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IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA

CRIMINAL REVISIONAL JURISDICTION

APPELLATE SIDE

Present:

The Hon’ble Justice Ananya Bandyopadhyay

C.R.R. 3935 of 2011

Biswambhar Bose

-Vs-

The State of West Bengal and Anr.

For the Petitioner : Mr. Arnab Chatterjee

Ms. Ankusha Ghosh

For the State : Ms. Faria Hossain

Mr. Anand Keshari

Judgment on : 09.06.2026

Ananya Bandyopadhyay, J.:-

1. The revisional application has been instituted by the petitioner seeking

quashing of the entire criminal proceeding arising out of G.R. Case No.2601

of 2010 pending before the Learned Judicial Magistrate, 1

st

Court,

Barrackpore, emanating from Dum Dum Police Station Case No.286 dated

30.07.2010 registered under Sections 143, 186 and 506 of the Indian Penal

Code. Challenge has also been directed against every consequential order

passed therein, including the order dated 09.09.2010 whereby cognizance

was taken of the aforesaid offences.

2. The foundation of the prosecution, as delineated in the written complaint

lodged by the opposite party no.2 before the Officer-in-Charge, Dum Dum

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Police Station on 30.07.2010, was that on 29.07.2010 at about 5:00 p.m. the

complainant, accompanied by members of an inspecting team functioning

under the Directorate of Rationing, Food and Supplies Department,

Government of West Bengal, visited Fair Price Shop No.315 for examination

of account books and verification of stock position relating to food grains and

other commodities. According to the complaint, during continuation of the

inspection at about 6:45 p.m., the petitioner along with approximately thirty-

five others allegedly entered the premises, interfered with the inspection

process, behaved discourteously with the inspecting officials and, by reason

of such conduct, induced the proprietor of the shop, namely Sankar Lal

Sadhukhan, to cease cooperation with the inspecting team, compelling the

officials to leave the premises with considerable difficulty.

3. Acting upon the said complaint, Dum Dum Police Station Case No.286 dated

30.07.2010 was registered under Sections 143, 186 and 506 of the Indian

Penal Code against the petitioner, Sankar Lal Sadhukhan and thirty-five

other persons. The petitioner has pointed out that on 07.08.2010 the named

accused persons, including the petitioner, surrendered before the Learned

Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Barrackpore and were enlarged on bail

on the very same day.

4. The petitioner has further stated that upon completion of investigation, the

investigating agency submitted Charge Sheet No.188 dated 15.08.2010

under Sections 143, 186 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code, though

ultimately only two persons, including the petitioner, were sent up for trial.

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On the basis of the said police report, the Learned Additional Chief Judicial

Magistrate, Barrackpore, by order dated 09.09.2010, took cognizance of the

offences under Sections 143, 186 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code against

the petitioner and another accused. Subsequently, on 13.04.2011, copies

were supplied to the accused persons and the matter stood transferred to the

Court of the Learned Judicial Magistrate, 1

st

Court, Barrackpore for disposal.

5. Assailing the continuation of the prosecution, the petitioner has contended

that even if the allegations contained in the charge sheet are accepted in

their entirety, the same fail to disclose the essential ingredients of the

offences alleged. It has been argued that the materials collected during

investigation do not furnish any legally admissible foundation capable of

establishing participation of the petitioner in the commission of the alleged

offences and, therefore, the order taking cognizance suffers from a serious

legal infirmity.

6. A substantial plank of the challenge rests upon the allegation under Section

143 of the Indian Penal Code. The petitioner has submitted that the offence

of unlawful assembly necessarily postulates the presence of five or more

persons constituting the assembly. Yet, after investigation, the charge sheet

was filed only against two accused persons, including the petitioner.

According to the petitioner, once the investigating agency itself confined the

prosecution to two individuals, invocation of Section 143 of the Indian Penal

Code lost its statutory foundation and continuation of such accusation

became legally untenable.

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7. The petitioner has also urged that the conclusion recorded in the charge

sheet regarding alleged obstruction to the public officials was founded upon

assumptions and speculative inferences rather than upon concrete

evidentiary material. Mere suspicion, conjecture or inferential reasoning, it

has been argued, cannot furnish the basis for a criminal prosecution nor can

such material justify exercise of jurisdiction under Section 190(1)(b) of the

Code of Criminal Procedure.

8. A further and more fundamental challenge has been directed against the

allegation under Section 186 of the Indian Penal Code. The petitioner has

submitted that cognizance of an offence punishable under Section 186 of the

Indian Penal Code is circumscribed by the statutory mandate embodied in

Section 195(1)(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The provision requires a

complaint in writing by the concerned public servant or by another public

servant to whom such officer is administratively subordinate. According to

the petitioner, compliance with this statutory precondition constitutes the

very basis upon which jurisdiction to take cognizance may be exercised.

9. The petitioner has maintained that the prosecution sought to circumvent the

legislative command contained in Section 195(1)(a) Code of Criminal

Procedure by resorting to a police report and charge sheet. Such a course,

according to the petitioner, strikes at the root of jurisdiction and cannot be

salvaged by recourse to Section 465 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It

has, therefore, been contended that the Learned Magistrate travelled beyond

the limits of jurisdiction while taking cognizance of the offence punishable

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under Section 186 Indian Penal Code despite the express statutory bar

governing such cognizance.

10. The petitioner has additionally argued that an offence under Section 186

Indian Penal Code contemplates a deliberate and overt act of resistance or

obstruction to a public servant in discharge of public functions. The

materials collected during investigation, according to the petitioner, do not

reveal any specific act attributable to him that could satisfy the statutory

ingredients of voluntary obstruction. Absence of such material, it is

submitted, renders the accusation legally deficient.

11. Finally, the petitioner has asserted that the record is devoid of any material

establishing a nexus between him and the alleged acts constituting the

offences. The charge sheet, according to the petitioner, proceeds upon broad

allegations bereft of evidentiary support and fails to disclose circumstances

from which criminal liability could legitimately be inferred. On these

premises, the petitioner seeks quashing of the criminal proceeding, the

charge sheet, the order taking cognizance and all consequential steps taken

pursuant thereto, contending that continuation of the prosecution would

amount to a misuse of the criminal process and a departure from settled

principles governing criminal jurisprudence.

12. The Learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued, at the threshold,

that the allegation under Section 143 of the Indian Penal Code stood

deprived of its statutory basis. The prosecution case itself proceeded on the

assertion that the petitioner had acted in concert with a large assemblage of

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persons. Yet, after completion of investigation, the investigating agency chose

to submit charge-sheet only against two individuals, namely the petitioner

and one other accused. Since the offence of unlawful assembly derives its

existence from the participation of not less than five persons as

contemplated under Section 141 of the Indian Penal Code, the filing of

charge-sheet against only two persons, without identification of any

additional participants constituting the alleged assembly, dismantled the

very premise upon which the accusation under Section 143 rested.

According to the petitioner, continuance of the prosecution on such a charge

represented a legal incongruity warranting intervention of the Court.

13. The Learned Advocate for the petitioner further contended that the allegation

of obstruction to the officials of the Food and Supplies Department had been

founded upon assumptions rather than demonstrable facts. The charge-

sheet, according to the petitioner, merely recorded inferential conclusions

regarding interference with official duties without disclosing any concrete

material capable of establishing the commission of an offence. It was

submitted that conjectural reasoning cannot furnish the juridical basis for a

criminal prosecution and that the Learned Magistrate committed a legal

error in taking cognizance on the strength of a police report lacking factual

particulars capable of constituting the alleged offences.

14. The challenge to the charge under Section 186 of the Indian Penal Code was

articulated with particular emphasis. Learned counsel submitted that

prosecution for obstruction of a public servant in discharge of public

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functions could commence only in the manner prescribed under Section

195(1)(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The statutory mandate requires

a written complaint by the concerned public servant or by another public

servant to whom he is administratively subordinate. Such requirement, it

was argued, constitutes a jurisdictional precondition and not a procedural

formality capable of subsequent rectification.

15. Proceeding on that premise, it was urged that recourse to a police report

could not substitute the complaint contemplated by Section 195(1)(a) Code of

Criminal Procedure. Absence of such complaint, according to the petitioner,

struck at the very authority of the Court to assume cognizance of the offence

under Section 186 Indian Penal Code. The defect, it was submitted,

penetrated the root of jurisdiction and could not be neutralised by reference

to Section 465 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Consequently, the order

taking cognizance under Section 186 Indian Penal Code was portrayed as

one rendered in disregard of an express legislative prohibition.

16. It was also maintained that an accusation under Section 186 Indian Penal

Code demands proof of a deliberate and discernible act of resistance or

obstruction. Mere presence at the scene or generalized allegations of

interference would not satisfy the statutory ingredients. The materials

collected during investigation, according to the petitioner, did not reveal any

overt act attributable to him which could constitute voluntary obstruction of

a public servant in discharge of official duty.

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17. Attention was invited to the chronology of events. The alleged occurrence,

according to the prosecution itself, took place on 29.07.2010 between

approximately 5:00 p.m. and 6:45 p.m. The formal First Information Report

recorded that the distance between the place of occurrence and the police

station was merely 1.5 kilometres. Despite such proximity, the FIR came to

be registered only on 30.07.2010 at about 7:30 p.m., more than twenty-four

hours after the alleged incident. The prosecution offered no explanation

whatsoever for this delay. Learned counsel submitted that such unexplained

lapse assumed significance while assessing the authenticity and spontaneity

of the allegations.

18. Reiterating the challenge to the charge under Section 143 Indian Penal Code,

the petitioner submitted that the prosecution had failed to establish the

existence of an unlawful assembly comprising five or more persons. The

charge-sheet identified only two accused persons and remained silent

regarding the identity of any additional members of the alleged assembly. In

the absence of foundational facts satisfying the statutory threshold

prescribed under Section 141 Indian Penal Code, the charge under Section

143, according to the petitioner, stood divested of legal support.

19. With regard to Section 186 Indian Penal Code, the petitioner submitted that

the offence was not capable of being pursued through ordinary police

machinery in disregard of the specific embargo contained in Section

195(1)(a)(i) Code of Criminal Procedure. Since no written complaint by the

concerned public servant or superior authority had been placed on record,

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initiation of criminal proceedings solely on the basis of a police report was

asserted to be legally defective and incapable of sustaining the prosecution.

20. The accusation under Section 506 Indian Penal Code was also subjected to

detailed criticism. Learned counsel submitted that neither the written

complaint nor the charge-sheet disclosed the essential constituents of

criminal intimidation. No specific threat was attributed to the petitioner. No

statement revealed the precise words allegedly spoken. No material indicated

that any expression was uttered with the intention of causing alarm to the

complainant. Equally absent was any allegation suggesting that the

complainant was placed under fear or compelled to alter his conduct by

reason of the alleged threat. It was argued that casual expressions, heated

exchanges, or discourteous language, divorced from the intention and

consequence contemplated under Section 503 Indian Penal Code, cannot

mature into an offence punishable under Section 506 Indian Penal Code.

21. The petitioner further placed reliance upon personal and equitable

considerations. It was submitted that he was approximately sixty-nine years

of age and was suffering from cancer. The criminal proceeding, originating in

the year 2010, had remained pending for nearly fifteen years. The Learned

Counsel informed the Court that at an earlier stage of hearing the

prosecution itself disclosed that the original case records could not be

traced. Such circumstances, viewed cumulatively, were cited as factors

accentuating the oppressive nature of the continuation of the prosecution.

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22. In support of the plea founded upon prolonged pendency, reliance was

placed upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Common Cause, A

Registered Society v. Union of India & Others, reported in (1996) 4 SCC 33,

particularly paragraph 4 thereof, wherein emphasis was laid upon the

constitutional imperative of expeditious criminal justice and the adverse

consequences flowing from inordinate delay.

23. On the strength of the aforesaid factual and legal considerations, the

Learned advocate for the petitioner prayed for quashing of the entire criminal

prosecution being G.R. Case No.2601 of 2010 pending before the Learned

Judicial Magistrate, 1st Court, Barrackpore, North 24-Parganas, arising out

of Dum Dum Police Station Case No.286 of 2010 dated 30.07.2010, together

with all consequential proceedings emanating therefrom.

24. The Learned Advocate representing the State submitted at the nascent stage

the revisional application must not be allowed.

25. The revisional application invites examination of the legality of the criminal

proceeding arising out of Dum Dum Police Station Case No.286 dated

30.07.2010, culminating in G.R. Case No.2601 of 2010 pending before the

Learned Judicial Magistrate, 1

st

Court, Barrackpore. The petitioner seeks

annulment of the prosecution instituted under Sections 143, 186 and 506 of

the Indian Penal Code, together with the order dated 09.09.2010 by which

cognizance was taken upon submission of Charge Sheet No.188 dated

15.08.2010.

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26. The prosecution traces its genesis to a written complaint lodged by an officer

attached to the Directorate of Rationing, Food and Supplies Department

alleging that during an inspection of Fair Price Shop No.315 on 29.07.2010,

the petitioner and several others entered the premises, interfered with the

inspection process, behaved discourteously with the inspecting team and

thereby impeded discharge of official duties. Investigation thereafter

culminated in submission of charge-sheet against only two persons, namely

the petitioner and another accused.

27. At the forefront stands the accusation under Section 143 of the Indian Penal

Code. The statutory mandate governing unlawful assembly predicates an

assembly must consist of five or more persons sharing one of the common

objects enumerated in Section 141 Indian Penal Code. Membership of such

assembly constitutes the offence punishable under Section 143 Indian Penal

Code.

28. The complaint originally referred to the presence of numerous persons. Yet

the investigating agency, after scrutiny of the materials, elected to prosecute

only two individuals. The charge-sheet neither identifies nor attributes any

role to the remaining alleged participants. No material has been placed

before the Court demonstrating the existence of five or more persons whose

participation could satisfy the statutory threshold.

29. A criminal charge cannot subsist upon a numerical deficiency which strikes

at the very foundation of the offence. Once the prosecution itself confines the

accusation to two persons, the essential element required for constituting an

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unlawful assembly disappears from the record. The accusation under

Section 143 Indian Penal Code consequently loses its juridical basis.

30. The allegation under Section 186 Indian Penal Code presents a more

formidable obstacle to the prosecution.

31. Section 195(1)(a)(i) of the Code of Criminal Procedure embodies a legislative

safeguard of considerable significance. Cognizance of an offence punishable

under Section 186 Indian Penal Code may be taken only upon a complaint in

writing by the concerned public servant or by another public servant to

whom he is administratively subordinate. The provision does not merely

regulate procedure; it prescribes the very source from which jurisdiction to

take cognizance must emanate.

32. The prosecution in the present matter proceeded through registration of an

FIR, police investigation and submission of a police report under Section 173

Code of Criminal Procedure. The record does not reveal any complaint

presented before the Magistrate in the manner contemplated by Section

195(1)(a)(i) Code of Criminal Procedure.

33. Principally where a statute prescribes a particular mode for assumption of

jurisdiction, recourse to an alternative route remains impermissible. The

legislative command contained in Section 195 Code of Criminal Procedure

cannot be diluted by a police report, regardless of the evidentiary material

gathered during investigation.

34. The order taking cognizance under Section 186 Indian Penal Code, therefore,

stands deprived of statutory support. Continuation of the prosecution for the

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said offence would amount to perpetuation of a proceeding initiated in

derogation of an express legislative mandate.

35. Even on the factual plane, the materials collected during investigation fail to

disclose any distinct overt act attributable to the petitioner constituting

voluntary obstruction of a public servant in discharge of public functions.

The allegations remain generalized and bereft of particulars demonstrating

resistance, restraint or obstruction within the meaning of Section 186 Indian

Penal Code. The accusation under Section 506 Indian Penal Code fares no

better.

36. Criminal intimidation postulates a threat intended to cause alarm to the

person threatened or to induce conduct which the law does not require. Mere

use of harsh language, expressions uttered during a heated exchange or

allegations lacking particulars do not satisfy the ingredients of the offence.

37. Neither the written complaint nor the charge-sheet specifies the precise

words allegedly spoken by the petitioner. No material indicates the nature of

the threat. No circumstance reveals that the complainant was placed under

apprehension or altered his conduct on account of any intimidation. The

prosecution narrative remains conspicuously silent regarding the

fundamental ingredients of the offence.

38. A criminal court cannot be invited to conduct a trial in search of ingredients

which are absent from the foundational materials themselves. The

accusation under Section 506 Indian Penal Code, therefore, rests upon a

factual foundation far too fragile to sustain criminal prosecution.

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39. The alleged occurrence took place on 29.07.2010. The First Information

Report came to be registered more than twenty-four hours thereafter, despite

the admitted proximity of the place of occurrence to the police station. The

record discloses no explanation accounting for such delay. Though delay by

itself may not prove fatal in every prosecution, absence of any explanation

assumes significance where the allegations are themselves lacking in

specificity.

40. The Court cannot remain oblivious to the passage of time. Nearly fifteen

years have elapsed since institution of the prosecution. The petitioner is an

elderly individual stated to be suffering from serious illness. The prosecution

itself has indicated that the original case records were found missing at one

stage. Such circumstances further diminish the possibility of a meaningful

adjudicatory exercise.

41. The power of quashing is exercised sparingly. Yet where the allegations, even

if accepted at their highest, fail to disclose the essential ingredients of the

offences alleged, where cognizance is taken in disregard of a statutory

embargo, and where the foundational materials do not reveal a prima facie

case warranting continuation of criminal proceedings, intervention becomes

a judicial necessity rather than a matter of discretion.

42. The cumulative effect of the deficiencies noted above leaves the prosecution

devoid of legal sustainability. The accusation under Section 143 Indian Penal

Code collapses for want of the statutory requirement relating to the

composition of an unlawful assembly. The proceeding under Section 186

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Indian Penal Code suffers from a jurisdictional defect arising from non-

compliance with Section 195(1)(a)(i) Code of Criminal Procedure. The

allegation under Section 506 Indian Penal Code lacks the factual

constituents necessary to constitute criminal intimidation. Continuation of

the prosecution in such circumstances would advance neither the

administration of justice nor the legitimate purposes of criminal law.

43. Accordingly, the revisional application succeeds.

44. The criminal proceeding being G.R. Case No.2601 of 2010 pending before the

Learned Judicial Magistrate, 1

st

Court, Barrackpore, arising out of Dum

Dum Police Station Case No.286 dated 30.07.2010 under Sections 143, 186

and 506 of the Indian Penal Code, together with the charge-sheet, the order

dated 09.09.2010 taking cognizance and all consequential proceedings

emanating therefrom, stands quashed.

45. In view of the above discussions, the instant revisional application being

CRR 3935 of 2011 is allowed.

46. Accordingly, CRR 3935 of 2011 stands disposed of.

47. There is no order as to costs.

48. Let the copy of this judgment be sent to the Learned Trial Court as well as

the police station concerned for necessary information and compliance.

49. All parties shall act on the server copy of this judgment duly downloaded

from the official website of this court.

(Ananya Bandyopadhyay, J.)