2025 INSC 835 Page 1 of 12

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2025

(ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) NO(S). OF 2025)

@ DIARY NO. 16901/2025

COMMUNIDADE OF TIVIM , TIVIM, BARDEZ GOA …APPELLANT

Versus

STATE OF GOA & ORS. ..RESPONDENTS

J U D G M E N T

SUDHANSHU DHULIA, J.

1. Delay of 146 days in filing the Special Leave Petition is

condoned. Leave granted.

2. The appellant before this court is a ‘Communidade’

1 or an

agricultural association of villagers that has properties in

common and the income derived from these properties accrues

in favour of its members. The system is peculiar to Goa and is

based on the concept of collective village ownership, which was

originally called as the ‘Gaunkari System’ and the village

communities owning the land collectively were known as

1

Portugese translation of the English word ‘Community’.

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‘gaunkaria’ which ultimately came to be termed as

‘communidades’ during the Portuguese colonisation of Goa.

3. Under challenge before us in this Appeal is the judgment dated

06.08.2024 by which the Writ Petition filed by the appellant,

stood dismissed by the High Court of Bombay at Goa.

4. The High Court while doing so has upheld the order dated

13.04.2023 by which the Administrative Tribunal, Goa has

refused to grant permission to the Appellant to compromise

proceedings instituted by the private respondents herein

(respondent Nos. 3 to 11) under the Goa, Daman and Diu

Agricultural Tenancy Act, 1964 (hereinafter ‘Tenancy Act,

1964’).

5. At the outset, it is necessary to mention here at this stage that

the administration of Comunidades is governed by the Code of

Comunidades (hereinafter ‘the Code’). Article 154 (3) of the

Code empowers the Administrative Tribunal to grant

permission to the Communidade to compromise terms in any

suit to which the Communidade is a party.

6. The facts which have led to filing of the Writ Petition before the

High Court can be summarised as under:

a) Two properties (hereinafter ‘Suit Properties’) belonging to

the appellant, known as “Oiteil-De-Madel” bearing Survey

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No. 448/0 & “Levelechy Aradi” bearing Survey No. 440/0 are

situated in the village of Tivim in the taluka of Bardez in Goa

and were leased to the predecessors-in-interest of the

private respondents by the appellant, in July, 1978.

b) A civil suit was filed by the predecessor of the private

respondents praying that his name be entered in the

Tenants column in the Survey numbers which correspond

to the two properties mentioned above. This suit was

decreed on 08.01.1986 & consequently, the name of the

predecessor of the private respondents was entered as

tenant of the two properties. Since no appeal was preferred

against the decree passed by the Trial Court, the same

attained finality. Thereafter, predecessor of the private

respondents herein passed away on 01.02.2015.

c) On 08.12.2016, the private respondents herein filed

Tenancy Application No. 71/2016 before the Civil Judge,

Junior Division (B-Court), Bicholim (hereinafter ‘Trial

Court’) for declaration of Tenancy under Section 7 of the

Tenancy Act, 1964. Despite service of notice to the appellant

by the Trial Court, no appearance was entered on its behalf,

which led to the case being proceeded ex-parte against the

appellant.

d) Vide Judgment & Order dated 01.09.2017, Trial Court

allowed the Tenancy Application, consequently declaring the

private respondents as agricultural tenants of the Suit

Properties. Aggrieved by the declaration of tenancy, the

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appellant preferred Tenancy Appeal before the Ad -hoc

District Judge-I at Mapusa, Goa (hereinafter ‘Appellate

Court’).

e) The above-mentioned appeal remains pending before the

Appellate Court till date. All the same, during pendency of

the Tenancy Appeal, an Extraordinary General Body Meeting

of the appellant was held on 14.03.2021, in which members

of the appellant deliberated upon the Tenancy Appeal and

also considered the fact that if the appeal fails, they stand

to lose a major chunk of land held by the Communidade. It

is at this meeting that the Communidade resolved that as a

compromise, the land in dispute could be bifurcated into a

60:40 sharing ratio, with 60% of the land being allotted to

the private respondents and 40% of the land to be retained

by the communidade.

f) Pursuant to the above, Managing Committee of the

Communidade had further deliberations and finally, a

General Body Meeting was convened on 31.10.2021 wherein

consent terms were finalised and agreed upon. All the same,

before filing these consent terms before the Appellate Court,

permission was needed from the Administrative Tribunal in

terms of Article 154 (3) of the Code. Accordingly, on

22.02.2023, respondent No. 2 herein i.e., Administrator of

Communidades forwarded the consent terms to the

Administrative Tribunal for approval.

g) As stated earlier, by an Order dated 13.04.2023, such

permission was denied by the Administrative Tribunal and

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this Order of the Administrative Tribunal was assailed by

the Communidade before the High Court by way of a Writ

Petition.

7. The short question that arose for consideration before the High

Court, which will also be before this Court is whether the

Administrative Tribunal was correct in its refusal to grant the

appellant, permission to compromise proceedings with the

private respondents in terms of Article 154 (3) of the Code?

The High Court as we know has already held that this

permission could not have been granted under law.

8. We have heard Mr. Huzefa Ahmadi, learned counsel for the

appellant who submits that the Administrative Tribunal has

erred in refusing to grant permission to the Communidade,

and as such, the High Court ought not to have upheld the

Administrative Tribunal’s decision. He contends that the best

interests of the appellant and its members have to be

considered and both the High Court as well as the

Administrative Tribunal have failed to take into consideration

the fact that the appellant had finalised consent terms,

keeping in mind its best interest and in the absence of such

terms, the suit properties would have to be regarded as

‘tenanted land’ which is allotted to the private respondents

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herein, which would in turn be contrary to the appellant’s best

interests.

9. It is Mr. Ahmadi’s second argument that the Code itself by

virtue of Article 30 (4) (g) empowers the Communidade to

deliberate upon, the withdrawal and compromise of civil suits

and this aspect of the matter was completely ignored by the

High Court.

10. For the respondent no. 1-State of Goa and respondent no. 2,

we have heard learned counsel Mr. Abhay Anil Anturkar, who

supports the decision of the Administrative Tribunal and

submits that the same warranted no interference by the High

Court and hence, there is no infirmity with the order

impugned. Learned couns el would argue that the consent

terms sought to be entered into between the appellant and the

private respondents is nothing but an attempt to bypass and

negate the provisions contained in the Tenancy Act as well as

the Goa Land Use (Regulation) Act, 1991 (hereinafter ‘Land

Use Act’).

11. In this regard, the learned Counsel has referred to Clauses i),

iii), v), x) and xi) of the consent terms, which essentially confer

to the private respondents ‘all rights and interests, which rights

shall be akin to full ownership rights’ over 60% of the land and

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reciprocally, the appellant is to have ‘exclusive rights free from

any tenancy claim’ over 40% of land. Additionally, these

clauses also stipulate that the private respondents can use

and utilise 60% of the land ‘for any purpose whatsoever’ in lieu

of which the appellant is also entitled to use its share of 40%

of land ‘in the manner deemed fit and proper.’

12. It is therefore the respondent-State’s contention that the

proposed consent terms effectively accord freehold ownership

rights over the land in question to both the parties and also

allows them to use the land for non-agricultural purposes,

which is in blatant violation of statutory provisions contained

in the Tenancy Act as well as the Land Use Act.

13. Having heard learned counsel for both the sides and having

perused the material on record, we are of the considered

opinion that the Administrative Tribunal has rightly refused to

grant permission to the consent terms finalised by the

appellant. A bare perusal of the same indicates that it is

nothing but an attempt to circumvent the statutory framework

laid down in Tenancy Act and also violates the Land Use Act.

14. We are in complete agreement with the Administrative

Tribunal, Goa which has refused to accord its permission to

the filing of the consent terms. What weighed in with the

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Tribunal is the fact that these terms effectively wipe out

tenancy rights of the private respondents which was declared

by the Trial Court vide judgment dated 01.09.2017 and by the

proposed compromise, the parties have agreed that in lieu of

the 60:40 bifurcation of land between them, the judgment

dated 01.09.2017 stands set aside. This prompted the

Tribunal to observe that instead of testing the correctness of

judgment dated 01.09.2017 on merits before the appellate

court, the parties intend to set aside the judgment by way of

compromise.

15. Moreover, the Tribunal also expressed its dismay at the fact

that these consent terms have the effect of bypassing the

Tenancy Act, since it confers full ownership rights to the

private respondents who have been declared as tenants and

any compromise which is contrary to a statute cannot be

entered into by the appellant.

16. Section 9 of the Tenancy Act lists down the modes of

termination of tenancy and specifies that tenancy can only be

terminated via three modes. The first is when the tenant

himself surrenders his right of tenancy to the landlord in the

manner contained in Section 10. Similarly, in the second

situation, the landlord may terminate the tenancy, but only on

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the basis of the specific grounds contained in Section 11.

Lastly, Section 9 (c) provides for termination under any other

specific provision of the Tenancy Act. It is abundantly clear

that by means of the proposed compromise, the parties have

essentially terminated the tenancy, without recourse to any of

the modes referred to in Section 9 of the Act.

17. We shall now refer to Chapter IIA of the Tenancy Act which is

titled “Special rights and privileges of tenants.” Section 18A in

this chapter provides that every tenant shall be deemed to

have purchased from his landlord, the land held by him as a

tenant on the tillers’ day, subject to other provisions of the Act.

This chapter then lays out the procedure to be followed.

Section 18C provides for the Mamlatdar to first issue public

notice to the tenants who are deemed to have purchased the

lands as well as the landlords of such lands and other

interested persons. The purchase price payable by a tenant to

the landlord is then indicated in the Table contained in Section

18D. We must also take note of the fact that Section 18K of

the Tenancy Act prohibits a tenant who has purchased the

land from transferring the land without the Mamlatdar’s prior

permission. If the proposed consent terms are to be allowed,

not only would the tenant be conferred full ownership rights,

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in complete disregard of the procedure for purchase mentioned

above, but it would also mean that the tenant would be

conferred a right to alienate land, without seeking permission

of any statutory authority.

18. It is also important to take note of the fact that even after a

tenant has purchased the land in question after complying

with the procedure contemplated under Chapter IIA, he is

barred from using the land for any purpose other than

agriculture, as per Section 2 of the Land Use Act, which reads

as under:

“2. Regulation of use of land. — Notwithstanding

anything contained in the Goa, Daman and Diu Town and

Country Planning Act, 1974 (Act 21 of 1975), or in any plan

or scheme made thereunder, or in the Goa Land Revenue

Code, 1968 (Act 9 of 1969), no land which is vested in a

tenant under the provisions of the Goa, Daman and Diu

Agricultural Tenancy Act, 1964 (Act 7 of 1964) shall be used

or allowed to be used for any purpose other than

agriculture.”

19. A bare reading of the aforementioned provisions is enough to

come to the conclusion that the proposed consent terms or the

compromise sought to be entered by the appellant with the

private respondents falls foul of both the statutes i.e., the

Tenancy Act and the Land Use Act, insofar as it creates

freehold ownership rights over tenanted land, without

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resorting to the procedure contemplated for the purchase of

such land by the tenant and secondly, for the reason that

these terms effectively allow the appellant, as well as the

private respondents, to use an agricultural land for non-

agricultural purposes. In other words, the compromise not

only circumvents procedural aspects contained in Chapter IIA

of the Tenancy Act but also allows the parties to use the suit

properties for a purpose which is expressly barred by the Land

Use Act. The compromise sought by the parties is nothing but

an abuse of the process of law. The so called compromise or

agreement is a ploy to defeat the provisions of law and

therefore it has been rightly denied the legal sanctity which

was sought.

20. As regards the submission of the learned counsel relating to

Art. 30 (4) (g) of the Code, it is to be noted that the said

provision merely empowers a Communidade to deliberate

upon terms of compromise, which upon finalisation, has to be

forwarded to the Administrative Tribunal. By no stretch of

imagination can this provision be construed to mean that it

confers an unfettered power on the Communidade to enter into

a compromise, without the Tribunal’s sanction.

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21. Hence, we see absolutely no reason to interfere with the order

dated 06.08.2024 passed by the High Court of Bombay at Goa.

22. Consequently, this appeal stands dismissed. Pending

application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

23. All the same, we deem it necessary to clarify that we have

expressed no opinion whatsoever on the merits of the dispute

between the appellant and private respondents as regard the

claim of Tenancy. The Tenancy Appeal filed by the appellant

before the Appellate Court shall be decided on its own merits,

in accordance with law.

….....................................J.

[SUDHANSHU DHULIA]

……..................................J.

[K. VINOD CHANDRAN]

NEW DELHI;

JULY 14, 2025.