

T.V. Rajan at all. In fact in PW-7’s deposition, he mentions one

Stanly as the person from whom a comparable sum was

collected, and Stanly was never examined as a prosecution

witness. PW-9’s own account of paying Rs. 5,000/- and later Rs.

2,500/- to PW7 thus stands wholly uncorroborated by the very

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intermediary through whom the payment is said to have been

made to the appellant.

Transaction III: Bribe giver C.K. Aravindan (PW-10), wherein

the appellant was not convicted by the High Court.

77. PW-10 C.K. Aravindan deposed that PW-7 Abdul Gafoor

conveyed a demand of Rs. 10,000/- said to emanate from the

appellant, and that he paid Rs. 5,000/- to PW-7 “for giving to the

appellant,” following which he was relieved and posted to

Calicut. PW-7, for his part, confirmed only that PW-10 gave him

Rs. 5,000/- for the appellant. PW-10 did not, and could not, offer

any independent basis for the assertion that he, PW-7, had

demanded and would remit that sum as instructed by the

appellant. The High Court itself recorded this precise infirmity in

terms that bear repeating that there is “no independent evidence

to prove that PW-7 demanded and accepted Rs. 5,000/ - from

PW-10 as instructed by the appellant.”

78. This is not a case, as with Transaction I, where the

foundational fact of a demand traceable to the appellant is stated

to be independently established and the difficulty arises at the

further stage of acceptance. Here, the very first foundational fact

that the demand conveyed by PW -7 was one made by or

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attributable to the appellant, rather than one PW-7 devised or

embellished on his own account, is itself unproved by anything

beyond PW-7’s own assertion. In cases of intermediary evidence

generally, the existence of a nexus between an intermediary and

the accused must itself be proved by reliable evidence and

cannot be presumed merely because the intermediary happened

to be subordinate or was allegedly close to the accused. Nor does

Section 20 of the Act assist the prosecution, since it operates

only once the foundational facts of demand and acceptance

attributable to the accused are established, which is precisely

what is missing here. The conviction thus could not be sustained

in respect of this transaction.

Transaction IV: Bribe giver, N.P. Gopi Kumar (PW-11),

wherein the appellant was convicted by the Trial Court and

affirmed by High Court.

79. This transaction stands on a different footing than the

other three. Unlike the transaction related to trap proceedings,

where the appellant was never proved to have received anything

and the chain of proof had to rest on an unproved assumption

about his future conduct, and unlike the transaction related to

PW-10, where the very attribution of the demand to the appellant

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rested on PW-7’s uncorroborated word, the present transaction

involves the allegation of appellant’s presence at the time of

acceptance.

80. PW-11 deposed that he was summoned to the

appellant’s quarters not through any intermediary’s initiative

alone, but at the appellant’s own instance, communicated

through his Inspector by telephone. On arrival, the appellant

himself addressed PW-11 directly, asking him in Hindi, in words

PW-11 himself translated as asking whether he had “forgotten

him” after his transfer was secured. It is significant that the

appellant’s own words, as deposed to, make no mention

whatsoever of money. The remark is, on its face, capable of more

than one meaning, and it was PW-11’s own understanding, not

anything the appellant is shown to have said, that supplied the

connection to the bribe. It was PW-7, present at the same time

and place, who then told PW-11 that the appellant was asking

for the balance of Rs. 5,000/-, and PW-11 handed over Rs.

3,000/- to PW-7 after some discussion outside the residence of

the appellant. It is, at the least, unusual that the actual

transaction between the bribe giver and the intermediary took

place outside the residence of the appellant when in the end PW-

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7 went inside the residence along with PW-11 and handed over

Rs. 3,000 to the appellant in PW-11’s presence. Interestingly,

though PW-11 was allegedly called by the appellant himself for

giving the remaining Rs. 5,000 for doing the favour of

transferring the PW-11 to the desired place, yet when only Rs.

3,000 was given to the appellant, the appellant apparently did

not show any reservation. He appeared to have accepted without

any demur which appears to be strange to say the least.

Although this narration is not uncorroborated, PW-11, the bribe

giver and PW-7, the conduit, both depose to the same event, at

the same place, with the appellant himself as an active,

participant rather than an absent principal whose involvement

must be inferred. This conclusion cannot, however, be sustained

as on a closer scrutiny as the evidentiary foundation for this

transaction suffers from infirmities.

81. It is, at the outset, worth noticing how markedly this

account departs from the appellant’s own alleged practice in

every other transaction relied upon by the prosecution, including

Transaction I. In each of those instances, the appellant is said

to have kept himself absent at the actual moment of payment,

communicating demands and directions through an

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intermediary only and never being shown as personally present

when money changed hands. The present transaction is the

solitary exception, where he is said to have summoned the bribe

giver to his own residence and to have accepted himself the

money from the intermediary. Such a departure from an

otherwise consistent pattern is not to be rejected at the outset,

but it is a circumstance that calls for caution, and one that could

more readily have been accepted had it been supported by some

independent witness. In the absence of any such independent

evidentiary support, and in light of the unrefuted alibi of the

appellant discussed below, this solitary and uncharacteristic

departure raises rather than dispels reasonable doubt on the

prosecution case.

82. Firstly, there is no other evidence independent of PW-7

and PW-11 themselves. The Inspector who is said to have

telephoned PW-11 at the instance of the appellant and directed

PW-11 to meet the appellant at his residence was never

examined. There is no call record of any such summons and no

muster roll, movement register, nor duty record has been

produced to place the appellant at his residence at the relevant

time. What remains is the oral testimony of an approver (PW-7,

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a pardoned co-accused) and the word of the alleged bribe giver

(PW-11), each corroborating the other on the very transaction in

which both were active participants of the transaction. That is

not independent corroboration in the sense required by the rule

of prudence applicable to accomplice evidence, corroboration by

an observer not connected with or part of the transaction which

endows it with the character of independence.

83. Secondly, and significantly, the appellant’s own

monthly diary (Ext.D2) records that he left Palakkad by train on

the evening of 29.07.2005 and did not return until the night of

31.07.2005. The only date attributed to this transaction

anywhere on the record is 30.07.2005, appearing in PW-7’s

Section 164 Cr.P.C. statement falls squarely within this window.

Neither PW-7 nor PW-11 stated any date for the meeting in their

substantive testimony before the Trial Court. The prosecution

has offered no explanation reconciling this diary entry with its

own case.

84. Thirdly, unlike the transaction discussed above, this

was never a trap. No currency was recovered, tested, or produced

at any stage, either at the time or subsequently. No part of the

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Rs. 3,000/- said to have changed hands in the appellant's

presence, or anything traceable to it, was ever recovered from

the appellant, in his residence, or his office.

85. Therefore, in the light of Neeraj Dutta (supra) case, the

foundational facts necessary before any presumption of fact can

be drawn that, the appellant himself demanded or accepted the

amount, have not been established by evidence of the quality

that the provision contemplates. What is left, once PW-7’s

approver status is accounted for and the diary entry is weighed

against the sole date on record, is the uncorroborated word of

two interested witnesses as to an event unsupported by recovery,

documentary record, or any independent witness, and

contradicted, on the only date available, by the appellant’s own

contemporaneous diary.

CONCLUSION

86. We, therefore, hold that in view of the lingering

reasonable doubts, as discussed above, the charge against the

appellant could not be said to have been proved with certain

element of definitiveness as contemplated under the principle of

proof beyond reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the conviction of

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the appellant in respect of the transaction concerning PW-11

N.P. Gopi Kumar cannot be sustained under Section 7 of the Act,

and the appellant is entitled to be acquitted in this transaction

as well.

87. Before parting with the case, we may observe that the

appellant, in his additional statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C.,

has attributed the prosecution to a conspiracy. One M. Ramesh,

Inspector RPF, who allegedly had close ties with investigating

officer, Nand Kumar Nair (PW-7), as well as was in a good

relationship with the complainant P.P. Nandakumar (PW-6), in

order to secure his posting at DSC/Palghat, Palakkad in place of

the appellant, conspired against the appellant, and was in fact

posted later at the aforesaid position after shifting of the

appellant from post of DSC/Palghat due to this case. However,

given the conclusions that we have reached on the evidence

available, it is unnecessary to examine this contention, and we

refrain from doing so. For the same reasons, we do not consider

it necessary to dwell upon the contention of the appellant that

the sanction granted to prosecute the appellant was vitiated.

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88. In the result, Crl. Appeal No. 4733 of 2024 (arising from

C.C. No. 2/2014) is allowed, and the appellant is acquitted of all

charges therein.

Crl. Appeal No. 4732 of 2024 (arising from C.C. No.

3/2015) is also allowed, and the appellant is acquitted of all

charges therein.

89. The bail bonds furnished by the appellant pursuant to

the order of this Court dated 22.11.2024 in both appeals shall

stand discharged and any fine amount deposited by the

appellant shall be refunded to the appellant.

Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of, in

accordance with this judgment.

………………………...J.

(DIPANKAR DATTA)

……………...………………………………J.

(NONGMEIKAPAM KOTISWAR SINGH)

NEW DELHI;

SEPTEMBER 16, 2026