As per case facts, the petitioner (husband), currently residing in Texas, USA, filed a matrimonial petition seeking court permission to appear via video conferencing for reconciliation proceedings. He cited difficulties ...
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THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE RAVI NATH TILHARI
CIVIL REVISION PETITION NO: 311 of 2026
ORDER :
This Civil Revision Petition, has been filed under Article 227 of
the Constitution of India, challenging the order dated 24.10.2025
passed in I.A.No.457 of 2024 in H.M.O.P.No.35 of 2023 on the file of
the Civil Judge (Senior Division) Yellamanchili.
2. Heard Sri B.Abhay Siddanth Mootha, learned counsel for
the petitioner and perused the material on record.
I. Facts :-
3. H.M.O.P. No.35 of 2023 was filed by the present
petitioner, who is the husband of the respondent, represented by his
power of attorney holder (father). In the said H.M.O.P., I.A. No.457 of
2024 was filed by the petitioner seeking permission to appear before
the learned Senior Civil Judge through video conferencing i.e., Zoom,
WhatsApp or Skype, as he was unable to attend the Court in person for
the purpose of reconciliation.
4. The petitioner is residing in Texas, USA. Due to the
non-availability of leave, as his employer did not permit him to travel to
India, he was unable to attend the Court proceedings personally and
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therefore requested permission to participate in the reconciliation
proceedings through video conferencing in the matrimonial dispute.
5. The respondent/wife filed counter denying the material
allegations and contended that the application was liable to be
dismissed, as no bonafide reasons or sufficient cause had been shown
to permit the petitioner to appear through virtual mode for
reconciliation. She further contended that the petitioner ought to attend
the reconciliation proceedings in person.
6. The learned Trial Court dismissed the petition. It, recorded
that the petitioner’s General Power of Attorney holder was present and
represented by counsel on 25.10.2024, on which date it was stated that
the petitioner would come to India in April, 2025. On that basis, the
learned Trial Court inferred that the petitioner was in a position to travel
to India and, therefore, found no justification to permit his appearance
through video conferencing, notwithstanding the fact that he did not
ultimately come to India in April, 2025. The learned Trial Court was not
inclined to grant permission to attend the proceedings through virtual
mode. The learned Trial Court referred to the judgment of this Court in
Nerella Chiranjeevi Arun Kumar vs. Nerella Akula Sowjanya
1
which
was cited before it by the learned counsel for the petitioner, wherein
the husband was permitted to participate in the reconciliation
1
2019 Supreme (AP) 357
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proceedings through Skype technology, but did not permit observing
that there was possibility for the petitioner to come to India.
II. Submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner :-
7. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the
impugned order cannot be sustained in the eyes of law. He submitted
that in the era of technology, the refusal of the learned Trial Court to
permit the petitioner to attend the proceedings through video
conferencing is unsustainable, and the technology ought to be
effectively utilized, particularly in the present case where the
petitioner/husband is residing in Texas, USA, and owing to the nature
of his employment and the difficulty in obtaining leave, he is unable to
travel to India and attend the Court personally.
8. Learned counsel submitted that video conferencing is
permissible and can be availed at any stage of the proceedings,
including matrimonial proceedings, which are judicial in nature.
According to him, such facility can be extended even at the stage of
reconciliation. He placed reliance on the “Rules for Video Conferencing
for Courts,2023” as applicable to the High Court of Andhra Pradesh (in
short, “the Rules,2023”), issued vide Roc. No.415/2020-CPS, dated
10.06.2023. He submitted that Rule 3(i) clearly provides that “Video
conferencing facilities may be used at all stages of judicial proceedings and
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proceedings conducted by the Court.” He submitted that the expression
“Court” is defined under Rule 2(iv) of the Rules,2023 to mean “a
physical Court and a virtual Court or a Tribunal.” He further referred to
Rule 3(iii), which stipulates that “all relevant statutory provisions
applicable to judicial proceedings, including the provisions of the CPC,
CrPC, Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, the Indian Evidence Act, 1872
(hereinafter referred to as “the Evidence Act”), the Information Technology
Act, 2000 (hereinafter referred to as “the I.T. Act”), and other relevant Acts
and Rules, shall apply to proceedings conducted through video conferencing”.
On the strength of the aforesaid provisions, he submitted that the video
conferencing is permissible at all stages of judicial proceedings. The
matrimonial proceedings being judicial proceedings, Rules 2023 would
apply and all stages in matrimonial proceedings would necessarily
include the stage of reconciliation conducted before a Court.
9. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the
Rules, 2023 governing Video Conferencing were framed in the
exercise of the powers conferred upon the High Court under Article 227
of the Constitution of India. So, Rules,2023 are binding on the learned
Trial Court, as they have been promulgated for regulating the practice
and procedure of proceedings before the subordinate Courts.
According to the learned counsel, the impugned order suffers from
non-compliance with the directions contained in the Rules, 2023 and is
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thus, liable to be set aside in exercise of the supervisory jurisdiction of
this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
10. Learned counsel further contended that the judgment of
this Court in Nerella Chiranjeevi Arun Kumar (supra) was binding
on the learned Trial Court. In the said decision, it was categorically held
that even for the purpose of reconciliation, the use of video
conferencing technology would have to be considered and weighed in
favour of the person seeking such facility, having regard to the
advancements in technology and the circumstances pleaded. He
submitted that the said judgment was required to be followed by the
learned Trial Court, which was bound by the judicial pronouncement of
the High Court. He further submitted that unless the said judgment is
set aside by a superior Court or declared to be per incuriam, it
continues to hold the field, and retains its binding nature. He reiterated
that the decision in Nerella Chiranjeevi Arun Kumar (supra), not
having been set aside or declared per incuriam, should be followed by
this Court as well, it being a decision rendered by a Co-ordinate Bench.
11. The attention of the learned counsel for the petitioner was
drawn to Ground No.5 of the memorandum of the Civil Revision
Petition, which reads as under:
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“5. The Court below failed to appreciate the well
considered Judgement of the Hon'ble Apex Court in
Santhini Vs. Vijaya Venkatesh reported in 2018 1
SCC 1, where in the Hon'ble Supreme Court had held
that video Conference can be permitted for
reconciliation through video conference and hence
committed gross illegality and irregularities in
dismissing the Application.”
12. The attention of the learned counsel was further drawn to
the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Santhini vs. Vijaya
Venkatesh
2
, as referred to in paragraph No.5 of the grounds of the
Civil Revision Petition and it was pointed out to him that, what has
been reproduced in paragraph No.5 of the ground does not correctly
reflect the law declared in Santhini (supra), but that was a minority
view. It was pointed out to the learned counsel that the majority view
expressed in Santhini (supra), insofar as the issue of video
conferencing in matrimonial matters at the stage of reconciliation is
concerned, is that video conferencing may be resorted to only after
efforts at settlement or reconciliation have failed. The Hon’ble Supreme
Court had held after the settlement fails, that when both parties file a
joint application or their respective consent memoranda seeking
2
(2018) 1 SCC
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hearing through video conferencing before the concerned Family
Court, the Court may, in its discretion, permit such request, subject to
the conditions stipulated in the said judgment.
13. Paragraph No.58 of Santhini (supra) deserves
reproduction as under :
“58. In view of the aforesaid analysis, we sum up
our conclusion as follows:
58.1. In view of the scheme of the 1984 Act and in
particular Section 11, the hearing of matrimonial
disputes may have to be conducted in camera.
58.2. After the settlement fails and when a
joint application is filed or both the parties file their
respective consent memorandum for hearing of the
case through videoconferencing before the Family
Court concerned, it may exercise the discretion to
allow the said prayer.
58.3. After the settlement fails, if the Family
Court feels it appropriate having regard to the facts
and circumstances of the case that videoconferencing
will subserve the cause of justice, it may so direct.
58.4. In a transfer petition, videoconferencing
cannot be directed.
58.5. Our directions shall apply prospectively.
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58.6. The decision in Krishna Veni Nagam )(2017)
under section 34 of the Act,1996 SCC 150) is
overruled to the aforesaid extent.”
14. Learned counsel for the petitioner then submitted that, due
to an inadvertent mistake, the minority view expressed in Santhini
(supra) was quoted in paragraph No.5 of the memorandum of grounds
and there was no intention to misquote or misrepresent the law laid
down by the Hon’ble Apex Court. He finally conceded that what is
stated in Ground No.5 of the memorandum does not reflect the law as
laid down in Santhini (supra), but that was only the minority view
expressed in Santhini (supra).
15. Learned counsel for the petitioner then submitted that the
decision in Santhini (supra) is not applicable to the present case and
cannot be pressed into service. He submitted that subsequent to the
said judgment, the Andhra Pradesh High Court Video Conferencing
Rules, 2023 have come into force. In view of Rule 3(i), which expressly
provides that “Video Conferencing facilities may be used at all stages
of judicial proceedings and proceedings conducted by the Court,” the
legal position, as in Santhini (supra), according to him, now stands
altered. The very basis on which the judgment in Santhini (supra)
proceeded no longer survives, inasmuch as the Rules, 2023
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specifically authorize the use of video conferencing at all stages of
judicial proceedings. Reconciliation in matrimonial matters, being one
of the stages of such judicial proceedings before a Court, would also
fall within the ambit of the said Rule. Therefore, learned counsel
submitted that in view of the statutory framework introduced by the
Rules, 2023, video conferencing is permissible even at the stage of
reconciliation, and consequently, the law in Santhini (supra) cannot
operate as a bar in the State of Andhra Pradesh to deny such facility of
video conferencing in matrimonial matters even the stage of
reconciliation.
16. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that
the decision in Santhini (supra) arose out of a transfer petition and,
therefore, according to him, the observations made therein do not
constitute a declaration of law binding under Article 141 of the
Constitution of India. He submitted that the said case pertained to
proceedings under the Family Courts Act, whereas the present matter
is pending before a Civil Court and not before a Family Court. On that
premise, he submitted that the principle of law laid down in Santhini
(supra) would not govern the present proceedings and is
distinguishable on facts as well as on the statutory framework
applicable.
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17. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that
the decision of this Court in Mohammad Razik Shaik vs. Sufia
Sultana Bano Mo hammad
3
would also not be applicable to the
present case. He submitted that in Mohammad Razik Shaik
(supra), this Court, upon consideration of the judgments in Santhini
(supra), Nerella Chiranjeevi Arun Kumar (supra),
G.Shrilakshmi vs. Anirudh Ramkumar
4 and batch (decided
on 18.10.2024), as well as certain decisions of the Madras High Court
and other High Courts, held that video conferencing is not permissible
at the stage of reconciliation in matrimonial matters before the Family
Courts, and further held that only after the efforts at reconciliation and
settlement have failed, video conferencing may be resorted to, upon a
joint application by the parties or upon consent memoranda filed by
both counsel representing the husband and wife, subject to the
discretion of the Court. However, learned counsel submitted that the
decision in Mohammad Razik Shaik (supra) cannot be relied upon
for inter-alia the following principal reasons:
(i) The Andhra Pradesh High Court Video Conferencing
Rules, 2023 were not brought to the notice of this Court
while deciding Mohammad Razik Shaik (supra);
3
2025 SCC OnLine AP 314
4
C.R.P.No.1194 of 2024, dated 18.10.2024
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(ii) The applicability of the judgment in Santhini
(supra), after the coming into force of the Rules, 2023,
in the State of Andhra Pradesh was not considered;
iii). This Court did not hold that the earlier judgment of
the Co-ordinate Bench in Nerella Chiranjeevi Arun
Kumar (supra) was rendered per incuriam or that it
fell within the doctrine of sub silentio. In the absence of
any such declaration, the judgment in Nerella
Chiranjeevi Arun Kumar (supra) continued to be
binding on the Co-ordinate Bench in Mohammad
Razik Shaik (supra) and, therefore, ought to have
been followed.
III. Points for consideration :-
18. The following points are for consideration and
determination :
(A). Whether Video Conferencing is permissible
in a matrimonial proceeding at the stage of
reconciliation ?
(B). Whether the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex
Court in Santhini (supra) would be inapplicable to
the State of Andhra Pradesh, in view of the Andhra
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Pradesh High Court “Rules for Video Conferencing for
Courts,2023” ?
(C) Whether the impugned order dated
24.10.2025 passed in I.A.No.457 of 2024 in
H.M.O.P.No.35 of 2023, deserves to be set aside or
maintained ?
IV. Consideration on points ‘A’ and ‘B’ :-
19. The aforesaid points “A & B” are connected, which are
being considered together.
20. The main emphasis of the learned counsel for the
petitioner is on the Andhra Pradesh High Court Video Conferencing
Rules, 2023. It was submitted that, in view of Rule 3(i) of the Rules,
2023, video conferencing is permissible at all stages of judicial
proceedings and, therefore, in matrimonial proceedings, the stage of
reconciliation would also be covered within the ambit of the said Rule.
So, video conferencing is permissible even at the stage of
reconciliation and in view of, such Rule,2023, the judgment of the
Hon’ble Apex Court in Santhini (supra) would no longer be applicable
in the State of Andhra Pradesh, and that the binding force of the said
judgment stands diminished.
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21. Further, the Rules, 2023 have been framed under Article
227 of the Constitution of India, in exercise of the High Court’s power of
superintendence over the Courts and Tribunals in relation to which it
exercises jurisdiction, and therefore the learned Trial Court was bound
to adhere to the said Rules and further that Santhini (supra) arose
out of a transfer petition and was rendered in the context of
proceedings under the Family Courts Act, and hence is distinguishable
and the law declared therein cannot be followed as the present case is
from the Court of Civil Judge though in a family dispute.
22. All the aforesaid contentions are misconceived and
deserve rejection for the discussion to follow, but before adverting to
the aforesaid contentions specifically, on the point of Rules 2023 and
its effect on the judgment in Santhini (supra), this Court considers it
appropriate to refer to the judgment in Mohammad Razik Shaik
(supra), in which Santhini (supra) was elaborately referred and the
relevant portions were extracted and discussed. This Court deems it
appropriate to refer to the relevant paragraphs from Mohammad
Razik Shaik (supra).
23. The moot question that arose for consideration in
Mohammad Razik Shaik (supra) is set out in paragraph No.12
thereof, which reads as under:
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“12. Whether in matrimonial disputes, Family Court
disputes, at the stage of reconciliation, appearance of the
parties or any of them for reconciliation process, is legally
permissible through Video Conferencing ? and if it is
permissible under what circumstances and conditions, if any
?”
24. This Court elaborately considered the law on the aforesaid
aspect, namely, the permissibility of the use of video conferencing, and
the same was discussed in paragraph Nos.13, 14, 19 and 20 of
Mohammad Razik Shaik (supra), which read as under:
“13. The law on the aforesaid aspect, i.e., use of video conferencing,
i.e., technology, at the stage of reconciliation process and also afterwards,
if the reconciliation fails, and after conclusion of the settlement
proceedings, has been well settled by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Santhini
(supra). The Hon'ble Apex Court considered its previous pronouncements
on the use of technology, video conferencing etc; the object and scope and
scheme of the Family Courts Act, the importance of reconciliation; the right
of a woman in such reconciliation proceedings in a family dispute pending
in the Family Court; right of privacy; incamera proceedings and in para-58
of Santhini (supra) the Hon'ble Apex Court by majority judgment,
recorded the following principles of law:
“58. In view of the aforesaid analysis, we sum up our conclusion as follows:
58.1. In view of the scheme of the 1984 Act and in particular Section 11,
the hearing of matrimonial disputes may have to be conducted in camera.
58.2. After the settlement fails and when a joint application is filed or
both the parties file their respective consent memorandum for hearing of
the case through videoconferencing before the Family Court concerned, it
may exercise the discretion to allow the said prayer.
58.3. After the settlement fails, if the Family Court feels it appropriate
having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case that
videoconferencing will subserve the cause of justice, it may so direct.
58.4. In a transfer petition, videoconferencing cannot be directed.
58.5. Our directions shall apply prospectively.
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58.6. The decision in Krishna VeniNagam [Krishna VeniNagam v. Harish
Nagam, (2017) 4 SCC 150 : (2017) 2 SCC (Civ) 394] is overruled to the
aforesaid extent.”
14. The aforesaid conclusions of the Hon'ble Apex Court, as summed
up, show that the hearing of the matrimonial disputes has to be
conducted in camera. In camera proceedings are to be conducted if the
Court considers it appropriate and if any of the parties, seeks in camera
proceedings, then, necessarily. The confidentiality of the proceedings is
imperative. After the settlement fails and when a joint application is
filed or both the parties file their respective consent memorandum for
hearing of the case through videoconferencing before the Family Court
concerned, it may exercise the discretion to allow the said prayer. In para-
58.3 of Santhini (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court observed that ‘after the
settlement fails’, if the Family Court feels it appropriate having regard to
the facts and circumstances of the case that videoconferencing will
subserve the cause of justice, it may so direct. From the aforesaid, the law
as settled is that direction for hearing of the case through
videoconferencing may be given by the Family Court, subject to
conditions, as mentioned in para-58 of Santhini (supra). But, that is after
the settlement fails. The present is a case at the stage of
settlement/reconciliation. So, it is not a case after the settlement has
failed. The request in the present case, for videoconferencing, is for the
purpose of reconciliation/settlement proceedings, by the
husband/petitioner.
19. So, in Santhini (supra) in clear words it has been laid down that
the videoconferencing may be permitted only after the settlement fails,
on the joint application of the parties or on their respective consent
memo, if the Family Court feels it appropriate. So, the videoconferencing
at the stage of reconciliation/settlement process is not permissible at
all. The question of consent of both the parties is also of no
consideration or relevance, at the stage of the reconciliation.
20. The aforesaid is the majority view and thus, the law laid down.”
25. In Mohammad Razik Shaik (supra), this Court also
held that “this Court is to follow the majority view, which is the law laid
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down” and further observed that in Santhini (supra), the judgment of
the Hon’ble Apex Court considered its previous judgments on the point
of Video Conferencing, use of technology etc., but distinguished those
judgments on the ground that those proceedings were different from
matrimonial proceedings and could not be regarded as precedents for
the proposition that the Video Conferencing can be one of the modes
to regulate the matrimonial proceedings. Paragraph No.24 of
Mohammad Razik Shaik (supra) is as under :
“24. In respect of the advantages of the videoconferencing and
speedy decision, the majority view also considered the same and
observed in para-33 that the pronouncement with respect to the use
of technology, modes of videoconferencing etc., in the judgments
referred by it, on different points, on different controversies, different
from matrimonial proceedings and those judgments could not be
regarded as precedents for the proposition that the
videoconferencing can be one of the modes to regulate the
matrimonial proceedings. Para-33 of Santhini (supra) reads as under:
“33. The aforesaid pronouncements, as we find, are
absolutely different from a controversy which is involved
in matrimonial proceedings which relate to various
aspects, namely, declaration of marriage as a nullity,
dissolution of marriage, restitution of marriage, custody
of children, guardianship, maintenance, adjudication of
claim of stridhan, etc. The decisions that have been
rendered cannot be regarded as precedents for the
proposition that videoconferencing can be one of the
modes to regulate matrimonial proceedings.”
26. In Mohammad Razik Shaik (supra), this Court
considered Nerella Chiranjeevi Arun Kumar (supra) and
G.Shrilakshmi (supra) in paragraph Nos.25 & 26 thereof, which
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read as under, and observed that those cases were of no help and
could not be relied upon for the considerations made in Paragraph
Nos.25.2 to 25.5 of Mohammad Razik Shaik (supra) :
“25. I now proceed to consider the judgment cited by the learned
counsel for the petitioner.
25.1. In Nerella ChiranjeeviArun Kumar (supra), the civil revision
petition was filed challenging the Order dated 23.04.2019 passed in I.A.
No. 991 of 2018 in FCOP No. 634 of 2017. The consideration was,
whether the petitioner therein could be allowed to be represented by
General Power of Attorney Holder for reconciliation, when the petition
was dismissed and on application under Order 9 Rule 9 CPC to set aside
the dismissal order and to restore the main petition and to permit the
GPA holder to contest the reconciliation proceedings was filed. The
learned single Judge, considering the previous pronouncements, mainly
on the point of power of attorney and appearance through power of
attorney holder, observed that since the husband was working in USA
and it would be difficult to get leave from his company, and also noting
that the husband requested for process of reconciliation through
electronic devices, i.e., Skype, whatsapp, true caller etc., whereas the
wife was insisting the personal appearance of the husband, further
observed that during the conciliation proceedings, it could not be
necessary for the husband to come all the way from US, and with the
technology in the information sector was available, therefore, the party
seeking such benefit, be allowed the appearance by using the technology
to reduce the cost of litigation and save the precious time for the purpose
of reconciliation.
25.2. Nerella ChiranjeeviArun Kumar (supra) was decided on
13.09.2019, however, the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Santhini
(supra) which was decided on 09.10.2017 appears not to have been
brought to the notice of the learned single Judge, as it does not find
mention.
25.3. In G. Shrilakshmi (supra), which was a case under Section 13B
of the Hindu Marriage Act before the Family Court, the learned single
Judge of the Madras High Court, highlighting the importance of the
virtual proceedings, referring to the judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court
in State of Maharashtra v. Dr.Praful Dubey
5
, Amardeep Singh v. Harveen
Kaur
6
, AnuradhaBhasin v. Union of India
7
and others issued direction to
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the Principal Family Court, Chennai, to dissolve the marriage between the
parties therein without insisting the physical presence of the parties,
permitting the respective power of attorney of the parties to present the
petition. The direction was also issued that the Family Courts shall not
insist physical presence of the spouses at the time of presenting the
petition at the first instance and for future hearings, and also that the
parties can be present through virtual mode from their respective places
and the place of location, identity of the person to be confirmed with
relevant documents. It was further directed that the Court can verify with
the parties appearing through virtual mode as to the petition, proof
affidavit, documents produced and record the same as evidence on
satisfaction and to pass appropriate orders. The Madras High Court
observed that virtual proceedings provide an opportunity to modernize
the system by making it more affordable and citizen friendly, enabling the
aggrieved to access justice from any part of the country in the world.
Thus, the Family Court, to ensure that such system of conducting the
proceedings through videoconferencing was put to usage, without
insisting the presence of the petitioner even from the time of first
presentation till the conclusion of the proceedings, direction was given to
the Family Court, not to raise technical objections and insist on physical
appearance of the parties at any stage.
25.4. Para-29 of G. Shrilakshmi (supra) upon which learned counsel
for the petitioner placed reliance, is as under:
“29. Virtual proceedings provide an opportunity to modernize the system
by making it more affordable and citizen friendly, enabling the aggrieved
to access justice from any part of the country in the world. Thus the
Family Court to ensure that such a system of conducting the proceedings
through video conferencing is put to usage without insisting the presence
of petitioner even from the time of first presentation till the conclusion of
proceedings. The Family Court henceforth not to raise technical
objections and insist on physical appearance of petitioner/parties at any
stage.”
25.5. A reading of the judgment in G. Shrilakshmi (supra) shows that
the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Santhini (supra) was not
taken note of.
26. For the aforesaid consideration made in particular paras-25.2 to
25.5 (supra), the judgments in NerellaChiranjeeviArun Kumar (supra) and
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G. Shrilakshmi (supra) are of no help to the petitioner and cannot be
relied upon.”
27. In Mohammad Razik Shaik (supra), this Court also
considered the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Anjali
Brahmawar Chauhan vs. Navin Chauhan
5
. Subsequent to
Santhini (supra), in the said case of Anjali (supra), the Hon’ble
Apex Court permitted the facility of video conferencing in a matrimonial
matter arising out of a transfer petition, having regard to the then
prevailing extraordinary circumstances of the COVID-19 pandemic.
This Court further noted that in Anjali Brahmawar Chauhan
(supra), the review petition filed seeking review of the judgment in
Santhini (supra) was dismissed and while dismissing the review, the
Hon’ble Apex Court clearly observed that, in the normal course, it
would not have directed the use of video conferencing in matrimonial
matters, in view of the law declared in Santhini (supra). Paragraph
Nos.27 and 28 of Mohammad Razik Shaik (supra) read as under:
“27. I may also refer to the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex
Court in Anjali Brahmawar Chauhan v. Navin Chauhan. In the said case,
the transfer petition of the petitioner was dismissed on account of the
fact that no serious inconvenience would be caused to the petitioner
for travelling between Gautambudh Nagar, U.P. to Saket, New Delhi.
The petitioner filed review petition on the ground that there was no
videoconferencing facility at Gautambudh Nagar, District Courts.
5
(2021) 16 SCC 501
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Another ground was taken that videoconferencing was not permissible
in matrimonial matters in accordance with the judgment in Santhini
(supra). The Hon'ble Apex Court dismissed the review petition.
However, due to the ongoing Pandemic situation at that time and the
physical functioning of the Courts had been stopped since March 2020,
and the proceedings of all Courts were being conducted only through
videoconferencing, the Family Court was directed to conduct trial
through videoconferencing. The Hon'ble Apex Court, however,
observed that in the normal course, it would not have directed
videoconferencing in respect of matrimonial matters as per the
judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court, in Santhini (supra).
28. Paragraph Nos. 2 to 4 of Anjali Brahmawar Chauhan (supra)
are as under:
“2. This review petition has been filed by the petitioner on the ground
that there is no videoconferencing facility at Gautambudh Nagar,
District Courts. Another ground in the review petition is that
videoconferencing is not permissible in matrimonial matters in
accordance with the judgment of this Court dated 9-10-2017 in Santhini
v. VijayaVenketesh [Santhini v. VijayaVenketesh, (2018) 1 SCC 1 : (2018)
1 SCC (Civ) 1 (three-Judge Bench)].
3. Notice was issued in the review petition on 20-3-2018 [Anjali
Brahmawar Chauhan v. Navin Chauhan, 2018 SCC OnLine SC 3652]. Due
to the ongoing Pandemic, physical functioning of the courts has been
stopped since March 2020. Proceedings in all courts are being
conducted only through videoconferencing. In the normal course we
would not have directed videoconferencing in respect of matrimonial
matters as per the judgment of this Court mentioned above.
However, in the present situation where all proceedings are conducted
through videoconferencing, we direct the Family Court, District
Gautambudh Nagar, U.P. to conduct the trial through
videoconferencing.
4. The review petition is dismissed.”
28. Learned counsel for the petitioner laid much emphasis that
in view of the Rules,2023, the Video Conferencing in the State of
21
(RNT,J
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Andhra Pradesh is permissible in the proceedings before the learned
Family Court/ Civil Court in matrimonial proceedings at the stage of
reconciliation as well. The contention raised was that in view of those
Rules, 2023, the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in Santhini (supra)
shall not be applicable in the State of Andhra Pradesh. He submitted
that Santhini (supra) is prior to the framing of the Rules, 2023 and
consequently, after the Rules,2023, the position in law has changed in
Andhra Pradesh. Those Rules were framed under Article 227 of
Constitution of India, so had to be given affect to by the learned Trial
Court which were framed in exercise of supervisory power and
jurisdiction over the trial Court. He submitted that the judgment of this
Court in Mohammad Razik Shaik (supra) followed the Supreme
Court judgment in Santhini (supra), but did not consider the Rules,
2023 and consequently, Mohammad Razik Shaik (supra) is per
incuriam; also for the reason that in Mohammad Razik Shaik
(supra), this Court did not hold the previous judgment of the
Co-ordinate Bench in Nerella Chiranjeevi Arun Kumar (supra) as
per per incuriam, so, without holding that, it was not open for the
Co-ordinate Bench to take a contrary view and consequently
Mohammad Razik Shaik (supra) is not to be followed in the
present case.
22
(RNT,J
C.R.P.No.311 of 2026)
29. The argument of the petitioner’s counsel is that the very
basis of the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Santhini (supra)
has been taken way by the Rules,2023, so as to make it ineffective for
its applicability in the State of Andhra Pradesh.
30. So far as the Andhra Pradesh High Court Rules for Video
Conferencing, 2023 are concerned, those have been framed in the
exercise of the power under Article 227 of Constitution of India.
31. Article 227 of Constitution of India reads as under :
“227. Power of superintendence over all courts by the High
Court.—
4
[(1) Every High Court shall have superintendence over all courts
and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises
jurisdiction.]
(2) Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing provisions, the
High Court may—
(a) call for returns from such courts;
(b) make and issue general rules and prescribe forms for regulating
the practice and proceedings of such courts; and
(c) prescribe forms in which books, entries and accounts shall be
kept by the officers of any such courts.
(3) The High Court may also settle tablet of fees to be allowed to the
sheriff and all clerks and officers of such courts and to attorneys,
advocates and pleaders practising therein:
Provided that any rules made, forms prescribed or tables settled
under clause (2) or clause (3) shall not be inconsistent with the
provision of any law for the time being in force, and shall require the
previous approval of the Governor.
(4) Nothing in this article shall be deemed to confer on a High Court
powers of superintendence over any court or tribunal constituted by or
under any law relating to the Armed Forces.”
32. A bare reading of Article 227, shows that Clause (2)
provides that the High Court may make and issue general rules and
23
(RNT,J
C.R.P.No.311 of 2026)
prescribe forms for regulating the practice and proceedings of such
Courts i.e., the Court and Tribunal throughout the territories in relation
to which it exercises jurisdiction.
33. The judgment in Santhini (supra) is on the Family
Courts Act,1984/Hindu Marriage Act. Section 11 of the Family Courts
Act,1984 provides proceedings to be held in camera in every suit or
proceedings to which the Family Courts Act applies. The proceedings
may be held in camera if the Family Court so desires, and shall be so
held if either party so desires. In Santhini (supra), the Hon’ble Apex
Court elaborately discussed Section 11 of the Family Courts Act, 1984
and the rights of both parties, and observed that the said provision,
being statutory in nature, mandates that proceedings be conducted in
camera, ensuring confidentiality, which is imperative in matrimonial
disputes involving adversarial issues between the parties. The Hon’ble
Apex Court also considered Section 22 of the Hindu Marriage Act,
which also provides that “every proceeding under this Act shall be
conducted in camera”. Further, the reconciliatory measures are to be
taken at the first instance and the emphasis was on the efforts for
reconciliation, failing which, the Court should proceed with adjudication.
34. At the stage of reconciliation/settlement process, in
Santhini (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court in detail discussed the
24
(RNT,J
C.R.P.No.311 of 2026)
position for use of Video Conferencing, only after reconciliation fails, in
paragraphs-47 to 56, which are as under:
“47. The language employed in Section 11 of the 1984 Act is absolutely
clear. It provides that if one of the parties desires that the proceedings
should be held in camera, the Family Court has no option but to so direct.
This Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction, cannot take away such a
sanctified right that law recognises either for the wife or the husband.
That apart, the Family Court has the duty to make efforts for
settlement. Section 23(2) of the 1955 Act mandates for reconciliation.
The language used under Section 23(2) makes it an obligatory duty on the
part of the court at the first instance in every case where it is possible, to
make every endeavour to bring about reconciliation between the parties
where it is possible to do so consistent with the nature and
circumstances of the case. There are certain exceptions as has been
enumerated in the proviso which pertain to incurably of unsound mind or
suffering from a virulent and incurable form of leprosy or suffering from
venereal disease in a communicable form or has renounced the world by
entering any religious order or has not been heard of as being alive for a
period of seven years, etc. These are the exceptions carved out by the
legislature. The Court has to play a diligent and effective role in this
regard.
48. The reconciliation requires presence of both the parties at the
same place and the same time so as to be effectively conducted. The
spatial distance will distant the possibility of reconciliation because the
Family Court Judge would not be in a position to interact with the parties
in the manner as the law commands. By virtue of the nature of the
controversy, it has its inherent sensitivity. The Judge is expected to deal
with care, caution and with immense sense of worldly experience
absolutely being conscious of social sensibility. Needless to emphasise,
this commands a sense of trust and maintaining an atmosphere of
confidence and also requirement of assurance that the confidentiality is in
no way averted or done away with. There can be no denial of this fact. It is
sanguinely private. Recently, in K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India [K.S.
Puttaswamy v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1], this Court, speaking
through one of us (Chandrachud, J.), has ruled thus : (SCC pp. 498-99, para
298)
“298. …The intersection between one's mental integrity and privacy
entitles the individual freedom of thought, the freedom to believe in what
25
(RNT,J
C.R.P.No.311 of 2026)
is right, and the freedom of self-determination. When these guarantees
intersect with gender, they create a private space which protects all those
elements which are crucial to gender identity. The family, marriage,
procreation and sexual orientation are all integral to the dignity of the
individual.”
And again : (SCC p. 499, para 299)
“299. Privacy represents the core of the human personality and recognises
the ability of each individual to make choices and to take decisions
governing matters intimate and personal.”
49. Felix Frankfurter, J. in Schulte Inc. v. Gangi [Schulte Inc. v. Gangi,
1946 SCC OnLine US SC 81 : 90 L Ed 1114 : 328 US 108 (1946)], has stated
that the policy of a statute should be drawn out of its terms as nourished
by their proper environment and not like nitrogen out of the air. Benjamin
N. Cardozo, J. in Hopkins Federal Savings and Loan Assn. v. Cleary [Hopkins
Federal Savings and Loan
Assn. v. Cleary, 1935 SCC OnLine US SC 186 : 80 L Ed 251 : 296 US 315
(1935)], has opined that when a statute is reasonably susceptible of two
interpretations, the Court has to prefer the meaning that preserves to the
meaning that destroys.
50. The command under Section 11 of the 1984 Act confers a right
on both the parties. It is statutory in nature. The Family Court Judge who is
expected to be absolutely sensitive has to take stock of the situation and
can suomotu hold the proceedings in camera. The Family Court Judge is
only meant to deal with the controversies and disputes as provided under
the 1984 Act. He is not to be given any other assignment by the High
Court. The in-camera proceedings stand in contradistinction to a
proceeding which is tried in court. When a case is tried or heard in court,
there is absolute transparency. Having regard to the nature of the
controversy and the sensitivity of the matter, it is desirable to hear in
court various types of issues that crop up in these types of litigations. The
Act commands that there has to be an effort for settlement. The
legislative intendment is for speedy settlement. The counsellors can be
assigned the responsibility by the court to counsel the parties. That is the
schematic purpose of the law. The confidentiality of the proceedings is
imperative for these proceedings.
51. The procedure of videoconferencing which is to be adopted
when one party gives consent is contrary to Section 11 of the 1984 Act.
There is no provision that the matter can be dealt with by the Family
26
(RNT,J
C.R.P.No.311 of 2026)
Court Judge by taking recourse to videoconferencing. When a matter is
not transferred and settlement proceedings take place which is in the
nature of reconciliation, it will be well-nigh impossible to bridge the gap.
What one party can communicate with other, if they are left alone for
some time, is not possible in videoconferencing and if possible, it is very
doubtful whether the emotional bond can be established in a virtual
meeting during videoconferencing. Videoconferencing may create a dent
in the process of settlement.
52. The two-Judge Bench [Krishna VeniNagam v. Harish Nagam,
(2017) 4 SCC 150 : (2017) 2 SCC (Civ) 394] had referred to the decisions
where the affirmative rights meant for women have been highlighted in
various judgments. We have adverted to some of them to show the
dignity of woman and her rights and the sanctity of her choice. When
most of the time, a case is filed for transfer relating to matrimonial
disputes governed by the 1984 Act, the statutory right of a woman
cannot be nullified by taking route to technological advancement and
destroying her right under a law, more so, when it relates to family
matters. In our considered opinion, dignity of women is sustained and
put on a higher pedestal if her choice is respected. That will be in
consonance with Article 15(3) of the Constitution.
53. In this context, we may refer to the fundamental principle of
necessity of doing justice and trial in-camera. The nine-Judge Bench in
Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar v. State of Maharashtra [Naresh Shridhar
Mirajkar v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1967 SC 1], after enunciating the
universally accepted proposition in favour of open trials, expressed : (AIR
pp. 8-9, para 21)
“21. … While emphasising the importance of public trial, we cannot
overlook the fact that the primary function of the judiciary is to do justice
between the parties who bring their causes before it. If a Judge trying a
cause is satisfied that the very purpose of finding truth in the case would
be retarded, or even defeated if witnesses are required to give evidence
subject to public gaze, is it or is it not open to him in exercise of his
inherent power to hold the trial in camera either partly or fully? If the
primary function of the court is to do justice in causes brought before it,
then on principle, it is difficult to accede to the proposition that there can
be no exception to the rule that all causes must be tried in open court. If
the principle that all trials before courts must be held in public was treated
as inflexible and universal and it is held that it admits of no exceptions
whatever, cases may arise where by following the principle, justice itself
27
(RNT,J
C.R.P.No.311 of 2026)
may be defeated. That is why we feel no hesitation in holding that the
High Court has inherent jurisdiction to hold a trial in camera if the ends of
justice clearly and necessarily require the adoption of such a course. It is
hardly necessary to emphasise that this inherent power must be exercised
with great caution and it is only if the court is satisfied beyond a doubt
that the ends of justice themselves would be defeated if a case is tried in
open court that it can pass an order to hold the trial in camera; but to
deny the existence of such inherent power to the court would be to ignore
the primary object of adjudication itself. The principle underlying the
insistence on hearing causes in open court is to protect and assist fair,
impartial and objective administration of justice; but if the requirement
of justice itself sometimes dictates the necessity of trying the case in
camera, it cannot be said that the said requirement should be sacrificed
because of the principle that every trial must be held in open court.”
54. The principle of exception that the larger Bench enunciated is
founded on the centripodal necessity of doing justice to the cause and not
to defeat it. In matrimonial disputes that are covered under Section 7 of
the 1984 Act where the Family Court exercises its jurisdiction, there is a
statutory protection to both the parties and conferment of power on the
court with a duty to persuade the parties to reconcile. If the proceedings
are directed to be conducted through videoconferencing, the command
of the section as well as the spirit of the 1984 Act will be in peril and
further the cause of justice would be defeated.
55. A cogent reflection is also needed as regards the perception
when both the parties concur to have the proceedings to be held through
videoconferencing. In this context, the thought and the perception are to
be viewed through the lens of the textual context, legislative intent and
schematic canvas. The principle may have to be tested on the bedrock
that courts must have progressive outlook and broader interpretation
with the existing employed language in the statute so as to expand the
horizon and the connotative expanse and not adopt a pedantic approach.
56. We have already discussed at length with regard to the
complexity and the sensitive nature of the controversies. The statement of
law made in Krishna VeniNagam [Krishna VeniNagam v. Harish Nagam,
(2017) 4 SCC 150 : (2017) 2 SCC (Civ) 394] that if either of the parties gives
consent, the case can be transferred, is absolutely unacceptable.
However, an exception can be carved out to the same. We may repeat at
the cost of repetition that though the principle does not flow from
statutory silence, yet as we find from the scheme of the Act, the Family
28
(RNT,J
C.R.P.No.311 of 2026)
Court has been given ample power to modulate its procedure. The
Evidence Act is not strictly applicable. Affidavits of formal witnesses are
acceptable. It will be permissible for the other party to crossexamine the
deponent. We are absolutely conscious that the enactment gives
emphasis on speedy settlement. As has been held in Bhuwan Mohan Singh
[Bhuwan Mohan Singh v.
Meena, (2015) 6 SCC 353 : (2015) 3 SCC (Civ) 321 : (2015) 4 SCC (Cri) 200],
the concept of speedy settlement does not allow room for lingering the
proceedings. A genuine endeavour has to be made by the Family Court
Judge, but in the name of efforts to bring in a settlement or to arrive at a
solution of the lis, the Family Court should not be chained by the tentacles
by either parties. Perhaps, one of the parties may be interested in
procrastinating the litigation. Therefore, we are disposed to think that
once a settlement fails and if both the parties give consent that a
witness can be examined in videoconferencing, that can be allowed.
That apart, when they give consent that it is necessary in a specific
factual matrix having regard to the convenience of the parties, the
Family Court may allow the prayer for videoconferencing. That much of
discretion, we are inclined to think can be conferred on the Family Court.
Such a limited discretion will not run counter to the legislative intention
that permeates the 1984 Act. However, we would like to add a safeguard.
A joint application should be filed before the Family Court Judge, who
shall take a decision. However, we make it clear that in a transfer petition,
no direction can be issued for videoconferencing. We reiterate that the
discretion has to rest with the Family Court to be exercised after the
court arrives at a definite conclusion that the settlement is not possible
and both parties file a joint application or each party filing his/her
consent memorandum seeking hearing by videoconferencing.”
35. In Santhini (supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court thus clearly
held that the reconciliation requires presence of both the parties at the
same place and the same time so as to be effectively conducted. The
spatial distance will distant the possibility of reconciliation because the
Family Court Judge would not be in a position to interact with the
parties in the manner as the law commands. By virtue of the nature of
29
(RNT,J
C.R.P.No.311 of 2026)
the controversy, it has its inherent sensitivity. The Judge is expected to
deal with care, caution and with immense sense of worldly experience
absolutely being conscious of social sensibility. It was emphasized
that, this commands a sense of trust and maintaining an atmosphere of
confidence and also requirement of assurance that the confidentiality is
in no way averted or done away with. The Hon’ble Apex Court further
observed that the Family Courts Act under Section 11 of the 1984 Act
confers a right on both the parties. It is statutory in nature. The Family
Court Judge who is expected to be absolutely sensitive has to take
stock of the situation and can suomotu hold the proceedings in
camera. The Family Court Judge is only meant to deal with the
controversies and disputes as provided under the 1984 Act. The in
camera proceedings stand in contradistinction to a proceeding which is
tried in court. When a case is tried or heard in court, there is absolute
transparency. Having regard to the nature of the controversy and the
sensitivity of the matter, it is desirable to hear in court various types of
issues that crop up in these types of litigations. The Act commands
that there has to be an effort for settlement. The legislative intendment
is for speedy settlement. The confidentiality of the proceedings is
imperative for these proceedings.
36. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Santhini (supra) further
observed that what one party can communicate with other, if they are
30
(RNT,J
C.R.P.No.311 of 2026)
left alone for some time, is not possible in videoconferencing and if
possible, it is very doubtful whether the emotional bond can be
established in a virtual mee ting during videoconferencing.
Videoconferencing may create a dent in the process of settlement. The
Hon’ble Apex Court further observed and emphasized that the
statutory right of a woman cannot be nullified by taking route to
technological advancement and destroying her right under a law, more
so, when it relates to family matters. It was observed that if the
proceedings were directed to be conducted through videoconferencing,
the command of the section as well as the spirit of the 1984 Act would
be in peril and cause of justice would be defeated.
37. The Hon'ble Apex Court, overruled its judgment in
Krishna Veni Nagam v. Harish Nagam [(2017 4 SCC 150)] to a
certain extent. In Krishna Veni Nagam (supra), the statement of
law that if either of the parties gives consent, the case can be
transferred, was held absolutely unacceptable. The Hon'ble Apex
Court in Santhini (supra) however carved out an exception that once
a settlement fails and if both the parties give consent that a witness
can be examined in videoconferencing that can be allowed. That apart,
when the parties give consent that it is necessary in a specific factual
matrix having regard to the convenience of the parties, the Family
Court may allow the prayer for videoconferencing. The Hon'ble Apex
31
(RNT,J
C.R.P.No.311 of 2026)
Court also added a safeguard that a joint application should be filed
before the Family Court Judge, who shall take a decision. It was made
clear that in a transfer petition, no direction can be issued for
videoconferencing. It was reiterated that the discretion has to rest with
the Family Court to be exercised after the Court arrives at a definite
conclusion that the settlement is not possible and both the parties file a
joint application or each party filing consent memorandum of
videoconferencing.
38. In view of the aforesaid, can it be said that the very basis
of Santhini (supra) has been taken away by the Rules,2023, as per
the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner.
39. This requires consideration of the following points:
(i) Whether, by the Rules, 2023 framed under
Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the basis of the
judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court can be taken
away?
and if it be so, the second point for consideration would be :
(ii) Whether such basis has, in fact, been taken
away by the Rules,2023 ?
If the answer to the first point (i) is that it cannot be taken
away, the second question (ii) will not arise at all for consideration.
32
(RNT,J
C.R.P.No.311 of 2026)
40. It is settled in law that the basis of a judgment of the High
Court or the Supreme Court can be taken away.
41. In Tirath Ram Rajindra Nath, v. State of U.P. and
another
6, the Hon’ble Apex Court held that there is distinction
between encroachment on the judicial power and the nullification of the
effect of a judicial decision by changing the law retrospectively. The
former (encroachment on the judicial power) is outside the competence
of the Legislature, but the latter (nullification of the effect of a judicial
decision by changing the law retrospectively) is within its permissible
limit. The relevant portion of paragraph No.7 of the judgment reads as
under :
“7. Now coming to the second contention of Dr Singhvi, we fail
to see how the question of lack of power now arises in view of Section
3-AB. While developing his Contention 2, Dr Singhvi urged that the
Legislature has unauthorisedly encroached on the judicial power. The
amended Section 3-AB merely intradicts the decision rendered by the
High Court and has not removed the want of power noticed by the
High Court. We are unable to accede to this contention. The
Legislature has not purported either directly or by necessary
implication to overrule the decision of the Allahabad High Court
in Krishna Brick Field case. On the other hand it has accepted
the decision as correct but has sought to remove the basis of the
decision by retrospectively changing the law. This court has
pointed out in several cases the distinction
between encroachment on the judicial power and the nullification
of the effect of a judicial decision by changing the law
6
(1973) 3 SCC 585
33
(RNT,J
C.R.P.No.311 of 2026)
retrospectively. The former is outside the competence of the
Legislature but the latter is within its permissible limits. In the
instant case what the Legislature has done is to amend the law
retrospectively and thereby remove the basis of the decision rendered
by the High Court. Such a course cannot be considered as an
encroachment on the judicial power.”
42. In M/s. Hiralal Rattanlal etc., etc., v. State of
U.P. and another etc.,
7 also the larger Bench of Supreme Court
has reiterated the principle that Legislature is competent to remove the
basis of the decision by changing the law retrospectively. The relevant
paragraph No.16 of the judgment reads as under :
“16. Now coming to point 3, there is no justification for the
contention that the Legislature has usurped any judicial power. The
Legislature has not purported either directly or by necessary
implication to overrule the decision of the Allahabad High Court in
Tilock Chand Prasan Kumar case. On the other hand it has accepted
that decision as correct; but has sought to remove the basis of that
decision by retrospectively changing the law. This Court has pointed
out in several cases the distinction between the encroachment on the
judicial power and the nullification of the effect of a judicial decision by
changing the law retrospectively. The former is outside the
competence of the Legislature but the latter is within is permissible
limits. From the statement of objects and reasons, it appears that in
the principal Act, the legislative intent was not clearly brought out. By
means of the Amending Act the Legislature wanted to make clear its
intent.”
7
(1973) 1 SCC 216
34
(RNT,J
C.R.P.No.311 of 2026)
43. In Satchidananda Misra v. State of Orissa and
others
8 also the Hon’ble Apex Court held in paragraph Nos.11 & 12,
in respect to a Validating Act that it is too well settled that the legislature
has the power to validate an Act by removing the infirmity indicated in any
judgment and that too also retrospectively but they cannot merely set
aside, annul or override a judgment of the court. The Hon’ble Apex Court
referred to the Constitution Bench judgment in the case of Prithvi
Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Broach Borough Municipality [(1969) 2 SCC
283], in which on the principles about validating statutes, it was held that
if the legislature has the power over the subject-matter and competence to
make a valid law, it can at any time make such a valid law and make it
retrospectively so as to bind even past transaction. It was further held
that the validity of a validating law, therefore, depends upon whether the
legislature possesses the competence which it claims over the subject-
matter and whether in making the validation it removes the defect which
the courts had found in the existing law and makes adequate provisions in
the validating law for a valid imposition of the tax.
44. Recently, in State of Rajasthan and others v.
Sharwan Kumar Kumawat and others
9, the same principle has
been restated. The relevant portion of paragraph No.21 reads as under
:
8
(2004) 8 SCC 599
9
(2023) 20 SCC 747
35
(RNT,J
C.R.P.No.311 of 2026)
“21. Though it is contended by the learned advocates
appearing for the respondents that the impugned Rules have been
brought forth only to nullify the effect of the judgments, as
discussed, we do not think so. The appellants have duly
complied with the orders passed. Even otherwise, law is quite
settled that basis of a judgment can be removed and a decision
of the court cannot be treated like a statute, particularly when
power is available to act and it is accordingly exercised in public
interest. In such view of the matter, we do not find any legal malice in
the amendments.”
45. So, the proposition of law is well settled that basis of the
judgment can be taken away so as to render it ineffective for its
applicability for the future as a precedent, in the changed law, but the
judgment cannot be over turned by the Parliament or the Legislature.
Even after the change in law, may be retrospective taking away the
basis of the decision, so far as the parties to the subject are concerned
they shall ordinarily be bound by the judgment rendered in their case
on its attaining finality.
46. But, such law that may take away the basis of a judgment
has to be enacted by Parliament in respect of matters enumerated in
List I, or by the State Legislature in respect of matters falling under List
II, and further by both the Parliament and the State Legislature on the
36
(RNT,J
C.R.P.No.311 of 2026)
subjects enumerated in List III (Concurrent List), all in Seventh
Schedule of the Constitution of India. In the event of a conflict between
a law made by Parliament and a law made by the State Legislature on
a subject in the Concurrent List, it is also settled that, the law made by
Parliament shall prevail to the extent of inconsistency, unless the State
law, having been reserved for the consideration of the President, has
received Presidential assent, in which case the State law shall prevail
in that State. The emphasis of this Court is that there should be a law
made by the Parliament or the State Legislature as the case may be.
Such law shall also be a valid law withstanding the test of the
constitutional provisions under Articles 14, 21, etc.
47. The Rules framed by the High Court under Article 227 of
the Constitution of India, are not made by the Parliament or by the
State Legislature.
48. This Court is of the view that, in the light of the
constitutional framework of distribution of legislative powers as
provided under Article 246 of the Constitution of India, which prescribes
the field of legislation, the laws made by Parliament and the State
Legislatures stand on a different footing from the Rules framed by the
High Court in exercise of its powers under Article 227(2)(b) of the
Constitution of India.
37
(RNT,J
C.R.P.No.311 of 2026)
49. Rules made under Article 227(2)(b) cannot encroach upon
the legislative domain of Parliament or the State Legislatures as
envisaged under Article 246 of the Constitution of India nor can be
placed at par so as to take away the basis of the judgment of Supreme
Court or High Court on a subject, like in the present case. Family
Courts Act and Hindu Marriage Act, fall for legislation in the domain of
the Parliament or/and the State Legislatures, so, taking away the basis
of Santhini (supra), would require legislative amendment in the
Family Courts Act and Hindu Marriage Act, which falls outside the
domain of the High Court’s rule making power under Article 227 (2) of
the Constitution of India.
50. Further, the Rules made by the High Court under Article
227 (2)(b) of the Constitution of India shall not be inconsistent with any
law for the time being in force. Proviso of Article 227 (2) and (3) of the
Constitution of India makes it very clear that any rules made, forms
prescribed, or tables settled under Clauses (2) and (3) shall not be
inconsistent with the provisions of any law for the time being in force.
51. In P.Radhakrishnan v. High Court of Judicature
at Madras reptd. By Us Registrar, High Court, Madras and
another
10. the Madras High Court held that the limitation imposed by
10
1986 SCC OnLine Mad 113
38
(RNT,J
C.R.P.No.311 of 2026)
the proviso to Article 227 of the Constitution of India, which requires
that the rules must not be inconsistent with the provisions of any law for
the time being in force is, therefore, by the clear and specific language
of the proviso applicable only where rules are made by the High Court
in exercise of its rule-making power under Article 227 (2). The relevant
portion from the paragraph No.2 reads as under :
“2.….The proviso to Art. 227 declares that any rules
made by the High Court in exercise of its rule-making
power under Art. 227, Cl.(2) shall not be inconsistent with
the provisions of any law for the time being in force. This
limitation imposed by the proviso to Art. 227 which
requires that the rules must not be inconsistent with the
provisions of any law for the time being in force is,
therefore, by the clear and specific language of the proviso
applicable only where rules are made by the High Court in
exercise of its rule-making power under Art. 227, Cl.(2) and
has no application where rules are made by the High Court
in exercise of rule-making power under some other
statutory provision. The proviso to Art. 227 also does not
operate as a limitation on the exercise of the rule- making
power belonging to the High Court under S. 122 of the
Code. Art. 227, Cl. (2) and S. 122 of the Code are two
distinct and different provisions conferring rule making
power on the High Court and the limitation imposed by the
proviso to Art. 227 is applicable only to the exercise of the
rulemaking power conferred under Art. 227, Cl.(2) and
cannot be imported so as to restrict the scope and ambit of
the rule making power conferred under S. 122 of the
Code….”
39
(RNT,J
C.R.P.No.311 of 2026)
52. Though, in P.Radhakrishnan (supra), it was also held
that the said limitation of the proviso to Article 227 (2) & (3) of the
Constitution of India would not come into play where a rule is framed
under Section 122 CPC, since the same is not in issue in the present
case, this Court is neither dealing nor making any observation on that
part. This Court refers to the said judgment only to the extent that the
Rules framed under Article 227(2) of the Constitution of India cannot be
inconsistent with the provisions of any law for the time being in force.
53. In Keshavlal Parbhuas Chokshi Firm and others
v. Manubhai I Vyas
11. the Gujarat High Court held that the proviso
to Article 227(3) of the Constitution is undoubtedly paramount, and it
must prevail over any statutory provision to the extent of any
inconsistency. The Gujarat High Court observed that any rules made
by the High Court in exercise of its rule-making power under Article
227(2) shall not be inconsistent with the provisions of any law for the
time being in force. It was further observed that, by its clear and
specific language, the proviso applies only where rules are made by
the High Court in exercise of its powers under Article 227(2). The
relevant portion from paragraph No.7 reads as under :
“7…….The proviso to Article 227 being a
constitutional provision is undoubtedly paramount and it
must prevail against any statutory provision to the extent
11
1967 SCC OnLine Guj 16
40
(RNT,J
C.R.P.No.311 of 2026)
to which such statutory provision may come into clash with
it but we do not find any clash or conflict between the
proviso to Article 227 and Section 122 of the Code. The
proviso to Article 227 declares that any rules made by the
High Court in exercise of its rule-making power under
Article 227 Clause (2) shall not be inconsistent with the
provisions of any law for the time being in force. This
limitation imposed by the proviso to Article 227 which
requires that the rules must not be inconsistent with the
provisions of any law for the time being in force is,
therefore, by the clear and specific language of the proviso
applicable only where rules are made by the High Court in
exercise of its rulemaking power under Article 227 Clause
(2)……”
54. The law declared by the Hon’ble Apex Court is also a law
within the meaning of Article 227 (2)(b) Proviso. The expression “law”
encompasses not only statutory law but also the law declared through
judicial pronouncements. The declaration of law by the Hon’ble Apex
Court is binding under Article 141 of the Constitution of India. Such law
cannot be altered, diluted, or rendered ineffective by framing any rule
under Article 227(2)(b) by the High Court, inconsistent with the law
declared by the Hon’ble Apex Court.
41
(RNT,J
C.R.P.No.311 of 2026)
55. In Bhargavi Constructions and another v.
Kothakapu Muthyam Reddy and others
12, which arose in the
context of Order 7 Rule 11 CPC, which provides for rejection of the
plaint, inter alia, under clause (d), where the suit appears from the
statement in the plaint to be barred by law, the Hon’ble Apex Court
considered the meaning of the expression “law”. It was held by some
High Courts that the term “law” occurring in clause (d) of Rule 11 of
Order 7 does not include judicial decisions of the Hon’ble Apex Court.
There was difference of opinion on the said aspect between different
High Courts. The Allahabad High Court in Virendra Kumar Dixit V.
State of UP (2014) SCC OnLine All 16476 , had taken a view that
“law includes not only legislative enactments but also judicial
precedents. An authoritative judgment of the Court including higher
judiciary is also law”. The Hon’ble Apex Court expressed its
agreement with the view taken by the Allahabad High Court, as also by
other High Courts which had taken a similar view. The relevant
paragraph Nos.25 to 32 read as under :
“25. The High Court was, therefore, not right in by-passing the law laid
down by this Court on the ground that the suit can be filed to challenge the
award, if the challenge is founded on the allegations of fraud. In our opinion,
it was not correct approach of the High Court to deal with the issue in
question to which we do not concur.
26. We also do not agree with the submissions of Mr Adinarayana Rao,
learned Senior Counsel for the respondents when he urged that firstly, the
12
(2018) 13 SCC 480
42
(RNT,J
C.R.P.No.311 of 2026)
expression "law" occurring in clause (d) of Rule 11 Order 7 does not include
the "judicial decisions" and clause (d) applies only to bar which is contained
in "the Act" enacted by the legislature; and secondly, even if it is held to
include the "judicial decisions", yet the law laid down in State of Punjab
(2008) 2 SCC 660 cannot be read to hold that the suit is barred. Both these
submissions, in our view, have no merit.
27. Black's Law Dictionary (9th Edn.) defines the expression "law".
It says that "law" includes the "judicial precedents" (see at p. 962).
Similarly, the expression "law" defined in Jowett's Dictionary of English Law
(3rd Edn., Vol. 2, (pp. 1304/1305) says that "law is derived from judicial
precedents, legislation or from custom. When derived from judicial
precedents, it is called common law, equity, or admiralty, probate or
ecclesiastical law according to the nature of the courts by which it was
originally enforced".
28. The question as to whether the expression "law" occurring in clause (d)
of Rule 11 of Order 7 of the Code includes "judicial decisions of the Apex
Court" came up for consideration before the Division Bench of the Allahabad
High Court in Virendra Kumar Dixit v. State of U.P., 2014 SCC OnLine ALL
16476. The Division Bench dealt with the issue in detail in the context of
several decisions on the subject and held in para 15 as under: (SCC OnLine
All)
"15. Law includes not only legislative enactments but also
judicial precedents. An authoritative judgment of the courts
including higher judiciary is also law."
29. This very issue was again considered by the Gujarat High Court (Single
Bench) in Hermes Marines Ltd. v. Capeshore Maritime Partners FZC, 2016
SCC OnLine Guj 8686. The learned Single Judge examined the issue and
relying upon the decision 2014 SCC OnLine ALL 16476 of the Allahabad
High Court quoted supra held in para 53 as under: (Hermes case, SCC
OnLine Guj)
"53. In the light of the above discussion, in the considered
view of this Court, it cannot be said that the term "barred by any
law" occurring in clause (d) of Rule 11 of Order 7 of the Code,
ought to be read to mean only the law codified in a legislative
enactment and not the law laid down by the courts in judicial
precedents. The judicial precedent of the Supreme Court in
Liverpool & London Steamship Protection and Indemnity Assn.
Ltd. v. M.V. Sea Success I, (2004) 9 SCC 512 has been followed
by the decision of the Division Bench in Croft Sales & Distribution
Ltd. v. M.V. Basil, 2011 SCC OnLine Guj 673. It is, therefore, the
law as of today, which is that the Geneva Convention of 1999
cannot be made applicable to a contract that does not involve
public law character. Such a contract would not give rise to a
maritime claim. As discussed earlier, the word "law" as occurring
in Order 7 Rule 11(d) would also mean judicial precedent. If the
judicial precedent bars any action that would be the law."
30. Similarly, this very issue was again examined by the Bombay High Court
(Single Judge) in Shahid S. Sarkar v. Mangala Shivdas Dandekar 2017 SCC
OnLine Bom 3440. The learned Judge placed reliance on the decisions of
43
(RNT,J
C.R.P.No.311 of 2026)
the Allahabad High Court in Virendra Kumar Dixit v. State of U.P., 2014 SCC
OnLine All 16476 and the Gujarat High Court in Hermes Marines Ltd., 2016
SCC OnLine Guj 8686 and held as under: (Shahid case 2017 SCC OnLine
Bom 3440, SCC OnLine Bom paras 18 & 19)
"18. ... The law laid down by the highest court of a State as well
as the Supreme Court, is the law. In fact, Article 141 of the
Constitution of India categorically states that the law declared
by the Supreme Court shall be binding on all courts within the
territories of India. There is nothing even in CPC to restrict the
meaning of the words "barred by any law" to mean only codified
law or statute law as sought to be contended by Mr Patil. In the
view that I have taken, I am supported by a decision of the
Gujarat High Court in Hermes Marines Ltd., 2016 SCC OnLine
Guj 8686 ...
19. One must also not lose sight of the purpose and intention
behind Order 7 Rule 11(d). The intention appears to be that
when the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be
barred by any law, the courts will not unnecessarily protract the
litigation and proceed with the hearing of the suit. The purpose
clearly appears to be to ensure that where a defendant is able
to establish that the plaint ought to be rejected on any of the
grounds set out in the said Rule, the Court would be duty-
bound to do so, so as to save expenses, achieve expedition
and avoid the court's resources being used up on cases which
will serve no useful purpose. A litigation, which in the opinion of
the court, is doomed to fail would not further be allowed to be
used as a device to harass a defendant."
31. Similarly, issue was again examined by the High Court of Jharkhand
(Single Judge) in Mira Sinha v. State of Jharkhand, 2015 SCC OnLine Jhar
4377. The learned Judge, in para 7 held as under: (SCC OnLine Jhar)
"7. In the background of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, it
is apparent that Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC application is maintainable only
when the suit is barred by any law. The expression "law" included in Rule
11(d) includes the law of limitation and, it would also include the law
declared by the Hon'ble Supreme Court."
32. We are in agreement with the view taken by the Allahabad, Gujarat,
Bombay and Jharkhand High Courts in the aforementioned four decisions
which, in our opinion, is the proper interpretation of the expression "law"
occurring in clause (d) of Rule 11 of Order 7 of the Code. This answers the
first submission of the learned counsel for the respondents against the
respondents.
44
(RNT,J
C.R.P.No.311 of 2026)
56. When the law under the Family Courts Act, 1984 and the
Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 clearly mandates that the proceedings shall
be conducted in camera, and on the said provisions, the Hon’ble Apex
Court laid down the law in Santhini (supra) that after the settlement
fails, Video Conferencing can be permitted subject to the conditions
and the circumstances provided by Santhini (supra).
57. The Rules 2023 framed in the exercise of power under
Article 227 (2)(b) of the Constitution of India can neither provide nor
can be construed as providing for Video Conferencing in matrimonial
dispute at the stage of reconciliation, otherwise that would, be
inconsistent with the law for the time being in force under the Family
Courts Act and the Hindu Marriage Act, and the Law declared by the
Hon’ble Apex Court in Santhini (supra). The High Court Rules cannot
provide for conducting such proceedings through video conferencing in
a manner that defeats or dilutes the mandate in Santhini (supra).
58. It is a well-settled principle that there is a presumption in
favour of the constitutionality of an enactment, and even where two
views are possible, one, which makes the provision intra vires and the
other which renders it ultra vires the Constitution, the latter is to be
avoided and the former is to be preferred.
45
(RNT,J
C.R.P.No.311 of 2026)
59. In Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Shri Justice S.R.
Tendolkar and others
13
, the Hon’ble Apex Court on the point of
constitutionality of enactment, restated the principles in paragraph No.11,
which reads as under :
“11. The principal ground urged in support of the contention as
to the invalidity of the Act and/or the notification is founded on Article
14 of the Constitution. In Budhan Choudhry v. State of Bihar [(1955) 1
SCR 1045] a Constitution Bench of seven Judges of this Court at p.
1048-49 explained the true meaning and scope of Article 14 as
follows;
“The provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution have come up for
discussion before this Court in a number of cases, namely, Chiranjit
Lal Choudhuri v. Union of India [1950 SCC 833 : (1950) SCR 869] ,
State of Bombay v. F.N. Balsara [1951 SCC 860 : (1951) SCR 682] ,
State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar [(1952) 1 SCC 1 : (1952)
SCR 284] , Kathi Raning Rawat v. State of Saurashtra [(1952) 1 SCC
215 : (1952) SCR 435] , Lachmandas Kewalram Ahuja v. State of
Bombay [(1952) 1 SCC 726 : (1952) SCR 710] , Qasim Razvi v. State
of Hyderabad [(1953) 1 SCC 228 : (1953) SCR 581] and Habeeb
Mohamad v. State of Hyderabad [(1953) 1 SCC 501 : (1953) SCR
661] . It is, therefore, not necessary to enter upon any lengthy
discussion as to the meaning, scope and effect of the article in
question. It is now well established that while article 14 forbids class
legislation, it does not forbid reasonable classification for the purposes
of legislation. In order, however, to pass the test of permissible
classification two conditions must be fulfilled, namely, (i) that the
classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which
distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from others
13
AIR 1958 SC 538
46
(RNT,J
C.R.P.No.311 of 2026)
left out of the group, and (ii) that that differentia must have a rational
relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question.
The classification may be founded on different bases, namely,
geographical, or according to objects or occupations or the like. What
is necessary is that there must be a nexus between the basis of
classification and the object of the Act under consideration. It is also
well established by the decisions of this Court that Article 14
condemns discrimination not only by a substantive law but also by a
law of procedure.”
The principle enunciated above has been consistently adopted and
applied in subsequent cases. The decisions of this Court further
establish—
(a) that a law may be constitutional even though it relates to a single
individual if, on account of some special circumstances or reasons
applicable to him and not applicable to others, that single individual
may be treated as a class by himself;
(b) that there is always a presumption in favour of the
constitutionality of an enactment and the burden is upon him who
attacks it to show that there has been a clear transgression of the
constitutional principles;
(c) that it must be presumed that the legislature understands and
correctly appreciates the need of its own people, that its laws are
directed to problems made manifest by experience and that its
discriminations are based on adequate grounds;
(d) that the legislature is free to recognise degrees of harm and may
confine its restrictions to those cases where the need is deemed to be
the clearest;
47
(RNT,J
C.R.P.No.311 of 2026)
(e) that in order to sustain the presumption of constitutionality the
court may take into consideration matters of common knowledge,
matters of common report, the history of the times and may assume
every state of facts which can be concieved existing at the time of
legislation; and
(f) that while good faith and knowledge of the existing conditions on
the part of a legislature are to be presumed, if there is nothing on the
face of the law or the surrounding circumstances brought to the notice
of the court on which the classification may reasonably be regarded as
based, the presumption of constitutionality cannot be carried to the
extent of always holding that there must be some undisclosed and un-
known reasons for subjecting certain individuals or corporations to
hostile or discriminating legislation.
The above principles will have to be constantly borne in mind by the
court when it is called upon to adjudge the constitutionality of any
particular law attacked as discriminatory and violative of the equal
protection of the laws.”
60. This Court do not say that the Rules, 2023 are
ultra vires Article 227(2)(b) read with the proviso to Clause (3), as this
Court is of the considered view that the said Rules, 2023 have been
framed generally to regulate video conferencing. The said Rules are
procedural in nature and are to be understood as regulating the
procedure for video conferencing where such conferencing is otherwise
permissible. However, in cases where video conferencing is not
48
(RNT,J
C.R.P.No.311 of 2026)
permissible, or is not permissible up to or at a particular stage of
judicial proceedings, the said Rules shall have no application.
61. This Court is further unable to construe the Rules, 2023 in
the manner urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner. The
submissions are misconceived and proceed on misunderstanding of
the settled legal principles and that too the very basic principles. This
Court cannot read the Rules, 2023 as mandating video conferencing in
matters such as the present case, whether before the Family Court or a
Civil Court dealing with matrimonial disputes, so as to permit video
conferencing even at the stage of reconciliation, contrary to the law laid
down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Santhini (supra).
62. The Rules, 2023 cannot be construed as being in conflict
with, or inconsistent with, the provisions of the statutory enactments or
the judge-made law laid down by the High Court or the Supreme Court.
63. In Government of Andhra Pradesh and Others v.
P. Laxmi Devi
14, the Hon’ble Apex Court held that before declaring
the statute to be unconstitutional, the court must be absolutely sure
that there can be no manner of doubt that it violates a provision of the
Constitution. If two views are possible, one making the statute
14
(2008) 4 SCC 720
49
(RNT,J
C.R.P.No.311 of 2026)
constitutional and the other making it unconstitutional, the former view
must always be preferred. Paragraph No.46 reads as under :
“46. In our opinion, there is one and only one ground for
declaring an Act of the legislature (or a provision in the Act) to
be invalid, and that is if it clearly violates some provision of the
Constitution in so evident a manner as to leave no manner of
doubt. This violation can, of course, be in different ways e.g. if
a State Legislature makes a law which only Parliament can
make under List I to the Seventh Schedule, in which case it will
violate Article 246(1) of the Constitution, or the law violates
some specific provision of the Constitution (other than the
directive principles). But before declaring the statute to be
unconstitutional, the court must be absolutely sure that there
can be no manner of doubt that it violates a provision of the
Constitution. If two views are possible, one making the statute
constitutional and the other making it unconstitutional, the
former view must always be preferred. Also, the court must
make every effort to uphold the constitutional validity of a
statute, even if that requires giving a strained construction or
narrowing down its scope vide Rt. Rev. Msgr. Mark Netto v.
State of Kerala [(1979) 1 SCC 23 : AIR 1979 SC 83] SCC para 6
: AIR para 6. Also, it is none of the concern of the court whether
the legislation in its opinion is wise or unwise.”
64. The Rules,2023 of the High Court cannot take away the
basis of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Santhini (supra), so
as to render its applicability ineffective in Andhra Pradesh.
50
(RNT,J
C.R.P.No.311 of 2026)
65. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner
that, in view of the Rules, 2023, video conferencing is permissible in
matrimonial disputes even at the stage of reconciliation is
unsustainable and is rejected.
66. This Court reiterates that, in view of Santhini (supra),
which is binding under Article 141 of the Constitution, video
conferencing between husband and wife in matrimonial disputes is
impermissible at the stage of reconciliation, i.e., until reconciliation fails.
This position holds good irrespective of whether the proceedings are
before a Civil Court or a Family Court. No distinction can be drawn
regarding the applicability of Santhini (supra) based on the forum i.e.,
Civil Court or the Family Court.
67. The contention of the petitioner’s counsel that in
Mohammad Razik Shaik (supra), this Court did not hold Nerella
Chiranjeevi Arun Kumar (supra) as per incuriam and therefore,
Nerella Chiranjeevi Arun Kumar (supra) is to be followed by this
Court, being a Co-ordinate Bench, is also without substance and is
rejected. In Mohammad Razik Shaik (supra) as already mentioned
above, this Court considered Nerella Chiranjeevi Arun Kumar
(supra) and in clear words held that the said judgment did not consider
51
(RNT,J
C.R.P.No.311 of 2026)
the Hon’ble Apex Court judgment in Santhini (supra). Consequently,
the law in Nerella Chiranjeevi Arun Kumar (supra), which is
contrary to the Supreme Court judgment cannot be followed. There
was no need to declare the said judgment as per incuriam, being in
conflict with the judgment of the Supreme Court. This Court has to
follow the judgment of the Apex Court and not of the Co-ordinate
Bench, which is contrary to the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex
Court.
68. The Rules,2023 framed by the High Court in exercise of its
power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India cannot take away
the basis of the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Santhini
(supra), so as to render it ineffective in its applicability in the State of
Andhra Pradesh.
V. Conclusion :-
69. In view of the aforesaid discussion, this Court holds, on
points of determination ‘A’ and ‘B’, that video conferencing is
permissible in matrimonial proceedings, whether before the Family
Court or the Civil Court, after reconciliation fails. In other words, at
the stage of reconciliation, until it fails, video conferencing is not
permissible for such purpose. The judgment in Santhini (supra)
applies with full force in the State of Andhra Pradesh as well and is not
52
(RNT,J
C.R.P.No.311 of 2026)
inapplicable, as contended by the petitioner’s counsel, on account of
the Andhra Pradesh High Court “Rules for Video Conferencing for
Courts, 2023”.
70. In view of the conclusions reached on points ‘A’ and ‘B’,
the answer to point ‘C’ is that the impugned order is perfectly justified
in law, in terms of Santhini (supra), and calls for no interference.
VI. Result :-
71. For all the aforesaid reasons, this Court finds no merit in
the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner.
The order under challenge has been passed in consonance with the
law as settled by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Santhini (supra) and
warrants no interference.
72. The Civil Revision Petition is dismissed.
No order as to costs.
As a sequel thereto, miscellaneous petitions, if any pending,
shall also stand closed.
____________________
RAVI NATH TILHARI, J
Date : 30.04.2026
Note :- L.R. Copy to be marked.
B/o
RPD.
53
(RNT,J
C.R.P.No.311 of 2026)
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE RAVI NATH TILHARI
(DISMISSED)
CIVIL REVISION PETITION NO: 311 OF 2026
Date : 30.04.2026
Note :- L.R. Copy to be marked.
B/o
RPD.
54
(RNT,J
C.R.P.No.311 of 2026)
*HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE RAVI NATH TILHARI
+ CIVIL REVISION PETITION NO: 311 OF 2026
% 30.04.2026
#1. Bheemisetti Suryanarayana.
……Petitioner
And:
$ 1. Bheemisetti Mrudula Naga
Bhavani.
….Respondent.
!Counsel for the petitioner : Sri B.Abhay Siddanth Mootha
^Counsel for the respondent/(s) : ---.
<Gist:
>Head Note:
? Cases referred:
1. 2019 Supreme (AP) 357
2. (2018) 1 SCC
3. 2025 SCC OnLine AP 314
4. C.R.P.No.1194 of 2024, dated 18.10.2024
5. (2021) 16 SCC 501
6. (1973) 3 SCC 585
7. (1973) 1 SCC 216
8. (2004) 8 SCC 599
9. (2023) 20 SCC 747
10. 1986 SCC OnLine Mad 113
11. 1967 SCC OnLine Guj 16
12. (2018) 13 SCC 480
13. AIR 1958 SC 538
14. (2008) 4 SCC 720
55
(RNT,J
C.R.P.No.311 of 2026)
HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE RAVI NATH TILHARI
CIVIL REVISION PETITION NO: 311 OF 2026
1. Bheemisetti Suryanarayana.
……Petitioner
And:
1. Bheemisetti Mrudula Naga
Bhavani..
….Respondent.
DATE OF JUDGMENT PRONOUNCED : 30.04.2026
SUBMITTED FOR APPROVAL:
THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE RAVI NATH TILHARI
1. Whether Reporters of Local newspapers may be
Allowed to see the judgments? Yes/No
2. Whether the copies of judgment may be marked
to Law Reporters/Journals? Yes/No
3. Whether Your Lordships wish to see the fair
Copy of the Judgment? Yes/No
____________________
RAVI NATH TILHARI, J
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