http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 14

CASE NO.:

Appeal (civil) 8003 of 2002

PETITIONER:

Bhavnagar University

RESPONDENT:

Palitana Sugar Mill Pvt. Ltd. & Ors.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 03/12/2002

BENCH:

CJI, K. G. Balakrishnan & S.B. Sinha.

JUDGMENT:

J U D G M E N T

WITH

Civil Appeal Nos.1539, 1540, 1541 of 2001 and

Civil Appeal Nos. 8004-8012 2002

[Arising out of SLP (C) Nos.1636-1644 of 2001]

S.B. SINHA, J :

Leave granted in special leave petitions.

This batch of appeals arising out of common Judgment and Order of the

Gujarat High Court at Ahmedabad in SCA Nos. 10108/94, 4427/92, 4733/92,

4847/92, 3537/95, 8882/99, 8888/99, 6461/96 and 6519/98 involving the question

as regard to interpretation of Sections 20 and 21 of the Gujarat Town Planning and

Urban Development Act, 1976 (for brevity, hereinafter referred to as the 'Said Act'),

were taken up for hearing together and are being disposed of by this common

judgment.

The basic fact of the matter is not in dispute.

The State of Gujarat in exercise of its power conferred upon it under Section

20 of the said Act reserved certain areas of which the respondents herein amongst

others are the owners

On or about 3.3.1986 a development plan was finally published in terms of

the provisions of the said Act, and the period of 10 years therefrom lapsed on

2.3.1996. A revised Development plan however came into being on 20th February,

1996. It is not in dispute that respondents who claim ownership of the lands in

question issued notices in terms of sub-section 2 of Section 20 of the said Act,

asking the State Government to acquire the properties in terms thereof.

The short question which arises for consideration in these matters is as to

whether by reason of inaction on the part of the State and its authorities under the

Town Planning Act to acquire the lands for a period of more than 10 years, in

terms of the provisions of Lan

ection 20 of the Act and on their failure to do so the reservation/designation in

respect of land in question would lapse.

Per contra the contention of the Appellant was that the provisions of Section

20(2) of the Act although enables service of notice by land owners for acquisition

within six moths from the expiry of 10 years from the date of final development plan

but the same would not come into operation when the final development plan is in

the process of revision under Section 21 of the said Act read with sub-section 1 of

Section 20 thereof.

The High Court upon taking into consideration the provisions of the said Act

and upon consideration of the rival contentions raised therein came to the conclusion

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 14

that issuance of a draft revised plan by itself does not put an embargo on the

application of sub-Section (2) of Section 20 of the Said Act.

The appellants were represented by Mr. Kirit N. Rawal, Solicitor General and

Mr. T.R. Adhyarujina, learned senior counsel appearing for the Gujarat University

and Mr. Tanna for the South Gujarat University. The contention of the learned

counsel for the appellant was that having regard to the scope and purport of the said

Act, the High Court must be held to have erred in so far as it failed to take into

consideration that the objects of an integrated, incorporated and interdependent

development plan, cannot be fully achieved within a period of 10 years and in that

view of the matter when steps are taken for revision of the final development plan,

the period specified in sub-section (2) of Section 20 would get automatically

extended. Strong reliance in this behalf has been placed on K.L. Gupta & Ors. v.

The Bombay Municipal Corporation and Ors, [(1968) 1 SCR 274], Ahmedabad

Urban Development Authority v. Manilal Gordhandas & Ors. [(1996) 11 SCC 482];

Murari & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. [(1997) 1 SCC 15].

On the other hand, the submissions of learned counsel for the respondents

led by Mr. Asok Desai the learned senior counsel is that in the event the

interpretation of the provisions of Sections 20 and 21 as suggested by the learned

counsel for the appellant is accepted, the same would render sub-section 2 of Section

20 otiose and redundant. According to learned counsel the right of an owner of the

land cannot be kept under suspension for a long time and the period of 10 years

specified by the legislature must be held to be a reasonable one, and thus by no

stretch of imagination only by taking recourse to the provisions of Section 21 of the

said Act, the period specified therein can be extended. Strong reliance in support of

the said contention has been placed on Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v.

Dr. Hakimwadi Tenants' Association & Ors. [(1988) Supp. SCC 55].

Mr. Desai would urge that the expression 'so far as may be' occurring in

Section 21 of the Act must be given a proper meaning and thus in the event the

interpretation of the provisions put-forth by the learned counsel for the appellant is

accepted, the same will lead to an anomalous and absurd situation; which was not

contemplated by the Legislature.

Reliance in this connection has been placed in The Land Acquisition

Officer, City Improvement Trust Board v. H. Narayanaiah & Ors. [(1976) 4 SCC 9].

Before we advert to the rival contentions, as noticed hereinbefore, we may

look to the relevant provision of the said Act.

The preamble suggests that the said Act was enacted to consolidate and

amend the law relating to making and execution of development plans and town

planning schemes in the State of Gujarat. It is not in dispute that the said Act came

into force with effect from 1.2.1978 in terms of an appropriate notification issued in

this behalf under sub-section (3) of Section 1 thereof .

Section 2 of the said Act contains definition clause. 'Development Plan' has

been defined in Section 2(x) to mean a plan for development or redevelopment or

improvement of a development area.

Section 3, postulates issuance of a notification by the State Government

specifying a development area.

In term of Section 4 of the said Act, the State Government by issuing a

notification is empowered to exclude the whole or part of a development area from

the operation thereof. Section 5 provides for constitution of Area Development

Authorities consisting of two Nominees of the Government and Local Authorities as

specified therein. The State Government in terms of Section 6 of the Act is

empowered to designate any Local Authority functioning in the development area as

an Area Development Authority in State. The State Government has been conferred

with the powers, which amongst others, include preparation of Development Plan,

Town Planning Schemes and to control the development activities in terms of

Section 7 of the Act. Section 9 provides that not later than three years after the

declaration of such area as a development area or within such time as the State

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 14

Government, may from time to time, extend, the authority shall prepare and submit

to the State Government a draft development plan for the whole or any part of the

development area". The State Government on the failure of development authority

to prepare such a plan is required to do so within a period of three years thereafter.

A draft development plan has to be kept open for public inspection in terms of

Section 10. Section 12 provides for the contents of draft development plan, the

relevant portions whereof read as under:-

"Contents of draft development plan :

(1) A draft development plan shall generally indicate the

manner in which the use of land in the area covered by it shall

be regulated and also indicate the manner in which the

development therein shall be carried out.

(2) In particular, it shall provide, so far as may be

necessary, for all or any of the following matters,

namely :-

(a) xxxx

(b) proposals for the reservation of land for public

purposes, such as schools, colleges and other

educational institutions, medical and public health

institutions, markets, social welfare and cultural

institutions, theatres and places for public

entertainment, public assembly, museums, art

galleries, religious buildings, playgrounds, stadium,

open spaces, dairies and for such other purposes as

may, from time to time, be specified by the State

Government;

(c) xxxx

(d) transport and communications, such as roads,

highways, parkways, railways, waterways, canals and

airport, including their extension and development.

(e) xxxx

(f) reservation of land for community facilities and

services;

(g) xxxx

(h) xxxx

(i) xxxx

(j) xxxx

(k) proposals for the reservation of land for the purpose of

Union, any State, local authority or any other authority

or body established by or under any law for the time

being in force;

(l) xxxx

(m) xxxx

(n) provision for preventing or removing pollution of

water or air caused by the discharge of waste or other

means as a result of the use of land;

(o) such other proposals for public or other purposes as

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 14

may from time to time be approved by the area

development authority or as may be directed by the

State Government in this behalf."

Section 13 specifies publication of draft development plan for the purpose of inviting

suggestions and objections from public and affected parties, which are required to be

considered in terms of Section 14 thereof. Necessary modifications may be made

therein as provided under Section 15. A modified draft plan prepared in terms of

Section 15 is required to be submitted to the State Government for sanction, which

in exercise of it power under Section 17 of the Act may grant the same with further

notifications as deemed necessary, after publishing the same again inviting

suggestions and shall be notified in the official gazette.

In terms of sub clause (d) of sub-section (1) of Section 17, the sanction

accorded to the draft development plan by the State Government shall be notified

in the Official Gazette, and on such sanction, it shall be called "the final

development plan" which shall come into force from a date to be notified, but the

same shall be not earlier than one month from the date of publication of such

sanction. Sub-section (2) of Section 17 requires the State Government to take

certain precautions with regard to the reservation of land for specific purposes

mentioned in Section 12, but only on the satisfaction that the land, so reserved, is

likely to be acquired within ten years from the publication of final development

plan.

Sub-section (2) of Section 17 reads as under :-

"17(2) Where the draft development plan submitted by an

area development authority or, as the case may be, the

authorized officer contains any proposals for the reservation

of any land for a purpose specified in clause (b) or clause (n)

or clause (o) of sub-section (2) of Section 12 and such land

does not vest in the area development authority, the State

Government shall not include the said reservation in the

development plan, unless it is satisfied that such authority

would acquire the land, whether by agreement or compulsory

acquisition, within ten years from the date on which the final

development plan comes into force."

Under Section 18, the State Government has been empowered even to amend

the final development plan, by extending or reducing its area. Under Section 19, the

State Government is empowered to vary the final development plan, but, only after

inviting suggestions and objections in the manner laid down therein. Section 20

provides for acquisition of land designated or reserved for specified purposes

mentioned in Section 12. As the said provision is material for this case, the same is

reproduced hereunder :-

"Section 20 Acquisition of land :

(1) The area development authority or any other authority for

whose purpose land is designated in the final development

plan for any purpose specified in clause (b), clause (d),

clause (f), clause (k), clause (n) or clause (o) of sub-section

(2) of Section 12, may acquire the land either by agreement

or under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.

(2) If the land referred to in sub-section (1) is not acquired by

agreement within a period of ten years from the date of the

coming into force of the final development plan or if

proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, are not

commenced within such period, the owner or any person

interested in the land may serve a notice on the authority

concerned requiring it to acquire the land and if within six

months from the date of service of such notice the land is

not acquired or no steps are commenced for its acquisition,

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 14

the designation of land as aforesaid shall be deemed to have

lapsed."

Section 21 of the Act provides for the revision of development plan and reads

as under :-

"Section 21. Revision of development plan :

At least once in ten years from the date on which a final

development plan comes into force, the area development

authority shall revise the development plan after carrying out,

if necessary, a fresh survey and the provisions of Sections 9

to 20, shall, so far as may be, apply to such revision."

It is the basic principle of construction of statute that the same should be read

as a whole, then chapter by chapter, section by section and words by words.

Recourse to construction or interpretation of statute is necessary when there is

ambiguity, obscurity, or inconsistency therein and not otherwise. An effort must be

made to give effect to all parts of statute and unless absolutely necessary, no part

thereof shall be rendered surplusage or redundant.

True meaning of a provision of law has to be determined on the basis of what

provides by its clear language, with due regard to the scheme of law.

Scope of the legislation on the intention of the legislature cannot be enlarged

when the language of the provision is plain and unambiguous. In other words

statutory enactments must ordinarily be construed according to its plain meaning and

no words shall be added, altered or modified unless it is plainly necessary to do so to

prevent a provision from being unintelligible, absurd, unreasonable, unworkable or

totally irreconcilable with the rest of the statute.

It is also well settled that a beneficient provision of legislation must be

liberally construed so as to fulfill the statutory purpose and not to frustrate it.

An owner of a property, subject to reasonable restrictions which may be

imposed by the Legislature, is entitled to enjoy the property in any manner he likes.

A right to use a property in a particular manner or in other words a restriction

imposed on user thereof except in the mode and manner laid down under statute

would not be presumed.

In Legislation and Interpretation by Jagdish Swarup, at page 479, it is stated :

"We ought not to assume without the clearest

language that the legislature intends to destroy

common law rights. The presumption is that the

legislature intends not to interfere with any legal

rights or any legitimate expectations of any person

whatsoever. Rights, whether private or public,

cannot be taken away or hampered by implication

from the language employed in a statute, unless the

legislature clearly and distinctly authorises the

doing of a thing which is physically inconsistent

with the continuance of an existing right. In order

to take away the right it is not sufficient to show

that the thing sanctioned in the Act, it done, will of

a sheer physical necessity, put an end to that right; it

must also be shown that the legislature has

authorised the thing to be done at all events, and

irrespective of its possible interference with existing

rights. An Act should be so interpreted as in no

respect to interfere with or prejudice a clear private

right or title unless that, private right or title is taken

away per directum"

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 14

By reason of the provision of the said Act, a reasonable restriction, has been

imposed upon the owner on the user of his property. In terms of Section 12 of the

said Act, town planning is contemplated through preparation of draft development

plan which contains not only proposals for designating certain area for residential,

industrial, commercial, agricultural or recreational purposes but also for the purposes

for maintaining environment and ecological balance by setting up zoological

gardens, green belts, natural reserves and sanctuaries . In terms of such development

plan reservation of certain land for public use is also provided. From the relevant

provisions of the said Act, as noticed hereinbefore, it is absolutely clear that in terms

thereof the State Government is made the ultimate authority to publish a

development plan, inter alia, providing for designation or reservation of the land.

The State Government while arriving at its conclusion as regards public interest

involved in the matter is required to arrive at its satisfaction on objective basis as

provided in terms of sub-section (2) of Section 17 to the effect that the lands in

respect whereof reservation is proposed to be made can be acquired for the

fulfillment of the object therefor either by agreement or compulsory acquisition

within the period specified therein. It has not been disputed before us nor is it

necessary to consider in the facts and circumstances of this case as to whether

establishment of the educational institutions or universities would be covered by the

provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 12 thereof?

Sections 20 and 21 of the said Act are required to be read conjunctively with

Sections 12 and 17. We may notice that clause (k) of sub-section (2) of Section 12

does not find mention in sub-section (2) of Section 17 as regards proposed

reservation for the State and other statutory authorities but clauses (n) and (b) of

sub-section (2) of Section 12 are specifically mentioned in Section 20. In Section

20, provisions of clauses (b), (d), (f), (k) and (o) of sub-section (2) of Section 12

have specifically been mentioned. The High Court has proceeded on the basis that

the words 'designation' or 'reservation' are interchangeable for the purpose of the

Act. The said finding of the High Court is not in question.

Whereas in terms of Sections 12 and 17 of the said Act, the reservation and

designation have been provided, sub-section (1) of Section 20 thereof only enables

the authorities to acquire the land designated or reserved for the purpose specifically

mentioned in clauses (b) and (n) of sub-section (2) of Section 12 as also other clauses

specified therefor either by acquisition or agreement or in terms of the provisions of

the Land Acquisition Act. Sub-section (1) of Section 20 is merely an enabling

provision.

Sub-section (2) of Section 20, however, carves out an exception to the

exercise of powers by the State as regards acquisition of the land for the purpose of

carrying out the development of the area in the manner provided for therein; a bare

reading whereof leaves no manner of doubt that in the event the land referred to

under sub-section (1) of Section 20 thereof is not acquired or proceedings under the

Land Acquisition Act are not commenced and further in the event an owner or a

person interested in the land serves a notice in the manner specified therein, certain

consequences ensue, namely, the designation of the land shall be deemed to have

lapsed. A legal fiction, therefore, has been created in the said provision.

The purpose and object of creating a legal fiction in the statute is well-

known. When a legal fiction is created, it must be given its full effect. In East End

Dwelling Co. Ltd. v. Finsbury Borough Council, [(1951) 2 All.E.R 587], Lord

Asquith, J. stated the law in the following terms:-

"If you are bidden to treat an imaginary state of

affairs as real, you must surely, unless prohibited from

doing so, also imagine as real the consequences and

incidents which, if the putative state of affairs had in

fact existed, must inevitably have flowed from or

accompanied it. One of these in this case is

emancipation from the 1939 level of rents. The statute

says that you must imagine a certain state of affairs; it

does not say that having done so, you must cause or

permit your imagination to boggle when it comes to

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 7 of 14

the inevitable corollaries of that state of affairs."

The said principle has been reiterated by this Court in M. Venugopal v. Divisional

Manager, Life Insurance Corporation of India, Machilipatnam, A.P. & Anr. [(1994)

2 SCC 323]. See also Indian Oil Corporation Limited v.

Chief Inspector of Factories & Ors.etc., [(1998) 5 SCC 738], Voltas Limited,

Bombay v. Union of India & Ors.,[(1995) Supp. 2 SCC 498], Harish Tandon v.

Addl. District Magistrate, Allahabad, U.P. & Ors. [(1995) 1 SCC 537] and G.

Viswanathan etc. v. Hon'ble Speaker, Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly, Madras &

Anr. [(1996) 2 SCC 353].

The relevant provisions of the Act are absolutely clear, unambiguous and

implicit. A plain meaning of the said provisions, in our considered view, would lead

to only one conclusion, namely, that in the event a notice is issued by the owner of

the land or other person interested therein asking the authority to acquire the land

upon expiry of the period specified therein viz. ten years from the date of issuance of

final development plan and in the event pursuant to or in furtherance thereof no

action for acquisition thereof is taken, the designation shall lapse.

This Court in Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay's case (supra), in no

uncertain terms while construing the provisions of Section 127 of the Maharashtra

Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 held the period of ten years as reasonable

in the following words :-

"While the contention of learned counsel appearing

for the appellant that the words 'six months from

the date of service of such notice' in Section 127 of

the Act were not susceptible of a literal

construction, must be accepted, it must be borne in

mind that the period of six months provided by

Section 127 upon the expiry of which the

reservation of the land under a Development Plan

lapses, is a valuable safeguard to the citizen against

arbitrary and irrational executive action. Section

127 of the Act is a fetter upon the power of eminent

domain. By enacting Section 127 the legislature has

struck a balance between the competing claims of

the interests of the general public as regards the

rights of an individual."

It was observed that :

"The Act lays down the principles of fixation by

providing first, by the proviso to Section 126(2) that

no such declaration under sub-section (2) shall be

made after the expiry of three years from the date of

publication of the draft regional plan, development

plan or any other plan, secondly, by enacting sub-

section (4) of Section 126 that if a declaration is not

made within the period referred to in sub-section

(2), the State Government may make a fresh

declaration but, in that event, the market value of

the land shall be the market value at the date of the

declaration under Section 6 and not the market

value at the date of the notification under Section 4,

and thirdly, by Section 127 that if any land reserved,

allotted or designated for any purpose in any

development plan is not acquired by agreement

within 10 years from the date on which a final

regional plan or development plan comes into force

or if proceedings for the acquisition of such land

under the Land Acquisition Act are not commenced

within such period, such land shall be deemed to be

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 8 of 14

released from such reservation, allotment or

designation and become available to the owner for

the purpose of development on the failure of the

Appropriate Authority to initiate any steps for its

acquisition within a period of six months from the

date of service of a notice by the owner or any

person interested in the land. It cannot be doubted

that a period of 10 years is long enough., The

Development or the Planning Authority must take

recourse to acquisition with some amount of

promptitude in order that the compensation paid to

the expropriated owner bears a just relation to the

real value of the land as otherwise, the

compensation paid for the acquisition would be

wholly illusory. Such fetter on statutory powers is

in the interest of the general public and the

conditions subject to which they can be exercised

must be strictly followed."

It is true that Section 21 of the Act imposes a statutory obligation on the part of the

State and the appropriate authorities to revise the development plan and for the said

purpose Sections 9 to 20 'so far as may be' would be applicable thereto, but thereby

the rights of the owners in terms of sub-section (2) of Section 20 are not taken away.

The question, however, is as to whether only because the provision of

Section 20 has been referred to therein; would it mean that thereby the Legislature

contemplated that the time of ten years specified by the Legislature for the purpose

of acquisition of the land would get automatically extended? The answer to the said

question must be rendered in the negative. Following the principle of interpretation

that all words must be given its full effect, we must also give full effect to the words

"so far as may be" applied to such revision.

The said words indicate the intention of the Legislature to the effect that by

providing revision of final development plan from time to time and at least once in

ten years, only the procedure or preparation thereof as provided therein, is required

to be followed. Such procedural requirements must be followed so far as it is

reasonably possible. Section 21 of the Act, in our opinion, does not and cannot

mean that the substantial right conferred upon the owner of the land or the person

interested therein shall be taken away. It is not and cannot be the intention of the

Legislature that what is given by one hand should be taken away by the other.

Section 21 does not envisage that despite the fact that in terms of sub-section

(2) of Section 20, the designation of land shall lapse, the same, only because a draft

revised plan is made, would automatically give rise to revival thereof. Section 20

does not manifest a legislative intent to curtail or take away the right acquired by a

land-owner under Section 22 of getting the land defreezed. In the event the

submission of the learned Solicitor General is accepted the same would completely

render the provisions of Section 20(2) otiose and redundant.

Sub-section (1) of Section 20, as noticed hereinbefore, provides for an

enabling provision in terms whereof the State become entitled to acquire the land

either by agreement or taking recourse to the provisions of the Land Acquisition

Act. If by reason of a revised plan, any other area is sought to be brought within the

purview of the development plan, evidently in relation thereto the State will be

entitled to exercise its jurisdiction under sub-section (1) of Section 20 but it will bear

repetition to state that the same would not confer any other or further power upon the

State to get the duration of designation of land, which has been lapsed, extended.

What is contemplated under Section 21 is to meet the changed situation and

contingencies which might not have been contemplated while preparing the first final

development plan. The power of the State enumerated under sub-section (1) of

Section 20 does not become ipso facto applicable in the event of issuance of a

revised plan as the said provision has been specifically mentioned therein so that the

State may use the same power in a changed situation.

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 9 of 14

The statutory interdict of use and enjoyment of the property must be strictly

construed. It is well-settled that when a statutory authority is required to do a thing

in a particular manner, the same must be done in that manner or not at all. The State

and other authorities while acting under the said Act are only creature of statute.

They must act within the four-corners thereof.

There is another aspect of the matter which cannot be lost sight of. Despite

statutory lapse of designation of the land, the State is not denuded of its power of

eminent domain under the general law, namely, Land Acquisition Act in the event

an exigency arises therefor.

We are not oblivious of the law that when a public functionary is required to

do a certain thing within a specified time, the same is ordinarily directory but it is

equally well settled that when consequence for inaction on the part of the Statutory

authorities within such specified time is expressly provided, it must be held to be

imperative.

In Sutherland, Statutory Construction, 3rd edition, Vol.3 at p.102 the law is

stated as follows :-

".unless the nature of the act to be performed, or

the phraseology of the statute is such that the

designation of time must be considered a limitation

of the power of the Officer."

At p.107 it is pointed out that a statutory direction

to private individuals should generally be

considered as mandatory and that the rule is just the

opposite to that which obtains with respect to public

officers. Again, at p. 109, it is pointed out that often

the question as to whether a mandatory or directory

construction should be given to a statutory provision

may be determined by an expression in the statute

itself of the result that shall follow non-compliance

with the provision. At p.111 it is stated as follows :

"As a corollary of the rule outlined above,

the fact that no consequences of non-compliance are

stated in the statute, has been considered as a factor

tending towards a directory construction. But this is

only an element to be considered, and is by no

means conclusive."

[See also Crawford on Statutory Construction , Article 269 at p.535].

In Dattatrays v. State of Bombay [AIR 1952 SC 181], it was held as under :-

"Generally speaking the provisions of a

statute creating public duties are directory and those

conferring private rights are imperative. When the

provisions of statute relate to the performance of a

public duty and the case is such that to hold null and

void acts done in neglect of this duty would work

serious general inconvenience or injustice to

persons who have no control over those entrusted

with the duty and at the same time would not

promote the main object of the Legislature, it has

been the practice of the courts to hold such

provisions to be directory only, the neglect of them

not affecting the validity of the acts done."

In Craies on Statute Law VIII Edn. at page 262, it is stated thus :-

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 10 of 14

"It is the duty of courts of justice to try to

get at the real intention of the Legislature by

carefully attending to the whole scope of the statute

to be construedThat is each case you must look

to the subject-matter, consider the importance of the

provision and the relation of that provision to the

general object intended to be secured by the Act,

and upon a review of the case in that aspect decide

whether the enactment is what is called imperative

or only directory."

In the aforementioned backdrop, we may usefully refer to the decision of this

Court in The Land Acquisition Officer, City Improvement Trust Board, Bangalore's

case (supra) wherein it has been stated :-

"There was some argument on the meaning of the

words "so far as they are applicable", used in

Section 27 of the Bangalore Act. These words

cannot be changed into "in so far as they are

specifically mentioned" with regard to the

procedure in the Acquisition Act. On the other

hand, the obvious intention, in using these words,

was to exclude only those provisions of the

Acquisition Act which become inapplicable because

of any special procedure prescribed by the

Bangalore Act (e.g. Section 16) corresponding with

that found in the Acquisition Act (e.g. Section 4(1)).

These words bring in or make applicable, so far as

this is reasonably possible, general provisions such

as Section 23(1) of the Acquisition Act. They

cannot be reasonably construed to exclude the

application of any general provisions of the

Acquisition Act. They amount to laying down the

principle that what is not either expressly, or , by a

necessary implication, excluded must be applied. It

is surprising to find misconstruction of what did not

appear to us to be reasonably open to more than one

interpretation."

We may at this juncture usefully quote the words of Oliver Wendell

Holmes : "It is sometimes more important to emphasize the obvious than to

elucidate the obscure". (See the Interpretation and Application of Statutes by Reed

Dickerson at page 7).

The decision of this Court in K.L. Gupta's case (supra), whereupon the

learned counsel for the Appellant strongly relied upon, may in the aforementioned

backdrop, be considered. In that case, the vires of the provisions of Sections 9, 10,

11, 12 and 13 of the Bombay Town Planning Act, 1954 were in question. Although

the constitutionality of Section 17 of the Act was also questioned before this Court,

at the hearing the same was given up. The Court specifically noticed so stating :-

"Towards the end of the hearing counsel for the

petitioners submitted that s.17 of the Act might be

left out of consideration for the purpose of these

petitions and learned counsel for the respondents

were agreeable to this course. We, therefore, do

not express our views about the validity or

otherwise of this section."

In that case the rights of the owners accrued to them having regard to the

inaction on the part of the State and other authorities despite rights to the owners of

land as envisaged under sub-section (2) of Section 20 of the Act were not in

question. Section 17 of the Act was in pari materia with Section 21 of the said Act.

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 11 of 14

The scheme of the provisions of the Bombay Act as regards designation or

reservation of land for ten years and further right of revision after every ten years

was considered having regard to the challenges made therein that thereby the State

was conferred with a power which was unreasonable and thus violative of Articles

14 and 19(1) of the Constitution of India.

The observations made by this Court should be understood in that context.

In that case the rival contention as regards interpretation of the statute was not the

subject-matter of the consideration of the Constitution Bench.

The scheme of the Act was noticed thus :-

"The idea behind this sub-section is that if

any land is to be set apart for public purposes such

as parks etc. mentioned in cl.(b) of s. 7 or any other

public purpose which might be approved by a local

authority or directed by the State Government in

terms of cl. (e) of s. 7, the State Government must

examine whether it would be possible for the local

authority to be able to acquire such land by private

agreement or compulsory purchase within a period

of ten years. This acts as a check on the local

authority making too ambitious proposals for

designating lands for public purposes which they

may never have the means to fulfil. It is obvious

that the local authority must be given a reasonable

time for the purpose and the legislature thought that

a period of ten years was a sufficient one. S.11(1)

empowers the local authority to acquire any land

designated in the development plan for a purpose

specified in cls. (b), (c),(d) or (e) of s. 7 either by

agreement or under the Land Acquisition Act.

Under sub-s. (2) of s. 11 the provisions of the Land

Acquisition Act of 1894 as amended by the

Schedule to the Act are to apply to all such

acquisitions. The Schedule to the Act shows that s.

23 of the Land Acquisition Act is to stand amended

for the acquisition under this Act with regard to the

compensation to be awarded. In fact it is for the

benefit of the person whose land is acquired, as he

can get the market value of the land at the date of

the publication of the declaration under s. 6 of the

Land Acquisition Act in place of s.4. Sub-s.(3)

provides that if the designated land is not acquired

by agreement within ten years from the date

specified under sub-s. (3) of s. 10 or if proceedings

under the Land Acquisition Act are not commenced

within such period, the owner or any person

interested in the land may serve notice to the local

authority and if within six months from the date of

such notice the land is not acquired or no steps as

aforesaid are commenced for its acquisition, the

designation shall be deemed to have lapsed. This

provision again is for the benefit of the owner of the

land for unless the land is acquired or steps taken in

that behalf within the fixed limits of time, he ceases

to be bound by the designation of his land as given

in the development plan."

(Emphasis Supplied)

What was emphasised in that case is unreasonableness of Section 17 of the

Act which, as indicated hereinbefore, was not pressed at a later stage. This Court

had no occasion to consider the conflicting rights of the parties under sub-section (3)

of Section 10 vis--vis Section 17 of the Bombay Act. What was considered and

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 12 of 14

upheld by the Court was the contention that by taking the recourse to Section 17

more than once acquisition might be held up indefinitely from generation to

generation.

As the facts of the present case stand absolutely on a different footing and

this Court in K.L. Gupta's case (supra) was not called upon to answer the same, the

same cannot be said to be an authority for the proposition that by reason of Section

21 of the Act, the designation of the land although lapsed in terms of Section 20, the

same would get automatically extended or revised once a revised plan is made. This

Court in K.L. Gupta's case merely held that the land which is reserved for ten

years can be subjected to further reservation for any period till it is actually required

for its town planning activities leading to revision of development plans from time to

time. Therein, this Court did not negate the right of owners. Such a right of the

land-owners, as noticed hereinbefore, has been specifically acknowledged.

Nowhere it was stated that valuable right conferred on a land-owner of getting his

land reserved by serving notice would be defeated or taken away merely because a

revised development plan was in the offing.

The question raised in the said case, thus, was absolutely different. It is

interesting to note that the law of the land was considered therein, as it then stood by

observing :-

"No one can be heard to say that the local

authority after making up its mind to acquire land

for a public purpose must do so within as short a

period of time as possible. It would not be

reasonable to place such a restriction on the power

of the local authority which is out to create better

living conditions for millions of people in a vast

area."

However, we may notice that the Parliament amended the Land Acquisition

Act, 1984 in terms whereof, inter alia, Section 11A was inserted. In the Objects and

Reasons of the said Act, it was stated :-

"With the enormous expansion of the State's

role in promoting public welfare and economic

development since independence, acquisition of

land for public purposes, industrialization, building

of institutions, etc., has become far more numerous

than ever before. While this is inevitable,

promotion of public purpose has to be balanced

with the rights of the individual whose land is

acquired, thereby often depriving him of his means

of livelihood. Again, acquisition of land for private

enterprises ought not to be placed on the same

footing as acquisition for the State or for an

enterprise under it. The individual and institutions

who are unavoidably to be deprived of their

property rights in land need to be adequately

compensated for the loss keeping in view the

sacrifice they have to make for the larger interests

of the community. The pendency of acquisition

proceedings for long period often causes hardship to

the affected parties and renders unrealistic the scale

of compensation offered to them."

The decision in Ahmedabad Urban Development Authority's case (supra), in

our opinion, has again no application to the fact of the present case. The fact of the

matter therein was completely different. The Gujarat Planning and Urban

Development Act, 1976, which is now in operation in the State of Gujarat, came into

force from 30th November, 1978, prior to which the Bombay Town Planning Act,

1954 was applicable to the State of Gujarat. Prior to coming into force of the

Gujarat Act, the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation submitted the development

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 13 of 14

plan on 15th January, 1976 which came to be sanctioned by the State Government on

12th August, 1983. It was held by this Court that the draft development plan

submitted by the Corporation on 15th January, 1976, could not have been sanctioned

under the provisions of the Gujarat Act on 12th August, 1983 ignoring the fact that

meanwhile a comprehensive draft development plan had been prepared and

submitted by the Corporation on 23rd July, 1981 which also came to be sanctioned

on 2nd November, 1986 and which included the areas covered by the earlier illegally

sanctioned plan on 12th August, 1983. In the aforementioned peculiar facts, the

question arose as to from which date the period of ten years had to be reckoned for

application of Section 20(2) of the Act. This Court answered the aforementioned

question in the following terms :-

"As in the present case the only question

which is to be answered is as to with effect from

which date 10 years period shall be counted, it has

to be decided as to which date shall be deemed to be

the date of coming into force of the final

development plan, so far the area within the

Corporation is concerned. The notification dated

2.11.1987, had been issued by the State

Government covering the area notified on

12.8.1983, several years before, the issuance of

notices by the writ petitioners. The notification

dated 2.11.1987, was neither questioned by the writ

petitioners-respondents nor could have been

questioned, according to us. When power has been

vested in the appellant to prepare a draft

development plan and there being no bar to include

in the said draft development plan even area, for

which an earlier draft development plan had already

been sanctioned, then the draft development plan

which was sanctioned and notified on 2.11.1987,

shall be deemed to be the final development plan

within the meaning of Section 20 of the Gujarat

Town Planning Act. As such the period of 10 years

has to be calculated and counted with reference to

3.12.1987, the date when such final development

was to come into force."

Yet again the decision of this Court in Murari's case (supra) has no

application to the fact of this matter. The question which arose for consideration

therein was as to whether in terms of the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act any

actual physical possession is required to be obtained or merely taking the possession

specified therein would serve the purpose.

Having regard to the provision of the said Act, we are of the opinion that the

decisions cited by the learned Solicitor General have no application in the instant

case.

A decision, as is well-known, is an authority for which it is decided and not

what can logically be deduced therefrom. It is also well-settled that a little difference

in facts or additional facts may make a lot of difference in the precedential value of

a decision. [See Smt. Ram Rakhi v. Union of India & Ors. [AIR 2002 Delhi 458],

Delhi Administration (NCT of Delhi) v. Manoharlal [AIR 2002 SC 3088], Haryana

Financial Corporation and Anr. v. M/s Jagdamba Oil Mills & Anr. [JT 2002 (1) SC

482] and Dr. Nalini Mahajan etc. v. Director of Income Tax (Investigation) & Ors.

[(2002) 257 ITR 123].

For the aforementioned reasons, we are in agreement with the findings of

the High Court.

Before parting with the case, we may notice that Mr. Tanna

appearing on behalf of the South Gujarat University in C.A. No.1540 of 2002

submitted that various other contentions had also been raised before the High Court.

We are not prepared to go into the said contentions inasmuch assuming the same to

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 14 of 14

be correct, the remedy of the appellants would lie in filing appropriate application for

review before the High Court. Incidentally, we may notice that even in the special

leave petition no substantial question of law in this behalf has been raised nor any

affidavit has been affirmed by the learned advocate who had appeared before the

High Court or by any officer of the appellant who was present in court that certain

other submissions were made before the High Court which were not taken into

consideration. In State of Maharashtra v. Ramdas Shrinivas Nayak & Anr. [AIR

1982 SC 1249], this Court observed :-

"When we drew the attention of the learned

Attorney General to the concession made before the

High Court, Shri A.K. Sen, who appeared for the

State of Maharashtra before the High Court and led

the arguments for the respondents there and who

appeared for Shri Antulay before us intervened and

protested that he never made any such concession

and invited us to peruse the written submission

made by him in the High Court. We are afraid that

we cannot launch into an inquiry as to what

transpired in the High Court. It is simply not done.

Public Policy bars us. Judicial decorum restrains

us. Matters of judicial record are unquestionable.

They are not open to doubt. Judges cannot be

dragged into the arena. "Judgments cannot be

treated as mere counters in the game of litigation".

(Per Lord Atkinson in Somasundaran v.

Subramanian, AIR 1926 PC 136). We are bound to

accept the statement of the Judges recorded in their

judgment, as to what transpired in court. We cannot

allow the statement of the Judges to be contradicted

by statements at the Bar or by affidavit and other

evidence. If the Judges say in their judgment that

something was done, said or admitted before them,

that has to be the last word on the subject. The

principle is well-settled that statements of fact as to

what transpired at the hearing, recorded in the

judgment of the court, are conclusive of the facts so

stated and no one can contradict such statements by

affidavit or other evidence. If a party thinks that the

happenings in court have been wrongly recorded in

a judgment, it is incumbent upon the party, while

the matter is still fresh in the minds of the Judges, to

call the attention of the very Judges, who have made

the record to the fact that the statement made with

regard to his conduct was a statement that had been

made in error (Per Lord Buckmaster in

Madhusudan v. Chandrabati, AIR 1917 PC 30).

That is the only way to have the record corrected. If

no such step is taken, the matter must necessarily

end there. Of course a party may resile and an

Appellate Court may permit him in rare and

appropriate cases to resile from a concession on the

ground that the concession was made on a wrong

appreciation of the law and had led to gross

injustice; but, he may not call in question the very

fact of making the concession as recorded in the

judgment."

For the aforementioned reasons , there is no merit in these appeals which are

dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no

order as to costs.