2026 INSC 360 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(S). 1924 OF 2026

(ARISING OUT OF SLP (CRL) NO(S). 1878 OF 2026)

DHANANJAY RATHI ….APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

RUCHIKA RATHI …RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

VIJAY BISHNOI, J.

Leave granted.

2.This appeal has been preferred by the Appellant-

Husband challenging the order dated 07.01.2026 (hereinafter

referred to as “Impugned Order”) passed in Crl. M.C. No.

116 of 2026 by the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi

(hereinafter referred to as “the High Court”) wherein the High

Court issued notice and granted an interim order directing

1

that the proceedings initiated in DV Complaint No. 3186 of

2025 (hereinafter referred to as “DV Proceedings”) under the

Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005

(hereinafter referred to as “the DV Act”) by the Respondent-

Wife against the Appellant-Husband and his mother (mother-

in-law of the Respondent-Wife) shall proceed, subject to

deposit of ₹89,00,000/- by the Respondent-Wife before the

Registrar General of the High Court.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

3.The marriage between the Appellant-Husband and the

Respondent-Wife was solemnized on 19.02.2000 in

accordance with the Hindu rites and ceremonies and from the

wedlock, a daughter was born on 06.06.2003 and a son was

born on 01.01.2006. Thereafter, due to temperamental

differences, matrimonial disputes arose between the parties

and they started living separately from the year 2022-23.

Consequently, the Appellant-Husband filed Divorce Petition

bearing H.M.A. No. 275/2023 under Sections 13(1)(i-a) &

13(1)(i)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (hereinafter

2

referred to as “the Act”) before the Court of Principal Judge,

Family Court, Saket Court House, Delhi.

4.The Court of Principal Judge, Family Court, Saket Court

House, Delhi vide order dated 13.07.2023 referred the matter

to mediation. Pursuant to mediation, a settlement was

entered into between the parties on 16.05.2024, settling all

the disputes between them (hereinafter referred to as

“Settlement Agreement”). It is not the case of either of the

party that the said Settlement Agreement is not accepted by

the Principal Judge, Family Court, Saket Court House. The

terms of the Settlement Agreement are summarised as

follows:

4.1Both agreed to dissolve their marriage by a Decree of

Divorce by Mutual Consent as per Sections 13B(1) and

13B(2) of the Act.

4.2The Appellant-Husband agreed to withdraw the Divorce

Petition bearing H.M.A. No. 275/2023 filed under

Sections 13(1)(i-a) & 13(1)(i)(ia) of the Act.

4.3The Appellant-Husband agreed to pay and the

Respondent-Wife agreed to accept ₹1,50,00,000/-

3

(including ₹4,77,129/- invested in the PPF Account)

towards full and final settlement of all the claims arising

out of the matrimonial discord, in two installments:

4.3.1 A sum of ₹75,00,000/- at the time of recording

of statement under First Motion.

4.3.2 A sum of ₹70,22,871/- at the time of recording

of statement under Second Motion.

4.4A Gift Deed would be executed by the Respondent-Wife

for an amount of ₹2,52,38,794/- in favour of the

Appellant-husband to validate the accounts which stand

reflected in the business account of Appellant-Husband

on account of their relations as husband and wife.

4.5The Appellant-Husband agreed to pay 14,00,000/- for

₹

purchase of a car.

4.6The Appellant-Husband agreed to hand over jewellery

items as per APPENDIX A to P to the Respondent-Wife.

4.7Pursuant to the grant of the First Motion, the

Respondent-Wife agreed to present herself for executing

Gift Deeds and such other documents required for

4

transfer of properties, shares and policies bought in her

name by the Appellant-Husband, which are as follows:

4.7.1 Project Manorath: Flat No. E-2002, Mascot GH-

04B/1, Sector 16, Greater Noida.

4.7.2 Project Neo Town: Flat No. 02/1704 Patel GH-03

Tech zone, Greater Noida.

4.7.3 Project Neo Town: Flat No. D2/1705 Patel GH-03

Tech zone, Greater Noida.

4.7.4 LIC Policy No. 117410693 and Bajaj Allianz Policy

No. 0506426223

4.7.5 Shares held in Globe Capital, K.L. Rathi Steels and

Rathi Steels Ltd.

4.7.6 Jewellery account as maintained by the Appellant-

Husband in favor of their daughter.

4.8Both the parties further agreed to put an end to all the

disputes between them and their family members, and

additionally both the parties also agreed to refrain from

instituting any case (civil or criminal) against each other

or their family members.

5

5 Thereafter, on 04.07.2024, the Divorce petition bearing

H.M.A. No. 235/2023 filed under Sections 13(1)(i-a) & 13(1)(i)

(ia) of the Act was withdrawn by the Appellant-Husband and

furthermore, a petition for Divorce under Section 13-B(1) of

the Act was jointly filed by the Appellant-Husband and the

Respondent-Wife, which was registered as H.M.A. No.

1185/2024, in the Court of Principal Judge, Family Court,

Saket Court House, Delhi. Both the parties therein signed an

Affidavit of Undertaking dated 03.07.2024, agreeing to

comply with the terms of the Settlement Agreement.

6 Thereafter, the Court of Principal Judge, Family Court,

Saket Court House, Delhi, vide order dated 14.08.2024,

allowed the First Motion of the petition filed under Section

13B(1) of the Act, in view of the settlement arrived at between

the parties. In compliance with the terms of the Settlement

Agreement, the Appellant-Husband paid 75,00,000/- as first

₹

installment of the final settlement amount along with a sum

of 14,00,000/- for purchase of the car. The Appellant-

₹

Husband has also returned the Jewellery Items as described

in APPENDIX A to P to the Respondent-Wife. At the same

6

time, the Respondent-Wife, in compliance with her

obligations under the Settlement Agreement, transferred a

sum of 2,52,38,794/- to the Appellant-Husband.

₹

7 Subsequently, the Respondent-Wife withdrew her

consent for the mutual divorce and in response, the

Appellant-Husband filed a Contempt Petition No. 07/2025

before the Principal Judge, Family Court, South District,

Saket District Court, New Delhi. Later, a complaint bearing

DV Complaint No. 3186 of 2025, was filed, before the Chief

Metropolitan Magistrate, Saket Courts, Delhi, by the

Respondent-Wife under Section 12 of the D.V. Act, against

the Appellant-Husband and his mother on 16.10.2025

wherein, vide order dated 13.11.2025, summons were issued

against them.

8 Thereafter, the Appellant-Husband withdrew the

Contempt Petition No. 07/2025 filed before the Principal

Judge, Family Court, South District, Saket District Court,

New Delhi and proceeded to file a Quashing Petition bearing

Crl. M.C. No. 116 of 2026 before the High Court. The

Appellant-Husband also filed a Contempt Petition bearing

7

Contempt Case (C) No. 19 of 2026 before the High Court

seeking initiation of contempt proceedings against the

Respondent-Wife for alleged breach of the Settlement

Agreement, which is still pending.

9 The High Court in the Quashing Petition, vide Impugned

Order passed an interim order issuing notice, and agreeing to

continue the D.V. proceedings while directing the

Respondent-Wife to deposit 89,00,000/- and retain the

₹

jewellery received by her in terms of the Settlement

Agreement. The relevant portions from the judgment are

reproduced hereinunder:

“CRL.M.A. 392/2026 (exemption)

Exemption granted, subject to just exceptions.

Let requisite compliances be made within 01 week.

The application stands disposed-of.

CRL.M.C. 116/2026 & CRL.M.A. 391/2026 (stay)

By way of the present petition filed under

section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha

Sanhita 2023, the petitioner seeks quashing of

domestic violence complaint bearing CT Case

No.3186/2025 pending before the learned Judicial

Magistrate First Class-02/Mahila Court, South

District, Saket Courts, New Delhi.

2. Mr. Prabhjit Jauhar, learned counsel appearing

for the petitioner submits, that the parties had

resolved their disputes vide a Settlement Agreement

dated 16.05.2024 signed under the aegis of the

8

Delhi Mediation Centre, Saket Courts, New Delhi, as

per which the parties were to seek divorce by

mutual consent. It is submitted that under the said

settlement, the petitioner has paid to the

respondent Rs. 89 lacs and has also handed-over

to her jewellery as referred to in clause ‘B’ of the

settlement.

3. Mr. Jauhar submits, that pursuant to the

settlement, parties filed the first motion seeking

divorce by mutual consent under 13B(1) of the

Hindu Marriage Act 1955 (‘HMA’), wherein the

respondent also filed an affidavit of undertaking as

required by law, agreeing to abide by the terms of

the settlement; and the first motion was passed by

the learned Family Court vide order dated

14.08.2024.

4. Mr. Jauhar submits, that one of the terms of the

settlement was that the parties will put to an end

all disputes between them and with their respective

family members; and further the respondent had

also agreed as follows:

“12. The Parties agree and acknowledge

that by signing of the present Settlement

Agreement shall put an end to all disputes

between the Parties and their family

members and relatives. The Second Party

undertakes and acknowledges that neither

she nor her parents or any of her family

members, relatives, friends shall institute

any case or proceedings (civil or criminal) in

future against the First Party, his family

members, relatives and friends with respect

to the present matrimonial discord between

the Parties. Similarly, the First Party

undertakes and acknowledges that neither

he nor his parents or any of his family

members, relatives, friends shall institute

any case or proceedings (civil or criminal) in

future against the Second Party, her family

9

members, relatives and friends with respect

to the present matrimonial discord between

the Parties.”

5.Counsel submits however, that despite the

aforesaid position, the respondent has now reneged

on the terms of settlement and has filed a complaint

under section 12 of the Protection of Women from

Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (‘DV Act’) alleging acts

of domestic violence and seeking various reliefs

against the petitioner.

6. It is argued, that having signed the mediated

settlement agreement and having received benefits

thereunder, the respondent cannot now be

permitted to file the complaint under section 12 of

the DV Act, since that would amount to abuse of the

process of law.

7.Mr. Jauhar further submits, that as part of the

terms of settlement, the petitioner has in fact

withdrawn a petition that he had filed under

section 13 of the HMA vide order dated 04.07.2024,

whereby the petitioner had sought dissolution of his

marriage with the respondent on the ground of

adultery; and that the petitioner is accordingly now

put to serious disadvantage.

8.Issue notice.

9.Mr. Prashant Mendiratta learned counsel

appears for the respondent on advance copy;

accepts notice; and opposes the grant of any interim

relief.

10.Mr. Mendiratta submits, that in addition to the

terms contained in the settlement agreement, there

were certain other terms that were also agreed

upon between the parties by exchange of e-mails,

which the petitioner is now dithering on; and by

reason of the petitioner’s conduct, the respondent is

no longer willing to abide by the mediated

settlement and will not concede to a divorce by

mutual consent.

10

11.In support of their respective submissions,

learned counsel for the parties have cited certain

judgments of the Supreme Court as well as of

Coordinate Benches of this court.

12.After hearing learned counsel for the parties, on

a prima-facie view of the matter, and in the

interests of justice, this court is of opinion that the

following directions are required to be passed at

this stage:

12.1. The respondent shall, by way of

disgorgement, deposit the sum of Rs. 89 lacs

that have admittedly beenreceived by her from

the petitioner under the terms of Settlement

Agreement dated 16.05.2024, with the

Registrar General of this court within 04 weeks

from today;

12.2. The Registrar General is directed to retain

the amount so deposited in a fixed deposit

account in a nationalised bank, initially for a

period of 01 year; to be renewed for the same

period from time-to-time, without awaiting any

further directions from this court in that behalf,

unless otherwise directed by the court;

12.3. Though the respondent shall continue to

hold the jewellery, which also she admits to

having received from the petitioner in terms of

clause ‘B’ of the settlement agreement, she is

restrained from selling, transferring or parting

with possession of any part of that jewellery

during the pendency of the present

proceedings, without prior permission of this

court;

12.4. Since this court considers it inadvisable to

restrain a party from exercising their legal

rights by prosecuting legal proceedings, subject

to compliance of the above, the respondent

shall be entitled to proceed with the complaint

filed by her under section 12 of the DV Act.

11

13.Let reply to the petition as well as CRL.M.A. No.

391/2026 be filed within 04 weeks; rejoinder

thereto, if any, be filed within 03 weeks thereafter;

with copy to the opposing counsel.

14.Whether or not the petition filed by the

petitioner under section 13 of the HMA (which was

subsequently withdrawn by him) should be

restored, will be considered subsequently. For the

record, Mr. Mendiratta submits, that they have no

objection to the petitioner reviving the said divorce

case.

15.Re-notify on 05th May 2026. JANUARY 7,2026

CRL.M.C. 116/2026”

10.Aggrieved by the Impugned Order, the Appellant-

Husband approached this Court by filing the present SLP. In

addition to this, the Appellant-Husband also preferred an

application bearing I.A. No. 35342 of 2026 in the present SLP

seeking Decree of Divorce under Article 142(1) of the

Constitution of India. This Court vide order dated

06.02.2026, issued notice and stayed the DV proceedings

pending before the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Saket

Courts, Delhi. Subsequently, a Counter-Affidavit and

Rejoinder Affidavit have been filed by the respective parties.

SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES

12

A. On behalf of the Appellant-Husband

11.The learned counsel for the Appellant-Husband

vehemently submitted that the Impugned Order suffers from

an error of law as it failed to appreciate that the parties have

been living separately since 21.12.2022, with no intention

whatsoever to resume cohabitation. It was submitted that the

Respondent-Wife indulged in an extramarital relationship,

leading to the filing of a divorce petition dated 30.01.2023 on

the grounds of adultery and cruelty. The matter was

thereafter referred to mediation, culminating in a Settlement

Agreement dated 16.05.2024, whereby, under Clause 11, the

Respondent-Wife agreed to accept a lump sum amount of

1,50,00,000/- towards full and final settlement of all claims,

₹

along with jewellery and 14,00,000/- for the purchase of a

₹

new car, as provided under Clause 7 of the Settlement

Agreement.

12.It was further submitted that Clause 12 of the

Settlement Agreement clearly stipulated that neither the

Respondent-Wife nor her family members would initiate any

13

civil or criminal proceedings against the husband or his

family members. It has been submitted that the Respondent-

Wife admittedly received 75,00,000/- as first installment of

₹

the lump sum amount, 4,00,000/- for the car, and her

₹

entire jewellery at the time of the First Motion, which was

duly allowed by the Family Court, Saket. It was argued that,

despite having accepted 89,00,000/- and all her jewellery,

₹

the Respondent-Wife, with malafide intentions, refused to

proceed with the Second Motion Petition and instead filed a

vexatious complaint under the DV Act, solely to extract a

more financially lucrative settlement. The learned counsel

contended that such conduct amounts to a clear abuse of the

process of law and is contumacious in nature, and thus,

liable to be nipped in the bud, as held by this Court in Ruchi

Agarwal v. Amit Kumar Agarwal and others , reported as

(2005) 3 SCC 299, and Mohd. Shamim and others v.

Nhahid Begum and another , reported as (2005) 3 SCC 302.

13.The allegations made by the Respondent-Wife is that she

provided her consent to the Settlement Agreement and the

consequent divorce only on the basis of assurances given by

14

the Appellant-Husband that he would return her jewellery

worth 120 crores and gold biscuits worth 50 crores, were

₹ ₹

vehemently denied. Per contra, it was argued that no such

agreement ever existed, nor was there any evidence to

suggest that jewellery of such value was ever given, and that

these claims were merely tactics to extort additional money

from the Appellant-Husband. It was further contended that

the Respondent-Wife listed all her items to be returned by the

Appellant-Husband, which were not specified under the

Settlement Agreement, by way of WhatsApp messages dated

17.02.2025, wherein there is not even a whisper of the

jewellery worth 120 crores and the gold biscuits worth 50

₹ ₹

crores.

14.The learned counsel further submitted that the marriage

between the parties has irretrievably broken down, with both

parties having made serious allegations of cruelty,

incompatibility, and irreconcilable differences, and neither

party having expressed any willingness to resume marital

obligations at any stage. Reliance was placed upon the

judgment of this Court in Trisha Singh v. Anurag Kumar ,

15

reported as 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1191, wherein this Court

exercised powers under Article 142 to dissolve the marriage

when there existed no scope of reconciliation between the

parties and directed compliance with the terms of a

concluded settlement. It was further submitted that the

Appellant-Husband herein is ready and willing to comply with

the Settlement Agreement by paying the balance amount of

75,00,000/-.

₹

15.It was argued that the High Court erred in permitting

the Respondent-Wife to continue with the DV proceedings

subject to deposit of 89,00,000/-, instead of quashing the

₹

same in exercise of powers under Section 528 of the

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (hereinafter

referred to as “BNSS”), despite the proceedings being ex facie

an abuse of process in light of the binding Settlement

Agreement as well as the Affidavit of Undertaking dated

03.07.2024. The Appellant-Husband has also initiated

contempt proceedings for breach of the Settlement Agreement

and the Undertaking. The learned counsel finally argued that

loss of finality in litigation would ensue if parties are

16

permitted to renege from mediated settlements. As a result, it

was prayed that this Court should exercise its extraordinary

powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India to

dissolve the marriage and quash the DV proceedings to

secure the ends of justice.

B. On behalf of the Respondent-Wife

16.It is submitted by the learned counsel on behalf of the

Respondent-Wife that the Appellant-Husband had assured

the Respondent-Wife that he will return the jewellery gifted to

the Respondent-Wife by his parents, relatives and family

members and by her parents worth

₹

120 crores at the time of

signing of the Settlement Agreement and gold biscuits worth

₹50 crores before signing of the Second Motion Petition.

However, the same was not included in the Settlement

Agreement and the Respondent-Wife was told by the

Appellant-Husband that including the same would alert the

Income Tax Department and he may have to give a wealth tax

on the same. It was also made clear that in case the

Appellant-Husband fails to return the said jewellery, the

17

Respondent-Wife need not sign the Second Motion Petition.

Accordingly, it was contended that believing the said

assurances being made by the Appellant-Husband, the

Respondent-Wife signed the Settlement Agreement and the

First Motion Petition.

17.The learned counsel further submitted that after the

recording of the statements for the First Motion, the

Respondent-Wife asked the Appellant-Husband to hand over

the jewellery and the gold biscuits as promised by him.

However, the Appellant-Husband completely refused and said

that he would hand over the jewellery and gold biscuits only

after the grant of decree of divorce by mutual consent.

Therefore, the Respondent-Wife refused to sign the Second

Motion Petition and withdrew her consent to the mutual

divorce because of the conduct and ill-intention of the

Appellant-Husband and reliance was placed on the email

dated 21.02.2025 sent by the counsel for the Appellant-

Husband, wherein it was expressly stated that all payments,

terms or personal items agreed upon and not specifically

18

mentioned in the Settlement Agreement shall be made good

in toto by 02.03.2025.

18.It is also submitted by the learned counsel that the

Respondent-Wife, that in compliance with the direction given

by the High Court and within the stipulated time period, she

has deposited the amount of 89,00,000/- by way of two

₹

Demand Drafts ( 75,00,000/- and 14,00,000/-,

₹ ₹

respectively) before the Registrar General of the High Court.

19.Furthermore, it is submitted that in terms of settled

principles governing divorce by mutual consent, the consent

of the parties must subsist not only at the stage of filing of

the petition but also, is required to continue to exist till the

passing of the final decree. Reference in this regard was made

to the judgment of this Court in Smt Sureshta Devi v. Om

Prakash, reported as (1991) 2 SCC 25, wherein it was held

as follows:

“14. Sub-section (2) requires the court to hear the parties which

means both the parties. If one of the parties at that stage says

that “I have withdrawn my consent”, or “I am not a willing

party to the divorce”, the court cannot pass a decree of divorce

by mutual consent. If the court is held to have the power to

make a decree solely based on the initial petition, it negates the

whole idea of mutuality and consent for divorce. Mutual

consent to the divorce is a sine qua non for passing a decree for

19

divorce under Section 13-B. Mutual consent should continue till

the divorce decree is passed. It is a positive requirement for the

court to pass a decree of divorce. “The consent must continue to

decree nisi and must be valid subsisting consent when the case

is heard”. [See (i) Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th edn., vol. 13

para 645; (ii) Rayden on Divorce, 12th edn., vol. 1, p. 291; and

(iii) Beales v. Beales [(1972) 2 All ER 667, 674].”

20.It is also submitted that the Settlement Agreement is

entirely one-sided, whereby the Respondent-Wife alone was

required to relinquish her rights, share in properties and

financial interests in favour of the Appellant-Husband,

including transfer of a sum of 2,52,38,794/- by diluting and

₹

liquidating her mutual funds and shares, despite having no

independent source of income, and without receiving any

commensurate or reciprocal consideration in return and

thus, withdrawal of consent by the Respondent-Wife was a

legally justified and inevitable consequence of the conduct of

the Appellant-Husband.

21.Moreover, it is submitted that the unlawful retention of

the Respondent-Wife’s stridhan, jewellery, gold biscuits, and

monies, coupled with her continued deprivation thereof,

amounts to continuing economic abuse as recognised under

Section 3 of the DV Act and the cause of action continues to

20

subsist and the rights of the Respondent-Wife to seek

redressal under the DV Act remain unaffected by the

cessation of cohabitation or the alleged severance of

matrimonial ties.

ANALYSIS

22.We have heard the parties and perused the materials

available on record and the issues arising for consideration

before this Court are as follows:

I. Whether the proceedings initiated by the Respondent-

Wife under the DV Act should be quashed?

II.Whether any party can back out from the Settlement

Agreement arrived at in the mediation proceedings? If

yes, in what situation?

III. Whether this Court, in the case in hand, can exercise

its powers under Article 142(1) of the Constitution of

India to grant a decree of divorce to the parties herein

on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage,

upon an application filed by the Appellant-Husband? If

yes, then on what terms and conditions?

21

23.In the present case, the marriage between the parties

was solemnized on 19.02.2000 and they have two issues, a

daughter aged 23 years and a son aged 20 years. On

30.01.2023, the Appellant-Husband filed a Divorce Petition

on grounds of cruelty and adultery. In the said case, the

concerned trial Court referred the parties for mediation at the

mediation centre. During mediation, both the parties agreed

to settle all their disputes and accordingly, a Settlement

Agreement was entered between the parties, wherein, subject

to the compliance with the terms thereof, the parties were to

apply for divorce by mutual consent.

24.The First Motion Petition in the petition for divorce by

mutual consent was allowed on 14.08.2024 after fulfilling the

terms as per the Settlement Agreement to that effect and the

Second Motion Petition was to be filed on or before

20.02.2025. However, the Respondent-Wife refused to sign

the Second Motion Petition within the stipulated time period

and withdrew her consent to the mutual divorce.

25.Subsequently, the Appellant-Husband filed a contempt

petition being Contempt Petition No. 7/2025, which was later

22

withdrawn by the Appellant-Husband to pursue his remedy

before the High Court. Soon after filing the contempt petition,

the Respondent-Wife initiated proceedings under Section 12

of the DV Act and filed a case bearing D.V. Complaint No.

3186/2025 on 16.10.2025.

26.This Court in the case of Ruchi Agarwal (supra) was

caught up with a similar situation wherein the husband

performed his part of the compromise agreed for mutual

consent divorce, however, the wife partly performed her

obligations and did not withdraw certain cases. It was argued

by the wife that the said compromise was obtained by the

husband and his family through threat and coercion. This

Court therein held that it was difficult to accept the argument

that the compromise was signed under coercion since the

wife partly performed the obligations mentioned thereunder.

The relevant portions from the judgment are reproduced

hereinunder:

“7. It is based on the said compromise the appellant obtained a

divorce as desired by her under Section 13-B of the Hindu

Marriage Act and in partial compliance with the terms of the

compromise she withdrew the criminal case filed under Section

125 of the Criminal Procedure Code but for reasons better

known to her she did not withdraw that complaint from which

23

this appeal arises. That apart after the order of the High Court

quashing the said complaint on the ground of territorial

jurisdiction, she has chosen to file this appeal. It is in this

background, we will have to appreciate the merits of this

appeal.

8. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant, however,

contended that though the appellant had signed the

compromise deed with the abovementioned terms in it, the

same was obtained by the respondent husband and his family

under threat and coercion and in fact she did not receive lump

sum maintenance and her stridhan properties. We find it

extremely difficult to accept this argument in the background of

the fact that pursuant to the compromise deed the respondent

husband has given her a consent divorce which she wanted,

thus had performed his part of the obligation under the

compromise deed. Even the appellant partially performed her

part of the obligations by withdrawing her criminal complaint

filed under Section 125. It is true that she had made a

complaint in writing to the Family Court where Section 125

CrPC proceedings were pending that the compromise deed was

filed under coercion but she withdrew the same and gave a

statement before the said court affirming the terms of the

compromise which statement was recorded by the Family Court

and the proceedings were dropped and a divorce was obtained.

Therefore, we are of the opinion that the appellant having

received the relief she wanted without contest on the basis of

the terms of the compromise, we cannot now accept the

argument of the learned counsel for the appellant. In our

opinion, the conduct of the appellant indicates that the criminal

complaint from which this appeal arises was filed by the wife

only to harass the respondents.

9. In view of the abovesaid subsequent events and the conduct

of the appellant, it would be an abuse of the process of the

court if the criminal proceedings from which this appeal arises

is allowed to continue. Therefore, we are of the considered

opinion to do complete justice, we should while dismissing this

appeal also quash the proceedings arising from criminal case

Cr. No. 224 of 2003 registered in Police Station Bilaspur

(District Rampur) filed under Sections 498-A, 323 and 506 IPC

and under Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act

against the respondents herein. It is ordered accordingly. The

appeal is disposed of.”

(Emphasis Supplied)

24

27.The case of Anurag Vijaykumar Goel v. State of

Maharashtra, reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1611, was

also based on an almost identical set of facts. In that case,

the first motion for divorce by mutual consent was moved by

both the parties along with the Settlement Agreement and the

same was allowed by the Family Court. Before moving the

Second Motion Petition, the wife resiled from the settlement

agreement. A three-judge Bench of this Court therein noting

down that the marriage has irretrievably broken, granted

divorce and quashed all the proceedings between the parties

arising out of the matrimonial relationship. The relevant

portion from the judgment is reproduced hereinunder:

4. The first motion dated 03.09.2022 for divorce on mutual

consent under Section 13B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955

was moved by both the parties along with settlement entered

into between them, which was recorded by the Family Court on

14.09.2022. But before the second motion, the respondent-wife

resiled from the agreement which prompted the appellant to

approach the High Court of Bombay for quashing the criminal

proceedings pending before the Metropolitan Magistrate, 15th

Court at Sewree, Mumbai arising out of CR No. 63 of 2018

dated 19.04.2018. The principal ground raised before the High

Court was the appellant's withdrawal from the divorce on

mutual consent, which according to the appellant justified the

quashing of the criminal proceedings. The appellant also moved

the High Court of Delhi alleging contempt insofar as

withdrawing from the consent and refusing to follow it up on

the second motion before the Family Court. A learned Single

Judge of the Delhi High Court punished the respondent for

25

contempt which order was set aside by the Division Bench on

an appeal filed by the respondent.

XXXX

13. We have already found that the allegations in the

statement of 19.04.2018 based on which the crime was

registered against the appellant inter-alia under Section 498-A

are common-place, banal and vague, without any specific

instances mentioned and filed one year after the admitted

separation of the couple. The High Court in the impugned order

has rejected the contention of the appellant to quash the

criminal proceedings with respect to the agreement having been

resiled from, at the second motion. We cannot fault the findings

of the High Court that the ground raised of the respondent-wife

having withdrawn from her consent on the second motion, is

perfectly in exercise of the statutory right of the respondent-

wife. However, but for a casual reference to the other grounds

set out in the petition, the High Court has not considered those

at all. It was observed peremptorily that the contrary

statements of the witnesses should be tested in a trial and

there is no question of the veracity of the allegations in the FIR

or charge-sheet being considered, at this stage. This cannot be

upheld especially when the statement leading to the charge-

sheet does not have any grounds leading to an allegation under

Section 498-A of the IPC.

14. We have already held, but for marital squabbles blown out

of proportion there is nothing substantial in the complainant

leading to the registration of crime under Section 498-A.

Reference can be usefully made to the trite principle for exercise

of powers under Section 482 of Cr. P.C. from the oft quoted

decision in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal2. Suffice to refer to

one of the grounds laid down by the Constitution Bench, but

with a caveat that there cannot be any precise, clearly defined

and sufficiently channelized and inflexible guideline or rigid

formulae :

“(1) Where the allegations made in the first information

report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their

face value and accepted in their entirely do not prima

facie constitute any offence or make out a case against

the accused.”

15. The respondent who appeared in person has specifically

taken us through the Division Bench order of the High Court of

Delhi which absolved her from the contempt proceedings;

especially the observation that the attempt of initiating the

contempt is only a coercion to participate in the second motion

for divorce. It was also found that an affidavit of undertaking

26

recorded at the first motion would crystallise into an

undertaking only if the terms are agreed upon and divorce is

consented to by both the parties at the second motion. We are

quite in agreement with the finding regarding the second

motion, as already observed. But on the question of the

maintainability of contempt proceedings, we need not say

anything further, since it has been informed across the Bar that

there is an SLP filed from the said order and that in the event of

closure of all proceedings under Article 142, the appellant

would not pursue the same.

16. The facts as detailed by us herein above and the

acrimonious relations between the parties for the last 8 years

without any let-up and the multiple legal proceedings pending,

clearly indicate that the relationship has irretrievably broken

down. We are convinced that the invocation of Article 142 is

imperative in the above case to do complete justice to both the

parties, on being satisfied that the marriage has been rendered

totally unworkable, emotionally dead and beyond salvation as

held in Shilpa Sailesh 1 . What remains is only the terms on

which the parties could go their separate ways to live their lives

independently, without the yoke of a troubled marriage. The

terms of the settlement agreed upon according to us, does

justice to the estranged wife and does not unduly burden the

husband.

XXX

21. We hence quash the criminal proceedings initiated as CC

No. 136/PW/2018 pending before the Metropolitan Magistrate,

15thCourt at Sewree Mumbai for offence punishable under

Section 498-A, 406 r/w Section 34 of the IPC. We also allow the

application filed under Article 142 of the Constitution of India

dissolving the marriage between the appellant and the second

respondent finding the marriage to have irretrievably broken

down, in the best interest of both the parties and for doing

complete justice, but subject to the following terms:

I) The appellant shall deposit the entire arrears to the Society

as on today and upto 1st September, 2025, with the Society as

the maintenance charges for the apartment namely A-52,

Kalpataru Habitat, Dr. S.S. Rao Road, Mumbai, alongwith the

two car parking areas upon which the Society shall give a no-

encumbrance certificate to the appellant as also issue the

ownership certificate in his name.

II) Along with the above documents the appellant shall execute

a gift deed on or before 30.08.2025 on any date informed by

written notice; by the appellant to the respondent, with due

acknowledgment taken.

27

III) We have seen from the records that the draft of the deed

was exchanged between the parties and both the appellant

and the respondent No. 2 shall be present before the

jurisdictional Registrar for execution and registration on the

date notified.

IV) If the respondent No. 2 does not turn up on the said date,

the jurisdictional Registrar shall acknowledge and record the

presence of the appellant and in that event the appellant and

the respondent shall be present on 15.09.2025 before the

Registrar for execution of the deed.

V) If the appellant does not comply with the above, then the

order of divorce shall not come into effect. However, if the

respondent does not present herself on the date notified by the

appellant and on such failure even on the date specified by us,

the divorce shall come into effect.

VI) All proceedings, civil and criminal, initiated by the parties to

the marriage now dissolved, in relation to or arising out of such

marriage, shall stand closed. There shall also be no further

proceedings, both civil and criminal instituted, by the respective

parties, on any aspect arising out of in relation to the marriage.

22. The Criminal Appeal stands allowed along with the

application under Article 142 of the Constitution of India

dissolving the marriage between the appellant and the second

respondent on the ground of irretrievable break down, subject

to the terms and conditions specified above. All proceedings

pending between the parties shall stand closed and there shall

be no further proceedings initiated by either parties, relatable to

their marriage, which stands dissolved by this judgment, on

the terms and conditions being complied with.”

(Emphasis Supplied)

28.Again coming to the facts of the case, even at the cost of

repetition, we would like to mention that as per the

Settlement Agreement, the Appellant-Husband was to pay

75,00,000/- as first installment of the final settlement

₹

amount along with a sum of 14,00,000/- for purchase of the

₹

car, both of which had been complied with. The Appellant-

28

Husband has also returned the jewellery items as per

APPENDIX A to P to the Respondent-Wife. The Respondent-

Wife, as part of her obligations under the Settlement

Agreement, transferred 2,52,38,794/- to the Appellant-

₹

Husband at the time of filing the First Motion Petition.

29.However, the Respondent-Wife refused to honour the

terms of the Settlement Agreement and refused to sign the

Second Motion Petition stating that she had withdrawn her

consent from the divorce. Though it is well within the law, for

any party, to withdraw consent at any stage before grant of

divorce by mutual agreement, however, in case a compromise

deed or a settlement agreement has been entered in between

the parties regarding the full and final settlement of their

disputes, then in that case it is not open for the party to step

back from the terms and conditions so arrived between them.

30.It is trite law that once the parties have entered into a

settlement agreement which was duly authenticated by the

mediator, in case of any resilement from such terms as

agreed upon in the settlement, the resiling party must be

encumbered with heavy costs. Any deviation from the terms

29

of the settlement arrived in mediation and later confirmed by

the Court should be dealt with strictly as such deviation

harbors an attack to the foundational basis of the entire

process of mediation. This Court in the case of Gimpex

Private Limited v. Manoj Goel, reported as (2022) 11 SCC

705, while dealing with a compromise entered between the

parties in case of cheque dishonour, held that the parties

cannot be allowed to reverse the effect of a settlement

agreement by pursuing either original or subsequent

complaints. A three-Judge Bench of this Court therein

emphasized that a settlement once entered and authenticated

by a mediator subsumed the original complaint. The relevant

portion of the said judgment is reproduced herein under:

“41. When a complainant party enters into a compromise

agreement with the accused, it may be for a multitude of

reasons — higher compensation, faster recovery of money,

uncertainty of trial and strength of the complaint, among

others. A complainant enters into a settlement with open eyes

and undertakes the risk of the accused failing to honour the

cheques issued pursuant to the settlement, based on certain

benefits that the settlement agreement postulates. Once parties

have voluntarily entered into such an agreement and agree to

abide by the consequences of non-compliance of the settlement

agreement, they cannot be allowed to reverse the effects of the

agreement by pursuing both the original complaint and the

subsequent complaint arising from such non-compliance. The

settlement agreement subsumes the original complaint. Non-

compliance of the terms of the settlement agreement or

30

dishonour of cheques issued subsequent to it, would then give

rise to a fresh cause of action attracting liability under Section

138 of the NI Act and other remedies under civil law and

criminal law.

XXX

C.2. Liability arising from the settlement agreement

49. Once a settlement agreement has been entered into

between the parties, the parties are bound by the terms of the

agreement and any violation of the same may result in

consequential action in civil and criminal law.”

(Emphasis Supplied)

31.The exception to the above rule is that a party can resile

from the Settlement Agreement arrived in the mediation

proceedings is, if it successfully demonstrates that the said

Settlement Agreement was procured by force, fraud or undue

influence. The party can also resile from the Settlement

Agreement on account of non-fulfillment of any of the

conditions by the opposite party as set out in the Settlement

Agreement.

32.The Respondent-Wife alleged that the Appellant-

Husband assured the Respondent-Wife that apart from the

considerations specified in the Settlement Agreement, the

Appellant-Husband would give 120 Crores worth of jewellery

₹

along with gold biscuits worth 50 Crores in lieu of the

₹

stridhan (apart from those mentioned in the Settlement

31

Agreement) to her before signing of the Second Motion

Petition. However, since the Appellant-Husband did not

adhere to his promise, the Respondent-Wife did not sign the

Second Motion Petition.

33.Another argument raised by the Respondent-Wife, that

she only agreed to exclude these terms from the Settlement

Agreement upon being asked so by the Appellant-Husband in

order to avoid alerting the Income Tax Department and to

evade any liability towards wealth tax, is highly egregious. We

are appalled at the sheer audacity of such a submission being

advanced before a court of law and deplore the evident

disregard exhibited towards the legal system.

34.We are not impressed by the reasons given by the

learned counsel of the Respondent-Wife for resiling out of the

Settlement Agreement. It is difficult to comprehend as to why

in the Settlement Agreement the condition for return of

jewelleries and gold biscuits have not been mentioned. It is

an admitted position that the Respondent-Wife had signed

the Settlement Agreement and we are not sure as to why she,

being a mature and educated woman assisted by her

32

advocate, did not press for the inclusion of these conditions

in the Settlement Agreement.

35.In addition, we find no plausible explanation as to why

the Respondent-Wife waited for eight long months from the

date of the Second Motion Petition before initiating the DV

proceedings. It is evident from the WhatsApp chats dated

17.02.2025 between them, wherein the Respondent-Wife

listed all articles she sought to be returned, that were not a

part of the Settlement Agreement, that the said list did not

make any mention whatsoever of any jewellery worth 120

₹

crores or gold biscuits worth 50 crores, which she claims

₹

were assured to her by the Appellant-Husband. Notably,

these allegations were raised for the first time only in the DV

complaint. This prolonged delay in raising such a substantial

ground raises serious suspicion as to the credibility and

authenticity of the allegations made therein in blatant

disregard of the terms of the Settlement Agreement. In

addition to this, with regard to the email sent by the counsel

for the Appellant-Husband dated 21.02.2025, wherein it was

mentioned that the Appellant-Husband would make good all

33

other obligations, apart from those mentioned in the

Settlement Agreement, it must have been in pursuance of the

list of items sent by the Respondent-Wife through the

WhatsApp chat dated 17.02.2025 and it cannot be construed

in such a manner that it would have included the demands

for jewellery worth ₹120 Crores or gold biscuits worth ₹50

Crores.

36.Reliance was placed upon by the learned counsel for the

Respondent-Wife on certain judgments, however, all the said

cases would not apply in the present case for the following

reasons:

A.Smt Sureshta Devi v. Om Prakash, reported as (1991)

2 SCC 25: The Respondent-Wife relied on the said judgment

to the effect that the consent of the parties must subsist not

only at the stage of filing of the petition but also, is required

to continue to exist till the passing of the final decree.

However, in the present case, regarding the withdrawal of

consent before the Second Motion, the Respondent-Wife could

not prove any fraud, force, or undue influence and her

withdrawal of consent is merely on the ground of non-

34

adherence to the promise made by the Appellant-Husband

which was not even the part of the Settlement Agreement and

thus, cannot benefit her to initiate another proceeding.

B.Hitesh Bhatnagar v. Deepa Bhatnagar, reported as

(2011) 5 SCC 234: The Respondent relied on the said

judgment to the effect that one of the parties could withdraw

his/her consent at any time before passing of the decree. In

the said case, the agreement was entered into between the

parties independently, however, in the present case the

settlement was arrived upon mediation between the parties

on specific order of the Court and which was also later

ratified by the Court.

C.Smruti Pahariya v. Sanjay Pahariya, reported as

(2009) 12 SCC 338: The said judgment of the Court was given

after following the reasoning given in the case of Surestha

Devi (supra) which has been already distinguished above.

Proceedings under the DV Act

37.A careful perusal of the complaint filed by the

Respondent-Wife under the DV Act depicts that there are no

specific allegations regarding any sort of domestic violence

35

that could emanate from the pleadings. The Respondent-Wife

has failed to mention any event describing any sort of

violence carried out either by the Appellant-Husband or his

mother. A criminal complaint regarding domestic violence,

with mere reference to the names of the family members or

the husband without any specific allegation that points

towards their active involvement in commission of such an

act of violence, shall be nipped in the bud.

38.While we are conscious of the fact that the parties to a

long standing marital dispute are often fuelled by emotions,

we cannot allow such emotions to take a drastic turn in as

much as allowing the bursts of emotions to form the basis of

criminal prosecution. Such criminal prosecution, if allowed,

would lead to an abuse of law and cause harassment.

39.It is evident from the petition filed by the Respondent-

Wife that apart from the Appellant-Husband’s non-

compliance with the condition of giving 120 Crores and gold

₹

biscuits worth 50 Crores, all the other allegations seems to

₹

be trivial disagreements exaggerated, solely to justify the

institution of the complaint under the DV Act.

36

40.Moreover, we cannot be oblivious to the fact that,

admittedly, since the last couple of years (from 2022-23), the

Respondent-Wife is living separately from the Appellant-

Husband. The proceedings under the DV Act appear to be

premeditated, one filed in order to sustain some sort of

litigation between the parties after she had resiled from the

Settlement Agreement, as it was evidently for the first time in

a long span of about 23 years of their sustained marriage,

that such a petition alleging domestic violence has been filed

by the Respondent-Wife. The proceedings initiated under the

DV Act were merely an afterthought, as they were filed after

notice was issued in the contempt petition filed by the

Appellant-Husband.

41.Therefore, we are of the view that the proceedings under

the DV Act as initiated by the Respondent-Wife are liable to

be quashed, the continuance of which would be an abuse of

the process of law.

ARTICLE 142(1) AND IRRETRIEVABLE BREAKDOWN OF

MARRIAGE

37

42.Now we shall proceed on to adjudicate upon the

application filed by the Appellant-Husband under Article

142(1) to examine if in the instant case, exercise of powers

under Article 142(1) of the Constitution of India for

dissolution of marriage would be justified.

43.Article 142(1) of the Constitution of India grants powers

to the Supreme Court to pass any orders or decree in order to

achieve complete justice. Article 142(1) has been reproduced

hereinbelow for easy reference:

“142. Enforcement of decrees and orders of the Supreme

Court and orders as to discovery, etc. —(1) The Supreme

Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction may pass such decree or

make such order as is necessary for doing complete justice in

any cause or matter pending before it, and any decree so

passed or order so made shall be enforceable throughout the

territory of India in such manner as may be prescribed by or

under any law made by Parliament and, until provision in that

behalf is so made, in such manner as the President may by

order prescribe.

(2) Subject to the provisions of any law made in this behalf by

Parliament, the Supreme Court shall, as respects the whole of

the territory of India, have all and every power to make any

order for the purpose of securing the attendance of any person,

the discovery or production of any documents, or the

investigation or punishment of any contempt of itself.”

This vast power vested in the highest court of the country by

the insertion of the phrase “such order as is necessary for

doing complete justice” has been done with the intent to

38

protect the interests of the persons (and not merely “the

litigants”) approaching the institution of judiciary with the

hopes of seeking justice. Having been empowered with these

extraordinary powers, it is the quintessential duty of this

Court to ensure that the parties who are present before it are

not left remediless merely because certain statutory gaps

exist and their rights are adequately safeguarded.

44.Irretrievable breakdown of marriage is not a valid

ground under the Act for the ground of divorce. The Act

permits a decree of divorce to be passed either when certain

matrimonial offences have been committed by either party or

through mutual consent. The jurisprudence pertaining to the

grant of divorce under Article 142(1) on the ground of

irretrievable breakdown of marriage has been developed with

caution through various judgments.

45.A Constitution Bench of this Court in the judgment of

Shilpa Sailesh v. Varun Sreenivasan, reported as (2023)

14 SCC 231 held that the power to grant divorce under the

aegis of Article 142(1) is exercisable by this Court only in

those cases where in the opinion of the Court, there has been

39

a “complete and irretrievable breakdown” of the marriage.

This Court therein however specified that irretrievable

breakdown of marriage has to be ascertained factually while

weighing all the underlying circumstances. This relevant

paragraphs from Shilpa Sailesh to this effect are reproduced

hereinbelow:

“62. Having said so, we wish to clearly state that grant of

divorce on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage

by this Court is not a matter of right, but a discretion which is

to be exercised with great care and caution, keeping in mind

several factors ensuring that ‘complete justice’ is done to both

parties. It is obvious that this Court should be fully convinced

and satisfied that the marriage is totally unworkable,

emotionally dead and beyond salvation and, therefore,

dissolution of marriage is the right solution and the only way

forward.

63. That the marriage has irretrievably broken down is to be

factually determined and firmly established. For this, several

factors are to be considered such as the period of time the

parties had cohabited after marriage; when the parties had last

cohabited; the nature of allegations made by the parties

against each other and their family members; the orders

passed in the legal proceedings from time to time, cumulative

impact on the personal relationship; whether, and how many

attempts were made to settle the disputes by intervention of the

court or through mediation, and when the last attempt was

made, etc. The period of separation should be sufficiently long,

and anything above six years or more will be a relevant factor.

But these facts have to be evaluated keeping in view the

economic and social status of the parties, including their

educational qualifications, whether the parties have any

children, their age, educational qualification, and whether the

other spouse and children are dependent, in which event how

40

and in what manner the party seeking divorce intends to take

care and provide for the spouse or the children. Question of

custody and welfare of minor children, provision for fair and

adequate alimony for the wife, and economic rights of the

children and other pending matters, if any, are relevant

considerations. We would not like to codify the factors so as to

curtail exercise of jurisdiction under Article 142(1) of the

Constitution of India, which is situation specific. Some of the

factors mentioned can be taken as illustrative, and worthy of

consideration.”

(Emphasis Supplied)

46.In Rinku Baheti v. Sandesh Sharda, reported in

(2025) 3 SCC 686, it was held that the Court is required to

take a holistic view on the relationship between the parties

and then conclude whether there is an irretrievable

breakdown of marriage. The relevant portion from the

judgment is reproduced herein below:

“43. Unlike a divorce proceeding before the Family Court, where

the court is bound by the fault-divorce provisions contained in

the HMA and other allied legislations and thus has to

necessarily appreciate the evidence to give a finding about

whether a party had indeed committed the alleged matrimonial

offence or not, this Court while dealing with an application

seeking divorce under Article 142(1) of the Constitution can

depart from the said procedure as well as the substantive laws

by acting as a problem solver and balancing out the equities

between the conflicting claims. This Court is therefore not

required to look deep into the veracity of the detailed

allegations made by the parties against each other to find as to

who is at fault, but is required to take a holistic view on the

relationship between the parties and conclude if there is an

irretrievable breakdown of the marriage and the parties have

no scope of reconciliation. Thus, the thrust of considering an

application under Article 142(1) of the Constitution is in order to

ascertain whether there is an irretrievable breakdown of

41

marriage between the parties and as a result, it is in their

interest that they should part ways by passing a decree of

divorce by exercising jurisdiction under Article 142(1) of the

Constitution and thereby doing complete justice between the

parties.”

(Emphasis Supplied)

47.Even recently, in the case of Trisha Singh (supra) this

Court was faced with a similar situation wherein the wife

resiled from the terms of settlement as agreed before the

mediator, and this Court while relying upon Ruchi Agarwal

(supra) held that such conduct from wife proves that the

marriage has been irretrievably broken down and therefore

granted divorce under Article 142(1) of the Constitution of

India. The relevant portions from the judgment are

reproduced hereinunder:

“3. It is thus manifest that there was a clear undertaking by the

parties before the Mediator that they shall part ways

peacefully.

4. It is also clear that the respondent-husband had voluntarily

paid a sum of Rs. 20 lakhs for the support of his child during

the period from March, 2020 to October, 2023. The respondent-

husband also paid a sum of Rs. 50 lakhs to the petitioner-wife

in the terms of the settlement. The remaining amount of

permanent alimony has been agreed to be paid as per the

schedule indicated in the settlement deed. Out of this agreed

amount, the respondent-husband has paid a sum of Rs.

50,00,000/-(fifty lacs) only to the petitioner-wife.

5. However, today when the matter was taken up, this Court

was apprised that the petitioner-wife seems to have resiled

from the settlement agreement.

42

6. Learned counsel for the petitioner-wife has affirmed that his

client has stopped instructing him in the matter. Acting on the

terms of the settlement, the respondent-husband has already

withdrawn the matrimonial case on 23rd April, 2024 which fact

is recorded in the order sheet of the Family Court placed on

record with I.A. No. 112620 of 2024 and thus he is abiding by

the terms of settlement in letter and spirit.

7. It seems, the petitioner-wife having taken advantage of the

settlement executed before the Mediator has managed to get

the matrimonial case instituted by the respondent-husband

withdrawn. She has also accepted a sum of Rs. 50 lakhs from

the respondent-husband towards part payment of the

permanent alimony and thereafter, she is trying to resile from

the settlement without any justification. The conduct of the

petitioner-wife is clearly, recalcitrant inasmuch as she has

disregarded the terms and conditions agreed before the

Mediator in the settlement proceedings which were undertaken

pursuant to the directions of this Court. Not only this, because

of her conduct, the respondent-husband has been put to grave

disadvantage inasmuch as he has withdrawn the matrimonial

case and has also paid a significant proportion of the

permanent alimony to the petitioner-wife in terms of the

settlement agreement.

8. Learned counsel for the respondent-husband on instructions

states that his client undertakes to abide by the remaining

terms and conditions of the settlement agreement in letter and

spirit and shall make due payments on the schedule dates if

the marriage is dissolved.

9. A similar situation was examined by this Court in the case of

Ruchi Agarwal v. Amit Kumar Agrawal….

XXXX

10. On going through the material available on record, we find

that the matrimonial relations between the spouses have

broken down irrevocably and there is no possibility of

reconciliation and revival of the spousal relationship. Hence,

looking at the conduct of the petitioner-wife as indicated supra

and the other attending facts and circumstances, we are

inclined to exercise the powers under Article 142 of the

Constitution of India so as to grant decree of divorce and hence,

the marriage between the petitioner and the respondent is

dissolved.

43

11. However, it is made clear that the respondent in terms of

the settlement shall make the remaining payment to the

petitioner.

12. The petition is allowed in these terms.”

(Emphasis Supplied)

48.The aforesaid line of reasoning has been continuously

adopted by this Court in a catena of judgments including but

not limited to Vishal Shah v. Monalisha Gupta reported in

2025 SCC OnLine SC 383; Vineet Taneja v. Ritu Johari

reported in (2025) 3 SCC 732; Neha Lal v. Abhishek Kumar

reported in 2026 SCC OnLine SC 95.

49.A perusal of the dicta laid down by this Court in the

above mentioned judgments and several others holding

authority on the said law point makes it crystal clear that the

Court while exercising its power under Article 142(1) for grant

of divorce has to first conclude that there has been an

irretrievable breakdown of marriage.

50.In the case at hand, the Appellant-Husband had first

filed a divorce petition being H.M.A. No. 275/2023 under

Sections 13(1)(i-a) & 13(1)(i)(a) of the Act, which was later

withdrawn as per the terms of the Settlement Agreement.

Further, in the petition for divorce by mutual consent filed on

44

joint petition by both the parties, First Motion Petition has

been allowed vide order dated 14.08.2024 and the Second

Motion Petition has not been filed as yet.

51.Apart from the above, the parties have been admittedly

living separately from around 2022-23. Both the children of

the parties have attained majority and are now living their

respective lives. Moreover, even after the Settlement

Agreement, the Respondent-Wife proceeded to file a case of

domestic violence against the Appellant-Husband and his

mother. Thus, we are convinced that the sacrosanct thread

tying the parties in this martial relationship has been

snapped for long now and we perceive no possibility that they

could be united (for good) in a matrimonial relationship.

52.On going through the materials on record, it is evident

that there has been a complete and irretrievable breakdown

of the matrimonial relationship between the parties. In such a

case, when there is no scope of parties peacefully co-existing

together, we see no point in continuation of any sorts of

litigation in between the parties arising solely out of the

matrimonial discord.

45

53.Thus, in the light of the abovestated facts, we conclude

that the present is a fit case for exercise of powers under

Article 142(1) to grant a divorce as there had been an

irretrievable breakdown of the marriage.

Prevailing Position of the Settlement between the Parties

54.We notice that various terms and conditions have been

set out in the Settlement Agreement and out of all such

conditions, some have been already performed by the parties

and the rest are yet to be completed. The following table

indicates the terms of the Settlement Agreement between the

parties and their status:

S.

No.

Condition of the Settlement

Agreement

Status of

Completion

1.Dissolution of Marriage by Mutual

Consent: Parties agreed to dissolve

their marriage under Section 13B(1)

and 13B(2) of the Hindu Marriage Act

by filing a joint petition.

Partially

Completed: The

First Motion was

jointly filed and

granted by the

Family Court on

14.08.2024,

However, the

Second Motion

was not signed

as the

Respondent-Wife

withdrew her

consent.

46

2.Withdrawal of Fault-Based Divorce

Petition: The Appellant-Husband

undertook to withdraw his pending

Divorce Petition (H.M.A. No.

275/2023) filed on grounds of

adultery and cruelty.

Completed

3.Payment of First Installment

(Alimony): Appellant-Husband agreed

to pay 75,00,000/- via Demand

₹

Draft towards full and final settlement

at the time of recording the First

Motion.

Completed

4.Payment for Purchase of a New Car:

Appellant-Husband agreed to pay an

additional 14,00,000/- via Demand

₹

Draft for the purchase of a car at the

time of the First Motion.

Completed

5.Handing over of Jewellery

(Appendix A to P): Appellant-

Husband agreed to hand over specific

jewellery items listed in Appendix A to

P to the Respondent-Wife at the time

of the First Motion.

Completed

6.Execution of Gift Deed/Indemnity

for Funds: Respondent-Wife agreed to

execute a Gift Deed/forfeit her claim

to 2,52,38,794/- to validate

₹

accounts reflected in the Appellant-

Husband business.

Completed

7.Relinquishment of Properties,

Shares, and Policies: Respondent-

Wife obligated to forfeit her rights and

execute transfer documents/gift

deeds for properties (in Mascot & Neo

Town), LIC/Bajaj Allianz policies, and

company shares (Globe Capital, K.L.

Rathi Steels) back to the Husband.

Pending/Not

Complete

8.Investment in PPF Account & Pending/Not

47

Handover of Passbook: A Sum of

₹4,77,129/- has been invested in the

PPF Account No.

152900PPF00000031787 under the

name of the Respondent-Wife. The

Appellant-Husband was required to

hand over the PPF passbook to the

Wife at the time of recording the

Second Motion

Complete

9.Payment of Second Installment

(Alimony): Appellant-Husband agreed

to pay the remaining balance of

70,22,871/- via Demand Draft at the

₹

time of recording the Second Motion.

Pending/Not

Completed

10.Bar on Future Litigation: Both

parties undertook that neither they

nor their family members would

institute any civil or criminal

proceedings against each other

regarding the matrimonial discord in

the future.

Breached/Not

Completed

DIRECTIONS

55.In the above situation, we pass the following directions:

i.The criminal appeal stands allowed and the

proceedings initiated by the Respondent-Wife

pursuant to DV Complaint No. 3186/2025 are

quashed hereby and the Impugned Order is set aside.

ii.The application filed by the Appellant-Husband under

Article 142(1) for grant of divorce stands allowed and

48

the marriage between the party is dissolved subject to

the terms specified hereunder.

iii.Contempt Case (C) No. 19 of 2026 pending before the

High Court of Delhi filed by the Appellant-Husband

and all consequential proceedings thereto stands

closed.

iv.The Appellant-Husband shall pay the remaining

amount of 70,22,871/- (after deduction of a sum of

₹

4,77,129/- towards PPF Account) and he shall also

₹

handover the passbook of the said PPF Account in the

bank account of the Respondent-Wife within two (2)

weeks from the date of the judgment. In case the

Appellant-Husband fails to comply with the same, the

divorce shall not come into effect.

v.Immediately after the transfer of the amount

mentioned in the preceding clause, on the next

working day, the parties shall appear before the

jurisdictional Registrar to execute all the

relinquishment deeds as agreed between the parties

as per Clause 8(E) of the Settlement Agreement within

49

four (4) weeks from the date of the judgment. If the

Respondent-Wife fails to appear on the said date, the

jurisdictional Registrar shall acknowledge and record

the presence of the parties and the Registrar shall

register such deed in the favour of the Appellant-

Husband on the said date itself and the rights of the

Respondent-Wife would be relinquished.

vi.The amount of 89,00,000 as deposited by the

₹

Respondent-Wife before the High Court of Delhi shall

be returned back to her along with the interest

accrued on the said amount within two (2) weeks

from the date of receipt of the bank details submitted

by the Respondent-Wife to the Registrar General of

the High Court.

vii.All proceedings, civil and criminal, initiated by the

Appellant-Husband or the Respondent-Wife, their

family members, relatives, friends, in relation to or

arising out of such marriage between the parties,

shall stand closed and quashed. In addition to this,

there shall be a complete bar on all future

50

proceedings, either civil or criminal, by the Appellant-

Husband or the Respondent-Wife, their family

members, relatives, friends, on any aspect arising out

of or in relation to the marriage.

viii.A copy of this judgment shall be sent to the Courts

concerned for taking action as per the directions in

this judgment. However, if there is any other case

arising out of the matrimonial dispute, though not

mentioned in the list, but pending, the same shall

also stand disposed of on production of a copy of this

judgment by the parties.

56.Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of.

……………………………J.

(RAJESH BINDAL)

…………………………. J.

(VIJAY BISHNOI)

NEW DELHI,

DATED: 13 APRIL, 2026

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