2026:HHC:8056

IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA

Cr.MMO No.1234 of 2025

Date of Decision: 20.03.2026

__________________________________________________________________________

Deepak ……...Petitioner

Versus

State of Himachal Pradesh and Another …....Respondents

Coram

Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sandeep Sharma, Judge.

Whether approved for reporting? Yes.

_____________________________________________________________________________

For the Petitioner: Mr. Gurmeet Bhardwaj and Ms. Anuja Mehta ,

Advocates.

For the Respondents: Mr. Rajan Kahol & Mr. Vishal Panwar, Additional

Advocates General, with Mr. Ravi Chauhan and

Mr. Anish Banshtu, Deputy Advocates General, for

State.

__________________________________________________________________________

Sandeep Sharma, J. (Oral)

By way of present petition filed under Section 528 of the BNSS,

2023, prayer has been made by the petitioner-accused for quashing of FIR

No.91/2024, dated 18.05.2024, under Section 10 of Prohibition of Child

Marriage Act, 2006, (for short, ‘the Act’) registered at Police Station Balh,

District Mandi, Himachal Pradesh as well as consequent proceedings i.e.

case No.308/2024, titled as State of H.P. Vs. Gaytri Devi and Others,

pending in the Court of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Mandi, District

Mandi, Himachal Pradesh.

2. Precisely, the grouse of the petitioner, as has been highlighted

in the petition and further canvassed by Mr. Gurmeet Bhardwaj, Advocate,

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duly assisted by Ms. Anuja Mehta, Advocate, learned counsel representing

the petitioner, is that no case much less under Section 10 of the Act is

made out against the petitioner for the reason that there is no evidence that

petitioner herein conducted, directed or abeted child marriage inter se

persons namely Pushp Raj and Riya, aged 19 and 20 respectively, rather he

being Public Notary only attested the affidavit, that too in the presence of

independent witnesses, who claimed above named persons to be major.

Above named counsel further argued that otherwise also, Section 13 of the

Notaries Act, 1952, clearly provides that no Court shall take cognizance of

any offence committed by a Notary in the exercise or purported exercise of

his functions, save upon complaint in writing made by an officer authorized

by the Central Government or a State Government by general or special

order in that regard. In support of his aforesaid argument, he placed

reliance upon judgment dated 14.07.2025 passed by Coordinate Bench of

this Court in Cr.MMO No.1069 of 2024, titled as Jagdish Kumar Negi Vs.

State of H.P. and Another, and judgment dated 27.02.2026, passed by

this Court in Cr.MMO No.754 of 2024, titled as Dalip Singh Thakur Vs.

State of H.P. and Another , wherein taking note of Section 13 of the

Notaries Act, this Court, while exercising power under Section 482 Cr.P.C.

(now Section 528 of BNSS), proceeded to quash criminal proceedings

initiated against the Notary Public.

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3. Mr. Vishal Panwar, learned Additional Advocate General, while

fairly admitting that no Court shall take cognizance of any offence

committed by a Notary in the exercise or purported exercise of his functions

under the Notaries Act, submitted that petitioner herein, being an Advocate

and Notary Public, was well aware of the fact that no boy having age less

than 21 years could solemnise marriage and as such, there was no

occasion, if any, for him to attest the affidavit of person namely Pushp Raj,

who at relevant time was 19 years of age. Mr. Panwar submitted that mere

identification/verification, if any, by the independent witness may not be

sufficient to rule out the complicity of the petitioner in the commission of

offence punishable under Section 10 of the Act. He submitted that since

Challan already stands filed in the competent Court of law and matter is

listed for framing of Charge, it may not be appropriate for this Court to

exercise power under Section 528 of BNSS to quash the FIR, rather

petitioner herein can raise defences/submissions sought to be raised in the

instant proceedings before the learned trial Court at the time of framing of

Charge.

4. Precisely, the facts of the case, as emerge from the pleadings as

well as other material adduced on record by the respective parties are that

FIR sought to be quashed came to be instituted at the behest of

complainant-Chinta Devi, who alleged that her daughter namely Riya, aged

20 years, had gone to Medical College at Ner Chowk for Nursing Course on

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09.05.2024, but not returned back. She alleged that on 10.05.2024, she

lodged complaint of missing of her daughter, but no action was taken. She

alleged that on 13.05.2024, she came to know that Pushp Raj son of Late

Nand Lal (Nandu), resident of village Khandla, Post Office Kummi, Tehsil

Balh, Himachal Pradesh, made her daughter elope with him and on

10.05.2024, above named person solemnised marriage with her daughter.

Complainant alleged that since person namely Pushp Raj was below the age

of 21 years at the time of his having solemnised marriage with her

daughter, he is required to be dealt with in accordance under Section 10 of

the Act. Complainant further alleged that family members as well as other

persons, who helped Pushp Raj and her daughter to solemnise marriage,

may also be punished in accordance with law. In afore background, FIR

sought to be quashed came to be lodged against Pushp Raj, Gopal Singh,

Gayatri Devi, Dumti Devi, Ahilya, Rinku, Jeewani Devi and petitioner

herein, on the allegation that they all abeted/instigated the child marriage.

After completion of investigation, Police has already presented Challan in

the competent Court of law and now matter is posted for framing of Charge.

5. Precisely, case of the prosecution against present petitioner is

that he being Notary Public attested the affidavit of Pushp Raj and Riya,

which he could not have done for the reason that at the time of

solemnisation of marriage, age of the boy i.e. Pushp Raj was 19 years,

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whereas as per requirement, he should have attained the age of 21 years,

before his solemnising the marriage.

6. I have heard the parties and gone through the record.

7. In nutshell, case of the prosecution is that petitioner herein,

who admittedly being public Notary attested the affidavit of Pushp Raj and

Riya, is that he despite knowing that Pushp Raj is 19 years old, proceeded

to attest the affidavit for marriage and as such, he is liable to be punished

under Section 10 of the Act. To the contrary, case of the petitioner is that

though he in the capacity of Notary attested the affidavits of Pushp Raj and

Riya, but at that juncture, both the above named persons were identified by

independent witnesses and factum of there being not major was not

brought to his notice. Besides above, he is also entitled to protection under

Section 13 of the Notaries Act, which clearly provides that no Court shall

take cognizance of any offence committed by a Notary in the exercise or

purported exercise of his functions, save upon complaint in writing made

by an officer authorized by the Central Government or a State Government

by general or special order in this behalf.

8. Before ascertaining the correctness and genuineness of the

aforesaid submissions and counter submissions made on behalf of learned

counsel representing the parties, this Court deems it necessary to

discuss/elaborate the scope and competence of this Court to quash the FIR

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as well as criminal proceedings, while exercising power under Section 528

of the BNSS.

9. The law relating to quashing of criminal cases was explained by

the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC

OnLine SC 7 as under:-

“7. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned, it is now more or

less well settled as regards the principles to be applied by the court. In this

regard, one may refer to the decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch.

Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein this Court has summarised

some of the principles under which FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be

quashed in the following words:

“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions

of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this

Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary

power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the

Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following

categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be

exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to

secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any

precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines

or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases

wherein such power should be exercised.

(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the

complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their

entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against

the accused.

(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if

any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an

investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under

an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.

(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and

the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission

of any offence and make out a case against the accused.

(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but

constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a

police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section

155(2) of the Code.

(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and

inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever

reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against

the accused.

(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of

the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is

instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or

where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing

efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.

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(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or

where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for

wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to a

private and personal grudge.” (emphasis added)

8. Of the aforesaid criteria, clause no. (1), (4) and (6) would be of relevance to

us in this case.

In clause (1) it has been mentioned that where the allegations made in the

first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face

value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence

or make out a case against the accused, then the FIR or the complaint can be

quashed.

As per clause (4), where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a

cognizable offence but constitute only a noncognizable offence, no

investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order dated by the

Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the CrPC, and in such a

situation, the FIR can be quashed.

Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an express legal bar

engrafted in any of the provisions of the CrPC or the concerned Act under

which the criminal proceedings are instituted, such proceedings can be

quashed.”

10. This position was reiterated in Ajay Malik v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC

OnLine SC 185, wherein it was observed:

“8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its extraordinary

powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may issue orders to prevent the

abuse of court processes or to secure the ends of justice. These inherent

powers are neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory

provision. However, given the broad and profound nature of this

authority, the High Court must exercise it sparingly. The conditions for

invoking such powers are embedded within Section 482 of the CrPC

itself, allowing the High Court to act only in cases of clear abuse of

process or where intervention is essential to uphold the ends of justice.

9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the course of several

decades, has laid down the principles and guidelines that High Courts

must follow before quashing criminal proceedings at the threshold,

thereby pre-empting the Prosecution from building its case before the

Trial Court. The grounds for quashing, inter alia, contemplate the

following situations : (i) the criminal complaint has been filed with mala

fides; (ii) the FIR represents an abuse of the legal process; (iii) no prima

facie offence is made out; (iv) the dispute is civil in nature; (v.) the

complaint contains vague and omnibus allegations; and (vi) the parties

are willing to settle and compound the dispute amicably (State of

Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335).”

10. It is apparent from the aforesaid exposition of law that power

under Section 528 of the BNSS can be exercised where there is an express

legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act

(under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and

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continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in

the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress al for the

grievance of the aggrieved party.

11. Now being guided by the aforesaid proposition of law laid down

by the Hon’ble Apex Court, this Court would make an endeavor to examine

and consider the prayer made in the instant petition vis-à-vis factual

matrix of the case.

12. Though during proceedings of the case, learned counsel

representing the petitioner, was unable to place on record material,

suggestive of the fact, that at the time of attestation of affidavit of marriage

executed by person namely Push Raj, he was not aware of the fact that

above named Pushp Raj is 19 years of age, but having taken note of Section

13 of the Notaries Act, prayer made on behalf of the petitioner for quashing

of FIR deserves to be considered. At this state, it would be apt to take note

of Section 13 of the Notaries Act, which read as under:

“Cognizance of offence.—(1) No court shall take cognizance of any offence

committed by a notary in the exercise or purported exercise of his functions

under this Act save upon complaint in writing made by an officer authorized

by the Central Government or a State Government by general or special order

in this behalf.

(2) No Magistrate other than a Presidency Magistrate or a Magistrate of the

first class shall try an offence punishable under this Act.”

13. Careful perusal of aforesaid provision of law clearly reveals that

the Court is barred from taking cognizance of any offence committed by a

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Notary in the exercise of his function under the Act, except upon a

complaint made by an officer authorized by the Central or the State

Government. It is not in dispute that petitioner had attested the affidavit in

exercise of the functions conferred upon him under the Notaries Act,

therefore, the provision of Section 13 of the Notaries Act will apply to the

present case.

14. It is none of the case of the prosecution, that complaint, if any,

was made against the petitioner by an officer authorized by the Central or

the State Government, rather complaint in the case at hand, on the basis of

which FIR came to be instituted, was lodged by mother of the girl namely

Riya. In similar facts and circumstances, this Court had an occasion to

deal with similar situation, where an Advocate, while discharge duties as

Public Notary, had attested some affidavits and he was booked under

Sections 467, 468, 471, 201, 120-B of IPC and Section 196 of Motor

Vehicles Act. This Court having taken note of Section 13 of the Notaries Act

proceeded to quash the FIR against the Notary Public. Relevant Paras of

judgment passed by this Court in Dalip Singh Thakur (supra) read as under:

“14.Careful perusal of aforesaid provision of law clearly reveals that the

Court is barred from taking cognizance of any offence committed by a

Notary in the exercise of his function under the Act, except upon a

complaint made by an officer authorized by the Central or the State

Government. It is not in dispute that petitioner had attested the affidavit in

exercise of the functions conferred upon him under the Notaries Act,

therefore, the provision of Section 13 of the Notaries Act will apply to the

present case.

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15.A Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in case tilted Jagdish Kumar

Negi vs. State of Himachal Pradesh and another, Cr.MMO No.1069 of

2024, decided on 14

th

July, 2025, has held that in the absence of a written

complaint made by an Officer authorized by the Central Government or

State Government, no criminal prosecution can be launched against the

Notary Public for acts performed by him in discharge of his functions under

the Notaries Act. The relevant paras of the aforesaid judgment are as

under:-

“14. It is apparent from the bare perusal of the Section that the

Court is barred from taking cognizance of any offence committed by

a Notary in the exercise of his function under this Act except upon a

complaint made by an officer authorised by the Central or the State

Government. It is undisputed that the petitioner had attested the

agreement in the exercise of the functions conferred upon him under

the Notaries Act; therefore, the provision of Section 13 of the

Notaries Act will apply to the present case. It was laid down by

Bombay High Court in Chandmal Motilal Bora v. State of

Maharashtra, 2003 SCC OnLineBom 762: (2004) 2 Mah LJ 41:

(2004) 106 (2) Bom LR 521: (2005) 1 Bom CR (Cri) 823 , that

when any allegation is made against the notary touching the official

purpose, the Criminal Court cannot take the cognizance except upon

the complaint made in writing. It was observed:

“10. Therefore, if any allegation is made against a Notary which

touches the official performance as a notary, the Criminal Court is

forbidden from taking cognisance unless the complaint in writing

is made by an officer authorised by the Central Government or

State Government by general or special order in this behalf.

Therefore, whenever an official act of a Notary comes into the

picture, it becomes the duty of the criminal Court to see whether

the allegations are directly concerned with his official duty or the

performance which he has to do as indicated in section 8 of the

Notaries Act. The Court, which has been requested to take

cognisance of the complaint, has to apply its judicial mind and

see whether the act which is the subject matter of the complaint is

the official act of a Notary or it is an act which is beyond his

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official performance. Suppose if the notary is alleged to have

committed an offence by his act directly in his personal capacity,

then there is no need for sanction, because, the said act is not

connected with his official performance, like an allegation showing

that the notary committed he murder or Notary assaulted a

person for the purposes of causing simple hurt, grievous hurt etc.

If the allegations show that by an act which is not in accordance

with the provisions of the Notaries Act, the notary has been

alleged to have committed an offence, there is no need to have a

sanction to the complaint in writing of an officer as contemplated

by provisions of section 13 of the Notaries Act. But if the act

alleged is touching his official performance, the Court has to be on

guard when it has been requested to take cognisance of the

allegations against the Notary.

11. If such protection is not granted to the Notary, he would be

involved, implicated and roped in in a number of offences,

because a number of documents are being notarised before him in

his Notarial register. Some documents may be purporting to be for

the offence of cheating, blackmailing or an offence of commercial

transactions. He would be involved in a number of offences

concerned with the disposal of property, transfer of the property,

sale of the property, and exchange of property. He would also be

coming into the picture as an accused in a number of offences

connected with a number of commercial crimes. A Notary is not

supposed to know each and every person before him for the

purpose of notifying a document in his Notarial register. He is not

supposed to know the truth behind the documents brought before

him for entries. He is generally introduced to parties by persons

who happen to be persons of his acquaintance. Such a person

may be an advocate, a clerk of the advocates, or some persons

who are connected with him by his profession as a Notary or by

his profession generally as a lawyer. If such protection is not

granted to a notary, it would be very difficult for him to work as a

notary and members of the public at large would be facing a

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number of difficulties at every step. With this object, section 13

has been enacted by the Legislature with foresight.

xxxxxx

14. As a special feature of a legitimate precaution which the

notary should have, a lawyer should have, while performing his

duty as Notary or lawyer, by his profession as such, by his work

as such, by his function as such, he is likely to be in near

proximity of a probable accused or an accused. In the

performance of his duty as such, he is likely to do some act, as

requested by such person, maybe as a client or a person who has

come to notarising a document. The advocate or a notary will have

to do such an act as requested by that person. At that stage, he

may not be known as to what would be the consequences of the

document which he has prepared or notarised. Would it be proper

to permit such an advocate or a notary to be roped in, in the

prosecution, which would be initiated against such a person in

the future proximity. The reasonable answer would be “no”. If

such protection is not granted to such persons, it would be very

difficult for them to perform the acts contemplated by the

profession of a lawyer or the functions contemplated to be done by

a notary. A Criminal Court has to take into consideration the

cognisance of such special features if they are indicated by the

prosecution or by the complaint of which the criminal Court is

requested to take cognisance. The Criminal Court has to consider

this aspect if an application is made to exonerate such an

accused, who happens to be a professional or performing an

official duty. When such a request is made, even at the initial

stage and if there is a case to act accordingly, the Criminal Court

should not be shy in entertaining such an application and even

allow it if such an application deserves to be allowed. Exactly that

has been contemplated, in the judgment of the Supreme Court in

Madhavrao Scindia's case (supra).

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15. A similar view was taken by the Gujarat High Court in Ashokbhai

Rameshchandra Ghantivala v. State of Gujarat, 2009 SCC OnLine

Guj 2203, wherein it was observed:

8. Heard the learned advocates for the parties. Having regard to the

submissions advanced by the learned advocates for the parties, this

court is of the view that it is not necessary to enter into the merits

of the allegations made in the chargesheet or the F.I.R., as the

same could have a bearing on the outcome of the proceedings

emanating from the F.I.R. However, examining the main contention

raised by the learned advocate for the petitioner namely, that in

view of the provisions of Section 13 of the Act, the court could not

have taken cognizance of the complaint except as provided under

the said provision, it would be necessary to refer to the provisions

of Section 13 of the Act which reads as under:

“13. Cognizance of offence. - (1) No Court shall take cognizance

of any offence committed by a notary in the exercise or

purported exercise of his functions under this Act save upon

complaint in writing made by an officer authorised by the

Central Government or a State Government by general or

special order in this behalf.

(2) No Magistrate other than a Presidency Magistrate or a

Magistrate of the first class shall try an offence punishable

under this Act.”

A plain reading of Section 13 makes it clear that a complaint against a

notary in exercise or purported exercise of his functions under the Act

has to be made in writing by an officer authorised by the Central

Government or the concerned State Government by general or special

order in this behalf. Unless a complaint is made in the manner

prescribed, no Court is empowered to take cognisance of the offence. This

view finds support from the objects and reasons behind the said

provision, which reads thus:

“The Committee consider that protection should be given to

notaries in respect of cognisance of offences. They think that

protection should be given only to notaries who commit an offence,

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acting or purporting to act in the discharge of their functions under

this Act. This clause has been inserted with this object.”

From the objections and reasons, it is apparent that even if an offence is

committed by a notary while acting or purporting to act in the discharge

of his functions under the Act, a complaint can be lodged only as

provided under Section 13 of the Act. Thus, any offence committed by a

notary acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his functions

under the Act would fall within the ambit of the Section, and a Court

can take cognisance of such offence only if the complaint is made in the

manner laid down in the Section.

16. Kerala High Court also held similarly in P.C. Jeeva v. State of

Kerala, 2022 SCC OnLine Ker 8294 , as under:

7. From the perusal of the aforesaid provision, it is evident that a

special procedure has been contemplated by virtue of the said

provision and it provides that the cognizance of any offence

committed by a Notary in exercise or purported exercise of his

function under the Notaries Act can be instituted only upon a

complaint in writing made by an officer authorized by the Central

Government in this behalf. The crucial aspect to be noticed in this

regard is that Section 13 of the Act is made applicable to any

offence committed by a Notary in the exercise or purported exercise

of his functions under this Act. It is evident that irrespective of the

question that the offence which is a subject matter is committed

under the provisions of the Notaries Act or any other enactment,

procedure as contemplated under Section 13 has to be followed

while taking cognisance of an offence against a Notary Public. The

aforesaid question came up for consideration before this Court in

Jyolsana VP. v. State of Kerala [2020 (6) KHC 334]. In paragraph 11

of the said judgment, this Court made the following observations:

“11. As discussed above, it is quite impossible for a Notary to know

the genuineness of the document produced before him for

attestation. The Notary is not supposed to know each and every

person before him for the purpose of notifying a document in his

Notarial Register. He is generally introduced to parties by persons

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who happen to be persons of his acquaintance. If such protection is

not granted to a Notary, it would be very difficult for him to work as

a notary and members of the public at large would be facing a

number of difficulties at every step. With this object, S. 13 has been

enacted by the Legislature as a safeguard.”

8. Thus, from the above, it is evident that the stipulation contained

under Section 13 is a mandatory provision as far as the offence

alleged to have been committed by a Notary Public in exercise or

purported exercise of his function is concerned. It is also clear that

no court can take cognisance of such offences unless the procedure

contemplated under Section 13 of the Notaries Act, 1952, is

followed. In this case, it is evident that the proceedings have been

instituted and cognisance thereon was taken on the basis of a

police report, which is not the procedure as contemplated under

Section 13 of the Act. In such circumstances, as the procedure

which is mandatorily required to be followed under Section 13 of

the Act is not complied with, the prosecution now ongoing against

the petitioner is vitiated. In such circumstances, I find some force

in the contentions put forward by the learned counsel for the

petitioner.

17. Karnataka High Court also held similarly in Praveen Kumar

Adyapady and Ors. vs. State of Karnataka and Ors. (11.04.2022 -KARHC) MANU/KA/2178/2022 as under:

6. Upon hearing and perusal of records, which reveal that accused

No. 1 got married to the victim girl and the daughter of this

complainant-respondent No. 2, defactocomplainant, by producing

the affidavit before the Arya Samaj before accused Nos. 7 and 9 and

married the victim girl, stating that the victim girl was major and

had attained the age of majority by manipulating the date of birth of

the victim girl as 25.09.1999, even though her actual date of birth

was 25.09.2000. Admittedly, these two petitioners were

advocates/notaries, and they have given a declaration in an affidavit

filed by the parties. After looking at the documents produced by the

parties, of course, while discharging the duty they have signed and

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given declarations in the document produced by the parties but it

cannot be said, that these petitioners had intentionally colluded with

the other accused persons and signed agreement of declaration for

helping the accused No. 1 by manipulating the age of the victim.

That apart, as per Section 13 of the Notaries Act, there is a bar for

taking cognisance by the Court for offences committed by the

advocate and notary. Under the said Notaries Act, they have to

obtain the permission of the Central Government or State

Government for filing the charge sheet and taking cognisance.

Admittedly, the petitioners are said to be Notaries of the Central

Government. Such being the case, as per Section 13 of the Notaries

Act, the sanction is necessary or permission is necessary before

filing a High Court of H.P charge sheet and taking cognizance

against this petitioner but no such permissions were obtained or

produced by the Investigation Officer along with the charge sheet

and also not mentioned anything about obtaining of the sanction in

the charge sheet. Such being the case, conducting criminal

proceedings against these petitioners/accused Nos. 8 and 10

requires to be quashed.”

15. Since it is quite apparent from the aforesaid law laid down by

this Court that no prosecution can be launched against the Notary Public

without there being a complaint made by an officer authorized by the State

or Central Government, no case can be permitted to continue against the

petitioner. The continuation of the criminal proceedings in the absence of

complaint by the competent authority would be impermissible in law.

16. In view of the reasons stated hereinabove, the case qua the

petitioner is bound to fail in all probabilities, therefore, no fruitful purpose

would be served by permitting the criminal prosecution of the petitioner.

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17. Consequently, in view of the aforesaid discussion as well as law

laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court (supra), FIR No.91/2024, dated

18.05.2024, under Section 10 of Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006,

registered at Police Station Balh, District Mandi, Himachal Pradesh as well

as consequent proceedings i.e. case No.308/2024, titled as State of H.P. Vs.

Gaytri Devi and Others, pending in the Court of learned Chief Judicial

Magistrate, Mandi, District Mandi, Himachal Pradesh, are quashed and set

aside, qua the petitioner.

The petition stands disposed of in the aforesaid terms,

alongwith all pending applications.

March 20, 2026 (Sandeep Sharma),

Rajeev Raturi Judge