CWP-21967-2012 1

IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA

AT CHANDIGARH

CWP-21967-2012

Reserved on: 10.03.2026

Pronounced on: 29.05.2026

Uploaded on: 29.05.2026

CHANDIGARH GOLF CLUB

-PETITIONER

V/S

CENTRAL INFORMATION COMMISSION AND ANOTHER

-RESPONDENTS

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE KULDEEP TIWARI

Present: Mr. Anand Chhibbar, Sr. Advocate, with

Mr. Vaibhav Sahni, Advocate

for the petitioner.

Mr. Arjun Shukla, Advocate, with

Ms. Vanshika Grover, Advocate, and

Mr. Abhimanyu Kaushal, Advocate,

for the respondent No.2, and

for the proposed respondents No.3 to 10.

***

KULDEEP TIWARI, J.

RELIEF YEARNED THROUGH THE WRIT PETITION

1. The gravamen of the writ petition stems from the order dated

08.10.2012 rendered by the Central Information Commission, New Delhi,

whereby the petitioner (hereinafter referred to as “the Golf Club”) was

adjudged to be a “public authority” within the meaning of Section 2(h)(ii)

of the Right to Information Act, 2005 (hereinafter referred to as “the RTI

Act”). Consequent thereto, the Golf Club was directed to implement an

appropriate mechanism for compliance with the provisions of the RTI Act

within four weeks from receipt of the said order. Thus, deriving grievance

CWP-21967-2012 2

from the order dated 08.10.2012, the Golf Club seeks quashing thereof.

OBSERVATIONS WHICH CONSTITUTE BEDROCK OF THE

IMPUGNED ORDER

2. The impugned order is founded principally upon th e

following observations:-

(a) Although the assessed rent at 2003 rates is

₹33,45,268/-, the Golf Club is paying only ₹8,530/- per

month (comprising ₹8,200/- as rent and ₹330/- as lease),

which amounts to 0.255% of the assessed rent. Accordingly,

the Commission concluded that the Golf Club is, in effect,

substantially financed indirectly by the Chandigarh

Administration.

(b) Three serving IAS officers are nominated members of

the Managing Committee of the Golf Club and possess full

voting rights. Therefore, the Commission inferred that by

virtue of the mandatory presence of government officers in

the Managing Committee, the government exercises control

over the functioning of the Golf Club.

SUBMISSIONS OF LEARNED SENIOR COUNSEL FOR THE

GOLF CLUB

3. Assailing the impugned order, learned senior coun sel

strenuously contends that the Golf Club is neither directly nor indirectly

dependent upon any financial assistance extended by the Chandigarh

Administration or any other governmental organisation, nor is it in any

manner subject to or under the control of the Chandigarh Administration.

To the contrary, it is a duly registered private society functioning under

the exclusive control and supervision of its own Managing Committee. It

is further contended that the Golf Club operates as a self-regulated entity,

CWP-21967-2012 3

whose internal governance is wholly circumscribed by its own society

rules. Rules 10 to 46 of the Chandigarh Golf Club Rules and Regulations

establish a comprehensive and structured membership framework that

governs the eligibility, classification, admission, rights, obligations, and

cessation of membership. The membership is divided into multiple

categories, namely Life, Permanent (Resident and Outstation), Corporate,

Mid-week, NRI, Tenure, Student, Mess, Honorary, Dependents, and

Green Card Holders, each carrying defined ceilings, privileges, and

financial requirements.

4. It is further submitted that the land in occupation of the Golf

Club forms part of the “green belt area”, which has been specifically

designated and earmarked by the Chandigarh Administration to be

maintained under green cover and not utilized for commercial purposes. It

is contended that the Chandigarh Administration does not incur any

overhead expenditure with respect to the said land, inasmuch as the entire

responsibility for maintenance and upkeep of the grounds and golf courses

is borne by the Golf Club itself. Accordingly, it is submitted that the

Chandigarh Administration is, in fact, benefitted by leasing the land to the

Golf Club, inasmuch as such arrangement ensures maintenance of the

green belt area.

5. Proceeding further, learned senior counsel, while placing

reliance upon the lease deed (Annexure P-1), submits that the

methodology for computation of the monthly rent has been explicitly

stipulated therein, thereby demonstrating that no concession whatsoever

has ever been received or availed of by the Golf Club in respect of the

CWP-21967-2012 4

lease amount. Furthermore, with respect to the presence of three

nominated serving IAS Officers in the Managing Committee of the Golf

Club, it is submitted that such officers have been nominated solely in

view of their administrative experience and expertise, with the object of

facilitating efficient management and administration of the Golf Club. It

is further submitted that all decisions of the Managing Committee are

taken by majority vote amongst fifteen members and, therefore, the mere

presence of three nominated officers cannot, by any stretch, be construed

as constituting governmental control, whether direct or indirect, over the

affairs of the Golf Club.

6. Marching forth with his submissions, learned senior counsel

submits that the matter at hand is squarely covered by the law laid down

in “Thalappalam Ser. Coop. Bank Ltd. and others Vs. State of Kerala

and others”, 2013 (16) SCC 82, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court

categorically held that subsidies, grants, exemptions, or privileges, such as

provision of land, do not, by themselves, amount to “substantial

financing” for the purposes of Section 2(h) of the RTI Act. It was further

held that, in the event the funding is shown to be so substantial that

“without such funding the institution would struggle to exist”, such a

body may fall within the ambit of a “public authority”. Learned senior

counsel submits that, in the present case, the Golf Club is neither

controlled nor substantially financed by the Chandigarh Administration,

whether directly or indirectly, and, therefore, does not fall within the

ambit of a “public authority”. Referring to the twin tests laid down in the

decision (supra), namely: (a) substantial financing; and (b) substantial

CWP-21967-2012 5

control, it is asserted that the instant case fails to satisfy either of the said

tests.

7. Further, learned senior counsel, while relying upon the

judgment dated 04.11.2016 passed by the learned Single Bench of this

Court in CWP-22748-2016 (Paramjit Singh Vs. State Information

Commissioner, Punjab and others), submits that although 12 acres of

government land had been leased out by the Punjab Government to the

hospital involved therein, the same was not found to be substantially

financed so as to declare it a “public authority”. The said judgment was

thereafter subjected to judicial scrutiny in an intra-court appeal, i.e. LPA-

1136-2017. Delving deep into the legal proposition, the Hon’ble Division

Bench held that the appellant had failed to demonstrate how the institution

was substantially funded, regularly financed, or subjected to such State

control as would amount to substantial control over its management or

affairs. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed vide order dated

29.01.2018.

8. Finally, before resting his submissions, learned senior

counsel places reliance upon the order dated 09.01.2025 passed by a

Coordinate Bench of this Court in a batch of two writ petitions, the lead

case being CWP-13580-2015 (The Punjab State Federation of

Cooperative House Building Societies Limited Vs. The State

Information Commission, Punjab), wherein the writ petitions were

disposed of on the ground that the State had invested only 21% in

HOUSFED and not more than 1% in the Cooperative Bank therein, which

was held insufficient to declare the petitioner-Societies therein as “public

CWP-21967-2012 6

authorities”.

SUBMISSIONS OF LEARNED COUNSEL FOR THE

RESPONDENT NO.2

9. Learned counsel for the respondent No.2 vigorousl y

contested the submissions advanced on behalf of the Golf Club and

submits that inasmuch as the Golf Club is paying merely ₹8,530/- per

month (comprising ₹8,200/- as rent and ₹330/- as lease) against the

assessed rent of ₹33,45,268/- computed at 2003 rates, which constitutes

no more than 0.255% of the assessed rent, it is abundantly manifest that

the Golf Club is being substantially financed indirectly by the Chandigarh

Administration for the promotion of public services, and therefore falls

squarely within the definition of “public authority” as contemplated under

Section 2(h)(ii) of the RTI Act. Further, while drawing attention of the

Court to the letter dated 15.11.2012 (Annexure R-1/1) addressed by the

Joint Secretary (Estates) to the Estate Officer, U.T. Chandigarh, it is

submitted that the said letter unambiguously records that the rent paid by

the Golf Club is subsidised, and that since the Golf Club/lessee is deriving

all the benefits of concessional allotment of land and utilizing public

property (land and building), it is obligated to comply with all

requirements of the RTI Act as a “public authority”.

10. Learned counsel further contends that, in terms of Clause 26

of the fresh/renewed lease deed dated 26.03.2018 executed between the

Golf Club and the Chandigarh Administration, three members of the

Governing Body of the Golf Club, possessing full voting rights and

nominated by the Administrator, exercise dominance inasmuch as, in the

CWP-21967-2012 7

event they differ from the views of the Governing Body on any issue

involving willful damage or causing financial loss to the property

occupied by the Golf Club, such matter has to be referred to the

Administrator for final decision. Not only this, Clause 26 further

mandates that the licensee shall ensure that necessary amendments are

made into the Rules and Regulations of the Golf Club in respect of the

aforesaid provision. Furthermore, the lease deed obligates the licensee to

provide free coaching to a minimum of 20 EWS persons, including

children, twice in a year. It is accordingly contended that the Chandigarh

Administration exercises control over the functioning and management of

the Golf Club, thereby clearly qualifying it for declaration as a “public

authority” within the meaning of the RTI Act.

RELEVANT PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THIS COURT

11. During the pendency of the writ petition, this Court, vide

order dated 28.01.2026, directed the Golf Club to file an affidavit

disclosing its organizational structure, besides disclosing whether the

Administrator, U.T. Chandigarh and/or the Governor, Punjab, is vested

with the authority to grant membership.

12. In compliance with the directions (supra), an affidavit dated

03.02.2026 sworn by Mr. Jagbir Singh Mangat, General Manager, The

Chandigarh Golf Club, Sector 6, Chandigarh, was filed before this Court.

The affidavit disclosed that, in terms of Rule 47(a) of the Rules and

Regulations of the Golf Club as well as Clause 27 of the lease deed dated

26.03.2018, the Administrator, U.T. Chandigarh, is vested with the power

to nominate three members (one Permanent and two Mid-week).

CWP-21967-2012 8

ANALYSIS OF THE APPOSITE LEGAL PROVISIONS AND

JUDICIAL PRONOUNCEMENTS GERMANE TO ADJUDICATE

THE CONTROVERSY ENGENDERING THE WRIT PETITION

13. Before embarking upon the process of evaluating the rival

submissions, gauging the legality of the impugned order and penning

down the resultant verdict, it is deemed imperative to first advert to and

comprehend the definitions of certain key expressions/words, as provided

under the RTI Act, such as “appropriate Government”, “information”,

“public authority” and “right to information”. For brevity, and ready

reference, the same are extracted hereinbelow:-

“2. Definitions.—In this Act, unless the context otherwise

requires,— (a) “appropriate Government” means in relation to a

public authority which is established, constituted, owned,

controlled or substantially financed by funds provided directly or

indirectly—

(i) by the Central Government or the Union territory

administration, the Central Government;

(ii) by the State Government, the State Government;(f)

“information” means any material in any form, including

records, documents, memos, e-mails, opinions, advices, press

releases, circulars, orders, logbooks. contracts, reports, papers,

samples, models, data material held in any electronic form and

information relating to any private body which can be accessed

by a public authority under any other law for the time being in

force;

(h) “public authority” means any authority or body or

institution of self- government established or constituted—

(a) by or under the Constitution;

(b) by any other law made by Parliament;

(c) by any other law made by State Legislature;

(d) by notification issued or order made by the appropriate

CWP-21967-2012 9

Government, and includes any—

(i) body owned, controlled or substantially financed; (ii)

non-Government organisation substantially financed, directly or

indirectly by funds provided by the appropriate Government;

(j) "right to information" means the right to information

accessible under this Act which is held by or under the control of

any public authority and includes the right to—

(i) inspection of work, documents, records;

(ii) taking notes, extracts or certified copies of documents

or records;

(iii) taking certified samples of material;

(iv) obtaining information in the form of diskettes, floppies, tapes,

video cassettes or in any other electronic mode or through

printouts where such information is stored in a computer or in

any other device;”

14. So far as the “appropriate Government” is concerned, it

means in relation to a public authority, which is established, constituted,

owned, controlled or substantially financed by funds provided directly or

indirectly by the Central Government or by the State Government, as the

case may be. In Thalappalam Ser. Coop. Bank Ltd. (supra), the principal

issue was, as to whether, a Cooperative Society, registered under the

Kerala Cooperative Society Act, 1969, could be said to be a Public

Authority or not?

15. Adverting to the issue, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that

a body, institution or organization, which is neither a State within the

meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution or its instrumentalities, may still

answer the definition of Public Authority, as defined under Section 2 (h)d

(i) or (ii). It was further opined that the RTI Act deals with bodies which

are owned, controlled or substantially financed, directly or indirectly, by

CWP-21967-2012 10

funds provided by the appropriate government and also non-government

organizations substantially financed, directly or indirectly, by funds

provided by the appropriate government. Moving to the definition of

expression “control”, it was noted down, to mean that the control by the

appropriate government must be a control of a substantial nature. The

mere “supervision” or “regulation” as such by a statute or otherwise of a

body would not make that body a “public authority” within the meaning

of Section 2(h)(d)(i) of the Act.

16. At this juncture, finding the expression “substantially

financed” of utmost importance, the Hon’ble Supreme Court examined

the same in extenso, and held that merely providing subsidiaries, grants,

exemptions, privileges etc., as such cannot be said to be providing

funding to a substantial extent, unless the record shows that the funding

was so substantial to the body which practically runs by such funding and

but for such funding, it would struggle to exist. The relevant observations

made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Thalappalam Ser. Coop. Bank

Ltd. (supra), in context of the matter under consideration, are extracted

hereinbelow:-

34. We are of the opinion that when we test the meaning of

expression “controlled” which figures in between the words

“body owned” and “substantially financed”, the control by the

appropriate government must be a control of a substantial nature.

The mere ‘supervision’ or ‘regulation’ as such by a statute or

otherwise of a body would not make that body a “public

authority” within the meaning of Section 2(h)(d)(i) of the RTI Act.

In other words just like a body owned or body substantially

financed by the appropriate government, the control of the body

CWP-21967-2012 11

by the appropriate government would also be substantial and not

merely supervisory or regulatory. Powers exercised by the

Registrar of Cooperative Societies and others under the

Cooperative Societies Act are only regulatory or supervisory in

nature, which will not amount to dominating or interfering with

the management or affairs of the society so as to be controlled.

Management and control are statutorily conferred on the

Management Committee or the Board of Directors of the Society

by the respective Cooperative Societies Act and not on the

authorities under the Co-operative Societies Act.

SUBSTANTIALLY FINANCED

36. The words “substantially financed” have been used in

Sections 2(h)(d)(i) & (ii), while defining the expression public

authority as well as in Section 2(a) of the Act, while defining the

expression “appropriate Government”. A body can be

substantially financed, directly or indirectly by funds provided by

the appropriate Government. The expression “substantially

financed”, as such, has not been defined under the Act.

“Substantial” means “in a substantial manner so as to be

substantial”. In Palser v. Grimling (1948) 1 All ER 1, 11 (HL),

while interpreting the provisions of Section 10(1) of the Rent and

Mortgage Interest Restrictions Act, 1923, the House of Lords held

that “substantial” is not the same as “not unsubstantial” i.e. just

enough to avoid the de minimis principle. The word “substantial”

literally means solid, massive etc. Legislature has used the

expression “substantially financed” in Sections 2(h)(d)(i) and (ii)

indicating that the degree of financing must be actual, existing,

positive and real to a substantial extent, not moderate, ordinary,

tolerable etc.

37. We often use the expressions “questions of law” and

“substantial questions of law” and explain that any question of

law affecting the right of parties would not by itself be a

substantial question of law. In Black's Law Dictionary (6th Edn.),

the word 'substantial' is defined as 'of real worth and importance;

of considerable value; valuable. Belonging to substance; actually

CWP-21967-2012 12

existing; real: not seeming or imaginary; not illusive; solid; true;

veritable. Something worthwhile as distinguished from something

without value or merely nominal. Synonymous with material.' The

word 'substantially' has been defined to mean 'essentially; without

material qualification; in the main; in substance; materially.' In

the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (5th Edn.), the word

'substantial' means 'of ample or considerable amount of size;

sizeable, fairly large; having solid worth or value, of real

significance; sold; weighty; important, worthwhile; of an act,

measure etc. having force or effect, effective, thorough.' The word

'substantially' has been defined to mean 'in substance; as a

substantial thing or being; essentially, intrinsically.' Therefore the

word 'substantial' is not synonymous with 'dominant' or

'majority'. It is closer to 'material' or 'important' or 'of

considerable value.' 'Substantially' is closer to 'essentially'. Both

words can signify varying degrees depending on the context.

38. Merely providing subsidiaries, grants, exemptions,

privileges etc., as such, cannot be said to be providing funding to

a substantial extent, unless the record shows that the funding was

so substantial to the body which practically runs by such funding

and but for such funding, it would struggle to exist. The State may

also float many schemes generally for the betterment and welfare

of the cooperative sector like deposit guarantee scheme, scheme

of assistance from NABARD etc., but those facilities or assistance

cannot be termed as “substantially financed” by the State

Government to bring the body within the fold of “public

authority” under Section 2(h)(d)(i) of the Act. But, there are

instances, where private educational institutions getting ninety

five per cent grant-in-aid from the appropriate government, may

answer the definition of public authority under Section 2(h)(d)(i).

NON-GOVERNMENT ORGANISATIONS :

39. The term “Non-Government Organizations” (NGO), as

such, is not defined under the Act. But, over a period of time, the

expression has got its own meaning and, it has to be seen in that

context, when used in the Act. Government used to finance

CWP-21967-2012 13

substantially, several non-government organizations, which carry

on various social and welfare activities, since those organizations

sometimes carry on functions which are otherwise governmental.

Now, the question, whether an NGO has been substantially

financed or not by the appropriate Government, may be a

question of fact, to be examined by the authorities concerned

under the RTI Act. Such organization can be substantially

financed either directly or indirectly by funds provided by the

appropriate Government. Government may not have any statutory

control over the NGOs, as such, still it can be established that a

particular NGO has been substantially financed directly or

indirectly by the funds provided by the appropriate Government,

in such an event, that organization will fall within the scope of

Section 2(h)(d)(ii) of the RTI Act. Consequently, even private

organizations which are, though not owned or controlled but

substantially financed by the appropriate Government will also

fall within the definition of “public authority” under Section 2(h)

(d)(ii) of the Act.”

17. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has categorically held that the

categories depicted in Section 2(h) of the Act exhaust themselves. Thus,

there is no question of adopting any such construction liberally to the

expression “Public Authority” to bring any other categories into its fold

which do not satisfy the test laid down in this regard:-

“43. We are of the view that the High Court has given a

complete go-bye to the above-mentioned statutory principles and

gone at a tangent by mis-interpreting the meaning and content of

Section 2(h) of the RTI Act. Court has given a liberal construction

to expression “public authority” under Section 2(h) of the Act,

bearing in mind the “transformation of law” and its “ultimate

object” i.e. to achieve “transparency and accountability”, which

according to the court could alone advance the objective of the

Act. Further, the High Court has also opined that RTI Act will

certainly help as a protection against the mismanagement of the

CWP-21967-2012 14

society by the managing committee and the society’s liabilities

and that vigilant members of the public body by obtaining

information through the RTI Act, will be able to detect and

prevent mismanagement in time. In our view, the categories

mentioned in Section 2(h) of the Act exhaust themselves, hence,

there is no question of adopting a liberal construction to the

expression “public authority” to bring in other categories into its

fold, which do not satisfy the tests we have laid down. Court

cannot, when language is clear and unambiguous, adopt such a

construction which, according to the Court, would only advance

the objective of the Act. We are also aware of the opening part of

the definition clause which states “unless the context otherwise

requires”. No materials have been made available to show that

the cooperative societies, with which we are concerned, in the

context of the Act, would fall within the definition of Section 2(h)

of the Act.”

18. Likewise, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in D.A.V. College

Trust and Management Society and others vs. Director of Public

Instructions and others”, AIR 2019 SUPREME COURT 4411, was put

in a situation to consider and answer the issue, as to whether, the colleges

run by the D.A.V. College Trust and Management Society, are amenable

to the Public Authority. While evaluating the definition of Public

Authority, in toto, so as to conclusively respond to the issue, it has been

held that when the definition clause contains the words “means and

includes” then both these words must be given the emphasis required and

one word cannot override the other. Elaborating the connotation further, it

has been held that words “and includes any”, expand the definition as

compared to the first part. The second part of the definition is an

inclusive clause which indicates the intention of the Legislature to cover

bodies other than those mentioned in clauses (a) to (d) of Section 2(h).

CWP-21967-2012 15

The relevant observations recorded in the judgment read as under:-

“8. It is a well settled statutory rule of interpretation

that when in the definition clause a meaning is given to certain

words then that meaning alone will have to be given to those

words. However, when the definition clause contains the words

‘means and includes’ then both these words must be given the

emphasis required and one word cannot override the other.

10. It is thus clear that the word ‘means’ indicates that

the definition is exhaustive and complete. It is a hard and fast

definition and no other meaning can be given to it. On the other

hand, the word ‘includes’ enlarges the scope of the expression.

The word ‘includes’ is used to signify that beyond the meaning

given in the definition clause, other matters may be included

keeping in view the nature of the language and object of the

provision. In P. Kasilingam’s case (supra) the words ‘means and

includes’ has been used but in the present case the word ‘means’

has been used in the first part of sub-section (h) of Section 2

whereas the word ‘includes’ has been used in the second part of

the said Section. They have not been used together.

15. If we analyse Section 2(h) carefully it is obvious

that the first part of Section 2(h) relates to authorities, bodies or

institutions of self-government established or constituted (a) un-

der the Constitution; (b) by any law of Parliament; (c) by any

law of State Legislature or (d) by notification made by the ap-

propriate Government. There is no dispute with regard to

clauses (a) to (c). As far as clause (d) is concerned it was con-

tended on behalf of the appellants that unless a notification is is-

sued notifying that an authority, body or institution of self-gov-

ernment is brought within the ambit of the Act, the said Act

would not apply. We are not impressed with this argument. The

notification contemplated in clause (d) is a notification relating

to the establishment or constitution of the body and has nothing

to do with the Act. Any authority or body or institution of self-

government, if established or constituted by a notification of the

Central Government or a State Government, would be a public

CWP-21967-2012 16

authority within the meaning of clause (d) of Section 2(h) of the

Act.

16. We must note that after the end of clause (d) there

is a comma and a big gap and then the definition goes on to say

‘and includes any –‘ and thereafter the definition reads as:

“(i) body owned, controlled or substantially financed;

(ii) non-Government organisation substantially financed, di-

rectly or indirectly by funds provided by the appropriate Gov-

ernment;”

The words ‘and includes any’, in our considered view, expand

the definition as compared to the first part. The second part of

the definition is an inclusive clause which indicates the intention

of the Legislature to cover bodies other than those mentioned in

clauses (a) to (d) of Section 2(h).”

19. Not only that, it has also been articulated that NGOs,

which are substantially financed, directly or indirectly, by funds

provided by the appropriate government, would be public authorities

amenable to the provisions of the Act. A Society, which may not be

owned or controlled by the Government, may be an NGO, but if it is

substantially financed, directly or indirectly, by the Government, it

would fall within the ambit of sub-clause (ii). The observations, which

cannot be skipped to take note of, are extracted hereinbelow:-

“

22. Therefore, in our view, Section 2(h) deals with six

different categories and the two additional categories are

mentioned in sub clauses (i) and (ii). Any other interpretation

would make clauses (i) and (ii) totally redundant because then an

NGO could never be covered. By specifically bringing NGOs it is

obvious that the intention of the Parliament was to include these

two categories mentioned in sub clauses (i) and (ii) in addition to

the four categories mentioned in clauses (a) to (d). Therefore, we

have no hesitation in holding that an NGO substantially financed,

CWP-21967-2012 17

directly or indirectly, by funds provided by the appropriate

government would be a public authority amenable to the

provisions of the Act.

23. NGO is not defined under the Act or any other statute

as far as we are concerned. In fact, the term NGO appears to

have been used for the first time describing an international body

which is legally constituted but nongovernmental in nature. It is

created by natural or legal entities with no participation or

representation by the Government. Even NGOs which are funded

totally or partially by the Governments essentially maintain the

NGO status by excluding Government representations in all their

organisations. In some jurisprudence, they are also referred to as

civil society organisations.

24. A society which may not be owned or controlled by the

Government, may be an NGO but if it is substantially financed

directly or indirectly by the government it would fall within the

ambit of subclause (ii).

20. In a somewhat similar situation, the Hon’ble Supreme Court,

while examining the word “substantial” held that it means a large portion,

and it does not necessarily mean to have a major portion or more than

50%. In fact, no hard and fast rule can be imposed, so as to establish,

whether an NGO is substantially financed, directly or either indirectly. It

has been observed that, if a land in a city is given free of cost or on heavy

discount to any NGO, it would itself sufficient to declare substantial

financing. However, it is clarified that substantial financing by a

Government is a question of fact, which is to be determined in the facts of

each case:-

“26. In our view, ‘substantial’ means a large portion. It

does not necessarily have to mean a major portion or more than

50%. No hard and fast rule can be laid down in this regard. Sub-

CWP-21967-2012 18

stantial financing can be both direct or indirect. To give an exam-

ple, if a land in a city is given free of cost or on heavy discount to

hospitals, educational institutions or such other body, this in itself

could also be substantial financing. The very establishment of

such an institution, if it is dependent on the largesse of the State

in getting the land at a cheap price, would mean that it is substan-

tially financed. Merely because financial contribution of the State

comes down during the actual funding, will not by itself mean that

the indirect finance given is not to be taken into consideration.

The value of the land will have to be evaluated not only on the

date of allotment but even on the date when the question arises as

to whether the said body or NGO is substantially financed.

27. Whether an NGO or body is substantially financed by

the government is a question of fact which has to be determined

on the facts of each case. There may be cases where the finance is

more than 50% but still may not be called substantially financed.

Supposing a small NGO which has a total capital of Rs.10,000/

gets a grant of Rs.5,000/from the Government, though this grant

may be 50%, it cannot be termed to be substantial contribution.

On the other hand, if a body or an NGO gets hundreds of crores

of rupees as grant but that amount is less than 50%, the same can

still be termed to be substantially financed.

28. Another aspect for determining substantial finance is

whether the body, authority or NGO can carry on its activities ef-

fectively without getting finance from the Government. If its func-

tioning is dependent on the finances of the Government then there

can be no manner of doubt that it has to be termed as substan-

tially financed.

29. While interpreting the provisions of the Act and while

deciding what is substantial finance one has to keep in mind the

provisions of the Act. This Act was enacted with the purpose of

bringing transparency in public dealings and probity in public

life. If NGOs or other bodies get substantial finance from the

Government, we find no reason why any citizen cannot ask for in-

formation to find out whether his/her money which has been given

CWP-21967-2012 19

to an NGO or any other body is being used for the requisite pur-

pose or not.”

REASONS FOR DISMISSING THE WRIT PETITION AND

AFFIRMING THE IMPUGNED ORDER DECLARING THE GOLF

CLUB TO BE A “PUBLIC AUTHORITY” UNDER SECTION 2(h)

(ii) OF THE RTI ACT

21. Having examined the present case in the light of the

exhaustive deliberations and propositions of law, including the definitions

of certain pivotal expressions/words, set out hereinabove, this Court is of

the view that the instant writ petition is bereft of merit and liable to be

dismissed. The reasons underpinning this conclusion are assigned

hereinafter.

22. The Golf Club is situated in the heart of Chandigarh,

occupying 132 acres of prime land in the City Beautiful, the market value

whereof, as recorded in the impugned order, is ₹1,000 crores, though its

present market value may well be considerably higher. The Golf Club

came to occupy the said land, along with the swimming pool, the Golf

Club Building and its extension in Sector 6, Chandigarh, pursuant to a

lease deed dated 16.03.1988 executed between the Golf Club and the U.T.

Chandigarh Administration acting on behalf of the President of India.

Besides the monthly rent to be determined by the Estate Officer in

accordance with the formula reproduced hereunder, the Golf Club was

also liable to pay an annual lease amount of ₹3,960/- for the Golf Course

at the rate of ₹30/- per acre per annum.

(i) @ 3.25% on the cost of the original buildings;

(ii) @ 6% on additions made in 1967; and

CWP-21967-2012 20

(iii) @ 6% on future additions.

23. A perusal of the record reveals that, against the assessed rent

of ₹33,45,268/- computed at 2003 rates, the Golf Club has been paying

merely ₹8,530/- per month (comprising ₹8,200/- towards rent and ₹330/-

towards lease charges), which constitutes no more than 0.255% of the

assessed rent.

24. A studied survey of the record thus clearly establishes the

following:

(i) The Golf Club building and swimming pool etc. were

originally constructed by the U.T. Chandigarh

Administration from public funds, and thereafter, the said

building along with the swimming pool and other attached

structures, as well as 132 acres of the most prime land in the

city, were handed over to the Golf Club on lease.

(ii) The public property was made available to the Golf

Club on concessional and symbolic lease.

(iii) In the absence of such substantial financial assistance

in the form of land, buildings, and heavily subsidized lease

amount extended by the U.T. Chandigarh Administration, the

existence of the Golf Club would not have been feasible.

25. Consequently, this Court has no hesitation in concluding that

the Golf Club is substantially financed by the U.T. Chandigarh

Administration from public funds and, therefore, qualifies to be declared a

“public authority” under the RTI Act.

26. The conclusion (supra), apart from becoming generated from

CWP-21967-2012 21

the factual matrix delineated above, garners strength also from the terms

and conditions embodied in both the original lease deed dated 16.03.1988

and the renewed lease deed dated 26.03.2018, which together demonstrate

that the U.T. Chandigarh Administration exercises substantive control

over the administration and functioning of the Golf Club.

27. Clause 4 of the lease deed dated 16.03.1988 expressly

prohibits the Golf Club from making any additions, alterations, or

encroachments upon the premises without the written consent of the

Administrator, U.T. Chandigarh. Clause 11 stipulates that while the

maintenance of the Golf Course and swimming pool shall remain the

responsibility of the Golf Club, the club building shall be maintained

by the Administration. Clause 15 confers upon the U.T. Chandigarh

Administration the power to terminate the lease by issuing three months'

notice in writing, without assigning any reason. Clause 20 mandates that

the Golf Club make available its golf course and other facilities to the

Chandigarh Administration at any time and for such duration, as may be

demanded in writing by the Finance/Sports Secretary of the

Administration. Clause 21 requires the Golf Club to maintain the golf

course, other facilities, and buildings including the swimming pool to the

satisfaction of the Chandigarh Administration, and also vests the

Administration’s representatives with unhindered access for inspection

purposes, thereby conferring upon the Administration control over

cleanliness and upkeep of the premises. Clause 22 further obligates the

Golf Club to operate the golf course and other facilities to the satisfaction

of the Chandigarh Administration and to promote the sport of golf by

CWP-21967-2012 22

organizing coaching for talented players. Clause 23 mandates that three

members of the Governing Body of the Golf Club, with full voting rights,

shall be nominated by the Administrator. The relevant clauses of the lease

deed dated 16.03.1988 are extracted hereunder:-

“(4) The lessee shall not make any additions or alterations in the

premises or make any other encroachments thereon without the

written consent of the Administrator, Union Territory,

Chandigarh.

(8) The lessee shall not use broadcaster or any such other

appliance in the premises without the prior permission of the

Estate Officer.

(11) The maintenance of the Golf Course, the Swimming Pool

would be the liability of the lessee. However, the club building

shall be maintained by the Administration.

(15) The lessor shall be at liberty to terminate this Lease giving

three months notice in writing without assigning any reason.

(16) On the termination of the lease in accordance with clause

(15) the lessor may in addition to resumption of the premises

forfeit the whole or part of the security deposited by the lessee.

(20) The lessee shall make available the use of the Golf Course

and other facilities to the Chandigarh Administration whenever

and for whatever period for which a written demand is through

the Finance/Sports Secretary of the Chandigarh Administrator.

(21) The lessee shall ensure the maintenance and upkeep of the

Golf Course and other facilities and buildings including the

swimming pool, to the satisfaction of the Chandigarh

Administration. And for this purpose the representatives of the

Chandigarh Administration shall have a free access for

inspection.

(22) The lessee shall run the Golf Course and other facilities to

the satisfaction of the Chandigarh Administration. And in

addition, shall promote the game of Golf by organizing coaching

CWP-21967-2012 23

for promising players. These may include even those who are not

members of wards of the members of the Golf Club.

(23) 3 members of the governing body of the Golf Club with full

voting rights would be nominated by the Administrator. The lessee

would ensure that necessary amendment is made in the Rules and

Regulations of the Golf Club to this effect.”

28. Upon renewal of the lease deed on 26.03.2018, the U.T.

Chandigarh Administration amended the original terms and conditions to

strengthen its control over the affairs of the Golf Club. Notably, Clause 26

of the renewed lease deed, while continuing the provision regarding

nomination of three members with full voting rights by the Administrator,

additionally empowers such nominated members to, in the event their

views differ with those of the Governing Body on an issue involving

willful damage or financial loss to the property occupied by the Golf

Club, refer such matter to the Administrator for a final decision. Clause 26

reads as under:-

“26. Three members of the Governing Body of the Chandigarh

Golf Club with full voting rights would be nominated by the

Administrator. The Licensee would ensure that necessary

amendment is made in the Rules and Regulations of the

Chandigarh Golf Club to this effect. If official nominees of the

Administrator have views which differ from the views of the

Governing body, on an issue creating willful damage causing

financial loss to the property being occupied by the Chandigarh

Golf Club then the same would be referred to the Administrator

for directions.”

29. Furthermore, the affidavit dated 03.02.2026 of Mr. Jagbir

Singh Mangat, General Manager, The Chandigarh Golf Club, confirms

that the Administrator, U.T. Chandigarh, is empowered under Rule 47(a)

of the Golf Club Rules and Regulations read with Clause 27 of the lease

CWP-21967-2012 24

deed dated 26.03.2018 to nominate three members (one Permanent and

two Mid-week).

30. Significantly, the letter dated 15.11.2012 (Annexure R-1/1)

of the Joint Secretary (Estates) addressed to the Estate Officer, U.T.

Chandigarh, also unambiguously records that the Golf Club, being

deriving all the benefits of concessional allotment of land and utilizing

public property (land and building), is under an obligation to comply with

the requirements of the RTI Act as a “public authority”. All this reflects

that the control of U.T. Chandigarh Administration is not merely

supervisory in nature or regulating through a statute, rather it has effective

control in the prominent affairs of the Golf Club, specifically upon the

land and its building.

31. The Golf Club has been created on 132 acres of the most

expensive public land. Its building was also constructed by the U.T.

Chandigarh Administration using funds collected from taxpayers’ money.

The lease amount is also highly subsidised, obligating the Golf Club to

pay only 0.255% of the assessed market lease amount. Without this

substantial financial assistance from public funds, the Golf Club cannot

imagine its existence and survival. Still, the Golf Club does not want to

adopt a mechanism of transparency, which raises serious questions about

its intent to serve the public cause.

32. Enough is enough. The time has now come to tell the Golf

Club that if its members want to enjoy playing golf at the cost of

taxpayers’ money, it must make itself accountable by adopting an RTI

mechanism.

CWP-21967-2012 25

33. In light of the foregoing, this Court concludes that the U.T.

Chandigarh Administration exercises substantial control over, and extends

substantial financing indirectly to, the Golf Club, thereby bringing it

within the definition of a “public authority” under Section 2(h)(ii) of the

RTI Act. There is no illegality or infirmity in the impugned order

declaring the Golf Club to be a “public authority” and directing it to put in

place an appropriate mechanism for compliance with the provisions of the

RTI Act.

FINAL ORDER

34. In summa, the instant writ petition, being devoid of merit,

is dismissed and the impugned order is affirmed. Given that the writ

petition has remained pending adjudication since 2012 and the Golf Club

has been enjoying interim stay since 05.11.2012, the Golf Club is hereby

directed to implement an appropriate mechanism for compliance with the

provisions of the RTI Act, as directed by the impugned order, within a

period of one month from the date of this order.

35. Pending application(s) stand disposed of accordingly.

(KULDEEP TIWARI)

May 29, 2026 JUDGE

devinder

Whether speaking/reasoned : Yes/No

Whether Reportable : Yes/No