Page 1 1

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4842 OF 2013

(Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.38886 of

2012)

COMMISSIONER OF POLICE, NEW DELHI & ANR. …Appellants

Versus

MEHAR SINGH …Respondent

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4965 OF 2013

(Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.4057 of

2013)

COMMISSIONER OF POLICE, NEW DELHI & ANR. …Appellants

Versus

SHANI KUMAR …Respondent

J U D G M E N T

(SMT.) RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J.

1.Leave granted in both the petitions.

Page 2 2. In both the appeals the judgments of the Delhi High

Court are under challenge. Appeal arising out of SLP (Civil)

No. 38886 of 2012 is against Judgment dated 09/07/2012

passed in Writ Petition (Civil) No.3918 of 2012. Appeal

arising out of SLP (Civil) No.4057 of 2013 is against

Judgment dated 21/05/2012 passed in Writ Petition (Civil)

No.3015 of 2012. Since both these appeals raise the same

question of law, they can be disposed of by a common

judgment. It may be stated here that while issuing notice,

this Court has stayed the orders impugned in both the

appeals.

3.The facts relating to the appeal against respondent -

Mehar Singh could be shortly stated.

4. FIR No.126/04 was registered against respondent -

Mehar Singh and others under Sections 143, 341, 323 and

427 of the Indian Penal Code (“the IPC”) upon a complaint

received from Ramji Lal s/o. Mamraj Saini r/o. Khetri - the

owner of Bus No.RJ-18P 0493. The substance of the

complaint was that when the bus reached the bus stand of

2

Page 3 village Raipur on 15/5/2004 at about 3.15 p.m, respondent -

Mehar Singh along with others armed with iron chain, lathi,

belts, danda, stones etc. stopped the bus on the road and

rebuked the conductor of the bus as to how he dared to take

the fare from one of his associates. Sanjay Singh, Basant,

Udai Bhan, Rajesh, Sandeep, Jagmal, Suresh and Karan

Singh intervened and tried to save the conductor of the bus.

During intervention, Sanjay and Basant suffered injuries on

their back, eyes and ears. All the accused broke the side

window panes of the bus by throwing stones and by giving

blows with lathis/dandas. When the other passengers

intervened, the accused fled the spot. The complainant

along with the injured reached the police station and lodged

the aforementioned complaint.

5.In the year 2009, the appellants issued an

advertisement for filling-up the post of constables (Exe.)

(male). It appears that in the criminal case registered

against respondent - Mehar Singh, he arrived at a

compromise with the complainant. In terms of the

3

Page 4 compromise, he and other accused were acquitted of the

offences under Sections 323, 341 and 427 of the IPC on

30/1/2009. As regards the offence under Section 147 of the

IPC, the trial court acquitted him and other co-accused for

want of evidence. It is pertinent to note that the witnesses

turned hostile. Respondent - Mehar Singh applied for the

post of constable pursuant to the advertisement issued by

the appellants. In relevant papers, he disclosed his

involvement in criminal case and his acquittal as both

parties had entered into a compromise. He was assigned

Roll No.422165 and put through the physical endurance and

measurement test and written test. After interview, he was

declared provisionally selected, subject to verification of

character and antecedents. During character and

antecedent verification, his involvement in the criminal case

and his subsequent acquittal due to compromise between

the parties was taken into account.

6.The case of respondent - Mehar Singh was examined by

the Screening Committee constituted by respondent 1 i.e.

4

Page 5 the Commissioner of Police, Delhi. The Screening Committee

observed that respondent - Mehar Singh and others had

assaulted the bus conductor with iron chain, belt and stones

in a preplanned manner and caused injuries to him, which

showed respondent - Mehar Singh’s violent nature and scant

respect for the law of the land. The Screening Committee in

the circumstances did not recommend his case for

appointment to the post of constable.

7.On 3/3/2011, appellant 2 - the Deputy Commissioner of

Police (Recruitment), New Delhi issued a notice to

respondent - Mehar Singh calling upon him to show cause as

to why his candidature should not be cancelled. He replied

to the show cause notice. He submitted that he was falsely

implicated in the criminal case and acquitted in the year

2009 after a full fledged trial. He submitted that a mere

registration of an FIR would not show any criminal

propensity. According to him the offence was falsely

reported by the complainant due to local issues and to avoid

prolonged proceedings, the issue was settled between him

5

Page 6 and the complainant and the trial court had acquitted him.

The Screening Committee did not find his reply to be

convincing. In his order dated 22/3/2011, the Deputy

Commissioner of Police (Recruitment), New Delhi stated that

the Screening Committee has, inter alia, observed that the

actions of respondent - Mehar Singh depicted his violent

nature and that he had no respect for the law of the land and

on considering the totality of the circumstances, the

Screening Committee held that he was not suitable for

appointment to the post of constable. By the said letter,

candidature of respondent - Mehar Singh was cancelled.

8.On 22/4/2011, respondent - Mehar Singh filed O.A.

No.1819 of 2011 before the Central Administrative Tribunal

(for short “the Tribunal”), Principal Bench, New Delhi

challenging the order of the Screening Committee. The

Tribunal by its order dated 7/3/2012 allowed his application.

The Tribunal set aside order dated 22/03/2011 cancelling the

candidature of Mehar Singh. The Tribunal referred to a

couple of cases in which persons charged under Section 307

6

Page 7 of the IPC were appointed by the appellants and held that

there was total non-application of mind on the part of the

appellants. A direction was given to consider the case of

respondent - Mehar Singh if he was otherwise found to be fit,

within six months.

9.Aggrieved by the order dated 7/3/2012 passed by the

Tribunal, the appellants filed a writ petition before the Delhi

High Court. The Delhi High Court dismissed the writ petition

holding that since respondent - Mehar Singh had been

acquitted of the offences for which he had faced trial, the

same cannot be held against him. Being aggrieved by the

said judgment and order, the appellants have preferred this

appeal by special leave.

10.The facts relating to the appeal against respondent -

Shani Kumar could be shortly stated. In 2007, FIR

No.114/2007 was registered against respondent Shani -

Kumar under Sections 307, 504 and 506 of the IPC at Police

Station Babri, District Muzuffar Nagar, (U.P.). Admittedly,

pursuant to an advertisement issued in the year 2009 for the

7

Page 8 post of Constable (Exe.) (male) in Delhi Police for Phase II

respondent - Shani Kumar applied for it. He mentioned in

his application as well as attestation form that a criminal

case was registered against him. On 23/4/2010, he was

provisionally selected to the said post subject to verification

of antecedents. On 14/5/2010, he was acquitted in the said

case by giving him benefit of doubt. On 3/3/2011, the

appellants issued a show cause notice to respondent - Shani

Kumar calling upon him to show cause as to why his

candidature to the post of Constable (Exe) (male) in Delhi

Police should not be cancelled as he along with other co-

accused was found involved in the offence of attempt to

commit murder with deadly weapons and causing bullet

injuries to the complainant’s brother. Respondent - Shani

Kumar sent a reply to the show cause notice on 14/3/2011,

which did not find favour with the appellants. By order dated

22/3/2011, the Deputy Commissioner of Police,

(Recruitment), NPL, Delhi cancelled respondent - Shani

Kumar’s candidature to the post of Constable (Exe.) (male).

8

Page 9 11.Being aggrieved by this cancellation, respondent -

Shani Kumar filed O.A. No.1821 of 2011 before the Tribunal.

By order dated 24/1/2012, the Tribunal allowed the

application and set aside order dated 22/3/2011 cancelling

his candidature. A direction was issued that respondent -

Shani Kumar be offered appointment to the said post as

expeditiously as possible. Being aggrieved by the Tribunal’s

order, the appellants filed writ petition before the Delhi High

Court. The High Court dismissed the appellants’ writ

petition. Hence, this appeal by special leave.

12.We have heard Mr. Rakesh Kumar Khanna, learned

Additional Solicitor General appearing on behalf of the

appellants and Mr. Ajesh Luthra, learned counsel appearing

on behalf of the respondents. We have perused the written

submissions filed by the appellants as well as by the

respondents in both the appeals.

13.Mr. Rakesh Kumar Khanna, learned Additional Solicitor

General, submitted that the employment in Delhi Police is of

a very sensitive nature. Therefore, the character, integrity

9

Page 10 and antecedents of a candidate aspiring to join it, assume

importance. Keeping this in mind, the Commissioner of

Police issued a Standing Order No.398/2010 dated

23/11/2010 laying down a uniform policy for deciding cases

of candidates provisionally selected in Delhi Police involved

in criminal cases (facing trial or acquitted). A Screening

Committee has been constituted for that purpose. Taking an

overall view of the matter, in the interest of Delhi Police,

which is a disciplined force, the Screening Committee has

taken a decision to cancel the candidature of both the

respondents. The respondents have not challenged the

Standing Order. The decision taken by the Screening

Committee, in the circumstances, ought not to be interfered

with. Counsel submitted that it is the settled law that

acquittal of a person in a criminal case does not entitle him

to reinstatement as a matter of right. The appointing

authority may still find such a person unfit to be appointed to

the post. Counsel submitted that even in cases of acquittal,

departmental proceedings may follow when the acquittal is

otherwise than honourable. If the acquittal in a criminal

10

Page 11 case is on account of flawed prosecution, it would not have

any impact on the finding of misconduct recorded in a

departmental enquiry on the basis of adequate evidence. It

is only if a person is honourably acquitted, that he can

possibly argue that he should be appointed to any post.

Counsel submitted that assuming the appellants have

appointed some persons with criminal antecedents in the

past; the doctrine of equality is not attracted to such cases.

He submitted that if some candidates have been granted

some benefits inadvertently, such order does not confer any

right on the respondents to get the same relief. Counsel

submitted that the impugned order does not take note of the

above vital aspects and, therefore, must be set aside. In

support of his submissions, counsel relied on the judgments

of this Court in Delhi Administration through its Chief

Secretary & Ors. v. Sushil Kumar

1

; Suresh Pathrella

v. Oriental Bank of Commerce

2

; Fuljit Kaur etc. v.

State of Punjab etc

3

; K. Venkateshwarlu v. State of

1

(1996) 11 SCC 605

2

(2006) 10 SCC 572

3

(2010) 11 SCC 455

11

Page 12 Andhra Pradesh

4

; Deputy Inspector General of Police

& Anr. v. S. Samuthiram

5

; Chandigarh Administration

& Anr. v. Jagjit Singh & Anr.

6

and Maharaj Krishan

Bhatt & Anr. v. State of Jammu & Kashmir & Ors.

7

.

14.Mr. Ajesh Luthra, learned counsel for the respondents

submitted that the appellants’ reliance on Sushil Kumar is

misplaced because Sushil Kumar has been distinguished in

Commissioner of Police v. Dhaval Singh

8

. Sushil

Kumar was a case of concealment of facts whereas in this

case, there is no concealment. Counsel submitted that,

many a time, due to personal enmity and political reasons,

people are falsely implicated in criminal cases. Very often,

criminal cases end in acquittal or are compounded.

Compounding or acquittal of a criminal case should,

therefore, not act as an obstacle to a person being appointed

to any post. Counsel submitted that an order of acquittal is

always honourable. An acquittal is an acquittal for all

4

(2012) 8 SCC 73

5

(2013) 1 SCC 598

6

AIR 1995 SC 705

7

(2008) 9 SCC 24

8

(1999) 1 SCC 246

12

Page 13 purposes. Relying on Ghurey Lal v. State of U.P.

9

,

counsel submitted that a person is innocent unless proved

otherwise. Administrative authorities cannot adjudicate the

suitability of a selected candidate in this manner. Quasi

judicial authorities cannot overreach the judgments

delivered by a competent court of law. Counsel submitted

that Lok Adalats have been created under the provisions of

the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 to encourage

compromises. If a selectee is to be denied appointment by

adjudging him unsuitable because the criminal case against

him has ended into acquittal only because of compromise,

then, it will defeat the object of the said Act. Counsel

submitted that the present case is different from cases

involving departmental proceedings. In the matter of

appointments, principles relating to pendency of criminal

case and initiation of departmental proceedings will not be

applicable. Counsel attacked the proceedings of the

Screening Committee as being arbitrary, unguided and

unfettered. He cited cases where, according to him, the

9

JT 2008(10) SC324

13

Page 14 Screening Committee has recommended candidates against

whom FIRs have been registered for serious offences, for

appointment. Counsel further pointed out that involvement

in a criminal case is not a disqualification or a stipulation

towards ineligibility in Delhi Police (Appointment and

Recruitment) Rules, 1980 (“ the Delhi Police Rules ”).

Counsel submitted that for verification of antecedents, the

appellants must not rely upon the criminal case where

acquittal has been the final outcome. It is open for the

appellants to conduct an independent enquiry about the

character and antecedents of a candidate concerned.

Counsel submitted that inasmuch as the respondents have

honestly disclosed that criminal cases were registered

against them and they ended either in acquittal or acquittal

on account of compromise, they cannot be denied

appointment in Delhi Police once having been selected for

the same. He submitted that the appeals, therefore, be

dismissed.

14

Page 15 15.Before we deal with the rival submissions, it is

necessary to refer to the judgment of this Court in

Jainendra Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh

10

. In that

case the appellant had applied for the post of constable and

was selected for the same. He had suppressed the fact that

a criminal case was registered against him. Subsequently

the said fact came to light and his appointment was

terminated. Thereafter, he was acquitted in the criminal

case. The question which fell for consideration of this Court

was whether, after a person is appointed to a post in a

disciplined force, it comes to light that he had suppressed

the fact that he was involved in a criminal case his

appointment can be terminated on the ground of

suppression of material facts. Noticing conflicting decisions

of this Court on this point and also the fact that different

yardsticks are being applied in the matter of grant of relief,

this Court formulated issues and referred them to a larger

bench. Since all the formulated issues are premised on

suppression of facts and since in this case there is no

10

(2012) 8 SCC 748

15

Page 16 suppression of facts it is not necessary for us to defer the

judgment of this case till the reference is answered by a

larger Bench.

16.The question before this Court is whether the

candidature of the respondents who had made a clean

breast of their involvement in a criminal case by mentioning

this fact in their application/attestation form while applying

for a post of constable in Delhi Police; who were provisionally

selected subject to verification of their antecedents and who

were subsequently acquitted/discharged in the criminal

case, could be cancelled by the Screening Committee of the

Delhi Police on the ground that they are not found suitable

for appointment to the post of constable.

17.We must first deal with the submission that under the

Delhi Police Rules, past involvement of a person in a criminal

case is not a disqualification for appointment. It is true that

Rule 6 thereof which provides for grounds for ineligibility,

criminal antecedents of a person is not mentioned as a

ground for ineligibility. But, to conclude from this that

16

Page 17 instances of moral turpitude, however grave, could be

overlooked because they do not find mention in Rule 6,

would be absurd. In any case, Standing Order No. 398/2010

issued by the Delhi Police to which our attention is drawn

empowers the police to take appropriate decision in such

cases. Pertinently the respondents have not challenged the

Standing Order. This Standing Order incorporates policy for

deciding cases of candidates provisionally selected in Delhi

Police involved in criminal cases (facing trial or acquitted). It

would be appropriate to re-produce the relevant portions of

the said Standing Order:

“STANDING ORDER NO. 398/2010

POLICY FOR DECIDING CASES OF CANDIDATES

PROVISIONALLY SELECTED IN DELHI POLICE

INVOLVED IN CRIMINAL CASES (FACING TRIAL OR

ACQUITTED).

During the recruitments made in Delhi Police,

several cases come to light where candidates

conceal the fact of their involvement in criminal

cases in the application Form/Attestation Form in

the hope that it may not come to light and

disclosure by them at the beginning of the

recruitment process itself may debar them from

participating in the various recruitment tests. Also

17

Page 18 the appointment if he/she has been acquitted but

not honourably.

In order to formulate a comprehensive policy,

the following rules shall be applicable for all the

recruitments conducted by Delhi Police:-

1).xxx xxx xxx

2).xxx xxx xxx

3).If a candidate had disclosed his/her

involvement and/or arrest in criminal cases,

complaint case, preventive proceedings etc. and

the case is pending investigation or pending trial,

the candidature will be kept in abeyance till the

final decision of the case. After the court’

judgment, if the candidate is acquitted or

discharged, the case will be referred to the

Screening Committee of the PHQ comprising of

Special Commissioner of Police/Administration,

Joint Commissioner of Police/Headquarters and

Joint Commissioner of Police/Vigilance to assess

his/her suitability for appointment in Delhi Police.

4)If a candidate had disclosed his/her

involvement in criminal case, complaint case,

preventive proceedings etc. both in the application

form as well as in the attestation form but was

acquitted or discharged by the court, his/her case

will be referred to the Screening Committee of

PHQ to assess his/her suitability for appointment in

Delhi Police.

5).xxx xxx xxx

6).Such candidates against whom charge-sheet

in any criminal case has been filed in the court and

the charges fall in the category of serious offences

or moral turpitude, though later acquitted or

acquitted by extending benefit of doubt or the

18

Page 19 witnesses have turned hostile due to fear of

reprisal by the accused person, he/she will

generally not be considered suitable for

government service. However, all such cases will

be judged by the Screening Committee of PHQ to

assess their suitability for the government job.

The details of criminal cases which involve moral

turpitude may kindly be perused at Annexure ‘A’.

7)Such cases in which a candidate had faced

trial in any criminal case which does not fall in the

category of moral turpitude and is subsequently

acquitted by the court and he/she discloses about

the same in both application form as well as

attestation form will be judged by the Screening

Committee to decide about his/her suitability for

the government job.

8) xxx xxx xxx

9).If any candidate is discharged by extending

the benefit of Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 this

will also not be viewed adversely by the

department for his/her suitability for government

service.

10).If a candidate was involved in a criminal case

which was withdrawn by the State Government,

he/she will generally be considered fit for

government service, unless there are other

extenuating circumstances.”

Annexure ‘A’ as mentioned in Clause 6 above lays down

the following offences involving moral turpitude:

1.Criminal Conspiracy (Section 120-B, IPC)

19

Page 20 2.Offences against the State (Sections 121 –

130, IPC)

3.Offences relating to Army, Navy and Air Force

(Sections 131-134, IPC)

4.Offence against Public Tranquility (Section

153–A & B, IPC).

5.False evidence and offences against Public

Justice (Sections 193-216A, IPC)

6.Offences relating to coin and government

stamps (Section 231-263A, IPC).

7.Offences relating to Religion (Section 295-

297, IPC)

8.Offences affecting Human Body (Sections

302-304, 304B, 305-308, 311-317, 325-333,

335, 347, 348, 354, 363-373, 376-376-A, 376-

B, 376-C, 376-D, 377, IPC)

9.Offences against Property (Section 379-462,

IPC)

10.Offences relating to Documents and Property

Marks (Section 465-489, IPC)

11.Offences relating to Marriage and Dowry

Prohibition Act (Section 498-A, IPC)

18.Clause 3 of the Comprehensive Policy delineated in the

Standing Order is material for the present case. It refers to

the Screening Committee comprising high police officers.

20

Page 21 After a candidate, who has disclosed his involvement, is

acquitted or discharged, the Committee has to assess

his/her suitability for appointment. Clause 6 states that those

against whom serious offences or offences involving moral

turpitude are registered and who are later on acquitted by

extending benefit of doubt or because the witnesses have

turned hostile due to fear of reprisal by the accused person

shall not generally be considered suitable for government

service. However, all such cases will be considered by the

Screening Committee manned by senior officers. In our

opinion, the word ‘generally’ indicates the nature of

discretion. As a matter of rule, such candidates have to be

avoided. Exceptions will be few and far between and

obviously must be substantiated with acceptable reasons.

19.A careful perusal of the policy leads us to conclude that

the Screening Committee would be entitled to keep persons

involved in grave cases of moral turpitude out of the police

force even if they are acquitted or discharged if it feels that

the acquittal or discharge is on technical grounds or not

21

Page 22 honourable. The Screening Committee will be within its

rights to cancel the candidature of a candidate if it finds that

the acquittal is based on some serious flaw in the conduct of

the prosecution case or is the result of material witnesses

turning hostile. It is only experienced officers of the

Screening Committee who will be able to judge whether the

acquitted or discharged candidate is likely to revert to

similar activities in future with more strength and vigour, if

appointed, to the post in a police force. The Screening

Committee will have to consider the nature and extent of

such person’s involvement in the crime and his propensity of

becoming a cause for worsening the law and order situation

rather than maintaining it. In our opinion, this policy framed

by the Delhi Police does not merit any interference from this

Court as its object appears to be to ensure that only persons

with impeccable character enter the police force.

20.We find no substance in the contention that by

cancelling the respondents’ candidature, the Screening

Committee has overreached the judgments of the criminal

22

Page 23 court. We are aware that the question of co-relation

between a criminal case and a departmental inquiry does

not directly arise here, but, support can be drawn from the

principles laid down by this Court in connection with it

because the issue involved is somewhat identical namely

whether to allow a person with doubtful integrity to work in

the department. While the standard of proof in a criminal

case is the proof beyond all reasonable doubt, the proof in a

departmental proceeding is preponderance of probabilities.

Quite often criminal cases end in acquittal because

witnesses turn hostile. Such acquittals are not acquittals on

merit. An acquittal based on benefit of doubt would not

stand on par with a clean acquittal on merit after a full

fledged trial, where there is no indication of the witnesses

being won over. In R.P. Kapur v. Union of India

11

this

Court has taken a view that departmental proceedings can

proceed even though a person is acquitted when the

acquittal is other than honourable.

11

AIR 1964 SC 787

23

Page 24 21.The expression ‘honourable acquittal’ was considered

by this Court in S. Samuthiram. In that case this Court was

concerned with a situation where disciplinary proceedings

were initiated against a police officer. Criminal case was

pending against him under Section 509 of the IPC and under

Section 4 of the Eve-teasing Act. He was acquitted in that

case because of the non-examination of key witnesses.

There was a serious flaw in the conduct of the criminal case.

Two material witnesses turned hostile. Referring to the

judgment of this Court in Management of Reserve Bank

of India, New Delhi v. Bhopal Singh Panchal

12

, where in

somewhat similar fact situation, this Court upheld a bank’s

action of refusing to reinstate an employee in service on the

ground that in the criminal case he was acquitted by giving

him benefit of doubt and, therefore, it was not an honourable

acquittal, this Court held that the High Court was not

justified in setting aside the punishment imposed in

departmental proceedings. This Court observed that the

expressions ‘honourable acquittal’, ‘acquitted of blame’ and

12

(1994) 1 SCC 541

24

Page 25 ‘fully exonerated’ are unknown to the Criminal Procedure

Code or the Penal Code. They are coined by judicial

pronouncements. It is difficult to define what is meant by

the expression ‘honourably acquitted’. This Court expressed

that when the accused is acquitted after full consideration of

prosecution case and the prosecution miserably fails to

prove the charges leveled against the accused, it can

possibly be said that the accused was honourably acquitted.

In light of above, we are of the opinion that since the

purpose of departmental proceedings is to keep persons,

who are guilty of serious misconduct or dereliction of duty or

who are guilty of grave cases of moral turpitude, out of the

department, if found necessary, because they pollute the

department, surely the above principles will apply with more

vigour at the point of entry of a person in the police

department i.e. at the time of recruitment. If it is found by

the Screening Committee that the person against whom a

serious case involving moral turpitude is registered is

discharged on technical grounds or is acquitted of the same

charge but the acquittal is not honourable, the Screening

25

Page 26 Committee would be entitled to cancel his candidature.

Stricter norms need to be applied while appointing persons

in a disciplinary force because public interest is involved in

it.

22. Against the above background, we shall now examine

what is the nature of acquittal of the respondents. As per

the complaint lodged by Ramji Lal, respondent Mehar Singh

and others armed with iron chains, lathis, danda, stones etc.

stopped a bus, rebuked the conductor of the bus as to how

he dared to take the fare from one of their associates.

Those who intervened were beaten-up. They received

injuries. The miscreants broke the side window panes of the

bus by throwing stones. The complainant was also injured.

This incident is undoubtedly an incident affecting public

order. The assault on the conductor was pre-planned and

pre-meditated. The FIR was registered under Sections 143,

341, 323 and 427 of the IPC. The order dated 30/01/2009

passed by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Khetri

shows that so far as offences under Sections 323, 341 and

427 of the IPC are concerned, the accused entered into a

26

Page 27 compromise with the complainant. Hence, learned

Magistrate acquitted respondent - Mehar Singh and others of

the said offences. The order further indicates that so far as

offence of rioting i.e. offence under Section 147 of the IPC is

concerned, three main witnesses turned hostile. Learned

Magistrate, therefore, acquitted all the accused of the said

offence. This acquittal can never be described as an

acquittal on merits after a full fledged trial. Respondent -

Mehar Singh cannot secure entry in the police force by

portraying this acquittal as an honourable acquittal.

Pertinently, there is no discussion on merits of the case in

this order. Respondent - Mehar Singh has not been

exonerated after evaluation of the evidence.

23.So far as respondent - Shani Kumar is concerned, the

FIR lodged against him stated that he along with other

accused abused and threatened the complainant’s brother.

They opened fire at him due to which he sustained bullet

injuries. Offences under Sections 307, 504 and 506 of the

IPC were registered against respondent - Shani Kumar and

27

Page 28 others. Order dated 14/5/2010 passed by the Sessions

Judge, Muzaffarnagar shows that the complainant and the

injured person did not support the prosecution case. They

were declared hostile. Hence, learned Sessions Judge gave

the accused the benefit of doubt and acquitted them. This

again is not a clean acquittal. Use of firearms in this manner

is a serious matter. For entry in the police force, acquittal

order based on benefit of doubt in a serious case of this

nature is bound to act as an impediment.

24.In this connection, we may usefully refer to Sushil

Kumar. In that case, the respondent therein had appeared

for recruitment as a constable in Delhi Police Services. He

was selected provisionally, but, his selection was subject to

verification of character and antecedents by the local police.

On verification, it was found that his antecedents were such

that his appointment to the post of constable was not found

desirable. Accordingly, his name was rejected. He

approached the Tribunal. The Tribunal allowed the

application on the ground that since the respondent had

28

Page 29 been discharged and/or acquitted of the offence punishable

under Section 304, Section 324 read with Section 34 and

Section 324 of the IPC, he cannot be denied the right of

appointment to the post under the State. This Court

disapproved of the Tribunal’s view. It was observed that

verification of the character and antecedents is one of the

important criteria to test whether the selected candidate is

suitable to the post under the State. This Court observed

that though the candidate was provisionally selected, the

appointing authority found it not desirable to appoint him on

account of his antecedent record and this view taken by the

appointing authority in the background of the case cannot be

said to be unwarranted. Whether the respondent was

discharged or acquitted of the criminal offences, the same

has nothing to do with the question as to whether he should

be appointed to the post. What would be relevant is the

conduct or character of the candidate to be appointed to a

service and not the actual result thereof. It was argued that

Sushil Kumar must be distinguished from the facts of the

instant case because the respondent therein had concealed

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Page 30 the fact that a criminal case was registered against him,

whereas, in the instant case there is no concealment. It is

not possible for us to accept this submission. The aspect of

concealment was not considered in Sushil Kumar at all.

This Court only concentrated on the desirability to appoint a

person, against whom a criminal case is pending, to a

disciplined force. Sushil Kumar cannot be restricted to

cases where there is concealment of the fact by a candidate

that a criminal case was registered against him. When the

point of concealment or otherwise and its effect was not

argued before this Court, it cannot be said that in Sushil

Kumar this Court wanted to restrict its observations to the

cases where there is concealment of facts.

25.Reliance placed by the respondents on Dhaval Singh

is misplaced. In Dhaval Singh, the respondent had not

mentioned the fact that a criminal case was pending against

him in the application form submitted by him on 21-

27/8/1995 seeking post of a constable. He was provisionally

selected and was interviewed pending verification of his

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Page 31 character. Before any order of appointment could be issued

in his favour, he, realizing the mistake, wrote a letter to the

Deputy Commissioner of Police on 15/11/1995 that a

criminal case was pending against him and he had

inadvertently not mentioned this fact in the application form.

On the ground that the respondent had concealed a material

fact, his candidature was cancelled on 20/11/1995. He was

acquitted in the criminal case on 8/12/1995. On being so

acquitted, he filed a representation before the Commissioner

of Police which was turned down. He approached the

Tribunal. The Tribunal set aside the cancellation of

candidature of the respondent and the rejection of his

representation. Aggrieved by this, the Commissioner of

Police approached this Court. This Court confirmed the

Tribunal’s order basically on the ground that the order of

cancellation dated 20/11/1995 did not show that the

information furnished by the respondent vide his letter dated

15/11/1995 was communicated to the Commissioner of

Police. There was no indication in the record that the

competent authority had a look at the letter. Therefore, the

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Page 32 cancellation of candidature was without any proper

application of mind and without taking into consideration all

relevant materials. The Tribunal’s order was upheld on the

ground of non-application of mind by the Commissioner of

Police to a vital fact. Besides, this Court also noted that

pursuant to the Tribunal’s order the respondent therein was

already reinstated. This decision will have no application to

the present case. Reliance on Ghurey Lal is also

misplaced. There can be no debate over the observation

made by this Court in that case that an accused is presumed

to be innocent till proved guilty. These observations were

made while dealing with a reversal of acquittal by the High

Court. They are not relevant to the present case.

26.So far as respondent - Mehar Singh is concerned, his

case appears to have been compromised. It was urged that

acquittal recorded pursuant to a compromise should not be

treated as a disqualification because that will frustrate the

purpose of Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987. We see no

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Page 33 merit in this submission. Compromises or settlements have

to be encouraged to bring about peaceful and amiable

atmosphere in the society by according a quietus to

disputes. They have to be encouraged also to reduce

arrears of cases and save the litigants from the agony of

pending litigation. But these considerations cannot be

brought in here. In order to maintain integrity and high

standard of police force, the Screening Committee may

decline to take cognizance of a compromise, if it appears to

it to be dubious. The Screening Committee cannot be faulted

for that.

27.The respondents are trying to draw mileage from the

fact that in their application and/or attestation form they

have disclosed their involvement in a criminal case. We do

not see how this fact improves their case. Disclosure of

these facts in the application/attestation form is an essential

requirement. An aspirant is expected to state these facts

honestly. Honesty and integrity are inbuilt requirements of

the police force. The respondents should not, therefore,

expect to score any brownie points because of this

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Page 34 disclosure. Besides, this has no relevance to the point in

issue. It bears repetition to state that while deciding

whether a person against whom a criminal case was

registered and who was later acquitted or discharged should

be appointed to a post in the police force, what is relevant

is the nature of the offence, the extent of his involvement,

whether the acquittal was a clean acquittal or an acquittal by

giving benefit of doubt because the witnesses turned hostile

or because of some serious flaw in the prosecution, and the

propensity of such person to indulge in similar activities in

future. This decision, in our opinion, can only be taken by

the Screening Committee created for that purpose by the

Delhi Police. If the Screening Committee’s decision is not

mala fide or actuated by extraneous considerations, then, it

cannot be questioned.

28.The police force is a disciplined force. It shoulders the

great responsibility of maintaining law and order and public

order in the society. People repose great faith and

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Page 35 confidence in it. It must be worthy of that confidence. A

candidate wishing to join the police force must be a person

of utmost rectitude. He must have impeccable character

and integrity. A person having criminal antecedents will not

fit in this category. Even if he is acquitted or discharged in

the criminal case, that acquittal or discharge order will have

to be examined to see whether he has been completely

exonerated in the case because even a possibility of his

taking to the life of crimes poses a threat to the discipline of

the police force. The Standing Order, therefore, has

entrusted the task of taking decisions in these matters to the

Screening Committee. The decision of the Screening

Committee must be taken as final unless it is mala fide. In

recent times, the image of the police force is tarnished.

Instances of police personnel behaving in a wayward manner

by misusing power are in public domain and are a matter of

concern. The reputation of the police force has taken a

beating. In such a situation, we would not like to dilute the

importance and efficacy of a mechanism like the Screening

Committee created by the Delhi Police to ensure that

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Page 36 persons who are likely to erode its credibility do not enter

the police force. At the same time, the Screening

Committee must be alive to the importance of trust reposed

in it and must treat all candidates with even hand.

29.The Screening Committee’s proceedings have been

assailed as being arbitrary, unguided and unfettered. But, in

the present cases, we see no evidence of this. However,

certain instances have been pointed out where allegedly

persons involved in serious offences have been

recommended for appointment by the Screening Committee.

It is well settled that to such cases the doctrine of equality

enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution of India is not

attracted. This doctrine does not envisage negative equality

(Fuljit Kaur). It is not meant to perpetuate illegality or

fraud because it embodies a positive concept. If the

Screening Committee which is constituted to carry out the

object of the comprehensive policy to ensure that people

with doubtful background do not enter the police force,

deviates from the policy, makes exception and allows entry

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Page 37 of undesirable persons, it is undoubtedly guilty of

committing an act of grave disservice to the police force but

we cannot allow that illegality to be perpetuated by allowing

the respondents to rely on such cases. It is for the

Commissioner of Police, Delhi to examine whether the

Screening Committee has compromised the interest of the

police force in any case and to take remedial action if he

finds that it has done so. Public interest demands an in-

depth examination of this allegation at the highest level.

Perhaps, such deviations from the policy are responsible for

the spurt in police excesses. We expect the Commissioner

of Police, Delhi to look into the matter and if there is

substance in the allegations to take necessary steps

forthwith so that policy incorporated in the Standing Order is

strictly implemented.

30.Our attention is drawn to certain orders of this Court

where, according to the respondents, special leave petitions

filed by the State, arising out of similar fact situations, have

been dismissed. It is not necessary for us to state that in

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Page 38 limine dismissal of special leave petition does not mean that

this Court has affirmed the judgment or the action impugned

therein. The order rejecting the special leave petition at the

threshold without detailed reasons does not constitute any

declaration of law or a binding precedent. This submission

is, therefore, rejected.

31.In the ultimate analysis, we are of the view that the

opinion formed by the Screening Committee in both these

cases which is endorsed by the Deputy Commissioner of

Police (Recruitment), Delhi, that both the respondents are

not suitable for being appointed in the Delhi Police Force

does not merit any interference. It is legally sustainable. The

Tribunal and the High Court, in our view, erred in setting

aside the order of cancellation of the respondents’

candidature. In the circumstances, the appeals are allowed.

The orders of the Delhi High Court impugned in both the

appeals are set aside. The cancellation of candidature of the

respondents - Mehar Singh and Shani Kumar is upheld.

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Page 39 ………………………… .J.

(G.S. Singhvi]

………………………… .J.

(Ranjana Prakash Desai)

New Delhi

July 02, 2013.

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