http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 8

CASE NO.:

Appeal (civil) 7015 of 2005

PETITIONER:

Competent Authority

RESPONDENT:

Barangore Jute Factory & Ors.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 23/11/2005

BENCH:

K.G. Balakrishnan & Arun Kumar

JUDGMENT:

JUDGMENT

(arising out of SLP ) 16820 OF 2004)

With

Civil Appeals No. 7016-17 of 2005

(arising out SLP(C ) Nos.17874-17875 of 2004)

AND WITH

Civil Appeal No. 7018 of 2005

(@ SLP (C ) No.18773 of 2004)

ARUN KUMAR, J.

Leave granted.

These appeals arise from a common judgment of the High Court. The

contesting parties before the High Court filed special leave petitions in this

Court against the judgment of the High Court dated 7th April, 2004. The

special leave petitions filed by the Competent Authority are registered as

SLP (Civil) No. 16820 of 2004 while those filed by the National Highways

Authority of India are SLP (Civil) Nos.17874-75 of 2004. The Writ

Petitioners before the High Court have also filed a petition which is

numbered as SLP (Civil) 18773 of 2004. Since all the petitions arise from a

common judgment, they were heard together and are being disposed of by

this judgment. For sake of convenience the land owners are being referred

to as the writ petitioners in this judgment. The other main parties are the

Competent Authority and the National Highways Authority of India (NHAI)

and they will be referred to as such in the judgment.

The subject matter of these appeals is the compulsory acquisition of

certain lands belonging to the writ petitioners by the Central Government

vide Notification dated 11th June, 1998 under Section 3A of the National

Highways Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act'). The writ

petitioners challenged the acquisition of their lands on various grounds. The

Division Bench of the High Court by its impugned judgment dated 7th April,

2004 disposed of the writ petition holding the impugned Notification

regarding compulsory acquisition of land to be bad in law. However,

keeping in view the fact that possession of the acquired land had already

been taken by the authorities, the High Court felt that no useful purpose

would be served by quashing the Notification. The High Court also took

note of the power of the acquiring authority to issue a fresh Notification for

acquisition of the land which could only lead to possible increase in the

amount of compensation payable to the owners. Keeping these aspects in

view it ordered that an additional amount of compensation be awarded to the

land owners. Accordingly, an additional amount calculated at 30% over and

above the compensation already determined was ordered to be paid to the

writ petitioners. The Competent authority is aggrieved of the order of the

High Court holding the Notification regarding the acquisition of the land to

be illegal, while the NHAI is aggrieved of the award of additional 30 per

cent amount as compensation to the Writ Petitioners. The owners/writ

petitioners are aggrieved of the Notification not being quashed in spite of

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 8

having been declared as illegal.

The acquisition of land in the present case is under the National

Highways Act, 1956. The power to acquire land is contained in Section 3A

of the Act. According to sub-section (1 ) where the Central Government is

satisfied that for a public purpose, any land is required for the building,

maintenance, management or operation of a national highway or part

thereof, it may, by notification in the Official Gazette, declare its intention to

acquire such land. Sub-section (2) provides that every Notification under

sub-section (1) shall give a brief description of the land. Under sub-section

(3) the Competent Authority is required to cause the substance of the

notification to be published in two local newspapers, one of which will be in

a vernacular language. The impugned notification in this case is challenged

on the ground that it does not give a brief description of the land sought to

be compulsorily acquired. There has been lot of argument on either side on

this aspect. The Competent Authority and the NHAI have supported the

Notification urging that brief description of the land contained in the

Notification meets the requirement of the statute while according to the writ

petitioners it is not so. A copy of the impugned Notification dated 11th June,

1993 has been placed on record. As per the Notification, a brief description

of the land sought to be acquired is given in the Appendix to the

Notification. In order to appreciate the rival contentions it is necessary to

reproduce some portions of the Appendix.

The GAZETTE OF INDIA EXTRAORDINARY

____________________________________________[PART II \026 SEC. 3 (iii]_

Brief description of land with or without

Structure falling within the proposed Right

of way in terms of Sub-Section (2) of

Section 3A of National Highways Laws

(Amendment) Act, 1997.

As per Appended \026

A

[No.RW/NH-15013/31/94-PL.]

A.D.NARAIN, Director General(Road Development

& Addl. Secy

.

APPENDIX \026 A to NOTIOFICATION No.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF PRIVATE LAND WITH/WITHOUT STRUCTURE

FALLING WITHIN PROPOSED RIGHT OF WAY OF SECOND VIVEKANANDA

BRIDGE & ITS APPROACHES IN NATIONAL HIGHWAY \026 2, WEST BENGAL.

(Vide Sub-Section (2) of Section 3A of the NH Laws (Amendment) Act, 1997

Sl. Dag No. Khaitan No. Full Area Land classification Acquisition/Alienati

on

No. Old New (Acre) as per BL & LR

proposed_____

Record For

Area (Acre)

1 2 3 4 5 6

7 8

State \026 West Bengal, District \026 Howrah,

Police Station \026 Bally, Mouza \026 Bally, J.L. - 14, Sheet \026 2.

1. 1020 1499 0 0.420 DANGA Part

0.0150

2. 1021 1538 0 0.130 DANGA Part

0.0900

3. 1448 7167 0 17.000 SUNA Part

2.7500

4. 1449 7115 0 10.550 SUNA Part

0.3800

5. 1659 3446 0 0.1800 DANGA Part

0.1800

6. 1662 2162 0 0.070 BASTU Part

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 8

0.0250

7. 1682 7167 0 6.250 SHALI Part

4.0500

0.4900

State \026 West Bengal, District \026 Howrah,

Police Station \026 Bally, Mouza \026 Bally, J.L. \026 14, Sheet \026 4.

_______________________________________________________________________________

1. 2920 7167 0 17.6500 SUNA Part 0.1000

2. 2904 7167 0 0.4900 DANGA Part 0.08

15

_______________________________________________________________________________

8.6715

_______________________________________________________________________________

State \026 West Bengal, District \026 Howrah,

Police Station \026 Bally, Mouza \026 Bally, J.L. \026 14, Sheet \026 10.

_______________________________________________________________________________

1. 8602 1990 0 0.2790 BASTU Part 0.00

10

2. 8603 1991 0 0.2080 BASTU Part 0.16

20

3. 8604 1992 0 0.0670 UDBASTU Part

0.0150

4. 8609 3532 0 0.0310 BASTU Full 0.03

10

5. 8610 3532 0 0.5100 DANGA Full 0.14

00

6. 8611 3532 0 0.0100 BASTU Full 0.01

00

7. 8612 5373 0 0.0930 UDBASTU Full 0.09

30

8. 8613 5373 0 0.1360 BASTU Full 0.13

60

9, 8616 7113 0 0.1560 DANGA Full 0.15

90

10. 8617 3579 0 0.0540 DANGA Full 0.05

40

11. 8618 3579 0 0.0240 BASTU Full 0.20

40

_______________________________________________________________________________

9.4965

The Appendix contains a long list of various portions of lands sought

to be acquired. The list runs into more than 10 pages in the paper book. We

have chosen to reproduce only a small portion of the Appendix in order to

appreciate the rival contentions of the learned counsel for the parties. The

learned counsel for the writ petitioners submitted that the purpose of giving

a brief description of the land sought to be acquired is that the person whose

land is to be taken away, should at least know what he is being deprived of.

This becomes all the more necessary when only a part of the land out of a

bigger chunk of land is sought to be acquired. A reference to the Tables

forming part of the Appendix, which according to the acquiring Authority

contain brief description of the land, will show that under various heads,

only part of bigger chunks of land is being acquired. If the entire land

falling in a particular survey is acquired, there cannot be any problem of

identification of land. But when only a part of land out of larger tract of land

is sought to be acquired, the question arises which part is going to be

acquired. For instance in the first Table full area of land in Dag No.1448 at

Serial No.3 is 17 acres as per column 5. Column 7 indicates that only a part

of the said 17 acres is being acquired and as per Column 8, the part which is

sought to be acquired is 2.7800 acres. This means out of 17 acres only

2.7800 acres is being acquired. The question will arise as to which side this

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 8

part which is sought to be acquired is falling, it could be anywhere on the

northern, southern, western, eastern sides or in the centre. How is one to

know which part is under acquisition? Similar position emerges with

reference to other serial numbers where only part of larger chunks of land is

being acquired. Such cases are several when we look at the entire Appendix

and the Tables forming part of it. According to the learned counsel for the

writ petitioners, the absence of information as to which part of the land is

being acquired makes the description insufficient, rather vague. The owners

are not in a position to identify the land under acquisition. It also renders it

impossible to make claim regarding compensation for the land under

acquisition because it is a matter of common knowledge that in bigger tracts

of land, certain areas on a particular side are more valuable than the others.

The absence of proper description of land makes it impossible to file

objection against acquisition. For all these reasons it is argued on behalf of

the land owners that the statutory requirement of a brief description of land

is not fulfilled. According to the Writ Petitioners non-compliance of sub-

section (2) of Section 3A renders the Notification invalid and the same is

therefore, liable to be quashed.

The learned counsel appearing for the Competent Authority as also

the counsel for the NHAI have tried to support the Notification. According

to them, the requirement in sub-Section (2) of Section 3A of the Act is only

of giving a brief description of the land. Brief description does not mean a

complete description. That would not be the intention of the statute. An

acquisition Notification is only required to convey to the persons claiming

interest in the land about the intention of the Government to acquire a

particular land and the description given in the impugned Notification meets

that requirement. The learned counsel appearing for the Competent

Authority had really no answer to the problem demonstrated above about

identification of land where only part of a larger chunk of land was being

acquired. Faced with this difficulty and in an effort to ensure that the

impugned Notification is upheld, the learned counsel appearing for the

Competent Authority raised various subsidiary issues which according to

him are sufficient to non-suit the Writ Petitioners. They are :

(1) Delay on part of writ petitioners in challenging the Notification

under Section 3A(1);

(2) Failure to file objections under section 3C within twenty one days

as prescribed in sub-section (1);

(3) Applying for compensation for the acquired land giving full details

of the lands sought to be acquired which shows that land owners

knew all the details about the land under acquisition and the

objection regarding absence of proper description of land sought to

be acquired in the impugned Notification is not open to them;

(4) On failure of the land owners to file objections under Section 3C

(1), the Competent Authority submitted a report to the Central

Government and the Central Government issued a declaration that

the land should be acquired for purposes mentioned in sub-section

(1). On publication of this declaration the land vests absolutely in

the Central Government free from all encumbrances. As per sub-

section (2) of Section 3D, therefore, land having vested in the

Central Government the acquisition could not be challenged;

(5) The Competent Authority on vesting of the land in the Central

Government and on compensation amount being deposited by the

Competent Authority, has taken possession of the lands, therefore,

the acquisition could not be challenged;

(6) Lastly, it was submitted that these acquisitions were for very

important public purpose, i.e., construction of National Highway

and the court should not interfere with the acquisition on mere

technicalities. The land owners only have a right to compensation.

The quashing of the Notification would only lead to postponment

of the date of Notification thereby possibly resulting in increase in

amount of compensation payable to the land owners. Therefore, at

best the land owners could be compensated by giving some

additional compensation for their acquired land. The acquisition

need not be disturbed.

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 8

So far as the question whether the impugned Notification meets the

requirement of Section 3A(1) of the Act regarding giving brief description of

land is concerned, we have already shown that even though plot numbers of

land in respect of each mouza are given, different pieces of land are acquired

either as whole or in part. Wherever the acquisition is of a portion of a

bigger piece of land, there is no description as to which portion was being

acquired. Unless it is known as to which portion was to be acquired, the

petitioners would be unable to understand the impact of acquisition or to

raise any objection about user of the acquired land for the purposes specified

under the Act or to make a claim for compensation. It is settled law that

where a statute requires a particular act to be done in a particular manner, the

act has to be done in that manner alone. Every word of the statute has to be

given its due meaning. In our view, the impugned notification fails to meet

the statutory mandate. It is vague. The least that is required in such cases is

that the acquisition notification should let the person whose land is sought to

be acquired know what he is going to lose. The impugned notification in

this case is, therefore, not in accordance with the law.

While dealing with the question of brief description of land in the

acquisition notifications, reference was made to some judgments of this

Court where acquisition Notifications under Section 4 of the Land

Acquisition Act had come up for consideration on account of challenge

being leveled on ground of vagueness of the Notifications. In most of these

cases, Plan of the area under acquisition was made part of the notifications

to show that the requirement of description of land was met. This lead us to

inquire whether there was any site plan forming part of the impugned

Notification.

The availability of a Plan would have made all the difference. If there

is a Plan, the area under acquisition becomes identifiable immediately. The

question whether the impugned Notification meets the requirement of brief

description of land under Section 3A(2) goes to the root of the matter. The

High Court rightly observed : "\005.it is just not possible to proceed to

determine the necessity of acquisition of a particular plot of land without

preparation of a proper Plan." The Appendix to the impugned Notification

shows that in many cases small parts of larger chunks of land have been

notified for acquisition. This is not possible without preparing a Plan. But

where is the Plan? The Notification in question makes no reference to any

Plan. Our attention was drawn to averments in pleadings by Writ Petitioners

and replies thereto of the acquiring authority. The Writ Petitioners have

pleaded that there was no Plan. Replies are vague and by way of rolled up

answers. There is no specific reply. It is obvious that there was no Plan and

therefore none was referred to in pleadings nor any thing was produced

before Court at the hearing. Learned counsel for the Competent Authority

tried to submit before us that there was a Plan at the time of issue of the

notification and the Writ Petitioners ought to have inspected it if they so

desired. He further submitted that the Plan was produced before the High

Court. We find that both these submissions are not sustainable as they are

not correct. A reference to the impugned Notification shows that there is no

mention of any Plan. Without this how can anybody know that there was a

Plan which could be inspected and inspected where? We are inclined to

accept that there was no Plan accompanying the impugned Notification.

During the course of hearing we were shown a Plan which we are unable to

link with the impugned Notification. This was a 1996 P.W.D.Plan. The

P.W.D. is a department of the State Government. The impugned Notification

is by the Central Government. The NHAI is established under a Central Act.

The Competent Authority under Section 3 of the Act is appointed by the

Central Government. Therefore, this State Government Plan of 1996 (the

impugned Notification is of 1998) is of no assistance. The impugned

judgment of the High Court emphasises the need for a Plan. It is clear from

the judgment of the High Court that no Plan was produced before it. The

absence of any reference to a Plan in the impugned Notification and in fact

non-availability of any Plan linked to the Notification, fortifies the argument

that the description of the land under acquisition in the impugned

Notification fails to meet the legal requirement of a brief description of the

land which renders the Notification invalid.

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 8

The absence of plan also renders the right to file objections under

Section 3C(1) nugatory. In the absence of a Plan, it is impossible to

ascertain or know which part of acquired land was to be used and in what

manner. Without this knowledge no objections regarding use of land could

be filed. Since the objection regarding use of the land had been given up by

the writ petitioners, we need not go any further in this aspect. We would,

however, like to add that unlike Section 5A of the Land Acquisition

Act,1894 which confers a general right to object to acquisition of land under

Section 4 of the said Act, Section 3C(1) of the National Highways Act gives

a very limited right to object. The objection can be only to the use of the

land under acquisition for purposes other than those under sub-section

3A(1). The Act confers no right to object to acquisition as such. This

answers the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the NHAI that

failure to file objections disentitles Writ Petitioners to object to the

acquisition. The Act confers no general right to object, therefore, failure to

object becomes irrelevant. The learned counsel relied on the judgment of

this court in Delhi Administration vs. Gurdip Singh Uban & Others

[(1999) 7 SCC 44]. In our view, this judgment has no application in the

facts of the present case where right to object is a very limited right. The

case cited is a case under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 which confers a

general right to object to acquisition of land under Section 5A. Failure to

exercise that right could be said to be acquiescence. The National Highways

Act confers no such right. Under this Act there is no right to object to

acquisition of land except on the question of its user. Therefore, the present

objection has to be decided independently of the right to file objections. De

hors the right to file objection, the validity of the Notification has to be

considered. Failure to file objection to the notification under Section 3C,

therefore, cannot non-suit the Writ Petitioners in this case.

The learned counsel supporting the acquisition submitted that the

delay in filing the Writ Petition is fatal to the case of land owners. It is true

that 11th June, 1998 Notification was challenged only in September, 2001 by

filing the Writ Petition. But if the Notification violates the very statute from

which it derives its force, will delay in challenging it clothe it with

legitimacy? The Act requires the Notification to be issued in a particular

manner with brief particulars of land being acquired. The Notification in

this case fails to meet this requirement. We have held it to be bad in law. It

has no legs to stand. The conduct of the opposite party cannot be used to

make it stand. Moreover, the Writ Petitioners have explained the reasons for

the delay in filing the Writ Petition. The Company which owns the lands

had been de-registered. It is a Company registered in the U.K. It had to be

revived. Revival came in mid-2001 whereafter the action was taken. Thus

we find no merit in the argument about delay in challenging the Notification

rendering the challenge liable to be rejected.

Coming to the point regarding filing of claim for compensation on

behalf of the Company by its General Manager with complete details of the

land under acquisition, we must note that at the relevant time in 1998 and

thereafter till 2001, the Writ Petitioner Company had no existence. On

account of demands of workers of the factory and to meet other statutory

demands, a committee was appointed by the High Court in the winding up

proceedings pending before it to run the factory. The claim for compensation

was filed by somebody as the General Manager of the Company. He had no

authority to do so. The committee had to manage only the factory and had

nothing to do with ownership issues. So far as details of land under

acquisition contained in the claim is concerned, it is based on material

contained in the impugned Notification and the Appendix. Filing of such a

claim by somebody who had no authority to do so, cannot deprive the

owners of their right to challenge the acquisition of the lands owned by the

Company. Therefore, neither delay in filing the Writ Petition nor filing of

claim for compensation can stand in the way of the Writ Petitioners in

seeking relief in these proceedings.

About the argument based on vesting of the land in the Central

Government, it is to be seen that if the initial Notification is bad, all steps

taken in pursuance thereof will fall with it. Vesting under Section 3D(2)

arises on a declaration by the Central Government under Section 3D(1).The

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 7 of 8

declaration is the result of disposal of objections under Section 3C. Each

step is a consequence of earlier step and in that sense all the steps are linked

to initial Notification for acquisition under Section 3A(1) and (2). This

initial Notification has been held to be not in accordance with law. When

the foundation goes rest of the edifice falls. The invalid Notification under

Section 3(A) renders all subsequent steps invalid. Therefore, vesting of land

in the Central Government in the present case cannot be said to be lawful

and it does not advance the case of the Competent Authority or the NHAI.

Taking possession of the land is yet another step in the same sequence and is

again subject to the initial Notification being held valid. The initial

Notification having been invalidated, there can be no legal or valid vesting

of land in the favour of the Central Government.

The aspect of possession of land having been taken by the Competent

Authority, is an important issue for consideration in this case. Vesting of

land in the Central Government has been held to be not in accordance with

the law. The other statutory requirement which needs to be complied before

taking possession is deposit of compensation. Under Section 3E(1)

possession can be taken only after the land vests in the Central Government

and the amount determined by the Competent Authority as compensation

under Section 3G has been deposited under sub-section (1) of Section 3H.

In the present case in view of an order dated 3rd April,2002 passed by the

High Court final compensation could not be determined by the competent

Authority. Therefore, there could not be a valid deposit of amount finally

determined as required under Section 3E(1) of the Act, which means the

possession could not have been taken. But the fact is that possession was

taken on 19th February, 2003 on deposit of provisional amount of

compensation. The NHAI had in fact applied for permission of court to take

possession of the land under acquisition. But without any order being passed

on that application, it hastened to take possession after giving only one day's

notice when the Act requires 60 days notice. Moreover, the possession is to

be taken through the Commissioner of Police or the Collector. This was not

done. Neither of the three statutory requirements for taking possession were

fulfilled. Thus taking of possession of the lands in the present case is in total

violation of the statutory provisions. The learned counsel for the acquiring

authority submits that possession was taken on basis of oral observations of

the court. This is a totally misconceived plea. Court orders are always in

black and white. Oral orders are never passed. Moreover, this plea is wrong

because the Division Bench observed in its order dated 27th March,2003 that

it never dealt with question of possession. The result is that taking

possession of the land sought to be acquired cannot be said to be in

accordance with law in this case and does not improve matters for the

NHAI.

At this stage we would like to note that the learned counsel appearing

for the writ petitioners made reference to a publication in the nature of a

brochure issued by the West Bengal Government wherein it is mentioned

that motels/shops/petrol pumps etc. will also come up in the area where the

acquired land is situate. On this basis it was sought to be argued that such

use of the acquired land would be contrary to the use mentioned in Section

3A of the Act and, therefore, is not permissible. There was lot of

controversy on this aspect between the parties particularly, on the ground

that this plea was being taken at this belated stage when the respondents had

no opportunity to give a proper reply thereto. We have mentioned this only

for the reason that the issue has come up during the course of hearing. We

do not consider it necessary to go into this aspect, in view of the fact that we

have held in this judgment that the basic acquisition notification itself is not

in accordance with law.

Having held that the impugned notification regarding acquisition of

land is invalid because it fails to meet the statutory requirements and also

having found that taking possession of the land of the writ petitioners in the

present case in pursuance of the said notification was not in accordance with

law, the question arises as to what relief can be granted to the petitioners.

The High Court rightly observed that the acquisition of land in the present

case was for a project of great national importance, i.e. the construction of a

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 8 of 8

national highway. The construction of national highway on the acquired

land has already been completed as informed to us during the course of

hearing. No useful purpose will be served by quashing the impugned

notification at this stage. We cannot be unmindful of the legal position that

the acquiring authority can always issue a fresh notification for acquisition

of the land in the event of the impugned notification being quashed. The

consequence of this will only be that keeping in view the rising trend in

prices of land, the amount of compensation payable to the land owners may

be more. Therefore, the ultimate question will be about the quantum of

compensation payable to the land owners. Quashing of the notification at

this stage will give rise to several difficulties and practical problems.

Balancing the rights of the petitioners as against the problems involved in

quashing the impugned notification, we are of the view that a better course

will be to compensate the land owners, that is, writ petitioners appropriately

for what they have been deprived of. Interests of justice persuade us to

adopt this course of action.

Normally, compensation is determined as per the market price of land

on the date of issuance of the notification regarding acquisition of land.

There are precedents by way of judgments of this Court where in similar

situations instead of quashing the impugned notification, this Court shifted

the date of the notification so that the land owners are adequately

compensated. Reference may be made to:

(a) Ujjain Vikas Pradhikaran v. Rajkumar Johri and others [1992 (1)SCC 328]

(b) Gauri Shankar Gaur & Ors. v. State of UP & Ors. [1994 (1) SCC 92]

(c) Haji Saeed Khan & Ors. v. State of UP & Ors. [2001 (9) SCC 513]

In that direction the next step is what should be the crucial date in the facts

of the present case for determining the quantum of compensation. We feel

that the relevant date in the present case ought to be the date when

possession of the land was taken by the respondents from the writ

petitioners. This date admittedly is 19th February, 2003. We, therefore,

direct that compensation payable to the writ petitioners be determined as on

19th February, 2003, the date on which they were deprived of possession of

their lands. We do not quash the impugned notification in order not to

disturb what has already taken place by way of use of the acquired land for

construction of the national highway. We direct that the compensation for

the acquired land be determined as on 19th February, 2003 expeditiously and

within ten weeks from today and the amount of compensation so

determined, be paid to the writ petitioners after adjusting the amount already

paid by way of compensation within eight weeks thereafter. The claim of

interest on the amount of compensation so determined is to be decided in

accordance with law by the appropriate authority. We express no opinion

about other statutory rights, if any, available to the parties in this behalf and

the parties will be free to exercise the same, if available. The compensation

as determined by us under this order along with other benefits, which the

respondents give to parties whose lands are acquired under the Act should be

given to the Writ Petitioners along with what has been directed by us in this

judgment.

Accordingly appeals filed by the Competent Authority (arising out of

SLP (C)No.16820 of 2004) and the National Highways Authority of India

(arising out of SLP (C) Nos.17874-17875 of 2004 are hereby dismissed

while the appeal filed by Ridh Karan Rakecha & Anr. (arising out of SLP(C)

No.18773 of 2004) is allowed in terms of the above judgment. There shall

be no order as to costs.