2026 INSC 797

1

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.9308 OF 2024

DELHI TECHNOLOGICAL UNIVERSITY … APPELLANT

VERSUS

B.S. RAWAT … RESPONDENT

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO.9309 OF 2024

AND

SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) NOS.625-626 OF 2021

J U D G M E N T

ALOK ARADHE, J.

1. These two appeals, though arising out of the separate

proceedings before the two different High Courts, involve

substantially overlapping questions of law, namely the right of

an employee to withdraw a tendered resignation, and the effect

of ratification, by the competent authority, of an otherwise

unauthorised acceptance of resignation.

FACTUAL MATRIX

CIVIL APPEAL ARISING FROM THE JUDGMENT OF HIGH

COURT OF DELHI

2. Delhi Technological University (DTU), formerly known as Delhi

College of Engineering was given the status of a University vide

Delhi Technological University Act, 2009 (the 2009 Act). The

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Government of Delhi after obtaining prior approval of the

Chancellor (Lieutenant Governor of Delhi) in exercise of powers

under Section 30 read with Section 31(1) of the 2009 Act,

notified Statutes of Delhi Technological University (First)

Statutes, 2009. On the recommendation of the Selection

Committee, the Vice-Chancellor of DTU offered the post of

Assistant Registrar (Legal) to the respondent. On 23.08.2010,

the respondent joined DTU as the Assistant Registrar (Legal).

By the Delhi Technological University (Amendment) Act, 2012,

Section 22 of the 2009 Act was amended creating the post of a

Chairperson to be nominated by the Chancellor to head the

Board of Management (BOM) , and Section 53 was inserted

empowering the Chancellor to issue such directions as may be

necessary or expedient in the interest of administration. Section

23(2)(ix) vests in the BOM the power to appoint persons to

teaching, administrative and ministerial posts.

3. The BOM in its meeting held on 27.05.2015, for the smooth

functioning of DTU, delegated all its powers to the Vice

Chancellor until the appointment of a Chairman for the BOM.

The then Vice-Chancellor of DTU tendered his resignation and

was relieved with effect from 23.09.2015. The Lieutenant

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Governor of NCT of Delhi who is the Chancellor of the

University in exercise of powers under Section 53 of the 2009

Act, assigned additional charge of the post of Vice-Chancellor of

DTU to Professor Yogesh Singh, Director, Netaji Subhash

Institute of Technology on 18.09.2015. He was appointed as a

full-time, salaried Vice-Chancellor only with effect from

14.07.2016.

4. On 19.05.2016, the respondent tendered his resignation to take

effect from 01.09.2016, the intervening period being treated as

advance notice. He thereafter sought waiver of the notice period

and requested acceptance of his resignation with effect from

31.05.2016. By a memo dated 25.05.2016, the then Vice -

Chancellor, holding additional charge, accepted the resignation

with effect from 31.05.2016, and the respondent was relieved.

Accordingly, his no-dues certificate, last pay certificate and

experience certificate were issued which were accepted by him.

5. On 22.09.2016, four months after being relieved, the

respondent addressed a letter to DTU seeking withdrawal of his

resignation, contending that it had neither been accepted nor

been ratified by the BOM, the competent authority under

Section 23(2)(ix) of the Act. The 20

th meeting of the BOM held

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on 26.09.2016, ratified the acceptance of the resignation, and

by an order dated 03.11.2016, the request for withdrawal of

resignation was rejected.

6. Being aggrieved, the respondent filed a writ petition, namely

W.P.(C) No. 2611 of 2019, which was allowed by the learned

Single Judge on 15.12.2021, and the orders dated 25.05.2016,

31.05.2016 and 03.11.2016 were quashed and reinstatement

with full back wages along with interest @ 9% per annum was

directed. In appeal, the Division Bench, by the impugned

judgment dated 08.08.2022, affirmed reinstatement but denied

back wages on account of the respondent’s conduct in having

taken up gainful employment in the interregnum.

7. DTU has preferred an appeal, namely, C.A No. 9308 of 2024

against the direction of reinstatement whereas the respondent

challenges the denial of back wages in C.A. No. 9309 of 2024.

CIVIL APPEAL ARISING FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE

HIGH COURT OF KERALA

8. Consequent upon his resignation from DTU, the respondent

joined National Institute of Technology, Calicut (‘NITC’) as

Deputy Registrar on 08.02.2017. On 08.11.2018, he tendered a

conditional letter of resignation seeking leave to withdraw the

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same before the date of relieving. The resignation was returned

as impermissible under Statute 30 of the First Statutes of the

National Institute of Technology, 2009 (NIT First Statutes,

2009). The respondent, thereafter, submitted an unconditional

letter of resignation, while reiterating his request for leave to

withdraw the resignation before relieving.

9. The competent authority accepted the resignation on

22.11.2018. The acceptance of resignation was communicated

on 04.12.2018, to the respondent, and he was permitted to be

relieved on 11.01.2019 i.e. upon completion of the notice

period. On 28.11.2018, upon selection on deputation with the

East Delhi Municipal Corporation, the respondent sought to

withdraw his resignation. The request, reiterated on

07.12.2018, was rejected by a reasoned order dated 07.01.2019

and the respondent was relieved on 11.01.2019.

10. Being dissatisfied, the respondent filed a writ petition, which

was partly allowed by the learned Single Judge, the orders of

acceptance of resignation and rejection of withdrawal were held

illegal and reinstatement with notional continuity of service,

without back wages, was directed. Cross-appeals were

preferred, W.A. No. 809 of 2020 by NITC and W.A. No. 816 of

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2020 by the respondent seeking back wages. By the impugned

judgment dated 01.12.2020, the Division Bench allowed NITC’s

appeal in entirety, and set aside the direction of reinstatement,

and dismissed the respondent’s appeal for back wages. Being

aggrieved, respondent has filed the Special Leave Petition (C)

Nos. 625-626 of 2021.

SUBMISSIONS

11. Mrs. Avnish Ahlawat, learned counsel for DTU, has submitted

that the Chancellor of DTU was the competent authority to

appoint the Vice-Chancellor who had been assigned the

additional charge. It is further submitted that the respondent,

having tendered his resignation and having requested that the

notice period be waived, cannot now turn around and contend

that his resignation was not accepted by the competent

authority. It is submitted that the resignation was accepted by

the acting Vice-Chancellor and the same was duly ratified by

the BOM. Therefore, it is contended that impugned judgment in

so far as it directs reinstatement of the respondent is liable to

be set aside. It is urged that the Division Bench has rightly held

that the respondent is not entitled for back wages. In support of

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the aforesaid submissions, reliance has been placed on the

decisions of this Court

1

.

12. On the contrary, respondent in C.A. No. 9308 of 2024 who has

appeared in-person submitted that his resignation was not

approved by the competent authority and the question of its

ratification by the BOM does not arise. It is contended that

there is no document on record to show that resignation has

ever been accepted. It is, therefore, urged that the learned

Single Judge as well as Division Bench have rightly directed

reinstatement of the respondent. It is submitted that the

respondent is entitled to back wages. In support of the

aforesaid submission, reliance has been placed on the decision

of this Court

2

.

13. The respondent in S.L.P. (C) Nos. 625-626 of 2021 has

submitted that NITC erred in relieving him before the notice

period. It is further submitted that the resignation of the

respondent was not accepted by the competent authority

1

Director General of Police & Anr. v. M. Jeyanthi, (2021) 14 SCC 677; New Victoria Mills & Ors. v.

Shrikant Arya, (2021) 13 SCC 771; Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Anil Padegaonkar, (2020) 5

SCC 474; Air India Express Ltd. & Ors. v. Captain Gurdarshan Kaur Sandhu, (2019) 17 SCC 129;

National Institute of Technology & Anr. v. Pannalal Choudhury & Anr., (2015) 11 SCC 669; Union of

India & Ors. v. Gopal Chandra Misra & Ors., (1978) 2 SCC 301; Municipal Commissioner, Jamnagar

Municipal Corporation & Anr. v. R.M. Doshi, (2024) 20 SCC 742 and Dr. Suman V. Jain v. Marwadi

Sammelan through its Secretary & Ors., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 161.

2

Bhartiben Chandrakantbhai Thakor v. State of Gujarat & Ors., 2023 SCC Online SC 208.

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namely, the Board of Governance and the action which is

without jurisdiction, cannot be ratified by the Board of

Governance. It is, therefore, contended that the impugned

judgment be set aside.

14. Learned counsel for NITC, submitted that proviso to Statute 30

of the NIT First Statutes, 2009, provide that resignation is

effective on the date of acceptance and the request for

withdrawal of the resignation was rightly rejected. It i s

contended that the respondent cannot claim reinstatement in

DTU as well as NITC. It is contended that the impugned

judgment does not call for any interference.

POINTS FOR DETERMINATION

15. The following questions arise for determination:

(i) Whether the acceptance of resignation of respondent, by

an officer holding additional charge of Vice-Chancellor and

admittedly not the competent authority under Section

23(2)(ix) of the 2009 Act, stood validated by the

subsequent ratification of the BOM?

(ii) Whether the Division Bench of the High Court of Kerala

was justified in upholding the acceptance of resignation of

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the respondent and the rejection of his request for

withdrawal thereof?

ANALYSIS

Civil Appeal against the judgment of the High Court of

Delhi

Re: Competent Authority

16. Section 23(2)(ix) of the 2009 Act vests in the BOM the power

and function “to appoint persons in teaching, administrative

and ministerial posts”. It is the common ground between the

parties that this provision, being the source of the power of

appointment, is equally the repository of the power to accept

the resignation from such posts, the latter being the necessary

concomitant of the former. The BOM was, therefore, the

competent authority to accept the respondent’s resignation.

Professor Yogesh Singh, who purported to accept the

resignation on 25.05.2016, held only additional charge of Vice-

Chancellor, at the relevant time, and the power of the BOM had

not, consistent with the statutory scheme, been validly

delegated to him. To this extent, the view taken by the Division

Bench calls for no interference.

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Re: Doctrine of Ratification

17. The question that squarely arises, and which, in our view, was

not addressed by the Division Bench with reference to the

correct legal principle, is the effect of the ratification of the

acceptance of resignation by the BOM at its 20

th meeting held

on 26.09.2016.

18. Ratification, in its ordinary legal signification, denotes the

confirmation or adoption, by a person or body possessing the

requisite authority, of an act earlier done on its behalf without

such authority, or done irregularly, so that the act is treated as

valid from its inception. Black’s Law Dictionary describes

ratification as “the confirmation of a previous act done either by

the party himself or by another”. The doctrine finds its origin in

the maxim ratihabitio mandato aequiparatur , a subsequent

ratification is equivalent to a prior command, refined further by

the maxim omnis ratihabitio retrotrahitur et mandato

priori aequiparatur, which imports the principle of relation-

back: a ratified act is deemed valid from the date of the original,

unauthorised act, and not merely from the date of ratification.

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19. This Court has, on more than one occasion, applied the

doctrine in the above sense

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. From these decisions, following

legal principles about doctrine of ratification can be culled out:

(i) Ratification means making a previously invalid act valid. It

is the subsequent approval of an act that was initially

done without authority.

(ii) A subsequent ratification is equivalent to prior authority.

Once the competent authority ratifies an act, the law

treats it as though the authority had existed from the

beginning. This is based on the maxim ratihabitio

mandato aequiparatur.

(iii) Ratification operates retrospectively. It relates back to the

date on which the original act was performed and cures

the defect arising from the absence of prior authority.

(iv) Only the competent authority can ratify an invalid act. The

authority which is legally empowered to perform the act

must itself approve or adopt the earlier unauthorised

action.

3

Sri Parmeshwari Prasad Gupta v. Union of India, (1973) 2 SCC 543; High Court of Judicature for

Rajasthan v. P.P. Singh & Anr., (2003) 4 SCC 239; Maharashtra State Mining Corpn. v. Sunil S/o

Pundikarao Pathak, (2006) 5 SCC 96, National Institute of Technology & Anr. v. Pannalal

Choudhury & Anr., (2015) 11 SCC 669 and Municipal Commissioner, Jamnagar Municipal

Corporation (supra)

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(v) Express approval of the earlier action is sufficient. It is not

necessary for the competent authority to pass a fresh

order. A resolution or decision approving the earlier

unauthorised act amounts to valid ratification.

(vi) Ratification cures defects of authority, not acts that are

inherently illegal. The doctrine applies where the act could

have been validly performed by the competent authority in

the first place. It cannot validate an act that is void

because it is prohibited by law or beyond the power of the

authority.

20. Another principle which arises for consideration in these

appeals may be stated. A resignation, even where accepted in

the first instance by one not clothed with authority to accept it,

may nonetheless become a consummated and irrevocable

transaction where both sides have, by their conduct, treated it

as final and altered their positions upon that footing. In such a

case, an employee is precluded, not by any doctrine of curative

ratification, but by the ordinary principle against approbation

and reprobation, from later impugning the very transaction he

brought about and from which he has already taken the entire

benefit.

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21. This principle finds support in a decision of the House of Lords

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which is noted in a decision of this Court

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. There, a resignation

tendered on the footing that formal acceptance would follow at

a later date was held incapable of unilateral withdrawal, the

resigner having, in Lord Halsbury’s words, already

“consummated” the arrangement by his own conduct before he

purported to revoke. Lord Watson likewise held that a resigner

who has done all that lay in his power to complete a transaction

cannot later be permitted to upset it merely because formal

acceptance was still awaited.

22. Tested on the touch stone of this principle, the fault in this

matter lies squarely at the respondent’s own door, and not

merely in the accepting officer’s want of authority. It was the

respondent who initiated the process by tendering resignation

and then went further, of his own volition, to request waiver of

the notice period and acceptance with effect from an advanced

date 31.05.2016 rather than the original date of 31.08.2016, he

himself had proposed. The university acted on that very

request: it relieved him with effect from the date he requested,

accepted his no-dues certificate, and issued him his last pay

4

Reichel v. Bishop of Oxford, (1889) 14 AC 259

5

Gopal Chandra Misra & Ors. (supra)

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and experience certificate. Every step that rendered the

resignation complete, in fact was taken either at the

respondent’s own instance or with his express concurrence.

The fact that the officer who signed the acceptance held only

additional charge, and was not the BOM, is a defect in the

University’s internal administration of which the respondent

was not even aware, and did not complain of, until 22.09.2016,

nearly four months later. The resignation thus stood

consummated by the conduct of the parties, and in particular

by the respondent’s own conduct.

23. That the respondent’s conduct in the interregnum was not the

product of mere delay or inadvertence, but a conscious

treatment of his resignation as final, is confirmed by the fact, as

found by the Division Bench itself, is that he proceeded to

secure fresh, gainful employment, joining the NITC as Deputy

Registrar on 08.02.2017, on the strength of the very experience

certificate DTU had issued to him. Having taken the settlement,

the relief, and the certificate, and having used that certificate to

open the door to another appointment, the respondent cannot,

upon being disappointed of that appointment or upon mere

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reconsideration, turn back and treat the resignation he himself

procured as a nullity.

24. He cannot have his cake and eat it too, i.e. he cannot claim the

benefits of a completed exit from DTU when it suited him to

move on, and simultaneously claim that no exit ever legally

occurred when it suits him to return. This conclusion is

reinforced by the decisions cited by the appellant recognising

that an employee who has acted upon, and accepted the

consequences of his own resignation cannot later found a

challenge on a technical infirmity in the mode of its acceptance.

25. The Division Bench, while correctly holding that Professor

Yogesh Singh lacked competence to accept the resignation, fell

into error in failing to appreciate the legal consequence of its

ratification by the BOM. The respondent’s letter of withdrawal

dated 22.09.2016, addressed nearly four months after he had

already ceased to be in service and had accepted all

consequential benefits flowing therefrom, cannot be equated

with the withdrawal of a resignation yet to take legal effect.

Once ratified, the acceptance related back to 25.05.2016, the

date his resignation accepted by the In-charge Vice-Chancellor,

there was, in point of law, no resignation left in existence which

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he could have withdrawn on 22.09.2016. For the foregoing

reasons, the impugned judgment of the High Court of Delhi in

L.P.A. No. 68 of 2022, insofar as it directs reinstatement of the

respondent, cannot be sustained.

Civil Appeal against the judgment of the High Court of

Kerala

26. We now turn to the connected appeal preferred by respondent,

assailing the judgment of the Division Bench on the following

grounds, namely (i) his resignation had not become effective, in

the absence of communication of acceptance; (ii) he possessed

an unqualified right to withdraw it before being relieved; (iii) the

refusal to permit withdrawal was arbitrary; and (iv) the

acceptance, being conditioned upon a notice period, was merely

prospective; therefore the order dated 07.01.2019 and the

consequent denial of reinstatement were, for aforesaid grounds,

unsustainable. Having considered the aforesaid submissions,

we find no fault with the impugned judgment and no merit in

the appeal, for the following reasons.

Re: Effectiveness of Resignation

27. The proviso to Statute 30 of the NIT First Statutes, 2009, is

explicit that resignation “shall take effect only on the date on

which the resignation is accepted by the appointing authority”.

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It imposes neither any requirement of communication as a

condition of efficacy, nor does it make effectiveness of

acceptance of resignation contingent upon expiry of the notice

period. The respondent’s resignation was accepted on

22.11.2018; that is the date on which it became effective in law.

The notice period thereafter regulated only the date of his

actual relieving, namely 11.01.2019, and did not hold the

acceptance itself in abeyance. The Division Bench was,

therefore, correct in reversing the view of the learned Single

Judge that acceptance was to be treated as prospective, and

equally correct in holding, that non-communication of an

acceptance which has, in fact, already been made by the

competent authority does not keep the resignation alive for

withdrawal. The respondent’s letter dated 28.11.2018 was,

accordingly, addressed after the resignation had already taken

legal effect. The view taken by the Division Bench is in

consonance with the decision of this Court

6

.

Re: Refusal to Permit Withdrawal

28. Paragraph 3 of the Office Memorandum dated 11.02.1988,

while recognising withdrawal of an accepted resignation before

actual relieving as the normal rule, expressly preserves to the

6

Raj Kumar v. Union of India, AIR 1969 SC 180.

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competent authority the discretion to refuse such withdrawal,

subject to the safeguard that reasons be recorded and

communicated. That discretion was duly and lawfully exercised

in the present case. The respondent had, in his own letter of

resignation, recorded that he was “not interested to work

anymore” in the Institute; his request for withdrawal followed

immediately upon his selection on deputation with the East

Delhi Municipal Corporation and was, on its own terms,

confined to seek leave to join that Corporation.

29. On this material, the competent authority’s conclusion,

recorded in order dated 07.01.2019, that the respondent had

no genuine intention of continuing in service and that the

request for withdrawal was opportunistic, was a plausible and

rational view. It is not for a court, exercising jurisdiction under

Article 226 of the Constitution, to substitute its own view of the

sufficiency of such reasons for that of the competent authority,

in the absence mala fides, perversity, or a demonstrated

violation of law. The reliance placed by the respondent on the

decision of this Court

7

does not assist the respondent since

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Gopal Chandra Misra & Ors. and Captain Gurdarshan Kaur Sandhu (supra)

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both decisions recognise that the general right to withdraw a

prospective resignation yields wherever special statutory or

regulatory provisions governs the subject, such as Statute 30 of

NIT First Statutes, 2009, and the Office Memorandum dated

11.02.1988 and it is precisely such a case that is presented on

these facts.

Re: Validity of Order Dated 07.01.2019 and Consequential

Reliefs

30. It follows that order dated 07.01.2019 suffers from no infirmity

warranting interference. It is neither contrary to any provision

of law nor is founded on inadmissible material. It also does not

exclude relevant material, and cannot be said to be a

conclusion which no reasonable authority could have reached.

Reinstatement being a relief consequential upon the resignation

being held invalid or its withdrawal having been wrongly

refused. Both the questions have been correctly answered

against the respondent by the Division Bench. Therefore, the

claim for denial of back wages, does not arise. In view of

preceding analysis, no case is made out for interference with

the impugned judgment dated 01.12.2020.

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CONCLUSION

31. For the reasons recorded hereinabove:

(i) Civil Appeal No. 9308 of 202 4 (Delhi Technological

University v. B.S. Rawat) is allowed. The impugned

judgment dated 08.08.2022 of the High Court of Delhi in

L.P.A. No. 68 of 2022 is set aside insofar as it directs

reinstatement of the respondent, and W.P. (C) No. 2611 of

2019 stands dismissed.

(ii) Civil Appeal No. 9309 of 2024 (B.S. Rawat v. Delhi

Technological University) is dismissed.

(iii) Special Leave Petition (C) Nos. 625-626 of 2021 (Bharat

Singh Rawat v. National Institute of Technology, Calicut) is

dismissed.

32. There shall be no order as to costs. Pending applications, if any,

stand disposed of.

………….……………….…… …….………J.

[PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA]

…………… .…….…………… ….……..….J.

[ALOK ARADHE]

NEW DELHI;

AUGUST 04, 2026.