( 1 ) CRA 196 2025

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

BENCH AT AURANGABAD

CIVIL REVISION APPLICATION NO. 196 OF 2025

Dipak Chandrabhan Gadhade/Gavande,

Age : 42 years, Occu :Agri.,

R/o : Kaudgaon Athre,

Tq. Pathardi, Dist.: Ahmednagar. ...APPLICANT

VERSUS

1.The State of Maharashtra

Through its Collector, Ahmednagar,

Collector office, Ahmednagar.

2.The Tahsildar,

Tahsil Office, Pathardi,

Dist- Ahmednagar.

3.The Circle officer,

Karanji, Tal- Pathardi,

Dist- Ahmednagar.

4.Bhimraj Nana Barde,

Age : 60 years, Occu : Agri.

5.Adinath Bhanudas Gadhade/Gavande.

Age : 40 years, Occu : Agri.

6.Balasaheb Bhika Shinde,

Age_ 52 years, Occu- Agril,

Res. No.4 to 6 R/o : Kaudgaon Athre,

Tq. Pathardi, Dist.: Ahmednagar. RESPONDENTS

(Res. No. 4 to 6

Original Plaintiffs)

7.Bhanudas Dhondiba Gadhade/Gawande,

Age- 64 years, Occu- Agril,

8.Lilabai Ramdas Umbare,

Age- 64 years, Occu- Agril, 2026:BHC-AUG:6216

( 2 ) CRA 196 2025

9.Zumbarbai Suryabhan Thorat,

Age- 65 years, Occu- Agril,

R/o Kasar Pimpalgaon, Tal- Pathardi,

Dist. Ahmednagar.

10.Macchindra Nana Barde,

Age- 65 years, Occu- Agril,

11.Rangubai Shripati Mali,

Age- 66 yrs, Occu- Agril,

12.Gahininath Rama Shirsath,

Age- 60 years, Occu- Agril,

13.Mirabai Karbhari Shirsath,

Age- 65 years, Occu- Agril,

14.Sonaji Nana Barde,

Age- 65 years, Occu- Agril,

Res. No.6 to 7 & 9 to 14 R/o : Kaudgaon Athre,

Tq. Pathardi, Dist.: Ahmednagar. ….RESPONDENTS

(Original Defendants)

Shri. Jiwan J. Patil, Advocate h/f. Shri. R. S. Kasar, Advocate for

Applicant

Shri. S. V. Hange, AGP for Respondent Nos.1 to 3

Mrs. Suvarna M. Zaware, Advocate for Respondent Nos.4 to 6

CORAM :SHAILESH P. BRAHME, J.

RESERVED DATE :03.02.2026

PRONOUNCED DATE:12.02.2026

JUDGMENT :-

1. Heard both sides finally.

( 3 ) CRA 196 2025

2. Applicants are challenging order below Exhibit-19 passed

on 30.07.2025 refusing to reject the plaint in Regular Civil Suit No.525

of 2024. The suit was filed by respondent nos.4 to 6 for declaration

that the order dated 15.02.2023 passed in Rasta Case No.24 of 2020

by the Tahsildar is bad in law.

3. Applicants – defendants sought rejection of plaint vide

application Exhibit-19 on the ground of maintainability of the suit

under Section 143 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966

(hereinafter referred to as ‘the Code’) and that the suit is barred by

limitation in view of Section 143(4) of the Code. It was contested by

respondent nos.4 to 6. The application is rejected by the impugned

order.

4. Mr. Jiwan J. Patil, learned counsel appearing for the

applicants submits that the suit for challenging order dated

15.02.2023 in Rasta Case No.24 of 2020 is not tenable as recourse to

remedy of RTS Appeal no.79 of 2023 was being taken. It is submitted

that the remedies provided by the Code under Section 143 of the Code

are mutually exclusive. It is further submitted that the suit has not

been filed within one year from the date of the order of Tahsildar

( 4 ) CRA 196 2025

which is barred by Section 143(4) of the Code. It is submitted that the

judgment of the Coordinate Bench in Jarasand s/o Suryabhan Borkar

vs. Bhagwat s/o Suryakant Kale and Others in Civil Revision

Application No.146 of 2022 is distinguishable on facts and will not

help the respondent.

5. Per contra, Ms. Suvarna Zaware, learned counsel for

respondent nos.4 to 6 would submit that it is not the limitation

provided under Section 143(4) that would apply, but the suit is

governed by Article 58 and 113 of the Limitation Act, 1963. She would

submit that the limitation would start from the date of the order of the

Appellate Authority and it is recurring. It is further submitted that it is

the choice of the party either to prefer the appeal under the Code or to

file the suit. It cannot be said that there is no cause of action and the

suit is not tenable. It is further submitted that respondent nos.2 to 4

have no any other remedy available and they are bonafide prosecuting

their suit. It is further submitted that in view of Section 14 of the

Limitation Act, 1963, the period during which RTS Appeal No.79 of

2023 remained pending needs to be excluded.

( 5 ) CRA 196 2025

6. The controversy between the litigating sides pertains to

the easement to approach their respective lands. The applicant is the

owner of land bearing Gat No.106 and the respondents – plaintiffs are

the occupants of Gat Nos.120, 121 and 122 situated at Kaudgaon

Athare. The applicant had filed Rasta Case No.24 of 2020 under

Section 143 of the Code before the Tahsildar. His application was

allowed on merits, vide judgment dated 15.02.2023 holding that he

was having easement and the same shall not be obstructed by the

respondent – plaintiff. Being aggrieved, RTS Appeal No.79 of 2023 was

preferred before the Sub-Divisional Officer. Application Exhibit-5 was

rejected by the Appellate Authority on 10.06.2024. Later on, the

respondents withdrew the appeal on 20.08.2024.

7. In this backdrop, respondent nos.4 to 6 have filed Regular

Civil Suit No.525 of 2024 on 28.06.2024, challenging the order dated

15.02.2023 passed by the Tahsildar in Rasta Case No.24 of 2020. The

suit was not immediately filed after the adjudication by the Tahsildar.

8. It is relevant to refer to Section 143 of the Code which is

as follows :

“143.Right of way over boundaries.

(1) The Tahsildar may inquire into and decide claims by

( 6 ) CRA 196 2025

persons holding land in a survey number to a right of way

over the boundaries of other survey numbers.

(2) In deciding such claims, the Tahsildar shall have regard

to the needs of cultivators for reasonable access to their

field.

(3) The Tahsildar’s decision under this Section shall, subject

to the provisions of sub-sections (4) and (5), be subject to

appeal and revision in accordance with the provisions of this

Code.

(4) Any person who is aggrieved by a decision of the

Tahsildar under this Section may, within a period of one year

from the date of such decision, institute a civil suit to have it

set aside or modified.

(5) Where a civil suit has been instituted under sub-section

(4) against the Tahsildar’s decision, such decision shall not

be subject to appeal or revision.”

9. The remedy of the appeal under the Code is provided by

Section 247, as per Schedule E of the Code. The orders passed by the

Tahsildar under sub-section (3) are susceptible to the appeal and

revision. A plain reading of Section 143 of the Code indicates that the

order of the Tahsildar can simultaneously be challenged by filing civil

suit. Once recourse is taken to the civil suit, it is impermissible to

fallback to the provisions of sub-section (3) to have recourse to remedy

of appeal under Section 247 of the Code.

10. In the present matter, the crucial question is as to whether

the plaintiffs, having taken recourse to the remedy of appeal under

( 7 ) CRA 196 2025

Section 247, can take recourse to filing of the suit against the order of

the Tahsildar. The wording of sub-section (4) shows that the decision

of the Tahsildar is susceptible to the remedy of the civil suit. Had it

been the intention of the legislature to permit the aggrieved person to

file a suit even after the decision rendered by the Appellate and

Revisional Authority, the wordings “decision of the Tahsildar” would

not have appeared in sub-section (4). Sub-section (5) prohibits

recourse to appeal and revision, once a party approaches the Civil

Court against the Tahsildar’s decision. The emphasis remains on the

Tahsildar’s decision.

11. My attention is adverted by Mr. Jiwan Patil, learned

counsel for the applicant to the judgment of State of Rajasthan vs.

Union of India and Ors. reported in 2018(12) SCC 83 to buttress the

doctrine of election when two remedies are provided for litigant. It’s

paragraph no.3 is as follows :

“3.After hearing the arguments of the learned counsel

for the parties, we find substance in the aforesaid

submission of the defendants. Even if we presume that the

suit was maintainable, at the same time the plaintiff also

had remedy of filing the statutory appeals etc. by agitating

the matter under the Finance Act. It chose to avail the

remedy under the Finance Act. The Doctrine of Election

would, therefore, become applicable in a case like this. After

( 8 ) CRA 196 2025

choosing one particular remedy the plaintiff cannot avail

the other remedy as well, in respect of the same relief

founded on same cause of action.”

12. Further reliance is placed on the matter of Jagannath

Ramu Mane & Ors vs. Shree Ram Bharma Bandgar & Ors. in Writ

Petition No.6340 of 2022 dated 30.11.2023. The facts are more akin to

the present case. The remedies provided under Section 143 of the

Code for the aggrieved party against the order of Tahsildar are

mutually exclusive. Following paragraphs are relevant :

“16.On perusal of Chapter IV of M.L.R.C., it appears that

the authority under the said Code is conferred the power of

fixation and demarcation of boundaries. Section 143 of

M.L.R.C. confers power to Tahsildar to decide claims by

persons holding land in a survey number to a right of way

over the boundaries of other survey numbers. Sub-section

(2) of Section 143 of the Code confers the power of

Tahsildar to decide the rationale claims having regard to the

needs of cultivators for reasonable access to their fields. Sub-

Section (3) of Section 143 of the Code states that such

adjudication by the Tahsildar shall, subject to the provisions

of sub-Sections (4) and (5), be subject to appeal and

revision in accordance with the provisions of this Code. Sub-

Section (4) confers the right of the aggrieved person to

institute a suit against the decision of Tahsildar within one

year from the date of such decision. Sub-Section (5) takes

away the right of the aggrieved person to institute the

appeal once the suit is decided as per sub-Section (4).

17.On a conjoint reading of the entire Section 143 of

M.L.R.C., it appears that the provision, in express words,

lays down one remedy to the exclusion of the other,

( 9 ) CRA 196 2025

therefore, the party could resort to one of them at his

option. Concurrent remedies are available before different

authorities for the same purpose.

18.Where a person has a right to choose between two

remedies that are not co-existent but alternative and he

adopts one of those remedies, his Act immediately operates

as a bar as regards the other and the bar is final and

absolute. When two remedies are offered by a statute for the

challenging validity of the order, they may be held to the

alternatives if the two remedies are inconsistent with each

other or if the cause of action is exhausted by resorting to

one of them and obtaining satisfaction so that nothing

remains to be enforced by the other remedy.

21.The person aggrieved by the decision of the Tahsildar

has two remedies: first, to challenge the decision of the

Tahsildar by way of appeal under Section 247 of M.L.R.C., or

second, to file a civil suit against the decision of the

Tahsildar under Sub-Section (4) is explicit in its language

which makes the decision of Tahsildar subject to the civil

suit. The two options available to the aggrieved person are

mutually exclusive. Once the person exercises one option, he

is not entitled to exercise the remaining option. The

aggrieved person can challenge in the civil suit Tahsildar’s

order or can file an appeal against the decision of Tahsildar.

Once such a person files an appeal and the Appellate

Authority decides such appeal on merits, the decision of

Tahsildar merges with the decision of the Sub Divisional

Officer (Appellate Authority). Once such a merger occurs,

Tahsildar’s decision is no longer available for challenge in a

civil suit. The rights conferred under sub-Section (4) of

Section 143 of M.L.R.C. are restricted to challenge the

decision of Tahsildar. Therefore, the civil suit challenging the

decision of the Sub Divisional Officer is not maintainable as

the aggrieved person has a remedy provided under the

statute to ventilate his grievance.”

( 10 ) CRA 196 2025

13. It can be said from the ratio laid down above that once

the Tahsildar’s decision merges into the order of Sub Divisional Officer,

the remedy of the suit is not available. There is a room to argue that in

the present case, the appeal before the Sub Divisional Officer was

withdrawn and therefore the suit can be said to be maintainable. But

the next judgment clarifies the position. The applicant has relied on

Sanjay Kerba Kadam and Anr. vs. Manchak Kondiba Kadam and Ors in

Civil Revision Application No.126 of 2022 dated 08.03.2023.

Following are the relevant extracts :

“6.Perusal of Section 143(5) of the Code states that

where a civil suit has been instituted under sub-section (4)

against the Tahsildar’s decision, such decision shall not be

subject to appeal or revision. Sub-section (4) provides that

any person, who is aggrieved by a decision of the Tahsildar

under this section may, within a period of one year from the

date of such decision, institute a civil suit to have it set aside

or modified. Section 247 of the Code provides for another

remedy i.e., an appeal may be preferred before the

competent Revenue Authority. It is thus, clear that

whichever remedy is availed that can only be taken to its

logical end by following further permissible remedies.

7.As admitted in the present case the order passed by

the Tahsildar has been taken exception by filing Appeal

under Section 247 of the Code. Thus, suit filed for challenge

to the order of Tahsildar may not be maintainable. The

question however arises in this case as to the application of

Order VII, Rule 11 when the entire plaint cannot be rejected,

on that ground.”

( 11 ) CRA 196 2025

In the present case, the respondent – plaintiff once chosen a

remedy under the Code should have been taken to its logical end

instead of withdrawing appeal from the Sub Divisional Officer. In the

present case also, the plaint is liable to be rejected as the suit is not

maintainable.

14. Mrs. Zaware, learned counsel for respondent nos.4 to 6

seeks to rely on the judgment of Jarasand (supra) passed by the

coordinate bench. Interestingly, the learned Single Judge did not

consider earlier judgment of learned Single Judge in case of Jagannath

(supra). Section 29 of the Limitation Act, 1963 has also not been taken

into account. The facts are distinguishable from the present case. In

the present case, only relief of declaration is sought. Another relief is

in the form of interim relief of temporary injunction. The observations

rendered by learned Single Judge in the matter of Sanjay Kadam

(supra) have not been considered albeit it was cited before the Court.

Hence, the decision will not help the respondent.

15. Once it is held that the limitation provided under the

general law of limitation is not applicable in view of the limitation

provided in the special statute, Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963

( 12 ) CRA 196 2025

also cannot be pressed into service. Otherwise also, any delay in

preferring the suit cannot be condoned by invoking Sections 5 to 14 of

the Limitation Act.

16. Learned counsel for respondent nos.4 to 6 has referred to

the judgment of Adani Power Ltd. And Another vs. Union of India and

Others reported in 2026 SCC Online SC 11. No arguments were

advanced as to how the said judgment would enure to the benefit of

the respondents. I find that facts are totally different. This judgment

does not support the respondents. Further reliance is placed on the

judgment of Kirpal Singh vs. Government of India, New Delhi and Ors

reported in 2025(2)ALD 165. The issue before the Supreme Court was

in respect of exclusion of the time under Section 14 of the Limitation

Act, 1963 while filing objections under Arbitration and Conciliation

Act, 1996. The said judgment is distinguishable on facts. It will not

help the respondents.

17. A useful reference can be made to the decision of the

Supreme Court in the matter of Prof. Sumer Chand vs. Union of India

and Others reported in (1994) 1 Supreme Court Cases 64. The

relevant extracts are as follows :

( 13 ) CRA 196 2025

“6. The first contention that has been urged by Shri Wad is

that Section 140 of the Act is in the nature of a general

provision governing all suits in respect of offences or wrongs

alleged to have been done by a police officer, and Article 74

of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, which prescribes the

period of limitation for suits for compensation for a

malicious prosecution, is in the nature of special provision

and since a special provision prevails over the general

provision, the limitation for the suit filed by the appellant

against the respondent will have to be governed by Article

74 of the Limitation Act and if the limitation is computed in

accordance with Article 74 of the Limitation Act, the suit

was not barred by limitation. We do not find any substance

in this contention. As indicated in the Preamble, the

Limitation Act is an enactment which consolidates and

amends the law for the limitation of suits and other

proceedings connected therewith. It is a law which applies

generally to all suits and proceedings. It is, therefore, in the

nature of a general enactment governing the law of

limitation. The Delhi Police Act has been enacted for the

purpose of amending and consolidating the law relating to

regulation of police in the Union Territory of Delhi. The Act

is a special enactment in respect of matters referred to

therein. Section 140 of the Act imposes certain restrictions

and limitations in the matter of institution of suits and

prosecutions against police officers in respect of acts done by

a police officer under colour of duty or authority or in excess

of such duty or authority. One such restriction is that such

suit or prosecution shall not be entertained and if

entertained shall be dismissed, if it is instituted more than

three months after the date of the act complained of.

7. Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act provides as under:

"(2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit,

appeal or application a period of limitation different from

the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of

Section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period

( 14 ) CRA 196 2025

prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of

determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit,

appeal or application by any special or local law, the

provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall

apply only insofar as, and to the extent to which, they are

not expressly excluded by such special or local law."

8. Since the Act is a special law which prescribes a period of

limitation different from the period prescribed in the

Schedule to the Limitation Act for suits against persons

governed by the Act in relation to matters covered by

Section 140, by virtue of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act,

the period of limitation prescribed by Section 140 of the Act

would be the period of limitation prescribed for such suits

and not the period prescribed in the Schedule to the

Limitation Act. This means that if the suit filed by the

appellant falls within the ambit of Section 140 then the

period of limitation for institution of the suit would be that

prescribed in Section 140 and not the period prescribed in

Article 74 of the Limitation Act.”

The above aspect is not dealt with in case of Jagannath (supra).

18. The decision of Tahsildar was passed on 15.02.2023 and

the suit is filed on 28.06.2024 which is clearly barred by limitation

provided under Section 143 (4) of the Code. In this regard, it has to be

mentioned that the limitation prescribed under the Code would prevail

over the Limitation Act, 1963. The Trial Court did not take into

consideration Section 29 of the Limitation Act, 1963, and its purport.

Impugned order is unsustainable.

( 15 ) CRA 196 2025

19. I, therefore, pass following order :

O R D E R

a.Civil Revision Application is allowed.

b.Impugned order is quashed and set aside.

c.Plaint in RCS No.525 of 2024 shall stand rejected.

( SHAILESH P. BRAHME, J. )

PRW