C/CRA/40/2020 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 21/01/2026

Reserved On : 22/12/2025

Pronounced On : 21/01/2026

IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD

R/CIVIL REVISION APPLICATION NO. 40 of 2020

FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:

HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE J. C. DOSHI Sd/-

=====================================================

Approved for Reporting Yes No

Yes

=====================================================

PRADIPKUMAR GORDHANDAS PATEL

Versus

CHANDRAKANT JIVANLAL PATEL

=====================================================

Appearance:

MR.MRUDUL M BAROT(3750) for the Applicant(s) No. 1

MR HARDIK D MUCHHALA(5634) for the Opponent(s) No. 1

=====================================================

CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE J. C. DOSHI

CAV JUDGMENT

1. By way of this revision under Section 115 of the Code

of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Code’),

revisionist prayed for following relief:-

“16. A) Allow this Application;

B) Be pleased to quash and set aside the order dated

04.12.2019 passed in P.S.R.P. No.22 of 2011 passed by the

Small Cause Court No.10, Ahmedabad;

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C) Pending admission, hearing and till the final disposal

of the present application, this Hon'ble Court may be

pleased to stay the said order dated 04.12.2019 passed in

P.S.R.P. No.22 of 2011 passed by the Small Casue Court

No.10, Ahmedabad;

D) Pass such orders as thought fit in favour of the

applicant in the interest of justice.”

2. The case backgrounds as under:-

2.1 Mr. Chandrakant Jivanlal Patel filed the application

under Section 41 of the Presidency Small Cause Court Act, 1882

(hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) to issue possession warrant

against the opponent – Pradipkumar Gordhandas Patel for

getting possession of the disputed premises bearing House No.86

situated at Uttar Gujarat Patel Society, Part-I, near Haripur,

Asarva, Ahmedabad (‘Disputed premises’) on the pleading that

the disputed premises was handed over to the opponents for the

use and enjoyment for the limited time period without charging

any rent, as the opponent was the relative of the applicant. The

permission is revoked and the plaintiff has demanded the

peaceful and vacant possession of the premises from the

opponent, but no possession has been handed over. Instead, the

opponent has filed the Civil Suit No. 2069 of 2003 for the relief of

injunction to protect his possession and Civil Suit No.2929 of

2010 for the relief of specific performance in the City Civil Court

against the plaintiff and other.

2.2 Some incidental pleading made to the effect that the

opponent has acquired alternative accommodation situated at

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Mandirvas Navi Parabadi, Haripura Gaam, Asarwa being House

No. 300/1 in Ahmedabad City.

2.3 The relief of issuance of possession warrant,

therefore, was sought under Section 41 read with Section 43 of

‘the Act’. On service of notice, the opponent has appeared before

the Court and has filed his written statement at Exhibit-40,

wherein defendant admitted that they are close relatives. It is

further averred that the petitioner is the son of defendant’s aunt

(Foi) and since defendant’s mother was expired, he was not kept

by the father of the plaintiff and later on, since defendant was

earning independently, he has purchased the disputed property

on the sale consideration of Rs. 45,50,000/- by paying Rs.

1.50,000/- being part payment thereof on 29.04.1994 and

Bharatbhai Patel, the brother of the plaintiff obtained the

possession of the disputed property thereof.

2.4 On the aforesaid conspectus, it was prayed that the

application under Section 41 and 43 of ‘the Act’ is not

maintainable.

2.5 Learned Small Cause Court permitted both the

parties to lead the evidence and allowed the petition and passed

the order of issuing the possession warrant under Section 43 of

‘the Act’ and the Bailiff of the Court was directed to execute the

possession warrant and to take the possession of the disputed

premises and handover it to the applicant.

2.6 Being aggrieved, the defendant is before this Court by

filing this revision.

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3. Heard learned advocate Mr. Mrudul M. Barot for the

revisionist – defendant and learned advocate Mr. Hardik D.

Muchhala for the original plaintiff.

3.1 Learned advocate Mr. Mrudul M. Barot raised the

argument that plaintiff has not given any notice in writing to the

revisionist, terminating the permission or revoking the

revisionist's right to remain in the possession of the demised

premises. Thus, order of isuance of posession warrant is bad in

law.

3.2 He would further submit that the plaintiff is totally

silent on the aspect that, on which date the plaintiff has left the

premises of the defendant to live in other premises, no specific

date was mentioned to claim that on particular date, the notice

was issued to the defendant and permission to live in the

disputed property was discontinued or revoked.

3.3 Learned advocate Mr. Mrudul M. Barot takes this

Court to the order dated 31.01.2020 passed by the coordinate

Bench and submitted that the revision was admitted on the

ground that, although the request for revocation of the

permission may not be in writing, but must be proved with

specific effective date of revocation, date of revocation to declare

the defendant as a permissive user or tresspasser. He would

submit that since the oral notice request was not proved in

absence of plea as to specific date on which the revisionist

becomes permissive user or was rendered tresspasser, inasmuch

as it is only after the said date that the petitioner could be

termed as a ‘tresspasser’. Therefore, in absence of compliance

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with the written notice request, the petition under Section 41 of

‘the Act’ was not maintainable.

3.4 He would further submit that the learned Small

Cause Court erroneously referred to provision of some other Act

and drew the analogy from there that if a notice in writing is to

be served to the defendant, the lawmakers must have stated so

in the provision of the law.

3.5 He would further submit that the predominant aspect

in Section 41 is to revoke the permission and the person

claiming to be the owner is to request the person in occupation

and such request must reckon from any particular date to

render the permissive possession as a possession of the

trespasser. In absence thereof, he would submit that the

application filed by the petitioner under Section 41 of ‘the Act’

was not maintainable, but the learned Small Cause Court has

committed serious error in overlooking the specific provision.

3.6 Mainly upon the aforesaid submission, learned

advocate Mr. Mrudul M. Barot submitted to allow this revision

and to interfere with the impugned judgment and order, and

consequently, to quash the same.

4. As against the aforesaid submission, learned

advocate Mr. Hardik D. Muchhala appearing for the original

plaintiff would submit that Section 41 of ‘the Act’ does not

contemplate to written request/notice to revoke the permission.

4.1 He would further submit that the defendant since

has apprehended the threat to his possession, has filed Civil Suit

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in the City Civil Court to protect from being dspossessed is

suffice to say that the plaintiff being a landlord has made the

request and revoked the permission of the revisionist to remain

in the possession of the disputed property. Therefore, he

submitted that the learned Small Cause Court has not

committed any error in reaching to conclusion of issuance of the

warrant for possession of the petitioner. Thus, he submitted to

dismiss this revision.

5. I have heard learned advocates for both the sides,

also perused the paper-book and applied anxious consideration

to the rival submission as well as the facts of the case.

5.1 Some admitted facts of the case are that the

defendant - Pradipkumar Gordhandas Patel is living in the

disputed property. Defendant’s possession has not been given

any statutory enactment like tenant, lessee, mortgagee, etc. It is

a case of the landlord that he is the owner of the disputed

property, it is not much disputed by the defendant. Rather,

during the course of leading of evidence, it is admitted that the

plaintiff is the owner of the property.

5.2 In para 1.2 of application, plaintiff came out with the

case that he has withdrawn the permission and has demanded

the possession of the disputed premises from the defendant. No

specific date is stated that on which date the permission was

withdrawn or revoked. Apt to note that the defendant has no

other statutory right to remain in possession of the disputed

property, except under the permission of the plaintiff.

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5.3 The plaintiff filed the PSRP Application under Section

41 of ‘the Act’ on 01.07.2011. The defendant filed two Civil Suits

being Civil Suit No.2069 of 2003 and secondly, Civil Suit

No.2929 of 2010. The former suit was filed for the injunction, as

the defendant was apprehending that his possession could have

been snatched away by the plaintiff without following due

process of law and second suit was filed for the specific

performance of the agreement, by which the defendant claims

that it was purchased by him from the brother of the plaintiff.

5.4 In juxtaposition of the aforesaid undisputed facts of

the case, the question arise that, whether landlord is required to

issue any written notice to revoke the permission given to the

defendant by specifying the particular date reckoned as a date

for revocation of the permission to file the petition under Section

41 of ‘the Act’ and to claim the possession of the disputed

property thereof.

6. The Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882 has

been enacted in 1882 with the specific object to consolidate and

streamline the law for small civil cases in the presidency towns

establishing the territorial Court with simpler procedure to

provide speedy, efficient justice for trivial disputes, reducing the

burden of regular Courts and ensuring quicker resolution for

small monetary issues and property possession issues. ‘The Act’

has been amended from time to time.

6.1 Section 4 of 'the Act' regulates the operation of the

“Small Cause Court” within the territorial jurisdiction of the

towns of Calcutta, Madras and Bombay.

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6.2 Section 5 to extends 'the Act' to the city of

Ahmedabad and the Court to be called the Court of Small

Causes of Ahmedabad

6.3 Section 6 to put the Court of Small Causes of

Ahmedabad and to be a Court subject to the superintendence of

the High Court of Gujarat and to be a Court subordinate to the

High Court within the meaning of Section 6 of the Legal

Practitioners Act, 1879 and further gives the High Court the

same powers in respect of the Small Cause Court of Ahmedabad

as it has in respect of the Courts subject to its appellate

jurisdiction.

6.4 Section 17 and 18 in Chapter IV of 'the Act' are in

regards to the Jurisdiction in respect of Suits. It defines the local

limit and jurisdiction of the Court of Small Causes. Section 18

also defines the territorial jurisdiction with the exceptions stated

in Section 19.

6.5 Chapter VII of 'the Act' is dealing with the litigation in

regards to recovery of possession of immovable property. Section

41 permits a person to file the PSRP Application for recovery of

the immovable property.

6.6 Section 43 permits the Small Cause Court to issue

possession warrant in case if the occupant does not appear at

the time appointed and show cause to the contrary.

6.7 Section 44 is in regards to execution of the

possession warrant. Section 45 is related to the granting the

right to sue to the occupant for compensation, and applicant, if

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entitled to possession, not to be deemed trespasser for any error

in proceedings.

6.8 Section 46 thereof deals with the situation where

applicant obtaining the possession of any property under the

Chapter of 'the Act' from any occupant, the occupant deeming

himself aggrieved thereby, may file a suit against the applicant

and the applicant’s possession would not be protected.

6.9 Section 47 of 'the Act' deals with the legal situation,

whereby the occupant, if intends to file a civil suit protecting his

possession and claiming of non-application of Section 41 of 'the

Act', was required to give two sureties, in a bond for such

amount as the Small Cause Court thinks reasonable, and if

occupant obtains a decree in any such suit against the

applicant, such decree shall supersede the order of the

possession warrant made under Section 43.

6.10 The Sections 41, 43, 45, 46 and 47 of 'the Act' being

important provision to decide this revision, are reproduced as

under:-

“41.Summons against person occupying property

without leave.—When any person has had possession of

any immovable property situate within the local limits, of the

Small Cause Court’s jurisdiction and of which the annual

value at a rack-rent does not exceed [two] thousand rupees,

as the tenant, or by permission, of another person, or of

some person through whom such other person claims,

and such tenancy or permission has determined or

been withdrawn,

and such tenant or occupier or any person holding

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under or by assignment from him (hereinafter called the

occupant) refuses to deliver up such property in compliance

with a request made to him in this behalf by such other

person,

such other person (hereinafter called the applicant)

may apply to the Small Cause Court for a summons against

the occupant, calling upon him to show cause, on a day

therein appointed, why he should not be compelled to deliver

up the property.

xxx xxx xxx

43.Order for possession.—If the occupant does not

appear at the time appointed and show cause to the

contrary, the applicant shall, if the Small Cause Court is

satisfied that he is entitled to apply under section 41, be

entitled to an order addressed to a bailiff of the Court

directing him to give possession of the property to the

applicant on such day as the Court thinks fit to name in

such order.

Explanation.—If the occupant proves that the tenancy

was created or permission granted by virtue of a title which

determined previous to the date of the application, he shall

be deemed to have shown cause within the meaning of this

section.

xxx xxx xxx

45.Applicant, if entitled to possession, not to be

deemed trespasser for any error in proceedings.

Occupant may sue for compensation. —When the

applicant, at the time of applying for any such order as

aforesaid, was entitled to the possession of such property,

neither he nor any person acting in his behalf shall be

deemed, on account of any error, defect or irregularity in the

mode of proceeding to obtain possession thereunder, to be a

trespasser; but any person aggrieved may bring a suit for

the recovery of compensation for any damage which he has

sustained by reason of such error, defect or irregularity:

when no such damage is proved, the suit shall be

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dismissed; and when such damage is proved but the

amount of the compensation assessed by the Court does not

exceed ten rupees, the Court shall award to the plaintiff no

more costs than compensation, unless the Judge who tries

the case certifies that in his opinion full costs should be

awarded to the plaintiff.

46.Liability of applicant obtaining order when not

entitled. —Nothing herein contained shall be deemed to

protect any applicant obtaining possession of any property

under this Chapter from a suit by any person deeming

himself aggrieved thereby, when such applicant was not at

the time of applying for such order as aforesaid entitled to

the possession of such property.

Application for order in such case an act of

trespass. —And when the applicant was not, at the time of

applying for any such order as aforesaid, entitled to the

possession of such property, the application for such order,

though no possession is taken thereunder, shall be deemed

to be an act of trespass committed by the applicant against

the occupant.

47.Stay of proceedings on occupant giving security

to bring suit against applicant .—Whenever on an

application being made under section 41 the occupant binds

himself, with two sureties, in a bond for such amount as the

Small Cause Court thinks reasonable, having regard to the

value of the property and the probable costs of the suit next

hereinafter mentioned, to institute without delay a suit in the

High Court against the applicant for compensation for

trespass and to pay all the costs of such suit in case he does

not prosecute the same or in case judgment therein is given

for the applicant, the Small Cause Court shall stay the

proceedings on such application until such suit is disposed

of.

If the occupant obtains a decree in any such suit

against the applicant, such decree shall supersede the order

(if any) made under section 43.

Nothing contained in section 22 shall apply to suits

under this section.”

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6.11 Thus, the entire scheme under Chapter-VII in regards

to possession of the immovable property, if streamlined, it can be

this wise that, ‘if the person being occupant continues his

occupation after losing the right to remain in possession and

delivered such property in compliance with the request made to

him in this behalf by such other person, i.e. applicant, the later

one has been given a right to file PSRP Application under Section

41 of 'the Act'.

6.12 Section 43 streamlines the proceedings of the Small

Cause Court. It gives the jurisdiction to the Small Cause Court

that if the occupant fails to show cause to the contrary and the

Small Cause Court is satisfied that the applicant is entitled to

apply under Section 41 of 'the Act', the Small Cause Court

should pass order addressed to the Bailiff of the Court directing

him to give possession of the property to the applicant on such

day as the Court may deem fit. Conjoint reading of Section 41

and 43 of 'the Act' demarks the proceeding under Chapter VII

from ordinary civil proceedings. It gives the summary power to

the Small Cause Court to recover possession from the occupant

without following the rigors of the ordinary civil suit proceedings

or following the rigors of the Evidence Act.

6.13 Section 45 of 'the Act' saves the action of the

applicant, he cannot deemed to be a trespasser in a case where,

at the time of applying for issuance of the possession warrant

and was entitled to the possession of such property, committed

any error, defect or irregularity in the mode of proceedings by

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himself or someone on his behalf. However, it gives the right to

the occupant or the person aggrieved to bring a suit for recovery

of compensation for any damage, which he has sustained by

reason of such error, defect or irregularity.

6.14 Section 46 of 'the Act' is a liability upon the applicant

and right given to the occupant and it permits the occupant to

file suit against the applicant to claim, if he is entitled to the

possession of such property, which is taken pursuant to the

warrant issued under Section 43 of 'the Act' establishing his

right to remain in occupation.

6.15 Section 47 of 'the Act' is in regards to giving

breathing time to the occupant to tender sureties and bonds for

any amount the Small Cause Court thinks reasonable, having

regard to the value of the property and the probable costs of the

suit and to institute the suit in the City Civil Court against the

applicant for compensation for trespass and to pay all the costs

of such suit, in case he does not prosecute the same or in case

judgment therein is given for the applicant, the Small Cause

Court shall stay the proceedings on such application until such

suit is disposed of and if the occupant obtains a decree, it would

supersede the judgment (if any) passed under Section 43 of 'the

Act'.

7. The coordinate Bench of this Court in Saiyad

Jabbarhusain and Ors. v. Hasan Abubakar Malbari

(deceased by Lrs.) and Ors., reported in AIR 1998 Gujrat 130,

referred to the provision under Chapter-VII of 'the Act'. Para 7, 8

and 12 observed and held as under:-

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“7. Section 41 of the said Act, which is to be found in

Chapter VII, which is captioned as “Recovery of Possession

of Immovable Property”, inter alia, provides that when any

person has had possession of any immovable property

situate within the local limits of the Small Cause Court’s

jurisdiction and of which the annual value at a rack-rent

does not exceed two thousand rupees, as the tenant, or by

permission, or another person, or of some person through

whom such other person claims, and such tenancy or

permission has determined or been withdrawn, and such

tenant or occupier or any person holding under or by

assignment from him (hereinafter called the occupant)

refuses to deliver up such property in compliance with a

request made to him in this behalf by such other person,

such other person (hereinafter called the applicant) may

apply to the Small Cause Court for a summons against the

occupant, calling upon him to show cause, on a day therein

appointed, why he should not be compelled to deliver up the

property.

In its application to the State of Gujarat, in Section 41,

for the words “two thousand” the words “three thousand”

were substituted by Guj. Act 5 of 1969, Section 5 and

Bombay Act 17 of 1952, Section 5 (4-11-1952). Now, in

Gujarat the words “three thousand rupees” are substituted

by the words “five thousand rupees” — Guj. Act 20 of 1979,

Section 9 (1-1-1980).

8. Under the scheme of the said Act, a person who is

alleged to be a licensee or a person who is put in possession

has the remedy under Section 46 to file an application, inter

alia, seeking declaration that the application of the applicant

under Section 41 is, in fact, an act of trespass and, on

making such application, he is required to apply under

Section 47 for stay of proceedings on the occupant giving

security to bring suit against the applicant. Section 47 of the

said Act, as amended by the State of Gujarat, in its

application to the city of Ahmedabad, reads as under :–

‘47. State of proceedings on occupant giving security to

bring suit against applicant : Whenever on an application

being made under Section 41 the occupant bind himself,

with two sureties, in a bond for such amount as the Small

Cause Court thinks reasonable, having regard to the value

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of the property and the probable costs of the suit next

hereinafter mentioned, to institute without delay a suit in the

High Court against the applicant for compensation for

trespass and to pay all the costs of such suit in case he does

not prosecute the same or in case judgment therein is given

for the applicant, the Small Cause Court shall stay the

proceedings on such application until such suit is disposed

of.

If the occupant obtains a decree in any such suit

against the applicant, such decree shall supersede the order

(if any) made under Section 43.

Nothing contained in Section 22 shall apply to suits

under this Section.

In its application to the city of Ahmedabad, Section

47 :– (i) for the words ‘occupant binds himself, substitute the

words ‘the occupant, at the earliest opportunity, and in any

event before filing any statement of defence, binds himself ;

and (ii) for the words ‘High Court’, substitute the words

‘Ahmedabad City Civil Court’ — Guj. Act 19 of 1961,

Sections 18 and 21 and Schedule (4-11-1961).’

xxx xxx xxx

12. Being fully conscious of the fact that the Court was a

Court of very limited jurisdiction, supposed to make inquiry

under Section 41 of the said Act only, he unfortunately

permitted himself to be carried away by a fact which was

not even the defence of deceased Hasan Abubakar, Having

totally forgotten the scope, nature and ambit of Section 41 of

the said Act, he proceeded to record a finding that the

deceased Hasan Abubakar who was inducted as a licensee

by the Wakf Committee, was in exclusive possession of the

room in question and that would create a tenancy in his

favour; and that such a right cannot be said to be a right of

licensee. The learned Small Causes Court Judge was not

deciding a dispute between the landlord and the tenant in

which case the matter would have been covered by the

Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act,

1947. He was very much conscious of the fact that he was

deciding an application under Section 41 of the said Act

where the licensee or person who was inducted as a

licensee by the Wakf Committee was required to institute an

application under Sections 46 and 47 for the purpose of

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declaration that the action of bringing an application under

Section 41 was an act of trespass on the part of the Wakf

Committee and he was required to apply for stay of such

proceeding in the City Civil Court within the stipulated time.

For the reasons best known to Shri A. S. Sanghvi, the then

Small Causes Court Judge, blatantly misdirected himself in

law and dragged himself into the controversy which was not

even raised by the deceased Hasan Abubakar. On such

reasoning, he rejected the application of the Wakf Committee

under Section 41 by the impugned order, least realising

thereby that the remedy which was available to the licensee

or person who is inducted in the premises under Section 41

of the said Act by resorting to Sections 46 and 47 of the said

Act was not availed of and he being a Court of very limited

jurisdiction cannot open up Pandora’s box and cannot create

a case which was not even pleaded by the deceased Hasan

Abubakar.”

8. The base contention of learned advocate Mr. Mrudul

M. Barot that the permission was not revoked by a written notice

or communication, the revocation was not reckoning from any

particular date, and therefore, the plaintiff was not entitled to file

the application under Section 41 of 'the Act' and consequently,

the Small Cause Court was not entitled to issue possession

warrant under Section 43 of 'the Act' thereof.

9. The plain reading of statute does not call for

revocation of the permission by a written communication or to

discontinue the permission by issuance of any statutory notice.

Section 41 of 'the Act' rather starts with the facts that, ‘if a

person i.e. occupant, had been in possession of any immovable

property either as the tenant, or by permission of another

person, or of some person through whom such other person

claims, and such tenancy or permission has determined or been

withdrawn, and such tenant or occupier still holds the

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possession, refuses to deliver up such property in compliance

with a request made to him, such other person, i.e. applicant,

would be entitled to prefer the application under Section 41 of

'the Act'.

10. The scheme of the statute, thus, clearly reflects that,

the person being an occupant has to establish by raising a

defence that his permission or tenancy has not been determined

or not been withdrawn to classify the application under Section

41 of 'the Act' as premature. It is not a duty upon the applicant

to establish that, by a particular date, the permission or tenancy

was determined or has been withdrawn and possession become

illegal. The phrase ‘refuses to deliver up such property in

compliance with a request made to him’, is indicative of the fact

that the request of the applicant may be implied. It is not

necessary to be explicit and by written communication. Any act

or gesture may be treated as a request made by the applicant to

deliver the peaceful and vacant possession of the immovable

property. The legislature being conscious enough has not

legislated that the request must be written and explicit and does

not make it statutory as it is made in some other statute, like the

Rent Act, Negotiable Instruments Act or Section 80 of “the Code”

or in some other Act, like the Panchayat Act or the GPMC Act,

etc.

11. In the rule of interpretation of the statute, applying

the Doctrine of Cassus Omissus, it is made explicitly clear that

when statute does not call for any supplant in reading of it, the

Court cannot supply it. It is further to be noted that provision of

the law has to be read as a whole in its context. When language

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of the provision is plain and unambiguous, question of supplying

Cassus Omissus does not arise. It is well settled principle of law

that, Court can interpret the provision of law, but cannot

legislate.

12. In Padma Sundara Rao (Dead) and Ors. v. State of

T.N. and Ors., reported in (2002) 3 SCC 533, the Supreme

Court while observing that the Court cannot read anything into

statutory provision, which is plain and unambiguous, in para 12

to 14 held as under:-

“12.The rival pleas regarding re-writing of statute and

casus omissus need careful consideration. It is well settled

principle in law that the Court cannot read anything into a

statutory provision which is plain and unambiguous. A

statute is an edict of the legislature. The language employed

in a statute is the determinative factor of legislative intent.

The first and primary rule of construction is that the

intention of the Legislation must be found in the words used

by the Legislature itself. The question is not what may be

supposed and has been intended but what has been said.

'Statutes should be construed not as theorems of Euclid".

Judge Learned Hand said, "but words must be construed

with some imagination of the purposes which lie behind

them’. (See Lenigh Valley Coal Co. v. Yensavage 218 FR

547). The view was re-iterated in Union of India and Ors. v.

Filip Tiago De Gama of Vedem Vasco De Gama (AIR 1990 SC

981).

13.In Dr. R Venkatchalam and Ors. etc. vs. Dy. Transport

Commissioner and Ors. etc. (AIR 1977 SC 842) it was

observed that Courts must avoid the danger of apriori

determination of the meaning of a provision based on their

own pre-conceived notions of ideological structure or scheme

into which the provision to be interpreted is somewhat fitted.

They are not entitled to usurp legislative function under the

disguise of interpretation.

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14.While interpreting a provision the Court only interprets

the law and cannot legislate it. If a provision of law is

misused and subjected to the abuse of process of law, it is

for the legislature to amend, modify or repeal it, if deemed

necessary. [See Rishabh Agro Industries Ltd. vs. P.N.B.

Capital Services Ltd. (2000 (5) SCC 515)]. `The legislative

casus omissus cannot be supplied by judicial interpretative

process. Language of Section 6(1) is plain and unambiguous.

There is no scope for reading something into it, as was done

in Narasimhaiah's case (supra). In Nanjudaiah's case

(supra), the period was further stretched to have the time

period run from date of service of High Court's order. Such a

view cannot be reconciled with the language of Section 6(1).

If the view is accepted it would mean that a case can be

covered by not only clauses (i) and/or (ii) of the proviso to

Section 6(1), but also by a non-prescribed period. Same can

never be the legislative intent.”

13. Yet in another judgment in the case of State of

Jharkhand and Anr. v. Govind Singh , reported in (2005) 10

SCC 437, similarly the interpretation has been made by

observing that when the words of statute are clear, plain or

unambiguous, they are reasonably susceptible of only one

meaning, the Courts are bound to give effect to that meaning,

regardless of consequences. The relevant are para 12, 15, 20 and

22, which reads as under:-

“12.It is said that a statute is an edict of the legislature.

The elementary principle of interpreting or construing a

statute is to gather the mens or sententia legis of the

legislature.

xxx xxx xxx

15.Where, however, the words were clear, there is no

obscurity, there is no ambiguity and the intention of the

legislature is clearly conveyed, there is no scope for the court

to innovate or take upon itself the task of amending or

altering the statutory provisions. In that situation the Judges

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should not proclaim that they are playing the role of a law-

maker merely for an exhibition of judicial valour. They have

to remember that there is a line, though thin, which

separates adjudication from legislation. That line should not

be crossed or erased. This can be vouchsafed by ‘an alert

recognition of the necessity not to cross it and instinctive, as

well as trained reluctance to do so’. (See: Frankfurter, Some

Reflections on the Reading of Statutes in "Essays on

Jurisprudence", Columbia Law Review, P.51.)

xxx xxx xxx

20.While interpreting a provision the Court only interprets

the law and cannot legislate it. If a provision of law is

misused and subjected to the abuse of process of law, it is

for the legislature to amend, modify or repeal it, if deemed

necessary. (See Commissioner of Sales Tax, M.P. v. Popular

Trading Company, Ujjain (AIR 2000 SC 1578). The

legislative casus omissus cannot be supplied by judicial

interpretative process.

xxx xxx xxx

22.It is then true that, "when the words of a law extend

not to an inconvenience rarely happening, but due to those

which often happen, it is good reason not to strain the words

further than they reach, by saying it is casus omissus, and

that the law intended quae frequentius accidunt." "But," on

the other hand, "it is no reason, when the words of a law do

enough extend to an inconvenience seldom happening, that

they should not extend to it as well as if it happened more

frequently, because it happens but seldom" (See Fenton v.

Hampton 11 Moore, P.C. 345). A casus omissus ought not to

be created by interpretation, save in some case of strong

necessity. Where, however, a casus omissus does really

occur, either through the inadvertence of the legislature, or

on the principle quod semel aut bis existit proetereunt

legislators, the rule is that the particular case, thus left

unprovided for, must be disposed of according to the law as

it existed before such statute - Casus omissus et oblivioni

datus dispositioni communis juris relinquitur; "a casus

omissus," observed Buller, J. in Jones v. Smart (1 T.R. 52),

‘can in no case be supplied by a court of law, for that would

be to make laws.’ ”

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14. Lastly, I may refer to the judgment in the case of

Commissioner of Customs (Import), Mumbai v. Dilip Kumar

and Company and Ors. , reported in (2018) 9 SCC, whereby the

Supreme Court involving the basic principles involving the

interpretation of the statutes, explained the purpose of

interpretation and explained the difference between the Literal

Construction, Principle of Strict Construction and plain meaning

of Rule. Para 20, 21, 23 and 25 are as under:-

“20. It is well accepted that a statute must be construed

according to the intention of the Legislature and the Courts

should act upon the true intention of the legislation while

applying law and while interpreting law. If a statutory

provision is open to more than one meaning, the Court has to

choose the interpretation which represents the intention of

the Legislature. In this connection, the following

observations made by this Court in District Mining Officer vs.

Tata Iron and Steel Co., (2001) 7 SCC 358, may be noticed:

‘… A statute is an edict of the Legislature and in

construing a statute, it is necessary, to seek the intention

of its maker. A statute has to be construed according to

the intent of them that make it and the duty of the Court

is to act upon the true intention of the Legislature. If a

statutory provision is open to more than one interpretation

the Court has to choose that interpretation which

represents the true intention of the Legislature. This task

very often raises the difficulties because of various

reasons, inasmuch as the words used may not be

scientific symbols having any precise or definite meaning

and the language may be an imperfect medium to convey

one’s thought or that the assembly of Legislatures

consisting of persons of various shades of opinion purport

to convey a meaning which may be obscure. It is

impossible even for the most imaginative Legislature to

forestall exhaustively situations and circumstances that

may emerge after enacting a statute where its application

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may be called for. Nonetheless, the function of the Courts

is only to expound and not to legislate. Legislation in a

modern State is actuated with some policy to curb some

public evil or to effectuate some public benefit. The

legislation is primarily directed to the problems before the

Legislature based on information derived from past and

present experience. It may also be designed by use of

general words to cover similar problems arising in future.

But, from the very nature of things, it is impossible to

anticipate fully the varied situations arising in future in

which the application of the legislation in hand may be

called for, and, words chosen to communicate such

indefinite referents are bound to be in many cases

lacking in clarity and precision and thus giving rise to

controversial questions of construction. The process of

construction combines both literal and purposive

approaches. In other words the legislative intention i.e.,

the true or legal meaning of an enactment is derived by

considering the meaning of the words used in the

enactment in the light of any discernible purpose or object

which comprehends the mischief and its remedy to which

the enactment is directed…’

21.The well settled principle is that when the words in a

statute are clear, plain and unambiguous and only one

meaning can be inferred, the Courts are bound to give effect

to the said meaning irrespective of consequences. If the

words in the statute are plain and unambiguous, it becomes

necessary to expound those words in their natural and

ordinary sense. The words used declare the intention of the

Legislature.

xxx xxx xxx

23.In applying rule of plain meaning any hardship and

inconvenience cannot be the basis to alter the meaning to

the language employed by the legislation. This is especially

so in fiscal statutes and penal statutes. Nevertheless, if the

plain language results in absurdity, the Court is entitled to

determine the meaning of the word in the context in which it

is used keeping in view the legislative purpose. Not only

that, if the plain construction leads to anomaly and

absurdity, the court having regard to the hardship and

consequences that flow from such a provision can even

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explain the true intention of the legislation. Having observed

general principles applicable to statutory interpretation, it is

now time to consider rules of interpretation with respect to

taxation.

xxx xxx xxx

25.At the outset, we must clarify the position of ‘plain

meaning rule or clear and unambiguous rule’ with respect of

tax law. ‘The plain meaning rule’ suggests that when the

language in the statute is plain and unambiguous, the Court

has to read and understand the plain language as such,

and there is no scope for any interpretation. This salutary

maxim flows from the phrase “cum inverbis nulla ambiguitas

est, non debet admitti voluntatis quaestio”. Following such

maxim, the courts sometimes have made strict interpretation

subordinate to the plain meaning rule4, though strict

interpretation is used in the precise sense. To say that strict

interpretation involves plain reading of the statute and to

say that one has to utilize strict interpretation in the event of

ambiguity is selfcontradictory.”

15. After referring to the aforesaid principle of law,

coming to the facts of the present case, the occupant -

defendants failed to show any statutory discipline to remain in

the possession of the disputed property.

16. It is discernible that the revisionist has filed the

application under Sections 46 and 47 of 'the Act' in the

proceedings of PSRP Application No.22 of 2011. The order dated

28.02.2013 disfavors the case of the revisionist. It was assailed

before this Court by way of filing a SCA No.10271 of 2013. The

revisionist remained unsuccessful in getting any favorable order.

The coordinate Bench in the proceedings of the SCA, in addition

to dismissing the SCA, directed the revisionist to vacate the

premises forthwith.

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17. The order was challenged before the Supreme Court

in Civil Appeal No. 3591 of 2019. The Supreme Court did not

incline to grant the application under Section 46 and 47 of ‘the

Act’, but found that the order passed by the coordinate Bench in

the SCA to vacate the premises is in excess of jurisdiction, and

therefore, a limited interference was made to that extent. What

could be noticeable from these proceedings that, at no point of

time, the occupant’s possession was conceded under any

statutory discipline, permitting the occupant to file the Civil Suit

under Section 46 or his request to grant the time to file the Civil

Suit under Section 47 of ‘the Act’. The obvious consequence was

to face the possession warrant under Section 43 of ‘the Act’.

18. It is noticeable aspect on the factual milieu is that,

prior to filing of the PSRP Application No.22 of 2011, since the

revisionist apprehended that his possession would have been

taken away by the petitioner and thus, had filed a Civil Suit

being a Civil Suit No.2069 of 2003 unsuccessfully, which itself

determined that the permission to remain in the possession of

the disputed property was revoked or withdrawn explicitly

known to the revisionist and it abundantly made clear to be a

deemed request of the applicant - landlord to handover the

peaceful and vacant possession of the disputed property.

19. According to this Court, under the limited

jurisdiction of revision, this Court finds no error, much less error

of interpreting the provision of law by the learned Small Cause

Court. This Court finds the argument that no written request

has been made as an attempt to open up the Pandora’s Box.

Such kind of argument is found to be breathless and in the teeth

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of the spirit of provision contained in Chapter VII of 'the Act'. It is

pitiable that the applicant, who is claiming the possession of the

disputed property since 2003 and subsequently filed the PSRP

Application under Section 41 of ‘the Act’ on 01.07.2011 is yet to

ripe the fruit of the provision, which is essentially a summary

proceedings.

20 In the aforesaid premises, reasoning stated

hereinabove are suffice to reject the revision. Accordingly, it is

rejected.

i) Interim-relief, if any, stands vacated.

ii) Registry is directed to return back the Record and

Proceedings to the concerned Court forthwith.

Sd/-

(J.C. DOSHI, J.)

Raj

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