REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 180 OF 2001

Chattar Singh and Anr. ..Appellants

versus

State of Haryana ..Respondent

J U D G M E N T

Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.

1.Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of a Division

Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court upholding the

conviction of appellant No.1-Chattar Singh (hereinafter

referred to as ‘A-1’) for offence punishable under Section 302

of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. He was also convicted for

offence punishable under Section 201 and Section 498A IPC.

Different sentences were imposed for the said offences.

Appellant-Mange Ram (hereinafter referred to as ‘A-2’) was

convicted for offence punishable under Section 498A IPC and

was sentenced to undergo RI for two years and to pay a fine of

Rs.2,000/-. The conviction recorded by learned Additional

Sessions Judge, Rohtak, was confirmed by Division Bench of

the High Court as also the sentences for both the appellants.

2.Background facts giving rise to the prosecution are as

follows:

A young girl, namely, Guddi (hereinafter referred to as

the ‘deceased’) aged about 26 years, belonged to village Nimly

in district Bhiwani in Haryana. Her marriage was performed

with Chattar Singh, A-1, son of Mange Ram, A-2 of village

Sahlawas, in district Rohtak, in the year 1990. Both the

families are agriculturists. A daughter, namely, Poonam

(deceased no.2) was born from this wedlock.

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Dead bodies of Guddi and that of the infant daughter

Poonam in the posture that the latter was in the armpit of

Guddi were found in a well of village Sahalwas on the morning

of 17.2.1993. Jeet Singh, father of the deceased made an

application Ex.PO on 16.2.1993, a day earlier that his

daughter was missing, before SI Ashok Kumar, PW-12, the

then Station House Officer, Police Station, Sahlawas and on

its basis formal FIR Ex.PN was recorded. On 17.2.1993 he

inspected the spot and prepared rough site plan Ex.PCC. He

got the dead bodies of the deceased photographed by Varinder

Singh, Photographer, PW.14. Ex.PJJ/l to 8 are the

photographs and Ex.PJJ/9 to 14 and Ex.PZ/7 and 8 are their

negatives. Zile Singh, PW.9, also took photographs Ex.PZ/7 to

12 and the negatives are Ex.PZ/1 to 6. The Investigating

Officer prepared inquest reports Ex.PB and PD. He also

prepared rough site plan of the place of recovery of dead

bodies Ex.PDD. The dead bodies were taken out from the well

and were despatched for post mortem. On 28.2.1993, Chattar

Singh and Mange Ram accused were produced by Babu Lal,

Sarpanch of the village before the Investigating officer who

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were arrested. On interrogation by the Investigating Officer on

1.3.1993, Chattar Singh accused made a disclosure statement

Ex.PFF and in pursuance thereof got recovered Chuni (Scarf)

from the specified place which were taken into possession vide

memo Ex.PFF/1. He also prepared rough site plan Ex.PFF/2

of the place of recovery. However, the statement made by Jeet

Singh, PW.3, the father of the deceased contained the

allegations that Chattar Singh (husband) and Mange Ram

(father-in-law) of the deceased as well as Rajesh and Vijay

Singh along with their wives Bimla and Bala respectively who

were maltreating his daughter were demanding Rs.50,000/-

as a part of dowry and only on fulfilment of that condition the

daughter could remain in peace. He allegedly borrowed a sum

of Rs.50,000/- from one Badan Singh, PW.8, and paid the

amount to the accused persons. He also claimed that he gave

various other amounts, valuables and articles on various

occasions and it was, therefore, that since this amount was

given at least 25 days earlier to the occurrence, after the birth

of the child when Guddi had stayed only for a short period

prior to the occurrence at the place of her in-laws. So, there

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was one version of the complainant, father of the deceased,

that the dispute which led to the death of the deceased was

the demand of dowry. However, during further investigation of

the case, it transpired that extra judicial confession was

allegedly made by Chattar Singh and Mange Ram accused

that they were suspecting illicit relation of the deceased Guddi

with some person and that she had conceived a child from

that person and the child was delivered at her parents’ place.

Therefore, on account of that stigma being cast on the family

of the accused, they did not think that it was befitting their

prestige that Guddi should be allowed to stay with them and

they have done her and the infant child to death and asked

the Sarpanch Babu Lal to help them in the matter. A similar

extra judicial confession was allegedly made before Dial Singh,

PW.5, Om Singh, PW.6 and Ms.Viney Bhardwaj, P.W.10, a

Reader in the Department of History who was the Secretary of

one Mahila Dakshita Samiti and the Samiti had approached

the accused persons in the village where Mange Ram made an

extra judicial confession that his son Chattar Singh had done

the deceased to death, because of infidelity of the deceased.

5

The post-mortem on the dead body of Guddi was

performed by Dr. Vijay Pal Khanagwal, PW.1, on 19.2.1993 at

9.00 A.M. and he found the following injuries on the dead

body:

1) There was a contusion present over the tip and alae of

nose, 3 cm in diameter. On dissection the sub cutaneous

and deeper structures showed acchymosed.

2) There were multiple contusions present over both the

lips and in an area of 3 to 4 cms around the lips.Size

varying from 1 x 0.5 to 2.5 x 1.5 cm. On dissection, the

underlying tissues were ecchymosed.

3)A contusion present over right side of face 1 cm

from mid line, situated 2 cm above lower border of

mendible measuring 3.2 cm placed transversely. On

dissection, thedeeper tissues showed ecchymosis.

6

In the opinion of the doctor the dead body was in

moderate stage of decomposition and that the cause of death

was smothering.

On the same day at 11.00 A.M. the aforesaid doctor

conducted post mortem on the dead body of infant child

Poonam and he found the following injuries on the dead body:

1) There was a contusion over the nose along its tip and

alae measuring 3 x 2 cm in size. On dissection the

underlying tissues showed ecchymosis.

2) There were multiple contusion present over the lips,

chin and the area around it in an area of 4 x 5 cms size

varying from 1 x 0.5 cm to 2 x 1 cm. On dissection the

sub cutaneous and deeper structure were ecchymosed.

In the opinion of the doctor the dead body was in

moderate stage of decomposition and the cause of death was

smothering.

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Clothes of the deceased were sent to the Forensic Science

Laboratory and they were found to be stained with human

blood as per report Ex.PQ/1.

Investigation was conducted by Inspector Sumer Singh

Malik, PW.13 who recorded the statements of Raghbir Singh,

Ramesh and one more witness on 5.4.1993. As per order of

Shri R.S. Yadav, Additional Superintendent of Police, who

supervised the investigation, he arrested Mange Ram, Chattar

Singh and Bhalliyan, accused. On completion of

investigation, charge sheet was filed.

It is to be noted that Jeet Singh (PW-3), father of the

deceased had brought a private complaint in which he had

named seven accused persons. The police presented challan

against two persons i.e. the present appellants and the names

of rest of the accused persons were kept in column No. II.

However, the trial Court ordered challan of the complaint to be

amalgamated and, therefore, all the seven persons were tried.

8

But the trial Court directed acquittal of five co-accused

persons while finding the appellants guilty.

The trial Court found that the prosecution case rested on

circumstantial evidence. Two of the major circumstances were

the alleged extra judicial confession and that the accused and

the deceased were last seen together. The trial Court found

the prosecution version to be cogent and credible. It is to be

noted that 14 witnesses were examined to further the

prosecution version. The complainant was examined as PW-3.

The present appellants pleaded innocence though they

admitted relationship inter se with the deceased Guddi and

the factum that she has delivered a child. Though a plea was

taken that the deceased had accidentally fallen in the well or

had committed suicide, the same was discarded. The trial

Court primarily relied on the evidence of Dr. Vijay Pal Kangwal

to rule out the death by drowning and that death had

occurred earlier and dead bodies were thrown in the well.

According to him, death was caused by closing the nostrils

and mouth of the deceased with hands or other means.

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Accordingly, the convictions were recorded and sentences

were imposed.

3.The primary stand in appeal was that the circumstances

do not present a complete chain. The High Court noted that

the trial Judge believed the evidence of extra judicial

confession against appellant No.1 that he had smothered his

wife and child and managed to throw the dead bodies in the

well and came to the conclusion that he alongwith father

Mange Ram also maltreated and harassed the deceased with

cruelty. The trial Judge had, therefore, rightly recorded

conviction. It was also averred before the High Court that

Guddi was missing from the house since morning of

16.2.1993 and on making report to that effect, her dead body

alongwith the dead body of child were found in the well. It was

also submitted that it was not a case of smothering and death

was due to asphyxia as stated by PW-1, the doctor and the

injury on the person of the deceased could be the result of the

deceased having fallen in the well. The version of the accused

persons that the deceased left the house around 6.00 a.m.

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was also falsified by the fact that semi digested food was found

in her intestine. It was also pleaded that one of the witnesses

to the alleged extra judicial confession supported the case of

the defence and not the prosecution. The High Court noticed

that the extra judicial confession before PW-10 was most

relevant. She had no animus against anyone whatsoever. The

evidence of PWs 5 and 6 was also believed so far as extra

judicial confession is concerned. The High Court did not find

any substance in the appeal and dismissed the same.

4.The stand taken before the High Court was re-iterated by

learned counsel for the appellants and the State.

5.It has been consistently laid down by this Court that

where a case rests squarely on circumstantial evidence, the

inference of guilt can be justified only when all the

incriminating facts and circumstances are found to be

incompatible with the innocence of the accused or the guilt of

any other person. (See Hukam Singh v. State of Rajasthan AIR

(1977 SC 1063); Eradu and Ors. v. State of Hyderabad (AIR

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1956 SC 316); Earabhadrappa v. State of Karnataka (AIR

1983 SC 446); State of U.P. v. Sukhbasi and Ors. (AIR 1985

SC 1224); Balwinder Singh v. State of Punjab (AIR 1987 SC

350); Ashok Kumar Chatterjee v. State of M.P. (AIR 1989 SC

1890). The circumstances from which an inference as to the

guilt of the accused is drawn have to be proved beyond

reasonable doubt and have to be shown to be closely

connected with the principal fact sought to be inferred from

those circumstances. In Bhagat Ram v. State of Punjab (AIR

1954 SC 621), it was laid down that where the case depends

upon the conclusion drawn from circumstances the

cumulative effect of the circumstances must be such as to

negative the innocence of the accused and bring the offences

home beyond any reasonable doubt.

6.We may also make a reference to a decision of this Court

in C. Chenga Reddy and Ors. v. State of A.P. (1996) 10 SCC

193, wherein it has been observed thus:

“In a case based on circumstantial

evidence, the settled law is that the

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circumstances from which the conclusion of

guilt is drawn should be fully proved and such

circumstances must be conclusive in nature.

Moreover, all the circumstances should be

complete and there should be no gap left in

the chain of evidence. Further the proved

circumstances must be consistent only with

the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and

totally inconsistent with his innocence....”.

7.In Padala Veera Reddy v. State of A.P. and Ors. (AIR

1990 SC 79), it was laid down that when a case rests upon

circumstantial evidence, such evidence must satisfy the

following tests:

“(1)the circumstances from which an

inference of guilt is sought to be drawn, must

be cogently and firmly established;

(2)those circumstances should be of a

definite tendency unerringly pointing towards

guilt of the accused;

(3)the circumstances, taken cumulatively

should form a chain so complete that there is

no escape from the conclusion that within all

human probability the crime was committed

by the accused and none else; and

(4)the circumstantial evidence in order to

sustain conviction must be complete and

incapable of explanation of any other

hypothesis than that of the guilt of the

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accused and such evidence should not only be

consistent with the guilt of the accused but

should be inconsistent with his innocence.”

8.In State of U.P. v. Ashok Kumar Srivastava, (1992 Crl.LJ

1104), it was pointed out that great care must be taken in

evaluating circumstantial evidence and if the evidence relied

on is reasonably capable of two inferences, the one in favour

of the accused must be accepted. It was also pointed out that

the circumstances relied upon must be found to have been

fully established and the cumulative effect of all the facts so

established must be consistent only with the hypothesis of

guilt.

9.Sir Alfred Wills in his admirable book “Wills’

Circumstantial Evidence” (Chapter VI) lays down the following

rules specially to be observed in the case of circumstantial

evidence: (1) the facts alleged as the basis of any legal

inference must be clearly proved and beyond reasonable

doubt connected with the factum probandum; (2) the burden

of proof is always on the party who asserts the existence of

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any fact, which infers legal accountability; (3) in all cases,

whether of direct or circumstantial evidence the best evidence

must be adduced which the nature of the case admits; (4) in

order to justify the inference of guilt, the inculpatory facts

must be incompatible with the innocence of the accused and

incapable of explanation, upon any other reasonable

hypothesis than that of his guilt, (5) if there be any reasonable

doubt of the guilt of the accused, he is entitled as of right to

be acquitted”.

10.There is no doubt that conviction can be based solely on

circumstantial evidence but it should be tested by the touch-

stone of law relating to circumstantial evidence laid down by

the this Court as far back as in 1952.

11.In Hanumant Govind Nargundkar and Anr. V. State of

Madhya Pradesh, (AIR 1952 SC 343), wherein it was observed

thus:

“It is well to remember that in cases

where the evidence is of a circumstantial

15

nature, the circumstances from which the

conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be in

the first instance be fully established and all

the facts so established should be consistent

only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the

accused. Again, the circumstances should be

of a conclusive nature and tendency and they

should be such as to exclude every hypothesis

but the one proposed to be proved. In other

words, there must be a chain of evidence so

far complete as not to leave any reasonable

ground for a conclusion consistent with the

innocence of the accused and it must be such

as to show that within all human probability

the act must have been done by the accused.”

12.A reference may be made to a later decision in Sharad

Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, (AIR 1984 SC

1622). Therein, while dealing with circumstantial evidence, it

has been held that onus was on the prosecution to prove that

the chain is complete and the infirmity of lacuna in

prosecution cannot be cured by false defence or plea. The

conditions precedent in the words of this Court, before

conviction could be based on circumstantial evidence, must be

fully established. They are:

(1)the circumstances from which the

conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be

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fully established. The circumstances

concerned ‘must’ or ‘should’ and not ‘may be’

established;

(2)the facts so established should be

consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt

of the accused, that is to say, they should not

be explainable on any other hypothesis except

that the accused is guilty;

(3)the circumstances should be of a

conclusive nature and tendency;

(4)they should exclude every possible

hypothesis except the one to be proved; and

(5)there must be a chain of evidence so

complete as not to leave any reasonable

ground for the conclusion consistent with the

innocence of the accused and must show that

in all human probability the act must have

been done by the accused.

13.These aspects were highlighted in State of Rajasthan v.

Raja Ram (2003 (8) SCC 180), State of Haryana v. Jagbir

Singh and Anr. (2003 (11) SCC 261) and Kusuma Ankama

Rao v State of A.P. (Criminal Appeal No.185/2005 disposed of

on 7.7.2008)

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14.So far as the last seen aspect is concerned it is necessary

to take note of two decisions of this court. In State of U.P. v.

Satish [2005 (3) SCC 114] it was noted as follows:

“22.The last seen theory comes into play

where the time-gap between the point of time

when the accused and the deceased were

seen last alive and when the deceased is

found dead is so small that possibility of any

person other than the accused being the

author of the crime becomes impossible. It

would be difficult in some cases to positively

establish that the deceased was last seen

with the accused when there is a long gap

and possibility of other persons coming in

between exists. In the absence of any other

positive evidence to conclude that the

accused and the deceased were last seen

together, it would be hazardous to come to a

conclusion of guilt in those cases. In this

case there is positive evidence that the

deceased and the accused were seen together

by witnesses PWs. 3 and 5, in addition to the

evidence of PW-2.”

15.In Ramreddy Rajeshkhanna Reddy v. State of A.P. [2006

(10) SCC 172] it was noted as follows:

“27. The last-seen theory, furthermore, comes

into play where the time gap between the point

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of time when the accused and the deceased

were last seen alive and the deceased is found

dead is so small that possibility of any person

other than the accused being the author of the

crime becomes impossible. Even in such a

case the courts should look for some

corroboration”.

(See also Bodh Raj v. State of J&K (2002(8)

SCC 45).)”

16.A similar view was also taken in Jaswant Gir v. State of

Punjab [2005(12) SCC 438] and Kusuma Ankama Rao’s case

(supra).

17.Confessions may be divided into two classes i.e. judicial

and extra-judicial. Judicial confessions are those which are

made before a Magistrate or a court in the course of judicial

proceedings. Extra-judicial confessions are those which are

made by the party elsewhere than before a Magistrate or

court. Extra-judicial confessions are generally those that are

made by a party to or before a private individual which

includes even a judicial officer in his private capacity. It also

includes a Magistrate who is not especially empowered to

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record confessions under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure, 1973 (for short the ‘Code’) or a Magistrate so

empowered but receiving the confession at a stage when

Section 164 of the Code does not apply. As to extra-judicial

confessions, two questions arise: (i) were they made

voluntarily? and (ii) are they true? As the section enacts, a

confession made by an accused person is irrelevant in

criminal proceedings, if the making of the confession appears

to the court to have been caused by any inducement, threat or

promise, (1) having reference to the charge against the

accused person, (2) proceeding from a person in authority,

and (3) sufficient, in the opinion of the court to give the

accused person grounds which would appear to him

reasonable for supposing that by making it he would gain any

advantage or avoid any evil of a temporal nature in reference

to the proceedings against him. It follows that a confession

would be voluntary if it is made by the accused in a fit state of

mind, and if it is not caused by any inducement, threat or

promise which has reference to the charge against him,

proceeding from a person in authority. It would not be

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involuntary, if the inducement, (a) does not have reference to

the charge against the accused person; or (b) it does not

proceed from a person in authority; or (c) it is not sufficient, in

the opinion of the court to give the accused person grounds

which would appear to him reasonable for supposing that, by

making it, he would gain any advantage or avoid any evil of a

temporal nature in reference to the proceedings against him.

Whether or not the confession was voluntary would depend

upon the facts and circumstances of each case, judged in the

light of Section 24 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (in short

‘Evidence Act’). The law is clear that a confession cannot be

used against an accused person unless the court is satisfied

that it was voluntary and at that stage the question whether it

is true or false does not arise. If the facts and circumstances

surrounding the making of a confession appear to cast a

doubt on the veracity or voluntariness of the confession, the

court may refuse to act upon the confession, even if it is

admissible in evidence. One important question, in regard to

which the court has to be satisfied with is, whether when the

accused made the confession, he was a free man or his

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movements were controlled by the police either by themselves

or through some other agency employed by them for the

purpose of securing such a confession. The question whether

a confession is voluntary or not is always a question of fact.

All the factors and all the circumstances of the case, including

the important factors of the time given for reflection, scope of

the accused getting a feeling of threat, inducement or promise,

must be considered before deciding whether the court is

satisfied that in its opinion the impression caused by the

inducement, threat or promise, if any, has been fully removed.

A free and voluntary confession is deserving of the highest

credit, because it is presumed to flow from the highest sense

of guilt. (See R. v. Warickshall) It is not to be conceived that a

man would be induced to make a free and voluntary

confession of guilt, so contrary to the feelings and principles of

human nature, if the facts confessed were not true. Deliberate

and voluntary confessions of guilt, if clearly proved, are among

the most effectual proofs in law. An involuntary confession is

one which is not the result of the free will of the maker of it.

So where the statement is made as a result of harassment and

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continuous interrogation for several hours after the person is

treated as an offender and accused, such statement must be

regarded as involuntary. The inducement may take the form of

a promise or of a threat, and often the inducement involves

both promise and threat, a promise of forgiveness if disclosure

is made and threat of prosecution if it is not. (See Woodroffe’s

Evidence, 9th Edn., p. 284.) A promise is always attached to

the confession alternative while a threat is always attached to

the silence alternative; thus, in one case the prisoner is

measuring the net advantage of the promise, minus the

general undesirability of a false confession, as against the

present unsatisfactory situation; while in the other case he is

measuring the net advantages of the present satisfactory

situation, minus the general undesirability of the confession

against the threatened harm. It must be borne in mind that

every inducement, threat or promise does not vitiate a

confession. Since the object of the rule is to exclude only those

confessions which are testimonially untrustworthy, the

inducement, threat or promise must be such as is calculated

to lead to an untrue confession. On the aforesaid analysis the

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court is to determine the absence or presence of an

inducement, promise etc. or its sufficiency and how or in what

measure it worked on the mind of the accused. If the

inducement, promise or threat is sufficient in the opinion of

the court, to give the accused person grounds which would

appear to him reasonable for supposing that by making it he

would gain any advantage or avoid any evil, it is enough to

exclude the confession. The words “appear to him” in the last

part of the section refer to the mentality of the accused.

18.An extra-judicial confession, if voluntary and true and

made in a fit state of mind, can be relied upon by the court.

The confession will have to be proved like any other fact. The

value of the evidence as to confession, like any other evidence,

depends upon the veracity of the witness to whom it has been

made. The value of the evidence as to the confession depends

on the reliability of the witness who gives the evidence. It is

not open to any court to start with a presumption that extra-

judicial confession is a weak type of evidence. It would depend

on the nature of the circumstances, the time when the

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confession was made and the credibility of the witnesses who

speak to such a confession. Such a confession can be relied

upon and conviction can be founded thereon if the evidence

about the confession comes from the mouth of witnesses who

appear to be unbiased, not even remotely inimical to the

accused, and in respect of whom nothing is brought out which

may tend to indicate that he may have a motive of attributing

an untruthful statement to the accused, the words spoken to

by the witness are clear, unambiguous and unmistakably

convey that the accused is the perpetrator of the crime and

nothing is omitted by the witness which may militate against

it. After subjecting the evidence of the witness to a rigorous

test on the touchstone of credibility, the extra-judicial

confession can be accepted and can be the basis of a

conviction if it passes the test of credibility.

18.So far as the extra judicial confession of A-2 before PWs

5 and 6 is concerned that actually is not of much relevance in

view of Section 30 of Evidence Act. The stress in the said

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provision is on the joint trial for the same offence. In the

instant case A-2 was not tried for Section 302 IPC. Therefore,

his confession if any is of no consequence. But the extra

judicial confession before PW-10 which has been relied upon

by both the trial Court and the High Court cannot be lost sight

of.

19.In view of the evidence led, the inevitable conclusion is

that the conviction recorded by the trial Court and upheld by

the High Court does not suffer from any infirmity to warrant

interference. However, considering the age of A-2 the sentence

is reduced to the period already undergone which is nearly

one year so far as A-2 is concerned. Except the modification of

sentence so far as A-2 is concerned the appeal is dismissed.

The bail bonds executed so far as A-2 is concerned shall stand

discharged. So far as A-1 is concerned he shall surrender to

custody forthwith to serve the remainder of sentence.

……………..……………………J.

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(Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT)

……….…………………………..J.

(Dr. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA)

New Delhi,

August 26, 2008

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