2026 INSC 763 Page 1 of 16

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10526 OF 2024

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10526 OF 2024

CONTAINER CORPORATION OF INDIA L IMITED …APPELLANT(s)

VERSUS

RISHI RANJAN MISHRA & ORS. …RESPONDENT(s)

J U D G M E N T

SANJAY KAROL, J.

1. This appeal is at the instance of the Container Corporation of India Limited,

and lays challenge to judgment dated 5

th

September 2019 in MAC. App. No.

614/2018.

2. The Additional District and Sessions Judge, P.O MACT(SE-01)

1

Saket

Courts answered the question in the negative in a petition for compensation filed

under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988

2

by respondent no.1 herein.

The High Court set aside this judgment and answered the question in the

affirmative. Now we are called upon to adjudge the correctness of the view so

taken.

1

Tribunal, MACT Petition No. 4791 of 2016

2

MVA

Page 2 of 16

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10526 OF 2024

3. Facts are of little relevance and so only a brief background as to how the

question arose may suffice. On 5

th

September, 2013, respondent no.1 visited

Inland Container Depot

3

, Tughlakabad, New Delhi, when the vehicle in question

hit him and ran over his pelvic region, leading to severe injuries. His right leg had

to be amputated, for which he had to undergo several surgeries. Physical disability

is 90%, which he claims to be at 100% as functional disability. Before the

Tribunal, he sought Rs.75 lakhs. Respondent no. 3 (New India Assurance Co.

Ltd.) objected to the claim through an application under Order VII Rule 11 of the

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

4

.

4. This came to be allowed by the Tribunal on 9

th

January 2018, observing

that Section 2(28) MVA makes it clear that there are two requirements for a

particular machine to be considered a motor vehicle i.e. it has to be mechanically

propelled and capable of being used on the road. At the same time, it also provides

for a special kind of vehicle to be used within enclosed premises, and the same is

excluded from the meaning of that word, as such, even though it is mechanically

propelled, the same would not be a motor vehicle.

Learned Single Judge of the High Court placed reliance on the judgments

of this Court inter alia Western Coalfields Limited v. State of Maharashtra

5

and

held that in light thereof, a Reach Stacker would also qualify as being a motor

vehicle. The restricted area in which it plies would not take away from its identity

and classification as such.

Heard Ms. Pinky Anand, learned senior counsel for the appellant,

Mr. Yadav Narender Singh, learned counsel for the respondent, and Ms. Shatakshi

Singh, learned amicus curiae appointed by this Court. The issue that arises for

consideration is whether a Reach Stacker is a motor vehicle within the context of

the MVA.

3

ICD

4

CPC

5

(2016)11 SCC 613

Page 3 of 16

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10526 OF 2024

5. The mainstay of the appellant’s case is that the enclosed premises, part of

the definition, would cover ICD, Tughlakabad, where the accident took place.

Further that the part regarding special type of vehicle to be used in a factory would

also cover the present case. That apart, the roads within ICD are specifically

constructed to handle the weight of Reach Stackers and are hence not equitable

to regular roads.

6. The claimant, on the other hand, contends that ICD spans an area of

approximately 10sq.kms. with extensive, interconnecting roads. It would

constitute a public place, and the area is accessible to authorized members of the

public. According to him, Reach Stacker would qualify as a motor vehicle for the

following reasons- (a) high capacity engine; (b) mounted on tyres and chassis; (c)

used for shifting containers across the area of ICD; (d) driven by driver and (e)

no technical barrier to move on roads.

The amicus supports the case of the respondent.

7. Relevant provisions of MVA read as under:

“2(28) “motor vehicle” or “vehicle” means any mechanically propelled

vehicle adapted for use upon roads whether the power of propulsion is

transmitted thereto from an external or internal source and includes a chassis

to which a body has not been attached and a trailer; but does not include a

vehicle running upon fixed rails or a vehicle of a special type adapted for

use only in a factory or in any other enclosed premises or a vehicle having

less than four wheels fitted with engine capacity of not exceeding twenty-

five cubic centimetres;

(34) “public place” means a road, street, way or other place, whether a

thoroughfare or not, to which the public have a right of access, and includes

any place or stand at which passengers are picked up or set down by a stage

carriage”

8. A bare perusal of the above reveals that for a particular machine to be

counted as a motor vehicle, it must be (a) mechanically propelled, (b) adapted to

be used on roads, irrespective of whether such vehicle which may have an internal

or external power propulsion source; a chassis which may or may not have a body

attached to it and a trailer. What does not constitute a motor vehicle, is (a) a

vehicle running on fixed rails or (b) a vehicle of special type adapted for use only

Page 4 of 16

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10526 OF 2024

in a factory or other enclosed premises or (c) a vehicle with less than four wheels

along with engine capacity less than 25 cubic centimeters.

9. Before proceeding further, it is necessary to look at the particulars of the

Reach Stacker. It is a machine, undisputedly on wheels that is used to lift heavy

materials such as shipping blocks and containers, and quite literally place them

on top of one another. The details as supplied by the appellant which have not

been disputed by the respondent or the Amicus, of the vehicle reveal that it is of

71.8 metric tonnes weight without it being laden with the containers and at 102

metric tonnes approximately at full capacity. In this context, reference must be

made to a Gazette Notification

6

issued by the Ministry of Road, Transport and

Highways under Section 58(1) of the MV Act which across a number of

categories shows the maximum permissible weight to be inter-alia 49 tonnes in

rigid vehicle, 55 tonnes semi-articulated vehicle and 54 tonnes in truck trailer

combination. This aspect we will discuss later. We must determine whether ICD

is a public place or not?

10. In Tarachand Logistic Solutions Ltd. v. State of A.P.,

7

the question that

arose before this Court was whether motor vehicles plying within the dispatch

yard of the Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Limited(‘RINL’) would be motor vehicles for

the purposes of payment of motor vehicle tax within the Andhra Pradesh Motor

Vehicle Taxation Act, 1963. In arriving at its conclusion, the Court discussed the

meaning of the word ‘public place’ which is relevant for our purposes. The

discussion as made by Bhuyan J., is as under:

“34…. A motor vehicle which is not adopted for use upon roads to which

the public have no right of access is not a motor vehicle. It was held that

dumpers and rockers would not be taxable as long as those were working

solely within the private premises of the respective owners. Bolani Ores

Ltd. (supra) is directly on the point in issue.

45. … Thus, if a vehicle is actually used in a ‘public place’ or kept in

such a way that it is intended to be used in a ‘public place’ then the tax

liability accrues. We have already noted that this Court in Bolani Ores

Limited (supra) has held that when the members of the public are not

6

S.O. 728(E), dated16

th

July 2018

7

2025 SCC OnLine SC 1851

Page 5 of 16

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10526 OF 2024

allowed access inside an area without prior permission and when there is

check on ingress and egress to ensure that no unauthorized person have

access to the premises, the same would be an enclosed premise and not a

‘public place’.”

11. Undisputedly, a road is a public space granted that public has access

thereto. Whether authorized personnel can be termed to be public? The Section

uses the words ‘thoroughfare or not’ which already indicates restricted access but

given the nature of work that is carried out inside these areas, which, as it appears

is movement of heavy machinery or shipping containers that too on specially

designed roads. Keeping in view the weight of the vehicles plied thereon, it

cannot be said that any person walking on the roads outside this area, can, as a

matter of right claim entry to this space. Since the ICD is a custom bonded area

within the meaning of Section 7 of the Indian Customs Act 1962, i.e. the place

for unloading and loading of goods imported and exported, it only stands to

reason that only those persons who are duly authorized by the competent

authority will have access to the same. This fortifies the conclusion that it is not

a place that public has a right to access. As such, the roads within ICD, to our

view do not constitute ‘public place’ as defined under Section 2 (34) of the MVA.

12. Now turning to the question whether Reach Stacker is a motor vehicle or

not?

13. The tests to determine this question, it has been submitted by Ms. Anand

learned senior counsel, have been laid down in the following judgments: Bolani

Ores Ltd. v. State of Orissa,

8

Goodyear India Ltd. v. Union of India

9

, and

Ultratech Cement Ltd. v. State of Gujarat

10

. Learned amicus, on the other hand

referred to inter-alia Central Coal Fields Ltd. v. State of Orissa

11

, Bose Abraham

v. State of Kerala

12

, Govt. of A.P. v. Road Rollers Owners Welfare Assn

13

.

8

(1974) 2 SCC 777

9

(1997) 5 SCC 752

10

2026 SCC OnLine SC 48

11

1992 Supp (3) SCC 133

12

(2001) 3 SCC 157

13

(2004) 6 SCC 210

Page 6 of 16

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10526 OF 2024

Let us discuss these judgments. We would first discuss the proposition involved

then shortly capture the case of the appellant and respondent/amicus respectively

and then provide our reasoning thereon, in successive paragraphs:

13.1 Bolani supra was a case concerned with taxation and the question was

whether dumpers, rockers and tractors are motor vehicles as understood

within the meaning of relevant State Motor Vehicles Taxation Acts, in

order to be taxed as such. The relevant observations of the three judge

Bench discussing the words ‘adapted for use’ as they appear in the

Section, are reproduced below for reference:

“23. The meaning of the word “adapted” in Section 2(18) of the

Act is itself indicated in Entry 57 of List II of the Seventh

Schedule to the Constitution, which confers a power on the State

to tax vehicles whether propelled mechanically or not and uses

the word “suitable” in relation to its use on the roads. The words

“adapted for use” must therefore be construed as “suitable for

use”. At any rate, words “adapted for use” cannot be larger in

their import by including vehicles which are not “suitable for

use” on roads. In this sense, the words “is adapted” for use have

the same connotation as “is suitable” or “is fit” for use on the

roads.

24. The question would then arise, are dumpers, rockers and

tractors suitable or fit for use on roads? It is not denied that these

vehicles are on pneumatic wheels and can be moved about from

place to place with mechanical power. The word “vehicle” itself

connotes that it is a contrivance which moves. A vehicle which

merely moves from one place to another need not necessarily be

a motor vehicle within the meaning of Section 2(18) of the Act.

It may move on iron flats made into a chain such as a caterpillar

vehicle or a military tank. Both move from one place to another

but are not suitable for use on roads. It is not that they cannot

move on the roads but that they are not adapted, made fit or

suitable for use on roads. They would, if used, dig and damage

the roads. It is contended that the dumpers or rockers are very

heavy and though they can move on roads they would damage

the roads and, therefore, they are not suitable for use on roads.

To substantiate this proposition the appellants have produced

before us certain notifications issued by the State of Orissa

under which vehicles beyond a certain laden weight are

prohibited from plying on the roads. It was rightly pointed out

by the learned advocate for the State of Orissa that there are only

some of the roads on which vehicles, heavier than what is

indicated in the notification cannot be permitted. But that is not

to say that all vehicles which exceed a particular weight are not

Page 7 of 16

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10526 OF 2024

adapted for use upon roads and are, therefore, not motor

vehicles. …

37. From the very nature of the area operated by these three

companies it is obvious that the machines which are the subject-

matter of these appeals must be working in their respective

mining areas. The mere fact that there is no fence or the barbed

wire around the leasehold premises is not conclusive. There is

evidence to show that the public are not allowed to go inside

without prior permission, there are gates and a check on ingress

and egress is kept by guards who also ensure that no

unauthorised persons have access to the mining area, all of

which indicate that the respective mining areas are enclosed

premises within the meaning of the exceptions under Section

2(c) of the Taxation Act.”

13.1.1 Appellant’s case: The ‘Bolani’ test therefore is regarding

‘suitability of use’. On this test the question is whether a Reach

Stacker when driven on the road shall drive in a normal fashion not

leaving damage and destruction in its wake. Reference has been made

to a notification by the Ministry of Road Transport and Highways

dated 18

th

July 2018 whereby gross vehicle weight for rigid vehicle

has been kept at 49 tonnes and 55 tonnes in case of semi-

articulated/trailers. The Reach Stacker in the present case is

undisputedly higher than said weight. Hence, valid questions arise

about its suitability on roads in light of this fact.

13.1.2 Respondent’s case: The discussion in this judgment creates

a distinction between vehicles moving on chain plates like

caterpillars or military tanks from one place to another that is on

chain plated or specific contraction vis-à-vis wheeled rubber-tired

vehicles. Given that Reach Stacker is mounted on chassis and has

rubber wheels, it is suitable for use on roads.

13.1.3 Our view: Well, to say that only because a vehicle has rubber

tyres and is on chassis that it is suitable for public roads, would be a

rather simplistic view of the whole situation. The concerned authority

has notified the permissible weights, and it goes without saying that

Page 8 of 16

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10526 OF 2024

if a particular vehicle goes against the guidelines mentioned therein,

its suitability is obviously impacted.

13.2 Goodyear supra posed a question regarding imposition of excise

duty for tyres to be used in heavy moving vehicles such as dumpers and earth-

movers, over a particular size, as tyres for ‘motor vehicles’. The Central tariff

uses the word ‘motor vehicles’ to include ‘mechanically propelled vehicles

adapted for use upon roads’. The definition with which we are concerned also

uses these words and therefore the interpretation given by K.T.Thomas J., for

a three judge Bench becomes important. It is as follows:

“10. A close reading of the definition of “motor vehicle” in Item 34

reveals that the striking ingredient thereof is that it should have

been “adapted for use upon roads”. Merely because the areas on

which such heavy-movers traverse might sometimes include roads

also is not enough to hold that they were “adapted for use upon

roads”. Such use of the heavy-mover on the road may only be

ancillary or incidental to the main use of it. Emphasis in the

definition must be on the words “use upon road” as those words

would denote the principal or dominant use and not where it may

move incidentally.”

13.2.1 Appellant’s case: As is obvious from the above, determination of

dominant use hinges on utility. It is not used on roads is the appellant’s pleaded

case. Its transportation is only done after it is dismantled, for doing so without

it is impossible for it contravenes weight limits.

13.2.2 Respondent’s case: Dismantling of a Reach Stacker falls within

operational economics and is not the determinant of suitability since many

other vehicles are transported in this manner. This would not denude its

characteristics of a motor vehicle.

13.2.3 Our view: If the determinant in Goodyear supra is utility, and the

answer given by the amicus is regarding suitability, the distinction that is

attempted by the latter cannot be accepted. It is an undisputed fact that the

surfaces within ICD are specifically designed to bear the weight of these

vehicles. If special care has been taken to design roads in accordance with

Page 9 of 16

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10526 OF 2024

what will be used on them, it stands to reason that those roads, that have not

taken into account regular use of such heavy vehicles will be unfit. Our own

research reveals that the use of Reach Stackers is in connection with

containers, ports and terminals, steel and aluminum etc., when such heavy

items are to be lifted and transported from one area to another. Because its

application is for a limited set of tasks and to a limited kind of industries, in

our considered view, the utility test also is decided in favour of the appellants.

13.3 Ultratech Cement Ltd. supra raised the question of taxability within the

Gujarat Motor Vehicles Tax Act, 1958 in so far as the following vehicles are

concerned: Heavy Earth Moving Machinery or special services vehicles or any

construction equipment vehicles such as Dumpers, Loaders, Excavators,

Surface Miners, Dozers, Drills, Rock Breakers etc. The question that the co-

ordinate bench was required to decide was whether these vehicles were covered

by the definition under Section 2(28) of the MVA, same as the question

presented in this case, albeit, not for taxation purposes. In the view of the Court

in that case, the deciding factor was whether the abovenamed vehicles would

fall within the exclusionary part of the definition. It was held:

“37. … The second part provides for the exclusion of certain

vehicles from the definition of the motor vehicle. It provides that

motor vehicle does not include a vehicle running upon fixed rails or

a vehicle of a special type adapted for use only in a factory or in

any other enclosed premises. It means that the legislature has

consciously provided for the exclusion of the vehicles of the special

kind which have been adapted for use only in a factory or any other

enclosed premises from the definition of motor vehicle. In other

words, though the term motor vehicle is wide enough but it

expressly excludes some of the motor vehicles which are of special

type and have been adapted for use only in factory or in any other

enclosed premises from its ambit.

38. The vehicles in question used by the appellant are all in the

nature of special vehicles as they are basically construction

equipment vehicles which have been made suitable for use only in

a factory and an enclosed premises rather than for use on roads.

These vehicles may be capable of being used on road but

essentially, they are meant to be used as a special vehicle inside the

enclosed premises or in the factory premises alone and not outside

on the road. Even for reaching the factory premises, or the so-called

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CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10526 OF 2024

enclosed premises they do not ply on road and are taken on tractors

and trailers from the place of their manufacturing to the place of

their deployment. The various certificates of the manufacturers and

suppliers as well as those issued by the Automotive Research

Association of India amply demonstrate that the aforesaid vehicles

used by the appellant are special type of vehicles meant for use only

within the factory premises or the enclosed premise. They are all

off-road vehicles that do not ordinarily ply on roads. Since, they do

not run on the roads, the manufacturers and suppliers do not even

issue any certificate of road worthiness in respect of these vehicles.

In short, the vehicles used by the appellants are special type of

vehicles meant to be used as construction equipment vehicle within

the enclosed premises and as such ex-facie stands excluded from

the definition of the motor vehicle as contained in Section 2(28) of

the Act, more particularly by virtue of the second part of the

definition.

39. In view of the above, we can safely conclude that though the

vehicles used by the appellant are “motor vehicles” within the first

part of the definition under Section 2(28) of the Act but they stand

excluded from the definition of “motor vehicles” on account of

their very nature of use and the place of the use by virtue of the

second part of the definition.”

13.3.1 Appellant’s case:The deciding factor in Ultratech Cement

Ltd. supra was the purpose for which the vehicles in question were

used. It was categorically observed that they were vehicles for

restricted, limited use within an area and each served a specific

purpose. They would, as such, fall within the exclusionary part of the

definition. The vehicle which is the point of dispute in the present case

meets all the criteria.

13.3.2 Respondent’s case: The decision in Ultratech Cement Ltd.

supra is sought to be distinguished on the basis of it being premised on

a different factual matrix. Since they were transported to the site in

question in dismantled form and were restricted to the industrial areas

only whereas in the present case, the reach stacker was being driven at

speed in a paved internal road of the ICD when it ran over the

respondent. An additional distinguishing factor is that the issue therein

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CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10526 OF 2024

was with regard to taxability in connection with Article 265 of the

Constitution read with Entry 57 List II thereof.

13.3.3 Our view: We are of the considered view that the distinction

attempted to be drawn is at best artificial. A perusal of the judgment

reveals that in order to determine the question of taxability, the Court

undertook a detailed analysis of what constitutes a motor vehicle with

reference to various earlier decisions of the Court, and then concluded

that even though the vehicles at issue therein were covered by the first

part of the definition, they were excluded from the scope of the

definition by the second part. To drive home the point, an analogy was

drawn with airplanes and tanks, observing that even though they are

suitable to land/use on roads, to accept this as the deciding factor would

lead to an anomaly. It is stated that the area where the Reach Stacker

was driven was a ‘paved internal road’ of the ICD. We may only ask

ourselves as to how this road would be any different from the roads on

which the vehicles discussed in this judgment, i.e., roads within

enclosed industrial areas?

13.4 We now deal with the judgments cited by the amicus to support the

case of respondent no.1 and how they are sought to be distinguished by the

learned senior counsel for the appellant:

13.4.1 Central Coal Fields Ltd. v. State of Orissa

14

, was relied

on to contend that plying Dumpers etc on roads would cause

damage to the roads, would not on its own make them unsuitable

for use on roads. In the present facts, it was argued by the other side

that reach stackers cannot ply on roads whatsoever, irrespective of

the fact that they are with rubber wheels.

14

1992 Supp (3) SCC 133

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CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10526 OF 2024

13.4.2 Bose Abraham v. State of Kerala

15

, a co-ordinate

Bench held that merely because there is a specific use of a vehicle

within enclosed premises, it does not render the same to be ‘a

different kind of vehicle’. The distinction that is sought to be drawn

is that road rollers and reach stackers are different when considered

from the point of view of use by nature. The latter, by its very

nature, is intended to be used within enclosed premises, therefore,

would not be a motor vehicle within this Act. We agree with the

distinction so drawn.

13.4.3 Govt. of A.P. v. Road Rollers Owners Welfare Assn

16

,

holds that a road-roller, since specifically built for use on the road,

necessarily has to be a motor vehicle. The distinction according to

the appellant in this case, is rather simple that the vehicle in this

case cannot ply on roads and, therefore, they are fundamentally

different.

13.4.4 Rajasthan SRTC v. Santosh

17

, concerned the question

whether ‘motorised cart’ generally called jugaad is a motor vehicle

within the meaning of Section 2 (28) MVA. It was held that the only

factor that needs to be considered is whether the vehicle in question

is adapted for the road or not. According to the learned judges in

this case, the use of the words ‘only’ in the second part dictates that

the exception applies only to those vehicles that can exclusively be

used within factory or closed premises, that is to say, a vehicle that

has not been adapted is to be excluded. The appellant uses the same

logic as they contend in Roadroller supra.

15

(2001) 3 SCC 157

16

(2004) 6 SCC 210

17

(2013) 7 SCC 94

Page 13 of 16

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10526 OF 2024

13.4.5 Natwar Parikh & Co. Ltd. v. State of Karnataka

18

, a

three-judge Bench of this Court was considering the taxability of a

tractor-trailer. It was held throughout that it would be taxable. It

was relied by the learned amicus because it was observed that the

word motor vehicle has to be interpreted broadly. On the other

hand, the appellant contends that this decision stands distinguished

by Ultratech supra. Section 2(28) clearly includes the word trailer

to be included within the definition. That in itself distinguishes the

present case from this.

13.4.6 Western Coalfields Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra

19

,

need not be dealt with separately since it places whole sole reliance

on Natwar Parekh supra.

13.5 Most of these judgments were taken note of by the Bench in

Ultratech Cement Ltd. supra and distinguished. The relevant para is as under:

“51. The decisions to the contrary cited at the Bar starting

from Travancore Tea Estates Co. Ltd. v. State of Kerala

10

, Union of

India v. Chowgule and Co. Pvt. Ltd.

11

, Central Coal Fields Ltd. v. State

of Orissa

12

, Chief General Manager, Jagannath Area (supra), Bose

Abraham v. State of Kerala

13

, State of Gujarat (supra) are all decisions

of the different Division Benches of this Court. No doubt, they hold that

vehicles used or kept for use on the public roads of the State are exigible

to tax, and if they are not so used they can claim exemption but all these

decisions fail to take into account the specific exclusion as contained in

the second part of Section 2(28) of the Act which defines “motor

vehicles”. As stated earlier, the vehicles or the construction equipment

vehicles used by the appellants are “motor vehicles” within the first part

of the definition as contained in Section 2(28) but they stand excluded

by virtue of the second part of the said definition. This aspect of the

matter has not been specifically considered by any of the above

decisions. Moreover, all these decisions simply brushes aside Bolani

Ores Ltd. (supra) without actually ruling it out on the ground that it

relates to “motor vehicles” as defined under the old Act without

realising that there was no material change between the definition of

“motor vehicles” in the old or present Act.

(emphasis supplied)

18

(2005) 7 SCC 364

19

(2016) 11 SCC 613

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CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10526 OF 2024

13.5.1 All these judgments that have been cited deal with road rollers,

tractor trailers or motorised carts. Regarding road rollers, to our mind, there

is an additional point to be made. The understanding of enclosed premises in

the context of road rollers vis-à-vis reach stacker is different. In the former,

while it does apply to enclosed premises, which may be a part of otherwise

public road, for example, where repairs or construction is being undertaken

but in the former, there is a designated area within which it can be used. Put

it differently, the latter can be used only within the four walls of a confined

space that is not accessible to public. Further, none of these vehicles come

with the stipulation that for them to ply, the roads are generally specially

reinforced to bear the weight. These vehicles cannot ply on roads; the Reach

Stacker exceeds the permitted weight; is dismantled to be transported and

lacks general safety features that are present in a motor vehicle otherwise

permitted on roads. Since it is vehicle dedicated to a particular kind of work

which takes place within duly notified areas, it would fall into the second half

of the definition of ‘motor vehicles’, i.e. the exclusion. The way the exclusion

functions does not require the characteristic of the motor vehicle to be absent

but instead it recognises that despite having the characteristics of a motor

vehicle, certain types of vehicles cannot be equated to those vehicles that are

generally understood to be ‘motor vehicles’.

13.5.2 These judgments do not, therefore, warrant any further discussion.

14. A further point that has been canvassed by the Appellants is the non-

registration of the vehicle in question under Section 39 of the MVA. Reference is

made to a Notification issued by the Joint Transport Commissioner and Secretary,

Regional Transport Authority, Hyderabad, stating that the Reach Stacker is not a

motor vehicle and, therefore, does not require registration under Section 39 of the

MV Act, 1988. The same is reproduced below:

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CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10526 OF 2024

“OFFICE OF THE JOINT TRANSPORT COMMISSIONER

AND SECRETARY

RTA(HYDERABAD)

...(illegible)...

TO WHOMSOVER IT MAY CONCERN

One piece of Model REACH STACKER LOAD CONTAINER

HANDLER bearing serial no…(illegible)... having ...(illegible)...kgs

with front axle 4 tyres 4x(15x25) tubeless. The gross vehicle weight

is ...(illegible)... the tyre size...(illegible)... is not prescribed in the

Motor Vehicle Act 1988 under Rules there under.

Similarly, the loads specified to the first axle and rear axles are not

prescribed under the MV Rules, 1989. As such the vehicle cannot be

operated on public road. This vehicle is of a

special...(illegible)...manufactured and adopted to be used only in

enclosed premises not as such...(illegible)...does not come under the

definition of Motor vehicle as prescribed under rule 2(28) of Motor

Vehicle Act of 1988.

Since this reach stacker is not a motor vehicle. It does not require

registration under sec 39 of MV Act, 1988.

(Sign)

JOINT TRANSPORT COMMISSIONER

&

SECRETARY RTA HYDERABAD ”

15. The Amicus Curiae’ answer to this is that mere non-registration is not a

reason to escape liability and the consequence that is posited of such argument

being accepted is that every unregistered vehicle would be removed from the

scope of this Act. It is difficult to accept this contention and consequence, as

submitted by the amicus, for there is a distinction. It is not that every vehicle that

is not registered would be taken out of the scope of this Act. If a vehicle plies on

the road without registration, that would be in violation of the provisions of the

MVA. But in the present case, a motor vehicle is what is required to be registered.

Page 16 of 16

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10526 OF 2024

If the concerned authority states that the reach stacker is not a motor vehicle, then

there cannot be registration for such a vehicle within the meaning of Section 39.

16. Before parting with the matter, however, we must place an important

caveat. We have held that ICD is not a ‘public place’ within the meaning of Section

2 (34) of MVA. This should, however, not restrict a claimant's right to seek

compensation under the MVA should such an untoward incident ever take place

within the four walls of the ICD with a ‘regular’ vehicle that ordinarily plies on

roads that may have been taken into the restricted area by officials of the

department or some other person connected with the ICD or its processes.

17. Consequent to the discussion as aforesaid, the judgment of the learned

Single Judge of the High Court of Delhi, dated 5

th

September 2019 in MAC. App.

No.614/2018 is set aside, and the findings of the Tribunal are restored. It is

clarified that if any money stands paid to respondent No.1, the same shall not be

subject to any recovery.

18. The appeal is allowed, however, in the circumstances, there will be no order

as to costs. Pending application (s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

……………… ……………………. ………….J

(SANJAY KAROL)

……………………………….. ……………….J

(NONGMEIKAPAM KOTISWAR SINGH)

New Delhi;

July 29, 2026