CA 5308/2022

1

Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Civil Appeal No 5308 of 2022

(Arising out of SLP (C) No 7772 of 2021)

Deepika Singh …Appellant

Versus

Central Administrative Tribunal and Others …Respondents

J U D G M E N T

Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, J

1. Leave granted.

2. This appeal arises from a judgment dated 16 March 2021 of a Division Bench of

the High Court of Punjab and Haryana.

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3. The appellant was, at the material time, working on the post of Nursing Officer in

the Post Graduate Institute of Medical Education and Research

1

at Chandigarh since

her appointment on 25 November 2005. On 18 February 2014, the appellant married

Amir Singh. The spouse of the appellant was married before his marriage to the

appellant, but his former wife passed away on 16 February 2013. From his first

marriage, he has two children, a male child born on 1 February 2001 and a female child

born on 3 March 2005. The appellant filed an application on 4 May 2015, requesting the

authorities at PGIMER to enter the names of the two children born from the first

marriage of her spouse in the official service record.

4. The appellant had her first biological child on 4 June 2019 from her marriage. On

6 June 2019, she applied for maternity leave for the period from 27 June 2019 to 23

December 2019 in terms of Rule 43 of the Central Civil Services (Leave) Rules 1972.

2

The authorities at PGIMER sought a clarification on 3 July 2019 regarding the fact that

the spouse of the appellant had two surviving children from his first marriage. The

appellant submitted a detailed reply on 24 July 2019. The request of the appellant for

the grant of maternity leave was rejected on 3 September 2019 on the ground that she

had two surviving children and had availed of child care leave earlier for the two

children born from the first marriage of her spouse. Consequently, maternity leave for

1

“PGIMER”

2

“Rules of 1972”

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the child borne by her, considered as her third child, was found to be inadmissible in

terms of the Rules of 1972. By an office order dated 21 January 2020, her leave for the

period from 30 May 2019 to 3 June 2019; 4 June 2019 to 27 October 2019; 27 October

2019 to 6 November 2019; and 7 November 2019 to 31 November 2019 was treated as

earned leave, medical leave, half pay leave, and extraordinary leave respectively. The

period of extraordinary leave was not counted towards increments in the scale of Rs.

9300-34800 under FR-26(ii) of the Fundamental Rules, Volume-I.

5. Aggrieved by the decisions dated 3 September 2019 and 21 January 2020 of the

administrative authorities at PGIMER, the appellant moved the Central Administrative

Tribunal

3

at its Chandigarh Bench in OA No 155 of 2020. By a judgment dated 29

January 2021, the Central Administrative Tribunal dismissed the OA, holding:

“10. [....] It is, thus, clear that the maternity leave can be granted

to a female government servant only if she has less than two

surviving children. As per her own request, the applicant has

already shown her two children from the first marriage of her

husband as her children and she has been availing benefit in

their respect on many occasions earlier and subsequent to her

marriage. Therefore, for all practical purposes and as far as

respondent department is concerned, she has already two

surviving children and she is taking benefit for them from the

respondent department by way of Child Care Leave and other

benefits.

11. In view of the above, any child born to her now will be

considered only as a third child and cannot be taken as the first

child. It may be true that Viren Partap Singh is first child born to

3

“CAT”

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her after her first pregnancy with her husband. But, of her own

choice, the applicant has already got the names of other two

children from her husband's first marriage entered in the record

of the office as her children and is availing benefits on their

behalf including Child Care Leave. The Rule position is clear and

for all practical purposes, the applicant has two surviving

children. As such, any child born to her now can only be

considered as third child.

12. In view of the above, the decision of the respondents to reject

her maternity leave is correct even though it may be first

maternity for the applicant herself”

6. The appellant moved the High Court in a writ petition

4

under Article 226 of the

Constitution, calling into question the judgment of the Tribunal, resulting in the

impugned judgment. By the impugned judgment and order dated 16 March 2021, the

High Court dismissed the petition on the ground that there is no perversity or illegality in

the judgment of the CAT. The High Court held:

“12. A bare perusal of the aforesaid rule would reveal that

maternity leave can be granted to a female Government servant

only if she has less than two surviving children. Though, the

petitioner is not the biological mother of the two children born

from the first wedlock of her husband, she cannot deny the fact

that now she is the mother of them also after having married to

Amar Singh. In this way, the petitioner has already two surviving

children. Not only this, she has also availed CCL for them from

the respondent Department. In this view of the matter, any child

born to her is to be considered as a third child. We are of the

considered view that the CAT has rightly observed in the

impugned order that “....for all practical purposes, the applicant

has two surviving children. As such, any child born to her now

can only be considered as a third child.”

4

CWP No 3460 of 2021

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7. Child care leave is provided under Rule 43-C. Rule 43-C is extracted below:

“43-(C). Child Care Leave

(1) A woman Government servant having minor children below

the age of eighteen years and who has no earned leave at her

credit, may be granted child care leave by an authority

competent to grant leave, for a maximum period of two years,

i.e., 730 days during the entire service for taking care of upto two

children whether for rearing or to look after any of their needs like

examination, sickness, etc.

(2) During the period of child care leave, she shall be paid leave

salary equal to the pay drawn immediately before proceeding on

leave.

(3) Child care leave may be combined with Leave of any other

kind.

(4) Notwithstanding the requirement of production of medical

certificate contained in sub-rule (1) of rule 30 or sub-rule (1) of

rule 31, leave of the kind due and admissible (including

commuted leave not exceeding 60 days and leave not due) upto

a maximum of one year, if applied for, be granted in continuation

with child care leave granted under sub-rule (1).

(5) Child care leave may be availed of in more than one spell.

(6) Child care leave shall not be debited against the leave

account.”

8. The High Court opined that since the appellant had availed of child care leave in

respect of the biological children of her spouse born from his first marriage, she would

be disentitled to the grant of maternity leave. After her marriage to Amar Singh, she was

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considered to have two surviving children. The High Court found that she therefore did

not meet the requirement of sub-rule (1) of Rule 43 of having less than two surviving

children for the purpose of being granted maternity leave.

9. Notice was issued in these proceedings on 1 July 2021. In pursuance of the

order issuing notice, the respondents have entered appearance and have filed a

counter affidavit.

10. We have heard Mr Akshay Verma, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the

appellant and Mr Sudarshan Rajan, learned counsel appearing for the second, third and

fourth respondents.

11. The case of the appellant is that the maternity leave was sought by her on the

birth of her first biological child and the fact that there are two children of her spouse

born from an earlier marriage would not disentitle her under Rule 43 of the Rules of

1972. Counsel for the appellant submitted that though the appellant had availed of child

care leave in respect of her step children, this leave is distinct from maternity leave.

12. The contention of the respondents is that having taken the benefit of child care

leave in respect of the two children born to the spouse of the appellant from his first

marriage, the appellant was not entitled to maternity leave in respect of the birth of her

own biological child. The appellant was, in the submission of the respondents,

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disentitled to maternity leave on the ground that she had two surviving children, in terms

of Rule 43 of the Rules of 1972.

13. The significant issue which falls for determination in the appeal turns on the

interpretation of Rule 43 of the Rules of 1972. The Central Civil Services (Leave) Rules

1972 have been framed under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution. Rule 43 is

extracted below:

“43. Maternity Leave

(1) A female Government servant (including an apprentice) with

less than two surviving children may be granted maternity leave

by an authority competent to grant leave for a period of (180

days) from the date of its commencement.

(2) During such period, she shall be paid leave salary equal to

the pay drawn immediately before proceeding on leave.

NOTE:- In the case of a person to whom Employees‟ State

Insurance Act, 1948 (34 of 1948), applies, the amount of leave

salary payable under this rule shall be reduced by the amount of

benefit payable under the said Act for the corresponding period.

(3) Maternity leave not exceeding 45 days may also be granted

to a female Government servant (irrespective of the number of

surviving children) during the entire service of that female

Government servant in case of miscarriage including abortion on

production of medical certificate as laid down in Rule 19:

Provided that the maternity leave granted and availed of before

the commencement of the CCS (Leave) Amendment Rules,

1995, shall not be taken into account for the purpose of this sub-

rule.

(4)(a) Maternity leave may be combined with leave of any other

kind.

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(b) Notwithstanding the requirement of production of medical

certificate contained in sub-rule (1) of Rule 30 or sub-rule (1) of

Rule 31, leave of the kind due and admissible (including

commuted leave for a period not exceeding 60 days and leave

not due) up to a maximum of two years may, if applied for, be

granted in continuation of maternity leave granted under sub-rule

(1).

(5) Maternity leave shall not be debited against the leave

account.”

14. The marginal note to Rule 43 is titled „maternity leave‟. Sub-rule (1) stipulates

that a female government servant with less than two surviving children would be

granted maternity leave for a period of 180 days from the date of its commencement.

Sub-rule (2) stipulates that during the period of maternity leave, the employee is entitled

to leave salary equal to the pay drawn immediately before proceeding on leave. Sub-

rule (3) stipulates that maternity leave not exceeding 45 days may also be granted to a

female government servant, irrespective of the number of surviving children, during the

entire service in case of a miscarriage including an abortion on production of a medical

certificate. Sub-rule (4) stipulates that maternity leave is capable of being combined

with leave of any other kind.

15. The provisions of Rule 43(1) must be imbued with a purposive construction. In

KH Nazar v. Mathew K Jacob,

5

this Court noted that beneficial legislation must be

given a liberal approach:

5

(2020) 14 SCC 126

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“11. Provisions of a beneficial legislation have to be construed

with a purpose-oriented approach. The Act should receive a

liberal construction to promote its objects. Also, literal

construction of the provisions of a beneficial legislation has to be

avoided. It is the court's duty to discern the intention of the

legislature in making the law. Once such an intention is

ascertained, the statute should receive a purposeful or functional

interpretation

12. In the words of O. Chinnappa Reddy, J., the principles of

statutory construction of beneficial legislation are as follows :

(Workmen case, SCC p. 76, para 4)

“4. The principles of statutory construction are

well settled. Words occurring in statutes of liberal

import such as „social welfare legislation and

human rights‟ legislation are not to be put in

Procrustean beds or shrunk to Lilliputian

dimensions. In construing these legislations the

imposture of literal construction must be avoided

and the prodigality of its misapplication must be

recognised and reduced. Judges ought to be

more concerned with the “colour”, the “content”

and the “context” of such statutes (we have

borrowed the words from Lord Wilberforce's

opinion

in Prenn v. Simmonds [Prenn v. Simmonds,

(1971) 1 WLR 1381 : (1971) 3 All ER 237 (HL)] ).

In the same opinion Lord Wilberforce pointed out

that law is not to be left behind in some island of

literal interpretation but is to enquire beyond the

language, unisolated from the matrix of facts in

which they are set; the law is not to be interpreted

purely on internal linguistic considerations. In one

of the cases cited before us, that is, Surendra

Kumar Verma v. Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal-

cum-Labour Court , we had occasion to say :

(Surendra Kumar Verma case, SCC p. 447, para

6)

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„6. … Semantic luxuries are misplaced in the

interpretation of “bread and butter” statutes.

Welfare statutes must, of necessity, receive a

broad interpretation. Where legislation is designed

to give relief against certain kinds of mischief, the

court is not to make inroads by making

etymological excursions.‟ ”

13. While interpreting a statute, the problem or mischief that the

statute was designed to remedy should first be identified and

then a construction that suppresses the problem and advances

the remedy should be adopted.”

16. In Badshah v. Urmila Badshah Godse,

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a two-judge Bench of this Court

comprising AK Sikri and Ranjana Desai, JJ. ruled that courts must bridge the gap

between law and society through the use of purposive interpretation, where applicable:

“13.3. Thirdly, in such cases, purposive interpretation needs to

be given to the provisions of Section 125 CrPC. While dealing

with the application of a destitute wife or hapless children or

parents under this provision, the Court is dealing with the

marginalised sections of the society. The purpose is to achieve

“social justice” which is the constitutional vision, enshrined in the

Preamble of the Constitution of India. The Preamble to the

Constitution of India clearly signals that we have chosen the

democratic path under the rule of law to achieve the goal of

securing for all its citizens, justice, liberty, equality and fraternity.

It specifically highlights achieving their social justice. Therefore,

it becomes the bounden duty of the courts to advance the

cause of the social justice. While giving interpretation to a

particular provision, the court is supposed to bridge the gap

between the law and society.

14. Of late, in this very direction, it is emphasised that the courts

have to adopt different approaches in “social justice

adjudication”, which is also known as “social context

6

(2014) 1 SCC 188

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adjudication” as mere “adversarial approach” may not be very

appropriate. There are number of social justice legislations giving

special protection and benefits to vulnerable groups in the

society. Prof. Madhava Menon describes it eloquently:

“It is, therefore, respectfully submitted that ‘social context

judging’ is essentially the application of equality

jurisprudence as evolved by Parliament and the Supreme

Court in myriad situations presented before courts where

unequal parties are pitted in adversarial proceedings and

where courts are called upon to dispense equal justice.

Apart from the social-economic inequalities accentuating the

disabilities of the poor in an unequal fight, the adversarial

process itself operates to the disadvantage of the weaker party.

In such a situation, the Judge has to be not only sensitive to the

inequalities of parties involved but also positively inclined to the

weaker party if the imbalance were not to result in miscarriage of

justice. This result is achieved by what we call social context

judging or social justice adjudication.” [Keynote address on

“Legal Education in Social Context” delivered at National Law

University, Jodhpur on October 12, 2005, available on

http://web.archive.org/web/20061210031743/http:/www.nlujodhp

ur.ac.in/ceireports.htm [last visited on 25-12-2013]]

…

16. The law regulates relationships between people. It prescribes

patterns of behaviour. It reflects the values of society. The role

of the court is to understand the purpose of law in society

and to help the law achieve its purpose. But the law of a

society is a living organism. It is based on a given factual

and social reality that is constantly changing. Sometimes

change in law precedes societal chan ge and is even

intended to stimulate it. In most cases, however, a change in

law is the result of a change in social reality. Indeed, when

social reality changes, the law must change too. Just as

change in social reality is the law of life, responsiveness to

change in social reality is the life of the law. It can be said that

the history of law is the history of adapting the law to society's

changing needs. In both constitutional and statutory

interpretation, the court is supposed to exercise discretion

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in determining the proper relationship between the

subjective and objective purposes of the law.”

(emphasis supplied)

17. For the purpose of adopting an approach which furthers legislative policy, it

would be appropriate to derive some guidance from the provisions of the Maternity

Benefit Act 1961

7

though, it must be stated at the outset that the Act per se has no

application to the PGIMER as an establishment. Nonetheless, the provisions of the Act

of 1961 are indicative of the object and intent of Parliament in enacting a cognate

legislation on the subject.

18. Section 3(c) of the Maternity Benefit Act of 1961 defines the expression „delivery‟

to mean the birth of a child. Section 5 provides for the right to payment of maternity

benefit. Section 5 is extracted in its entirety below:

“5. Right to payment of maternity benefit.– (1) Subject to the

provisions of this Act, every woman shall be entitled to, and her

employer shall be liable for, the payment of maternity benefit at

the rate of the average daily wage for the period of her actual

absence, that is to say, the period immediately preceding the day

of her delivery, the actual day of her delivery and any period

immediately following that day.

Explanation.– For the purpose of this sub-section, the average

daily wage‟ means the average of the woman‟s wages payable to

her for the days on which she has worked during the period of

three calendar months immediately preceding the date from

which she absents herself on account of maternity, the minimum

7

“Act of 1961”

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rate of wage fixed or revised under the Minimum Wages Act,

1948 (11 of 1948), or ten rupees, whichever is the highest.

(2) No woman shall be entitled to maternity benefit unless she

has actually worked in an establishment of the employer from

whom she claims maternity benefit, for a period of not less than

eighty days in the twelve months immediately preceding the date

of her expected delivery:

Provided that the qualifying period of eighty days aforesaid shall

not apply to a woman who has immigrated into the State of

Assam and was pregnant at the time of the immigration.

Explanation.– For the purpose of calculating under the sub-

section the days on which a woman has actually worked in the

establishment, the days for which she has been laid-off or was

on holidays declared under any law for the time being in force to

be holidays with wages, during the period of twelve months

immediately preceding the date of her expected delivery shall be

taken into account.

(3) The maximum period for which any woman shall be entitled

to maternity benefit shall be twenty-six weeks of which not more

than eight weeks shall precede the date of her expected delivery:

Provided that the maximum period entitled to maternity benefit by

a woman having two or more than two surviving children shall be

twelve weeks of which not more than six weeks shall precede the

date of her expected delivery:

Provided further that where a woman dies during this period, the

maternity benefit shall be payable only for the days up to and

including the day of her death:

Provided also that where a woman, having been delivered of a

child, dies during her delivery or during the period immediately

following the date of her delivery for which she is entitled for the

maternity benefit, leaving behind in either case the child, the

employer shall be liable for the maternity benefit for that entire

period but if the child also dies during the said period, then, for

the days up to and including the date of the death of the child.

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(4) A woman who legally adopts a child below the age of three

months or a commissioning mother shall be entitled to maternity

benefit for a period of twelve weeks from the date the child is

handed over to the adopting mother or the commissioning

mother, as the case may be.

(5) In case where the nature of work assigned to a woman is of

such nature that she may work from home, the employer may

allow her to do so after availing of the maternity benefit for such

period and on such conditions as the employer and the woman

may mutually agree.”

19. Sub-section (1) of Section 5 confers an entitlement on a woman to the payment

of maternity benefits at a stipulated rate for the period of her actual absence beginning

from the period immediately preceding the day of her delivery, the actual day of her

delivery and any period immediately following that day. Sub-section (3) specifies the

maximum period for which any woman shall be entitled to maternity benefit. These

provisions have been made by Parliament to ensure that the absence of a woman away

from the place of work occasioned by the delivery of a child does not hinder her

entitlement to receive wages for that period or for that matter for the period during which

she should be granted leave in order to look after her child after the birth takes place.

20. The Act of 1961 was enacted to secure women ‟s right to pregnancy and

maternity leave and to afford women with as much flexibility as possible to live an

autonomous life, both as a mother and as a worker, if they so desire. In Municipal

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Corporation of Delhi v. Female Workers (Muster Roll),

8

a two-judge Bench of this

Court placed reliance on the obligations under Articles 14, 15, 39, 42 and 43 of the

Constitution, and India‟s international obligations under the Universal Declaration of

Human Rights 1948

9

and Article 11 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of

Discrimination Against Women

10

to extend benefits under the Act of 1961 to workers

engaged on a casual basis or on muster roll on daily wages by the Municipal

Corporation of Delhi. The Central Civil Services (Leave) Rules 1972, it is well to bear in

mind, are also formulated to entrench and enhance the objects of Article 15 of the

Constitution and other relevant constitutional rights and protections.

21. Under Article 15(3) of the Constitution, the State is empowered to enact

beneficial provisions for advancing the interests of women. The right to reproduction

and child rearing has been recognized as an important facet of a person‟s right to

privacy, dignity and bodily integrity under Article 21.

11

Article 42 enjoins the State to

make provisions for securing just and humane conditions of work and for maternity

relief.

22. In this context, regard may also be had to several international conventions of the

United Nations that India has ratified. Article 25(2) of the UDHR provides that

8

2000 (3) SCC 224

9

“UDHR”

10

“CEDAW”

11

Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1; Suchita Srivastava v. Chandigarh Administration

(2009) 9 SCC 1

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motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and assistance. Article 11(2)(b)

of CEDAW requires states “to introduce maternity leave with pay or comparable social

benefits.” The relevant provision of Article 11 of CEDAW states that:

“Article 11:

1. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate

discrimination against women in the field of employment in order

to ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women, the same

rights, in particular:

(a) The right to work as an inalienable right of all human beings;

(b) The right to the same employment opportunities, including the

application of the same criteria for selection in matters of

employment;

(c) The right to free choice of profession and employment, the

right to promotion, job security and all benefits and conditions of

service and the right to receive vocational training and retraining,

including apprenticeships, advanced vocational training and

recurrent training;

(d) The right to equal remuneration, including benefits, and to

equal treatment in respect of work of equal value, as well as

equality of treatment in the evaluation of the quality of work;

(e) The right to social security, particularly in cases of retirement,

unemployment, sickness, invalidity and old age and other

incapacity to work, as well as the right to paid leave;

(f) The right to protection of health and to safety in working

conditions, including the safeguarding of the function of

reproduction.

2. In order to prevent discrimination against women on the

grounds of marriage or maternity and to ensure their

effective right to work, States Parties shall take appropriate

measures:

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(a) To prohibit, subject to the imposition of sanctions, dismissal

on the grounds of pregnancy or of maternity leave and

discrimination in dismissals on the basis of marital status;

(b) To introduce maternity leave with pay or with comparable

social benefits without loss of former employment, seniority

or social allowances;

(c) To encourage the provision of the necessary supporting

social services to enable parents to combine family obligations

with work responsibilities and participation in public life, in

particular through promoting the establishment and development

of a network of child-care facilities;

(d) To provide special protection to women during pregnancy in

types of work proved to be harmful to them.

3. Protective legislation relating to matters covered in this article

shall be reviewed periodically in the light of scientific and

technological knowledge and shall be revised, repealed or

extended as necessary.”

(emphasis supplied)

23. In alignment with the Constitution as well as the treaties mentioned above, Rule

43(1) of the Rules of 1972 contemplates the grant of maternity leave for a period of 180

days. Independent of the grant of maternity leave, a woman is also entitled to the grant

of child care leave for taking care of her two eldest surviving children whether for

rearing or for looking after any of their needs, such as education, sickness and the like.

Child care leave under Rule 43-C can be availed of not only at the point when the child

is born but at any subsequent period as is evident from the illustrative causes which are

adverted to in the provisions, which have been extracted in the earlier part of the

judgment. Both constitute distinct entitlements.

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24. The facts of the present case indicate that the spouse of the appellant had a prior

marriage which had ended as a result of the death of his wife after which the appellant

married him. The fact that the appellant‟s spouse had two biological children from his

first marriage would not impinge upon the entitlement of the appellant to avail maternity

leave for her sole biological child. The fact that she was granted child care leave in

respect of the two biological children born to her spouse from an earlier marriage may

be a matter on which a compassionate view was taken by the authorities at the relevant

time. Gendered roles assigned to women and societal expectations mean that women

are always pressed upon to take a disproportionate burden of childcare work. According

to a „time-use‟ survey conducted by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and

Development (OECD), women in India currently spend upto 352 minutes per day on

unpaid work, 577% more than the time spent by men.

12

Time spent in unpaid work

includes childcare. In this context, the support of care work through benefits such as

maternity leave, paternity leave, or child care leave (availed by both parents) by the

state and other employers is essential. Although certain provisions of the Rules of 1972

have enabled women to enter the paid workforce, women continue to bear the primary

12

Organisation for Economic Co -operation and Development, 'Time-Use' (OECD

Stat) <https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?datasetcode=TIME_USE#> accessed 22 August 2022

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responsibility for childcare. The grant of child care leave to the appellant cannot be

used to disentitle her to maternity leave under Rule 43 of the Rules of 1972.

25. Unless a purposive interpretation were to be adopted in the present case, the

object and intent of the grant of maternity leave would simply be defeated. The grant of

maternity leave under Rules of 1972 is intended to facilitate the continuance of women

in the workplace. It is a harsh reality that but for such provisions, many women would

be compelled by social circumstances to give up work on the birth of a child, if they are

not granted leave and other facilitative measures. No employer can perceive child birth

as detracting from the purpose of employment. Child birth has to be construed in the

context of employment as a natural incident of life and hence, the provisions for

maternity leave must be construed in that perspective.

26. The predominant understanding of the concept of a “family” both in the law and in

society is that it consists of a single, unchanging unit with a mother and a father (who

remain constant over time) and their children. This assumption ignores both, the many

circumstances which may lead to a change in one‟s familial structure, and the fact that

many families do not conform to this expectation to begin with. Familial relationships

may take the form of domestic, unmarried partnerships or queer relationships. A

household may be a single parent household for any number of reasons, including the

death of a spouse, separation, or divorce. Similarly, the guardians and caretakers (who

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traditionally occupy the roles of the “mother” and the “father”) of children may change

with remarriage, adoption, or fostering. These manifestations of love and of families

may not be typical but they are as real as their traditional counterparts. Such atypical

manifestations of the family unit are equally deserving not only of protection under law

but also of the benefits available under social welfare legislation. The black letter of the

law must not be relied upon to disadvantage families which are different from traditional

ones. The same undoubtedly holds true for women who take on the role of motherhood

in ways that may not find a place in the popular imagination.

27. The facts of the present case, too, indicate that the structure of the appellant‟s

family changed when she took on a parental role with respect to her spouse‟s biological

children from his previous marriage. When the appellant applied to PGIMER for

maternity leave, PGIMER was faced with facts that the law may not have envisaged or

adequately accounted for. When courts are confronted with such situations, they would

do well to attempt to give effect to the purpose of the law in question rather than to

prevent its application.

28. For the above reasons, we hold that the appellant was entitled to the grant of

maternity leave. The communication of the third respondent denying her the entitlement

was contrary to the provisions of Rule 43. We accordingly set aside the impugned

judgment of the High Court dated 16 March 2021 and the judgment of the CAT dated

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29 January 2021. The OA filed by the appellant shall in consequence stand allowed and

the appellant shall be granted maternity leave under Rule 43 in terms of the present

judgment. The benefits which are admissible to the appellant shall be released to her

within a period of two months from the date of this order.

29. The appeal is accordingly allowed.

30. Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.

….....…...….......………………........J.

[Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud]

..…....…........……………….…........J.

[A S Bopanna]

New Delhi;

August 16, 2022

CKB