A Division Bench of this Court, finding it difficult to agree and concur with the observations made in the order dated 01.04.2014 of another Division Bench, vide its order dated 16.04.2014, requested ...
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AFR
RESERVED
Writ Petition No. 2599 (M/B) of 2014
Dinesh Kumar Singh @ Sonu
Vs
State of U.P. & Ors.
Appearance:
For the petitioner: Mr. Digvijai Singh, Advocate
For the respondents:
Mr. Jaideep Narain Mathur, Senior Advocate,
with Mr. Shishir Jain, Advocate, for U.P.
Rajkiya Nirman Nigam Ltd.
Mr. Abhay Veer Singh, AGA, for the State
Hon'ble Dilip B Bhosale, Chief Justice
Hon'ble Devendra Kumar Upadhyaya, J
Hon'ble Rajan Roy, J
(Per Dilip B Bhosale, CJ)
A Division Bench of this Court, finding it difficult to agree and
concur with the observations made in the order dated 01.04.2014 of
another Division Bench, vide its order dated 16.04.2014, requested the
Chief Justice for constituting a larger Bench to hear and decide the writ
petition. The Chief Justice, vide order dated 17.04.2014 constituted a
three-Judge Bench presided over by Sunil Ambwani, J.
2.The Full Bench, vide its order dated 28.04.2014, formulated the
following question on the request and with the assistance of learned
counsel appearing for the parties:
“Whether a Judge of Hon'ble High Court sitting
alone or Judges sitting in a Division Bench hearing
any matter in his/their determination assigned by
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Hon'ble the Chief Justice, can overstep into the
determination of another Bench, if any issue or
question arises in the matter including a question in
public interest, which is not connected to the matter
before him/them, and which in his/their opinion is
necessary to be decided, and further in such case
where in his/their discretion it is necessary to decide
such question, what should be the procedure to be
adopted.”
3.It appears from the order dated 28.04.2014, that the Full Bench also
invited members of the Bar who were interested to assist the Full Bench.
Accordingly, the Oudh Bar Association entered its appearance through its
President and sought time to assist the Court. One Shri Ashok Pande,
Advocate, also made an application, supported by his affidavit, for
intervention. Insofar as the oral request for intervention of the Oudh Bar
Association is concerned, it was allowed. However, it was clarified that
the intervention application of Shri Ashok Pande was not being
considered then. The Full Bench also requested Shri Ashok Pande to
consider the deletion of paragraphs 14 and 15 of his affidavit. Thus, the
matter is now before this Full Bench.
4.It would be relevant and necessary to note the background facts that
occasioned the reference to a Larger Bench. When the writ petition (Writ
Petition No. 2599 of 2014) was placed before the Division Bench
presided over by Sunil Ambwani, J., separate applications, bearing C.M.
Application Nos. 38165 of 2014 and 38166 of 2014 filed by the Uttar
Pradesh Rajkiya Nirman Nigam Limited (for short, 'UPRNN') were also
placed before the Bench, for expunging the remarks/observations made in
the order dated 01.04.2014 passed in the writ petition and for recalling the
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said order, and so also for seeking permission to intervene in the writ
petition. An application, filed by the State of U.P., supported by the
affidavit of Shri Anil Kumar Gupta, Principal Secretary, Department of
Home, Government of Uttar Pradesh, Civil Secretariat, Lucknow, with
similar prayers was also placed before the Court. The Division Bench,
after having gone through the order dated 01.04.2014, passed by another
Division Bench presided over by Uma Nath Singh and Zaki Ullah Khan,
JJ. and after hearing learned counsel for the applicants, found substance in
the contentions urged on their behalf and in paragraphs 5, 6, 7 and 10 of
the order dated 16.04.2014 made the following observations, which
occasioned constitution of the larger Bench which formulated the
aforestated question for its opinion:
“5. We have gone through the order passed by
the Division Bench on 1.4.2014 and find substance in
the contention of Shri Jaideep Mathur that there were
no allegations in the pleadings nor there were any
prayers made in the writ petition with regard to any
larger enquiry to be made, in the matter of
constructions and other financial matters in award of
contracts, relating to construction of the new High
Court building. The writ petition was filed for
quashing the FIR dated 15.3.2014 registered vide
Case Crime No.59 of 2014 under Sections 353, 323,
504, 506 and 427 IPC at Police Station Vibhuti
Khand, District Lucknow and for issuance of a writ of
mandamus restraining the police authorities from
arresting the petitioner. This Court after summoning
the officers of the Metro Rail Corporation, Senior
Superintendent of Police, Managing Director, U.P.
Rajkiya Nirman Nigam Ltd, who had no concern with
the allegations, has made certain observations which
are injurious to reputation of the agency and its
officers. The observations and suggestion of
investigation of the matters relating to allegations
that only such contractors and sub contractors are
being given jobs, who are related to people in
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power, be it executive or judiciary, create strong
ground of suspicion about the quality of
construction of new High Court building as well as
the buildings of subordinate judiciary, already
constructed or are still under construction at
various places in UP, have no connection with the
matter for quashing a FIR which was brought
before the Court.
6. We also do not find that any prayer was
made or any material was available before the
Bench to consider as to whether the investigation
shall be given to any independent agency or the
CBI and further there could be no reason as to why
the orders on such enquiry for which no prayer was
made by any person appearing in the matter were
reserved.
7. We also find that there are some
insinuations and remarks in the order with regard
to Committees of Hon'ble Judges of the Court,
which have been entrusted by Hon'ble the Chief
Justice the task to look after the quality of
constructions.
10. We are of the view that on the facts and
special circumstances placed before us we following
the judicial discipline and traditions of the Court and
the judgment of the Apex Court in State of Uttar
Pradesh and others vs. Neeraj Chaubey and others
(supra) it is appropriate to refer the entire matter to
Hon'ble Chief Justice for constituting a larger bench
to hear and decide the writ petition. The larger bench
may formulate the question as may be necessary to be
decided by it. The registry will place the entire record
of the case before Hon'ble Chief Justice for
appropriate orders, forthwith and latest by tomorrow
for appropriate orders. ”
(emphasis supplied)
5.In view of the above, it becomes relevant to also note and
understand the background against which the order dated 01.10.2014 was
passed. The writ petition was filed by one Dinesh Kumar Singh @ Sonu
for quashment of a First Information Report dated 15.03.2014, registered
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vide Case Crime No. 59 of 2014, under Sections 353, 323, 504, 506 and
427 of the Indian Penal Code at Police Station Vibhuti Khand, District
Lucknow, and for issuance of a writ of mandamus restraining the police
authorities from arresting him. We do not deem it necessary to make
further reference to the FIR and the facts disclosed therein, since that may
not be relevant for addressing the question formulated by the Full Bench
and for expressing our opinion.
6.It appears from the order dated 01.04.2014 that when the writ
petition was placed before the very same Division Bench on 31.03.2014,
learned counsel for the parties had submitted that the allegations related to
the demand of bribe by a Junior Engineer of the UPRNN, a government
construction agency, which had also been assigned the job of construction
of a new High Court building at Lucknow and buildings of the
subordinate Courts at various places in the State. It was, therefore, urged
that the entire matter be enquired into by an independent agency under the
supervision of that Bench (Uma Nath Singh and Zaki Ullah Khan, JJ).
The Division Bench in the order dated 01.04.2014, referring to several
orders passed in Writ Petition No. 10089 of 2010 (MB) (PIL) [Oudh Bar
Association of High Court, Lucknow Bench Lucknow Vs. State of U.P. &
Ors.] and after noticing the order passed in the instant writ petition on
31.03.2014, observed thus:
“Now, towards our aforesaid order dated
31.3.2014, Shri Rajiv Agarwal, Managing Director,
Lucknow, Metro Rail Corporation, Shri Pravin Kumar,
Senior Superintendent of Police, Lucknow, Managing
Director, U.P. Rajkiya Nirman Nigam Ltd., the
petitioner as well as Junior Engineer Shri Rajendra
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Yadav and Station Officer, Police Station Vibhuti
Khand, are present in Court.
It is submitted on behalf of the State that the
impugned F.I.R. has been registered on the complaint
of Junior Engineer, Rajendra Singh Yadav against the
petitioner, who is a sub-contractor. Instead of passing
any direction for investigation by any other agency,
the Senior Superintendent of Police, Lucknow, may be
directed to look into the correctness of cross
allegations and submit a report. The U.P. Rajkiya
Nirman Nigam, is headed by Shri R.N.Yadav,
Managing Director, who states that Sri Rajendra Singh
Yadav, Junior Engineer, against whom there is
allegation of demand of bribe is presently under
transfer from this project and till the investigation is
completed, he may not be assigned any job.
In the facts and circumstances set out
hereinabove, particularly, repeated assertion on
affidavit as well as in complaint by the petitioner that
30 % amount of the payment due is being demanded
as kick back to clear the bills and the Infrastructure
Committee of the High Court, which alone is
supervising the construction works is also feeling
disgusted with the allegations of rampant corruption in
the construction works of New High Court building
and subordinate Courts premises throughout the State
by the State Construction Agencies, we do not think
that any useful purpose will be served by handing
over the investigation to the local police …
Further, there is also a lot of murmuring
among the Judges of High Court, who have local
roots about corruption, undue favour in giving
contracts/sub contracts and kick back etc.
Moreover, as it also appears from the
complaint of petitioner that the U.P.Rajkiya
Nirman Nigam, through its Engineering Wing is
also fostering and promoting mafias, apart from
indulging in corruption with impunity, we think it
expedient to consider the submissions that such
matter may require thorough investigation.
Besides, the allegations that only such Contractors
and sub-contractors are being given jobs, who are
related to people in power, be it executive or
judiciary, also create strong ground of suspicion
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about the quality of construction of new High
Court building as well as the buildings of
subordinate judiciary, already constructed or are
still under construction at various places in U.P.
As noticed hereinabove, since the Engineers
are also claiming patronage of the State
Government in earning illegal money, this Court
may have no option but to consider as to whether
the investigation should be given to C.B.I. to find
out the veracity of allegations as well as other areas
where the funds allocated for construction of High
Court buildings and buildings of subordinate
courts in the State have been illegally utilized or
diverted for private/personal use like the one
relating to construction and maintenance of
private buildings of persons, presently, directly or
indirectly, positioned in the helm of affairs.
Thus, we stay the arrest of petitioner in the
aforesaid case crime.
However, looking to serious consequence and
fall out that might follow if we direct inquiry by SIT
or CBI or any other independent agency into the
alleged demand of bribe, passing of kick backs,
diversion of funds, high payment, pilferage of
construction materials and showing favours in the
engagement of Contractor/sub contractors or suppliers
of materials etc. etc. relating to new High Court
building and other buildings of subordinate courts, we
think it appropriate and thus reserve the order on the
question of investigation by C.B.I. or any other
independent agency.”
(emphasis supplied)
7.Having noticed the observations made in the order dated
01.04.2014 by the Division Bench presided over by Uma Nath Singh, J.,
the Division Bench presided over by Sunil Ambwani, J., in the reference
order dated 16.04.2014, after having noticed the judgment of the Supreme
Court in State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. Vs. Neeraj Chaubey & Ors.,
(2010) 10 SCC 320 and the Full Bench judgment of this Court in Smt.
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Maya Dixit Vs. State of U.P. & Ors., [2010 (83) ALR 664], made a
reference to the Full Bench.
In this backdrop, we would straightaway like to refer to the
judgment of the Supreme Court in Neeraj Chaubey (supra) and the
judgment of the Full Bench of this Court in Maya Dixit (supra). We shall
also refer to other judgments which, in our opinion, squarely cover the
question formulated by the Full Bench for opinion and which, in our
opinion, deserves to be answered in the negative.
8.In Maya Dixit, the Full Bench among others also considered the
question, whether a Bench conferred/assigned a particular work in terms
of Chapter V of the Allahabad High Court Rules, can hear matters
assigned to another Bench, and in paragraphs 17 and 17-A, observed thus:
“17. From the law as earlier quoted, it would be
clear that the Division Bench assigned with a
particular work can only do the work assigned and
cannot do the work assigned to another Division
Bench even in respect of earlier matter which it was
hearing when the Chief Justice had assigned work to
that Bench to take up the matter. After the
assignment has changed, unless specifically ordered the
previous Bench cannot hear the matter. Even in respect
of tied up matters, in terms of the rule quoted above, the
matter may ordinarily be laid before the same Bench for
disposal. The expression "ordinarily" would mean that
the authority empowered to assigning matters must
exercise that power to place the matter before the
Bench, which earlier had heard the matter. This can be
done in individual cases or by a general order. This rule
is based on the principle that a Bench having
substantially heard the matter and spent valuable
judicial time, must be allowed to ordinarily hear and
dispose of the matter. This power, therefore, could only
be exercised by the Chief Justice who constitutes the
Benches and not by the Registry of the Court, nor can a
Bench hold that it can proceed with the matter as a part
heard matter.
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17.A. The order of the learned Bench in Noor
Mohammad (supra) dated 06.03.2009 was the subject-
matter of an SLP, which was disposed of on 06.04.2009
and a further clarification was issued on 28.08.2009,
which reads as under:-
"An application has been filed seeking
clarification of our order dated 6.4.2009. By
the said order the SLP filed by the petitioner
was dismissed. While dismissing the SLP, we
did not hold that the matter before the High
Court was a PIL. We only stated that if the
writ petition had been converted into a PIL
by the impugned order, the Registry will do
the needful by placing the matter before
appropriate Bench dealing with PILs as per
rules and guidelines. If the order of the High
Court did not convert the writ petition into a
PIL then obviously the said observation will
not apply. If there was any doubt regarding
posting, the matter ought to be placed before
learned Chief Justice of the High Court. With
the said observation, I.A. No.3 is disposed
of."
Thus, this would make it clear that even if a
Bench was hearing a matter assigned to it as per the
assignment and if in the course of hearing it proceeds
to consider reliefs not sought in the petition, but
which will fall within the PIL jurisdiction, then the
Bench is bound to direct the Registry to place the
matter before the learned Chief Justice for
appropriate directions or before the appropriate
P.I.L Bench. In other words, if that Bench is not
assigned PIL work, it cannot proceed to hear the
matter.”
(emphasis supplied)
9.In Neeraj Chaubey (supra), the Supreme Court considered the
matter relating to the new building of the High Court at Lucknow. The
matter before the Supreme Court arose from the orders dated 16.07.2010
and 25.08.2010 passed in Writ Petition No. 1872 of 1986. While dealing
with the impugned orders on merit, the Supreme Court also observed that
“we are concerned about the procedure adopted by the Division Bench
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issuing such directions in an unconnected matter treating it as a PIL and
keeping the issue before the same Bench.” It appears that the Division
Bench, vide order dated 16.07.2010, had directed the State Government to
submit a status report about sanctioning of funds for construction of new
High Court Building Complex at Gomti Nagar, Lucknow. Having noticed
those directions, the Supreme Court also observed that directions
regarding construction of a new High Court building and early sanction of
required funds for execution of the work cannot be faulted, and having so
observed, made the observation as aforementioned, that the procedure
adopted by the Division Bench issuing such directions in an unconnected
matter treating it as a PIL was not proper. The observations made by the
Supreme Court in paragraphs 9 and 10 which are relevant for our purpose,
read thus:
“9. The High Court had taken note of various
judgments of this Court including State of
Mahasashtra v. Narayan Shamrao Puranik
1
, Inder
Mani v. Matheshwari Prasad
2
, State of Rajasthan v.
Prakash Chand
3
, R. Rathinam v. State
4
and Jasbir
Singh v. State of Punjab
5
and various judgments of the
High Courts and came to the conclusion that the Chief
Justice is the master of roster. The Chief Justice has
full power, authority and jurisdiction in the matter of
allocation of business of the High Court which flows
not only from the provisions contained in sub-section
(3) of Section 51 of the States Reorganisation Act,
1956, but inheres in him in the very nature of things.
The Chief Justice enjoys a special status and he
alone can assign work to a Judge sitting alone and
to the Judges sitting in Division Bench or Full
Bench. He has jurisdiction to decide which case
1(1982) 2 SCC 440 : AIR 1982 SC 1198
2(1996) 6 SCC 587
3(1998) 1 SCC 1
4(2000) 2 SCC 391 : 2000 SCC (Crl) 958
5(2006) 8 SCC 294 : (2006) 3 SCC (Crl) 470
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will be heard by which Bench. If the Judges were
free to choose their jurisdiction or any choice was
given to them to do whatever case they may like to
hear and decide, the machinery of the Court would
collapse and the judicial work of the Court would
cease by generation of internal strife on account of
hankering for a particular jurisdiction or a
particular case. The Court held that a Judge or a
Bench of Judges can assume jurisdiction in a case
pending in the High Court only if the case is allotted
to him or them by the Chief Justice. Strict adherence
of this procedure is essential for maintaining judicial
discipline and proper functioning of the Court. No
departure from this procedure is permissible.
10. In case an application is filed and the
Bench comes to the conclusion that it involves
some issues relating to public interest, the Bench
may not entertain it as a public interest litigation
but the court has its option to convert it into a
public interest litigation and ask the Registry to
place it before a Bench which has jurisdiction to
entertain the PIL as per the Rules, guidelines or by
the roster fixed by the Chief Justice but the Bench
cannot convert itself into a PIL and proceed with
the matter itself.”
(emphasis supplied)
10.In Kishore Samrite Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., (2013) 2
SCC 398, the Supreme Court, while dealing with a somewhat similar
controversy, after referring to the judgment in Neeraj Chaubey, in
paragraph 29 observed thus:
“29. Judicial discipline and propriety are the two
significant facets of administration of justice. Every
court is obliged to adhere to these principles to ensure
hierarchical discipline on the one hand and proper
dispensation of justice on the other. Settled canons of
law prescribe adherence to the rule of law with due
regard to the prescribed procedures. Violation thereof
may not always result in invalidation of the judicial
action but normally it may cast a shadow of improper
exercise of judicial discretion. Where extraordinary
jurisdiction, like the writ jurisdiction, is very vast
in its scope and magnitude, there it imposes a
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greater obligation upon the courts to observe due
caution while exercising such powers. This is to
ensure that the principles of natural justice are not
violated and there is no occasion of impertinent
exercise of judicial discretion.”
(emphasis supplied)
11.In State of Rajasthan Vs. Prakash Chand & Ors., (1998) 1 SCC
1, a three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court, dealt with the requirement
of constitution of Benches, issuance of daily cause list and the powers of
the Chief Justice in terms of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949
read with Article 225 of the Constitution of India. After considering the
relevant provisions of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 and
Article 225 of the Constitution, the Supreme Court has drawn the
following conclusions:
“(1) That the administrative control of the High
Court vests in the Chief Justice alone. On the judicial
side, however, he is only the first amongst the equals.
(2) That the Chief Justice is the master of the
roster. He alone has the prerogative to constitute
benches of the court and allocate cases to the benches
so constituted.
(3) That the puisne Judges can only do that
work as is allotted to them by the Chief Justice or
under his directions.
(4) That till any determination made by the
Chief Justice lasts, no Judge who is to sit singly can
sit in a Division Bench and no Division Bench can be
split up by the Judges constituting the Bench
themselves and one or both the Judges constituting
such bench sit singly and take up any other kind of
judicial business not otherwise assigned to them by or
under the directions of the Chief Justice.”
12.This Court in Prof. Y.C. Simhadri, Vice Chancellor, B.H.U. &
Ors. Vs. Deen Bandhu Pathak, Student, 2001 (4) AWC 2688, after
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considering Rule 1 of Chapter V of the Allahabad High Court Rules, in
paragraphs 16, 17 and 18 observed thus:
“16. Thus, the following principles emerge from the
foregoing discussions:
(1) The administrative control of the High
Court vests in the Chief Justice alone and it is his
prerogative to distribute business of the High
Court both judicial and administrative.
(2) The Chief Justice alone has the right and
power to decide how the Benches of the High
Court are to be constituted : which Judge is to sit
alone and which cases he can and is required to
hear as also which Judges shall constitute a
Division Bench and what work those Benches
shall do.
(3) The puisne Judges can only do that work
which is allotted to them by the Chief Justice or
under his directions. No Judge or a Bench of
Judges can assume jurisdiction in a case pending
in the High Court unless the case is allotted to him
or them by the Chief Justice.
(4) Any order which a Bench or a single
Judge may choose to make a case that is not
placed before them or him by the Chief Justice or
in accordance with his direction is an order
without jurisdiction and void.
(5) Contempt jurisdiction is an independent
jurisdiction of original nature whether emanating
from the Contempt of Courts Act or under Article
215 of the Constitution of India.
(6) For exercising the jurisdiction under
Article 215 of the Constitution of India, the
procedure prescribed by law has to be followed.
17. It appears that on 26.3.2001, when the learned
Judge passed the said order, he was allotted and assigned
the determination with regard to the following matters by
the Chief Justice as appears from the printed cause list:
"Fresh writs in educational matters (except
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service writs) for orders, admission and hearing
and all single Judge writ-C for order, admission
and hearing including bunch cases".
The learned Judge on the face of the record,
therefore, had no determination assigned to him by the
Chief Justice with regard to the matters relating to
contempt and the said jurisdiction had been assigned to
another Hon'ble single Judge.
18. In view of the rule as already noted that the
power to constitute Benches and allotment of work to
the learned Judges vests absolutely in the Chief
Justice and the Rules 1, 6 and 17 of Chapter V and
Rule 2 of Chapter VIII of the Allahabad High Court
Rules also clearly provide for the same. In that view of
the matter, the order passed by the learned single
Judge in the instant case appears to us to be without
jurisdiction and void."
(emphasis supplied)
13.The legal position that emerges from the above judgments, is that
the roster and placing of cases before different Benches of the High Court
is unquestionably the prerogative of the Chief Justice of the High Court.
In the absence of the Chief Justice, the seniormost Judge may pass
directions in regard to the roster of the Judges and listing of cases.
Primarily, it is the exclusively prerogative of the Chief Justice and does
not admit of any ambiguity or doubt in this regard. A Judge of the High
Court can sit alone or in Division Benches and do such work only as may
be allotted to him by an order of or in accordance with the directions of
the Chief Justice. As observed in Prakash Chand (supra), it is not within
the the competence or domain of any Judge sitting alone or in Division
Bench to give any direction to the Registry in that behalf which may run
contrary to the directions of the Chief Justice. Therefore, in the scheme of
things, judicial discipline demands that in the event a Single Judge or a
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Division Bench considers that a particular case requires to be listed before
it for valid reasons, it should direct the Registry to obtain appropriate
orders from the Chief Justice. The puisne Judges are not expected to
entertain any request from the Advocates of the parties for listing of a
case which does not strictly fall within the determined roster. In such
cases, it is appropriate to direct the counsel to make a mention before the
Chief Justice and obtain appropriate orders. This is undoubtedly essential
for the smooth functioning of the Court. In other words, if a Bench was
hearing a matter assigned to it as per the assignment and if, in the course
of hearing, it proceeds to consider reliefs not sought in the petition but
which would fall within the PIL jurisdiction, then the Bench is bound to
direct the Registry to place the matter before the Chief Justice for
appropriate directions or before the appropriate PIL Bench and, in any
case, it cannot proceed to hear the matter which is not assigned to it, as
observed by the Full Bench in Maya Dixit.
14.In the present case, the Division Bench was dealing with a writ
petition that was filed only for quashment of an FIR and, therefore, the
scope was limited. The Division Bench, in our opinion, traveled beyond
the scope of the writ petition and not only passed orders which were not
within its determined roster but made unnecessary and unwarranted
observations against those who were not even parties to the petition. The
Division Bench virtually converted the writ petition for quashment of an
FIR under Article 226 of the Constitution read with Section 482 of the
Criminal Procedure Code, into a PIL when an independent PIL was
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pending before this Court wherein such questions could have been raised.
In our opinion, the Bench, whether it is a Single Judge or a Division
Bench, should observe some restraint while making observations, of the
nature as made in the order dated 01.04.2014, which are wholly
unconnected with the subject matter of the petition, in the nature of
insinuations and/or remarks/observations against unconnected parties and
the prayers made in the petition.
15.In the circumstances, we hold that a Judge of the High Court
sitting alone or Judges sitting in a Division Bench, hearing any matter in
his/their determination assigned by the Chief Justice, cannot overstep into
the determination of another Judge sitting alone or in a Division Bench. If
any such issue or question arises in the matter including a question in
public interest which is not connected with the matter before him/them
and which in his/their opinion is necessary to be decided, in that situation
the only option open to the learned Judge or the Division Bench is to
direct the Registry to place the matter before the Chief Justice for
appropriate directions or before the appropriate PIL Bench and, in any
case, should not convert such a writ petition into a PIL. The question is,
thus, answered accordingly in the negative.
16.It is not in dispute that during the pendency of the reference, a
charge sheet has been filed against the accused petitioner – Dinesh Kumar
Singh @ Sonu bearing Chargesheet No. 33 of 2014 on 14.04.2014 in Case
Crime No. 59 of 2014, registered at Police Station Vibhuti Khand,
Lucknow. In view thereof, it was submitted by leaned counsel for the
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State that the writ petition deserves to be disposed of as rendered
infructuous, may be with liberty to the petitioner to take appropriate
remedy if he so desires or to face trial. Mr. Digvijai Singh, learned
counsel for the petitioner could not and did not dispute the submission
made on behalf of the State and submitted that all contentions of the
petitioner may be kept open to be raised in appropriate proceedings. In the
circumstances, we dispose of the writ petition also as rendered
infructuous.
17.Insofar as the application filed by Ashok Pande for intervention in
the writ petition is concerned, we reject the same outright for more than
one reason. Firstly, he has absolutely no locus to address the Full Bench
on merits of the writ petition, and secondly because he has refused to
delete paragraphs 14 and 15 of his affidavit which the Division Bench
vide order dated 28.04.2014 had directed him to consider. It would be
relevant to reproduce those paragraphs so as to demonstrate that Mr.
Ashok Pande has been wholly irresponsible and callous in his assertions.
This, we note, is apart from the fact that this Court has observed, time and
again, that he is in a habit of making unfounded and reckless allegations
not only against the judiciary but against any person:
“14. That in view of it the constitution of the
three judges bench to hear this matter is highly illegal
and unconstitutional. This amounts to indictment,
insult and misbehavior with the Sri Uma Nath and Sri
Zaki Ulla. Though the Chief Justice is master of the
roster but that does not give an authority to the Chief
Justice to insult and misbehave the good, honest, bold
judges.
15. That one more fact the applicant intends to
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bring on the record of the matter is that a friend of
mine Sri R.N.S. Chauhan advocate who is also a close
friend of Sri Imtiaz Murtaza J. informed me that some
contractor approached him with a offer of 25 lakh
rupees in case he is able to manage a contract in his
favor with the Ashirvad/blessing of Sri Imtiaz
Murtaza J. Sri R.N.S. Chauhan denied the offer but
even then later on he was informed that the same
person has got the contract. This shows that the
contractors are moving around the High Court, the
resident of the judges and the resident of their nears
and dears with huge money for getting the contract.
The question is why the judges are so involved in the
award of contract? Whether it is judges work or it is
work of the bureaucracy? The bribe which was
offered to Mr. R.N.S. Chauhan Advocate went to
whom? How many such more contracts were awarded
and who received the bribe? On whose
recommendations and directions the contract of Civil
Court and High Court building are being awarded?”
18.When we commenced hearing, we once again requested Mr. Pande
to consider the deletion of paragraphs 14 and 15 of his affidavit but he
refused to do so. Further, he repeatedly made an attempt to make
submissions in support of the observations made in the order dated
01.04.2014 and on the merits of the writ petition, and did not make any
submission on the question formulated for the opinion of this Bench. In
the circumstances, we reject his application for intervention on this
ground as also on the ground that he advanced no submissions on the
merits of the reference and continued to only repeat the allegations, as
made in the aforesaid paragraphs 14 and 15.
19.The request made by Mr. J.N. Mathur, learned Senior Counsel
appearing for UPRNN, that an action needs to be taken against Mr. Pande,
who is appearing in person, for making irresponsible, baseless, reckless
and unfounded allegations in paragraphs 14 and 15 of his affidavit, either
19
for having committed criminal contempt of this Court and/or to restrain
him from entering the precincts of this Court at Lucknow and at
Allahabad in exercise of the powers under Rule 11 falling in Chapter
XXIV of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952, is kept open to be
considered at an appropriate stage.
January 5, 2017
AHA
(Dilip B Bhosale, CJ)
(D K Upadhyaya, J)
(Rajan Roy, J)
20
Writ Petition No. 2599 (M/B) of 2014
Dinesh Kumar Singh @ Sonu Vs State of U.P. & Ors.
Hon'ble Dilip B Bhosale, Chief Justice
Hon'ble Devendra Kumar Upadhyaya, J
Hon'ble Rajan Roy, J
Re: C.M. Application No. NIL of 2014 dated 28.04.2014 filed by Shri
Asok Pande for intervention
Rejected.
For orders, see order of date passed on the writ petition.
January 5, 2017
AHA
(Dilip B Bhosale, CJ)
(D K Upadhyaya, J)
(Rajan Roy, J)
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