WP(Crl) 3868/2025 Page 1 of 19

* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

Reserved on: 17.03.2026

Pronounced on: 08.04.2026

+ W.P.(CRL) 3868/2025

CHRISTIAN MICHEL JAMES .....Petitioner

Through: Mr.Aljo K.Joseph, Adv.

versus

UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. .....Respondents

Through: Mr.Satya Ranjan Swain, CGSC

with Mr.Kautilya Birat, GP for

R-1 & 2.

Mr.D.P. Singh, ASG/Special

Counsel with Mr.Manu Mishra,

Mr.Iman Khera, Ms.Garima

Saxena, Advs. for R-3 & 4.

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE NAVIN CHAWLA

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAVINDER DUDEJA

J U D G M E N T

NAVIN CHAWLA, J.

1. This petition has been filed by the petitioner praying for the

following reliefs:

“a) Issue writ, order or direction in the nature

of declaration that that the Article 17 of Indian

UAE Extradition Treaty is ultra-virus Article

21, 245 and 253 of the Constitution of India to

the extent the expression in Article 17 of the

treaty “anything connected there with” gives

liberty to the prosecution to read other

offences and sections into the chargesheet filed

against a fugitive Extradited from UAE, Ultra

virus of Section 21 of the Extradition Act 1962.

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b) Issue appropriate Writ order direction

declaring that non application of the Section

21 of the Extradition Act and considering the

provisions of treaty above the law made by

Parliament under Article 245 of the

Constitution of India violate the Fundamental

Rights of the petitioner under Article 21 of the

Constitution.

c) Issue appropriate writ order direction, in

the nature of writ of Certiorari quashing the

order dated 07.08.2025 passed by the Hon’ble

CBI Court and declare that the order passed

by the CBI court Annexure P-15 is illegal and

violative of Section 21 of the Extradition Act

consequently declare that the prolonged

incarceration of the petitioner is illegal and

direct the Trial Court to comply with the

provisions of 436 A Cr.P.C.”

BRIEF FACTS:

2. A brief background of facts giving rise to the present petition is

that the Central Bureau of Investigation („CBI‟), (respondent no.4

herein) registered RC No. 217-2013-A-0003 dated 12.03.2013 under

Section 120B read with Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860

(hereinafter referred to „IPC‟) and Sections 7, 8, 9, 12, 13(2) and

13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 alleging therein

that Air Headquarters of the Indian Air Force, after obtaining approval

from Raksha Mantri, issued Request for Proposal (hereinafter referred

as „RFP‟) in March, 2002 to 11 vendors for procurement of eight

helicopters for VVIPs thereby replacing the then existing MI-8

helicopters. Amongst others, Air HQ prescribed a mandatory altitude

requirement of 6000 meters for such helicopters. Only four firms

responded to the RFP, and three helicopters, namely MI-172, EC-225

WP(Crl) 3868/2025 Page 3 of 19

and EH-101 (subsequently known as AW-101) were selected by the

Technical Evaluation Committee for a flight evaluation. Out of the

three, only MI-172 and EC-225 were flight evaluated as EH-101

(AW-101) could not be evaluated in view of the vendor stating that

the helicopter was certified to fly upto an altitude of 4572 meters

(15000 feet) only, as against the mandatory requirement of 6000

meters. Though makers of EH-101(AW-101) promised to produce

certification to the effect that helicopter is capable of flying upto 6000

meters, they could not submit the same. As a consequence, two

helicopters, namely MI-172 and EC-225, underwent flight trial. Out of

these two, MI-172 did not conform to several mandatory parameters,

however, EC-225 helicopters qualified under all the parameters during

Field Evaluation Trial (hereinafter referred as „FET‟). The FET report

was then sent to Ministry of Defence (hereinafter referred to as

„MoD‟) in May, 2003 for approval.

3. It was further alleged that in June 2003, the Technical Manager

(Air) in MoD asked Air HQ to reassess the EC-225 and also obtain the

opinion of the Prime Minister's Office (hereinafter referred to as

„PMO‟) with regard to the suitability of cabin height. In a meeting

convened by the PMO on 19.11.2003 with representatives of MoD,

Air HQ and Special Protection Group (SPG), the PMO observed that

framing of mandatory requirements had effectively led to a single

vendor situation and this problem would not have arisen if the option

of the mandatory requirement for operational altitude at 4500 meter

and the higher flying ceiling limit of 6000 meters with a cabin height

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of 1.8 meter had been made as desirable instead of being mandatory.

Thereafter, the said matter was deliberated at several levels in 2004

amongst different departments. However, the Indian Air Force had

held its consistent and persistent stand for not reducing the flying

altitude limit of 6000 meters due to security constraints and other

related issues.

4. It is alleged that Mr. S.P. Tyagi was appointed as Chief of Air

Staff (hereinafter referred to as „CAS‟) on 30.10.2004 and in the

month of March, 2005, he approved the request to reduce the ceiling

limit of VVIP helicopters from 6000 metres to 4500 metres as

desirable rather than mandatory. It is alleged that Mr. Guido Haschke

and Mr. Carlo Gerosa, in conspiracy with Mr. Bruno Spagnolini, CEO

of M/s AgustaWestland International Ltd., had paid Euro 326,000/- to

Mr. S.P. Tyagi as kickbacks in order to subvert the mandatory flying

altitude of 6000 metres to 4500 metres of the VVIP helipcopters so as

to make M/s AgustaWestland eligible to bid for the aforesaid deal. It

is further alleged that the petitioner was acting as a middleman for the

said deal to be awarded to M/s AgustaWestland.

5. A Charge Sheet was thereafter filed by the CBI in the said case

on 31.08.2017, alongside seeking permission for further investigation,

naming the petitioner as one of the accused persons involved.

6. As the petitioner was based in Dubai, the Investigating Agency

started the process of the extradition of the petitioner to India from

Dubai. The same resulted in the Extradition Decree dated 02.09.2018

WP(Crl) 3868/2025 Page 5 of 19

allowing the said request. The petitioner was extradited to India on

04.12.2018.

7. The petitioner states that the issue of his extradition and

detention was considered by the United Nations Working Group on

Arbitrary Detention (UN WGAD), and in the recommendations passed

by the Human Rights Council Working Group on Arbitrary Detention

on its eighty-ninth session, held on 23-27 November 2020 in Opinion

No. 88/2020, it was opined that great human rights violations had

been committed by the Government of India in rendition and

continuation of the custody and custodial torture of the petitioner.

8. A Supplementary Charge- sheet was also filed by the CBI on

17.09.2020 and thereafter on 15.03.2022.

9. Respondent No. 4, that is, CBI, in its chargesheet, had stated

that, from the investigation conducted it was revealed that the

petitioner had been running two firms and was acting as a middlemen

for facilitating the award of the contract for the supply of 12 VVIP

helicopters by the Government of India as he was having contacts in

the MoD and the Indian Air Force. It is alleged that the petitioner,

through these contacts, had procured confidential documents

belonging to the IAF and MoD and then had sent the same to Mr.

Bruno Spagnolini and other persons. It was further alleged that, vide a

Service Agreement dated 01.03.2010, M/s Global Services FZE,

Dubai was engaged to assist and advise M/s Agusta Westland

International Ltd in implementing performance of contract for supply

of the said VVIP helicopters.

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10. The petitioner filed an application seeking bail before the CBI

Court, however, the same was dismissed vide order dated 18.06.2021.

The petitioner then filed an application seeking bail before this Court,

being Bail Appln. 2586/2021. The same, however, also stood

dismissed by this Court vide order dated 11.03.2022. The petitioner

challenged the said order before the Supreme Court by way of a

Special Leave Petition (Crl.) 4145/2022, which also came to be

dismissed vide the order dated 07.02.2023.

11. The petitioner then filed an application for release before the

learned Special Judge, CBI Court, claiming therein that he was in

custody for more than five years and three months which is longer

than the period prescribed for any of the offences charged against him.

The said application, however, was dismissed by the learned Special

Judge vide order dated 23.02.2024.

12. The petitioner then filed a Writ Petition being W.P.(Crl.)

140/2024 before the Supreme Court seeking his immediate release.

The Supreme Court, however, vide order dated 18.03.2024, declined

to entertain the same under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.

13. The petitioner also filed another application before this Court

seeking bail, being Bail Appln. 1338/2024, which again came to be

dismissed by this Court vide its order dated 25.09.2024. The

petitioner challenged the said order before the Supreme Court by way

of SLP (Crl) 17016/2024, wherein, vide an order dated 18.02.2025,

the Supreme Court directed the petitioner to be released on bail. As

WP(Crl) 3868/2025 Page 7 of 19

the petitioner has not complied with the condition for release on bail,

he continues to be in jail.

14. The petitioner again made a submission before the learned

Special Judge, CBI Court that he has already undergone the maximum

sentence prescribed for the offences with which he has been extradited

from Dubai and therefore, deserves to be released. However, the

learned Special Judge, vide order dated 07.08.2025, rejected the said

submission and the prayer made by the petitioner to be released.

Aggrieved whereof the petitioner has filed the present petition.

SUBMISSIONS OF THE LEARNED COUNSEL FOR THE

PETITIONER:

15. Mr.Aljo K. Joseph, the learned counsel for the petitioner,

submits that vide the Extradition Decree dated 02.09.2018 passed by

the Dubai Court, the petitioner had been extradited to India to face

trial for the offences under Sections 420 and 415 of the IPC and

Section 8 of the Prevention of Corruption Act only. Relying upon

Section 21 of the Extradition Act, 1962, the learned counsel for the

petitioner submits that the trial of the petitioner for the offence under

Section 467 of the IPC was, therefore, not maintainable.

16. He submits that the reliance of the respondents on the

Extradition Treaty dated 25.10.1999 published on 20.07.2000

(hereinafter referred to „Treaty‟) between India and UAE, and more

particularly Article 17 thereof, is ill-founded inasmuch as the use of

the word “offences connected therewith” cannot be read to include the

WP(Crl) 3868/2025 Page 8 of 19

offence for which accused has not been extradited from a foreign

country. He submits that to read it otherwise would be contrary to the

mandate of Section 21 of the Extradition Act, making the provision of

Treaty ultra vires Section 21 of the Extradition Act, as being contrary

to the Municipal Law. In support of his plea, he also placed reliance

on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Daya Singh Lahoria vs.

Union of India & Ors. (2001) 4 SCC 516.

17. Placing reliance on the judgments of the Supreme Court in

Gramophone Company of India Ltd. vs. Birendra Bahadur Pandey

and Ors. (1984) 2 SCC 534; and Commissioner of Customs,

Bangalore vs. G.M. Exports and Others (2016) 1 SCC 91, he submits

that as it is a well accepted international law that a person who has

been extradited cannot, without the consent of the Requested State, be

tried for offences other than the one for which he has been extradited,

the same should guide this Court even for interpreting not only

Section 21 of the Extradition Act but also Article 17 of the Treaty.

SUBMISSIONS OF MR. D.P. SINGH, LEARNED ASG ,

APPEARING FOR RESPONDENT NOS.3 AND 4:

18. On the other hand, Mr.D. P. Singh, the learned ASG, appearing

for the respondent nos.3 and 4 submits that the petitioner is guilty of

raising the same issue over and over again. Referring to the order

dated 11.03.2022 of this Court and the order dated 07.03.2023 of the

Supreme Court, he submits that the same issue was raised by the

petitioner, but was rejected by the Supreme Court stating that the same

can be considered only at the final stage of the trial, and the petitioner

WP(Crl) 3868/2025 Page 9 of 19

cannot today contend that he cannot be prosecuted for an offence

under Section 467 of the IPC.

19. He further submits that Article 17 of the Treaty expressly

provides that a person extradited can be tried for not only the offences

for which he has been extradited but also for the offences connected

therewith. He submits that Section 467 of the IPC is an offence

connected with the offences for which the petitioner was extradited, as

the Extradition Order itself records that the petitioner was being

sought to be extradited for “misuse of occupation or position, money

laundering, collusion, fraud, misappropriation and offering illegal

gratification”. He submits that, therefore, there is no merit in the

present challenge.

SUBMISSIONS OF MR.SATYA RANJAN SWAIN, LEARNED

CGSC FOR RESPONDENT NOS.1 AND 2.

20. Mr.Swain, the learned CGSC, appearing for the respondent

nos.1 and 2, while adopting the submissions of Mr.D. P. Singh, the

learned ASG, further submits that the expression “offences connected

therewith” appears not only in the Treaty with UAE, but also in the

Treaty between India and Oman and between India and Kuwait. The

very purpose of introducing the said expression in Article 17 of the

Treaty was to allow for the offence forming part of the same cause of

action to be tried. He submits that the Treaty, being Lex Specialis,

recognizes that complex transnational crimes often reveal deeper

levels of criminality as the trial progresses. The clause ensures that a

fugitive does not receive “technical immunity” for the offences.

WP(Crl) 3868/2025 Page 10 of 19

21. He submits that the Treaty is in conformity with Article 224

read with Article 253 of the Constitution of India and is not in any

manner ultra vires Section 21 of the Extradition Act. He submits that

the Treaty has also been notified in terms of Section 3(3) of the

Extradition Act.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS:

22. We have considered the submissions made by the learned

counsels for the parties.

23. Albeit for the purpose of deciding on the application filed by

the petitioner seeking bail, this Court, in its order dated 11.03.2022,

passed in Bail Appln. 2586/2021, on the same plea of the petitioner,

observed as under:

“16. Notably, the charge sheet against the

applicant has been filed for offences under

Section 120B read with Section 420 IPC and

Sections 7/8/9/12/13(2) read with Section

13(l)(d) of the PC Act. On a plain reading of

the judgment passed by the Dubai Supreme

Court; the Extradition Treaty signed between

UAE and the Republic of India; and the

authorities cited on, the issue by the parties,

this Court, prima facie, finds no merit in the

submission made on behalf of the applicant.

Even otherwise, the said submission would be

open to test at the time of framing of

Charge/trial.”

24. Aggrieved by the above, the petitioner had filed Special Leave

Petition, being SLP (Crl) 4145/2022, which came to be dismissed by

the Supreme Court vide order dated 07.02.2023, observing as under:

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“7. Article 17 of the Extradition Treaty

between India and the UAE contains the

following provision:

“1. The person to be extradited shall not

be tried or punished in the requesting

State except for the offence for which his

extradition is sought or for offences

connected therewith, or offences

committed after his extradition, If the

characterisation of the offence is

modified during the proceedings taken

against the person extradited, he shall

not be charged or tried, unless the

ingredients of the offence in its new

characterisation, permit extradition in

conformity with the provisions of this

Agreement.

2. If the person extradited had the liberty

and means to leave the territory of the

State to which he was extradited, and he

did not leave within thirty days

subsequent to his final release or left

during that period, but voluntarily

returned, he may be tried for the other

offences.”

8. From the above extract, it is evident that the

person to be extradited shall not be tried or

punished in the requesting State except for the

offences for which his extradition is sought or

for offences connected therewith.

9. Section 21 of the Extradition Act 1962 is in

the following terms:

“21. Accused or convicted person surrendered

or returned by foreign State not to be tried for

certain offences.―Whenever any person

accused or convicted of an offence, which, if

committed in India would be an extradition

offence, is surrendered or returned by a

foreign State, such person shall not, until he

has been restored or has had an opportunity of

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returning to that State, be tried in India for an

offence other than―

(a) the extradition offence in relation to which

he was surrendered or returned; or

(b) any lesser offence disclosed by the facts

proved for the purposes of securing his

surrender or return other than an offence in

relation to which an order for his surrender or

return could not be lawfully made; or (c) the

offence in respect of which the foreign State

has given its consent.”

10. In the present case, the extradition

offences in relation to which the petitioner was

returned appears from the text of the

extradition decree of the Dubai authorities,

which has been extracted earlier. The

extradition decree has to be read together with

the provisions of Article 17 of the India-UAE

Extradition Treaty.

11. The CBI initially registered a regular case

on 12 March 2013. The charge-sheet was

submitted on 31 August 2017. The CBI has

filed a supplementary charge-sheet on 17

September 2020. Further investigation under

Section 173(8) is stated to be in progress.

12. In the backdrop of the above discussion, it

has emerged before the Court that the

fundamental basis on which the petitioner has

sought bail, namely, under the provisions of

Section 436A, cannot be accepted as valid.

Besides the provisions of Sections 415 and 420

read with Section 120B IPC and Section 8 of

the PC Act, the petitioner is alleged to have

committed offences under Section 467 IPC

which is punishable with upto life

imprisonment. In this backdrop, the provisions

of Section 436A would not stand attracted in

the present case.”

WP(Crl) 3868/2025 Page 13 of 19

25. Therefore, the petitioner is merely trying to re-agitate the same

issue, which at least on prima facie basis stands considered by the

Supreme Court. The same may not be permissible.

26. Be that as it may, we have considered the submissions made by

the learned counsel for the petitioner.

27. Article 17 of the Treaty reads as under:

“Article 17

1. The person to be extradited shall not be

tried or punished in the requesting State

except for the offence for which his extradition

is sought or for offences connected therewith,

or offences committed after his extradition. If

the characterization of the offence is modified

during the proceedings taken against the

person extradited, he shall not be charged or

tried, unless the ingredients of the offence in

its new characterization, permit extradition in

conformity with the provisions of this

Agreement.

2. If the person extradited had the liberty

and means to leave the territory of the State to

which he was extradited, and he did not leave

within thirty days subsequent to his final

release or left during that period, but

voluritarily returned, he may be tried for the

other offences.”

(Emphasis supplied)

28. A plain reading of the above Article would show that the person

to be extradited can be tried for the offence for which his extradition is

sought “or for the offence connected therewith”. Therefore, Article 17

of the Treaty permits the prosecution of a person extradited, for the

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offence which may be made out against such person from the same

factual background asserted against the said person and on the basis of

which his extradition has been permitted by the other State or an

offence connected therewith.

29. Section 21 of the Extradition Act, reads as under:

“21. Accused or convicted person surrendered

or returned by foreign State not to be tried for

certain offences.―Whenever any person

accused or convicted of an offence, which, if

committed in India would be an extradition

offence, is surrendered or returned by a

foreign State, such person shall not, until he

has been restored or has had an opportunity of

returning to that State, be tried in India for an

offence other than―

(a) the extradition offence in relation to which

he was surrendered or returned; or

(b) any lesser offence disclosed by the facts

proved for the purposes of securing his

surrender or return other than an offence in

relation to which an order for his surrender or

return could not be lawfully made; or

(c) the offence in respect of which the foreign

State has given its consent.”

30. A reading of the above provision would show that a person

extradited cannot, until he has been restored or has had an opportunity

of returning to the State from which he was extradited, be tried in

India for the offences other than (i) extradition offences in relation to

which he was surrendered or returned; or (ii) any lesser offence

disclosed by the facts proved for the purpose of securing his surrender

or return; or (iii) the offence in respect of which the foreign State has

given its consent.

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31. In view of the above, once Article 17 of the Treaty permits the

trial of the person extradited even for offences connected with the

offences for which extradition has been sought, permission of the

State from which he has been extradited, that is UAE, for the person

extradited to be tried for such offence, is inbuilt. The Extradition

Decree has to be, therefore, read in conformity with Article 17 of the

Treaty. There is also no conflict between Article 17 of the Treaty and

Section 21 of the Extradition Act inasmuch as Article 17 of the Treaty

would have to be read in conformity with Section 21(c) of the

Extradition Act, implying consent of the State from which the

petitioner has been extradited.

32. In Daya Singh Lahoria (supra), the Supreme Court considered

Article 7 of the Extradition Treaty therein, which reads as under:

“7. A person surrendered can in no case

be kept in custody or be brought to trial

in the territories of the High Contracting

Party to whom the surrender has been

made for any other crime or offence, or

on account of any other matters, than

those for which the extradition shall

have taken place, until he has been

restored, or has had an opportunity of

returning, to the territories of the High

Contracting Party by whom he has been

surrendered.

This stipulation does not apply to crimes

or offences committed after the

extradition.”

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33. Considering the said term of the Treaty and Section 21 of the

Extradition Act, the Supreme Court held as under:

“3.....The provision of the aforesaid section

places restrictions on the trial of the person

extradited and it operates as a bar to the trial

of the fugitive criminal for any other offence

until the condition of restoration or

opportunity to return is satisfied. Under the

amended Act of 1993, therefore, a fugitive

could be tried for any lesser offence, disclosed

by the facts proved or even for the offence in

respect of which the foreign State has given its

consent. It thus enables to try the fugitive for a

lesser offence, without restoring him to the

State or for any other offence, if the State

concerned gives its consent. In other words, it

may be open for our authorities to obtain

consent of the foreign State to try the fugitive

for any other offence which the extradition

decree might not have mentioned, but without

obtaining such consent, it is not possible to try

for any other offence, other than the offence

for which the extradition decree has been

obtained. The Extradition Treaty contains

several articles of which Article 7 is rather

significant for our purpose, which may be

quoted hereinbelow in extenso:

xxxx

……The aforesaid article unequivocally

indicates that the person concerned cannot be

tried for any other crime or offence than those

for which the extradition shall have taken

place until he has been restored or has had the

opportunity of returning to the territories of

the High Contracting Party by whom he has

been surrendered. The provisions of Section

21 of the Extradition Act are in consonance

with the aforesaid article of the Extradition

Treaty. In the modern world interdependence

of States is natural and essential and

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consequently the importance of extradition

and problems of extradition would arise. It has

become so easy for a fugitive to escape from

the law of the land and if law has to take its

course and pursue the offender, extradition

proceedings are a necessary instrument to

secure the return of the offender to the altar of

law. Laxity in the extradition efforts would

only increase the offender's appetite to commit

crimes with impunity by fleeing to a foreign

territory where he cannot be touched except

through extradition. There is a natural

tendency on the part of the State of asylum to

facilitate the surrender of the fugitive. But

extradition of a fugitive is not that smooth as

one thinks. The liberty of an individual being

an inalienable right, many States, particularly

the United States of America and the United

Kingdom, prescribe that no fugitive will be

extradited in the absence of an extradition

treaty between the two countries. But

extradition is always necessary and no fugitive

should be given the impression that he can

commit an offence and flee from the country by

taking shelter in a foreign country. At the same

time surrender must be preceded by proper

precautions to the effect that nobody is denied

the due process of law and nobody is being

made a victim of political vindictiveness.

Extradition is practised among nations

essentially for two reasons. Firstly, to warn

criminals that they cannot escape punishment

by fleeing to a foreign territory and secondly,

it is in the interest of the territorial State that a

criminal who has fled from another territory

after having committed crime, and taken

refuge within its territory, should not be left

free, because he may again commit a crime

and run away to some other State. Extradition

is a great step towards international

cooperation in the suppression of crime……..”

WP(Crl) 3868/2025 Page 18 of 19

34. There was, therefore, a complete embargo on the extradited

person being tried for offences other than the one for which he had

been extradited. The Court emphasised the independence of the States

in considering the matters of extradition. In the present case, the

Treaty in question, is in clear departure from the one considered by the

Supreme Court. UAE and India, as sovereign countries, have decided

the principles that would govern the extradition requests and have in-

built consent for such person to be tried even for offences connected

with the ones for which such person has been extradited. The same is

in conformity and not in derogation of Section 21 of the Extradition

Act.

35. In view of the above, the scope of prosecution of the petitioner

must be understood in light of the extradition decree and the

underlying factual basis considered by the extraditing court. In the

present case, the petitioner asserts that his extradition was only for the

purpose of facing trial for the offences under Sections 420 and 415 of

the IPC and Section 8 of the Prevention of Corruption Act. A reading

of the Extradition Decree passed by the Dubai Court, however, does

not support this submission. The Extradition Decree is based on the

factual scenario placed before the Dubai Court. It states that the

offences for which the petitioner is wanted are of deceit and criminal

conspiracy, punishable by the laws of both the States. Though it then

discusses Section 120B, 415 and 420 of the IPC and Section 8 of the

Prevention of Corruption Act, it also discusses Articles 237, 399 and

423 of the Federal Penal Law No. 2 of 1987 and its amendment of

WP(Crl) 3868/2025 Page 19 of 19

2016 applicable in UAE. It is evident from the extradition decree

passed by the Dubai Court that the petitioner was extradited for facing

trial for offences which are directly arising from the factual

background in the present case, thereby indicating that the prosecution

of the petitioner falls within the scope of Article 17 of the Treaty.

36. As we find no conflict between Section 21 of the Extradition

Act and Article 17 of the Treaty, the judgments of the Supreme Court

in Gramophone Company of India Ltd (supra) and Commissioner of

Customs, Bangalore vs. G.M. Exports and Others (supra) shall have

no bearing on the facts of the present case.

37. We find no merit in the present petition. The same is,

accordingly, dismissed.

38. There shall be no order as to costs.

NAVIN CHAWLA, J.

RAVINDER DUDEJA , J.

APRIL 8, 2026/Arya/as