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Chandigarh Administration and Anr. Etc. Etc. Vs. Manpreet Singh and Ors. Etc. Etc.

  Supreme Court Of India
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Case Background

Punjab Engineering college Admissions tto be given in order of priority in descending order, the High court direct to switch the categories affecting the order of priority legality of.

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PETITIONER:

CHANDIGARH ADMINISTRATION AND ANR. ETC. ETC.

Vs.

RESPONDENT:

MANPREET SINGH AND ORS. ETC. ETC.

DATE OF JUDGMENT18/11/1991

BENCH:

SAWANT, P.B.

BENCH:

SAWANT, P.B.

JEEVAN REDDY, B.P. (J)

CITATION:

1992 AIR 435 1991 SCR Supl. (2) 322

1992 SCC (1) 380 JT 1991 (4) 436

1991 SCALE (2)1030

ACT:

Punjab Engineering College--Admissions---Union Territory

of Chandigarh Memo dated 19.5.1982/6.9.1990--Reservation of

seats for children/spouses of military/para-military person-

nel-College prospectus dividing them in 5

sub-categories--Admissions to be given in order of priority

in descending order---High Court's direction to switch the

categories affecting the order of priority Legality of.

Constitution of India 1950:

Art. 226--High Court's jurisdiction-Whether supervisory

in nature- objectives of writ jurisdiction explained-High

Court not to sit/act as an appellate authority over the rule

making authorities.

Practice and Procedure:

College admissions--Whether High Court should stay for

3-4 weeks implementation of its order admitting a student,

if so prayed.

HEADNOTE:

The Union Territory of Chandigarh, by its Memo dated

19.5.1982 as modifited by another Memo dated 6.9.1990,

reserved 5% of seats for children/spouses of military/pars-

military personnel. Pursuant thereto the Punjab Engineering

College, reserved 15 seats for such candidates. For the

purpose of admission the college categorised in its prospec-

tus these candidates into 5 sub-categories. These belonging

to the respective categories and obtaining qualifying marks

in the entrance examination were to be admitted meritwise in

the order of priority in descending order: sub-category 1

consisted of children/spouses of defence personnel who were

awardees of gallantry decorations of Paramvir/Mahavir/Vir

Chakra in person or posthumously, or, dependent

children/spouses of defence/pars military personnel who were

killed or totally incapacitated in action while in service.

Dependent childern/spouses of defence/pars military person-

nel who died in service were put in sub-category 2. Subcate-

gory 3 comprised the dependent children/spouses of

defence/pars military personnel incapacitated while in

service, Dependent children/spouses of Ex-servicemen (mili-

tary and pars military) were

323

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placed in sub-category 4; and those of serving defence/pars

military personnel found place in sub-category 5.

For the academic year 1991-92 out of the 15 seats, 9

seats went to all the 9 qualified candidates belonging to

sub-categories 1 to 3, and remaining seats were allotted to

6 candidates meritwise out of 90 qualified candidates be-

longing to sub-category 4. Sub-category 5 went unprovided.

Respondent no.1 in SLP No.16066/91, who appeared in the

entrance examination for the academic year 1991-92 but did

not get admission, filed a writ petition before the High

Court contending that his father was an awardee of 'Shaurya

Chakra' which was equivalent to Vir Chakra and therefore his

case ought to have been considered in sub-category 1. On

behalf of the College it was stated that 'Shaurya Chakra'

award was not covered under the rules and regulations and,

therefore, respondent no.1, being the son of an Exservice-

man, could be considered only in sub-category 4.

Respondents no.1 and 2 in SLP No.16065/91, the sons of

the serving defence personnel, filed another writ petition

before the High Court challenging the categorization of

defence personnel as unreasonable and contended that chil-

dren of serving defence personnel should have been preferred

over the children of Exserviceman.

The High Court allowed both the writ petitions and

directed the College to admit all the three petitioners. It

ordered that subcategory 5 should be treated as sub-category

4 and sub-categery 4 should be treated as sub-category 5,

and the admissions should be made accordingly.

The petitioner in SLP No.16451/91, being the son of an

serviceman, was initially entitled to be considered under

sub-category 4 which by the order of the High Court was

converted into sub-category 5. He challenged the said con-

version of categories by yet another writ petition which was

dismissed by the High Court.

The Chandigarh Administration and the College filed SLPs

No.16066 and 16065 of 1991 against the orders of the High

Court allowing the two writ petitions, whereas SLP No. 16451

of 1991 was filed by the petitioner in the third writ peti-

tion which was dismissed by the High Court.

324

It was contended on behalf of Chandigarh Administration

and the College that the High Court exceeded its jurisdic-

tion in granting the impugned order in as much as in writ

jurisdiction the High Court does not sit as an appellate

authority over the rule making body nor can it re-write the

rules.

On 15.11.1991 the three Special Leave Petitions were dis-

posed of.

Giving reasons in support of its order dated 15.11.1991

this Court,

HELD: 1. While acting under Article 226 of the Constitu-

tion, the High Court does not sit and/or act as an appellate

authority over the orders/actions of the subordinate author-

ities/tribunals. Its jurisdiction is supervisory in nature.

[pp. 335 H; 336 A]

One of the main objectives of this jurisdiction is to

keep the government and several other authorities and tribu-

nals within the bounds of their respective jurisdiction. The

High Court must ensure that while performing this function

it does not overstep the wellrecognised bounds of its own

jurisdiction. [p. 336 A]

2.1 In the instant case, the High Court should not have

indulged in the exercise of 'switching' the categories and

that too without giving any reasons therefor. Thereby, it

has practicably assumed the role of rule-making authority,

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or, at any rate, assumed the role of an appellate authority.

That is clearly not the function of the High Court acting

under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. IP. 334 G-H1

2.2 If the High Court was satisfied that the rule was

discriminatory and bad, the only course open to it was to

strike down the offending rule. It could also have directed

the authorities to reframe the rule and make admissions

accordingly. [p. 333 F]

By directing that category 4 should be treated as cate-

gory 5 and conversely category 5 should be treated as cate-

gory 4, the High Court has prejudicially affected the rights

of candidates falling under category 4 without even

hearing.them, particularly when these categories were men-

tioned in the order of priority. [p. 335 A]

3. A rule making authority need not observe the rule of

hear-

325

ing, but the High Court exercising its judicial power

cannot dispense with the requirement. [p. 335 AB]

4. Although the orders and directions made by the High

Court were totally unsupportable in law, yet, in view of the

subsequent developments, the Special Leave Petitions could

not be allowed. By the time the SLPs were taken up and stay

granted, the respondents were already admitted in the Col-

lege and they gave up their seats which they had obtained in

other colleges. Depriving them of their admission in the

College at such a late stage would result in grave and

irreparable prejudice to them. The Administration and the

College authorities ought to have acted with more alacrity

and approached this court earlier than they did. [p. 336 B-

D]

5. In matters where the High Court directs the students

to be admitted in educational institutions it would be

advisable if the High Court stays the operation of its order

for a period of about 3 to 4 weeks if a request therefor is

made by the educational institution or the State as the case

may be. [pp. 336 GH; 337 A]

JUDGMENT:

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Special Leave Petition

Nos. 16066. 16065 & 16451 of 1991.

From the Judgment and Order dated 28.8.1991,30.8.1991 &

9.10.1991 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in C.W.P.Nos.

12644, 12485 and 14606 of 1991 respectively.

Kapil Sibal, Ranjit Kumar, J.D. Jain, Mrs. Kawaljit

Kocher, Dr. Balram Gupta, Ms. Yasmin Tarapore, J. Lal Kai-

lash Vasdev, Ms Nandini Sawhney, R.K. Kapoor, A.A. Khan and

Anil Verma for the appearing parties.

The following Order of the Court was delivered:

In the Union Territory of Chandigarh, 5% of the seats

are reserved in favour of sons/daughters/spouses of Mili-

tary/Para-Military personnel. Orders in this behalf are

issued by the Administration in its memo dated 19th May,

1982 which were later modified in memo dated 6.9.1990. In

accordance with the said orders, Punjab Engineering College

(a College run by the Chandigarh Administration and affili-

ated to Punjab University) reserved 15 seats in favour of

sons/daughters/spouses of Military/ParaMilitary Personnel.

The College published a prospectus for the session 1991-92.

It contains inter alia the rules governing the admission of

stu-

326

dents to the said college. So far as the reservation in

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favour of children and spouses of Military/Para-Military

Personnel is concerned, the rule, (printed at pages 23 and

24 of the Prospectus) reads as follows:

"Sons/Daughters/Spouses of Military/Para-

military Personnel etc.:

3 The Admission of the candidates against the reserved

seats under this category will be made on the basis of merit

list prepared according to the priorities given below in the

descending order:-

1. Sons/Daughters/Spouses of defence personnel

who are awardees of gallantry decorations of

Paramvir/Mahavir/Vir Chakra in person or

posthumously.

OR

Sons/daughters/spouses of defence personnel

and para-military personnel like CRPF, BSF

etc. who are killed or are total incapacitated

in action while in service and were wholly

dependent on them.

2. Sons/daughters/spouses of defence person-

nel and para-military personnel like CRPF/BSF

etc. who die while in service and were wholly

dependent on them;

3. Sons/daughters/spouses of defence per-

sonnel and para-military personnel like

CRPF/BSF incapacitated while in service and

were wholly dependent on them;

4. Sons/daughters/spouses of exservicemen

(military and para-military personnel like

CRPF/BSF who are wholly dependent on them;

5. Sons/daughters/spouses of serving de-

fence personnel and paramilitary personnel

like CRPF/BSF who are wholly dependent on

them:

The candidates claiming admissions under the category 1

above are required to submit the photo-copy of citation for

the gallantry award, failing which the application will not

be considered in this category,

The candidates claiming admission under category I are

required to submit a certificate from the respective Head-

quarters regarding death/total incapacitation in action

while in service.

The candidates claiming admission under category 2 and

3 are required to submit a certificate from the respective

Headquarters regarding death/total incapacitation.while in

service.

327

The candidates claiming admission under category 4 are

required to submit discharge certificate from sevice and

certificate of dependence from the District Magistrate of

the district concerned.

The candidates claiming admission under category 5 are

required to submit the certificate of dependence from the

unit in which parent/spouse is serving.

The candidates who apply for admission against this

category will also be considered for admission against the

seats allocated for Chandigarh/ General Pool to which they

may belong as per their merit."

A perusal of the rule shows that the five categories are

mentioned in the order of priority in the descending order.

There is no allocation of seats as between these five cate-

gories. It means that in the first instance, all the quali-

fied and eligible candidates falling in category 1 will be

given admission and if any seats are left unfilled, quali-

fied candidates failing in category 2 will be admitted. If

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there are any seats still left unfilled, qualified candi-

dates falling in category 3 will be given admission and so

on. In a given year, it may well happen that all the avail-

able seats reserved for children/spouses of defence person-

nel are taken away by the candidates in the first or first

and second categories. As a matter of fact, for the year

1990-91, only 6 candidates belonging to sub-category 4 out

of 90 candidates could be admitted and not the others and

category 5 'went unprovided altogether. It is stated that

all candidates obtaining the specified minimum marks in the

common entrance test were treated as qualified for being

considered for admission.

S.L.P. 16066/91: The first respondent in the S.L.P.

applied for admission to Punjab Engineering College under

this quota. He appeared in the common Entrance Test along

with other applicants. The College Authorities considered

his case placing him in category 4 since his father was an

Ex-serviceman. He could not, however, be given the admission

because the 15 seats reserved for children and spouses of

Military/ParaMilitary Personnel in this College were allo-

cated in the following manner:

a. There were three candidates falling in

category 1 (i.e., children of Defence Person-

nel who are awardees of gallantry decoration,

Paramvir Chakra/Mahavir Chakra, in person or

posthumously). All the three were given admis-

sion.

b. There were 5 candidates falling in catego-

ry 2. They were admitted.

328

c. Only one candidate falling in category 3

appeared and was given the seat;

d. There were 90 candidates failing in

category 4. But only 6 seats were available

(nine seats having been taken away by sub-

categories a to c). These six seats were

allotted on the basis of inter-se merit among

the candidates failing in this category. The

first respondent being at a fairly lower

position in this merit list could not be given

the admission.

No seats were left for being allotted to

candidates failing in category 5.

Finding that he has not been given admission in this Col-

lege, the first respondent filed a writ petition in the High

Court of Punjab and Haryana being C.W.P. No.12644 of 1991.

His contention was that his father Major Kuldip Singh Malik

was awarded Shaurya Chakra for acts of gallantry, that

Shaurya Chakra is equivalent to Vir Chakra, in all respects

and, therefore, his case ought to have been considered in

category 1 and not in category 4. He submitted that along

with his application for admission he had enclosed a copy of

the citation awarded by the President of India to his father

showing that his father Major Kuldip Singh Malik was awarded

Shaurya Chakra for displaying exemplary courage and leader-

ship in the course of his duties in the Mizo Hills. He

complained that two of the candidates admitted under catego-

ry 1 have received less marks than

he.

The High Court has allowed the Writ Petition on the

following reasoning:

"According to Regulation 695 of the Defence

Services Regulations relating to the Army,

issued by the Ministry of Defence, Government

of India, Shaurya Chakra is awardable for

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gallantry and comes after Ashoka Chakra and

Kirti Chakra. Further, according to Regulation

717, in order of precedence, this award of

Shaurya Chakra is at number thirteen. that is

immediately below Vir Chakra and Param Vir

Chakra is at number two and Maha Vir Chakra is

at number seven. Despite all this, the re-

spondents, while considering the candidature

of the petitioner, did not grant him admission

to the Bachelor of Engineering Course in the

current session even though he was higher in

academic merit as compared to respondent Nos.

3 and 4 who have been granted such admission.

In reply, the respondents have pleaded that no

doubt the father of the petitioner was deco-

rated with Shaurya Chakra award in

329

1969, but it is gallantry award and is not

strictly covered by the rules, regulations and

the prospectus of the College, though it is

admitted that both respondents Nos.3 and 4,

who have been granted admission, were lower in

merit than the petitioner, so far as the

academic record is concerned.

After hearing the learned counsel for the

parties, we find that the approach of the

respondents in rejecting the candidature of

the petitioner is neither legally correct nor

just and fair. However, as respondent Nos.3

and 4 who are lower in academic merit than the

petitioner, happen to be the sons of the

awardees of Vir Chakra and Maha Vir Chakra

respectively, it would be unfair if the admis-

sion already granted to them by the Chandigarh

Administration and the Punjab Engineering

College, Chandigarh, is set aside.

Resultantly, we allow this petition and issue

a direction to respondent Nos. 1 and 2 to

admit the petitioner against the category of

sons/daughters of awardees of gallantry deco-

rations, without disturbing the admission of

respondents Nos.3 and 4. In case no such seat

is available for the petitioner, the respond-

ents shall create a seat for the purpose

forthwith. This shall also be deemed to be a

direction to the Punjab University for accord-

ing necessary approval for the creation of the

additional seat. There shall be no order as to

costs."

The decision of the High Court was rendered on 28th

August, 1991. The present S.L.P. was filed in this court on

7th October, 1991. In fact, it appears that having waited

for one month and not having been admitted in the college in

pursuance of the Judgment, the first respondent took pro-

ceedings for Contempt against the College Authorities. The

first respondent, was admitted in the college on 28th Octo-

ber, 1991. It is now stated by his counsel that the first

respondent has given up his seat in another college (Jamia

Millia), on being admitted to this College. The writ peti-

tion came up for final hearing before us on 15.11.1991. We

disposed of the SLPs on that day stating that reasons for

our orders will be given today.

S.L.P. No. 16065/91

Respondents 1 and 2 in this S.L.P. also applied for

admission to Punjab Engineering College as children of

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serving Defence Personnel. They too appeared for the common

Entrance Test along with other applicants. Since the parents

of the two respondents were serving Defence Personnel, their

case was considered under category 5, As stated herein

330

before, no seats were left for being allocated to candidates

falling in category 5. Respondents I and 2 were, therefore,

not given admission in this College whereupon they ap-

proached the Punjab and Haryana High Court by way of a writ

petition being C.W.P. No. 12485 of 1991. Their case was that

the categorisation of Defence Personnel was unjust and

unreasonable in as much as while the children and spouses of

serving Defence Personnel are placed in category 5, children

and spouses of Exserviceman are placed above them in catego-

ry 4. According to the respondents. children of serving

Defence Personnel must be preferred over the children of

Exservicemen. In a short order, the High Court allowed the

writ petition and directed'that category 5 should be treated

as category 4 and category 4 should be treated as category

5. The Court directed that admissions for the current year

(1991-1992) shall be made accordingly. The order of High

court is a short one and may be set out in its entirity:

"After hearing the learned counsel for the

parties and having gone through their plead-

ings, we are of the considered view that sub-

categories No. 1, 2 and 3 deserve to be re-

tained at their appropriate present places. So

far as sub-categories No.4 and 5 i.e. relating

to the sons, daughters and spouses of the

exservice personnel ,as well as the sons,

daughters and spouses of service Defence

personnel are concerned, we find that the ends

of justice would be adequately met and the

object for which the reservation has been

provided would be achieved if the sons, daugh-

ters and spouses of serving Defence personnel

are placed at sub-category No.4 i.e. above the

category of Exservicemen. This conclusion has

been arrived at by us after considering the

circumstances that the wards and spouses of

serving Defence personnel are at a disadvan-

tage in the absence of their guardians serving

at far off/distant places defending the coun-

try vis-a-vis who have retired from the mili-

tary and are now living with their wards.

Keeping these considerations in view, we

dispose of this writ petition by issuing a

direction to the respondent Union Territory

Chandigarh and Principal, Punjab Engineering

College, to go ahead with the admission of

this reserved category. Therefore, so far as

such categories 1,2 and 3 are concerned, there

shall not be any change. However, we direct

that so far as sub-category No.4 is concerned,

persons covered in this shall be considered at

No. 5 and those covered in sub-category 5 are

concerned, shall be considered at No. 4. The

admission, which are going to be finalised

tomorrow, shall not be made in accordance with

these directions. A copy of the order be

supplied Dasti also to the learned counsel for

the parties."

331

This order was made on 30th August, 1991 whereas the

present SLP was filed in this Court on 7th October, 1991.

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These respondents too took proceedings for contempt against

the college for not implementing the direction of the High

Court. They were admitted on 28th October, 1991. These

respondents also say that on being admitted to this college

they have given up their admission in other colleges. This

SLP was heard alongwith SLP. No.16066 of 1991 on 15.11.91.

S.L.P. No. 16451 of 1991

This petition for Special Leave is directed against the

order dated 9th October, 1991 passed by a Division Bench of

the Punjab ,and Haryana High Court dismissing the writ

petition filed by the petitioner. The petitioner (writ

petitioner) applied for admission to the Punjab Engineering

College for the year 1991-92 under category 4 being the son

of an Exserviceman. By virtue of the directions given by the

High Court in its order dated 30.8.1991 in C .W.P. No. 12485

of 1991, category 4 became category 5 and category 5 became

category 4 and admissions were being made on that basis. The

petitioner who fell in category 4 (,as per the prospectus of

the College) and which was now converted to category 5 by

virtue of the decision of the High Court aforesaid applied

to the High Court to consider his case in category 4 itself

and grant him admission. His writ petition was dismissed by

the High Court on 9th October, 1991 under a short order

which reads thus:

"Admissions are being done as per the direc-

tions issued in Civil Writ Petition No.12485

of 1991, decided by the Division Bench on

August 30. 1991. In view of the said decision,

we do not find any merit in the contentions

raised by the learned counsel for the peti-

tioner. The Writ petitions dismissed. A copy

of this order be given dasti."

The petitioner is in fact questioning the correctness of

the directions given by the High Court in C.W.P.No.12485 of

1991 disposed of on August 30, 91.

Counsel for Chandigarh Administration and the College

(petitioners in SLP's 16066 and 16065 of 1991) contended

that the High Court has exceeded its jurisdiction in grant-

ing the impugned directions. He submitted that High Court,

while exercising the writ jurisdiction conferred upon by

Article 226 of the Constitution of India, does not sit as an

Appellate Authority over the rule making authority nor can

it re-write the rules. If the rule or any portion of it was

found to be bad, the High Court could have struck it down

and directed the rule-making authority to re-frame the

332

rule and make admissions on that basis but the High Court

could not have either switched the categories or directed

that Shaurya Chakra should be treated as equivalent to Vir

Chakra By its directions, the High Court has completely

upset the course of admissions under this reserved quota and

has gravely affected the chances of candidates failing in

category 4 by down-grading them as category 5 without even

hearing them. These are good reasons for the categorisation

done by the Administration which was adopted by the College.

He submitted that while Paramvir Chakra, Mahavir Chakra and

Vir Chakra are awarded for gallantry in war, Ashok Chakra,

Kirti Chakra and Shaurya Chakra are awarded for gallantry

otherwise than in war. Shaurya Chakra was awarded to the

father of the first respondent in SLP.No. 16066 of 1991 for

his gallant conduct in counter-insurgency operations in Mizo

Hills. It was not a war. He placed, before us, the true

extract of order of precedence of awardees. It reads thus:

"TRUE EXTRACT OF ORDER OF PRECEDENCE OF

AWARDS.

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717. Order of Precedence of Awards-

The order of precedence of various awards is

as follows:

Bharat Ratna

Param Vir Chakra

Ashoka Chakra

Padma Vibhushan

Padma Bhushan

Param Vishisht Seva Medal

Maha Vir Chakra

Kirti Chakra

Padma Shri

Sarvottam Jeevan Raksha Padak

Ati Vishisht Seva Medal

Vir Chakra

Shaurya Chakra

The President's police and Fire Service Medal

for gallantry. Sena/Nao Sena/Vayu Sena Medal

Vishisht Seva Medal

The Police Medal for gallantry

Uttam Jeevan Raksha Padak Wound Medal

The General Service Medal 1947.

Samar Seva Star 1965

Poorvi Star

Paschimi Star

Raksha Medal 2965."

333

Counsel says that by its directions contained in the

two orders impugned herein, the High Court has exercised a

jurisdiction, which really did not belong to it. We are

inclined to agree with him.

Counsel for the petitioner in S.L.P.No. 16451 of 1991

supported the aforesaid arguments.

On the other hand, the counsel for respondents (writ

petitioners in the High Court) in the first two SLPs. sup-

iported the order of the High Court and submitted further

that since the said respondents have given up their seats in

other colleges and have been admitted in the Punjab Engi-

neering College any order throwing them out from the Punjab

Engineering College, at this juncture would cause them

irreparable prejudice. They submitted that the Chandigarh

Administration and the College authorities have been sleep-

ing over the matter until a contempt petition was filed and

that they moved this Court only after they were summoned in

the Contempt proceedings. They should be held dis-entitled

to any relief on account of laches, submitted the counsel.

We are of the considered opinion that the orders of High

Court are wholly unsustainable. We shall consider both the

directions separately. Let us first consider SLP 16066 of

1991, arising from C.W.P. 12644/91.

The rule as framed by the Chandigarh Administration and

as published by the College in its prospectus in the year

1991-92 placed in category I children and spouses of only

those Defence Personnel who were awardees of gallantry

decorations of Paramvir Chakra, Mahavir Chakra or Vir Chakra

in person or posthumously. It did not include Ashok Chakra,

Kirti Chakra or Shaurya Chakra. The validity of the rule was

not expressly questioned before the High Court. Assuming

that it was so questioned and assuming that the High Court

was satisfied that the rule was discriminatory and bad for

the reason of not including Ashok Chakra etc., the only

course open to it was to strike down the offending rule. It

could also have directed the authorities to reframe the rule

and to make admissiions accordingly. High Court however did

not choose to do so. It merely directed that since Shaurya

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Chakra is immediately below Vir Chakra in the order of

precedence and since respondents 3 and 4 in the writ peti-

tion admitted under sub-category I have obtained lesser

marks than the writ petitioner, he should be given admission

without disturbing the admission given to respondents 2 and

3 in that writ petition. The entire reasoning of the High

Court has been extracted by us herein above. It shows that

absolutely no reason is assigned for granting the said

direction. All that it says is that since Shaurya Chakra is

also awardable for gallantry and is placed imme-

334

diately below Vir Chakra, the writ petitioner should be

granted admission. If really the High Court was of the

opinion that Shaurya Chakra is equivalent to Vir Chakra and

should be treated on the same par as Vir Chakra then it

should spelt out the position also of Ashok Chakra and Kirti

Chakra. which are above Shaurya Chakra. According to the

Rules notified children/spouses of Ashok Chakra, Kirti

Chakra & Shaurya Chakra awardees did not fall under category

1 nor under categories 2 or 3. They would fail under catego-

ry 4 or category 5, as the case may be, depending upon

whether their parent/spouse was an ex-service person or a

serving person. There may have been other candidates who are

the children/spouses of Shaurya Chakra awardees and for that

matter, Ashok chakra and Kirti Chakra awardees who may have

obtained more marks than the writ petitioner (first respond-

ent in SLP 16066 of 1991) but who did not claim a seat under

category 1 nor were considered as such. They may not have

stated the fact of their parent/spouse being a Ashok

chakra/Kirli Chakra Shaurya Chakra awardee, nor filed the

relevant citation, since it was not relevant as per the

published Rules. Had the proper course been followed, all of

them could have applied properly and could have been consid-

ered. By saying this we do not mean to say that the Rule is

bad. We do not mean to say so at all. There may be good

reasons for the Rule as published - or there may not be.

That is not the issue. What we are saying is that if the

High Court was of the opinion that all the gallantry awar-

dees (including Ashok, Kirti and Shaurya Chakra) should be

placed in category 1, it should have said so, struck down

the category-and, may be, directed reframing of rule and

admissions made on that basis.

Coming to SLP 16065 of 1991, the position appears to

been even worse. Without assigning any reason the High Court

has directed that category 4 should be made category 5 and

category 5 should be made category 4. In short, it has

switched these two categories. Again, we must say that if

the High Court thought that this categorisation was discrim-

inatory and bad it ought to have struck down the categorisa-

tion to that extent and directed the authority to' re-frame

the rule. It would then have been open to the rule making

authority either to merge these two categories or delete one

or both of them, depending upon/he opinion they would have

formed on a review of the situation. We must make it clear

again that we express no opinion on the question of validity

or otherwise of the rule. We are only saying that the High

Court should not have indulged in the exercise of 'switch-

ing' the categories, - and that too without giving any

reasons thereafter. Thereby. it has practicably assumed the

rule of rulemaking authority, or. at any rate, assumed the

role of an Appellate Authority. That is clearly not the

function of the High Court acting under Article 226 of the

Constitution of India. Now, let us notice the implications

and consequences of the said 'switching'.

335

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By directing that category 4 should be treated as

category 5 and conversely category 5 should be treated as

category 4, the High Court has prejudicially affected the

rights of candidates falling under category 4 without even

hearing them. It must be remembered that these categories

are mentioned in the order of priority as emphasised herein-

before. A rulemaking authority need not observe the rule of

hearing, but the High Court exercising its judicial power

cannot dispense with the requirement and that is precisely

the grievance of the petitioner in S.L.P. 16451/91 arising

from V.W.P. 14606 of 1991. He was entitled to be considered

under category 4 (as per the prospectus) whereas by virtue

of the High Court's order his category has become category

5, the result of which is that no seat may be left for his

category, whereas the said category was entitled to some

seats at least according to the Rules as framed and pub-

lished by the Administration and College. Suffice is to say

that the giving the said direction, while the admission were

in progress, the situation has been confounded beyond re-

call.

Article 226 of the Constitution of India empowers the

High Court to issue to any person or authority (including

the government) directions, orders or writs including writs

in the nature of Habeas Corpus, mandamus, Prohibition, quo

warrants and certiorari, or any of them for the enforcement

of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other

purpose.

Though the Article itself does not contain any restric-

tive words, the Courts have, ever the years, evolved certain

self-constraints though, we are not bound by the procedural

technicalities governing these high prorogative writs in

English law. As observed by a Constitution Bench in Bassappa

v. Nagappa [1955] 1 S.C.R. 250 at 256:

"In view of the express provisions in our

Constitution we need not now look back to the

early history or the procedural technicalities

of these writs in English law, nor feel op-

pressed by any difference or change of opin-

ion, expressed in particular cases of English

Judges. We can make an order or issue a writ

in the nature of certiorari in all appropriate

cases and in appropriate manner, so long as

we keep to the broad and fundamental princi-

ples that regulate the exercise of jurisdic-

tion in the matter of granting such writ in

English law."

While this is not the place to delve into or detail the

self-constraints to be observed by the Courts while exercis-

ing the jurisdiction under Article 226, one of them, which

is relevant herein, is beyond dispute viz. while acting

under Article 226, the High Court does not sit and/or act as

an Appellate Authority over the orders/actions of the Subor-

dinate Authori-

336

ties/Tribunals. Its' jurisdiction is supervisory in nature.

One of the main objectives of this jurisdiction is to keep

the government and several other authorities and Tribunals

within the bounds of their respective jurisdiction. The High

Court must ensure that while performing this function it

does not overstep the well-recognized bounds of its own

jurisdiction.

Though we are satisfied that the orders and directions

made by the High Court are totally unsupportable in law, the

subsequent developments dissuade us from allowing these

SLPs. As stated above, the three respondents-writ-petition-

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ers (first respondent in SLP. 16066/91 and respondents I and

2 in SLP. 16065/91) have been admitted into this college

(Punjab Engineering College) on 28th October, 1991, where-

upon they have given up the seats which they had obtained in

other colleges. This statement of theirs is not disputed

either by the Chandigarh Administration or the college

authorities. Depriving the said respondents of their admis-

sion in this college at this stage would result in grave and

irreparable prejudice to them. We think that the Administra-

tion and College authorities ought to have acted with more

alacrity and approached this Court earlier than they did. By

the time, these SLPs were taken up by us and stay granted,

the said respondents were already admitted into the College

and, they say, they had given up their seats in the other

colleges. On this score alone, we decline to interfere with

the orders in C.W .P. 12644/91 and 12485/91.

Now coming to SLP 16451 of 1991, the situation is this:

By virtue of the orders of the High Court, three students

who were not entitled to admission according to rules have

been given admission against the three vacancies which had

arisen since the finalization of the admissions. The college

authorities say that but for the orders of the High Court,

these three vacancies would have gone to the first three

candidates in the waiting list. The petitioner in SLP 16451

of 1991 says that he is one such person in the waiting list

and he would have obtained admission but for the admission

given to the three candidates in pursuance of the High Court

orders. We do not know whether the petitioner's case is

true. All the same, we think it appropriate to make the

following direction: the college authorities shall create

three more seats in the said course and admit the first

three available students in the waiting list against those

seats. The Chandigarh Administration shall pass the neces-

sary orders in this behalf. Action in terms of this direc-

tion shall be taken forthwith by the Chandigarh Administra-

tion and the college authorities.

Before we part with this case we wish to make an obser-

vation. In matters of this nature where the High court

directs students to be admitted in Educational Institutions.

it would be advisable if the High Court stays

337

the operation of its order for a period of about 3 to 4

weeks, if a request therefor is made by the Educational

Institution or the State, as the case may be.

SLPs disposed of accordingly.

R.P. Petitions

disposed of.

338

Reference cases

Description

High Court Jurisdiction Under Article 226: The Supreme Court on College Admission Rules

In the landmark case of Chandigarh Administration & Anr. Etc. Etc. vs. Manpreet Singh & Ors. Etc. Etc., the Supreme Court of India delivered a crucial judgment clarifying the scope of a High Court's jurisdiction under Article 226, particularly in matters concerning college admission rules. This definitive ruling, now fully accessible on CaseOn, underscores the principle that judicial review is supervisory, not appellate, and that courts cannot assume the role of rule-making authorities.

Case Background: A Tussle for Engineering Seats

The case originated from the admission process at the Punjab Engineering College for the 1991-92 academic year. The Chandigarh Administration had reserved 5% of seats (15 in total) for the children/spouses of military and para-military personnel. These seats were to be filled based on a specific descending order of priority across five sub-categories:

  • Category 1: Children/spouses of personnel awarded top gallantry decorations (Paramvir/Mahavir/Vir Chakra) or those killed/totally incapacitated in action.
  • Category 2: Children/spouses of personnel who died in service.
  • Category 3: Children/spouses of personnel incapacitated while in service.
  • Category 4: Children/spouses of Ex-servicemen.
  • Category 5: Children/spouses of serving personnel.

Admissions proceeded according to this priority. However, several aggrieved students, who were denied admission, approached the Punjab and Haryana High Court, leading to two contentious orders that became the subject of the Supreme Court's appeal.

The High Court's Controversial Directives

The High Court issued two key directives that fundamentally altered the admission criteria:

  1. Equating Gallantry Awards: In one petition, a student's father was an awardee of the 'Shaurya Chakra'. While this is a gallantry award, it was not one of the three specified in Category 1. The High Court, noting its proximity to the 'Vir Chakra' in the order of precedence, directed the college to admit the student under Category 1, effectively treating the two awards as equivalent for admission purposes.
  2. Switching Priority Categories: In another petition filed by children of serving personnel (Category 5), the High Court concluded that they were at a greater disadvantage than the children of ex-servicemen (Category 4). It ordered the college to switch the categories, making Category 5 the new Category 4 and vice-versa, thereby giving serving personnel's children priority over those of ex-servicemen.

These decisions by the High Court threw the admission process into disarray and prompted the Chandigarh Administration and the college to appeal to the Supreme Court.

Understanding the distinct reasoning and implications of these two High Court rulings is central to this case. For legal professionals on the go, the 2-minute audio briefs on CaseOn.in offer a quick and efficient way to analyze these specific judicial actions and the Supreme Court's subsequent response.

The Supreme Court's Analysis: An IRAC Approach

Issue

The central legal question before the Supreme Court was: Does a High Court, while exercising its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, have the authority to rewrite admission rules, equate qualifications not specified in the rules, or interchange the order of priority of admission categories, thereby stepping into the shoes of the rule-making body?

Rule

The governing principle is Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The Supreme Court reiterated that the jurisdiction conferred by this article is supervisory in nature, not appellate. The primary objective is to keep governmental bodies, authorities, and tribunals within the bounds of their respective jurisdictions. A High Court cannot substitute its own judgment for that of the competent authority or assume the role of that authority itself.

Analysis

The Supreme Court found the High Court's actions to be a clear overreach of its judicial powers.

On Equating Gallantry Awards

The Court reasoned that if the High Court believed the rule limiting Category 1 to only three specific gallantry awards was discriminatory or arbitrary, the only proper course of action was to strike down the offending rule. It could have then directed the authorities to re-frame the rule and conduct admissions accordingly. Instead, by simply directing the admission of one student by treating his father's award as equivalent, the High Court had engaged in rule-making, a function that did not belong to it. This approach also ignored other potential candidates whose parents might have held similar or higher awards but did not apply under that category because they correctly followed the published rules.

On Switching Admission Categories

The Court found the second directive to be even more problematic. By swapping Category 4 and Category 5, the High Court had fundamentally altered the established priority. This decision was made without even hearing the candidates belonging to Category 4, whose chances of admission were severely and negatively impacted. The Court emphasized that while a rule-making authority may not be required to hear everyone, a court exercising judicial power cannot dispense with this fundamental requirement of natural justice. This action was a textbook example of the court assuming an appellate or legislative role, which is not permitted under Article 226.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court held that the orders and directions of the High Court were "totally unsupportable in law." It firmly established that a High Court cannot indulge in 'switching' categories or creating equivalencies that are not present in the rules. Doing so amounts to practicably assuming the role of a rule-making authority.

However, in a final twist dictated by equity, the Court considered the subsequent developments. By the time the appeal was heard, the students admitted under the High Court's orders had already begun their studies and had given up seats in other colleges. To reverse their admission at such a late stage would cause them "grave and irreparable prejudice." Citing the delay by the administration in approaching the Supreme Court, the Court chose not to interfere with the admissions. Instead, it directed the college to create three additional seats and admit the first three students from the waiting list who were wrongfully displaced by the High Court's orders.

Final Summary and Takeaways

The judgment in Chandigarh Administration vs. Manpreet Singh serves as a powerful reminder of the doctrine of separation of powers. The Supreme Court clarified the boundaries of judicial review under Article 226, holding that High Courts must act as supervisors, not as super-administrators. Their role is to ensure legality and procedural fairness, not to rewrite policies or rules they disagree with. While the ultimate outcome was a pragmatic one based on equity, the legal principle laid down is unequivocal: the function of the court is to interpret the law, not to create it.

Why is this judgment an important read for lawyers and students?

  • Clarity on Judicial Review: It provides a clear and practical illustration of the limits of the High Court's powers under Article 226.
  • Rule of Law: It reinforces the principle that admissions to educational institutions must be governed by pre-declared, objective rules, not by ad-hoc judicial directives.
  • Principles of Natural Justice: It highlights that courts cannot pass orders that adversely affect a group of people without giving them an opportunity to be heard.
  • Balance of Law and Equity: It demonstrates how the Supreme Court balances strict legal principles with equitable considerations to prevent extreme hardship to individuals caught in the crossfire of litigation.

Disclaimer: This content is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For any legal issues, please consult with a qualified professional.

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