C/SCA/12744/2020 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 09/02/2026

Reserved On : 29/01/2026

Pronounced On : 09/02/2026

IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD

R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 12744 of 2020

FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:

HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE HEMANT M. PRACHCHHAK

================================================================

Approved for Reporting Yes No

Yes

================================================================

CHHATRASING SAMSUBHAI BILWAL

Versus

INDIAN PETROCHEMICAL CORPORATION LIMITED & ORS.

================================================================

Appearance:

MR.J P THAKKAR(7116) for the Petitioner(s) No. 1

MR KM PATEL, SENIOR ADVOCATE ASSISTED BY MR NISARG DESAI

WITH MS PRAVALIKHA BATTHINI FOR GANDHI LAW

ASSOCIATES(12275) for the Respondent(s) No. 2

RULE SERVED for the Respondent(s) No. 1,3

================================================================

CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE HEMANT M.

PRACHCHHAK

CAV JUDGMENT

1.Present petition is filed by the petitioner – employee under

Articles 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India read with the provisions

of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter be referred to as “the

Act”) against the judgment and award dated 20.09.2019 passed by

the learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Vadodara (hereinafter be

referred to as “the Labour Court”) in Reference (LCV) No. 557 of 2003,

whereby, the learned Judge has rejected the reference filed by the

petitioner-employee and refused to reinstate the petitioner-employee

with back wages in service of the respondent-Company.

Page 1 of 32

C/SCA/12744/2020 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 09/02/2026

2.Facts giving rise to present petition in nut-shell are as under :

2.1The petitioner was employed as Junior Fireman in the

respondent-Company on 25.09.1989, which was formerly known as

Indian Petrochemical Corporation Limited (IPCL), solely owned by

Union of India and managed and administered by Ministry of

Petroleum of Central Government. That, the petitioner was confirmed

in service and made permanent in the year 1989. That, the petitioner

was discharging his duty honestly and with utmost loyalty to the

respondent-Company. That, somewhat in the year 2002, the Reliance

Industry purchased the equity share in IPCL to the tune of 26.64%,

while implementing the disinvestment program of the Central

Government and thereafter, purchased 20% of the equity share from

the market through SEBI and in all 46.64% equity share were acquired

by RIL, hence, there was a change in the management and Shri

Mukeshbhai D. Ambani became the Chairman of IPCL. That,

thereafter, Merger Agreement took place between IPCL and RIL on

06.03.2007, by which, the IPCL was merged into RIL, wherein, all the

service conditions of all the employees of IPCL were agreed to be

protected.

2.2It is the case of the petitioner that, after the change in the

management of IPCL in 2002, as stated above, by way of malicious

strategy, an unfair labour practice was adopted by the respondent-

Company and as the respondent wanted to diminish / reduce the

staff, by way of policy the respondent Management started to harass

the employees and under one or another created grounds, number of

employees were picked up for the purpose of removal from service.

As a part of that policy, hundreds of employees were served with the

Page 2 of 32

C/SCA/12744/2020 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 09/02/2026

departmental charge-sheets alleging that in the year 2001 or in any

other year, the employee remained absent for a period of 40 days, 50

days and 60 days, 90 days etc. That, the Petitioner was also served

with the similar type of charge-sheet dated 28.05.2002 alleging that

the petitioner remained absent without leave for a total period of 92

days in different months of the year 2001.

2.3The petitioner filed the reply to the said charge-sheet on

01.06.2002 wherein, the said absent was explained by saying that the

brother of petitioner was suffering from mantel illness since last six

years and due to which, many a times he was found missing from

home and such types of incidents used to occur many a times in the

family, due to which, old aged Senior citizen parents were also

suffering from similar mental torture, pain and agony and the present

petitioner was the only person who could take care of the family and

such ill-person. That, the petitioner was the only bread earner and

healthy person in the family and due to such types of incidents, there

was compelling necessity and demand of time, to remain with them in

the family and to take care of them and therefore, as and when the

family members were calling the petitioner, on emerging the serious

health problem to the family member, the petitioner was inclined to

immediately rush to native place, where the family was residing.

2.4That, on filing the said reply, the petitioner was neither called

upon to adduce any evidence for the same nor given any opportunity

to give a further explanation of the said absence, for which, at the

different occasions, the petitioner had applied to the Competent

Authority or to the Superior Officer for leave and non-sanction, if any,

was never communicated to the petitioner but, the respondent

Page 3 of 32

C/SCA/12744/2020 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 09/02/2026

management as a part of policy to have a mass removal of

employees, chosen to hold the departmental inquiry and appointed

the Inquiry Officer as well as Presenting Officer by order dated

06.07.2002. That, thereafter, by the letter dated 16.07.2002, the

Inquiry Officer fixed the date of preliminary inquiry and called upon

the petitioner to remain present on 25.07.2002. That, the petitioner

remained present on the said stipulated dated for preliminary inquiry

wherein, the petitioner was not afforded any opportunity to defend

the charge-sheet or the proceedings and straight way Inquiry Officer

put some preliminary questions to the petitioner that, whether the

petitioner was accepting the allegation that he remained absent for

92 days in the year 2001?, quo which the petitioner replied that he

remained absent was the true facts and he admitted the same. Even

the Inquiry Officer had further put the question to the petitioner to the

effect that as to why for such different 92 days the petitioner

remained absent in the year 2001 without leave?. The petitioner on

such preliminary questionary from the Inquiry Officer, explained and

replied that his old aged parents and younger brother were living in

Native place i.e. village Dabada of district Panchmahal and all such

family members were the dependents on the petitioner and the

younger brother Shri Balvantbhai of the petitioner was suffering from

severe mental diseases since last six years and because of such

mental illness of the younger brother, the old aged parents were also

being harassed and mentally disturbed and thereupon, whenever the

occasion of serious illness of the younger brother and the father

arisen, the mother was used to call the petitioner to help them for the

purpose of medical treatment and to carry them to the hospital for

medical treatment, in as much as there was no other person who can

discharge such social obligation and to save the family members from

Page 4 of 32

C/SCA/12744/2020 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 09/02/2026

such severe mental disease, and in the circumstances, it was not

practically possible for the petitioner to have any prior leave as the

petitioner was to rush immediately on receiving the message from the

mother or the family members. Thus, such reasonable cause and

reason were also pointed out to the Inquiry Officer during the course

of preliminary inquiry which took place on 25.07.2002.

2.5That, the Inquiry Officer considered the aforesaid episode

happened on the said date i.e. on 25.07.2002 before him, as an

admission of guilt or charges by the petitioner and chosen to

terminate the inquiry proceedings without affording any opportunity

to defend the charge-sheet or a charged leveled against the

petitioner. That, nobody was examined on behalf of the respondent-

Company to prove the charges leveled against the petitioner, nor

even the petitioner was permitted to get himself examined to

disprove the charges. That, the Inquiry officer adopted the procedure

like police investigation by putting such preliminary questions and the

same was construed to have an admission on the part of the

petitioner, and on that ground, the Inquiry officer terminated the

inquiry proceedings and prepared the report and submitted the same

to the Disciplinary Authority reporting to the effect that charges

leveled against the petitioner by charge-sheet dated 28.05.2002 was

proved because of an admission on the part of the petitioner and

thereby, the petitioner had violated the standing order Section-18

(28). That, considering the said Inquiry Report of the Inquiry Officer,

the Disciplinary Authority of the respondent-Company chosen to pass

an order of termination / discharge, discharging the petitioner from

service by inflicting the penalty by order dated 14.03.2003.

Page 5 of 32

C/SCA/12744/2020 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 09/02/2026

2.6That, the said termination order was challenged by raising the

dispute before the Assistant Labour Commissioner under Section 10 of

the Act, which was to the Labour Court, Vadodara and was registered

as Reference Case No.557 of 2003. That, the petitioner filed the

Statement of claim before the Labour Court and sought for a relief of

setting aside the termination order and also sought for a relief of

reinstatement with full back wages. That, the respondent-Company

filed the reply to the said statement of claim before the Labour Court.

That, the Labour Court thereafter, tried the different issues and

dismissed the reference of the petitioner on different grounds vide

judgment and award dated20.09.2019.

3.Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment

and award dated 20.09.2019 passed by the learned Presiding Officer,

Labour Court, Vadodara in Reference (LCV) No. 557 of 2003, the

petitioner has preferred this petition under Articles 226 & 227 of the

Constitution of India read with the provisions of Industrial Disputes

Act, 1947.

4.Heard Mr. Prakash Thakkar, learned counsel appearing virtually

for the petitioner-employee and Mr. K.M. Patel, learned senior counsel

assisted by Mr. Nisarg Desai and Ms. Pravalikha Batthini, learned

counsels appearing for the respondent No.2-IPCL.

5.Learned counsel Mr. Thakkar has submitted that the impugned

judgment and award passed by the Labour Court is illegal, unjust,

arbitrary, erroneous and contrary to the facts and material on record

and the provisions of the Act and therefore, the same is required to be

quashed and set aside. He would submit that the statement made on

Page 6 of 32

C/SCA/12744/2020 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 09/02/2026

behalf of the petitioner was not properly considered and appreciate

by the Labour Court while passing the impugned award, which is the

subject matter in this petition. He would further submit that the

petitioner was terminated on account of unauthorized absence for a

period of 92 days, for which, charge sheet (Annexure-B) was issued to

the petitioner and the petitioner had filed his reply to the said charge

sheet (Annexure-C) wherein, the petitioner has tried to explain that

the charge mentioned in the charge sheet is admitted by him,

however, in addition to that, he wanted to explain that his mother was

residing alone with his younger brother and both were dependent

upon the petitioner and the younger brother was suffering from

mental illness and because of that reason, he used to frequently visit

his native village Dabada of district Panchmahal and therefore, he

used to remain absent without seeking any prior permission and there

was no any intention on the part of the petitioner to remain absent

and under such circumstances, the charges were proved against the

petitioner, however, without considering these facts, the Labour Court

has committed a serious error in referring and relying upon past

incident / antecedent for which, there was no any show-cause notice

issued against the petitioner and thus, while relying upon the prior

antecedent, the Labour Court has committed a serious error of law

and facts. He would further submit that the earlier antecedent at

page-76 of the compilation, which is referred and relied upon by the

Labour Court from the reply filed by the respondent before the Labour

Court, for which the respondent had not issue any show-cause notice,

the same cannot be treated as relevant material while deciding the

reference as antecedent as there was no departmental proceedings

held for the earlier antecedents and therefore, under such

circumstances, the impugned award passed by the Labour Court is

Page 7 of 32

C/SCA/12744/2020 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 09/02/2026

erroneous, illegal, unjust and arbitrary and in violation of principles of

natural justice.

5.1Learned counsel Mr. Thakkar has referred and relied upon the

rejoinder filed by the petitioner and submitted that in the charge

sheet, there was no whisper about the fact that the petitioner was a

habitual absentee and he had remained unauthorizedly absent from

the duty for the period from 1991 to 2001, nor any evidence was led

before the Inquiry Officer in the departmental proceedings to that

effect, nor any show-cause notice for penalty was conveyed regarding

the past record, nor the impugned order of penalty was reflecting the

reliance of any past record of alleged habitual absence for the period

from 1991 to 2201 and, it was for the first time before the Labour

Court, the fresh and additional evidence and new ground for inflicting

the impugned penalty of termination of service was created by the

respondent-Company, which is not permissible in view of proviso to

Section 11A of the Act, which relates to powers of Labour Court,

Tribunals and National Tribunals to give appropriate relief in case of

discharge or dismissal of workmen, and therefore, the observation

made by the Labour Court relying upon prior antecedents is

completely erroneous, illegal and unjust. He has further submitted

that the Labour Court has not appreciated the fact that the standing

order No.18(28) is contemplating the deliberate unauthorized absent

without leave, while the petitioner was under the compelled

circumstances which were beyond his control and could not attend

the duty, therefore, such absenteeism cannot be construed as

deliberate one and therefore, the action or inaction on the part of the

petitioner is not falling within the definition of misconduct in view of

standing order No.18(28) of the respondent-Company and therefore,

Page 8 of 32

C/SCA/12744/2020 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 09/02/2026

the penalty order is illegal and bad in law. Over and above, the

grounds agitated in the memo of petition, learned counsel Mr.

Thakker has urged that the impugned judgment and award passed by

the Labour Court is required to be quashed and set aside and the

present petition is required to be allowed.

5.2In support of his submissions, learned counsel Mr. Thakkar has

referred and relied upon the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court

rendered in case of Mohd. Yunus Khan vs. State of Uttar

Pradesh, reported in [2010] 10 SCC 539, the relevant observations

made in paras-36 and 37. He has also referred and relied upon the

decision of this Court in case of Parshottam Rajabhai vs. State of

Gujarat, reported in [1994] 1 GLR 93, the relevant observations

made in para-5. So far as the scope and powers of Labour Court under

Section 11A of the Act is concerned, learned counsel Mr. Thakkar has

referred and relied upon the decision of Andhra Pradesh High Court in

case of A.V. Swami vs. Industrial Tribunal-cum-labour Court,

Warangal, reported in [1991] 2 LLJ 430, the relevant observations

made in para-5. So far as the contention with regard to misconduct is

concerned, learned counsel Mr. Thakkar has referred and relied upon

the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court rendered in case of

Krushnakant B. Parmar vs. Union of India, reported in [2012] 3

SCC 178, the relevant observations made in paras-16, 17, 18, 19, 20,

22, 23 and 24.

6.On the other hand, Mr. K.M. Patel, learned senior counsel

appearing for the respondent No.2, has opposed the present petition

and submitted that petitioner is not entitled to any relief as sought for

under Articles 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India as he has

Page 9 of 32

C/SCA/12744/2020 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 09/02/2026

challenged the proportionality of the punishment imposed upon him

and now, it is well settled that while deciding the proportionality of

the punishment imposed by the Inquiry Officer and confirmed by the

Disciplinary Authority as well as by the Labour Court, this Court has

very limited scope to interfere with the findings recorded by the

authorities as this Court is not sitting in an appeal over the decision of

the Inquiry Officer or the Disciplinary Authority. He has submitted that

in the case on hand, the charge sheet was issued against the

petitioner and he had accepted the charges lvelled against him in his

written explanation given to the Inquiry Officer and therefore, now, it

is not open for the petitioner to challenge the legality and validity of

the charge sheet, as it is borne out from the record that the petitioner

had remained absent for about 92 days in the year 2001 and every

time, he had remained absent without seeking prior permission and

without there being any leave sanctioned by the authority, as

contemplated under the standing order no.18(28), and is considered

to be a serious misconduct, which is mentioned in the show-cause

notice itself.

6.1Learned senior counsel Mr. Patel has submitted that it was

admitted by the petitioner that he had not sought any prior

permission from the authority nor his leave was sanctioned by the

authority and therefore, he cannot challenge the legality and validity

of the report of the Inquiry Officer or the order passed by the

Disciplinary Authority. He has further submitted that the petitioner

was serving as a Junior Fireman having the responsibility in the

Establishment / Organization, which is a petrochemical unit

processing hazardous chemicals day-in and day-out for the refinery,

which is highly inflammable and therefore, Fire Officer / Junior Fire

Page 10 of 32

C/SCA/12744/2020 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 09/02/2026

Officer and Fire Department have to remain vigilant and present 24

hours for 365 days. He has submitted that the petitioner cannot

remain absent like a labourer without any prior intimation or prior

permission of the authority as he is not a class-IV employee and

therefore, under such circumstances, considering the nature of duty

and the position he is holding in the establishment, he cannot say that

due to family situations, he had to rush to his native place without

seeking any prior permissions in haste and he remained absent for

number of days unauthorizedly, therefore, considering all these

aspects, the Inquiry Officer, after following due procedure and after

considering the written reply filed by the petitioner and after affording

personal hearing, has prepared the report and relying upon the same,

the Disciplinary Authority has passed the order of termination. He has

further submitted that even if this Court ignores the past conduct of

the petitioner, though it is relevant to decide the present petition,

however, for the time being, if this Court ignores, then also, the

petitioner being a Junior Fireman and considering the nature of work

which is allotted, the petitioner cannot remain absent unauthorizedly

for the period mentioned in the charge sheet, which is wholly illegal

and unjust on the part of the petitioner and he cannot expect from the

establishment to condone his absence. He has further submitted that

even the legality and validity of the inquiry report and the order

passed by the Disciplinary Authority were not challenged, however,

the petitioner has challenged the order passed by the Disciplinary

Authority before the Central Revisional Authority and Central

Administrative Authority and both the authorities have confirmed the

order passed by the Disciplinary Authority, after considering the facts

of the case and after considering the submissions advanced by the

petitioner before the Disciplinary Authority, as it was against the

Page 11 of 32

C/SCA/12744/2020 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 09/02/2026

concurrent findings of fact recorded by the Inquiry Officer, after going

through the records and after verifying the veracity and legality,

which was confirmed by the Disciplinary Authority, which was the

subject matter before the Labour Court and after considering the

relevant facts, the Labour Court has observed that while exercising

powers under Section 11A of the Act, the scope and nature of power,

the court is not sitting over the appellate jurisdiction and therefore,

the Labour Court after considering all the relevant material has rightly

passed the impugned award. Learned senior counsel Mr. Patel has

therefore, urged that no interference is required to be called for in the

present petition and the present petition be dismissed.

6.2In support of his submissions, learned senior counsel Mr. Patel

has referred and relied upon the following decisions of the Hon’ble

Apex Court as well as this Court :

[I] L & T Komatsu Ltd. vs. N. Udayakumar, [2008] 1 SCC 224 ,

relevant paras-5, 6, 8 to 11;

[II] Chairman and M.D.V.S.P. vs. Goparaju Sri Prabhakara,

[2008] 5 SCC 569, relevant paras-16 to 21;

[III] Delhi Transport Corporation vs. Sardar Singh, [2004] 7 SCC

574, relevant paras-2,9 and 11;

[IV] Satnam Singh vs. Pepsu Road Transport Corporation,

[2017] 153 FLR 536, relevant paras-3 and 4;

[V] Maganbhai L. Chauhan vs. Divisional Controller GSRTC,

[1999] 1 GLH 527, relevant paras-3, 4, 5 and 9;

[VI] Ahmedabad Municipal Transport Service vs. Vinubhai J.

Ghanchi, Special Civil Application No. 6632 of 2003, decided on

11.05.2011, relevant paras-4 to 7;

[VII] Shriraj A. Vora vs. IPCL, Special Civil Application No.

Page 12 of 32

C/SCA/12744/2020 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 09/02/2026

16857 of 2013, decided on 22.12.2014, relevant paras-4.1, 4.2 and

5.

7.I have heard the learned counsel appearing for the respective

parties and perused the material placed on record. The issue involved

in the present petition is that as to whether the Labour Court has

committed any error while passing the impugned award dismissing

the reference preferred by the present petitioner; whether the Labour

Court has exceeded its jurisdiction while examining the legality and

validity of the order of punishment passed by the Disciplinary

Authority and confirmed by the Revisional Authority and further

confirmed by the Administrative Authority of the respondent while

exercising jurisdiction under Section 11A of the Act; whether the

Labour Court can examine and refer and rely upon earlier

antecedents of similar in nature or the misconduct committed by the

petitioner.

8.Before dwelling into all these aspects, the facts of the case are

required to be looked into. It emerges from the records that the

petitioner was appointed as a Junior Fireman in the respondent-

Company i.e. IPCL, who was engaged in manufacturing process of

hazardous chemicals and there are all likelihood to occur untowards

incidents at anytime and therefore, the Fire Department was having a

vital role to play, wherein, the petitioner was working as a Junior

Fireman since 1989. It is alleged that the petitioner remained

unauthorizedly absent from duty, which is against the provisions of

standing order no.18(28) of the respondent-Company and therefore,

the respondent-Company had issued charge sheet dated 28.05.2002

alleging that the petitioner had remained unauthorizedly absent

Page 13 of 32

C/SCA/12744/2020 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 09/02/2026

without leave for a total period of 92 days in different months in the

year 2001 as under :

Sr. No. Month Total number of days

absent

1. January -

2. February 01

3. March 12

4. April 08

5. May 11

6. June 07

7. July 3.5

8. August 08

9. September 8.5

10. October 10

11. November 07

12. December 16

Total 92

8.1It appears that every time, the petitioner had neither informed

the authority nor any prior permission was sought for leave nor his

leave was sanctioned on any of the occasions. Even the petitioner has

admitted in his reply that he was not challenging the legality and

validity of the charge sheet and he has admitted the charges levelled

against him before the Inquiry Officer. Even considering the

deposition of the petitioner before the Inquiry Officer, which was

recorded on 25.07.2002 (Annexure “F”), which is reproduced

hereunder :

Question :Have you received the charge sheet given to you on 28/05/2002

and have you understood it properly ?

Answer :Yes, I have received the charge sheet and I have understood it

properly as well.

Page 14 of 32

C/SCA/12744/2020 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 09/02/2026

Question :For this departmental inquiry, do you wish to present a co-

worker or, if you are a member of a union, a union member as a

defense representative ?

Answer :No, I do not wish to present a co-worker or a union member as

a defense representative for this departmental inquiry. I myself

will give the answers to the questions regarding this.

Question :What is the reason for the unauthorized absence of 92 days in

the year 2001 shown in the charge sheet ?

Answer :My mother, father, and younger brother reside at my native

place in Dabada Village, Dist. Panchmahal. They are all

dependent on me. Since my younger brother (Mr. Balvantbhai)

is suffering from mental illness, he has to be taken to the

hospital frequently, and therefore, my father also faces

hardship due to this and he himself also suffers from mental

illness. Therefore, my mother calls me to the native place

frequently and I could not come to work for that reason which

led to my unauthorized absence.

Question :Since how long has your brother been suffering from a mental

illness ?

Answer :My younger brother has mental illness for the last six (6) years.

Question :Have you taken any doctor's treatment for your younger

brother in your native place in this regard ? Where have you

taken it ?

Answer Yes, doctor's treatment has been taken, and for his treatment, I

have taken him to Dr. Sharma in Limkheda village.

Question :Did you submit the medical certificate of your brother's

treatment to your superior officer regarding the fact that you

remained absent since you went to your village for your

brother's treatment ?

Answer :I have not submitted the medical certificate regarding this to

my superior officer.

Question :Why have you not submitted the medical certificate in this

regard ?

Answer :I should have submitted the medical certificate in this regard,

but I have not submitted it, which is my fault.

Question :You have remained absent in an unauthorized manner even six

(6) years ago, what is the reason behind it ? Your duty is in the

Fire Service and since it is your essential duty, you have to

remain present. Do you know that ?

Page 15 of 32

C/SCA/12744/2020 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 09/02/2026

Answer :Prior to this, I often did not feel like coming to work mentally,

and due to this reason, there is my unauthorized absence.

Question :Do you admit that you have remained absent in an

unauthorized manner for 92 days as shown in the charge sheet

given to you ?

Answer :Yes, I admit the unauthorized absence of 92 days. I give an

assurance that, I will not remain absent in an unauthorized

manner hereafter, and if I have to go on leave, I will intimate

regarding it to my department. I give assurance that, I will not

make such mistake in the future and if possible, kindly forgive

me.

Question :Presenting Officer and Delinquent, do you have anything

further to say regarding this departmental inquiry ?

Answer :In this regard, the delinquent replies : No, now both of us have

nothing to say further regarding this departmental inquiry.

8.2The Inquiry Officer, after considering the written explanation

and after recording the statement of the petitioner and after

considering the provisions of standing order no.18(28) of the

respondent-Company, has prepared the report dated 28.08.2002,

which was approved by the Senior Fire Service Manager and

Disciplinary Authority, which was challenged before the Revisional

Authority and further challenged before the Administrative Authority

and both the authorities have confirmed the order of termination

passed by the Disciplinary Authority and therefore, naturally, the

petitioner has preferred reference under Section 10(1) of the I.D. Act

challenging the order of Disciplinary Authority based upon the inquiry

report, which was subsequently confirmed by the Labour Court by

rejecting the reference and therefore, the Labour Court has rightly

refused to exercise powers under Section 11A of the, Act as the

Labour Court is not sitting over the appeal for the findings recorded

by the Inquiry Officer based on facts and the relevant material

produced before it. It is pertinent to note herein that, the petitioner

had challenged the legality and validity of the inquiry proceedings by

Page 16 of 32

C/SCA/12744/2020 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 09/02/2026

way of filing an application (Exh.-18) before the Labour Court,

wherein, the Labour Court vide order dated 09.08.2017 has held that

the inquiry conducted by the respondent-Company is valid and legal

and is in consonance with the principles of natural justice.

8.3In the facts and circumstances of the present case, if this Court

ignores the earlier antecedents of the petitioner of remaining absent,

then also, even for the very year 2001, the petitioner had remained

unauthorizedly absent for a period of 92 days without there being any

prior permission, which is a serious misconduct on the part of the

petitioner and therefore, the Labour Court has rightly passed the

impugned award, for which, the contention raised by the learned

counsel Mr. Thakkar that earlier antecedents cannot be looked into by

the Inquiry Officer as the respondent-Company has not issued any

charge sheet for the earlier antecedents and therefore, that cannot be

referred and relied upon. At this juncture, it would be appropriate to

refer to the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court rendered in case of

Union of India and Others vs. Bishamber Das Dogra, reported in

[2009] 13 SCC 102, the relevant observations made in para-30 read

as under :

“30. In view of the above, it is evident that it is desirable that delinquent

employee may be informed by the disciplinary authority that his past

conduct would be taken into consideration while imposing the punishment.

But in case of misconduct of grave nature or indiscipline, even in absence

of statutory rules, the authority may take into consideration the

indisputable past conduct/service record of the employee for adding the

weight to the decision of imposing the punishment if the facts of the case

so require.”

8.4The Labour Court has rightly observed referring to the written

statement filed by the respondent that the respondent has not

committed any error while mentioning that from the year 1991 to

Page 17 of 32

C/SCA/12744/2020 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 09/02/2026

2000, the petitioner remained unauthorizedly absent and therefore,

he was a habitual absentee for these years. Even otherwise, if this

Court considers that the legality and validity of the inquiry was not

challenged by the petitioner, however, so far as the proportionality of

the punishment is concerned, this Court cannot gone into while

exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226 & 227 of the Constitution of

India, as to whether the punishment imposed upon the petitioner is

disproportionate to the charges levelled against him. In case of Delhi

Transport Corporation (Supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court has

observed that absence without leave or continuous absence from duty

without sanctioned leave for long prima facie amounts to habitual

negligence of duties and lack of interest in the work, which is a

misconduct under the relevant standing order of the respondent-

Company, then burden lies upon the employee concerned to prove

otherwise by placing relevant material on record. Herein the present

case, it is the contention of the petitioner that he cannot be termed as

habitual absentee and his earlier antecedents cannot be taken into

consideration is not tenable in the eye of law. The relevant

observations made in paras-3, 4, 5 and 9 read as under :

“3. The employer approached the Delhi High Court and learned Single

judge of the Court held that the disapproval by the Tribunal was not in

order. The concerned employees preferred Letters Patent Appeals before

the Delhi High Court. A Division Bench of the Court by the impugned

judgment disposed of several L.P.As. being of the view that the Tribunal’s

conclusions were in order and the learned Single Judge was not correct in

his conclusions.

4. In support of the Appeals learned counsel for the appellant- employer

Corporation submitted that the Division Bench of the High Court has missed

to notice the true effect of paras 4(ii) and 19(h) of the Standing Orders.

Erroneously it was concluded that leave without pay meant grant of leave.

It is nothing but keeping the record straight and for the purpose of

maintaining correct record of service. It did not amount to sanction of

leave. The Standing Order clearly stipulates that the leave was to be

obtained in advance. Above being the position, the Division Bench was not

Page 18 of 32

C/SCA/12744/2020 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 09/02/2026

justified in interfering with the orders of the learned Single Judge.

5. In response, learned counsel for the concerned employees submitted

that where the record shows that the absence was treated as leave without

pay, it meant that leave was granted and mere long absence does not per

se show lack of interest in work, something more was necessary for the

purpose and the Tribunal therefore was justified in its view.

9. When an employee absents himself from duty, even without sanctioned

leave for very long period, it prima facie shows lack of interest in work. Para

19(h) of the Standing Order as quoted above relates to habitual negligence

of duties and lack of interest in the Authority’s work. When an employee

absents himself from duty without sanctioned leave the Authority can, on

the basis of the record, come to a conclusion about the employee being

habitually negligent in duties and an exhibited lack of interest in the

employer’s work. Ample material was produced before the Tribunal in each

case to show as to how the concerned employees were remaining absent

for long periods which affect the work of the employer and the concerned

employee was required at least to bring some material on record to show

as to how his absence was on the basis of sanctioned leave and as to how

there was no negligence. Habitual absence is a factor which establishes

lack of interest in work. There cannot be any sweeping generalization. But

at the same time some telltale features can be noticed and pressed into

service to arrive at conclusions in the departmental proceedings.”

8.5Recently, this Court had an occasion to consider the identical

issue with regard to unauthorized absence in case of Keshavbhai

Juthabhai Jethwa vs. Tourism Officer, Gujarat Tourism

Corporation Ltd. and Ors., in Special Civil Application No.

20708 of 2018, decided on 18.09.2024, wherein this Court, after

considering the relevant provisions of the Corporation and after

considering the decisions of the Hon’ble Apex Court as well as this

Court cited before the Court, has passed the order dismissing the

petition. So far as the scope and power of judicial review of the

discretion exercised by the employer to impose the particular penalty

on the delinquent employee is concerned, the Supreme Court has

repeatedly emphasized that the High Courts or the Tribunals cannot

exercise appellate jurisdiction in such matters and substitute their

opinion for the one formed by the disciplinary authority. It has been

held that the punishment imposed by the competent authority cannot

Page 19 of 32

C/SCA/12744/2020 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 09/02/2026

be modified / substituted with a lesser penalty unless the Court is

satisfied that the same is grossly or shockingly disproportionate or is

so unreasonable that no person of reasonable prudence would have

imposed such punishment in the facts and circumstances of the case.

8.6It is also worthwhile to refer to the decision of this Court in the

case of Pradeepkumar Thakur vs. State Bank of India and 1

other, reported in [2024] 2 GLH 149, wherein this Court has held

and observed as under :

“10. It is also worthwhile to refer to the judgment of the Division Bench of

this Court dated 06.01.2014 rendered in Letters Patent Appeal No.915 of

2013 wherein the Division Bench has observed in para-7 as under:-

“7. It is a settled proposition of law by a catena of judgments of the Apex

Court that the Court cannot usurp the jurisdiction of disciplinary authority

and decide the quantum of punishment. The principle governing judicial

review of punishment inflicted on the delinquent by the disciplinary

authority can be summed up as under;

(a) When charge(s) of misconduct is proved in an enquiry the quantum of

punishment to be imposed in a particular case is essentially the domain of

the departmental authorities;

(b) The Courts cannot assume the function of disciplinary / departmental

authorities and to decide nature of function the quantum penalty is to be of

punishment awarded, exclusively as within and this the jurisdiction of the

competent authority;

(c) Limited judicial review is available to interfere with the punishment

imposed by the disciplinary authority, only in cases where such penalty is

found to be shocking to the conscience of the Court;”

11. It is also worthwhile to refer to the decision of this Court in the case of C

S. Amin Vs. Assistant General Manager SBI, Region III & 2 reported in 2016

LawSuit (Guj) 1916 and Bhikhubhai Kamabhai Dabhi Vs. Surat Municipal

Corporation and 2 reported in 2017 LawSuit (Guj) 9 where in this Court has

decided similar issue as involved in the present petition.

12. In the case of C. S. Amin (supra), this Court has held and observed in

paras – 29, 30 and 31 as under:-

“29. I may quote the observations of the Division Bench as under:- The

doctrine of proportionality and Wednesbury rule evolved in England in

Page 20 of 32

C/SCA/12744/2020 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 09/02/2026

Council of Civil Services Union Vs. Minister for Civil Services (1983) 1 AC

768 and Associated Provincial Picture Houses Limited Vs. Wednesbury

Corporation - 1948 2 All ER 680 have been applied by the Courts in India in

various decisions. In Union of India Vs. C.G. Ganayutham - AIR 1997 SC

3387, the Supreme Court considered the ambit and scope of the doctrine of

proportionality and Wednesbury rule in the light of various judicial

pronouncements and laid down the following propositions: "

(1) To judge the validity of any administrative order or statutory discretion

normally the Wednesbury test is to be applied to find out if the decision was

illegal or suffered from procedural improprieties or was one which no

sensible decision-maker could, on the material before him and within the

framework of the law, have arrived at. The Court would consider whether

relevant matters had not been taken into account or whether irrelevant

matters had been taken into account or whether the action was not

bonafide. The Court would also consider whether the decision was absurd

or perverse. The Court would not however go into the correctness of the

choice made by the administrator amongst the various alternatives open to

him. Nor could the Court substitute its decision to that of the administrator.

This is the Wednesbury test.

(2) The Court would not interfere with the administrator's decision unless it

was illegal or suffered from procedural impropriety or was irrational in the

sense that it was in outrageous defiance of logic or moral standards. The

possibility of other tests, including proportionality being brought into

English Administrative Law in future is not ruled out. These are the CCSU

principles.

(3)(a) As per Bugdaycay, Brind and Smith, as long as the European Human

Rights Convention (Contention) is not incorporated into English Law, the

English Courts merely exercise a secondary judgement to find out if the

decision maker could have, on the material before him, arrived at the

primary judgment in the manner he has done.

(3)(b) If the Convention is incorporated in England making available the

principle of proportionality, then the English Courts will render primary

judgement on the validity of the administrative action and find out if the

restriction is disproportionate or excessive or is not based upon a fair

balancing of the fundamental freedom and the need for the restriction

thereupon.

(4)(a) The position in our country in administrative law, where no

fundamental freedoms are involved, is that the Courts/Tribunals will only

play a secondary role while the primary judgement as to reasonableness

will remain with the executive or administrative authority. The secondary

judgement of the Court is to be based on Wednesbury the CCSU principles

as stated by Lord Greene and Lord Diplock respectively to find if the

executive or administrative authority has reasonably arrived at his decision

as the primary authority.

(4)(b) Whether in the case of administrative or executive action affecting

Page 21 of 32

C/SCA/12744/2020 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 09/02/2026

fundamental freedoms, the Courts in our country will apply the principle of

'proportionality' and assume a primary role, is left open, to be decided in an

appropriate case where such action is alleged to offend fundamental

freedoms."

In Apparel Export Promotion Council Vs. A.K. Chopra - (1999) 1 SCC 759, the

Supreme Court reiterated the otherwise well settled principles of law on the

scope of judicial review of disciplinary action taken by the employer and

laid down the following propositions:-

"It is a settled position that in departmental proceedings, the disciplinary

authority is the sole judge of facts and in case an appeal is presented to the

appellate authority, the appellate authority has also the power/and

jurisdiction to re-appreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion,

on facts, being the sole fact-finding authorities. Once findings of fact, based

on appreciation of evidence are recorded, the High Court in writ jurisdiction

may not normally interfere with those factual findings unless it finds that

the recorded findings were based either on no evidence or that the findings

were wholly perverse and/or legally untenable. The adequacy or

inadequacy of the evidence is not permitted to be canvassed before the

High Court. Since the High Court does not sit as an appellate authority over

the factual findings recorded during departmental proceedings, while

exercising the power of judicial review, the High Court cannot, normally

speaking, substitute its own conclusion, with regard to the guilt of the

delinquent, for that of the departmental authorities. Even in so far as

imposition of penalty or punishment is concerned, unless the punishment or

penalty imposed by the disciplinary or the departmental appellate

authority, is either impermissible or such that it shocks the conscience of

the High Court, it should not normally substitute its own opinion and impose

some other punishment or penalty.

Further, it is a well-settled principle that even though judicial review of

administrative action must remain flexible and its dimension not closed, yet

the court, in exercise of the power of judicial review, is not concerned with

the correctness of the findings of fact on the basis of which the orders are

made so long as those findings are reasonably supported by evidence and

have been arrived at through proceedings which cannot be faulted with for

procedural illegalities or irregularities which vitiate the process by which

the decision was arrived at. Judicial review, is directed not against the

decision, but is confined to the examination of the decision-making process.

Judicial review, not being an appeal from a decision, but a review of the

manner in which the decision was arrived at, the court, while exercising the

power of judicial review, must remain conscious of the fact that if the

decision has been arrived at by the administrative authority after following

the principles established by law and the rules of natural justice and the

individual has received a fair treatment to meet the case against him, the

court cannot substitute its judgement for that of the administrative

authority on a matter which fell squarely within the sphere of jurisdiction of

that authority."

Page 22 of 32

C/SCA/12744/2020 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 09/02/2026

In Om Kumar Vs. Union of India - AIR 2000 SC 3689, the Supreme Court

traced the history of the principle of proportionality, referred to the

propositions culled out in Ganayutham's case (supra), noticed the decision

of the House of Lords in R. Vs. Chief Constable of Sussesc ex.p.

International Trader's Ferry Ltd. (1999) 1 All ER 129, wherein the principles

of Wednesbury and proportionality were almost equated and held that

where the decision of an administrative authority is attacked being

arbitrary, the principle of secondary review will have to be kept in mind.

Paragraphs 28, 29 66 to 71 of this judgement which theortises the law on

the subject are reproduced below:

"28. By 'proportionality' we mean the question whether, while regulating

exercise of fundamental rights, the appropriate or least restrictive choice of

measures has been made by the Legislature or the Administrator so as to

achieve the object of the legislation or the purpose of the administrative

order, as the case may be. Under the principle, the Court will see that the

Legislature and the administrative authority 'maintain a proper balance

between the adverse effects which the legislation or the administrative

order may have on the rights, liberties, or interests of persons keeping in

mind the purpose which they were intended to serve. The Legislature and

the administrative authority are, however, given an area of discretion or a

range of choices but as to whether the choice made infringes the rights

excessively or not is for the Court. That is what is meant by

proportionality."

"29. The above principle of proportionality has been applied by the

European Court to protect the rights guaranteed under the European

Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,

1950 and in particular, for considering whether restrictions imposed were

restrictions which were 'necessary' - within Arts.8 to 11 of the said

Convention (corresponding to our Art. 19(1) and to find out whether the

restrictions imposed on fundamental freedoms were more excessive than

required. (Handyside V. UK (1976) 1 EHR p.737) Articles 2 and 5 of the

Convention contain provisions similar to Art. 21 of our Constitution relating

to life and liberty. The European Court has applied the principle of

proportionality also to questions of discrimination under Art. 14 of the

Convention (corresponding to Art.14 of our Constitution). (See European

Administrative Law by J. Schwaze, 1992. Pp.677- 866)."

"66. It is clear from the above discussion that in India where administrative

action is challenged under Art.14 as being discriminatory, equals are

treated unequally or unequals are treated equally, the question is for the

constitutional Courts as primary reviewing Courts to consider correctness of

the level of discrimination applied and whether it is excessive and whether

it has a nexus with the objective intended to be achieved by the

Administrator. Here the Court deals with the merits of the balancing action

of the Administrator and is, in essence, applying 'proportionality' and is a

primary reviewing authority."

"67. But where, an administrative action is challenged as 'arbitrary' under

Art. 14 on the basis of Royappa (as in cases where punishments in

Page 23 of 32

C/SCA/12744/2020 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 09/02/2026

disciplinary cases are challenged), the question will be whether the

administrative order is 'rational' or 'reasonable' and the test then is the

Wednesbury test. The Courts would then be confined only to a secondary

role and will only have to see whether the Administrator has done well in

his primary role, whether he has acted illegally or has omitted relevant

factors from consideration or has taken irrelevant factors in to

consideration or whether his view is one which no reasonable person could

have taken. If his action does not satisfy these rules, it is to be treated as

arbitrary. (In G.B. Mahajan V. Jalgaon Municipal Council (1991) 3 SCC 91 at

p. 111 :(AIR 1991 SC 1153 at . 1165), Venkatachaliah, J. (as he then was)

pointed out that 'reasonableness' of the Administrator under Art. 14 in the

context of Administrative Law has to be judged from the stand point of

Wednesbury rules. In Tata Cellular V. Union of India (1994) 6 SCC 651 at Pp.

679- 680: (1994 AIR SCW 3344 and at Pp.3369-70 In Regional Manager U.P.

SRTC V. Hoti Lal, (2003) 3 SCC 605, the Supreme Court outlined the mode

to be adopted for determining whether the punishment imposed by the

disciplinary authority is shockingly disproportionate and observed as

under:: AIR 1996 SC 11); Indian Express Newspapers Vs. Union of India

(1985) 1 SCC 641 at p.691: (AIR 1986 SC 515 at Pp.542- 43): Supreme

Court Employees' Welfare Association V. Union of India (1989) 4 SCC 187 at

p.241 : (AIR 1990 SC 334 at p.368: 1990 Lab IC 324 at p.358) and U.P.

Financial Corporation V. GEM CAP (India) Pvt.Ltd. (1993) 2 SCC 299, at p.

307: (1993 SC 1435 at p.1439), while judging whether the administrative

action is 'arbitrary' under Art.14 (i.e.otherwise than being discriminatory),

this Court has confined itself to a Wednesbury review always."

"71. Thus, from the above principles and decided cases, it must be held

that where an administrative decision relating to punishment in disciplinary

cases is questioned as 'arbitrary' under Art.14, the Court is confined to

Wednesbury principles as a secondary reviewing authority. The Court will

not apply proportionality as a primary reviewing Court because no issue of

fundamental freedoms nor of discrimination under Art.14 applies in such a

context. The Court while reviewing punishment and if it is satisfied that

Wednesbury principles are violated, it has normally to remit the matter to

the Administrator for a fresh decision as to the quantum of punishment.

Only in rate cases where there has been long delay in the time taken by the

disciplinary proceedings and in the time taken in the Courts, and (in) such

extreme or rate cases can the Court substitute its own view as to the

quantum of punishment."

In Regional Manager U.P. SRTC V. Hoti Lal (2003) 3 SCC 605, the Supreme

Court outlined the mode to be adopted for determining whether the

punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority is shockingly

disproportionate and observed as under:

"The Court or tribunal while dealing with the quantum of punishment has to

record reasons as to why it is felt that the punishment was not

commensurate with the proved charges. The scope for interference is very

limited and restricted to exceptional cases. In the impugned order of the

High Court no reasons whatsoever have been indicated as to why the

punishment was considered disproportionate. Failure to give reasons

Page 24 of 32

C/SCA/12744/2020 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 09/02/2026

amounts to denial of justice. A mere statement that it is disproportionate

would not suffice. It is not only the amount involved but the mental set-up,

the type of duty performed and similar relevant circumstances which go in

to the decision-making process while considering whether the punishment

is proportionate or disproportionate. If the charged employee holds a

position of trust where honesty and integrity are inbuilt requirements of

functioning, it would not be proper to deal with the matter leniently.

Misconduct in such cases has to be dealt with iron hands. Where the person

deals with public money or is engaged in financial transactions or acts in a

fiduciary capacity, the highest degree of integrity and trustworthiness is a

must and unexceptional." (underlining is ours)

In Director General, RPF V. Ch. Sai Babu (2003) 4 SCC 331, the Supreme

Court reiterated that the High Court should ordinarily not interfere with the

discretion exercised by the disciplinary authority in the matter of imposition

of punishment and observed:

"Normally, the punishment imposed by a disciplinary authority should not

be disturbed by the High Court or a tribunal except in appropriate cases

that too only after reaching a conclusion that the punishment imposed is

grossly or shockingly disproportionate, after examining all the relevant

factors including the nature of the charges proved, the past conduct,

penalty imposed earlier, the nature of duties assigned having due regard to

their sensitiveness, exactness expected and discipline required to be

maintained, and the department / establishment in which the delinquent

person concerned works."

30. The above noted decision of this Court gives a clear idea of the limited

scope of judicial review of the discretion exercised by the employer to

impose the particular penalty on the delinquent employee. The Supreme

Court has repeatedly emphasised that the High Courts cannot exercise

appellate jurisdiction in such matters and substitute their opinion for the

one formed by the disciplinary authority. It has also been held that the

punishment imposed by the competent authority cannot be

modified/substituted with a lesser penalty unless the Court is satisfied that

the same is grossly or shockingly disproportionate or is so unreasonable

that no person of reasonable prudence would have imposed such

punishment in the facts and circumstances of the case.

31. For determination of the question whether the punishment imposed by

the disciplinary authority is grossly or shockingly disproportionate, the

Court has to take into consideration all the relevant factors including the

nature of charges proved, the past conduct of the employee, the

punishment if any imposed earlier, the nature of duties assigned to the

employee having due regard to their sensitiveness, performance norms if

any laid down by the employer and above all the paramount requirement of

maintaining discipline in the service.”

13. In the case of Bhikhubhai Kamabhai Dabhi (supra), this Court has held

and observed in paras – 17, 18 and 21 as under:-

Page 25 of 32

C/SCA/12744/2020 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 09/02/2026

“17. It is now well settled by a plethora of judgments of the Supreme Court

that in exercise of its powers under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution

of India should not venture into the reappreciation of evidence or interfere

with the conclusion arrived at by the disciplinary authority in the inquiry

proceedings, if the same are conducted in accordance with law or go into

the reliability / adequacy of evidence, or interfere, if there is some legal

evidence on which the findings are based, or correct error of fact however

grave it may be, or go into the proportionality of punishment unless it

shocks the conscience.

18. It is equally well settled that the High Courts in exercise of its powers

under Articles 226 and 227 can only consider whether the inquiry held by

the competent authority was in accordance with the procedure established

by law, and the principles of natural justice,whether irrelevant or

extraneous consideration and/or exclusion of admissible or material

evidence or admission of inadmissible evidence being influenced the

decision rendering it vulnerable.

21. In a very recent pronouncement in the case of Union of India and others

v. P. Gunasekaran [2015(2) SCC 610], the Supreme Court in details has

explained the position of law so far as the scope of interference in the

matter relating to the disciplinary proceedings is concerned. I may quote

the observations made by the Supreme Court from paras 12 to 20 as under:

“12. Despite the well settled position, it is painfully disturbing to note that

the High Court has acted as an appellate authority in the disciplinary

proceedings, re- appreciating even the evidence before the enquiry officer.

The finding on Charge No. 1 was accepted by the disciplinary authority and

was also endorsed by the Central Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary

proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first

appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Article 226/227 of

the Constitution of India, shall not venture into reappreciation of the

evidence. The High Court can only see whether:

(a). the enquiry is held by a competent authority;

(b). the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that

behalf;

(c). there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the

proceedings;

(d). the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair

conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits

of the case;

(e). the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant

or extraneous considerations;

(f). the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and

capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such

Page 26 of 32

C/SCA/12744/2020 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 09/02/2026

conclusion;

(g). the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible

and material evidence;

(h). the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible

evidence which influenced the finding;

(i). the finding of fact is based on no evidence.

13. Under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall

not:

(i). reappreciate the evidence;

(ii). interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has been

conducted in accordance with law;

(iii). go into the adequacy of the evidence;

(iv). go into the reliability of the evidence;

(v). interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be

based;

(vi). correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be;

(vii). go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its

conscience.

14. In one of the earliest decisions in State of Andhra Pradesh and others v.

S. Sree Rama Rao1, many of the above principles have been discussed and

it has been concluded thus:

"7. .....The High Court is not constituted in a proceeding under Article 226 of

the Constitution a court of appeal over the decision of the authorities

holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant: it is concerned to

determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that

behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and

whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Where there is some

evidence, which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry

has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion

that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of

the High Court in a petition for a writ under Article 226 to review the

evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. The High

Court may undoubtedly interfere where the departmental authorities have

held the proceedings against the delinquent in a manner inconsistent with

the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing

the mode of enquiry or where the authorities have disabled themselves

from reaching a fair decision by some considerations extraneous to the

evidence and the merits of the case or by allowing themselves to be

Page 27 of 32

C/SCA/12744/2020 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 09/02/2026

influenced by irrelevant considerations or where the conclusion on the very

face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person

could ever have arrived at that conclusion, or on similar grounds. But the

departmental authorities are, if the enquiry is otherwise properly held, the

sole judges of facts and if there be some legal evidence on which their

findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a

matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a

proceeding for a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution."

15. In State of Andhra Pradesh and others v. Chitra Venkata Rao [(1975) 2

SCC 557], the principles have been further discussed at paragraphs 21 to

24, which read as follows:

"21. The scope of Article 226 in dealing with departmental inquiries has

come up before this Court. Two propositions were laid down by this Court in

State of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao (AIR 1963 SC 1723). First, there is no

warrant for the view that in considering whether a public officer is guilty of

misconduct charged against him, the rule followed in criminal trials that an

offence is not established unless proved by evidence beyond reasonable

doubt to the satisfaction of the Court must be applied. If that rule be not

applied by a domestic tribunal of inquiry the High Court in a petition under

Article 226 of the Constitution is not competent to declare the order of the

authorities holding a departmental enquiry invalid. The High Court is not a

court of appeal under Article 226 over the decision of the authorities

holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant. The Court is

concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority

competent in that behalf and according to the procedure prescribed in that

behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Second,

where there is some evidence which the authority entrusted with the duty

to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably

support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it

is not the function of the High Court to review the evidence and to arrive at

an independent finding on the evidence. The High Court may interfere

where the departmental authorities have held the proceedings against the

delinquent in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in

violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the

authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair decision by some

considerations extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the case or by

allowing themselves to be influenced by irrelevant considerations or where

the conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious

that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at that conclusion. The

departmental authorities are, if the enquiry is otherwise properly held, the

sole judges of facts and if there is some legal evidence on which their

findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a

matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a

proceeding for a writ under Article 226.

22. Again, this Court in Railway Board, representing the Union of India, New

Delhi v. Niranjan Singh (AIR 1969 SC 966) said that the High Court does not

interfere with the conclusion of the disciplinary authority unless the finding

is not supported by any evidence or it can be said that no reasonable

Page 28 of 32

C/SCA/12744/2020 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 09/02/2026

person could have reached such a finding. In Niranjan Singh case this Court

held that the High Court exceeded its powers in interfering with the findings

of the disciplinary authority on the charge that the respondent was

instrumental in compelling the shutdown of an air compressor at about 8.15

a.m. on May 31, 1956. This Court said that the Enquiry Committee felt that

the evidence of two persons that the respondent led a group of strikers and

compelled them to close down their compressor could not be accepted at

its face value. The General Manager did not agree with the Enquiry

Committee on that point. The General Manager accepted the evidence. This

Court said that it was open to the General Manager to do so and he was not

bound by the conclusion reached by the committee. This Court held that

the conclusion reached by the disciplinary authority should prevail and the

High Court should not have interfered with the conclusion.

23. The jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari under Article 226 is a

supervisory jurisdiction. The Court exercises it not as an appellate court.

The findings of fact reached by an inferior court or tribunal as a result of the

appreciation of evidence are not reopened or questioned in writ

proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can

be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may

appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by a tribunal, a writ can

be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the tribunal had

erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had

erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the

impugned finding. Again if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that

would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of

certiorari. A finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged

on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the

Tribunal is insufficient or inadequate to sustain a finding. The adequacy or

sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn

from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal.

See Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan (AIR 1964 SC 477).

24. The High Court in the present case assessed the entire evidence and

came to its own conclusion. The High Court was not justified to do so. Apart

from the aspect that the High Court does not correct a finding of fact on the

ground that the evidence is not sufficient or adequate, the evidence in the

present case which was considered by the Tribunal cannot be scanned by

the High Court to justify the conclusion that there is no evidence which

would justify the finding of the Tribunal that the respondent did not make

the journey. The Tribunal gave reasons for its conclusions. It is not possible

for the High Court to say that no reasonable person could have arrived at

these conclusions. The High Court reviewed the evidence, reassessed the

evidence and then rejected the evidence as no evidence. That is precisely

what the High Court in exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari

should not do."

16. These principles have been succinctly summed up by the living legend

and centenarian Justice V. R. Krishna Iyer in State of Haryana and another

v. Rattan Singh [(1977) 2 SCC 491]. To quote the unparalled and inimitable

expressions:

Page 29 of 32

C/SCA/12744/2020 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 09/02/2026

"4. ...... in a domestic enquiry the strict and sophisticated rules of evidence

under the Indian Evidence Act may not apply. All materials which are

logically probative for a prudent mind are permissible. There is no allergy to

hearsay evidence provided it has reasonable nexus and credibility. It is true

that departmental authorities and Administrative Tribunals must be careful

in evaluating such material and should not glibly swallow what is strictly

speaking not relevant under the Indian Evidence Act. For this proposition it

is not necessary to cite decisions nor text books, although we have been

taken through case law and other authorities by counsel on both sides. The

essence of a judicial approach is objectivity, exclusion of extraneous

materials or considerations and observance of rules of natural justice. Of

course, fair play is the basis and if perversity or arbitrariness, bias or

surrender of independence of judgment vitiate the conclusions reached,

such finding, even though of a domestic tribunal, cannot be held good. ..…"

17. In all the subsequent decisions of this Court up to the latest in Chennai

Water Supply and Sewarage Board v. T. T. Murali Babu (2014) 4 SCC 108 :

(AIR 2014 SC 1141), these principles have been consistently followed

adding practically nothing more or altering anything.

18. On Article I, the disciplinary authority, while imposing the punishment of

compulsory retirement in the impugned order dated 28.02.2000, had

arrived at the following findings:

"Article was held as proved by the Inquiry authority after evaluating the

evidence adduced in the case. Under the circumstances of the case, the

evidence relied on viz., letter dated 11.12.92 written by Shri P.

Gunasekaran, provides a reasonable nexus to the charge framed against

him and he did not controvert the contents of the said letter dated 11.12.92

during the time of inquiry. Nor did he produce any defence witness during

the inquiry to support his claims including that on 23.11.92 he left the office

on permission. There is nothing to indicate that he was handicapped in

producing his defence witness. .…"

19. The disciplinary authority, on scanning the inquiry report and having

accepted it, after discussing the available and admissible evidence on the

charge, and the Central Administrative Tribunal having endorsed the view

of the disciplinary authority, it was not at all open to the High Court to re

appreciate the evidence in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226/227

of the Constitution of India. 20 Equally, it was not open to the High Court, in

exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India,

to go into the proportionality of punishment so long as the punishment does

not shock the conscience of the court. In the instant case, the disciplinary

authority has come to the conclusion that the respondent lacked integrity.

No doubt, there are no measurable standards as to what is integrity in

service jurisprudence but certainly there are indicators for such

assessment. Integrity according to Oxford dictionary is "moral uprightness;

honesty". It takes in its sweep, probity, innocence, trustfulness, openness,

sincerity, blamelessness, immaculacy, rectitude, uprightness, virtuousness,

righteousness, goodness, cleanness, decency, honour, reputation, nobility,

Page 30 of 32

C/SCA/12744/2020 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 09/02/2026

irreproachability, purity, respectability, genuineness, moral excellence etc.

In short, it depicts sterling character with firm adherence to a code of moral

values.”

8.7The standing order no.18(28) of the respondent-Company reads

thus :

“18. Misconduct :

(28) Repeated absence without leave or absence for more than 12

consecutive days without leave or excessive absence or absence even after

approved leave without satisfactory explanation.”

8.8In case of L & T Komatsu Limited vs. N. Udayakumar ,

reported in [2008] 1 SCC 224, the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed

that what circumstances are to be kept in mind by the High Courts or

the Labour Courts or the Tribunals while exercising powers under

Section 11A of the Act, the relevant observations made in para-6

onwards, wherein, the Hon’ble Apex Court has clarified with regard to

the scope and power of the courts while interfering with the order of

punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority and subsequently,

confirmed by the Appellate Authority, which was again reiterated in

case of Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage

Board vs. T.T. Murali Babu, reported in [2014] 4 SCC 108, more

particularly in paras-19, 21 and 22 and thus, in the present case,

considering the totality of facts, the Labour Court has not committed

any error while dismissing the reference and no interference is

required to be called for in the present petition.

9.On perusal of the inquiry report of the inquiry officer and the

order of the disciplinary authority, I am of the opinion that the

punishment of dismissal inflicted on the petitioner vis-a-vis the proven

misconduct is not so disproportionate as would shock the conscience

of this Court warranting interference. Considering the totality of facts,

Page 31 of 32

C/SCA/12744/2020 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 09/02/2026

I am of opinion that the authorities have rightly arrived at the

conclusion that the petitioner was guilty of misconduct, which was

sufficient to remove him from the service. This Court finds no reasons

to interfere with the same either.

10.Considering overall facts and circumstances of the case and the

decisions of the Hon’ble Apex Court as well as this Court, I am of the

opinion that, the present petition being devoid of any merits, deserves

to be dismissed.

11.In the result, the petition stands dismissed. The impugned

award passed by the Labour Court is hereby confirmed. Rule is

discharged. There shall be no order as to costs.

(HEMANT M. PRACHCHHAK,J)

Dolly

Page 32 of 32